Exhibit C - Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel lobbying

**PICTURES** - Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel with Bill and Hillary Clinton, and with the King of Morocco (and his brother)  
**ARTICLES** - Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel's involvement with Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign  
**ARTICLE** - Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel's activities with his homosexual constituency to whom he is beholden  
**_EMAILS** - Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel's emails to Hillary Clinton (on behalf of the King of Morocco)  
**DOCUMENTS** - Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel's Foreign Agent Registration Act documents and disclosures (and non-disclosures he is illegally withholding)  
**EMAILS** - Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel's lobbying emails and activities undertaken on behalf of the King of Morocco
Edward M. Gabriel with President and Secretary Clinton
Edward M. Gabriel and the Royal Family

Edward M. Gabriel with King Mohamed VI of Morocco

Edward M. Gabriel with Moulay Rachid of Morocco
Clinton’s Man in Morocco: Clinton campaign fails to disclose bundler actively lobbying for Morocco

BY: Brent Scher | July 17, 2015 5:00 pm

Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign failed to list a registered lobbyist for Morocco in its legally required disclosure of all bundled fundraising done by lobbyists, according to a Washington Free Beacon analysis. Edward Gabriel, who was named U.S. Ambassador to Morocco by former President Bill Clinton in 1997, now runs the Gabriel Company, a Washington, D.C., lobbying firm that has had the government of Morocco as a client since 2002 and has been paid more than $3.7 million by the nation since that point. Though Gabriel appeared on a list posted to the Clinton campaign website on Wednesday afternoon of all the bundlers that have raised over $100,000, his name is absent from documents filed to the Federal Election Commission listing all the other registered lobbyists that have been fundraising for the campaign. All contributions bundled by registered lobbyists must be disclosed to the FEC each quarter.

Gabriel was one of the many listed members of Clinton's National Finance Committee that had raised over $100,000 for the campaign. He also contributed to the Clinton Foundation, to which he has contributed as recently as 2014 and given between $100,001 and $250,000. Although the fact that Gabriel has been fundraising for the campaign was disclosed through her campaign website provided list, significantly less information is made available on that list than would be made available through the FEC filing. The list of "Hillblazers," as the campaign has dubbed them, only provides a name and a city of residence without disclosing any information about how much each has raised. Each entry on the FEC filing of lobbyist bundlers, however, is required to include name, address, employer, and the exact amount that has been raised. Gabriel is not Clinton's only bundler that is registered to lobby for foreign governments. It was reported on Thursday by Buzzfeed's Andrew Kaczynski that two of Clinton's listed bundlers, Matthew Bernstein and John Merrigan of DLA Piper, are also both registered to lobby for foreign governments. Bernstein has lobbied for the United Arab Emirates and the German State of Rheinland-Pfalz, while Merrigan is registered to lobby for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Both Bernstein and Merrigan are listed on Clinton's official FEC disclosure. The Clinton-Gabriel relationship extends to before he was named ambassador in 1997. Gabriel was a donor to Bill Clinton's 1996 presidential campaign and maxed out his contributions to Hillary Clinton's failed presidential campaign in 2008. Money from Morocco has flowed toward the Clintons as well. On the day that Clinton announced her current presidential campaign, it was reported that the Clinton Foundation would be paid at least $1 million to hold a May event in Marrakech. The event was paid for by OCP, the state-owned energy company that is despised by many in Morocco. "Hillary Clinton sold her soul when they accepted that money," a former miner for the company told Politico's Ken Vogel in Morocco. "We are concerned that if Hillary Clinton wins the presidency of the United States of America, she will take the side of Moroccans even more." The Clinton campaign did not respond to a request for comment.

A search conducted on Friday afternoon using the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) database found that the Gabriel Company is still an active registrant. Edward Gabriel signed its most recently filed continuation. FARA requires all groups hired to lobby on behalf of a foreign government to register with the Justice Department.

This entry was posted in Politics and tagged 2016 Election, Hillary Clinton. Bookmark the permalink.
Morocco lobbyist just one of several campaign bundlers Hillary hasn’t reported to the FEC

Posted on July 21, 2015 by Personal Liberty News Desk

Hillary Clinton’s campaign website lists a longtime family advocate and lobbyist for the nation of Morocco among its list of fundraisers, but the Clinton campaign hasn’t disclosed that fact to the Federal Election Commission. A recent analysis of Clinton’s FEC filings, done by The Washington Free Beacon, reveals the campaign failed to disclose specific contributions made by Edward Gabriel, a former Bill Clinton-nominated ambassador to Morocco who currently heads a lobbying firm that has, to date, received $3.7 million in payments from the Moroccan government. Candidates who accept funds from registered lobbyists, the Beacon notes, are required each quarter to disclose any contributions those lobbyists make to their campaigns. But the Clinton campaign hasn’t done that in Gabriel’s case. And, in a parallel with the Clinton Foundation’s practice of trading U.S. influence for foreign-government dollars, Hillary’s presidential campaign has ties with other bundlers who also work as lobbyists for foreign governments. From the report:

Gabriel is not Clinton’s only bundler that is registered to lobby for foreign governments. It was reported on Thursday by Buzzfeed’s Andrew Kaczynski that two of Clinton’s listed bundlers, Matthew Bernstein and John Merrigan of DLA Piper, are also both registered to lobby for foreign governments. Bernstein has lobbied for the United Arab Emirates and the German State of Rheinland-Pfalz, while Merrigan is registered to lobby for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

At least in those two instances, the Clinton campaign has reported those contributions to the FEC.

Read the full story here.
Democratic presidential nominee, Secretary Hillary Clinton, has developed an ethnic outreach effort to gain votes from various groups, including Arab Americans. Advising her campaign in Arab American outreach is Edward Gabriel, the former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco. Mr. Gabriel has been an active leader in the Arab American community for many years. He was the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco during President Bill Clinton’s administration, where he developed a close friendship with Mrs. Clinton. He has been a Middle East Policy Advisor in the last three administrations, and is currently serving in leadership positions at the Arab American Institute and the American Task Force for Lebanon. Mr. Gabriel is also involved in non-profit efforts. He is the co-chair of two American schools in Morocco and works often with ACCESS and the Arab American National Museum. For his part, Mr. Gabriel is conducting outreach in Michigan, Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, but the campaign hopes to reach Arab Americans in all 50 states. “There’s a great effort by Hillary and the campaign to make sure Arab Americans are a vital part of this targeted outreach effort,” Mr. Gabriel told Arab America. “Hillary’s theme is stronger together and that theme is across the board in this plan to reach Arab Americans. We are casting a wide net to encourage as many people as possible to get excited about Hillary and to get to know her.” Mr. Gabriel and other advisors have set up many initiatives to reach Arab Americans. In the works are small group meetings of leaders from each state, an “Arab American Day for Hillary” in Michigan, phone banking, social media outreach, and visiting top cities to meet with influential community members. The former ambassador’s plans have two main goals. “One is to make sure Arab Americans turn out and vote for Clinton and get in volunteer roles. The second thing I hope to achieve is showing a strong Arab American presence in electing her as president. That way we deserve a seat at the table when it comes to solving domestic issues,” said Mr. Gabriel. One of the main domestic issues Mr. Gabriel hopes to see addressed are Arab American civil liberties. Since 9/11, Arab Americans have been disproportionately targeted in surveillance, racial profiling, and unchecked terrorist watch lists, hindering the community’s civil rights. Mr. Gabriel believes “Hillary is the best candidate in either party when it comes to protecting and caring for the civil liberties of Arab Americans. When it comes to Donald Trump, it’s not even a contest.” When asked about how Arab Americans can overcome Clinton’s stance on Israel – an issue that prevents many in the community from supporting the candidate – Mr. Gabriel said that he trusts her to earn the confidence of Israelis and Palestinians to work together. “I can say unequivocally that she cares about all people in the Middle East… She was the first to call for a two-state solution, which has now become the official policy of the United States,” recalled Mr. Gabriel. “I’ve watched her and I’ve listened to her in [the peace process] and I believe she’s taken the exact approach necessary to gain the trust of the parties to move forward,” he added. Although Mr. Gabriel was not in the position to discuss policy opinions on behalf of the campaign, his faith in Hillary Clinton is sure to motivate other Arab American voters in time for the election. Other prominent Arab Americans included in the community outreach efforts are Jim Zogby, President of the Arab American Institute in Washington, DC; Fay Beydoun, Executive Director of the American Arab Chamber of Commerce in Dearborn, MI; and Saba Shami, founder of the New Dominion Political Action Committee for Arab Americans in Virginia. In order for Arab Americans to see their concerns addressed by political leaders, they must get involved. “We have a real seat at the table with this outreach plan,” said Mr. Gabriel. “She cares a great deal about the community and hearing our voices, which is why our interests are best served by Hillary Clinton.”
US Diplomat Expects Clinton to Win at Least 300 Votes in Electoral College

Washington, (Qatar News Agency) - Advisor to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton US diplomat Edward Gabriel has expected that she will win at least 300 votes of the electoral college in the presidential elections just 2% to 4% at the level of national popular vote.

He pointed out that a candidate needs at least 270 electoral votes, a majority of the 538 that are divided among the 50 US states.

Speaking to Qatar News Agency (QNA), Gabriel said that what the observers must carefully pay attention to on Tuesday is the result of the vote in Pennsylvania, adding that if Hillary Clinton wins in this state, she will guarantee her victory in the presidential elections.

Despite the optimism, the challenge is to mobilize the largest number of voters as the only factor to decide the result of the elections in favor of Clinton, Gabriel told QNA.

Gabriel, the former US ambassador in Morocco, said that Arab American voters' clear support to Hillary Clinton has reached a considerable level in this election, as two-thirds of these voters support Clinton, while only one-third of them support Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, especially in Michigan, Ohio and North Virginia.

He added that there is a wide acceptance for Clinton and her electoral program among Arab-American and Muslim communities, which differs from her counterpart Trump, especially with regard of defending the rights of American Muslims and her plans for immigration laws as well as her understanding, as a former secretary of state, of the Middle East's issues, making her the closest and favorite among Arab and Muslim communities in these elections.

Regarding the impact of Clinton's emails issue, which the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reopened its investigation into last week, Gabriel said that reopening the investigations certainly affected Clinton's campaign, as her lead ratio in national polls retreated, but because there were no new results in the investigation her ratio returned to rise in the previous two days.

In response to talks about a possibility of an outbreak of violence if Trump loses, Clinton campaign's advisor said he fully believes in the centrality of the US administration of the state that are not affected by any attempts of riots or external influences.

The American security devices are able to protect the security and stability and to face all threats of riots, violence or even possible external cyber-attacks, he added, stressing that the elections and the voters will be under the protection of the American security devices, which will oversee and secure the electoral process.

In his remarks to QNA, Gabriel said it’s time for a woman to be the next US president after nearly 200 years.

(QNA)
The Honorable Edward M. Gabriel talks about his up-by-the-bootstraps life with HOME — telling a story of appreciation for his Lebanese heritage, patriotism for his country and hope for stronger U.S.–Lebanese relations.

"The next generation has to take the reins from us, and make a difference in terms of what we feel is in America’s and Lebanon’s best interest."
Ambassador Edward Gabriel, a mover and shaker in American foreign policy, is proud of his humble beginnings. “Not many shoeshine boys grow up to be ambassadors,” he said recently in a Skype interview from his office at The Gabriel Company in Washington, D.C. His consultancy serves U.S. businesses seeking to invest in the Middle East and North Africa. Silver wisps above his ears gave a look of distinction to his otherwise dark hair; his narrow face filled with a broad smile. “Only in America,” he exclaimed. “I am proud of the fact that from a modest background, I was able to become a policymaker in my country and on its behalf overseas.”

Gabriel was appointed by President Bill Clinton as the U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco and served from November 1997 – March 2001. He is proud that, during his tenure, the Embassy won recognition for having the top strategic plan of all the U.S. embassies in the world. “We brought the entire embassy together — Americans and local hires — to develop a long-term strategic vision and we integrated all the federal agencies together in pursuit of that vision.”

More important, he said, was his role in bringing Morocco closer to the U.S. through strengthening commercial relations, educational and cultural exchanges, and security and military cooperation. That post may have been the pinnacle of his career, but it is certainly not the only place his influence is felt.

He continues to be on the front lines of diplomacy in the Middle East as the president and CEO of the American Task Force for Lebanon — meeting in September with Lebanon’s President Michel Aoun as the head of an ATFL delegation, aiming to improve U.S.–Lebanese relations. He advised Hillary Clinton on Arab-American relations during her presidential campaign, and traveled to Syria extensively, prior to the conflict there, as an advisor to the U.S. government, meeting with Syrian President Bashar Assad on multiple occasions.

His opinions are found in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Huffington Post and The Hill, a U.S. political news site read by government insiders. A study he chaired on America’s post-Cold War relations with the Arab world has become a reference guide on the changing policies towards the Middle East.

He’s a popular guest lecturer at top universities across the U.S., including Harvard, Princeton, Cornell, St. Lawrence, Yale and Stanford. And, of course, he is a favorite at his alma mater, Gannon University in Erie, Pennsylvania. Gabriel recently spoke at MOVE 2017, an Arab-American summit called to exchange ideas about a wide range of issues impacting Arab Americans. “They wanted to know how I got involved in the world of policy,” he said, referring to his decades in public service.

“Thank God we have an organization of prominent Lebanese Americans who care about their country of origin, can rally together and walk into the White House, the State Department and the halls of Congress, and make a difference.

He has an extensive background in international affairs, having convened multilateral policy forums on critical global concerns, including international energy, counterterrorism and regional security, and has been involved in matters of Russian and European nuclear nonproliferation.

Gabriel has served as a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a member of the Global Advisory Board of George Washington University, the Tangier American Legation Museum and the Lebanese American University. He is chairman of the Moroccan American Center (which works to strengthen U.S.-Moroccan political, business, cultural and security relationships) and co-chairman of the American Schools of Tangier and Marrakech. He is a member of the boards of AMIDEAST, the Arab American National Museum, the Lebanese American University (newly appointed), The Keystone Policy Center, a non-profit that works to influence public policy on “our society’s most challenging environmental, energy and public health problems,” and — the list goes on!

African Intelligence, a website that covers business and political news, ran a banner headline in late November that read, “Top Morocco PR Man Ed Gabriel Retires.” As if?

Actually — at 67, Gabriel stepped down as a consultant to the Kingdom of Morocco, but he shows no signs of retiring. He’s engaged in an impressive career that combines his passion for policy and his “Phoenician entrepreneurial gene,” another “only-in-America” experience, he said. “There are not many places in the world where you can combine both the public and private sectors into one’s career.”

Whether in the public, private or non-profit sectors, “your value system is most important,” said Gabriel. “I have found that the most important ingredient to success, whether in business or diplomacy, is being able to develop trust and confidence with your interlocutor. It doesn’t matter if you’re pitching a foreign leader or pitching a new client, trust and confidence always come first.”

Lebanese roots
Gabriel’s Lebanese roots run deep. With the Lebanese-American equivalent to coming over on the Mayflower, the family traces its lineage back to the first Lebanese person to immigrate to the U.S. — a Bishelany who settled in Boston in 1854. Gabriel’s father’s real name was Michel John Gabriel Bishelany. “At Ellis Island, the name Bishelany was removed and my father then became Michael John Gabriel.” The family’s name has been Gabriel ever since.
The Word Game
To gain some insight into how Ambassador Edward Gabriel thinks, HOME asked him to play a word association game with us. We mentioned a word and he responded with the first thing that came to mind.

Diplomacy
The skill to get people to understand your point of view, while you are understanding their point of view.

Social change
Moving forward.

Citizenship
Giving back to one's country.

Gender equality
We need more of it. How can our country ever succeed if it holds back half the population?

Reform
We need it. As much as Americans think we are No. 1 in all aspects, we are not. We need reform ourselves and need to make sure our values are exhibited at the same time.

Cultural diplomacy
It is important, especially exchange programs. When people visit America, they like America; when they don't, they don't. Polls show that.

Refugees
We have to do something about it. Americans are so far removed, they don't understand how much pressure will be on the rest of the world and America if we don't address it now.

Peacemaking
One of the greatest virtues that could ever be bestowed on an individual as his or her responsibility. I think of George Mitchell when I say that.
Historically, the Bishelany family was known for its work in the ancient silk industry in the Metn. Gabriel's immediate family immigrated in several waves in the early 1900s, with Gabriel's father being the last to arrive, hailing from Salima, Lebanon, in 1910.

"Everybody in this country has been touched by a Lebanese."

The family became quite prosperous — “everyone except my father,” Gabriel said. His relatives consider Bishop Robert Shaheen, a grandson of Gabriel's father's sister, the most successful member of the family. Shaheen was the head of the Maronite Church in America. “I soon discovered that although becoming an ambassador is an impressive and high honor, in my family, a bishop trumps an ambassador.”

Gabriel's patriotism may have come from his father. “I think my father's most satisfying work was his years in military service,” said Gabriel. “He lied about his age when he was too young to serve in World War I and again when he was too old to serve in World War II.”

Gabriel said his father was “very politically opinionated. A man of little means — a taxi cab driver, janitor, menial jobs — but he really cared about politics. I remember him always typing letters expressing his views to his representatives in Congress.”

He was especially concerned about injustices towards blacks and Native Americans. “His English language was not great, so he filled his commentary with colorful curse words. It was well known in our family that he was quite animated in his feelings about political situations, which was quite entertaining. He was very socially conscious,” said Gabriel. “That really made an impression on me.”

Gabriel's mother was born in Olean, New York. Her parents immigrated from Hasbaya el-Metn in 1895. Gabriel says his mother was “my best friend.”

In an oral history of Gabriel produced by the U.S. State Department, he said of his mother, “She taught me most of life's lessons: the importance of education — she never doubted that my sister and I would be the first in our family to go to college; that to get a good job and the opportunity to work hard was part of the American dream.” She also had the gift of humor, and the little Arabic he speaks came from listening to her.

Yet, in his early childhood, Gabriel didn't realize he was Lebanese. “People called us ‘Turks’ or ‘Syrians,’” he said.

Then, in the 1950s, “The Danny Thomas Show” became the most popular thing on TV and put Lebanese Americans on the map. “We became Lebanese with that show.”

“In the 1970s, with the Arab oil embargo, I became more politically knowledgeable about the Middle East. I was in my 20s, and there was a lot of political activity regarding the region at that time,” he said.

Gabriel visited Lebanon for the first time in 1994, when he was 44. “I felt at HOME as soon as we landed,” he recalled. “I'm very Lebanese. I took a DNA test that showed I'm 99.3 percent Lebanese/Middle Eastern.” He has continued visiting Lebanon every year since, and is currently going twice a year in official capacities as the head of the American Task Force for Lebanon and an LAU board member.

Gabriel's Lebanese heritage shows in “the strong connection to HOME and to parents; hospitality and sense of charitable giving, and opening your HOME to people — these are all very Lebanese,” he said.

Up by the bootstraps
The American expression “to pull one's self up by the bootstraps” means to succeed through your own efforts and abilities. That's just what Gabriel, his mother and his sister, who was four years his elder, had to do.

Gabriel's mother was born in Olean, New York. Her parents immigrated from Hasbaya el-Metn in 1895. Gabriel says his mother was “my best friend.”

In an oral history of Gabriel produced by the U.S. State Department, he said of his mother, “She taught me most of life's lessons: the importance of education — she never doubted that my sister and I would be the first in our family to go to college; that to get a good job and the opportunity to work hard was part of the American dream.” She also had the gift of humor, and the little Arabic he speaks came from listening to her.

Yet, in his early childhood, Gabriel didn't realize he was Lebanese. “People called us ‘Turks’ or ‘Syrians,’” he said.

Then, in the 1950s, “The Danny Thomas Show” became the most popular thing on TV and put Lebanese Americans on the map. “We became Lebanese with that show.”

“In the 1970s, with the Arab oil embargo, I became more politically knowledgeable about the Middle East. I was in my 20s, and there was a lot of political activity regarding the region at that time,” he said.

Gabriel visited Lebanon for the first time in 1994, when he was 44. “I felt at HOME as soon as we landed,” he recalled. “I'm very Lebanese. I took a DNA test that showed I'm 99.3 percent Lebanese/Middle Eastern.” He has continued visiting Lebanon every year since, and is currently going twice a year in official capacities as the head of the American Task Force for Lebanon and an LAU board member.

Gabriel's Lebanese heritage shows in “the strong connection to HOME and to parents; hospitality and sense of charitable giving, and opening your HOME to people — these are all very Lebanese,” he said.

Up by the bootstraps
The American expression “to pull one's self up by the bootstraps” means to succeed through your own efforts and abilities. That's just what Gabriel, his mother and his sister, who was four years his elder, had to do.

Gabriel's mother was born in Olean, New York. Her parents immigrated from Hasbaya el-Metn in 1895. Gabriel says his mother was “my best friend.”

In an oral history of Gabriel produced by the U.S. State Department, he said of his mother, “She taught me most of life's lessons: the importance of education — she never doubted that my sister and I would be the first in our family to go to college; that to get a good job and the opportunity to work hard was part of the American dream.” She also had the gift of humor, and the little Arabic he speaks came from listening to her.

Yet, in his early childhood, Gabriel didn't realize he was Lebanese. “People called us ‘Turks’ or ‘Syrians,’” he said.

Then, in the 1950s, “The Danny Thomas Show” became the most popular thing on TV and put Lebanese Americans on the map. “We became Lebanese with that show.”

“In the 1970s, with the Arab oil embargo, I became more politically knowledgeable about the Middle East. I was in my 20s, and there was a lot of political activity regarding the region at that time,” he said.

Gabriel visited Lebanon for the first time in 1994, when he was 44. “I felt at HOME as soon as we landed,” he recalled. “I'm very Lebanese. I took a DNA test that showed I'm 99.3 percent Lebanese/Middle Eastern.” He has continued visiting Lebanon every year since, and is currently going twice a year in official capacities as the head of the American Task Force for Lebanon and an LAU board member.

Gabriel's Lebanese heritage shows in “the strong connection to HOME and to parents; hospitality and sense of charitable giving, and opening your HOME to people — these are all very Lebanese,” he said.

Up by the bootstraps
The American expression “to pull one's self up by the bootstraps” means to succeed through your own efforts and abilities. That's just what Gabriel, his mother and his sister, who was four years his elder, had to do.

Gabriel's mother was born in Olean, New York. Her parents immigrated from Hasbaya el-Metn in 1895. Gabriel says his mother was “my best friend.”

In an oral history of Gabriel produced by the U.S. State Department, he said of his mother, “She taught me most of life's lessons: the importance of education — she never doubted that my sister and I would be the first in our family to go to college; that to get a good job and the opportunity to work hard was part of the American dream.” She also had the gift of humor, and the little Arabic he speaks came from listening to her.

Yet, in his early childhood, Gabriel didn't realize he was Lebanese. “People called us ‘Turks’ or ‘Syrians,’” he said.

Then, in the 1950s, “The Danny Thomas Show” became the most popular thing on TV and put Lebanese Americans on the map. “We became Lebanese with that show.”

“In the 1970s, with the Arab oil embargo, I became more politically knowledgeable about the Middle East. I was in my 20s, and there was a lot of political activity regarding the region at that time,” he said.

Gabriel visited Lebanon for the first time in 1994, when he was 44. “I felt at HOME as soon as we landed,” he recalled. “I'm very Lebanese. I took a DNA test that showed I'm 99.3 percent Lebanese/Middle Eastern.” He has continued visiting Lebanon every year since, and is currently going twice a year in official capacities as the head of the American Task Force for Lebanon and an LAU board member.

