


<https://nypost.com/2005/10/25/drug-lords-jihad-new-york-justice-for-thug-who-vowed-to-poison-america/>



## DRUG LORD'S JIHAD – NEW YORK JUSTICE FOR THUG WHO VOWED TO POISON AMERICA

By [Kati Cornell Smith](#) | October 25, 2005 | 4:00am

Meet the alleged fiendish Afghani drug lord **who bragged about waging jihad on America by poisoning New York's streets with heroin.** Haji Baz Mohammad, 47, used his Afghanistan poppy fields for his sickening plot against the city, boasting to cohorts **"that selling heroin in the United States was a jihad because they were taking the Americans' money, and the heroin was killing them,"** a stunning, newly unsealed indictment reveals. But Mohammad **"now faces what all drug kingpins fear the most – justice in a court in the United States, delivered by an American jury on the very streets of New York that he'd sought to poison,"** said Karen Tandy, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Mohammad was busted in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in January and finally extradited Friday to Manhattan to face federal charges filed here in 2003. He became the first person to be extradited from Afghanistan to the United States on federal charges, authorities crowed. But the steely-eyed suspect yesterday remained unbowed as he appeared before a Manhattan federal court judge for his arraignment. **"I am innocent,"** Mohammad said defiantly, dressed in the traditional tan and gray Afghan garb of a tunic and vest over pants. Mohammad also is accused of allowing his business to be used as a Taliban cash machine, funneling funds into the terror group while flooding city streets with his killer drugs. **"His opium trade financed the Taliban, and they in turn protected his crops, his heroin labs, his drug-transportation labs and his associates,"** Tandy said. **"[Mohammad] was one of the world's most wanted, most powerful and most dangerous drug kingpins."** **The drug thug allegedly made his chilling boast of launching his drug jihad on America during a meeting with cronies in Pakistan in 1990.** He allegedly ran a widespread ring that had manufactured \$25 million worth of heroin in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1990 and funneled much of it to New York. **The ring allegedly smuggled the drugs in suitcases and clothing, even sewing heroin into dresses to be mailed to Manhattan.** In June, President Bush added Mohammad's name to a list of the world's most-wanted narcotics traffickers. U.S. Attorney Michael Garcia described the suspect as one of a group of top international criminals trying to **"destabilize Afghanistan's emerging democracy, flood the Western markets with heroin and use their profits to support the Taliban and other terror groups."** About 13 other alleged ring members also are in custody, including main U.S. distributor Bashir Ahmad Rahmany, who was busted in July. Court papers show that over \$1.4 million in heroin seized in the United States has been traced to Mohammad, who is thought to have controlled poppy fields in Afghanistan and drug labs there and in Pakistan. In June 2004, investigators seized from the ring about 120 kilograms of chemical powder and **a ledger documenting the sale of missile explosive devices, rocket shells, AK-47s and other weaponry during a raid on a gas station in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province, prosecutors said.** Both Mohammad and Rahmany face up to life in prison if convicted of the charges. Mohammad was denied bail yesterday. His lawyer declined comment after his hearing. Rahmany is awaiting trial. **Their busts come amid another probe: An informant linked to a Colombian coke cartel allegedly told U.S. authorities that terror kingpin Osama bin Laden plotted to have devilish disciples peddle poisoned cocaine to Americans. Several months earlier, an international drug lord with ties to bin Laden and the Taliban also was busted for allegedly smuggling \$50 million in heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the United States. Bashir Noorzai – dubbed the "Pablo Escobar of Asia," in reference to the late Colombian drug chief – was reputedly closely tied to the Taliban, which provided protection for bin Laden's operations in Afghanistan before the Sept. 11 attacks.**



# NEW YORK POST

25 CENTS

LATE CITY FINAL

Published Wednesday, June 20, 2018 / Page 100A, 100B and 100C / 100A / Thursday, June 21, 2018

www.nypost.com

100A 100B 100C

**POST POKER**

**I WON \$10,000**

**TODAY'S NUMBER 1!**



**Giants pin**



**COUPON: BACK PAGE**




**JIHAD DEVIL**

**The man who tried to poison New York**

**FULL STORY: PAGE 5**

Al-Qaeda cleric Khalid Fajr bin Muhammad arrives in the U.S. in the custody of DEA agents, whose identities are being protected.



HEROIN HAJJ: Haji Baz Mohammed is arrested (above). His plan involved smuggling drugs into the United States concealed in such mundane items as clothes.



UNITED STATES  
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

HOME

USDOJ.GOV

PRIVACY POLICY

CONTACT US

SITE MAP

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE | April 3, 2003

## U.S. Arrests 9 Afghani Natives on Charges of Importing Heroin from Pakistan and Afghanistan

ANTHONY PLACIDO, the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Division of the Drug Enforcement Administration and JAMES B. COMEY, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced the arrests of 9 individuals on charges of importing more than half a million dollars in heroin into the United States from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and distributing that heroin in the New York Area.

According to a criminal Complaint unsealed today in Manhattan federal court, the 9 defendants - and 3 others who have been charged but not yet arrested - participated in a conspiracy to import more than eight kilograms of heroin into the U.S. over an 18-month period, often concealing drugs inside heat-sealed plastic tubing sewn into the seams of traditional Afghani women's clothing. All of the defendants are natives of Afghanistan who are currently living in New York and Pakistan.

According to the Complaint, a confidential witness (CW-1) negotiated with several of the defendants, including MOHAMMAD DAUD RAHIMI, AHMADULLAH BABURY and ABDUL WAHAD, to have heroin sent from Pakistan to a post office box in Manhattan, which the DEA had set up as an undercover mailbox. To facilitate the shipment of heroin to the post office box, RAHIMI instructed CW-1 to change the name on the mailbox from "M. Khan" to an "American-sounding" name because RAHIMI believed that a Muslim name would draw law enforcement attention. Ultimately, CW-1 received several shipments totaling approximately 550 grams of heroin sent from Pakistan to the post office box hidden in the seams of Afghani women's dresses.

Also according to the Complaint, in April 2002, WAHAD met with CW-1 in Karachi, Pakistan, where WAHAD was living. During the meeting WAHAD told CW-1, among other things, that:

- a. Christmas was the best time to send heroin overseas because the high volume of mail overwhelmed law enforcement in the United States.



Heroin concealed in the fabric of a woman's dress.



- b. WAHAD would be using a new technique to conceal heroin inside of clothing, which consisted of a high-quality plastic that could withstand heat sealing and was impossible for law enforcement to detect. The technique takes approximately 10 days to conceal one kilogram of heroin inside the clothing.
- c. WAHAD obtained opium from fields in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and Northern Afghanistan. Once obtained, WAHAD processed the opium into heroin by utilizing acid and high-quality chemicals that he obtained from Germany.

As alleged in the Complaint, in August 2002 MOHAMMADDIN AZIZI supplied a different cooperating witness (CW-2) with almost 7 kilograms of heroin inside a gym bag in the back of a minivan owned by AZIZI. Also according to the Complaint, AZIZI told CW-2 that he (AZIZI) received his heroin from a source in Pakistan who mailed heroin to AZIZI sewn inside women's Middle Eastern clothing.

The other defendants charged in the conspiracy are ALI AHMED, MOHAMMAD ISMAEL, ABDUL RASHID, TAJ MOHAMMAD, KHALIL PACHA, SHAH MAHMOOD, HAMAYON SALIMI and SHAH WALI.

RAHIMI, BABURY, ISMAEL, RASHID, MOHAMMAD, PACHA, AZIZI, SALIMI and WALI were arrested this morning and are scheduled to be presented on the charges in the Complaint before United States Magistrate Judge DOUGLAS F. EATON later today. The defendants are facing a maximum term of imprisonment of life and a mandatory minimum term of 10 years imprisonment. In addition, each defendant faces a fine of up to \$4 million.

ANTHONY P. PLACIDO, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S NEW YORK OFFICE stated, "The successful culmination of this investigation demonstrates the vital importance of a coordinated approach in targeting transnational crime. In addition to the outstanding cooperation between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and a number of domestic law enforcement agencies, I would also like to acknowledge and thank Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force for their valuable assistance."



x



CE  
12/20/01



x



Segments  
Removed

14725<sup>3</sup> Green Dress #1  
CE 12/10/01

12



## Arrests in Drug Scheme

# 9 charged with smuggling heroin in Afghan garments

By Patricia Hurtado. STAFF WRITER | Apr 4, 2003

NY Newsday – Long Island, N.Y. | Combined editions | Section: News | Page: A.39 | Text Word Count: 410

Nine people were arrested yesterday and charged with smuggling more than \$500,000 worth of Afghan and Pakistani heroin into the United States by hiding it in shipments of traditional Afghan women's dresses, the office of **U.S. Attorney James Comey said**. The complaint charges that the defendants participated in a conspiracy to import more than 8 kilos, or more than 17 pounds, of heroin into the United States during an 18-month period beginning in August 2001 and ending last month. Three more people were charged in the complaint but remain fugitives. **Investigators charged that the drugs often were enclosed in plastic, heat-sealed, straw-like tubes, obtained from Germany, and then sewn into embroidery on the dresses' bodices. Some of the defendants bragged to one witness that it would take about 10 days to conceal and sew the drug-filled tubes into the dresses, the complaint charges.** Agents with the Drug Enforcement Administration, working with a cooperating witness, set up a mailbox in Manhattan to facilitate shipping of the drugs, the complaint charges. The indictment charges that one of the fugitive defendants, identified as Abdul Wahad, met with a cooperating witness in Karachi, Pakistan, and advised him that Christmas was the best time to send heroin overseas "because the high volume of mail overwhelmed law enforcement in the United States." The complaint charges that Wahad said he had high-quality plastic tubes that could withstand heat sealing, a technique Wahad claimed made it almost impossible for law enforcement to detect the drugs. Prosecutors charge the drugs were obtained by Wahad from opium fields in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and northern Afghanistan, and were processed by utilizing German chemicals. Wahad told the cooperating witness, identified in court papers as CW-1, that the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, and subsequent anthrax attacks in the U.S. "made sending heroin by mail to the United States very difficult ... because packages were being scrutinized by law enforcement officials in search of anthrax. The defendants in custody were slated to be arraigned late last night in U.S. District Court in Manhattan before Magistrate Douglas Eaton. If convicted of the drug conspiracy charges, each faces up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to \$4 million.

[Illustration]

Caption: AP Photo - The seam of a Afghani garment is peeled open to reveal heat-sealed plastic tubing filled with heroin. Investigators say more than 17 pounds of the drug was sewn into clothes and then shipped to the United States.

Copyright Newsday Inc.

<https://nypost.com/2003/04/04/drug-ring-comes-apart-at-seams>



# DRUG RING COMES APART AT SEAMS

By [John Lehmann](#) | April 4, 2003 | 5:00am

A bunch of drug smugglers stitched together what they thought was a foolproof plan to beat the feds – hiding as much as \$500,000 worth of heroin in the seams of traditional Afghani dresses, court documents say. But their plan unraveled when they chose a secret federal informant to take part in a conspiracy to import more than eight kilograms of heroin into the U.S. over 18 months, the feds charge. Nine Afghans, living in New York and Pakistan, were arrested yesterday on drug smuggling charges that could land them in prison for life. FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration agents learned of the drugs-in-a-dress scheme when the informant met with accused smugglers Abdul Wahad and Ali Ahmed in Karachi last April, **Manhattan U.S. Attorney Jim Comey said**. Wahad told the informant that heroin could be sewn into the seams of traditional women's dresses after being placed inside a high-quality plastic material that could withstand heat sealing, DEA special agent Patrick Hamlette Jr. said in a criminal complaint unsealed yesterday. Using a factory in Pakistan, one kilogram of heroin could be hidden inside garments over a 10-day period. The informant organized to have heroin sent from Pakistan to a post office box in Manhattan and received several shipments of garments containing more than 550 grams, the court documents said. Another accused smuggler, Mohammad Daud Rahimi, suggested to the informant that he change the name on his mailbox from "M. Khan" to an "American-sounding" name, Hamlette said. The smugglers were accused of processing opium from Afghanistan into heroin using acid and chemicals obtained from Germany. If convicted, they face maximum life sentences and fines of up to \$4 million.

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/apr/5/20030405-090553-1825r/>

**The Washington Times**

# Arrests hint at Afghan drug exports

By - *The Washington Times* - Saturday, April 5, 2003

Ten Afghan nationals were arrested by federal agents this week in New York in a suspected scheme to smuggle heroin into the United States from Pakistan and Afghanistan igniting concerns that Afghanistan is again turning to opium as a key source of revenue. DEA Agent Anthony Placido, who heads the agency's New York division and supervised the investigation into the Afghan nationals, said efforts are under way to determine whether Afghanistan is back in the drug business. "It is something that has peaked our interest and we are giving it serious attention," Mr. Placido said. "Afghanistan traditionally has been seen as a major source of heroin and we're looking to see if there has been a major resurgence." The now-defunct Taliban regime, aligned closely with terrorist Osama bin Laden, collected more than \$40 million a year in profits from illicit opium sales, with some of the cash going to terrorists who hid and trained in that country. At one time, Afghanistan accounted for 70 percent of the global supply of poppies, the source crop for opium and heroin. More than 80 percent of the heroin sold in Europe was processed from opium produced and stockpiled in Afghanistan. Mr. Placido also said there are concerns that heroin sales in that country could be used again to finance terrorism, although "we're clearly not making that link in this case." He noted that while Afghanistan has been at war, the Taliban stockpiled as much as 60 percent of the country's opium crop to drive up the price. He said that supply could now be available. In the newest investigation, DEA agents said the 10 suspected drug smugglers took part in a conspiracy to import more than 17 pounds of heroin worth about \$500,000 into this country over an 18-month period, often concealing the drugs inside heat-sealed plastic tubing sewn into the seams of traditional Afghani women's clothing. Mr. Placido said all of the suspected smugglers are natives of Afghanistan who are currently living in New York and Pakistan. According to a criminal complaint unsealed Thursday in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, a confidential DEA informant negotiated with several of the suspected smugglers to have heroin sent from Pakistan to a post office box in Manhattan, which the DEA has set up as an undercover mailbox. To facilitate the shipment, the complaint said Mohammad Daud Rahimi told the informant to change the name on the box from "M. Khan" to an "American-sounding" name because Mr. Rahimi believed a Muslims name would draw law-enforcement attention. The complaint said the informant received several shipments totaling 19 ounces, or heroin from Pakistan hidden in the seams of Afghani women's dresses. Also, according to the complaint, a suspected smuggler identified as Abdul Wahad met with the informant in Karachi, Pakistan, in April 2002, and during that meeting, Mr. Wahad told the informant: Christmas was the best time to send heroin overseas because the high volume of mail volume overwhelmed law enforcement in the United States. Mr. Wahad would be using a new technique to conceal heroin inside of clothing, which consisted of high-quality plastic that could withstand heat sealing and was impossible for law enforcement to detect. He said the technique takes about 10 days to conceal 2.2 pounds, or 1 kilogram, of heroin inside the clothing. Mr. Wahad obtained opium from the fields of Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and from northern Afghanistan. Once obtained, he processed the opium into heroin by utilizing acid and high-quality chemicals he obtained from Germany. The complaint said another suspected smuggler, Mohammaddin Azizi, supplied a second confidential informant with almost 15-1/2 pounds of heroin inside a gym bag in the back of a minivan owned by Mr. Azizi.