Gabriel's Lebanese heritage shows in “the strong connection to HOME and to parents; hospitality and sense of charitable giving, and opening your HOME to people — these are all very Lebanese,” he said.

Up by the bootstraps
The American expression “to pull one's self up by the bootstraps” means to succeed through your own efforts and abilities. That's just what Gabriel, his mother and his sister, who was four years his elder, had to do.
worked his way through college in a construction job, digging ditches. Yet, he doesn’t remember those days as particularly difficult, he told HOME.

“The three of us lived in a community that was very caring,” he said. Gabriel grew up in Olean, a small town in the Allegheny Mountains in upstate New York. “We could stay out until all hours of the night without worrying our parents. If we got in trouble, the police would bring us HOME to face the consequences. It was a good life, a memorable life, an easy life in many ways.”

Gabriel is still in touch with a dozen of his grade school friends. “It tells you something,” he said. Just like in a small village in Lebanon, you stay connected.

“The community was a mix of Lebanese, Irish, Germans, Italians and Poles. Olean was 80 percent Catholic, and everybody had their church. We went to the Maronite church, St. Joseph Grade School was connected to the church. The Catholic Maronite Church was a very big part of my growing up,” he said.

“Small-town America — a place where we wandered beyond our neighborhood without fear, where we could go Christmas caroling for charity donations and people would open their HOMEs to us, where in the worst winter weather, we would be sledding on the high school hill across the street from my house. It was a great place to grow up.”

Thirty-four years ago, Gabriel married “an Irish woman, Kathleen Mary Linehan, from South Boston,” who, like Gabriel, is a hard-working professional.

Hopes for U.S.–Lebanese relations
Gabriel is pleased to have taken the reins of the American Task Force for Lebanon “at a time when it is so badly needed. I think we have increased the impact ATFL has had in Washington, D.C.,” he said. “Thank God we have an organization of prominent Lebanese Americans who care about their country of origin, can rally together and walk into the White House, the State Department and the halls of Congress, and make a difference in terms of what we feel is in America’s and Lebanon’s best interest.”

Still there is much work to be done, he said. “I feel strongly that America has to better understand Lebanon. Unfortunately, the press of the last few decades has painted the wrong picture of Lebanon to the average American, who doesn’t really know the Middle East.

Not many shoeshine boys grow up to be ambassadors — only in America!

“Lebanese Americans make up one of the most successful subgroups of our population,” said Gabriel. “Almost everybody in this country has been touched by a Lebanese.” They have Lebanese-American neighbors, teachers, community leaders and friends “who positively affected the popular perception of the Lebanese here in America. It’s been drowned out in the last few years.

“It is in America’s interest to support Lebanon’s security and to make sure there are strong financial institutions, like the banking system, to ensure a vibrant economy.”

And Americans can learn from Lebanon. “Lebanon is a country of diverse religions where the people live with respect for each other. We should learn from them and foster the exchange of ideas in religions. The Abrahamic faiths are very much alike. How can we make Americans understand — whether Muslim, Druse, Shite, Sunni, or various forms of Christianity, we all have the same values?"

One answer is Lebanese Americans themselves, said Gabriel. “They are the secret weapon of policy making in America. I hear heads of other countries say that they wish their people who are now citizens in America would care as much as Lebanese Americans.”

The next generation of Lebanese Americans needs to step up
“We need to educate young Lebanese Americans on the political process and encourage them to be involved in the community and the country they are living in,” said Gabriel.

“They can’t just complain. Lebanese Americans need to participate in the Task Force and similar organizations, to give time, money and brain power. They need to step up and say, ‘we believe in what you do and will join with you.’

“My generation of Lebanese Americans really cared about our country,” he said. “The next generation has to take the reins from us.”

---

Photo by melsgrimesguyphotography.com

Hazel O’Leary

“By Sandra Whitehead

Gabriel’s Mentors
Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel credits mentors, both famous and obscure, who gave him inspiration, encouragement and support along his amazing journey.

The Honorable George Mitchell – U.S. diplomat and Senate majority leader, chairman of The Walt Disney Company, a role model for rising from poverty.

Ed Stayer – his supervisor on a construction job, “who taught me to work hard.”

Charles Bennett – his college economics professor, “who taught me about socioeconomic policy and President Johnson’s War on Poverty, which led me to a long career in government and public policy.”

Ben Wiley – Executive director of the Greater Erie Community Action Committee, his employer and a black leader in the community, who “was bigger than life to me. He was a lifelong mentor.”

Hazel O’Leary – the Secretary of Energy, “who took me under her wing.”

President Bill Clinton and Secretary Hillary Clinton – under whom Gabriel worked in several capacities; President Clinton appointed Gabriel as Ambassador to Morocco.

“And I could go on,” Gabriel said.

By Sandra Whitehead

HOME Magazine - VOICE OF THE DIASPORA 169
Adviser to Clinton campaign says Arab-American presidency ‘will happen soon’

Rasha Elass

Washington

Adviser Gabriel has known the Clintons for more than 25 years, having served as Bill Clinton’s ambassador to Morocco from 1997-2001. Today, the son of Lebanese immigrants in advising Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign on outreach to Arab Americans. Gabriel is also president and chief executive officer of the American Task Force for Lebanon (ATFL).

Gabriel was interviewed by Khur Khan, a Muslim American whose son was killed in the Iraq war. Khan delivered a moving speech at the Democratic National Convention, during which he questioned the ability of commissioners to help Syrian refugees, saying in his convention speech, “that will stop Assad from slaughtering civilians and the opposition.”

Without a military presence, Assad and Russia won’t care. They just bomb people they don’t like.

Edward Gabriel

Lebanon is one of the issues near to Gabriel’s heart.

US unlikely to move against Assad after elections

Thomas Seibert

Washington

The United States is likely to step up its military campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, after a new US president is sworn in next January but un- seating Syrian President Bashar As- sad is unlikely to be a priority. Both major party nominees – Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican Donald Trump – have said they would escalate the bat- tle against ISIS if elected. Neither, however, has emphasized the need to end a war that since 2011 has killed about 250,000 people and forced another 55 million to flee to neighbouring countries and be- yond.

Clinton has said she would or- der more air strikes on ISIS and “a broader target set” for US and allied warplanes, as well as improve intelligence gathering. She also has called for more US special forces to be deployed against ISIS and more equipment provided to “viable Syrian opposition groups.”

With costly wars in Iraq and Af- ghanistan fresh in voters’ minds, Clinton has stressed that she does not want “a new generation of Americans in combat in the Middle East.” As for Assad, Clinton said she wants a political solution to the war and favours the formation of an opposition “that will stop Assad from slaugh- tering civilians and the opposition” and “will be prepared for a long pe- riod of instability and violence in dealing with terror groups such as ISIS or the former Jabhat al-Nusra,” which used to be considered al-Qaeda in Syria.

US soldier puts on a military demonstration during the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS Meeting, hosted by Defense Secretary Ash Carter, at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, on July 20th.

“Without a military presence, Assad and Russia won’t care. They just bomb people they don’t like.”

Edward Gabriel

Washington

“If we’re not going to do more to impose a robust stance against the Syr- ian president, General Stanley McChrystal has said. “We’re dealing with a Soviet-era problem that needs to be settled.”

Clinton has stressed that she does not want “100,000 Americans in Syria.” She has not said how such a plan would escalate the war and a new US president may still see the need for Assad to stay in power.

“We’re going to help countries move in that direction only when they’re chosen if and asked us to,” he said.

Gabriel suggested that the United States identify the ‘terrorists’ in Syria and those who are against ISIS, which is being held by the Department of Justice.

“One term intended as a compli- ment – and a ‘cultural jockey’ – the n-word,” he said.

His peers. “Since we were school- ing, except our bread was round,” he recalled.

Lebanon is one of the issues near to Gabriel’s heart.

17

Case 2:16-cr-00365   Document 212-4   Filed 06/02/19   Page 13 of 16
The Morocco Lobby, Brokeback Mountain, & the Fate of the Western Sahara
Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Having recently gotten back from an extended trip abroad, I searched and searched the Internet for blog-worthy items about the Western Sahara and was on the verge of concluding that Will, Alle, et al. had comprehensively taken care of business when I ran across a strange tale of J. Peter Segall and Edward M. Gabriel from early April that somehow missed their radar. Thanks guys for leaving one for me (or could it be that you did not consider it a blog-worthy item?). Anyway.... Now Ed Gabriel is familiar to my readers as the former American ambassador to Morocco who over the last few years has been on Rabat’s payroll as one of the major attractions in their multimillion-dollar propaganda circus in the U.S. Without getting into the tawdry particulars of his selling out to Morocco – which I have covered ad nauseum elsewhere – let me just say here that his groveling recitations of the Moroccan royalist line betray a moral compass little evolved from a cicada.

On April 1 the following “in memoriam” ad for Mr. Gabriel appeared in the Washington Post below his smiling mustachioed face: “Though I no longer have you as my partner, this day will always be OUR anniversary. . . . I could never quit you.” Before you construe my nasty words about Mr. Gabriel in the previous paragraph as tasteless trashing of a dead man, let me quickly add that the ad was an April Fools joke and that Mr. Gabriel is not in fact dead (you can still construe it as tasteless trashing of a live man if you like). In the spirit of April-foolery, the Post on April 2, in an article titled “A ‘Death’ is Noticed,” explained that Edward M. Gabriel, an “international business consultant who was the U.S. ambassador to Morocco from 1997 to 2001,” was “very much alive”; that the ad, “in language reminiscent of the movie ‘Brokeback Mountain,’” was a hoax; and that the one who took out the ad, public relations executive and lawyer J. Peter Segall, was paying for a retraction in that day’s Post.

Other than Mr. Gabriel’s obvious association with Morocco’s campaign to discredit the Polisario Front, I suspect you are wondering what it is that makes this a blog-worthy Western Sahara story. The hook is that J. Peter Segall is “general manager in Edelman’s Washington office, and oversee[s] the relationship with the Kingdom of Morocco.” In February of last year on Richard Edelman’s “6 A.M.” blog, I took Mr. Edelman to task for getting all self-righteous in criticizing Robert Mugabe’s autocratic ways, while at the same time taking lots of money from Morocco to cover up and whitewash Mohammed VI’s disdain for democracy and Morocco’s totalitarian ways in the occupied territories. Anyway, it was J. Peter Segall who responded to my comments with a predictably wishy-washy and unconvincing defense of Edelman’s relationship with Morocco. “Our work with Morocco has been transparent and forthright and we look forward to continuing our partnership with this unique and important country.”

According to the Post article, poor Ed “fielded calls all day from friends who thought he had died. One woman told him she spent two hours crying after seeing the ad.” An apparently mortified Segall explained, “As I said in a correction that I hope is published [today], I engaged in a very stupid and ultimately cruel April Fools' joke
against a man that has been my best friend for 30 years, and I deeply, deeply regret it." And Gabriel elaborates, “He's an old friend who plays jokes on me every year, and some are hilarious, but they've been private....He's a good friend who went a little too far. He's apologized profusely, and I've accepted it, but not without being a little hurt. I think -- I know -- he had no ill intent.” Summarizing the whole episode, “Segall said,” according to the Post “that he is a mature man who made an immature mistake.” Given the utter stupidity and silliness of publishing a gay death hoax about a friend in the Washington Post, I would say that Segall’s maturity is certainly open to question -- especially since he is a high-level executive for one of the biggest and most influential PR firms in the world.

And what in the world is the homosexuality angle all about? While Segall’s ad does seem to insinuate a gay relationship (“though I no longer have you as my partner...”), the Washington Post article takes it a step further by making the connection with “Brokeback Mountain” (“in language reminiscent of the movie ‘Brokeback Mountain’”), a popular recent movie about two married cowboys who carry on a long-time gay love affair behind the backs of their wives. The language in question in Segall’s ad, by the way, is “I could never quit you,” which is indeed reminiscent of Brokeback's “I wish I knew how to quit you.”

Let me preface this paragraph with a disclaimer that I couldn’t care less about Segall, Gabriel, or anyone else’s sexual orientation. I just find it incredibly strange that Segall would pull a public gay spoof on his old friend when, first of all, Gabriel is married (to Democratic Party operative and tobacco industry lobbyist, Kathleen “Buffy” Linehan), and, secondly, both these guys lobby and do PR for Morocco, where homosexual relations are illegal and can land you in jail for up to three years (Section 489 of the Moroccan Penal Code). With Edelman’s Morocco desk being overseen by someone exhibiting such atrociously bad judgment, there just might be some hope after all for the Western Sahara cause.

This whole silly April Fools episode strikes me as sadly symbolic of the tragic dilemma in which the Western Sahara currently finds itself. For over 35 years, the UN and the world community -- through numerous resolutions and rulings, and the refusal of even one country to recognize Morocco’s occupation -- have confirmed the Western Saharan’s right to self-determination. A combination of blind US and French support for Morocco, the UN retreating on its commitments to the Western Sahara (see van Walsum’s realism), and Morocco’s huge expenditures on PR and lobbying has brought us to the point where the future of a people is being determined by a mercenary bunch of yahoos such as J. Peter Segall and Edward M. Gabriel. I can’t help but be left with an image of J. Peter Segall and Edward M. Gabriel in their tight blue jeans sitting around a campfire on a dark stormy night on Brokeback Mountain concocting new and exciting schemes to screw the Sahrawi.

As an aside, in confirming that Gabriel was in fact married, I ran across some tidbits online about Gabriel’s wife, Buffy, that are interesting in the context of this story. In 1992, as head of Philip Morris’s lobbying group, she was deposed in a lawsuit against B.J. Reynolds Tobacco (KUEPER v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO). Sourcewatch, a project of the Center for Media and Democracy, comments about her deposition: “...Linehan indicated that she was involved in lobbying against the banning of smoking on commercial aircraft, and that she does not consider the health consequences of the product she is lobbying (cigarettes).” And at another deposition in 1995, Sourcewatch adds that “Linehan stated that she did not believe that cigarette smoking is addictive.” Buffy and Ed really do seem made for each other; both are lobbyists who get paid for actively promoting products (cigarettes and Morocco) that spread misery and death, and neither is willing to consider the human consequences of their actions.

Posted by Chasli at 10:23 AM
From: Edward Gabriel <EdwardGabriel@state.gov>
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Sun Jan 30 09:12:45 2011
Subject: Bravo Hilary

Great job this am. She carved a perfect policy line and the need to initiate a dialogue among key actors for a transition together. Very well put after two confusing days. Ed
From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 6, 2011 1:27 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Morocco arrests suspects in Marrakesh cafe bomb (Reuters)

RABAT (Reuters) - Police in Morocco arrested three people on Thursday for a cafe bombing in the tourist city of Marrakesh on April 28 that killed 16 people, and said the chief suspect showed "loyalty" to al Qaeda.

The three suspects were all Moroccans, the official news agency quoted the Interior Ministry as saying. Most of the bomb victims were foreign holidaymakers, including eight French people.

The ministry said the chief suspect was "well-versed in jihadi ideology and shows loyalty to al Qaeda".

It said the suspect had previously tried to fight alongside Islamist militants in Russia's turbulent Chechnya republic and in Iraq.

It said he dressed like a tourist to plant two remote-detoned devices, which then tore through a cafe overlooking Marrakesh's Jemaa el-Fna square, a spot that is often packed with tourists.

It was the first such attack in Morocco since 2003, when suicide bombings in the commercial capital, Casablanca, killed more than 45 people.
From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 2/23/2012 6:48:35 PM +00:00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Just hung up with Ed Gabriel. There's a morocco brief I'm sending to you and Jake.

---

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 608324731

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3$: true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1
From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, September 9, 2012 2:23 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; H
Subject: Re: TFF Call

I got the same call from Ed Gabriel yesterday. Will call you cause there’s a lot of history here. Especially with Sam Kaplan.

--- Original Message ---
From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2012 05:51 AM
To: 'H' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>; Abedin, Huma
Subject: FW: TFF Call

To discuss. Huma can you call me when you’re up.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Kaplan, Samuel L
Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2012 5:28 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: TFF Call

Hello Jake,

The reason I was urgently looking for you last night is the following:

Late yesterday I received a call from Taeb Fassi Fihri.

We obviously have to deal with this today. People will be leaving for DC tomorrow.

Sorry to complicate your day.

Sam
From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sunday, September 9, 2012 5:55 PM
To: [hanleymr@state.gov]
Subject: Ed Gabriel just called back. Will close loop with him and call you.
From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 9:08 AM
To: russorv@state.gov
Subject: H: 'russorv@state.gov'

Re: Pursuant to our talk in Rabat...

Ed raised this yesterday as well. Will fill you in today.

From: H
Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 08:31 AM
To: 'Russorv@state.gov' <Russorv@state.gov>
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Fw: Pursuant to our talk in Rabat...

Pis print.

From: Melanne Verveer
Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2012 10:28 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Pursuant to our talk in Rabat...

Fyi

From: "Edward Gabriel"
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 08:15:54 -0700
To: <pverveer>
Subject: Pursuant to our talk in Rabat...

Melanne,

It was a nice surprise running into you in Morocco and being able to spend a few minutes together. As I mentioned, the Moroccans, at the highest level, deeply appreciate Secretary Clinton's/Hillary's attention to Morocco these past four years. I can tell you that King Mohammed and his counselors are extremely excited about the coming launch of the Strategic Dialogue. The King views next week's event as a crowning achievement of the past thirteen years of his effort to create a strategic relationship with the US on bilateral, regional and multilateral matters.

As I mentioned last night, there are two concerns that I hope you can bring up to the Secretary. The first concerns her remarks at the event next week, and the second is in regards to the final communiqué that comes out following the event itself.

From the point of view of the officials at the highest levels in Morocco, this new Strategic Dialogue is the logical next step in a long history of our relations, especially over the last dozen years under the King's leadership, which have included a Free Trade Agreement, major non-NATO ally status, an MCC compact, and positive public statements that the Secretary/Hillary has made about the real progress that the King has made in Morocco on political, social and economic reforms.
It is "our" hope that Secretary Clinton/Hillary will draw particular attention to this fact, when she makes her public comments in at the SD next week, and says what this Dialogue represents and how it has come to pass as the culmination of the many things that Morocco has accomplished over the past 15 years and three US Administrations. This really is a story about the leadership of the King, including his recent interventions with the Secretary, and it is something I'm sure he would be pleased to hear. As I mentioned, there are many detractors and political adversaries in Morocco that are critical of the King and state that the US-Morocco relationship has waned, due to the fact that he has not yet met with President Obama. The SD obviously refutes this claim, and the Secretary's words in support of the King's achievements will go a long way in carefully balancing comments and correcting misinterpretations.

The Moroccans have also been working diligently on a draft final communique to be issued jointly at the end of the SD meeting, as well as a set of issues for the working groups, including women's empowerment. I am afraid the communique will get watered down without Hillary's staff's direct intervention to represent her views. I would graciously ask that you pass both messages on, and assure you that the views I express herein come from the highest levels in Morocco.

On a personal note, I would like to reiterate how proud I am to have been associated with Hillary and her team these past years. Her success makes us proud.

Talk with you soon and good luck next week with the SD.

Ed
From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>  
Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 1:52 PM  
To: Abedin, Huma; H  
Subject: RE: I just now got another direct call

Abedin, Huma

Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 12:54 PM  
To: 'H'; Sullivan, Jacob J  
Subject: FW: I just now got another direct call

FYI

From: Edward Gabriel
Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 9:49 AM  
To: Abedin, Huma  
Subject: I just now got another direct call

Huma,
The King phoned directly to me just now and asked to pass another message on to her:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Huma, I'm sorry for this continuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Ed

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 11/30/2015 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 09/10/2027
That must have been a surreal moment—so far from home but so present. He did a great job for the President, the party and the country.

Come see me when you have time this week.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Melanie Verveer [mailto:]
Sent: Thursday, September 06, 2012 12:58 AM
To: H

I'm in the business lounge at Dubai airport en route to Dhaka watching your husband's extraordinary speech and surrounded by countless foreigners all cheering him on. Only he would elicit that kind of reaction at home and abroad! I think it was his most brilliant performance yet, all bias aside. emailed me in the middle of it to say that you have to run for president so she can work for you!!!

The BMENA meeting in Morocco went better than I anticipated with a really impressive group of participants from the region -- men and women, NGO and gov't reps speaking candidly from their experiences about the key issues that need to be addressed. The Arab Spring has created a whole new understanding about the role of women and that was underscored over and over. I will write you a short summary as they provided many important insights.

Last night I met with a group of women leaders over dinner at Lalla Aloui's. [Ed Gabriel dropped by] We -- Americans and Moroccans -- all talked about you. As Lalla said, "We're Hillary people." The women are so concerned that the future of the family law reform, women's equality in the constitution and their other achievements will be reversed by the Islamists. I think they have to find a way to organize themselves and even act as an influential force in the region. I'm going to see if W will do more in the region to help.

Ed was in background discussions on the upcoming strategic dialogue. He said the Moroccans want women's empowerment on the dialogue agenda (I'll follow up). He also said the King was very grateful to you for making the dialogue happen. They are not without big challenges there.

Good luck at the APEC meetings!
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>REGISTRATION NUMBER</th>
<th>REGISTRANT NAME</th>
<th>DOCUMENT TYPE</th>
<th>STAMPED/RECEIVED DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/15/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>08/24/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/24/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/16/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/16/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/18/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>06/01/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/27/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/19/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/21/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/26/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/28/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/28/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/29/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/28/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/26/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>12/01/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>06/02/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>11/24/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/28/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>12/03/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>06/04/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>12/03/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/30/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>12/27/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>05/30/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>12/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>06/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>06/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>12/10/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>10/31/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>10/14/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Exhibit AB</td>
<td>05/19/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>04/30/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>10/31/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>06/16/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available FARA Public Office</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Short-Form</td>
<td>05/30/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Exhibit AB</td>
<td>05/30/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>05/23/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Exhibit C</td>
<td>05/23/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Supplemental Statement</td>
<td>04/30/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available FARA Public Office</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Short-Form</td>
<td>10/11/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Click Here</td>
<td>5523</td>
<td>Gabriel Company, LLC</td>
<td>Exhibit AB</td>
<td>10/11/2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

https://www.fara.gov/search.html
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy initiatives to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/28/17</td>
<td>Mashouh Media Wire</td>
<td>email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/17</td>
<td>US State Department</td>
<td>meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/30/17</td>
<td>Pittsburgh Post-Gazette</td>
<td>email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/30/17</td>
<td>Pittsburgh Post-Gazette</td>
<td>email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/1/17</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/3/17</td>
<td>The Blade</td>
<td>email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Money
FARA registration supplemental e-filing – May 24, 2017 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>NAME OF CANDIDATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/23/17</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>Issa for Congress</td>
<td>Darrell Issa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/28/17</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>Raheem Khusain for Congress</td>
<td>Raheem Khusain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/17</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>New Dominion PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/17</td>
<td>$2,000.00</td>
<td>Sand for Congress</td>
<td>Feiyrae Sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/7/17</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>Charlie Crist for Congress</td>
<td>Charlie Crist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabrielle Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/21/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/8/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Phone Call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/3/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/14/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/15/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Phone Call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/18/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/28/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Egypt &amp; Maghreb</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Egypt &amp; Maghreb</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Director for Maghreb Affairs</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Director</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/25/17</td>
<td>Office of the Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/2/17</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements - Munites
FARA registration supplemental e-filing - November 16, 2016 - $305.00
14. **RECEIPTS-MONIES**
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/11/16</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (1st trimester)</td>
<td>166627.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/16</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (2nd &amp; 3rd trimesters)</td>
<td>333276.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

(b) **RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN**
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ____________

(d) **RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE**
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

⁵ A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, monies, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 2016a).

⁶ An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

⁷ Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION II: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provide advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/19/16</td>
<td>Morocco Desk, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/18/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary/NEA</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/17/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary/NEA</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/28/16</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/21/16</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/16</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/8/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/7/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/31/16</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/31/16</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/13/16</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/10/16</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/7/16</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27/16</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/22/16</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17/16</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/13/16</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/23/16</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/23/16</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/19/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/16/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/10/16</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/5/16</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary (DOS)</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/4/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/2/16</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Near East</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements - Monies
FARA registration supplemental e-filing - May 16, 2016 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)
15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/20/16</td>
<td>$300.00</td>
<td>Matt Heinz for Arizona</td>
<td>Matt Heinz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/10/16</td>
<td>$300.00</td>
<td>ALC PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/6/16</td>
<td>$1,500.00</td>
<td>Hoyer Majority Fund</td>
<td>Siunya Hoyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/16</td>
<td>$500.00</td>
<td>Kaptur for Congress</td>
<td>Mary Kaptur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/23/16</td>
<td>$2,700.00</td>
<td>Debbie Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>Debbie Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/8/16</td>
<td>$500.00</td>
<td>Luanne Bendor for Congress</td>
<td>Luanne Bendor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/10/16</td>
<td>$250.00</td>
<td>Matt Heinz for Arizona</td>
<td>Matt Heinz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/8/16</td>
<td>$2,700.00</td>
<td>Katie McGinty for Senate</td>
<td>Katie McGinty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/16/16</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>Raskin for Congress</td>
<td>Jamie Raskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14/16</td>
<td>$2,700.00</td>
<td>Hillary for America</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/15/16</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>Denise Juneau for Congress</td>
<td>Denise Juneau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/06/15</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13/15</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/01/15</td>
<td>State Department, Morocco Desk</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/20/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/26/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/12/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/13/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/17/16</td>
<td>State Department, Morocco Desk</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/18/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/18/16</td>
<td>Office of State Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/18/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/19/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/21/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/24/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/28/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/12/16</td>
<td>State Department, Morocco Desk</td>
<td>Emails</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/25/16</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/25/16</td>
<td>State Department, Morocco Desk</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>1/1-11/10</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals*</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>12/13-12/16</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>1/27-2/2</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not including the night of 1/3-11/4

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements - Money
FARA registration supplemental e-filing - November 18, 2015 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements - Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 05/16/2016 10:48:41 AM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/29/15</td>
<td>$33,400</td>
<td>Hillary Victory Fund</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/04/15</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Arab-American PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/08/16</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Cooper for North Carolina</td>
<td>Roy Cooper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/10/16</td>
<td>$290</td>
<td>Dr. Matt Heinz for Arizona</td>
<td>Matt Heinz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/16</td>
<td>$1,200</td>
<td>Van Hollen for Senate</td>
<td>Chris Van Hollen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant - The Gabriel Company, LLC - did not make any contributions.
14. (a) **RECEIPTS-MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?

Yes ☑️ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/6</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (1st trimester 2015)</td>
<td>166,617.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (2nd trimester 2015)</td>
<td>166,627.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/05</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (3rd trimester 2015)</td>
<td>166,627.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

(b) **RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes ☐ No ☑️

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?

Yes ☐ No ☑️

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date __________

(c) **RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?

Yes ☑️ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6. A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, monies, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 201(c)).

8. An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

9. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/20/15</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, US State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of International Organization Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Office of White House Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>NSC, Executive Office of the President</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Office of Global Women's Issues, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/3/15</td>
<td>Office of the NEA, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/3/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/3/15</td>
<td>Bureau of African Affairs</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of International Organization Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of White House Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of Policy Planning, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>NSC, Executive Office of the President</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Email Address</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of Global Women's Issues, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of NEA, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/15</td>
<td>Bureau of African Affairs</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of Deputy Secretary of State, US State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of International Organization Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>White House Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of Policy Planning, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>NISC, Executive Office of the President</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of Economic and Business Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of Global Women's Issues, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Morocco Desk Officer, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Office of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/15</td>
<td>Bureau of African Affairs</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/13/15</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/24/15</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary, State Department</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/26/15</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>5/3-5/15</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/22</td>
<td>$2700</td>
<td>Katie McGinty for Senate</td>
<td>Katie McGinty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Keith Ellison for Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/9</td>
<td>$1200</td>
<td>Boundary for Congress</td>
<td>Charles Boustany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/10</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Lahood for Congress</td>
<td>Darin Lahood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/8</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Ros-Lehtinen for Congress</td>
<td>Ileana Ros-Lehtinen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
Amendment to Registration Statement
Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

INSTRUCTIONS. File this amendment form for any changes to a registration. Compliance is accomplished by filing an electronic amendment to registration statement and uploading any supporting documents at http://www.fara.gov.

Privacy Act Statement. The filing of this document is required for the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., for the purposes of registration under the Act and public disclosure. Provision of the information requested is mandatory, and failure to provide the information is subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions established in Section 8 of the Act. Every registration statement, short form registration statement, supplemental statement, exhibit, amendment, copy of informational materials or other document or information filed with the Attorney General under this Act is a public record open to public examination, inspection and copying during the posted business hours of the Registration Unit in Washington, DC. Statements are also available online at the Registration Unit's webpage: http://www.fara.gov. One copy of every such document, other than informational materials, is automatically provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Act, and copies of any and all documents are routinely made available to other agencies, departments and Congress pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Act. The Attorney General also transmits a semi-annual report to Congress on the administration of the Act which lists the names of all agents registered under the Act and the foreign principals they represent. This report is available to the public in print and online at: http://www.fara.gov.

Public Reporting Burden. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1.5 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Chief, Registration Unit, Counterintelligence Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

1. Name of Registrant

The Gabriel Company, LLC

2. Registration No.

$523

3. This amendment is filed to accomplish the following indicated purpose or purposes:

☐ To give a 10-day notice of change in information as required by Section 2(b) of the Act.
☐ To correct a deficiency in

☐ Initial Statement

☒ Supplemental Statement for the period ending April 30, 2015

☐ Other purpose (specify) ____________________________

☐ To give notice of change in an exhibit previously filed.

4. If this amendment requires the filing of a document or documents, please list:

5. Each item checked above must be explained below in full detail together with, where appropriate, specific reference to and identity of the item in the registration statement to which it pertains. (If space is insufficient, a full insert page must be used.)

Amendment to question 15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/28</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Connolly for Congress</td>
<td>Gerry Connolly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/01/2015 9:30:04 AM
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/25</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/7</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/29</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/26</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/26</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/23</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/18</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/18</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/18</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/17</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/13-11/23</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/30-12/7</td>
<td>Airfare</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>1/21-1/21</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>3/26-4/5</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies
FARA registration supplemental e-filing – 11/19/2014 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/18</td>
<td>$2700</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton for President</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Butterfield for Congress</td>
<td>G.K. Butterfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/29</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Chris Van Hollen for Senate</td>
<td>Van Hollen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Brad Sherman for Congress</td>
<td>Brad Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>Gwen Graham for Congress</td>
<td>Gwen Graham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant - The Gabriel Company, LLC - did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money (whether as compensation or otherwise)?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal, an account of such monies.

Date From Whom Purpose Amount
10/16/14 Government of the Kingdom of Morocco Compensation for services rendered 333,228.34

333,228.34

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.

Date

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Foreign Principal Date Received Thing of Value Purpose
See Attachment A

---

6. A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, or other forms of value for a foreign principal as part of a fundraising campaign (See Rule 201(b)).
7. An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.
8. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest-free loans, expense-free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 11/19/2014 1:35:27 PM
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/28</td>
<td>Office of DOS Undersecretary for Economies</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/17</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/29</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/25</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17</td>
<td>Office of the Undersecretary for Economies</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>9/23-10/10</td>
<td>Lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>06/21-06/29</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>05/19-05/23</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies
FARA registration supplemental e-filing – 05/22/2014 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/19/14</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Sherman for Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/16/14</td>
<td>$2200</td>
<td>Keep Nick Rahall in Congress</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11/14</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Ellison for Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/10/14</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Mark Udall for Congress</td>
<td>Mark Udall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/3/15</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Mark Udall for Congress</td>
<td>Mark Udall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/10/14</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>166,613.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/02/13</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>166,616.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign8, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D9 to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.

Date

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value10 other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 201(e)).

7. An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

8. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/30/14</td>
<td>Cong Fattah</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>North Africa security &amp; stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/14/14</td>
<td>Office of Senator Durbin</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/03/14</td>
<td>Office of Senator Durbin</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/31/14</td>
<td>Office of Senator Durbin</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/30/14</td>
<td>Office of Senator Durbin</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/25/14</td>
<td>Cong Hastings</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>North Africa security &amp; stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/04/14</td>
<td>Cong Richmond</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>North Africa security &amp; stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/14/14</td>
<td>Cong Butterfield</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/14/14</td>
<td>Cong Moore</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/14/14</td>
<td>Cong Green</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/14/14</td>
<td>Cong Horford</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/13/14</td>
<td>Cong Meeks</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>North Africa security &amp; stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/06/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/04/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/24/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/24/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/24/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/03/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/13</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/13</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/13</td>
<td>US Embassy, Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/13</td>
<td>Office of the Undersecretary, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/13</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary, State Department</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/13</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>4/30/14</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>3/29/21</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>1/20/13</td>
<td>Lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies
FARA registration supplemental e-filing – 11/26/2013 - $305.00
SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/28/14</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Nick Rahall for Congress</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/28/14</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Debbie Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>Debbie Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/16/14</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Bass for Congress</td>
<td>Karen Bass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/19/13</td>
<td>$1500</td>
<td>The Hoyer PAC</td>
<td>Steny Hoyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/13</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Gerry Connally for Congress</td>
<td>Gerry Connally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/13</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>Keep Nick Rahall in Congress</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?  
Yes ☐  No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/18/13</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$166,636.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $166,636.67

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?
Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?
Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.  Date ________________

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?
Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6, 7 A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, monies, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 26.1(e)).
8 An Exhibit D, for which no printed item is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.
9 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/21/13</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/13</td>
<td>Office of the VP</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/18/13</td>
<td>Embassy Rabat</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/19/13</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary, DOS</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/22/13</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/17/13</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/21/13</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/14/13</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary, DOS</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>6/27-7/5</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>9/29-10/6</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>10/31-11/6</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies
FARA registration supplemental e-filing 05/29/2013 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/8/13</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>John Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/30/13</td>
<td>$2,356.43</td>
<td>Keith Ellison for Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/23/13</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Udall for Colorado</td>
<td>Mark Udall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/19/13</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Sherman for Congress</td>
<td>Brad Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/18/13</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Moran for Congress</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/8/13</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Tom Udall for Congress</td>
<td>Tom Udall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☑ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.☐

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/06/2012</td>
<td>Government of the</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$166,636.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/30/2013</td>
<td>Government of the</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$166,636.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$333,273.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign?, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ___________ ___________

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6, 7 A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, monies, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 11c)

8 An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

9 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, discounts, and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/25/2013</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/21/2013</td>
<td>Office of Deputy Secretary of State</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/17/2013</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/14/2013</td>
<td>National Security Council/OFFICE OF VP</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12/2013</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/11/2013</td>
<td>NSC/OFFICE OF VP/WH</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/2012</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/10/2012</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/9/2012</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/9/2012</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7/2012</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/6/2012</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/12-11/21</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>12/9-12/17</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>01/29-02/07</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Moroccos</td>
<td>02/20-02/25</td>
<td>Lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies
FARA registration supplemental e-filing – 11/29/2012 – $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/15/2013</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Darrell Isser for Congress</td>
<td>Darrell Isser</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CRO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/21/2012</td>
<td>Government of the</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$333,290.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>(1st &amp; 2nd Trimester 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$333,290.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date __________

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/21/12</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat, Morocco</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/3/2012</td>
<td>Office of Deputy Secretary of State</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/19/2012</td>
<td>Office of Secretary of State</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/2012</td>
<td>Office of Women's Affairs</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/8/2012</td>
<td>Office of Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/10/2012</td>
<td>Office of Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11/2012</td>
<td>Office of Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>8/28-9/5</td>
<td>Lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>10/7-10/10</td>
<td>Airfare, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies
FARA registration supplemental e-filing – May 29, 2012 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/15/2012</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Moran for Congress</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$3000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/16/2012</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Pascrell for Congress</td>
<td>Bill Pascrell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/28/2012</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>AMERIPAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/18/2012</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
<td>Royer for Congress</td>
<td>Story Hoyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/2012</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
<td>Ellison for Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?  Yes [ ] No [X]

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/17/2011</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>166,649.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

166,649.17

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?  Yes [X] No [ ]

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?  Yes [X] No [ ]

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.

Date

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?  Yes [ ] No [X]

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6. A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, monies, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 201(e))

8. An Exhibit D, for whom no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

9. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/16/2012</td>
<td>The Atlantic</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/20/2012</td>
<td>US Embassy Rabat, Morocco</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/22/2011</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>4/19-4/26</td>
<td>Lodging</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>1/18-1/21</td>
<td>Lodging</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements - Money
FARA registration supplemental filing - November 28, 2011 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements - Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/18/11</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>Brad Sherman for Congress</td>
<td>Brad Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/30/12</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>ALC political PAC.</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12/12</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>John Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant - The Gabriel Company, LLC - did not make any contributions.
### IV. FINANCIAL INFORMATION

#### 14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?  
- Yes ☐  
- No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/9/2011</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$166,649.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $166,649.17

#### 14. (b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?  
- Yes ☐  
- No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?  
- Yes ☐  
- No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.

#### 14. (c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?  
- Yes ☐  
- No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6. If a report is required to file an Exhibit D if the collector or receiver contributes, lends, loans, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign (See Rule 2014-6).

8. An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

9. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expenses, free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, 'kickbacks,' and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/22/11</td>
<td>Rep. Nana Dickson</td>
<td>Office of Congressman Dickson</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/7/11</td>
<td>Ambassador Samuel Kaplan</td>
<td>US Ambassador to Morocco</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>US-Morocco bilateral relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>5/3-5/7</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>6/11-6/20</td>
<td>Airline ticket, some lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>9/4-9/16</td>
<td>Lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Money
FARA registration supplemental filing – May 18, 2011 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/22/11</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Republican National Congressional Committee (RNCC)</td>
<td>John Dingell for Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/24/11</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>John Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
## IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

### 14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?  

- Yes ☐  
- No ☐  

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/10/10</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$166,641.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total     | $166,641.67 |

### (b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?  

- Yes ☐  
- No ☐  

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?  

- Yes ☐  
- No ☐  

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.  

Date ____________

### (c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?  

- Yes ☐  
- No ☐  

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Attachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco. The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/21/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Recent events in North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/19/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Letter signed by former US ambassadors regarding North African stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/25/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary and</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary and Undersecretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/21/11</td>
<td>Office of the Undersecretary</td>
<td>Office of the Undersecretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/19/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>News article on Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>News article on Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/13/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>News article on Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/10/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>News article on Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/22/11</td>
<td>Ambassador Samuel Kaplan</td>
<td>US Ambassador to Morocco</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/31/11</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/6/10</td>
<td>State department officials</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Exact date unclear, but meeting did occur between 2/15-2/27*

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>12/10/10-12/15/10</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies

FARA registration supplemental filing – November 23, 2010 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/3/11</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Ben Cardin for Senate</td>
<td>Ben Cardin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/15/10</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>John D Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/28/10</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Friends of Dick Durbin</td>
<td>Dick Durbin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant - The Gabriel Company, LLC - did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONEYS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/21/2010</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$169,975.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/29/2010</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$205,025.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$375,000.00

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

See Attachment A
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco. The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/1/2010</td>
<td>Samuel Kaplan</td>
<td>US Ambassador to Morocco</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/9/2010</td>
<td>Terry Lerman</td>
<td>Office of the Majority Leader</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/16/2010</td>
<td>Mariam Siskowski</td>
<td>Office of the Majority Leader</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/23/2010</td>
<td>Janet Sanderson</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/1/2010</td>
<td>Janet Sanderson</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>5/2-5/7</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>5/30-6/5</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>6/28-7/2</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>7/25-7/29</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>9/6-9/10</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>10/26-10/30</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Monies
FARA registration supplemental filing – May 25, 2010 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/20/2010</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Moran for Congress</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27/2010</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Richard Burr for Senate</td>
<td>Richard Burr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/20/2010</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Moran for Congress</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/16/2010</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Clifford for Congress</td>
<td>Gabriel Clifford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/16/2010</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/22/2010</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Boucher for Congress</td>
<td>Rick Boucher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/22/2010</td>
<td>$2400</td>
<td>Rahall for Congress</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☑ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such money:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/23/10</td>
<td>Government of the</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$124,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>(Q1-Q4 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $124,975

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value, other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Attachment A
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/26/10</td>
<td>Pablo Duran</td>
<td>Office of Senator Tom Udall</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18/10</td>
<td>Huma Abedin</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/3/10</td>
<td>James Smythers,</td>
<td>Office of Senator Richard Burr</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/10</td>
<td>Virginia White</td>
<td>Office of Senator Jeff Bingaman</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/10</td>
<td>Susan Bell</td>
<td>Office of Senator Richard Burr</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3/10</td>
<td>Sylvia Oliver</td>
<td>Office of Senator Byron Dorgan</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/10</td>
<td>Katie Hoard</td>
<td>Office of Senator Blanche Lincoln</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/10</td>
<td>Jennifer Barrett</td>
<td>Office of Senator Mark Udall</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/10</td>
<td>Donna Morgan</td>
<td>Office of Senator Tom Udall</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/10</td>
<td>Chris Lynch</td>
<td>Office of Senator Benjamin Cardin</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/16/09</td>
<td>Mark Udall</td>
<td>Office of Senator Mark Udall</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>2/4-2/8/10</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>12/10/12/15/09</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/14-11/21/09</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/1-11/9/09</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements – Money
FARA registration supplemental filing – November 18, 2009 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/26/10</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Issa for Congress</td>
<td>Daryll Issa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23/10</td>
<td>$4800</td>
<td>Frank Kratovil for Congress</td>
<td>Frank Kratovil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/24/10</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>Sheila Jackson Lee for Congress</td>
<td>Sheila Jackson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/09</td>
<td>$2400</td>
<td>Friends of Byron Dorgan</td>
<td>Byron Dorgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/09</td>
<td>$5000</td>
<td>AALC PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/27/10</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Ellison for Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23/10</td>
<td>$2300</td>
<td>Frank Kratovil for Congress</td>
<td>Frank Kratovil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's Vice President. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/1/09</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (Q1-Q4 2009)</td>
<td>$99,975.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/28/09</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (Q1-Q4 2009)</td>
<td>$100,037.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$200,012.50

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ________________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

See Attachment A
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/19/09</td>
<td>Congressman Eric Massa</td>
<td>Cong. Massa's office</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/11/09</td>
<td>Senator Tom Udall</td>
<td>Senator Udall's office</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Security and stability issues in N. Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>5/10-5/15</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>6/2-6/9</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>9/24-9/27</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements - Monies
FARA registration supplemental filing – May 19, 2009 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements - Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/22/09</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Henry Waxman for Congress</td>
<td>Henry Waxman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/25/09</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Friends of Byron Dorgan</td>
<td>Byron Dorgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/25/09</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>Sherman for Congress</td>
<td>Brad Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/25/09</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>Friends of Barbara Boxer</td>
<td>Barbara Boxer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/26/09</td>
<td>$2400</td>
<td>Massa for Congress</td>
<td>Eric Massa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/09</td>
<td>$2400</td>
<td>Ellison for Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/18/09</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Citizens for Senator Spector</td>
<td>Arlen Spector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/13</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Frank Kratovil for Congress</td>
<td>Frank Kratovil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/09</td>
<td>$2400</td>
<td>Steny Hoyer for Congress</td>
<td>Steny Hoyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/21/09</td>
<td>$2400</td>
<td>AMERIPAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONEY
   During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes [x] No [ ]

   If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such money:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/20/2009</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (Q1-04 2009)</td>
<td>$299,962.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$299,962.50

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN
   During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes [ ] No [x]

   If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes [ ] No [x]

   If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ____________________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE
   During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes [x] No [ ]

   If yes, furnish the following information:
   - Name of foreign principal received thing of value
   - Date
   - Description of thing of value
   - Purpose

See Attachment A

---

6. A regimen is required to file an Exhibit D if it solicits or receives contributions, wide, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 300).
7. An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign, and transmitted to a foreign principal is the same manner as a foreign principal.
8. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over connections, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Staff of Kathy Dahlkemper</td>
<td>Cong. Dahlkemper’s office</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Norm Dicks:</td>
<td>US Congress</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Karl Moe</td>
<td>Cong. Ellison’s office</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
<td>US Congress</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Erica Fein</td>
<td>Cong. Dingell’s office</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Beth Shaowski</td>
<td>Cong. Dingell</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Donna Fromh</td>
<td>Cong. Frank Kratovil</td>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/09</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
<td>US Congress</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>John Tanner</td>
<td>US Congress</td>
<td>Phone call</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>Senator Leagy</td>
<td>US Senate</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>Senator Feingold</td>
<td>US Senate</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>Senator Inhoff</td>
<td>US Senate</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>Senator Demint</td>
<td>US Senate</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>Senator Kohl</td>
<td>US Senate</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>Senator Brownback</td>
<td>US Senate</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/09</td>
<td>Senator Kennedy</td>
<td>US Senate</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/8/08</td>
<td>Staff of Kathy Dahlkemper</td>
<td>Cong. Dahlkemper’s office</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/8/09</td>
<td>Donna Fromh</td>
<td>Cong. Frank Kratovil</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>Morocco-US bilateral relations; Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/15-11/19</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>12/10-12/15</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>1/28-2/3</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>4/2-4/5</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Consultations on Morocco-US relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements - Monies
FARA registration supplemental filing - November 21, 2008 - $305.00
SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements - Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/19/08</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>WesPac</td>
<td>WesPac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/25/09</td>
<td>$2300</td>
<td>Ellison for Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18/09</td>
<td>$2400</td>
<td>Fritchez for Congress</td>
<td>John Fritchez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/24/09</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Friends of Byron Dorgan</td>
<td>Byron Dorgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/31/09</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>DSAC</td>
<td>DSAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/09</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>New Dominion PAC</td>
<td>New Dominion PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/09</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Moran for Congress</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/29/09</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>Schumer for Senate</td>
<td>Charles Schumer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/29/09</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Fritchez for Congress</td>
<td>John Fritchez</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contribution was made by the Registrant’s Vice-President. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howard Diamond</td>
<td>5/29/08</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>House Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim Reiser</td>
<td>5/9/2008</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senate Appropriations Committee</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puneet Talwar</td>
<td>5/23/2008</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 14 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>5/12-5/17</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>10/6-10/16</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a)

15 (a) Disbursements - Monies
FARA registration supplemental filing – May 22, 2008 - $305.00

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/1/2008</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Keep Rahall in Congress</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1/2008</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Byrne for Congress</td>
<td>Leslie Byrne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/18/2008</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Ameripac</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/2008</td>
<td>$2300</td>
<td>Lincoln for Congress,</td>
<td>Lincoln Diaz-Balart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/8/2008</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Team Sununu</td>
<td>John Sununu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/20/2008</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Udall for Colorado</td>
<td>Mark Udall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11/2008</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Issa for Congress</td>
<td>Daryl Issa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/26/2008</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>Udall for Us All</td>
<td>Tom Udall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/26/2008</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Jim Moran for Congress</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/2008</td>
<td>$2300</td>
<td>Kratovil for Congress</td>
<td>Frank Kratovil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO.
The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If no, explain why.
While the Registrant's President & CEO is paid by the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, payment was not received for this reporting period.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/28</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (Q1 2007)</td>
<td>$174,975.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/22</td>
<td>Government of the Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (Q1 - Q4 2008)</td>
<td>$499,975.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$674,950.00

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/19-11/27</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>12/29-3/5</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. A recipient is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign (See Rule 301(c)).