© Copyright 2017 The Washington Times, LLC

3600 New York Avenue NE

Washington, DC 20002

202-636-3000

<https://www.timesledger.com/stories/2003/15/20030410-archive85.html>

**TIMES**Ledger  
Serving Queens since 1919

## Flushing Afghans smuggled heroin in dress lining: Feds

By Alexander Dworkowitz | April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2003

Federal agents pulled the plug on a suspected **Flushing-based** heroin ring this week with the arrest of nine people charged with smuggling the drug inside traditional Afghan wedding dresses, **U.S. Attorney James Comey in Manhattan said**. Eight of the men were arrested Monday morning and were later arraigned in front of U.S. Magistrate Judge Douglas F. Eaton in federal court in Manhattan on charges of conspiracy to import heroin, while one man was arrested back in August, prosecutors said. They each face up to life in prison and \$4 million in fines if convicted. Three of the suspects still are at large. The ring operated by sending the drug sealed inside the dresses from Pakistan to a Manhattan post office box, according to testimony by Patrick Hamlette Jr., a special agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration, in the criminal complaint. All of the defendants were born in Afghanistan, prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District said. Authorities secretly recorded meetings between a confidential informant and the defendants, **many of whom conducted their transactions out of apartments in Flushing, Hamlette said. The informant first met with one of the defendants, Mohammad Daud Rahimi, at the Afghan Independence Festival in Flushing Meadows Corona Park in August 2001, Hamlette said.** Through Rahimi, the informant arranged to buy heroin from dealers in Pakistan, who in turn got the drug from Afghanistan, Hamlette said. Afghanistan is the world's largest source of opium, which is used to make heroin. **Federal authorities were looking into the possibility that some of the money had made its way into the hands of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a source said.** About 550 grams of the seized heroin was sent to the post office box, prosecutors said. The drug was concealed in heat-sealed plastic tubing sewn into the seams of traditional Afghan women's wedding clothing, a time-consuming technique, prosecutors said. **The informant often dropped off the money to the dealers in apartments on Parsons Boulevard in Flushing, Hamlette said. Flushing has one of the largest populations of Afghan immigrants in the country. The nine were not the first to be arrested in the sting. In August 2002, authorities arrested Mohammaddin Azizi, a Flushing resident, after he supplied a courier with almost seven kilograms of heroin hidden inside a gym bag, Hamlette said.** The courier, who was also arrested, became a second government informant in the case, prosecutors said. The first shipment to the post office box was taken by federal agents on Dec. 5, 2001, Hamlette said. Abdul Wahid, the accused supplier of the heroin in Pakistan, told the informant that "Christmas was the best time to send heroin overseas because the high volume of mail overwhelmed law enforcement in the United States," Hamlette said. Wahid also told the informant that scrutiny after Sept. 11, 2001 made shipping the drug extremely difficult, Hamlette said. The post office box was originally under the name of M. Khan, but the dealers thought the name would arouse suspicion and changed it to Lisa R. Ford, Hamlette said. On the recorded conversations, the defendants called a kilogram of heroin a "telephone," a "textile" or a "car," **while heroin dealers were named "chicken stores," according to Hamlette. Several of the defendants living in the city were employed at fried chicken stores, where Afghan immigrants often work, prosecutors said.** Azizi, Rahimi, Ahmadullah Babury, Mohammad Ismael, Taj Mohammad, Khalil Pacha, Abdul Rashid, Hamayon Salimi, Shah Wali were arrested and charged in the ring, prosecutors said. Wahad, Ali Ahmed and Shah Mahmood were also charged and were still at large, prosecutors said.

Reach reporter Alexander Dworkowitz by e-mail at [Timesledger@aol.com](mailto:Timesledger@aol.com) or call 718-229-0300, Ext. 141.

[https://www.deamuseum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Hazi\\_Baz\\_Mohammad.pdf](https://www.deamuseum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Hazi_Baz_Mohammad.pdf)

## DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION LECTURE SERIES - HAJI BAZ MOHAMMAD

**00:00:01:01** We're marking the 35th anniversary of DEA and looking back across the decades. We started in the 1970s with Nicky Barnes and Frank Lucas. Then in April we went to the 1980s with Pablo Escobar, 1990s with the Ariano Felix organization, and today we wrap up with the 2000s and Haji Baz Mohammad. **00:00:22:03** Just a brief mention for the courtesy of your fellow guests in the auditorium as well as the speakers, if you could silence your cell phones and pagers that would be much appreciated. I want to thank Katy Drew or museum educator who has put together this spring lecture series and all of her hard work in getting the speakers together.

**00:00:41:04** Today I'm very honored to introduce our expert panel. We have three guests that have traveled down from New York to be here today to speak. I'm gonna introduce all three of them as we begin and then they'll all three be speaking throughout the course of the presentation, and then at the end we'll have a period of time for questions and answers.

**00:00:58:21** First is Special Agent Patrick Hamlet. He's currently assigned as a group supervisor out of DEA to the New York Field Division's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Strike Force, specifically group Z-53. That's the group that initiated the Haji Baz Mohammad investigation back in March of 2001 through the analysis literally of an anonymous letter.

**00:01:21:01** So you never know where your sources are coming from. He spent nine years with the New York Fire Department and fourteen years in drug law enforcement. He served in the United States Marine Corps and holds a Masters of Business Administration from his educational background.

**00:01:38:05** Special Agent Francis Rawl has been a special agent with the DEA's New York Field Division since 2000. He worked in the high intensity drug trafficking area group from 2000 to 2004 and is currently also assigned to the New York Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Strike Force.

**00:01:55:01** Prior to being employed with DEA Special Agent Rawl was a Captain in the United States Army Military Intelligence Branch and received an honorable discharge. He is a graduate of St. Johns University, Queens, New York.

**00:02:08:22** Finally, Assistant United States Attorney Boyd Johnson. He's a Magna Cum Laude graduate of Hamilton College and a Cum Laude graduate of Cornell Law School where he served as editor of the Cornell International Law Journal.