9. An Exhibit D for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and remitted for a foreign principal.

9. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest-free loans, expenses for travel, favored stock purchases, exclusivities, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/29/08</td>
<td>Senator John Sununu</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Senator Sununu's office</td>
<td>Telephone call to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/24/08</td>
<td>Tim Rieser</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>House Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Staff briefing to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10/08</td>
<td>Tim Rieser</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senator Leahy's office</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/12/08</td>
<td>Denis McDonough</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Coordinator</td>
<td>Obama for America</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/07</td>
<td>Gary Gensler</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton for President</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/07</td>
<td>Sarah Margon</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senator Feingold's office</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/15/08</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Tom Udall for NM Congress</td>
<td>Tom Udall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12/08</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>John D. Dingell for Congress</td>
<td>John D. Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12/08</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>Larry LaRocco for Senate</td>
<td>Larry LaRocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/07</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Mark Udall for Colorado</td>
<td>Mark Udall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/04/07</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>Footlick for Congress</td>
<td>Jay Footlick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/14/07</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Ros-Lehtinen for Congress</td>
<td>Ileana Ros-Lehtinen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO.

The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/28/08</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton for President</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/03/07</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton for President</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the above contributions were made by the Registrant’s Vice-President. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/07/2007</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (for Q2 &amp; Q3)</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$200,000.00

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ____________________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>06/24/07</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>09/18/07</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>10/31/07</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, interest, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign (Rule 203.03(c)).

6. An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

7. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favors, meals, purchases, and some rights, favors, representation and campaign "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/03/07</td>
<td>Kari Moe</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Congressman Ellison office</td>
<td>Email to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/11/07</td>
<td>Alan Makovaky</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>House Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/16/07</td>
<td>Senator Feingold and Sarah Margo</td>
<td>Senator and staff</td>
<td>Senator Feingold’s office</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/17/07</td>
<td>Staff of Senate Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senate foreign relations committee</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/07</td>
<td>Puneet Talwar</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Email to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/30/07</td>
<td>Paul Blocher</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Congressman Thad McCotter</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/30/07</td>
<td>Frank Lowenstein</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senator John Kerry</td>
<td>Meeting and follow-up email to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/07</td>
<td>Frank Lowenstein</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Senator John Kerry</td>
<td>Follow-up email to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/12/07</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/7/07</td>
<td>Kari Moe</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Congressman Ellison office</td>
<td>Email to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/07</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/07</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Gregory Meeks for Congress</td>
<td>Gregory Meeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/11/07</td>
<td>$2300</td>
<td>Hoyer for Congress</td>
<td>Steny Hoyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/07</td>
<td>$2300</td>
<td>Friends of Fred Thompson</td>
<td>Fred Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/07</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>Committee to Reelect Ed Towns</td>
<td>Ed Towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17/07</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Barbara Lee for Congress</td>
<td>Barbara Lee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17/07</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>Carol Shea-Porter for Congress</td>
<td>Carol Shea-Porter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/15/07</td>
<td>$2300</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton Exploratory Committee</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant’s Vice-President. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
### 14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONEY

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If no, explain why.

While the Registrant's President & CEO is paid by the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, payment was not received for this reporting period.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### (b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ____________

### (c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/1/06</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>12/6/06</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>2/3/07</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>4/1/07</td>
<td>Ticket, lodging, meals</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Questions 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Topics Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/29</td>
<td>Byron Dorgan</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/29</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30</td>
<td>John Sununu</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/28</td>
<td>Russ Feingold</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/17-4/25</td>
<td>Jim Moran</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Phone call to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jim Cooper</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Cong. Dingell office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beth Siniawsky</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Nick Rahall office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norm Dicks</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ed Whitfield</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Cong. Keith Ellison office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vickey Bandy</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Ackerman office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bart Gordon</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Cong. Ackerman office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Tanner</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Ackerman office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/17</td>
<td>Ben Cardin</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19</td>
<td>Puneet Talwar</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Foreign Relations Committee</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20</td>
<td>Mariah Sixkiller</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Majority Leader's office</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/27</td>
<td>Howard Diamond</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Ackerman office</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss the issue of instability in North Africa and Moroccan proposals to address the issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

15 (c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/15</td>
<td>$4600</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton Exploratory Committee</td>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/22</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Rangel for Congress</td>
<td>Charles Rangel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/28</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>Allyson Schwartz for Congress</td>
<td>Allyson Schwartz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11</td>
<td>$2100</td>
<td>Bill Richardson for President Exploratory Committee</td>
<td>Bill Richardson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Ellen Tauscher for Congress</td>
<td>Ellen Tauscher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/15</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Friends of Rahm Emanuel</td>
<td>Rahm Emanuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/12</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Ellison for US Congress</td>
<td>Keith Ellison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/14</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>New Dominion PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Team Sununu</td>
<td>John Sununu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/26</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Democratic National Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/26</td>
<td>$2500</td>
<td>Bill Richardson for President Exploratory Committee</td>
<td>Bill Richardson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/27</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Joe Biden for President</td>
<td>Joe Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/29</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>Darrell Issa for US Congress</td>
<td>Darrell Issa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/29</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Sandhills PAC</td>
<td>Chuck Hage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

(a) RECEIPTS-MONEY

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money other than compensation or otherwise?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such money:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08/07/06</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered (for Q3 &amp; Q4)</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.  Date ____________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>05/20/06</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging &amp; meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>07/05/06</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging &amp; meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>09/11/06</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging &amp; meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.7 A foreign principal is required to file an Exhibit D if the collector receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign.

7. For Exhibits D, the amount of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign or represented for a foreign principal.

8. Things of value include but are not limited to, gifts, expense due to travel, expenses due to travel, financial stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Question 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, including regional North Africa security issues and the creation and administration of advocacy institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Topics discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/96</td>
<td>Jordan Paul</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. L. Diaz-Ballart office</td>
<td>Meeting on Western Sahara &amp; other general Middle East issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/06</td>
<td>Jordan Paul</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. L. Diaz-Ballart office</td>
<td>Meeting on the new Moroccan position regarding Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/06</td>
<td>Jordan Paul</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. L. Diaz-Ballart office</td>
<td>Meeting on the new Moroccan position regarding Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15(c)

15(c) Disbursements  Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/1/06</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>ALC PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/15/06</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cong. Jim Moran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/06</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>DNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/4/06</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Richardson for Governor, NM</td>
<td>Bill Richardson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/11/06</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Unite Our States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/06</td>
<td>$2000</td>
<td>Hilary Clinton for Senate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/06</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>ALC PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONEY
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?  Yes [ ] No [ ]

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such money:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/24</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See Attachment A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$100,000.00
Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ____________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

5. A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal as part of a fund raising campaign (See Rule 20.16(b)).
6. An exhibit for which no printed form is provided, must show an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.
7. Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favorable treatment over competitors, 'kickbacks,' and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Question 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, and on the cultural and business interests between Morocco and the United States. Issues discussed include bilateral trade and economic policies; regional North Africa security issues; and the creation and administration of cultural, trade and educational institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Topics discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/28/05</td>
<td>Michael Singh</td>
<td>Director of North Africa &amp; Regional Affairs</td>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>Telephone call on behalf of Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri to discuss news reports on prisoner interrogations in Europe to confirm the US position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/28/05</td>
<td>William Laurence</td>
<td>Desk Officer-Tunisia</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Telephone call on behalf of Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri to discuss news reports on prisoner interrogations in Europe to confirm the US position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/05</td>
<td>Kent Keiser</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Rahall's office</td>
<td>Telephone call or meeting regarding their support of a congressional letter from Congress to Condoleezza Rice on the subject of Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beth Siniawski</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Dingell's office</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism and migration issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katie Albert</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Stony Hoyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cong. Jim Moran</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>Darrell Issa</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Western Sahara meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laurent Crenshaw</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Darrell Issa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ian Campbell</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Meeks office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Flake office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Cong. Tancredo office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/05</td>
<td>Henry Waxman</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shelly Berkley</td>
<td>Congresswoman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cong. Israel</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cong. Steve King</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/06</td>
<td>Jeff Bergner</td>
<td>A/S for Legislative Affairs</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Telephone call to discuss specific points in a letter to Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Ballart: human rights concerns &amp; view of Morocco’s desire to lay down an autonomy proposal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION IV: Response to Question 15(c)

15(c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/10/05</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>Team Sununu</td>
<td>Senator John Sununu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/15/05</td>
<td>$1000</td>
<td>WesPAC</td>
<td>Multi-candidate PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/15/06</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO.
The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such money:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05/05</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$400,000.00

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D² to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ______________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>5/28/05</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging &amp; meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>7/16/05</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging &amp; meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>9/17/05</td>
<td>Airline ticket, lodging &amp; meals</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² A request is made to file an Exhibit D if the candidate receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign (See Rule 14.6).

² An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

² Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense for travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, 'tick marks,' and like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Question 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, and on the cultural and business interests between Morocco and the United States. Issues discussed include bilateral trade and economic policies; regional North Africa security issues; and the creation and administration of cultural, trade and educational institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15(c)

15(c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/15</td>
<td>$250.00</td>
<td>WesPAC</td>
<td>Multi-candidate PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>AmeriPAC</td>
<td>Multi-candidate PAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/04</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered See Attachment A</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/05</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered See Attachment A</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $200,000.00

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ____________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>11/14</td>
<td>Airline ticket and lodging</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>01/09</td>
<td>Airline ticket and lodging</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION III: Response to Question 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: The Registrant's President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, and on the cultural and business interests between Morocco and the United States. Issues discussed include bilateral trade and economic policies; regional North Africa security issues; and the creation and administration of cultural, trade and educational institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Topics discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/30/05</td>
<td>Atul Keshap</td>
<td>Language Student</td>
<td>Foreign Service Institute</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/04</td>
<td>Tim Pounds</td>
<td>Director for North African and Middle East Regional Affairs</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15(c)

15(c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/21/05</td>
<td>1000.00</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/13/05</td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Ray Lahoud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/13/05</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>Maryland State Delegate</td>
<td>Tom Quinn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONEYS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income, or money either as compensation or otherwise?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/04</td>
<td>Government of Morocco</td>
<td>Compensation for services rendered, See Attachment A</td>
<td>$133,333.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $133,333.32

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ____________________

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>05/04</td>
<td>Airline ticket</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>09/04</td>
<td>Airline ticket</td>
<td>Advise Government of Morocco on regional security issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. A recipient is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 204(d)).

8. An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, must be filed on account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

9. Things of value include benefits not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive replies, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Question 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: From time to time, the Registrant’s President and CEO provides advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, and on the cultural and business interests between Morocco and the United States. Issues discussed include bilateral trade and economic policies; regional North Africa security issues; and the creation and administration of cultural, trade and educational institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15(c)

15(c) Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/13/04</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>House race, WY</td>
<td>Nick Rahall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/04</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Senate race, OK</td>
<td>Brad Carson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/04</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
<td>Arab-American Leadership Council PAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO. The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
ATTACHMENT A

Activities on behalf of the Government of the United Arab Emirates: Registrant's President and CEO helped coordinate and attended meetings between the Minister of Interior and Culture of the United Arab Emirates and members of the United States Government on Capitol Hill. The subjects of these meetings were post-Iraq, the Middle East Peace Process, and counter-terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UAE Officials</th>
<th>US Government Officials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Abdallah Ben Zayed Al Nahyan</td>
<td>Senator John Sununu</td>
<td>1/28/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Minister of Information &amp; Culture)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousef Otaiba (Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)</td>
<td>House International Relations Committee</td>
<td>1/30/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff</td>
<td>1/30/04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If no, explain why.

Registrant's President and CEO is not paid, as described in the initial registration and this supplemental statement, by any of its foreign principals.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND-RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed.  Date

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?  Yes ☐  No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of foreign principal</th>
<th>Date received</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>Dec. 8, 2003</td>
<td>Airline ticket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Question 11 and 12

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: From time to time, the Registrant’s President and CEO has provided advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, and on the cultural and business interests of Morocco and the United States. Issues discussed include bilateral trade and economic policies; regional North Africa security issues; and the creation of cultural, trade and educational institutions to promote Morocco’s interests in the United States.

Activities on behalf of the Government of the United Arab Emirates: Registrant’s President and CEO helped coordinate and attended meetings between the Minister of Interior and Culture of the United Arab Emirates and members of the United States Government on Capitol Hill. The subjects of these meetings were post-Iraq, the Middle East Peace Process, and counter-terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UAE Officials</th>
<th>US Government Officials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Abdallah Ben Zayed Al Nahyan (Minister of Information &amp; Culture)</td>
<td>Senator John Sununu</td>
<td>1/28/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousef Otaiba (Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)</td>
<td>House International Relations Committee</td>
<td>1/30/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff</td>
<td>1/30/04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (a) and 15(c)

15(a). Disbursement – Monies
Registrant’s President and CEO is not paid by any foreign principal and has made no disbursements on their behalf during this 6-month reporting period.

15(c). Disbursements – Political Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/27/04</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>Presidential campaign</td>
<td>Sen. John Kerry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/31/04</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Rep. Chris John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/04</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Rep. John Dingell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/24/03</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Puerto-Rican Self Determination PAC</td>
<td>Governor Pedro Rosello</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant’s President and CEO.
The Registrant – The Gabriel Company, LLC – did not make any contributions.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION III: Response to Question 11

Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: From time to time, the Registrant's President and CEO has provided advice to the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations, and on the cultural and business interests of Morocco and the United States. Issues discussed include bilateral trade and economic policies; regional North Africa security issues; and the creation of cultural, trade and educational institutions to promote Morocco's interests in the United States.

SECTION IV: Response to Question 15 (c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/29</td>
<td>$2,000.00</td>
<td>Wes Clark for President</td>
<td>Wesley Clark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/29</td>
<td>$250.00</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Jonathan Miller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/29</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>John Dingell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Registrant's President and CEO made a contribution of $500.00 to the campaign of Congressman Jim Moran in March 2003. This contribution was inadvertently left out in the Registrant's most recent supplemental statement, filed May 23, 2003.

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant's President and CEO. The Registrant - The Gabriel Company, LLC - did not make any contributions.
ATTACHMENT A

Activities on behalf of the Government of the United Arab Emirates: Registrant’s President and CEO helped coordinate and attended meetings between officials of the United Arab Emirates and members of the United States Government on Capitol Hill. The subjects of these meetings were post-Iraq, the Middle East Peace Process, and counter-terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UAE Officials</th>
<th>US Government Official</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Mohammed Ben Zayd Al Nahyan (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)</td>
<td>Sen. Hagel, R-Nebraska</td>
<td>5/19/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Abdallah Ben Zayd Al Nahyan (Minister of Information &amp; Culture)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youssef Otaiba (Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jamal (Advisor for the Armed Forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Pryor, D-Arkansas</td>
<td>5/19/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Chafee, R-Rhode Island</td>
<td>5/19/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Warner, R-Virginia</td>
<td>5/20/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Hutchison, R-Texas</td>
<td>5/20/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Tony Blinken – Chief of Staff for the Minority, Committee on Foreign Relations</td>
<td>5/20/03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) **DISBURSEMENTS: THINGS OF VALUE**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement?

- Yes □
- No □

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date disposed</th>
<th>Name of person to whom given</th>
<th>On behalf of what foreign principal</th>
<th>Description of thing of value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(c) **DISBURSEMENTS: POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

- Yes □
- No □

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount or thing of value</th>
<th>Name of political organization</th>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/21/02</td>
<td>$2,500.00</td>
<td>Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (CDCC)</td>
<td>Darrell Issa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/21/03</td>
<td>$2,500.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/24/03</td>
<td>$2,500.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that these contributions were made by the Registrant, President & CEO.
The Registrant, The Gabriel Company LLC, did not make any contributions.

---

12. II Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest less than 5%, expense less than travel, leased stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks" and the like.
ATTACHMENT A

SECTION I: Response to Question 5(c)
The individual listed in the response to question 1.5(c) has not yet rendered services to any foreign principal, but may do so in the future. Therefore her short-form registration is included as part of this supplemental filing.

SECTION III: Responses to Questions 11 and 12

11. Activities on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco: From time to time, Registrant's President and CEO has provided advice on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on U.S.-Morocco relations and on the cultural and business interests of Morocco in the United States. Issues discussed include bilateral trade and economic policies, as well as regional North Africa security issues.

Activities on behalf of the Government of the United Arab Emirates: Registrant's President and CEO helped coordinate and attended meetings between officials of the United Arab Emirates and members of the United States Government on Capitol Hill. The subjects of these meetings were post-Iraq, the Middle East Peace Process, and counter-terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UAE Officials</th>
<th>US Government Officials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Mohammed Ben Zayd Al Nahyan (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)</td>
<td>Sen. Hagel; R-Nebraska</td>
<td>5/19/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Abdallah Ben Zayd Al Nahyan (Minister of Information &amp; Culture)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youssef Otiba (Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jamal (Advisor for the Armed Forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Pryor; D-Arkansas</td>
<td>5/19/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Chafee; R-Rhode Island</td>
<td>5/19/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Warner; R-Virginia</td>
<td>5/20/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Sen. Hutchison; R-Texas</td>
<td>5/20/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Tony Blinken – Chief of Staff for the Minority, Committee on Foreign Relations</td>
<td>5/20/03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We have to seek agreement from Rabat on anything we do that mentions Algeria. Until we have clarity on that pt. Algeria is off limits.

Sent from my iPad

On Aug 26, 2011, at 8:25 AM, "RobertMHolley@aol.com" <RobertMHolley@aol.com> wrote:

Great stuff. Will look for the RRT recommendations, but a couple of things I think we definitely should do. A press release, obviously. But also an Op-Ed back to the same media outlet that we used when we first did a piece on this subject (under Ed's signature -- as we did last time). Purpose of the Op-Ed would also be something that we can again circulate to Congress as we did with the last one to point out the Polisario complicity in defying the UN resolution and engaging in active combat against the US and its NATO allies. Also useful to point out again that Algeria, along with Syria, was among those who voted against sanctioning Libya during the original Arab League vote. Press release and Op-Ed should also pick up the salient points from that excellent article analyzing US/UK/GOF policy moves in trying to maneuver Algeria away from support for Libya (a move that obviously failed miserably -- and caused us the famous "collateral damage" when State got its nose out of joint for our making a public issue out of this story while they were engaged in their failed attempt to end GOA support for Ghaddafi's regime and protect their precious "neutral" stance between GOM/GOA on the Sahara issue). Noting the steady stream also of news articles reporting the various times that Algeria was caught shipping materials to Libya -- all of which they denied -- of course. Denials that not look even more disingenuous today than they did at the time. Really think we can do some very serious damage to Algeria and especially the Polisario in Congress with this new information. Would like to think that hammering on this could help move State -- but will believe that when I see it. nevertheless, getting this around the Hill should both stiffen the resolve of our friends to back us and might even sway some neutrals and get some of the Polisario supporters on the defensive in a serious way.

We are very engaged here in McGill stuff today, but will have my Blackberry with me and would like to see drafts of both the press release and Op-Ed.

Thanks. Bob

Gee wiz! I guess we weren't wrong after all!! Jean, I think we need a rapid response team meeting to assess and recommend asap. I also need a translation. Thx

Sent from my iPad
> Libye : Des dizaines de mercenaires du polisario captures par le CNT
>
> Quelques 556 mercenaires du "polisario", appeles en renfort par Jes troupes de Kadhafi, ont ete
arretes par Jes combattants du Conseil national de transition libyen (CNT), selon le site internet
"geotribune.com" qui cite une source du conseil. Plusieurs de ces
mercenaires ont ete arretes dans la ville de Zawiya, mais egalement dans le complexe militaire de Bab
El Aziziah , ajoute la meme source, precisant que le CNT a ordonne leur transfert vers Benghazi en
attendant de "mettre la main sur le reste des elements du Polisario se trouvant en Libye". Selon la
meme source, la decision du CNT a ete prise a la suite de l'attaque menee le 22 aout par Jes insurges
contre l'ambassade d'Algerie a Tripoli. Dans les locaux de la chancellerie algierienne, Jes combattants
anti-Kadhafi auraient trouve des documents particulierement compromettants pour Alger, revelant un
soutien massif au colonel Kadhafi. Les dossiers ont confirme ce qui etait en partie connu : une aide
militaire et logistique algierienne a Kadhafi, outre la presence sur le sol libyen de plusieurs centaines de
mercenaires du Polisario. Pour rappel, la presence de mercenaires du Pol isario aux cotes du clan
Kadhafi avait provoque, des le debut de l'insurrection, une forte tension entre le CNT et Alger, note le
site internet qui ajoute que le CNT accusait les responsables Algeriens de soutenir le dictateur libyen
par l'envoi de mercenaires sahraouis du Po
>
We are pleased to inform you that the US House of Representatives has acknowledged that US aid should be used in the Western Sahara. This is potentially a huge advancement for this issue as it allows US monies to be spent in the Sahara. Additional language was also included in the report, which we are forced to accept as part of the compromise process explained below.

As part of the full House Appropriations Committee process, the subcommittee on House Foreign Operations (which funds the State Department and other foreign operations) approved its budget for the fiscal year 2012, along with a committee report explaining various caveats defining particular budget items. It is in this report language that we were successful in inserting the following language:

Morocco. - The Committee notes that funds provided in title III of this Act (which is means all bilateral development and economic assistance programs) for Morocco may be used in any region or territory administered by Morocco. The Committee remains concerned about resolving the dispute over the Western Sahara and urges the State Department to prioritize a negotiated settlement and should consider the Moroccan autonomy plan.

As part of the congressional appropriations process, compromises must be made among members, especially when they are in the same party. This particular compromise required an attempt to satisfy Congressman Wolf by his congressional colleagues. The additional language in the bill therefore includes the following:

The Committee notes Morocco’s partnership and cooperation on counter-terrorism activities and commends the recent constitutional referendum but remains concerned by the deportations of United States citizens living in Morocco. The Committee directs the Department of State to work with the Government of Morocco to ensure that United States citizens receive due process in such cases. The Committee further directs the Secretary of State to submit a report, no later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, detailing steps taken by the Government of Morocco in the previous 18 months on human rights, including deportation of United States citizens in Morocco.

This language is a significant win for the team, as it only calls for a report on the status of the deportation of US citizens, and not the elimination of the MCC compact of $500M, which Congressman Wolf had originally sought and is still seeking.

Please take careful note that this is only the first step in the complex process of getting this language included in the final appropriations bill. The Senate Foreign Operations subcommittee has already passed its version of the budget, which does not include our language, as stated above. The reason being that Senator Leahy is the chairman of this particular subcommittee and has been antagonistic towards Morocco. Our strategy in this regard was to make sure we did not inform him of our actions in the other chamber.

Now the two bills must be approved by the full House and Senate, before going to a joint conference committee to reconcile them both into one version for congressional passage and submission to the President for signing. As you can see, we have many more steps to go before we will know for sure whether we were successful. In the meantime please keep this news confidential as we do not want to give our adversaries the opportunity to insert themselves into this process. Thank you, Ed
This information has not been corroborated by third parties but is from a generally reliable source.

A Sahrawi journalist in Algiers told us earlier this week that discussions within Polisario’s ruling circles over the situation in Dakhla are focused on how to maintain the momentum of the movement and create a capital of sympathy with the young demonstrators. Parallel to this, there are efforts to transform these social protests into demonstrations against the “recently settled” populations of Dakhla and Laayoune, to whom the authorities settled in camps in the two cities pending more permanent housing. The Moroccan government’s aim is to populate the Sahara with Moroccans, says the journalist. A wave of demonstrations calling for the “expulsion of the settlers” will be launched in the coming days, concentrating at first on the Camp de l’Unite in the suburbs of Dakhla [now more commonly known as Wekala], and then extending to other Sahrawi towns.

A member of the “Polisario of the interior” from Laayoune says his organization has been collecting signatures since August from Sahrawis under Moroccan rule for a petition to the European Union to take the Western Sahara out of fishing accords with Morocco. The petition calls on the EU to stop according Morocco the right to exploit the natural resources of the “occupied” Western Sahara. The campaign is organised by Polisario activists “of the interior” and coordinated with the SADR leadership.

Sent from my iPad
Rachad,

Every year the Potomac Institute sponsors a Terrorism conference at the National Press Club. Together with the Embassy we have been working with Potomac on this conference for the past three years, supplying information and data. **Attached is an invitation requesting your participation in this year’s conference, February 2nd.** Let me know how we can help and how you want to proceed and how we can be helpful. Thank you, Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
To: Ambassador Mohamed Rachad Bouhlal  
Ambassador of Morocco to the United States

From: Prof. Yonah Alexander  
Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)  
e-mail: yalexander@potomacinstitute.org  
703-525-0770 (office)  
301-518-2823 (cell)

Date: January 10, 2011

Subject: Invitation to Speak at the 14th Annual Seminar on “International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2011 and Outlook for 2012” National Press Club, February 2, 2012 from 2:00pm to 4:00pm

Dear Ambassador Bouhlal:

The purpose of this communication is to invite you to be a speaker at our 14th Annual Seminar on “International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2011 and Outlook for 2012” at the National Press Club on Thursday, February 2nd from 2:00pm to 4:00pm. This event is co-sponsored by the IUCTS, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and the International Law Institute. We consider the extraordinary contribution of Morocco to regional and global security concerns of immense value and therefore shall be grateful for your participation at the event.

We are also inviting Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, as well as the Ambassadors of India and Turkey. The audience, by invitation only, will include academics, government officials, congressional staff, diplomats, professionals, and businesspeople. We expect wide domestic and foreign media coverage of the seminar (e.g. C-SPAN). Moreover, the event will be accessible on the IUCTS-Potomac Institute for Policy Studies website and a seminar summary will be published in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Review (please see attached information on this publication as well as general material on our academic programs).

We will be honored if you find it possible to join us on February 2, 2012 and would appreciate a response from you at your earliest convenience. I can be reached at yalexander@potomacinstitute.org or 703-525-0770 (office) and 301-518-2823 (cell).

With best wishes,  
Yonah Alexander
Rachad,

We have a mailing list to Washington team members – Embassy, consultants and Mac people. We pass on news items and other information they may find interesting from open sources. Below is a list of the names from the Embassy that were on the previous list before you arrived. Can you review at your convenience and add or subtract from the list please. Ed

Embassy personnel currently on the Wash Team List:
Hakim Sayeh
Hichame Dahane
Mouaad Ibriz
Ouafae Sehhar
Saida Zaid
Sandrine Boutonnet
Wassane Zailachi

Thank you, Ed
Rachad
I'm leaving for the airport shortly and on my cell if you want to contact me. While in Morocco
I'll be on my Moroccan cell as well.

We have been busy putting our strategy together and plan to email you a rough draft by
Sunday the 22nd. Is it possible for you and me to meet the week of the 23rd to compare
strategies?

Again, I remain at your service and please call me as needed. I will return to DC on saturday
January 21st. Ed
US cell +1 202 744 6810
Moroccan cell: +212 661 34 66 34
Ok, thanks. I may call with a interim report on the conference. I will definitely see Ambassador Kaplan here, I'm sure. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2012 8:35 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Re: Getting ready to depart

Hi Ed,

Thank you for the email and I wish you a great trip.
We can definitely meet when you are back and talk about the strategy.

In the meantime enjoy your trip.

As for Isobel Coleman, I managed to arrange meetings for her with the Minister of Habous, the Mourchidates and the Ministry of education because she requested it during her conference call with Saida, Calvin and Naomi.

Please feel free to call me if you need to.

Rachad

2012/1/13, Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>:
> Rachad
> I'm leaving for the airport shortly and on my cell if you want to
> contact me. While in Morocco I'll be on my Moroccan cell as well.
> 
> We have been busy putting our strategy together and plan to email you
> a rough draft by Sunday the 22nd. Is it possible for you and me to
> meet the week of the 23rd to compare strategies?
> 
> Again, I remain at your service and please call me as needed. I will
> return to DC on saturday January 21st. Ed US cell +1 202 744 6810
> Moroccan cell: +212 661 34 66 34
Rachad,

I’d like to propose a few items for your consideration in week ahead:

- I will work with Sandrine to schedule a lunch to further discuss the strategic plan. At that time perhaps we can agree on a way to keep each other informed on weekly activities. I’m concerned that as we go through our efforts to finalize the strategic plan we will miss the activities we are doing on a weekly basis. Let’s discuss how I can report to you weekly on our work etc.
- Do you want to finalize a strategic plan with our staffs? If so that would seem to be a next step after we agree on the plan.
- After we’ve agreed on a strategic plan and reviewed with staff, I then suggest you meet with the Washington team, including the Embassy, Mac and the consultants, to inform them of the plan and your priorities for the year. I think we should sign off on the strategic plan before you meet with the consultants. That way, in addition to a simple courtesy meeting with them you also will be outlining our plan for the year. I think this will be a very good way to present yourself and the way in which you and I are working together.

We can close off on these ideas when we next meet. Ed
Ambassador,

Attached is Jean’s report and assessment of the NAPEO conference for your information. We’d be happy to discuss further with you at your convenience. Thank you, Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
24 January 2012

TO: Ed Gabriel

FROM: Jean AbiNader
       Executive Director, MATIC

RE: PNB/NAPEO Report

While there are many criteria by which to evaluate the program, there are three that are most important for MATIC: program content, relevance of the content to US trade and investment policy, and opportunities going forward for Morocco. In addition, I will touch briefly on four other items: the pre-conference workshop, conference logistics, perceptions issues, and lessons learned. Please treat these perspectives as my personal views and not representing what I say/have said in public. You can check my blogs at www.moroccoonthemove.com for my public statements.

There were very few participants from the Maghreb governments. Most of the audience and presenters were from the private sector: NGOs, companies, entrepreneurs, civil society, business associations, and similar groups. This helped to focus topics and possible results more broadly than if specific government programs were being discussed. After the Moroccans, the largest group was from Algeria.

**Content**

The speakers, in terms of expertise and materials presented, were quite effective, relevant, and enthusiastic about the potential for the region. The plenary sessions were WEF style discussion format, which did not necessarily provide for enough substance in the introductory sessions. For example, the discussion among the chairs of the Local Advisory Boards of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria was useful for insights into their goals; however, the discussion featuring Madeleine Albright and others would have been more substantive if they had more time than an hour, when too much time was taken up by acknowledgements and pleasantries. Overall, the Moroccan presenters, from the Minister of Economy and Finance, and Mostafa Terrab, to those who are working on specific issues including Jai Hokimi (US - entrepreneurship), Omar Tazi (youth employment), Hicham Lahlou (design),
Ilham Zhiri (women mentoring), Adil Naji (US – design), and others, made a very strong showing.

Topics including a wide range of topics from K-12 education to training and mentoring, entrepreneurship promotion, financing related to business development, cross-border opportunities, marketing, and sessions on specific sectors. It was difficult not to have something to do for the entire time of the conference.

**Relevance to US Goals**
If the purpose of NAPEO is to facilitate the creation of public-private partnerships that will generate specific projects and programs that result in measurable achievements of job growth, then it has succeeded at this stage. The challenges are ahead as the local advisory boards must acquire resources, overcome hurdles in each country, not impose a bureaucracy on local efforts, ensure support from the governments, and reach out for cross-border cooperation.

The role of the US government is clearly not clear...there was confusion about the relationship of the State Department and the Aspen Institute (the secretariat for PNB/NAPEO on a contract basis), what could be expected in funding from US agencies, and what role the US embassies play in each country. The State Department has funded the Education for Employment (EfE) expansion into Tunisia and Algeria with Libya to follow when it’s ready. It has also given a grant to EfE in Morocco for a start-up program. The State Department does not have additional funding to undertake program activities beyond seed monies for such programs. In addition, the role of the Aspen Institute creates confusion because it is a contractor, not a US agency, and so does not/cannot fund projects under its mandate.

Whether or not the US will eventually benefit from the PNB/NAPEO initiative is ultimately in the hands of the local advisory boards and the Aspen Institute. As importantly, the local US embassies must be fully integrated into the program, which may conflict with their own USAID and MEPI priorities and their concern with initiatives over which the embassies have little control. This was clearly the case in Morocco until weeks before the Marrakech convention. There are US trade and investment promotion agencies that can play a helpful role, if the participants are exposed to their services and contact information. This is a key role for the US embassies and commercial offices.

One feature of the conference that was important but not handled well was the continual announcements of new initiatives and programs, such as a venture capital fund, funding for franchising, etc., that were made at every plenary session/meals. Very few people paid attention to the announcements and they did not “fire up the crowd,” which was probably the intention.

**Opportunities for Morocco**
Given the level of participation by Moroccans and the range of initiatives that are underway, there appears to be a strong probability for growing jobs and companies over the next year. An interesting question is how the new government, which is focused on job creation, will look on NAPEO and the local committee. A great deal more can be achieved if there is coordination between the private sector and government agencies concerned with employment, entrepreneurship, and de-regulating bureaucratic commercial regimes. Corruption in Morocco, logistics tie-ups in the ports, antiquated rules on transshipments, and other impediments were mentioned by international companies that work in the Maghreb. Although Algeria was more criticized, that’s not our problem...and it’s not an excuse for not pursuing more aggressively those steps that will make Morocco more business friendly, from revising labor regulations to reducing the levels of corruption at the ports.

It is also clear that if NAPEO is to be effective in Morocco, it must depoliticize the image of its local advisory board. It will be helpful if the local board is able to gain recognition from the new government by having access to ministries that can facilitate access to resources, reforms, and outreach to small and medium-sized enterprises.

From the various panels and workshops, it is obvious that Morocco has much to gain and to offer within the region. Tourism, entrepreneurship, IT, tourism/hospitality services, microfinance, and agro-industries are areas for cooperation and expansion. Tunisia is poised to take a prominent position in tourism once again and it would be smart for Moroccan operators to be engaging their counterparts in Tunisia to look at regional tour packages combining the best of both countries. There is some question about how the local boards will encourage cross-border cooperation or how they will enable the participants at the conference to systematically follow up leads to which they have been exposed.

**Related Concerns**
As previously mentioned, there are four areas for additional comments that may be useful.

**Pre-conference workshops**
In response to a recommendation that the conference provide a higher-level of hands-on experience/expertise to the participants, NAPEO scheduled a day of workshops before the conference. Due to miscommunication with the local advisory committee, the workshops were not promoted in Morocco and those who attended were charged a fee separate from the conference. The content and presentations in the workshops was of a very high quality but there was very poor attendance. In most sessions, there were more presenters than attendees. The concept is right; the execution was a disaster. Hopefully, this will not be a problem next year in Tunisia.

**Logistics**
This was the greatest weakness of the conference and was the responsibility of the local advisory board. Registration did not open on time; in fact it was delayed for four hours. Every day the schedule was over time as the day started late and never recovered. Whenever there were breaks, attendees did not return to the sessions. This could not be helped since the primary purpose was networking but it could have been managed much better. These are not new issues for conference organizers. Directions to the rooms for concurrent sessions were unclear. Attendees were not fully aware that updated schedules were produced continually, thereby missing or arriving late at sessions. Integration of efforts between the local board and Aspen was not smooth.

The food was unsatisfactory and service to the rooms was 2+ stars, not better. The location was not user friendly; and the hotel, while attractive, was a taxi ride from the medina...not helpful to promoting tourism and not a good example to the other countries!

Perceptions
While this was not obvious to others, a number of Moroccans mentioned that it was unfortunate that the hotel, travel logistics, food and beverages, design firm, events management, and other services were all provided by a single vendor, who was on the local advisory board. If the overall effort had been first class, then there would have been less complaining or at least it would be more defensible.

Lessons Learned
While remedies for the logistics and other concerns mentioned above may not affect next year’s program in Tunisia, there are some lessons that Morocco should take advantage of going forward.

- Workshops are a vital component of these types of programs. The more hands-on the presentations, the more likely the learning. Workshops should be fully integrated into the program.
- Local advisory boards are ambassadors for their countries to the private sector/civil society. They should maximize opportunities to consult, develop a strategy, gather the needed resources, and work as a team with Aspen to succeed.
- Morocco should come to Tunisia prepared with concrete options for cross-border projects: in tourism, IT, services, and other areas. This will require follow up by the local advisory board in Morocco with participants to get their inputs and project ideas and build them into proposals.
- Morocco should have an institutional means for coordinating with NAPEO. With the change in government, there was a hiatus in coordination. Perhaps an agency such as AMDI or a Regional Investment Center should have the responsibility over the longer term. Rather than waiting until the last months before the conference, efforts should start now to broaden Morocco’s participation in Tunisia based on follow up to Marrakech.
Unfortunately I have no new updates to provide you on your contracts for 2012. While I am confident that we will receive answers soon, I cannot make any commitments at this time and therefore cannot pay for any services after February 1st. I hope you will understand this unusual circumstance and bear with us until we get through this transition with the new government in Rabat. Thank you, Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Attached is a chronology we prepared, as background, for the upcoming Potomac conference. It will also be used in our strategy as we discuss what we can and cannot discuss on this issue moving forward. Your input in this future exercise will be important. This provides you with a view of how we sometimes work hand in hand with Think Tanks, offering our research capability only, without authorship. Very good background for you on this subject. Ed
CHRONOLOGY – Why it’s time to Close the Camps

Timeline of documented incidents & reports linking members of the Polisario Front, based at refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, with illicit, renegade actions and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Polisario members engage in drug & arms smuggling in Sahel, gun battles in Mali, kidnappings for AQIM, & as mercenaries for Qaddafi

It’s time to close the camps & stop letting US aid $$ subsidize renegades & terrorist recruits

Washington, DC (January 2012) – Late last year, Polisario insiders reportedly helped an offshoot of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnap three Western aid workers from Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, supplying assailants with arms and directions to the victims. The incident is only the latest in a long line of recent illicit, renegade acts by Polisario cadres based in the camps – including drug & arms smuggling, gun battles in Mali, mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya, and kidnappings & collaborating to expand AQIM’s terror network in Africa’s Sahel.

Growing AQIM ties with Polisario and other militants in the region – Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, FARC in Colombia, and AQAP in Yemen – have created what AFRICOM head US General Carter Ham calls a “threat to the US” and British Foreign Secretary William Hague warns could have a “profoundly destabilizing effect on countries in North Africa and the Gulf.” The AQIM-Polisario connection is also a clear threat to aid workers and refugees forced to live in the Tindouf camps. It’s time to free the refugees and close the camps.

Reviewing the CHRONOLOGY of documented incidents and expert reports confirms the separatist Polisario-run camps have become a dangerous recruiting ground for AQIM, hub for trafficking arms across the Sahel and drugs into Europe, and threat to the security of the region and reforms of the Arab Spring.

Top 5 Reasons to Close the Camps

▶ Polisario recruits carry out AQIM kidnappings – In addition to the three taken from the camps Oct. 23, Mauritania court records reveal AQIM paid Polisario veterans to kidnap Spanish nationals in 2009. Since 2006 AQIM has abducted some 50 Westerners for an est. $130 million in ransom. AQIM offshoot ‘al Qaeda in Polisario camps’ reportedly seized two more victims, French, on Nov. 24.

▶ Polisario drug & arms smuggling rings among Sahel’s largest – Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania have arrested dozens of Polisario members caught leading and operating major AQIM-linked drug and arms trafficking rings.

▶ Polisario incursions, gun battles in Mali – On Dec. 15, a Polisario cadre invaded Mali, kills one, kidnaps three. Mali warns: ‘this isn’t the Wild West.’ In Sept., a gun battle between Polisario and rival drug gangs kills four in Mali.

▶ Polisario mercenaries hired by Qaddafi to fight NATO/Libya rebels – Senior NATO officials received reliable information last spring that Qaddafi paid hundreds of Polisario mercenaries $10,000 to fight for him in Libya.

▶ Polisario denies rights, confines refugees, who are welcome elsewhere – Refugees in the camps are among the only in the world welcome to go elsewhere if the Polisario let them. Instead refugees are confined to the camps & denied their rights. Thousands have escaped to Moroccan Western Sahara. Those who succeed never go back. Those caught the Polisario jails inside containers sent for humanitarian aid. Since 1990 international agencies have spent more than $1 billion on the camps – more than $300 million from the US. Much is diverted for Polisario profit & smuggling. This has to stop. US aid $$ must only be used for durable solutions to resettle & repatriate refugees, not to deny rights or subsidize renegades & terrorist recruits.

It’s time to close the camps, free the refugees, and shut down the Polisario-run base for AQIM recruits and renegades in the region.
Jan. 11, 2012
Algerian and Mauritanian security agencies reportedly break up major drug trafficking and money laundering rings. Officials say the rings are believed linked with groups such as Al Qaida, which is working with the Polisario to traffic arms and drugs from Mauritania to neighbors north. Mali reportedly also steps up efforts against AQIM and what is believed its latest offshoot, “Al Qaida in Polisario Camps,” said to abduct two French nationals Nov. 2011.¹ World Tribune, 1-11-12

Jan. 3, 2012
Security expert Dr. J. Peter Pham, Atlantic Council, reports economic and political reforms in Africa are “threatened by the spread of violent extremism” and “increasing links” between AQIM and other militants in the Sahel, recently “buoyed by the flow of arms and fighters” from Libya. “More ominously, AQIM has increased its linkages with the Polisario,” evidence in AQIM’s Oct. 23 kidnappings near Tindouf, which were “aided by Polisario sympathizers” inside the Polisario’s camps. The camps offer “a ready pool of potential recruits” from “large numbers of idle young fighters.” ² Atlantic Council, 1-11-12

Dec. 27, 2011
Mali reportedly distances itself from the Polisario, accusing it of kidnapping, drug trafficking, and suspected collusion with a Sahrawi branch of al-Qaeda in the Magreb. A source close to the government says Mali is "angry" with the Polisario, and Mali officials say the Oct. 23 kidnapping was done in collusion with the ‘Sahrawi link’ of AQIM.³ AFP, 12-27-11

Dec. 24, 2011
Mali refuses entry to "eight young Sahrawis" coming from Niger. "They had no papers. There are laws to be respected in Mali especially when it comes to dubious propaganda," said Mali police.⁴ AFP, 12-27-11

Dec. 17, 2011
Mali warns Polisario “our country is not the Wild West where they can come to kill and kidnap people.” Bamako will "no longer accept the violation of its territorial integrity by the Polisario Front," says a Malian Minister. A local official adds, "everybody here knows who AQIM’s accomplices are, they even assisted in abducting the Europeans in Tindouf. His name is Omar al Sahraoui but neither Mali, nor Algeria, nor the Polisario are doing anything to capture him." In 2010, al Sahraoui, reportedly a Polisario veteran, was sentenced to 12 years in Mauritania for kidnapping Spanish aid workers for AQIM, according to Mauritania court papers. He was later released in a trade for the aid workers.⁵ Middle East Online, 12-17-11

Dec. 15, 2011
Security analysts warn that AQIM is seeking to turn the region into “a new Somalia” on the edge of Southern Europe. The Western Sahara dispute is cited as a key impediment to regional coordination to counter the rising threat.⁶ UPI, 12-13-11

TERSOTM HOT SPOT: AL-QAEDA CASTS SHADOW OVER SAHEL, EXPANDS ACROSS AFRICA
Traces path through Failed/Fragile States, Links with Cartels at new Crossroads of Terrorism & Trafficking

ICTS — International Center for Terrorism Studies, at Potomac Institute for Policy Studies — October 2011
Dec. 15, 2011
Polisario launches armed incursion into northern Mali, killing one, abducting three others, ostensibly looking for kidnappers of three Western aid workers taken Oct. 23 from Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria.7 MIDDLE EAST ONLINE, 12-17-11

Dec. 10, 2011
A splinter group of AQIM confirms holding the three aid workers kidnapped on Oct. 23 near the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. The group, linked by some to al Sahraoui, calls itself "Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa."8 AFP, 12-10-11

Dec. 8, 2011
AQIM denies Oct. 23 kidnapping of three Spanish and Italian aid workers in southern Algeria, but confirms two other abductions in Mali, of two French men, and a Dutch, Swedish, and South African national.9 AP, 12-9-11

Nov. 30, 2011
US House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hears testimony that AQIM is expanding its ties in the Sahel to the Polisario, as well as to militant Nigerian group Boko Haram and Somalia-based al-Shabaab.10 WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, 12-15-11

Nov. 28, 2011
UK Foreign Secretary William Hague says AQIM’s expanding terrorist ties to other militant groups in the Sahel could have a “profoundly destabilizing” effect on a region already rocked by the Arab Spring.11 REUTERS, 11-28-11

Nov. 25, 2011
AQIM kidnaps a Dutch, Swedish, S. African, kills one German in Timbuktu.12 AP, 12-9-11

Nov. 24, 2011
AQIM kidnaps two French tourists from their hotel at night in eastern Mali, claiming they are spies.13 AP, 12-9-11

Nov. 7, 2011
Algerian Chief of Staff General Qaid Saleh reportedly reprimands Polisario chief Mohammed Abdul Aziz for allowing an Al Qaida presence inside the Polisario-controlled camps in Tindouf.14 WORLD TRIBUNE, 11-7-11

Nov. 6, 2011
W. Post columnist J. Rubin cites alarm at AQIM kidnapings in Polisario camps. “This is a catastrophe waiting to happen. The need to empty the camps, deprive AQIM of a supply of victims and accomplices, and restore order has never been greater.”15 WASHINGTON POST, 11-6-11

Oct. 26, 2011
Spanish daily El Pais reports on Tindouf abductions that “To cross the checkpoints of the Algerian army and Polisario, kidnappers benefited from support of Polisario’s military.”16 MOROCCO WORLD NEWS, 10-26-11

Oct. 25, 2011
Spain requests UN security mission to Polisario-run camps. “We’ve asked the UN to send a mission to Algeria to assess the security situation in the camps of Tindouf” – For. Minister Trinidad Jimenez.17 AL ARABIYA, 10-25-11

Oct. 23, 2011
AQIM splinter group kidnaps three Western aid workers from Polisario-run camps in Algeria, reportedly with Polisario-insider help. “Unarmed AQIM militants entered the Sahrawi refugee camp in Tindouf, western Algeria, where sympathizers of the Polisario Front gave them weapons and helped them seek out the hostages.”18 AFP, 10-30-11

Sept. 29, 2011
Mauritanian President reports that AQIM has acquired Libyan arms, including surface-to-air missiles.19 VOA, 9-29-11