**00:02:21:31** After clerking for a federal judge in Los Angeles, California and working for a corporate law firm in New York City Mr. Johnson joined the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York in January in 1999.

**00:02:36:21** During his tenure Mr. Johnson has served as the Deputy Chief and Chief of the International Narcotics Trafficking Unit. Mr. Johnson has prosecuted DEA-led cases against Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez Orwhela, the leaders of the Cali cartel, the ten leaders of the Norte Viyeh cartel and Haji Baz Mohammad of course the one we're here to hear about today.

**00:02:59:13** He's the first Afghan drug lord ever extradited from Afghanistan to the United States. Mr. Johnson also supervise DEA prosecutions of the leaders of the AUC and the FARC, and from November 2006 through to the present Mr. Johnson has served as Chief of the Public Corruption Unit in the Southern District of New York.

**00:03:20:02** Interestingly in that capacity he has supervised prosecutions against corrupt officials at the UN and at federal, state and local government. Most recent and most notably Mr. Johnson led the prosecution of an international prostitution and money laundering ring that resulted in the resignation of New York Governor Elliot Spitzer from office.

**00:03:39:10** Mr. Johnson is currently leading the DEA terrorism prosecution of Mozar Alcazar, a notorious international arms trafficker charged with conspiring to kill Americans overseas. Please join me in welcoming our three guest speakers, Boyd Johnson, Francis Rawl and Patrick Hamlet. Thank you.

(Applause).

### BOYD JOHNSON

**00:04:08:12** MS: Thank you very much and good morning everyone. Thanks for coming. It's always a tough way to begin a day to listen to a lawyer talking so I particularly appreciate your attendance to hear me. I've worked with the DEA for nine and a half years now, almost a decade, and I've had a lot of opportunities to support the DEA on a number of cases.

**00:04:34:18** But one of the highlights has really been this case that we're gonna be talking about today, **the Baz Mohammad** case, which ultimately led to his extradition from Afghanistan to the U.S. I've really been in awe through the years of supporting the DEA with the work of the DEA both here in this country, in our communities and our neighborhoods and also in the casework that they've done abroad.

**00:05:02:12** Really from where I sit as one of the prosecutors who gets the opportunity to support these cases I can't really think of another agency that does the kind of work internationally with the kind of success that they've had as the DEA. So it's an honor to be here. It's particularly an honor to be here with my colleagues and friends, Fran and Pat, who are gonna be discussing this case with me, and hopefully we'll be able to keep you engaged this morning.

**00:05:37:05** **This is a photograph of our target in this case, Haji Baz Mohammad from sometime in the 1990s.** He looks a lot different from the man we saw who came off the plane in October of 2005 in New York after he was extradited. But this is Baz Mohammad really

at the height of his power running a heroine trafficking importation distribution organization from Pakistan and Afghanistan, really the source of supply for the organization and also the manager making sure that the heroine is imported into the U.S. and then is distributed throughout the communities.

**00:06:20:11** This case again really the most exciting event in this case for me was the extradition of this defendant from Afghanistan, and that happened on October 21st of 2005, and it was really an incredible achievement and the results of the individual work of Pat and Fran and the other agents in New York but also just a testament to the collective ability I think of the DEA to work overseas to support their investigations abroad and to display a commitment to identifying and to dismantling the command and control elements of Mafia organizations around the world.

**00:07:25:28 VIDEO**

**00:09:35:12** So the question becomes how did we get to the extradition of Baz Mohammad, and that's gonna be the focus of our presentation to you this morning. Really to understand how we got to October 21st of 2005. You have to go back four years to a brand new DEA agent or almost a brand new agent sitting at his desk in New York who got an anonymous letter in the mail.

**00:10:02:19** From that we got four years after to the fact to this historic extradition. So I'm gonna turn it over to Pat Hamlet, one of the case agents on this case, to begin to give you the background to this investigation and to show you while this was an exotic investigation in a lot of ways it's really at the core of what the DEA does best which is work informants, wire tap the phones and then work with its partners around the world to identify and to dismantle their command and control. Pat.

**PAT HAMLET (AT SOME POINT IN THE FOLLOWING BOYD STARTS SPEAKING)**

**00:10:43:18** Good morning. My name is Pat Hamlet, and I want to thank the DEA Museum for having us here to present the Haji Baz Mohammad case. It a true privilege to share this investigation with you. Haji Baz Mohammad is a high level or was a high level southwest Asian heroine trafficker.

**00:11:05:15** From 1990 to 2005 Baz Mohammad was responsible for distributing and for conspiring to distribute hundreds of kilograms of southwest Asian heroine to the United States, and he did this from his safe haven in Afghanistan.

**00:11:23:28** Now bear in mind from 1990 to 2001, during the course of this conspiracy, there was no U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan and there was no DEA presence in Afghanistan other than our agents in Islamabad who handled Afghanistan.

**00:11:41:16** With that situation Baz Mohammad led a jihad in his own words. He sent this heroine to the United States, and as a result Americans were killed because of it. Baz Mohammad knew that from his safe haven in Afghanistan he was untouchable or so he thought.

**00:12:02:21** In 2001 when the intelligence division of New York provided me with an anonymous letter and asked that I review it I had no idea that we would get to this point. But as a result of that letter and as a result of DEA's initiative traction was gained in this investigation, and DEA became Baz Mohammad's worst nightmare.

**00:12:29:20** DEA became the worst nightmare of Baz Mohammad's New York-based organization. Evidence that we acquired in this case led us to the conclusion based on seized heroine that Baz Mohammad was sending his heroine to the United States concealed in dresses and other ceremonial Afghan garments.

**00:12:54:09** This heroine tested over 93% pure which is extremely high. His associates in the United States which were other members of his Afghan tribe would then distribute this heroine throughout the United States, from the east coast of New York all the way to California, and they did this and they evaded law enforcement for over a decade.

**00:13:20:15** The characteristics of this organization enhanced their ability to evade law enforcement. They were extremely patient. They did not have to turn over this heroine fast in order to fund their operations. They could hold on to the heroine for months, close to a year at a time.

**00:13:40:02** They were very select in who they sold their heroine to. They did not live flashy lifestyles with a lifestyle that would catch the eye of law enforcement. They often lived in rented apartments, sometimes 10/15 people to an apartments with very little furniture.

**00:14:05:17** Now in 2001 when I received the anonymous letter it provided the name of an individual in Afghanistan who was arrested in the United States at one time but was since deported and it stated that the U.S.-based members of this organization were selling the heroine, sending it to Afghanistan and it was supporting the Taliban. That's all we had. We had nothing else. We had no lead from SOD.

**00:14:34:20** We had no seizures that we knew of. We had no informants, and in any type of investigation in order to dismantle the hierarchy of the organization having human beings there with human intelligence is essential.

**0:14:51:03** So our first step in dismantling this organization was to identify the members, and we did so by taking the phone record of the individual who was in New York at one time and (tape skips) Afghanistan and getting his toll records. We then analyzed those toll records.

**00:15:13:14** Once we identified the subscribers of these phones that were in contact with our target we query our law enforcement databases and we reached out to our counterparts. Again, this is very important, and I want you all to remember this. What DEA prides itself on in our ability to work with our counterparts both domestic and overseas.