Sept. 20, 2011
US expert says the “Polisario is intensifying activities to transport and smuggle illegal drugs in both North Africa and Europe. The Polisario is working with Al Qaida in both the drug & weapons trade” – Y. Alexander, ICTS.20 WORLD TRIBUNE, 9-20-11
Sept. 15, 2011
Malian security forces hunt for rival gangs of drug smugglers from Mali, Niger, and the Polisario, after desert gun battle over ton of cocaine and hashish leaves four dead, according to a Malian army official.21 MIDDLE EAST ONLINE, 9-15-11

Sept. 10, 2011
Analysts say Libyan dictator Qaddafi’s fall seriously weakens the Polisario in its dispute with Morocco on the Western Sahara, after widespread reports that Polisario mercenaries sided with Qaddafi.22 AFP, 9-10-11

May 29, 2011
US Cong. Mario Diaz-Balart urges colleagues give "serious attention" to evidence Polisario members are "participating as mercenaries in Col. Gadhafi’s murderous campaign."23 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, 5-29-11

May 20, 2011
US Administration expresses concern to Algeria that “credible sources report” Polisario mercenaries are being paid by Qaddafi “to fight NATO-led forces and kill Libyan protesters and rebels,”24 WORLD TRIBUNE, 5-20-11

April 21, 2011
London Telegraph reports senior NATO officials have received information Col. Qaddafi is hiring 450 Polisario mercenaries for $10,000 each to fight Libyan rebels and prop up his regime.25 LONDON TELEGRAPH, 4-21-11

Jan. 16, 2011
Former Polisario Chief Police Inspector, Mustapha Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud says “the situation is grave for the youth who are marginalized” in Polisario-run camps in Algeria. “The camps are fertile grounds for Islamic fundamentalist groups and drug traffickers.”26 WASHINGTON POST, 1-16-11

Jan. 6, 2011
Terrorism cell and arms cache broken up in W. Sahara, arrests suggest “links between AQIM and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front.”27 Washington Post columnist J. Rubin writes: “There is ample evidence the Polisario Front... is in league with al-Qaeda.”28 WASHINGTON POST, 1-6-11 and 1-16-11

Jan. 3, 2010
US DEA former Director of Operations, Michael Braun, calls conditions ‘dismal for Saharan living in the Polisario-run camps,’ which have become "a breeding-ground for potential future AQIM recruits."29 FOREIGN POLICY/THE MIDDLE EAST CHANNEL, 1-3-11

Dec. 21, 2010
Leaders arrested in one of Sahel’s largest drug-smuggling rings have close ties to the Polisario Front. Niger officials call it “one of the major drug trafficking networks” in the Sahara... It is known as "Polisario" because 90% of its members come from camps of the Polisario Front.30 MIDDLE EAST ONLINE, 12-21-10

Dec. 9, 2010
Political experts express increasing concern about violence instigated by pro-Polisario militants in Laayoune, Western Sahara. “The situation is becoming more dangerous, because of the violence and because al-Qaeda is now present,” – political analyst T. Tarik.31 NY TIMES, 12-9-10

Nov. 30, 2010
AQIM reported for first time to supply operatives to al-Qaeda’s Yemeni arm (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula/AQAP) to assist in a thwarted seaborne attack against France.32 WASHINGTON POST, 11-30-10
Nov. 10, 2010
Algeria reports “Cocaine that comes from Brazil, Peru, and Colombia supports the nucleus of al-Qaeda in the region” – Algerian head of the National Office for Combating Drugs & Addiction, Abdelmalek Sayeh.33 MAGHAREBIA, 11-10-10

Oct. 18, 2010
Drug ring linked to AQIM dismantled in Morocco; Sahrawi recruits cited. VOA report cites experts and evidence from Mauritania and Mali that AQIM has over the last two years worked “to recruit Sahrawis who are trained fighters to carry out their operations.”34 VOA, 10-18-10

Aug. 23, 2010
AQIM frees three Spanish kidnapping victims after Mauritanian agrees to release kidnapping perpetrator, Omar Sahraoui, who is “believed to have been a senior commander of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.”35 ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8-23-10

July 2010
Mauritania sentences reported Polisario veteran, Omar al Sahraoui, to 12 years for 2009 kidnapping of Spanish aid workers. Mauritanian court papers document that he was paid by AQIM along with at least three other Polisario veterans to carry out the crime.36 WORLD DEFENSE REVIEW, 9-23-10

April 12, 2010
Security expert says Western Sahara conflict is a “vicious cycle” terrorists can use as an opening to exploit; cites “evidence members of the military arm of the Polisario Front have been involved.”37 JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA, 4-12-10

February 2010
Polisario veteran Omar le Sahraoui is arrested in Mali and extradited to stand trial in Mauritania for kidnapping the Spanish aid workers.38 WORLD DEFENSE REVIEW, 9-23-10

Nov. 29, 2009
AQIM claims responsibility for kidnapping three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania. Mauritanian security services later discover that AQIM had hired Omar le Sahraoui—who was reportedly a member of the Polisario’s hierarchy—and at least three other Polisario veterans to organize and carry out the abductions.39 WORLD DEFENSE REVIEW, 9-23-10

July 2009
U.S. Committee for Refugees & Immigrants (USCRI) issues report, “Stonewalling Refugee Rights: Algeria & the Sahrawi,” that calls attention to the Polisario’s routine abuse and denial of refugee rights at the Tindouf camps in southwestern Algeria. The report notes the camps are located in a bleak part of the Sahara called ‘Devil’s Garden’ where “prospects for livelihoods are virtually non-existent,” from which refugees are denied the freedom to leave. It cites the 2008 case of Aboh Sghair, a refugee born in the camps, who the Polisario jailed after catching him trying to escape with his wife to Morocco. He bears scars after being chained 3 months in a food container (right) that international relief groups use to deliver humanitarian aid.40 USCRI, July 2009
"N. African states take down major narcoterror drug network,"  
**WORLD TRIBUNE**, 1-11-12


"The Islamist Threat to Africa's Rise in 2012,"  
**ATLANTIC COUNCIL**, J. Peter Pham, 1-3-12


"Mal distances itself from the Polisario Front,"  
**AFP**, 12-27-11

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hJQYCSJBL5a0NCGjPMIyCS8SryfQ?docId=CNG.4df034a80725d0c44df3a185f954e26d4  

"Kidnappers of 3 European aid workers benefit from Polisario security apparatus' support,"  
**REPORT: AL-QAIDA IN N. AFRICA? ,** 11-20-11


"Al-Qaeda splinter group' claims kidnap of Westerners,"  
**AFP**, 12-10-11

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i4CHA2HdwpcQJ_XrfCkoFm4echBQ?docId=CNG.09c4b9e875fc23c8718820ade10fe&index=0  

**AP/USA TODAY**, 12-9-11


"Western Sahara: Forgotten Corner of Arab Spring,"  
**WORLD POLITICS REVIEW**, 12-15-11


"AQIM expansion could be "profoundly destabilizing" to Arab Spring nations: UK Foreign Secretary,"  
**REUTERS**, 11-28-11


**AP/USA TODAY**, 12-9-11


"Report: Al-Qaida in North Africa denies kidnapping of European aid workers by Polisario,"  
**MAIL ONLINE**, 12-17-11

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2224211/Al-Qaida-splinter-group-claims-kidnapping-Westerners.html  

"Al-Qa'ida affiliate flexing its muscles in the Maghreb,"  
**WASHINGTON POST**, Jennifer Rubin, 11-6-11


"Kidnappers of 3 European aid workers benefit from Polisario security apparatus' support,"  
**MOROCCO WORLD NEWS**, 10-26-11


"Has Spain switched gear on the Western Sahara conflict?"  
**AL ARABIYA ,** 10-25-11

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/25/174691.html  

"Three Qaeda hostages seized last week alive: mediator,"  
**AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (AFP) ,** 10-30-11

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i4CHA2HdwpcQJ_XrfCkoFm4echBQ?docId=CNG.09c4b9e875fc23c8718820ade10fe&index=0  

"Gadhafi Collapse Raises Concerns Over Arms for Africa Al-Qaida,"  
**VOICE OF AMERICA**, 9-29-11


"Report: Polisario working with Al Qaida in drug, weapons trafficking,"  
**WORLD TRIBUNE**, 9-20-11


"Mali security forces hunt desert drug traffickers belonging to Polisario Front,"  
**MIDDLE EAST ONLINE**, 9-15-11

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english?id=48062  

"Kadhafi's fall strengthens Morocco over Western Sahara,"  
**AFP**, 9-10-11

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i4CHA2HdwpcQJ_XrfCkoFm4echBQ?docId=CNG.09c4b9e875fc23c8718820ade10fe&index=0  

"US wants probe on Gadhafi's alleged recruitment of mercenaries from Algeria to fight NATO, rebels,"  
**INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES**, 5-29-11


"Sources: Gadhafi paying Polisario mercenaries $10,000 each to fight for him,"  
**WORLD TRIBUNE**, 5-20-11


"Libya: Col Gaddafi 'has spent £2.1m on mercenaries','"  
**LONDON TELEGRAPH ,** 4-21-11

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/lebanon/libya/4864254/Libya-Col-Gaddafi-has-spent-2-1m-on-mercenaries.html  

"Exclusive: Ex-Polisario Front police chief tells his story,"  
**WASHINGTON POST**, Jennifer Rubin, 1-16-11


"Arrests of Terrorism Suspects Announced,"  
**WASHINGTON POST**, World Digest from ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1-6-11

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/05/AR2010120506468.html  

"Morocco: A Different Kind of Muslim Country,"  
**WASHINGTON POST**, Jennifer Rubin, 1-12-11

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/right-turn/2011/01/morocco_a-different-kind_of_muslim_country.html  

"Unlikely bedfellows: Are some Saharan Marxists joining Al-Qaida in N. Africa? ,"  
**FOREIGN POLICY/MIDDLE EAST CHANNEL , 1-3-11

http://mideastforeignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/03/unlikely_bedfellows_are_some_saharan_marxists_joining_al_qaida_operations_in_north  

"Key members of Sahara drug ring captured are from Morocco,"  
**MIDDLE EAST ONLINE**, 12-21-10

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english?id=43149  

"Desert Land in Limbo Is Torn Apart,"  
**NEW YORK TIMES ,** 12-9-10


"Al-Qaeda Yemen affiliate widens search for recruits, targets,"  
**WASHINGTON POST**, 11-30-10


"Al-Qaeda looks to Sahel for new funding sources,"  
**MAGHABRIA ,** 11-10-10


"Morocco says dismantled drug ring linked to terrorists,"  
**VOICE OF AMERICA ,** 10-18-10


"Spanish hostages freed by al-Qaeda arrive in Spain,"  
**ASSOCIATED PRESS ,** 8-23-10

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=11464811  

"Threat of Emboldened al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb,"  
**WORLD DEFENSE REVIEW ,** J. Peter Pham, 9-23-10

http://worlddefensereview.com/pham092310.shtml  

"Not Another Failed State: Toward Realistic Solution in Western Sahara,"  
**JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA ,** 4-12-10


"Threat of Emboldened al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb,"  
**WORLD DEFENSE REVIEW ,** J. Peter Pham, 9-23-10

http://worlddefensereview.com/pham092310.shtml  

"Threat of Emboldened al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb,"  
**WORLD DEFENSE REVIEW ,** J. Peter Pham, 9-23-10

http://worlddefensereview.com/pham092310.shtml  

"Stonewalling Refugee Rights: Algeria and the Sahrawis ,"  
**US COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS ,** Merrill Smith, July 2009

http://www.uscirefugees.org/2010Website/3_CourtWork/3_2-1_3_Morocco/Stonewalling.pdf
The following report is from open and closed sources. None of the information has been corroborated by third parties.

**ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT**

**Executive Summary**

**Political Trends**
- Gen. Ahmed Kherfi has been replaced as head of the DSI, the domestic security branch of the DRS, by Gen. Bachir Tartag, who has a reputation for brutality in combating islamist subversion.
- Parliamentary elections which are to be held in the first half of May look set to be considerably more transparent than previous polls, and there is a strong possibility that islamist parties will fare particularly well.
- The regime appears to be preparing for a carefully managed hand-over to an islamist dominated coalition government, although this is likely to unsettle the 'secular-modernist' within the regime itself.
- In what seems to be a tactical move ahead of the elections, the government has begun legalising new political parties, the better to ensure that no single party can win an outright majority.

**Foreign Relations**
- Moroccan Foreign Minister S. Othmani’s visit to Algeria – his first foreign trip since taking office – has been taken as a sign that a rapprochement between Rabat and Algiers is making headway.
- Othmani, like his colleagues in the new islamist-led, does not have an entirely free hand, however, and those who really wield power in both Rabat and Algiers still seem reluctant to make compromises over the key issues dividing them: the border, and Western Sahara.
- Morocco has been invited to take part in the second Ministerial Conference on security in the Sahara-Sahel region to be held in Bamako in February, largely because Algiers now recognises that broader international cooperation is necessary to confront the challenge of the spread of weapons from Libya across the region.
- A source at the Algerian presidency has spoken disparagingly of Polisario's ability to contribute to the counter-terrorism effort in the Sahara.

**Security**
- After a lull, AQMI’s level of activity picked up again in late December and January. Most incidents were as usual concentrated in Kabylia.
- In the Algiers region, the security forces have clashed with jihadists just to the south of Houari Boumedienne Airport.
- The governor of Illizi province in the south-east has been abducted and held for a time in Libyan territory before being freed by a Libyan militia.
- Both AQMI’s Sahel branch and the dissident group which kidnapped three Western aid workers from Polisario’s camps in Tindouf last autumn have issued communiqués threatening France.
Political Trends

As the Algerian regime gingerly negotiates the changes brought on by the 'Arab Spring', there has been a change at the head of the crucial Directorate of Internal Security (DSI) within the DRS intelligence and security service. On Dec. 22, Gen. Abdelkader 'Ahmed' Kherfi, who had headed the DSI for just over two years, was replaced by Gen. Bachir 'Athmane' Tartag, a DRS career officer with a reputation as a hardliner, who was apparently called back from retirement for the occasion.

The move – officially made necessary by Kherfi's unspecified health problems – attracted an unusually large volume of media comment, most of it speculative (and possibly encouraged by the military and security establishment itself), with various explanations being put forward for the change at the top of this important institution. *El Watan* claims Kherfi was dismissed because of “the many setbacks suffered by the security services in the fight against AQMI”; Tartag's task, the newspaper argues, is to “eradicate the last foci of AQMI that still exist in the north of the country and to prevent the possible proliferation of terrorism to the borders with Libya, Niger and Mali, particularly in the wake of the major geopolitical upheavals in North Africa”. *Le Matin* concurs that Kherfi was ditched because of shortcomings in counter-terrorism, pointing to the kidnapping of European aid workers on from Polisario's Rabouni camp in October as a particular failing; the appointment of Tartag is “synonymous with a strategic shift in the strata of power”, argues *Le Matin*. Specialised news portal Kalima DZ notes that Gen. Kherfi “did not know how to, or could not, prevent the spread of riots, strikes, rallies and the media and the return of radical opposition” and suggests that Gen. Tartag will respond more swiftly, and more harshly, to events such as the food price riots that shook Algerian cities a year ago; thus “the Algerian generals have decided to raise a dam against the tide of history”. Another specialised website, Maghreb Intelligence, for its part, places the change at the head of the DSI in the context of a struggle for Lt-Gen. Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène's succession at the head of the DRS itself, suggesting that Tartag is Tewfik's preferred dauphin.

A source close to Tewfik to whom we spoke puts the removal of Kherfi down to a “business dispute of some sort” and insists that the change has nothing to do with the Tewfik's succession – notwithstanding occasional press speculation about his health, the DRS chief “isn't going anywhere” in the foreseeable future, insists the source. Even so, the choice of such a controversial figure as Tartag – who would certainly be the target of law suits from Algerian exile opposition groups for past human rights abuses should he ever have to travel to Europe – is by no means anodyne, and merits some consideration.

The change at the head of the DRS' domestic security arm comes at a sensitive time. Although there may be some sense that the Algerian regime has managed to ride out the worst of the turbulence of the Arab Spring, the coming parliamentary elections – due to be held in the first half of May – are likely to be a delicate moment. Conditions may not be in place for completely free and fair elections (amongst other things, the deeply flawed electoral registers have not been revised, leaving the door open to instances of multiple voting and other abuse), but the signs so far are that the regime is preparing for a poll that will be considerably more transparent than previous elections, in which rigging has on occasion been quite egregious – sizeable numbers of
international observers are to be invited this time, it would seem, and clear perspex ballot boxes are supposed
to replace the eminently stuffable receptacles used in the past. Islamist parties – with considerable support in
Algerian society at large, and buoyed by Islamist electoral victories in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt – are likely to
fare the best in any reasonably free election, and indeed an Islamist parliamentary majority could by no means
be ruled out. Indeed, it would seem to be in anticipation of this that the “house-trained” Islamist MSP
announced on Jan. 1 that it was leaving the Presidential Alliance, in which it has been partnered with the FLN
and the RND for the past eight years, and striking out on its own (albeit without giving up its ministerial
portfolios for the time being). An 'alternance à la marocaine' – a carefully prepared and managed handover to
an Islamist-dominated coalition government – would appear to be the regime's chosen path, or at least an
option that it is prepared to consider. Objectively, a government with an Islamist orientation is by no means
incompatible with the interests of the regime's main stakeholders, as long as guarantees are given with regard
to their power and privileges (immunity from prosecution for human rights abuses, respect for property rights
including for those whose wealth was acquired through their proximity to the state apparatus, etc.) – after all,
successive Presidential Alliance governments, under the influence of the MSP and the “islamo-conservative”
wing of the FLN led by Abdelaziz Belkhadem, have already done much for the re-Islamisation of social mores
and, arguably, of the law. But subjectively the regime is encumbered with the legacy of the civil war of the 1990s
and 2000s, during which it relied heavily on anti-Islamist discourse, expounded most consistently and
persistently by the secular-modernists not only in the media and political class but also within the regime's own
ranks, including in the Army and security services. These secular-modernist elements will certainly be
alarmed by the slide towards an openly Islamist government, potentially provoking tensions within the regime's own
organs. Against this background, the appointment of an officer with a reputation as an unflinching, indeed
brutal, enemy of the Islamists to head the DSI may be designed to allay such misgivings.

In the meantime, in preparing its tactics for the forthcoming election, the government appears to be doing all it
can to balkanise the political landscape, so that no single political force can obtain a majority. In an apparent
reversal of past practice, Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia has given the go-ahead for at least ten new parties
to hold their constituent assemblies and intimated that full authorisation to operate can be delivered within as
little as a month – in plenty of time for the parliamentary elections. Among these are at least three Islamist
parties: Abdelmajid Menasra's Front National pour le Changement (a split-off from the MSP), Ahmed Djaballah's
Front pour la Justice et le Développement and Mohamed Saïd's Parti pour la Liberté et la Justice. While the
Moroccan experience suggests that such a tactic can be very effective, it is worth considering that the
multiplication of political groups is likely to increase the workload of the DRS, and more particularly the DSI,
which has historically made a point not only of monitoring all political formations but also of maintaining agents
of influence within them. Be it by accident or design, both the strategy and the tactics currently adopted by the
Algerian regime seem to be guaranteed to enhance still further the specific weight of the DRS in general, and
the DSI in particular.
Regime Vulnerability Barometer®

Algeria risk factor levels
up to January 27

Score:
0.00 (yellow): low.
1.00 (red): high.

Youth rebellion
- Endemic or worsening youth / graduate unemployment, housing shortage for young couples, lower middle and working classes adopting youth grievances, etc.

Loss of state monopoly over ideas and information
- Contagion of ideas, ease of circulation of information, independently of the authorities: degree of internet penetration, number of mobile telephone subscribers, access to satellite TV, etc.

Cultural hegemony failure
- Cultural hegemony can be said to have failed when segments of society no longer espouse the values of the ruling elite and the latter is compelled to resort to violence in order to assert its power.

Coalescent Opposition
- Risk to the regime increases whenever existing ethnic / religious / regional cleavages do not hinder the emergence of a united opposition at a national level.

Succession crisis
- Crisis of governance and/or succession, ageing leader, "hereditary republic" syndrome, etc.

Divisions within the security forces
- Internal rivalries, splits within the security services, government neglect of important segments of the armed forces, degree of reliance on conscripts, etc.
REGIME VULNERABILITY BAROMETER®

Algeria risk factor levels
Changes between February 2011 and January 2012

- Youth rebellion
- Loss of state monopoly over ideas and information
- Cultural hegemony failure
- Coalescent Opposition
- Succession crisis
- Divisions within the security forces

Score:
0.00: low
1.00: high

Change over time

© 2012 Middle East Technical Studies BAIL
Foreign Relations

Several months ago, it will be recalled, Algerian sources began to suggest that, with the old regional certainties crumbling around them, Algeria's leaders might envisage mending bridges with Morocco, in the hope of securing at least one stable relationship with a neighbouring country. More recently, shortly after Morocco's parliamentary elections last November in which the moderate Islamists PJD emerged as the largest single party, one of the party's top leaders intimated to us that one of the central points of its programme for government was a "re-examination" of Morocco's relations with Algeria and a creative re-think of all the disputes between the two countries (see AMSR #109). With the visit to Algiers this week by Morocco's new Foreign Minister Saadedine El Othmani (one of the PJD's main leaders), these trends towards rapprochement seemed at last to be coming together – an impression that was strengthened all the more by Algerian media reports that Morocco would henceforth be taking part in meetings of the so-called pays du champ group devoted to security in the Sahara-Sahel region, from which it has so far been pointedly excluded.

El Othmani has made a point of choosing Algiers as the destination for his very first trip abroad as Foreign Minister, but it would not do to mistake it as a revolution in relations between the two countries, or even the beginning of one. The PJD may be sincerely committed to reorienting Moroccan foreign policy towards ties with Arab and Muslim countries, beginning by clearing the air with Algeria, but in this as in other domains its hands are not entirely free. The elected, PJD-dominated government is effectively shadowed by what amounts to a parallel government of royal advisors at the Palace – among them El Othmani's predecessor Taieb Fassi-Fihri, a long-time friend and associate of the King, who was given a position in the Palace team as soon as he had handed over the Foreign Ministry – and there is little or no realistic chance of El Othmani and his colleagues overstepping the boundaries set by the Palace.

To be sure, as Foreign Minister Fassi-Fihri himself had over the preceding months been making positive-sounding noises about normalisation of relations with Algeria (see AMSR #109). But there can be no prospect of qualitative change in relations between the two countries as long as each continues to insist on the other's total surrender on the two key bones of contention between them, to wit the question of the border and the fate of Western Sahara, and there is as yet no sign that either Algiers or Rabat is really prepared to grasp those nettles. Indeed, El Othmani was unable to discuss either the border or the Western Sahara question while in Algiers. El Othmani and his Algerian counterpart Mourad Medelci did promise one another that they would meet for "political talks" every six months, and it was announced that an Algerian-Moroccan High Joint Committee will meet in Rabat on February 17, but these steps are altogether in continuity with the policy followed by Fassi-Fihri. Arguably the most striking innovation of El Othmani's trip to Algiers was his one-on-one meeting with Boudjerra Soltani – the leader of the moderate Islamist MSP, who holds no government position – at the MSP headquarters on Jan. 24, after the completion of his official two-day visit.

The day after El Othmani left Algiers, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani poured cold water on reports that Morocco was to be invited to join the pays du champ. Morocco was not being inducted into the Algerian-led group, he explained, but simply invited along with numerous other countries to attend a far broader meeting on counter-terrorism in the Sahara to be held in the Malian capital Bamako in February. “The central core will remain exclusively limited to four countries – Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania – with the probable addition of Libya, when the Libyans request it,” Belani told news portal TSA, whereas Morocco is “an extra-regional partner which is not concerned by the meetings of the pays du champ, such as the one that was just held in Nouakchott.” In other words, what Morocco is being invited to is the follow-up to the Ministerial Conference on Security in the Sahel that was held in Algiers last September (with participation from the United States, other UN Security Council members and the countries of the European Union).

This is a long way short of full-blown security cooperation. But the invitation extended to Morocco to attend the second Ministerial Conference is a breakthrough of sorts – despite pressure from France, Algiers is understood to have refused to invite the Moroccans to the first edition back in September (see AMSR #107). A staffer at the Algerian presidency tells us that the decision to invite Morocco – along with Libya, Tunisia and Egypt – this time round is dictated by one simple necessity: the need to do something about the proliferation of Libyan weaponry across the Sahara-Sahel region, up to and including Morocco, where the authorities have seized weapons that have been smuggled in from Libya. A Mauritanian political source, believed to be close to President Ould Abdelaziz, goes further, arguing that Algiers has been “compelled to review its strategy” with regard to counter-terrorism cooperation, in large part because it is “genuinely terrified about the possibility of proliferation of Libyan weapons” on its own territory. The Algerians have been pushed in this direction by a number of warning signs, according to the Mauritanian source: the revival of the Tuareg insurrection in northern Mali (where Algeria was supposed to be the guarantor of peace and national reconciliation), led by Tuareg fighters who have returned from Libya with abundant supplies of arms, an increasingly active presence in

[1] number of warning signs

[2] proliferation of Libyan weaponry

[3] Western Sahara

[4] central core

[5] border issue

[6] pays du champ

[7] regional partner
Weeks of relative calm have been broken by a series of AQMI raids in December and January.

Security

Following an exceptionally quiet period in the first three weeks of December 2011 (see previous report), AQMI stepped up its activity in the final days of 2011. The month of January saw a further acceleration, with 23 operations recorded up to January 26.

As usual, the great majority of AQMI operations took place in Kabylia (out of 34 incidents recorded for the period December 20-January 26, 18 were at the initiative of AQMI, and of these no fewer than 14, most of them roadside bombs, occurred in Kabylia). In the Algiers area the security forces on January 8 ambushed and shot dead two jihadists on the road from Khemis el-Khechna to Hammadi, between the wilayas of Boumerdès and Algiers, about 10km south of Houari Boumedienne International Airport. One soldier was wounded and died in hospital four days later.

Elsewhere, the most remarkable incident came on January 16 when a group of armed men kidnapped the governor of Illizi, Mohamed Laïd Khelfi, near Deb Deb and took him across the border into Libya. He was liberated by Libyan fighters the next day and returned to Algeria on January 18, suffering a broken shoulder. The three kidnappers were locals protesting against heavy prison sentences received by their relatives in a terror-related case in early January. The town of Deb Deb had seen several demonstrations and sit-ins the previous week, prompting the governor to visit the town hoping to calm the situation, only to be abducted on the way back. AQMI issued a statement dated Jan. 18 “saluting the intifada of our people in Deb Deb” and declaring its support for the locals’ “fight for justice”. It also warned the new Libyan authorities not to hand over the kidnappers to Algeria. Despite its quick denouement, this affair is deeply embarrassing to the Algerian government. The fact that a regional governor was kidnapped so easily by “amateurs” in what should be a high-security zone near the Libyan border seriously dents the credibility of Algeria’s security services at a time when the situation around Algeria’s frontiers remains dangerously volatile.

To the east, Libya remains chaotic. In addition to weapons smuggling, Algerian authorities now have to face the threat of regular incursions by unruly Libyan fighters, while on at least two occasions in January, Libyan fighters detained Algerian citizens who they claimed had crossed into Libyan territory. It cannot be excluded that such incursions could lead to isolated clashes between Libyan militias and Algerian forces.

Across Algeria's southern borders, while the revival of the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali (see above) adds another dimension to Algiers' difficulties, AQMI itself has been comparatively quiet. On January 12, however, AQMI sent a statement to a Mauritanian news agency saying it has “reliable information” that France, “with backing from Algeria and Mauritania,” is preparing a military operation to liberate Western hostages detained by the group. The statement goes on to warn European countries that such a move would mean you are signing the death sentence of your citizens”. France was also the target of threats from Jamat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharbi Afriqiyya (Unicity and Jihad in West Africa), the previously-unknown group which on December 10 claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Western aid workers from Rabouni camp near Tindouf (see AMSR #108). On January 3 the group, which describes its members as AQMI dissidents, sent a statement to AFP “declaring war on France, the enemy of Islam”, accompanied by a video of the three hostages it captured at Rabouni in October.

END
From 1990 to 2001 – a decade which comprised the worst years of Algeria’s ‘dirty war’ – Tartag, then a colonel, headed the Centre Principal Militaire d’Investigation at Ben Aknoun, Algiers, a unit of the DRS which had a sombre reputation as a torture centre and home base for death squads.

“Countries of the field”. To date, Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania, who, on paper at least, participate in the joint military command (CEMOC) for the Sahara formally established at a summit in Algiers in 2010.

Algerian news website TSA has, it is true, reported that the Algerian police is undertaking “technical preparations” for the opening of the land border, suggesting that the border could be opened to traffic as soon as early May, but this claim – which is by no means without precedent – remains for the time being unconfirmed.

The exact date of the second Ministerial Conference has not yet been set, it would seem, in part because the organisers are still waiting for Libya and Tunisia to confirm that they will send representatives.

This is coherent with what we had heard from Moroccan sources last autumn. One non-governmental source told us in mid-November: “The security forces — police, Border Guard, the Gendarmerie and Auxiliary Forces — are on maximum alert, with specific instructions to take all measures necessary to prevent shipments of weapons, which are supposed to be on their way from Libya, from reaching Moroccan territory. Border areas adjacent to Algeria and Mauritania are subject to exceptional surveillance measures. … Over the past few weeks, vehicles transporting foreigners have [also] been stopped and checked from the area north of Laayoune, and at the entry points to every Sahrawi town and village. The police freely admit they are looking for weapons coming from Libya.”

Who visited Algiers for talks on security with President Bouteflika in mid-December, it will be recalled.

On Jan. 16 and 17, the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad, a new group formed out of a merger of Malian Tuareg rebel factions, launched an offensive with attacks on the towns of Menaka, near the border with Niger, Aguelhok and Tessalit, near the border with Algeria. A number of Algerian soldiers were reportedly evacuated from Tessalit. On Jan. 26, the rebels are reported to have taken control of the town of Aguelhoc near the border with Niger and an abandoned Malian army camp at Léré, close to the border with Mauritania. A Malian government communiqué claimed that “AQMI fighters” took part in the raids alongside MNLA fighters, but this seems unlikely insofar as one of the Tuareg rebels’ complaints against the central government is that it has effectively given carte blanche to AQMI to establish a safe haven in the Tuareg lands of northern Mali.

As a result, the level of jihadist activity in December was on balance comparable with what was seen in the previous months (21 operations all told, down from 23 in November and 22 in October).

On January 2, a court in Algiers sentenced Abdelhamid Abou-Zeid, one of the chiefs of AQMI in Sahel and a native of Deb Deb, to life in prison and five members of his family to ten years in prison each on charges of “forming an international armed group”.

The first time a regional governor has been kidnapped since the troubles began.

The group’s only reported action being the abduction of a Mauritanian gendarme on December 20, after which it issued a communiqué calling on the “Mauritanian regime” to free two of its prisoners in exchange for the soldier’s release.
Rachad,
How true do you think this is? It could have important implications for how we play the press and Congress. The last paragraph is somewhat ambiguous.?? Ed

Algeria-Morocco Border Set to Open Before May

Jan 30
Posted by MoroccoTomorrow

According to Algerian Newspapers, preparations for reopening the border were being made even before Saadeddine Othamni, the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, visited Algeria last week. (Photo: AFP – Farouk Batiche)

By: Mourad Traboulsi
Published Sunday, January 29, 2012

Algerians and Moroccans may soon be able to cross the border between the two countries if campaigns by Islamist parties on both sides calling for stronger ties between the North African countries bear fruit. The new land crossing points scheduled to resume operation by next May are likely to bring tourists and much-needed revenue to Morocco.

Algiers – This spring, the border between Morocco and Algeria will be reopened. When the border was closed in 1994 in the wake of a visa row between the two states, the usual influx of Algerian tourists was cut off, denying Morocco an estimated total of nearly US$2 billion in revenue over the course of one year.

Al-Akhbar has learned that the decision to reopen the border will likely be implemented in the coming weeks. According to Algerian newspapers, preparations for reopening the border were being made even before Saadeddine Othamni, the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, visited Algeria last week. While the minister assigned to Maghreb and African affairs, Abdelkader Messahel, claimed that the borders were not discussed during Othamni’s visit, reports in Morocco suggested there was a closed meeting between Othamni and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika last Tuesday. In the meeting, it is believed that the two men discussed the border and issues concerning Western Sahara, though no statements were released about the result of this meeting.

Joint panels have been working for months to normalize relations between the two neighboring countries and to boost economic cooperation. The two capitals have alternately hosted meetings for experts and officials to discuss the general framework of the expected integration in such fields as the economy, cultural affairs, and sports. The Movement of Society for Peace, an Algerian Islamist party close to President Bouteflika, made opening the border a centerpiece of their last political campaign. Its leader, Bouguerra Soltani, promised to open the borders “as soon as the Islamists come to power.”

Soltani had already discussed this issue in Rabat weeks ago with officials from the Justice and Development Party (PJD), which heads Morocco’s current government.
Previously, most of the Moroccan and Algerian political parties abided by official decisions made by their respective leaderships. However, as the Arab Spring transformations swept across the region, there was more room for political parties to stake out a position on the subject.

Hence, while campaigning, the Moroccan PJD placed improving relations with Algeria high on its list of priorities, and the Algerian Movement of Society for Peace followed suit. Such steps were helped by the fact that both parties belong to the regional network of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Perhaps it was “Islamist pressure” that made the Algerian government accelerate its plans to resolve the problem of the border before the upcoming parliamentary elections in May. These elections are expected to lead to an Islamist majority or an Islamist lead opposition in the parliament for the first time in the modern history of Algeria.

The borders between the two largest countries in the Arab Maghreb Union were closed in 1994 when Moroccan authorities decided to impose visa restrictions on Algerians wishing to visit Morocco. This move was seen by many as a response to a bombing that was carried out in Marrakesh, which Rabat blamed on Algerian intelligence.

In response, then Algerian President, Liamine Zeroual ordered the closure of land borders indefinitely.

Ten years later, King Mohammad VI dropped the visa requirement for Algerians and declared that his country was seeking to reopen the border. Algeria, for its part, responded by also dropping visa requirement for Moroccans but the land border crossings remained closed.

Algerian authorities conditioned the anticipated re-opening of the border on a set of political and security measures, including stopping the flow of drugs into Algeria, resolving the Western Sahara conflict, and raising the level of border security cooperation in the context of the “war on terror.”

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
thank you for your thoughts. this is helpful

Sent from my iPad

On Jan 31, 2012, at 16:21, "Rachad Bouhlal" <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com> wrote:

   Ed,

   Al-Akhbar is a pretty respected newspaper, even though the article is from "MoroccoTomorrow".

   The Minister's visit to Algiers follows the sectorial visits that occured in 2011. we remain hopeful that the process this time will bring us closer.

   The "conditions" that the article talk about have always been Morocco's concerns too.

   We will keep our messages that cooperation in north africa will benefit all countries, especially with the events happening in NA.

   Rachad

On Jan 31, 2012, at 9:31 AM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

   Rachad,

   How true do you think this is? It could have important implications for how we play the press and Congress. The last paragraph is somewhat ambiguous.?? Ed

---

**Algeria-Morocco Border Set to Open Before May**

*Jan 30*

Posted by MoroccoTomorrow

According to Algerian Newspapers, preparations for reopening the border were being made even before Saadeddine Othamni, the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, visited Algeria last week. (Photo: AFP – Farouk Batiche)

By: Mourad Traboulsi

Published Sunday, January 29, 2012
Algerians and Moroccans may soon be able to cross the border between the two countries if campaigns by Islamist parties on both sides calling for stronger ties between the North African countries bear fruit. The new land crossing points scheduled to resume operation by next May are likely to bring tourists and much-needed revenue to Morocco.

Algiers – This spring, the border between Morocco and Algeria will be reopened. When the border was closed in 1994 in the wake of a visa row between the two states, the usual influx of Algerian tourists was cut off, denying Morocco an estimated total of nearly US$2 billion in revenue over the course of one year.

Al-Akhbar has learned that the decision to reopen the border will likely be implemented in the coming weeks.

According to Algerian newspapers, preparations for reopening the border were being made even before Saadeddine Othamni, the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, visited Algeria last week. While the minister assigned to Maghreb and African affairs, Abdelkader Messahel, claimed that the borders were not discussed during Othamni’s visit, reports in Morocco suggested there was a closed meeting between Othamni and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika last Tuesday. In the meeting, it is believed that the two men discussed the border and issues concerning Western Sahara, though no statements were released about the result of this meeting.

Joint panels have been working for months to normalize relations between the two neighboring countries and to boost economic cooperation. The two capitals have alternately hosted meetings for experts and officials to discuss the general framework of the expected integration in such fields as the economy, cultural affairs, and sports.

The Movement of Society for Peace, an Algerian Islamist party close to President Bouteflika, made opening the border a centerpiece of their last political campaign. Its leader, Bouguerra Soltani, promised to open the borders “as soon as the Islamists come to power.”

Soltani had already discussed this issue in Rabat weeks ago with officials from the Justice and Development Party (PJD), which heads Morocco’s current government.

Previously, most of the Moroccan and Algerian political parties abided by official decisions made by their respective leaderships. However, as the Arab Spring transformations swept across the region, there was more room for political parties to stake out a position on the subject.

Hence, while campaigning, the Moroccan PJD placed improving relations with Algeria high on its list of priorities, and the Algerian Movement of Society for Peace followed suit. Such steps were helped by the fact that both parties belong to the regional network of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Perhaps it was “Islamist pressure” that made the Algerian government accelerate its plans to resolve the problem of the border before the upcoming parliamentary elections in May. These elections are expected to lead to an Islamist majority or an Islamist lead opposition in the parliament for the first time in the modern history of Algeria.

The borders between the two largest countries in the Arab Maghreb Union were closed in 1994 when Moroccan authorities decided to impose visa restrictions on Algerians wishing to visit Morocco. This move was seen by many as a response to a bombing that was carried out in Marrakesh, which Rabat blamed on Algerian intelligence.

In response, then Algerian President, Liamine Zeroual ordered the closure of land borders indefinitely.

Ten years later, King Mohammad VI dropped the visa requirement for Algerians and declared that his country was seeking to reopen the border. Algeria, for its part, responded by also dropping visa requirement for Moroccans but the land border crossings remained closed.

Algerian authorities conditioned the anticipated re-opening of the border on a set of political and security measures, including stopping the flow of drugs into Algeria, resolving the Western Sahara conflict, and raising the level of border security cooperation in the context of the “war on terror.”

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Dear Rachad,

Attached and below is the Mac release on the Potomac Institute conference. We would like to release it by 4pm tomorrow. Any comments you would like to provide, would be appreciated. Thanks Rachad. Ed

CONTACT:
Garth Neuffer
202.470.2055
gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com

DRAFT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Thursday, February 2, 2012

Study Warns of Rising al-Qaeda Threat in North Africa

Urges closing Polisario camps which have become recruiting ground for terrorists

Washington, DC (Feb. 2)—A new study by the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS) warns that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses a “dangerous threat” to the region and beyond as it seeks to exploit Arab Spring instability and expand terrorist ties to other militants and al-Qaeda affiliates across Africa’s Sahel. The report recommends closing the Polisario Front’s refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, which the study says “are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” It calls on the US and international community to “prioritize” resettling the refugees.

The study, “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring,” was released today at the 14th annual ICTS terrorism review at the National Press Club, hosted by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

The study and reliable news media report that Polisario members have engaged in drug and arms trafficking, gun battles in Mali, AQIM
kidnappings in Mauritania and Algeria, and as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya. Two months ago, AQIM-linked assailants abducted three Western aid workers from a Polisario headquarters camp, reportedly with help from Polisario insiders, who gave the assailants arms and directions to the victims.

[Add quote from Yonah Alexander, Director, ICTS after Thursday event]

“Our concern,” says the report, is that “al-Qaeda has established a safe haven and breeding ground” in “the failed and fragile states bordering the Sahara.” The report calls it an “arc of instability that stretches from the Red Sea and is poised to reach to the Atlantic.”

The report cites AQIM’s expanded ties to other al-Qaeda affiliates and militant groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram based in Nigeria, and Polisario militants from Algeria. AQIM also has opened links to “Latins for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling into Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario Front.”

The annual report chronicles attacks by al-Qaeda and other terrorists in North and West/Central Africa since 9/11. This year it also provides a nine-country survey of developments since the Arab Spring. Among its key findings:

* Al-Qaeda is poised to take advantage of Arab Spring events “to destabilize the region even further.”

* Since 9/11, attacks by AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel jumped more than 500% from their low point to reach a new high in 2009, and remain dangerously high level in 2011.

* AQIM is taking advantage of the 35-year-old Western Sahara conflict for “expansion and also recruitment of hard-core Polisario members among the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.”

** For a copy of the “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring” report, go to: [Add URL]

For more on Morocco and the region, visit MoroccoOnTheMove.com and follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

###

The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) is a non-profit organization whose principal mission is to inform opinion makers, government officials, and interested publics in the United States about political and social developments in Morocco and the role being played by the Kingdom of Morocco in broader strategic developments in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. For more, please visit www.moroccoonthemove.com.

This material is distributed by the Moroccan American Center for Policy on behalf of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Thursday, February 2, 2012

Study Warns of Rising al-Qaeda Threat in North Africa
Urges closing Polisario camps which have become recruiting ground for terrorists

Washington, DC (Feb. 2)—A new study by the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS) warns that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses a "dangerous threat" to the region and beyond as it seeks to exploit Arab Spring instability and expand terrorist ties to other militants and al-Qaeda affiliates across Africa’s Sahel. The report recommends closing the Polisario Front’s refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, which the study says "are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” It calls on the US and international community to “prioritize” resettling the refugees.

The study, “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring,” was released today at the 14th annual ICTS terrorism review at the National Press Club, hosted by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

The study and reliable news media report that Polisario members have engaged in drug and arms trafficking, gun battles in Mali, AQIM kidnappings in Mauritania and Algeria, and as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya. Two months ago, AQIM-linked assailants abducted three Western aid workers from a Polisario headquarters camp, reportedly with help from Polisario insiders, who gave the assailants arms and directions to the victims.

“Of grave concern,” says the report, is that “al-Qaeda has established a safe haven and breeding ground” in the failed and fragile states bordering the Sahara.” The report calls it an "arc of instability that stretches from the Red Sea and is poised to reach to the Atlantic.”

The report cites AQIM’s expanded ties to other al-Qaeda affiliates and militant groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram based in Nigeria, and Polisario militants from Algeria. AQIM also has opened links to “Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling into Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario Front.”

The annual report chronicles attacks by al-Qaeda and other terrorists in North and West/Central Africa since 9/11. This year it also provides a nine-country survey of developments since the Arab Spring. Among its key findings:
* Al-Qaeda is poised to take advantage of Arab Spring events “to destabilize the region even further.”
* Since 9/11, attacks by AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel jumped more than 500% from their low point to reach a new high in 2009, and remain dangerously high level in 2011.
* AQIM is taking advantage of the 35-year-old Western Sahara conflict for “expansion and also recruitment of hard-core Polisario members among the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.”

** For a copy of the “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring” report, go to: [Add URL]

For more on Morocco and the region, visit MoroccoOnTheMove.com and follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

###

The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) is a non-profit organization whose principal mission is to inform opinion makers, government officials, and interested publics in the United States about political and social developments in Morocco and the role being played by the Kingdom of Morocco in broader strategic developments in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. For more, please visit www.moroccoonthemove.com.

This material is distributed by the Moroccan American Center for Policy on behalf of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
FYI, Ed

Here is the embargoed copy of the report that is being released by the Potomac Institute on terrorism in North, West and Central Africa in 2011:

www.2012specialupdatereportfr~1/terrorismafrica/index.htm
Team,

FYI – Below is a commentary posted by Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin and also a blog posting on MoroccoOnTheMove on today’s announcement at the National Press Club (2-4 pm) of a new ICTS Report, “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring,” by ICTS Director Yonah Alexander. The report includes as key recommendations: resolve the Western Sahara conflict; and shut down the Polisario camps, which have become a recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers. Post columnist Rubin interviewed Alexander earlier today by phone. A MAC Release is also attached. For a full copy of the report, click on the above link. Both stories also attached as PDFs.


Follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/north-africa-terrorism-on-the-rise/2012/02/02/gIQAxia9kQ_blog.html

The Washington Post

Thursday, February 02, 2012  Posted at 05:00 PM ET

Right Turn

North Africa: Terrorism on the rise

By Jennifer Rubin

The International Center for Terrorism Studies is out with a new report that should catch the attention of
Tragically, the Maghreb — Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia — as well as adjacent parts of the Sahel — Chad, Mali, and Niger — have emerged as one of the most worrying strategic challenges to the international community, and yet for decades these regions have mostly been overlooked by policymakers in the West. Consider, for example, the empirical data generated since September 11, 2001.

More specifically, for the past ten years terrorist attacks by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other militant extremists in the Maghreb and Sahel have increased more than 500 percent from their low point in the period to hit a high of 204 attacks in 2009. In 2011, the number of terrorist attacks remains dangerously high, increasing from 2010’s total to reach 185 attacks for the year. . . . What is particularly of grave concern is that AQIM, jointly with other al-Qa’ida affiliates and militant groups (e.g. al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, operating in Yemen, as well as al-Shabaab members in Somalia, Boko Haram militants based in Nigeria, and Polisario militants from Algeria) currently and for the foreseeable future, represent a most dangerous threat both regionally and inter-regionally. Clearly in the failed and fragile states bordering the Sahara, al-Qa’ida has established a safe haven and breeding ground for its activities.

The ICTS recommends 10 steps to address the toxic mix of refugees, drug, human trafficking and terrorism. These include improved “collection and analysis of data related to al-Qa’ida’s terrorism in general in the region and beyond,” additional technical assistance for counterterrorism, and support for governments in the region “to accelerate regional economic and social reforms with a “carrot-and-stick” approach to increase broadly the levels of economic cooperation between the nations and spur increased trade and commerce that contributes to economic growth and reduces poverty as an underlying factor in fueling social unrest and extremism.” The last few recommendations are most eye-catching:

7. **Resolve the Western Sahara crisis**, which is inhibiting both security and economic cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel, and is driving a wedge between two of the region’s most influential nations—Morocco and Algeria.

8. **Shut down the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria because they are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.** The US and international community should prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.

9. Face the intellectual challenge of radical Islam directly with “home-grown” religious and intellectual leaders who are able to challenge the misuse of Islam and channel religious tendencies into more productive social development opportunities.

10. **Raise the diplomatic, economic, political, and military costs to Iran high enough to outweigh the benefits of supporting terrorism and exporting jihadist terrorism elsewhere.**

As with Syria and terrorism in the Middle East, Tehran is at the nub of the problem. So long as we demonstrate there is little penalty for terrorist-support, not to mention killing of Americans, Tehran will continue to play a destabilizing role both in the Maghreb and in the Middle East.