**00:15:40:10** That was crucial in this investigation. With the identification of these individuals who are in contact with officials (unint.), and with the law enforcement databases showing that they have prior arrests in the United States, we had a blueprint if you will of this organization.

**00:16:06:13** Our next focus was to find human sources that could infiltrate this organization. So with the criminal record database checks we found that there were people incarcerated throughout the United States that smuggled heroine into the United States.

**00:16:28:07** We then traveled all over the United States in an attempt to recruit human sources. We probably got one out of twenty people to cooperate, but that one person was able to then give us a sub-source who we recruited.

**00:16:44:24** With this newly recruited sub-source we began to infiltrate this organization, gain evidence and intelligence on how this organization operates. Early in the investigation when I reached out to our counterparts about their reports, our counterparts in customs, in FBI, they had told me that they seized Afghan heroine at different airports throughout the United States as you see in different years.

**00:17:19:10** During these seizures they acquired the phone records and address books of the individuals that they arrested. They had the phone number and the name of Baz Mohammad. Now that was the first time we heard of Baz Mohammad.

**00:17:37:13** But our law enforcement counterparts who did a great job. They told us look, we seized this heroine. We know that Baz Mohammad is significant, but we have no way of getting to him in Afghanistan. We just don't know how to do it.

**00:17:52:08** So with Baz Mohammad identified and with these seizures that we have (unint.) to him we began to put together a historical conspiracy. Okay, that's where we started. Second, with the individual who we recruited and who infiltrated the organization we instructed this informant to make buys of heroine from the New York based members of the organization.

**00:18:21:00** We now had current buys into this organization which were crucial to our wiretaps. We initiated wiretaps not only on the cellular telephones of the New York members of this organization but also non-consensual intercepts in their housing, judicial authorized room bugs and video, and that was crucial because this organization they infrequently used telephones.

**00:18:53:14** What they would do was meet in person and that was a norm of their customs and that is what made it extremely difficult for U.S. law enforcement to infiltrate this organization because it was a face-to face way of doing business.

**00:19:11:25** Everything they did was face-to-face. After we made heroine buys from the New York based members of the organization we began to make arrests. In April of 2003 roughly two years after getting the anonymous letter we arrested nine members of the organization in New York.

**00:19:35:11** Subsequent to that we began arresting and indicting additional members which led to cooperators. These cooperators provided a great deal of insight on Haji Baz Mohammad and how he operates, where he lives in Afghanistan, conversations that he had with these members about how the organization operates and who he supports, the extremist organizations in Afghanistan.

**00:20:06:12** We reached out to our counterparts overseas and to our DEA embassy and to the Islamabad country office, the Kabul country office, and we drafted a game plan to locate Baz Mohammad and arrest him.

**00:20:35:29** Now of course part of that game plan was knowing where Baz Mohammad is, okay. In Bangohar (ph.) province, next to Jilalobod, Baz Mohammad had opium crops and labs that he used to convert opium into heroine. In Kandahar (ph.) Afghanistan where Baz was from he led the organization and had the refuge and safe haven of southern Afghanistan and had armed followers that protected him.

**00:21:03:19** In Qaeda (ph.) Pakistan he lived. He had a residence that he used to purchase with narcotics proceeds, and in Karachi Pakistan we arranged a meet in coordination with our counterparts in Pakistan between a member of this organization and one of our confidential sources.

**00:21:31:06** As a result of this meeting we obtained additional heroine which was sent to the United States in the dresses and which would directly link to Baz Mohammad.

**00:21:52:11** Now this investigation is a testament to really all DEA employees. There were so many people that took part in this, not only the agents but the intel analysts, the program analysts, the people who worked in SORI (ph.). I can't tell you how many times I had to call headquarters and request reports that were written ten years before, and the people in SORI pulled these reports and sent them to me immediately which we used in the indictment.

**00:22:20:29** I know I went off focus for a second, but that's very important. I want you all to realize that DEA has an extreme priority of objectives. We know what we want and we know how to get it. Baz Mohammad never thought that we would be able to reach out and touch him, but we did and he's now sitting in jail.

**00:22:45:29** Now this organization led by Baz Mohammad sold the heroine, smuggled it into the United States. The proceeds were used to fund the Taliban. As a result the Taliban provided Baz Mohammad with the safe haven and protected his routes, his smuggling routes, transportation routes so that he can continue his conspiracy to send heroine to the United States.

**00:23:28:15** Now since 2001 the investigation continued to grow and gain traction. The first indictment against him was in 2003. Post-2003 we continue to breach operators. It required new evidence and information. We used that in a subsequent indictment in 2004.

**02:48:00:06** Now in 2005 in coordination with our counterparts in Afghanistan and in working with Boyd Johnson from the Southern District of New York we had intense negotiations with the Afghan government. As a result Baz Mohammad was captured in Kandahar and he was actually held.

**00:24:11:21** He was held at the Minister of Interior's holding facility subsequent to his capture. Now you have to keep in mind this was never done before. This was never done before in Afghanistan, and the Afghan government received a great deal of pressure and nonsupport from outside factions because of what they did to help the United States in capturing this major trafficker.

**00:24:43:18** They were steadfast. They held Baz Mohammad in custody for over a year although they were getting daily pressure to have him released. As a result President Karzi (ph.) authorized Baz Mohammad's extradition to the United States in October of 2005.

**00:25:12:08** It was remarkable obviously because it was the first extradition but also because at the time of the arrest of Baz Mohammad the government of Afghanistan really didn't know how to handle an extradition because there had never been an tradition from that country to the U.S. or to any place else in the world.

**00:25:31:07** And they were at the time and they continue to be today a team of attorneys from the department and obviously a number of agents from DEA on the ground at the embassy in Afghanistan who worked with us and with the government of Afghanistan to get through these issues.

**00:25:47:16** There was no—there was no agreements, formal agreement between the two countries, for extradition. So there was no mechanism that was in place in 2005 to carry out the extradition. The constitution of Afghanistan in fact had just been written. So we had a situation, and it's hard for us to appreciate this because this country has obviously had a constitution for hundreds of years.

**00:26:13:11** But this is a country who just had written a constitution, no agreement for extraditions with the United States and we're asking them to extradite a kingpin from their country to ours. Very difficult situation for the government of Afghanistan. But as Pat indicated they were committed to this.

**00:26:34:08** They were committed to the rule of law and ultimately we worked with those issues and found a mechanism for Baz Mohammad to be extradited to the U.S. WE worked together on the order for Karzi to execute, and now in fact with the support of DOJ attorneys and DEA agents and other agencies on the ground in Afghanistan now there is a mechanism in place for extradition to the U.S.

**00:27:02:23** But it was really the Baz Mohammad case that was able to pave the way for that. Just to tell you some more details about what happened to Baz Mohammad he was extradited to New York. He appeared before a judge. There was a date for trial that was set. We began to prepare for trial which as it often requires in these cases including moving witnesses from Afghanistan and family members to the U.S. so they would be secure.

**00:27:40:06** But ultimately in July of '06 we got an agreement from Baz Mohammad to plead guilty. Just to be in that courtroom that day as Pat and I were and hear him say what we had known for years that he was in charge of this heroine trafficking organization, that he gave the heroine to the couriers in Pakistan and Afghanistan to bring it to the U.S., that he knew that heroine was coming to the U.S. and was distributed in our communities was so satisfying for all of us who had worked so long on this case.

**00:28:18:17** I mean it's always a great thing for a defendant to plea because you don't have to go to trial. But it was particularly significant in this case to know that what we had thought all along was true and that the guy who was for so long above the law finally was prepared to admit his crimes in court.

**00:28:35:27** Then in October of last year he was sentenced to 188 months in jail. He's an older guy and so that sentence likely means that he'll spend the rest of his life in jail, and he has not appealed which is also a good development. So I'll turn it back to Pat.

**PAT HAMLET**

**00:29:01:10 PH:** Thank you Boyd. Just to add to this organization's characteristics, we completely dismantled the New York cell of this organization. As a result through intelligence gleaned from human sources and to our domestic and (unint.) program we were able to determine that since the dismantlement of this cell the availability of southwest Asian heroine in New York has significantly dropped.

**00:29:31:16** So we have an identifiable reduction in southwest Asian heroine as a result of this organization. To date every one who we were gonna take to trial in this organization has plead guilty. Again, this case was started with an anonymous letter. It's a testament to the DEA family and our commitment to go after the worst, the most threatening, the top leadership in these international heroine trafficking organizations.

**UNKNOWN MALE SPEAKER**

**00:30:10:06 MS:** We traveled together shortly after the extradition to Afghanistan and met with the officers and attorneys over there from the Afghan side who had contributed so much to this extradition and to this investigation.

**00:30:27:02** The one thing that I remember the most from that trip is how we constantly were hearing from the Afghan officials how this case had given them hope that for so long the rule of law had been non-existent in Afghanistan and that the people who were really controlling the trade of opium and of heroine were simply above the law and that while there still was heroine in Afghanistan, while there still were lots of obstacles to overcome, the fact of this extradition to those Afghans we spoke with was very, very significant.

**00:31:07:27** There are problems in Afghanistan. The problem of narcotics in Afghanistan is a complicated one. Just like it was long ago when the DEA first started to go to Columbia. You think about the progress that's been made in Columbia with the leadership of the terrorist organizations, of FARC and the paramilitaries now being extradited to courts in the U.S., and you think about the achievements that have happened with the DEA as really the tip of the spear of law enforcement in those countries and that country.

**00:31:52:14** You have to think that there is some hope for Afghanistan. But there's a long way to go there, and there's substantial issues to be overcome. We're gonna show you just a video that just came out that The Voice Of America just completed, and it really—I think it puts in context the significance of the Baz Mohammad extradition and his conviction.

**00:32:19:22** But it also highlights the problems in Afghanistan that are ongoing. The commitment of DEA in Afghanistan and the mission of DEA in Afghanistan I think is so important to the communities in this country but also to the world that we just have to continue and to try to build on the success of Baz Mohammad and to continue to identify the kingpins over there and to bring them to justice in this country.

**VIDEO**

**00:37:09:25 MS:** So the Baz Mohammad case I think is really the beginning of what will be the journey of DEA and its counterparts in Afghanistan, and I know that the DEA is gonna continue to succeed over there and there's gonna be more cases like the Baz Mohammad case which are very important to this country and for our neighborhoods but also for the people of Afghanistan who are the ones who are really being exploited on the ground by these—by these criminals.

**00:37:44:15** So what were the keys to our success in the Baz Mohammad case? First, I mean these cases are all about informants and wire taps, and that's what the DEA is all about. I think the DEA is certainly one of the best in the business on working to recruit and to

develop and to deploy informants and also to try to attack the ability of criminal organizations to communicate which is where we get the lion's share of our evidence that we used—that we use in court.

**00:38:18:24** Second, I think the key is the relationship between the agents and the prosecutor on the case. These are tough cases, and I can remember lots of discussions with Pat and Fran that weren't maybe as cordial as you would expect. But that's the way these cases ought to work. There's gotta be a relationship where you have confidence in each other, where you trust each other and where you're willing to go to bat for each other.

**00:38:51:16** I mean there were times in this case as there have been in other cases certainly I've worked with DEA where we're hanging out there a little bit and people looking for us to fail. If you're not sure of the partnership that you have between your agent and the prosecutor these cases just aren't gonna come together.

**00:39:10:11** Finally the partnerships internationally so key to success in these cases and in this case in particular. Without the courage of the government of Afghanistan and the President of Afghanistan to go forward with the extradition this case wouldn't be a success. We would have gotten everybody in New York but the kingpin would have remained and he would have hired a bunch of new people to run his drugs around our communities.

**00:39:37:18** The DEA has sure as much as you all know has the most offices abroad of any federal agency and has the unique ability to develop partnerships with their counterparts abroad appreciating the culture within which they have to work and really making the bonds between agents and investigators that are the key to these kinds of cases.

#### UNKOWN MALE SPEAKER

**00:40:08:05 MS:** As I look across the room I see many managers that were in New York and in... (tape skips) and individuals that were here in headquarters that directly contributed to the success of this investigation. I'm sure those people in this audience just as myself would never have thought seven years ago when this case was initiated we would be where we are right now.

**00:40:39:22** As DEA demonstrates time and time again that's just a testament to that strategic focus. Every single seizure that DEA makes takes you somewhere else. If you stick together, if you work on it, you develop those relationships with your prosecutor, with other domestic law enforcement agencies, with our foreign counterparts as we did in this investigation, history will be met.

**00:41:07:11** History will be made, and the first extradition from another country yet to be made will happen again. So it's been fun, it's been stressful and it's been an incredible learning experience. The case is ongoing. We're still working and we'll continue to work. We're not done.

#### BOYD

**00:41:26:28 MS:** Just one final word, I mean some of the lessons I think that I draw at least from this case is first there's no limits to what the DEA can do around the world, and the idea that a GS-9 sitting at his desk in New York would have gotten a letter from some nut job in jail and would have read it and would have followed up on it and seven years—well four years after that would frankly have changed the world with the first extradition from Afghanistan I mean people would laugh at that.

**00:42:05:21** But that's how you should be thinking every day. That's how agents and investigators and prosecutors should be thinking every day. I mean each lead that you get matters and might be the one that will make all the difference. Since I've moved from narcotics to corruption I mean I'm still very much involved in narcotics with DEA.

**00:42:27:10** I get a lot of calls about who is the one who was—they had the shooter of Kennedy, where Hoffa is buried in New York. Lots of calls that I figure out aren't leads that we should follow. But you get that one call, that one lead, one tip from an informant and that could be the one that could make the career case for you.

**00:42:57:14** So it's a commitment to following up on every lead and to appreciating that there just are no limits to what you and the DEA, what your partners around the world can achieve. Thanks for your attention, and I guess we'll take questions now, right.

**00:43:16:19 MS:** If I may Boyd, if we could have folks with questions just wait a moment until a microphone arrives when you raise your hand and Boyd calls on you that way everyone in the audience has an opportunity to hear your question.

**00:43:43:28 MS:** Just make up a question, anything.

#### QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

**00:43:54:14 MS:** Were you able to follow the money back and if so how were they sending the money back.

**00:44:00:17 MS:** We were. Do you want to comment on that.

**00:44:04:17 MS:** We were able to send—to follow the money back. The method that this organization utilized to send the heroine proceeds back to Afghanistan and Pakistan is centuries old non-formal system called Whowala (ph.). They did not use traditional banking methods.

**00:44:23:22** So they used this century old system whereas money does not physically leave one location to another location at that time of the transfer. For example, if there is \$100,000 in heroine proceeds here in the United States in New York that needs to go to Kandahar, Afghanistan the Whowala dealer in Afghan—in New York will contact the Whowala dealer in Afghanistan and say I need to send \$100,000. That \$100,000 in Afghanistan will already be there, okay. The recipient in Afghanistan would pick up that money by way of a password. It could be a password, it could be the serial number from a dollar bill that was provided by the sender in New York.

**00:45:18:20** They usually charge a 2% or 3% fee of the amount to be sent, and that money is replenished at a later time whether it's smuggled into Afghanistan via human couriers, whether it's goods and items sent to Afghanistan that were under-valued or over-valued. But the money is recouped.

**00:45:42:12 MS:** Just a follow up. We charged and we convicted the money launderers involved in this organization who were primarily responsible for collecting the money and using the Whowala system that Pat described to get the proceeds back to Afghanistan. Yes.

**00:45:57:20 MS:** Good morning. I have kind of two questions. One is what were **the—how strong were the links between Baz and the Taliban as far as financing acts of terrorism or financing Taliban operations in general?** Two, because he considers killing Americans with heroine as a form of jihad and based on his support of the Taliban is there—is there any way in the law that you run into problems with bringing him here for prosecution and if he's seen as more of an enemy combatant.

**00:46:30:15** Kind of where is that fine line where we could bring somebody here and try them where they're seen as an enemy combatant and go to Guantanamo or something like that?

**00:46:38:06 MS:** Last question is a big question. I don't think I'm competent or frankly have time to answer this morning. But I mean from the beginning this was a case that was going to court. It was a criminal investigation from the moment that we began to look at Baz Mohammad and we saw it as a criminal investigation.

**00:47:00:26** There certainly are some operations that lead elsewhere in terms of the way the cases are handled ultimately. But just back to the first question that you asked. **I mean we charged in the initial indictment in this case that from 1994 forward some of the proceeds that were generated from Baz Mohammad's heroine were going back to the Taliban in Afghanistan.**

**00:47:24:12** You gotta realize at the time that he was in charge of his heroine organization, at least up to the mid to late 1990s, the Taliban was the government of Afghanistan, and as you've seen say in Columbia or Mexico, in other countries abroad, often times the ability of the traffickers to corrupt the government or officials within the government can really be key to their success to move their loads out of the country or to control the money that's coming back.

**00:47:57:02** So we—we actually included in the initial indictment the allegation that some of the proceeds were going back to the Taliban in Afghanistan and that obviously changed the focus of the case a bit. I mean obviously any guy who is importing a substantial amount of heroine to our neighborhoods I think is a risk to the national security of this country.

**00:48:16:23** **Which is why in June of '05 the President actually identified Baz Mohammad as a threat to our national security. But where you've got this added element of funds that are going to a terrorist organization that's obviously something that raises additional and different concerns. Yes.**

**00:48:38:29 MS:** As you said Haji Baz Mohammad is not in business anymore. But Afghanistan is still a country who produces most opium in the world, most heroine. United States, Britain and some other countries they have spent like hundreds of millions of dollars to stop heroine production and processing in Afghanistan.

**00:49:12:10** But as we have heard the reports that the heroine production in Afghanistan is the same amount that was produced last year. My question is why this is impossible to stop heroine production in Afghanistan? There is not—there is no good policy for that? Where is the problem?

**00:49:42:00 MS:** As in the case with this investigation and the arrest of Haji Baz Mohammad this organization that sent the heroine to the United States was dismantled. As a result the availability of southwest Asian heroine in the United States has significantly declined.

**00:50:02:04** That's the success, and that's what we will continue to do. Now as you accurately pointed out the output of heroine and opium production in Afghanistan either increases or it's been steady in some provinces. But it's also decreased in provinces as well along the northern parts of Afghanistan.

**00:50:23:18** So there are huge successes in Afghanistan with the production of opium. Now Afghanistan is a traditional opium-producing country. The United States in coordination with the Afghan officials have not been working for long in trying to find alternate livelihoods, in training the Afghan farmers in alternate livelihoods and ways to support their family as well as their judicial system.

**00:50:53:21** We're still at the ground level and we're still working hard. So progress has been made, but everyone understands that it is going to take time.

**00:51:05:22 MS:** I think it's also as very well put. It's a complicated issue, the issue of the supply of opium and heroine out of Afghanistan. The mission of DEA that I've been able to support has been focused on identifying the organizations that control the supply of illegal drugs and trying to dismantle them from the command and control on down. It's a mission that I think is essential to making the kind of progress that needs to be made in Afghanistan.

**00:51:33:07** That said the issues are complicated and there's one other thing that I noticed at least when I was in Afghanistan with Pat. There's a lot of good people on the ground from the U.S., from the UN and certainly from Afghanistan itself.

**00:51:47:08** Some Afghan citizens who have come back to the country now after being in exile for years who really want to make it better for the people of Afghanistan. So I think that there is a commitment there, but that doesn't mean it's a problem that's gonna be solved overnight.

**00:52:01:23** I mean I think you do look for example to Columbia and you go from the days of Escobar, one of the lectures that you had. It's a guy who basically ran the government of that country and was a terrorist. And you look at what's happening there now. The guy who inherited the cartel from Escobar has been extradited to New York and he plead guilty. He's spending the rest of his life in jail.

**00:52:25:22** I mean there are real signs of progress in Columbia but it took an awful long time. I think it's a commitment that I know that the DEA has made and that the U.S. government and its partners around the world need to make to work with the Afghans for as long as it takes to try to address the problem.

**00:52:44:25 MS:** I'm Major James Manchip, Civil Air Patrol and Drug Demand Reduction officer. Twenty-something years ago Public Law 99570 was passed. It allowed the Department of Defense to aid the process of drug enforcement.

**00:53:02:24** That question goes with this. How much do you think that the military presence in Afghanistan contributed to at least the potential of the government to feel that they could survive if they cooperated. That's sort of a first question. The second question you mentioned about corruption.

**00:53:24:20** I question then is the corruption speaking of foreign corruption or do you address also corruption in the United States. So that's kind of related to that. Third thing you talked about jihad and you spoke about dollar figures. But jihad was against individuals. You have any numbers of youth, our American children who are dying on the streets by result of Haji Baz Mohammad.

**00:53:58:14** Then finally, do you have any way that you can see this thing to be reached out to the teenagers in our schools today which is the drug demand reduction effort?

**00:54:10:11 MS:** Well let me just say I mean first I've traveled a fair amount in a decade or so working with the DEA to countries, and I've spoken to a lot of officials in those countries, and the big issue that they always have raised with me is the problem of our demand for these illegal drugs in this country.

**00:54:26:17** That's a problem that you and your partners in OMBCP have been working on and are working on successfully. But it's a big issue. I mean we are the market for these drugs, for cocaine out of Columbia, for heroine out of Columbia and in part for heroine out of Afghanistan, and that's a problem.

**00:54:40:17** And we need to be honest about that problem and deal with it. I mean it's always very hard to show the link between a certain amount of heroine that comes in say to a country to your and then to the users down the line. I mean there just are—there's a number of people in between the supplier and ultimately the user that it's almost impossible to detect and in this case actually haven't been able to identify any specific individuals who are users.

**00:55:09:06** But I mean there's no drug more potent or dangerous than heroine. We all know that in this world. The extent that you have a guy here who realizes that this poison he's getting into this country has the potential to kill Americans and is satisfied by the fact that it's making him rich that's the guy I want to go after.

**00:55:34:02** As far as the relationship between the military in Afghanistan and the courage of the Karzi administration actually I think it mattered. I think that certainly I know that the DEA since they've engaged in Afghanistan has been working with the military over there. It's essential to operate, to hit the labs they're hitting, to dismantle the organizations they're dismantling.

**00:01:54:12** That's a partnership that I know is gonna continue. I mean the military has a lot of responsibilities in Afghanistan aside from attacking opium supply. But I think it's a mission that's able to compliment the rest of the missions the military is carrying out over there.

**00:56:13:26** I'm not sure if I missed any of your questions there. But I tried to address them all.

**00:56:18:03 MS:** It's virtually impossible for you to track down who the (unint.) levels the (inaud.) the depth of (inaud.).

**00:56:32:20 MS:** Yeah, I mean you can go to communities. You know we know communities from Queens to Brooklyn even and part of Manhattan where the heroine ultimately ended up. But again it's hard to find and to specifically identify the users. But this is a guy—I mean he plead guilty to supplying heroine from 1990 through 2005.

**00:56:54:11** I frankly wasn't sure that's what he would say when he plead guilty. It's not what he—he could have said less. But he said for a decade and a half he got that dope to New York and all across the U.S. Because of this case we forced him to take responsibility for that.

**00:57:13:01 MS:** Good morning. My name is David McKeeby (ph.). I'm a staff writer for America.gov. It's the State Department public diplomacy website. First I want to thank you for your service. Fascinating lecture. From the State Department's perspective a very important part of this question is it comes down to governance, and it's no coincidence that the areas where the production concentration is right now are the places where you have the least security.

**00:57:41:08** USAID is doing a big part on alternative livelihoods and that part of the puzzle. But I'd like to ask you two quick questions. One, I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about the informant. Obviously you can't tell us specifics, but I'd love to know if you have any insight as to what might have motivated that informant.

**00:58:03:19** Second, I'd like you to talk a little bit more about your partnership with the Afghan police and Pakistani authorities in this case. Generally speaking characterize how that relationship works, how positive is it and also because there is that climate of corruption, particularly in Afghanistan, is here sometimes a question of confidence in your partners? Thank you.

**00:58:31:19 MS:** Well I think it's probably best as we often say not to discuss the details of any informants. They're obviously security issues that surround that and just that observation about your other question I'll turn over to Pat. I think any time that you're operating in a country that is emerging like in Columbia when the DEA went down there.

**00:58:55:22** Mexico now in certain ways and certainly in the past you have the issue on the corruption and you have to be aware of that issue. The DEA has policies in place and very specific policies to try to identify the corruption and that's a part of the partnership.

**00:59:13:06** I mean of course where there's any indication that anyone involved in the operation is corrupt that needs to be dealt with immediately whether it's American or corruption on the other side. I mean I think the relationship is whether it's been a success or not I think it's shown by the result.

**00:59:31:18** We got Baz Mohammad back. He spent a lot of time in Pakistan, he spent a lot of time in Afghanistan. We did operations in both of those countries with the cooperation and support of those governments. So I mean it was very successful.

**00:59:44:24** Were there bumps in the road, of course. But the fact that we got him here, that we got the complete support of our partners in those two countries to build the case and to convict him is a testament to the relationships and to their commitment to doing the right thing.

**01:00:00:01 MS:** I agree. Thank you for your question. As far as operating overseas and more specifically in this case it's absolutely crucial that you have a relationship with your host country counterparts and in this case Pakistan and Afghanistan. There have been bumps in the road as in any type of relationship. But we were able to overcome those obstacles.

**01:00:21:14** One key factor in any type of investigation is you've got to know your targets and you've got to know the people that you're dealing with. That holds true for your counterparts as well. For example often it's not a criminal motive that would lead a counterpart not to agree with you.

**01:00:43:07** Sometimes it's merely a tribal relationship, and that goes deeper and is more profound than a loyalty to the individual country. That's something that you've gotta understand when working with counterparts overseas. You've gotta understand the people. You've gotta understand the culture.

**01:01:02:18** Once you do that it will definitely enhance the working relationship. That's one of the things we were able to identify and address in this investigation.

(END OF SIDE A)

**01:01:17:21 MS:** ...Johnson. It's a pleasure having you at DEA headquarters. You are a friend of DEA and you have the guts to take on one of the difficult cases that DEA has worked on. Question. I would like for you to elaborate a little bit more on the extradition. Did you use the 1961 Convention to extradite Haji Baz Mohammad and/or what other mechanism? Do we currently have a formal negotiation with the Karzi government on informant extradition between the United States and Afghanistan? Thank you.

**01:01:53:18 MS:** I appreciate those comments at the beginning. You can keep going if...no. We don't have a formal extradition treaty between the two countries. That's something that I know—something I know is via the Department of State has been dealing with. But there is a mechanism in place as we saw in Baz Mohammad for extraditions to happen.

**01:02:17:22** What we did is we used the 1988 Vienna Convention on Drugs which anyone who has done an EMLAT (ph.) to a country or made a request for evidence that's the document that you rely on. With our partners at the Office of International Affairs DOJ we argued to the Karzi administration and to the chief judge of the - well the courts in Afghanistan who by the way was not an attorney which may have been a good thing.

**01:02:50:21** That there was a basis because Afghanistan signed on to that convention. There's a provision in that convention that actually says if there were parties to the treaty that you can use that or to the convention rather than that you can use that and that document as a basis for extradition.

**01:03:08:29** Now the other obstacle I had then was to convince the Karzi government that the constitution of Afghanistan which had just recently been passed which had something in it about the aversion to extradite anybody from Afghanistan anywhere wasn't a barrier to using the UN convention that way.

**01:03:29:02** So there was actually a memo I did over a weekend I remember to one of the other DOJ attorneys in Afghanistan, and then the next thing I knew Monday they said oh, this went to Karzi and he read it which was a little jarring for me because I would have probably taken some more time to spell check it.

**01:03:47:05** But anyway, but we carried the day with that argument, and I think again just to go back to the beginning it was really the ability or the desire of the Karzi administration in Afghanistan to promote the rule of law that carried the day because what we said was you signed the convention. We all agree that this heroine is bad for all of us and this guy is a bad actor.

**01:04:14:22** There's a basis in law for you to extradite him and they did. Thanks very much. Thank you. It's been an honor and a pleasure. (Applause)

(END OF TAPE)