I have **written** before on the intersection of **refugees and terrorism** arising from the humanitarian crisis in the Western Sahara. I spoke by phone today with the ICTS’s director, Prof. Yonah Alexander, who has studied the topic for 40 years. He told me that the warehousing of refugees creates “a breeding ground for
terrorist propaganda, even among children.” So long as thousands remain in camps, he says, we will see “exploitation of people from a very early age.” He warns: “No. 1 is the humanitarian issue. And No. 2 is the national security issue,” which has escalated into violence, kidnapping, gun-running and support for AQIM. He says bluntly that money spent through international agencies to support the camps’ operation is “perpetuating the problem.”

The Obama administration has been rhetoric ally supportive of late in trying to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. But the report should add new urgency to efforts to empty the tinder box that is fueling an upsurge in violence and terrorism in an already unstable part of the world.

http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/al-qaeda-threat-in-n-africa-rising-warns-icts-urges-closing-polisario-camps-which-are-recruiting-ground-for-terrorists/

Morocco on the Move

LATEST NEWS

Thursday, February 2, 2012

AL-QAEDA THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA RISING – ICTS; CLOSE POLISARIO CAMPS – TERRORIST RECRUITING GROUND

Washington, DC (Feb. 2)—A new study by the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS) warns that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses a “dangerous threat” to the region and beyond as it seeks to exploit Arab Spring instability and expand terrorist ties to other militants across Africa’s Sahel. The report recommends closing the Polisario Front’s refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, which the study says “are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” It calls on the US and international community to “prioritize” resettling the refugees.

The study, “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring,” authored by Yonah Alexander, ICTS Director, was released at the 14th annual terrorism review today at the National Press Club, hosted by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
“Osama Bin Laden has been killed, but his ideas and al-Qaeda affiliate organizations are alive and kicking,” said Alexander at the National Press Club. “One of the most troubling is AQIM in North Africa, which has links with weapons and narco-trafficking, militants in Nigeria, and Polisario mercenaries who fought for Qaddafi in Libya.”

Among the report’s key recommendations: “Shut down the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria because they are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” It adds that “The US and international community should prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.”

The study and reliable news media report Polisario members have been arrested and accused of criminal activities that include drug and arms trafficking, gun battles in Mali, AQIM kidnappings in Mauritania and Algeria, and as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya. Two months ago, AQIM-linked assailants abducted three Western aid workers from a Polisario headquarters camp, reportedly with help from Polisario insiders who gave the assailants arms and directions to the victims.

“Of grave concern,” says the report, is that AQIM has established links to other militant groups and a “safe haven” in Africa’s Sahel, along an “arc of instability that stretches from the Red Sea and is poised to reach to the Atlantic.” It calls the largely “ungoverned areas” a potential “terrorist breeding ground” and cites AQIM ties to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Polisario militants in Algeria. The study says AQIM also has links to “Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling into Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario.”

The annual ICTS report, which chronicles attacks by al-Qaeda and other terrorists in the region since 9/11, also offers a nine-country survey of developments since the Arab Spring. Among its key findings:

* Since 9/11, attacks by AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel jumped more than 500% from their low point to reach a new high in 2009, and remain dangerously high level in 2011.

* Al-Qaeda is poised to take advantage of Arab Spring events “to destabilize the region even further.”

* AQIM is taking advantage of the 35-year-old Western Sahara conflict for “expansion and also recruitment of hard-core Polisario members among the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.”

To read the full ICTS Report, click on: “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring.”
North Africa: Terrorism on the rise

By Jennifer Rubin

The International Center for Terrorism Studies is out with a new report that should catch the attention of policymakers in the United States and elsewhere. The critical finding is this:

Tragically, the Maghreb — Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia — as well as adjacent parts of the Sahel — Chad, Mali, and Niger — have emerged as one of the most worrying strategic challenges to the international community, and yet for decades these regions have mostly been overlooked by policy-makers in the West. Consider, for example, the empirical data generated since September 11, 2001.

More specifically, for the past ten years terrorist attacks by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other militant extremists in the Maghreb and Sahel have increased more than 500 percent from their low point in the period to hit a high of 204 attacks in 2009. In 2011, the number of terrorist attacks remains dangerously high, increasing from 2010’s total to reach 185 attacks for the year. . . . What is particularly of grave concern is that AQIM, jointly with other al-Qa’ida affiliates and militant groups (e.g. al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, operating in Yemen, as well as al-Shabaab members in Somalia, Boko Haram militants based in Nigeria, and Polisario militants from Algeria) currently and for the foreseeable future, represent a most dangerous threat both regionally and inter-regionally. Clearly in the failed and fragile states bordering the Sahara, al-Qa’ida has established a safe haven and breeding ground for its activities.

The ICTS recommends 10 steps to address the toxic mix of refugees, drug, human trafficking and terrorism. These include improved “collection and analysis of data related to al-Qa’ida’s terrorism in general in the region and beyond,” additional technical assistance for counterterrorism, and support for governments in the region “to accelerate regional economic and social reforms with a “carrot-and-stick” approach to increase broadly the levels of economic cooperation between the nations and spur increased trade and commerce that contributes to economic growth and reduces poverty as an underlying factor in fueling social unrest and extremism.” The last few recommendations are most eye-catching:

7. Resolve the Western Sahara crisis, which is inhibiting both security and economic cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel, and is driving a wedge between two of the region’s most influential nations — Morocco and Algeria.

8. Shut down the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria because they are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises. The US and international community should prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.

9. Face the intellectual challenge of radical Islam directly with “home-grown” religious and intellectual leaders who are able to challenge the misuse of Islam and channel religious tendencies into more productive social development opportunities.

10. Raise the diplomatic, economic, political, and military costs to Iran high enough to outweigh the benefits of supporting terrorism and exporting jihadist terrorism elsewhere.

As with Syria and terrorism in the Middle East, Tehran is at the nub of the problem. So long as we demonstrate there is little penalty for terrorist-support, not to mention killing of Americans, Tehran will continue to play a destabilizing role both in the Maghreb and in the Middle East.

I have written before on the intersection of refugees and terrorism arising from the humanitarian crisis in the Western Sahara. I spoke by phone today with the ICTS’s director, Prof. Yonah Alexander, who has studied the topic for 40 years. He told me that the warehousing of refugees creates “a breeding ground for terrorist propaganda, even among children.” So long as thousands remain in camps, he says, we will see “exploitation of people from a very early age.” He warns: “No. 1 is the humanitarian issue. And No. 2 is the national security issue,” which has escalated into violence, kidnapping, gun-running and support for AQIM. He says bluntly that money spent through international agencies to support the camps’ operation is “perpetuating the problem.”

The Obama administration has been rhetorically supportive of late in trying to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. But the report should add new urgency to efforts to empty the tinder box that is fueling an upsurge in violence and terrorism in an already unstable part of the world.
LATEST NEWS
Thursday, February 2, 2012

AL-QAEDA THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA RISING – ICTS; Close Polisario camps – Terrorist recruiting ground

Washington, DC (Feb. 2)—A new study by the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS) warns that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses a “dangerous threat” to the region and beyond as it seeks to exploit Arab Spring instability and expand terrorist ties to other militants across Africa’s Sahel. The report recommends closing the Polisario Front’s refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, which the study says “are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” It calls on the US and international community to “prioritize” resettling the refugees.

The study, “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring,” authored by Yonah Alexander, ICTS Director, was released at the 14th annual terrorism review today at the National Press Club, hosted by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

“Osama Bin Laden has been killed, but his ideas and al-Qaeda affiliate organizations are alive and kicking,” said Alexander at the National Press Club. “One of the most troubling is AQIM in North Africa, which has links with weapons and narco-trafficking, militants in Nigeria, and Polisario mercenaries who fought for Qaddafi in Libya.”

Among the report’s key recommendations: “Shut down the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria because they are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” It adds that “The US and international community should prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.”

The study and reliable news media report Polisario members have been arrested and accused of criminal activities that include drug and arms trafficking, gun battles in Mali, AQIM kidnappings in Mauritania and Algeria, and as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya. Two months ago, AQIM-linked assailants abducted three Western aid workers from a Polisario headquarters camp, reportedly with help from Polisario insiders who gave the assailants arms and directions to the victims.

“Of grave concern,” says the report, is that AQIM has established links to other militant groups and a “safe haven” in Africa’s Sahel, along an “arc of instability that stretches from the Red Sea and is poised to reach to the Atlantic.” It calls the largely “ungoverned areas” a potential “terrorist breeding ground” and cites AQIM ties to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Polisario militants in Algeria. The study says AQIM also has links to ‘Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling into Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario.”

The annual ICTS report, which chronicles attacks by al-Qaeda and other terrorists in the region since 9/11, also offers a nine-country survey of developments since the Arab Spring. Among its key findings:

* Since 9/11, attacks by AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel jumped more than 500% from their low point to reach a new high in 2009, and remain dangerously high level in 2011.
* Al-Qaeda is poised to take advantage of Arab Spring events “to destabilize the region even further.”
* AQIM is taking advantage of the 35-year-old Western Sahara conflict for “expansion and also recruitment of hard-core Polisario members among the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.”

To read the full ICTS Report, click on: “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring,”
PODCAST: Ray Hanania interviews Ambassador Edward Gabriel, “Morocco & the Arab Spring”

What has been Morocco’s response to the Arab Spring? How can the Moroccan experience serve as an example to other countries in the region? As Morocco assumes its role on the UN Security Council, how will it work with the United States and other allies to tackle the most important international political issues of our time? Listen as radio host and activist Ray Hanania explores these questions and more with Ambassador Edward Gabriel, former US Ambassador to Morocco.

To listen to the podcast, click here.

Ray Hanania is a media analyst and political consultant specializing in Middle East issues and events, and mainstream American politics. Hanania co-hosts the American Arab radio show “Radio Baladi” which is simulcast in three states on Friday mornings (7-8 am Central, 8-9 am Eastern) including in Michigan, Ohio and Northern Illinois. Hanania Hosts Radio Chicagoland on WSBC AM 1240 Radio every Sunday in Chicago from 8 am until 11 am. Previously, he hosted live Chicago morning shows on WLS AM 890 Radio and recently on WJJG AM 1530 radio. For more information visit “The Ray Hanania Show”.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
FYI information and reading, not a priority. Ed

This is the research that was conducted on tribes by Caitlin a while back. Nothing was done with it. It has not been edited.
Who Represents the Sahrawis: An Analysis of the Tribal Structure of the People of the Sahara and their Misrepresentation by the Polisario Front

Introduction

The inhabitants of the area currently known as Western Sahara have a rich and unique tribal history that the Polisario Front, the self-proclaimed leader of the Sahrawis, has abhorrently oversimplified in its attempt to gain political control of the region. Even the terms most commonly used to describe the territory, "Western Sahara," and the people "Sahrawi" have been used incorrectly in an effort to promote the idea of a "nation-state" comprised of a single, unified population. The reality of the tribal structures and tribal relations of the region prove much more complex. This paper will attempt to clarify the tribal origins of the inhabitants of the western expanse of the Sahara desert, identifying key tribes and key events that made the Sahrawi people who they are today. It will further explore the creation of a Sahrawi national consciousness and will analyze how the Polisario Front used political changes during Spanish decolonization to force a national identity upon the diverse tribes of the region. Lastly, it will detail how the Polisario has actively suppressed the important tribal history of the Sahrawis to assert political dominance over the people.

History of the Sahrawis

The tribes living in the western part of the Sahara are offshoots of the two main Berber people in northwest Africa, the Zenata and the Sanhaja.1 The overarching term used to describe the people, Sahrawi, translates as "people of the Sahara" and is used to describe a variety of tribes living throughout the region. There are eight major tribes divided into forty-five fractions living in the Western Sahara according to most sources (including the 1974 Spanish census). These major tribes are the Rguibat (Lgouacem and Sahel), the Tekna (Ait Lahsen and Izarguine), the Ouled Tidrarin, the Ouled Delim, the Arosien, the Imraguen, the Ma El Ainin and the Ouled Bu Sbaa.2

While the tribes are of nomadic origins, there did exist general patterns of migration that were unique to each tribe prior to the arrival of the Spanish and the subsequent sedentarization of the population. The areas they inhabited were dependent both on their source of income/resources (fishing, trading, warfare, etc.) and on their relations to other tribes in the region. The Rguibat Lgouacem predominated in the coastal area of Saguia El Hamra (northern part of the Western Sahara), southwest Algeria, and Northern Mauritania and the Rguibat Sahel lived along the Mauritanian frontier to the south. The Izarguine Tekna inhabited an area near Laâyoune on the northern coast of Western Sahara and in the Moroccan littoral. The Ouled Delim and Ouled Bu Sbaa inhabited Tiris El Gharbia in the area of southern Western Sahara known as Río de Oro. The Ouled Tidrarin, the Arosien, and the Ait Lahsen Tekna lived along the northern coast and in the area near southern Morocco, and the Ma El Ainin tribe traditionally lived in southern Morocco, south of the Draa. The Imraguen or Hawata were scattered along the Atlantic coast of the Sahara and, according to some sources, used to occupy the coast as far north as Southern Morocco.


Source: IDC Centre, Laâyoune

Despite diverse tribal identities and regional origins, all of the tribes of the Western Sahara share a common Arabo-Berber origin, a shared belief in Islam, and a common structure of political and social governance. Politically, each tribe and fraction was responsible for regulating its own internal affairs through a *djemaa* (assembly) composed of the heads of distinguished families. The *djemaa* elected a sheikh to oversee the tribe and each group established its own body of law to compliment *sharia*.\(^5\) When disputes arose between tribes, the tribes generally resolved them through military means, although occasionally the Ait Arbain, a council of forty sheikhs, was formed to regulate relations.\(^6\) Socially, the tribes of the Western Sahara are governed by a common, stratified social structure. Family and tribal ties form the basis of social interaction and identity for the tribes of the Sahara. Genealogy thus plays a very important role in the lives of the Sahrawis as it determines both their social status and their identity.

Society is divided both horizontally into *qabael* (tribes), and vertically into classes. In the area of Western Sahara, there are four social classes. The *Ahel mdafa* (people of the gun) and the *Shorfa* (descendants of the Prophet) make up the highest class, as warrior status is highly important in a desert region where tribes competed for resources and dominance and religious authority was equally well regarded. The main tribes of warrior status are the Ouled Delim and the Tekna, including the Ait Lahsen and Izarguien fractions. The primary *Shorfa* are the Rguibat, the Arosien, and the Ouled Bbu Sbaa.\(^7\) However, the main tribes of the *Shorfa* are also part of the *Ahel Mdafa*. This is particularly true for the Rguibat, who are known as a bellicose warrior tribe that militarily dominated the region.\(^8\) The second class is comprised of *znaga* (tribes of tributary status), nomadic fisherman, and pastoral nomads of the interior, as well as a few sedentary and semi-sedentary Moorish groups. The main large tribes of this class are the Ouled Tidrarin and the Imraguen. The third class is the artisan and craftsman class, including tribes involved in trade, followed by the *Haratin* (freed, yet dependent individuals) and the slaves, who make up the lowest social class.\(^9\) While these social classifications are relatively fixed, it should be noted that tribes often did engage in alternate economic activities as necessary. Some tribes shifted between nomadism and sedentary life and trade, farming, or some other type of economic activity as the circumstances demanded. Likewise, fractions of tribes, while affiliated with the main group, did not always maintain a fixed identity or occupation. As L. Cabot Briggs, an anthropologist at Harvard, noted in his book on the Tribes of the Sahara, “the status of a clan or tribe could and occasionally did shift under the stress of compelling circumstances.”\(^10\)

The nature of the desert was such that whole tribes rarely lived or traveled together. Rather, migration required small groups so it was a rare occasion that the entirety of a tribe met in one place. Moreover, as a nomadic people, the Sahrawis moved fluidly across national borders in present-day Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, and the Western Sahara according to the changing state of desert pastureland and the relationship between the tribes. As Tony Hodges, the author of *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*, notes, “desert societies have always been prone to intertribal strife and raiding. By virtue of their migrations, nomadic tribes would enter into frequent contact, and they were in competition for scarce pastoral resources, water, and livestock. Moreover, since the creation of large-scale forms of human organization was discouraged by the inhospitality of the desert and by

---

6 Besenyő, p. 34.
7 Hodges, “The Western Saharans.”, p. 4.
8 Besenyő, p. 29-31.
9 Briggs, p. 219.
10 Briggs, p.212-213.
the sparseness and dispersion of the population, there was no effective supratribal authority to maintain order in the Western Sahara.\(^{11}\) Success in battle was thus the surest route to power, and the warrior groups that dominated the region had ample means of war and skills of evident military application. The insecurity that resulted from this constant state of war encouraged or forced tribes to enter into alliances and pacts for protection and created an environment in which no one group dominated the region. Tribes with military prowess, however, were able to force other tribes into tributary status.

Based on both their numerical strength and military skill, the Rguibat tribe dominated much of the region. The Rguibat make up the largest tribe in the Western Sahara and the 19th century saw the rise of the Rguibat as the largest and most powerful of all the tribes in the Western Sahara.\(^{12}\) The Rguibat claim semi-religious prestige as descendants of Sid Ahmed-er-Rguibi, a religious man who came to the valley of the Draa from Barbary as a Muslim missionary in 1503.\(^{13}\) However, the real power of the Rguibat comes from their reputation as a well-organized fighting force with significant wealth in livestock and a highly organized political structure. The Rguibat gained their power by defeating many tribes in the northern part of the territory.

In the southernmost part of the Spanish Sahara, the Ouled Delim emerged as the dominant tribe.\(^{14}\) One of the most fully Arabized of all the major tribes of the Sahara, the Ouled Delim entered into a period of expansion in the 19th century. In 1877, a series of ambushes, skirmishes, and minor battles occurred between the Ouled Tidrarin and the Ouled Delim.\(^{15}\) Accounts of the battles vary, with some suggesting that the Ouled Delim attacked the Ouled Tidrarin in an attempt to reduced them to the status of tributary vassals, while other suggest that the latter tribe sought the protection of the former. In any event, the Ouled Tidrarin were soon joined by the Rguibat, and the Ouled Delim were joined by the Ait Lahsen, and in the end almost all of the central Moorish tribes got involved.

When the Spanish arrived in 1884, they therefore encountered a territory rife with intertribal raiding and lacking in governance structures. The nomadic tribes moved easily across the national frontiers of Mauritania, Morocco, Mali, and Algeria, and while they had strongholds in certain areas of the territory, the concept of a defined territory with defined inhabitants had no historical precedent. There was neither territorial unity nor an overarching “Sahrawi” identity. As Tony Hodges summarized, “like many modern African nations, Western Sahara has no historical antecedent. The Sahrawis never constituted a nation in pre-colonial times. Before the arrival of the Spanish, no supratribal authority had ever regulated Western Sahara. The harsh world of the desert was not conducive to the rise of large and complex state structures, and as we have seen, Sahrawi society was traditionally prone to intertribal raiding. The Sahrawis prime loyalties were therefore to tribe, fraction, and family.”\(^{16}\) It was only with the advent of Spanish colonization that the historic pattern of endemic intertribal raiding was halted and the concept of a “Sahrawi” people living in a defined territory came to be defined.

**The Creation of a Sahrawi National Consciousness: Spanish Colonization and Nationalist Politics**

Spanish colonization was the real trigger for the development of a nationalist movement. Spanish investment in the region’s mineral resources led to the establishment of towns and the growth of employment and educational opportunities in those towns.

---

\(^{11}\) Hodges, “Western Sahara.”, p. 12.

\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 10.

\(^{13}\) Briggs, p. 231-232.

\(^{14}\) Hodges, “Western Sahara.”, p. 9.

\(^{15}\) Briggs, p. 212-213.

\(^{16}\) Hodges, “Western Sahara.”, p. 149.
encouraged Sahrawis to abandon their nomadic way of life and settle in urban areas, thus increasing their contact with other Sahrawi tribes.\textsuperscript{17} The process of sedentarization, however, took decades. Notions of blood loyalty were strong and although the arrival of the Spanish terminated intertribal raiding, notions of tribal or fraction identity and loyalty had changed little by the late 1950’s.\textsuperscript{18}

It was only when the Spain increased its economic and political development of the region in response to Moroccan overtures to take over the region, following its independence in 1956, that more concrete political transformation took place. During the conflict with Morocco, some Sahrawis served in the Spanish armed forces. Others, including members of both the Rguibat and the Tekna tribes joined the Moroccan Army of Liberation in 1956 and were sent to the desert to inspire other nomads to revolt against Spanish rule.\textsuperscript{19} There was thus early resistance against Spanish colonial by Sahrawi guerilla forces in coordination with the Moroccan Army of Liberation in 1957-1958 and a slight hint of nationalist tendencies among the divided Sahrawi people. However, their numbers were small, their impact limited, and their efforts brutally repressed by the Spanish in \textit{Operation Ecouvillion}. According to Tony Hodges, had the Army of Liberation succeeded in driving Spain from the Sahara, the territory would have been integrated into Morocco and doubtless Sahrawi nationalism would have emerged as a political force.\textsuperscript{20} However, that was not the case, and after their defeat in 1957-1958, many of the older, more conservative elements of Sahrawi society left the territory and settled in southern Morocco. Others, attracted by the benefits of cooperating with the Spanish, began participating in a newly created political entity designed to increase native Sahrawi participation in the governance of the Spanish colony.

The territorial conflict with Morocco had forced Spain to introduce a series of political changes in the late 1950’s and 1960’s that ultimately reinforced the idea that the territory was an independent political entity with a defined population. The 1967 \textit{Djemaa} (assembly) established by the Spanish authorities in the Sahara was an attempt to give greater voice to the Sahrawis, although in reality the assembly had no real power. Nevertheless, as the members of the \textit{Djemaa} were assigned according to tribe, the makeup of the \textit{Djemaa} provides an indication of the tribal division in 1967. All 82 members of the assembly were Sahrawi and tribes were represented in proportion to their size. Forty of the members were elected by tribal \textit{djemaas} and the rest were appointed. In 1967, the Rguibat held 45 seats, the Ouled Delim held 12, the Izarguien (Tekna) 6, the Arosien 5, the Ouled Tidrarin 7, and the remaining 7 seats were shared by the smaller tribes.\textsuperscript{21} Despite this affiliation by tribe, the establishment of the \textit{Djemaa} did force various tribes to work together and helped concretize the notion that the Sahrawis shared a common identity. This identity, however, was neither fixed nor unified.

Just as some Sahrawis were cooperating with the Spanish, others were working to rid the colonial power from the territory. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s wider mass resistance against Spanish rule began to take place. The leadership of this anti-colonial movement, however, differed from the previous movement. It was led by youth who had settled in towns during their childhood, and despite association with a nomadic lifestyle, had been educated in Spanish towns and Moroccan universities. Indeed, the first movement of this sort was founded in 1967 by a Rguibi named Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri who had attended university in Casablanca.\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Harakat Tahrir Saguia el Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab} (Organization for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab) was the first

\textsuperscript{17} Hodges, "Western Sahara.", p. 151.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p. 149.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, p. 153.
urban-based political party organized by Sahrawi activists. The Movement was suppressed violently and dissolved by Spanish authorities, but it established the groundwork for future activist organizations.

Shortly after the dissolution of Harakat, a new movement was formed by a Rguibi studying law in Morocco, El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed. This movement, which came to be known as the Polisario Front, was founded by the academic elite and the original members recruited by El-Ouali moved on to hold senior positions in the Polisario.\(^{23}\) The Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario) was officially formed on May 10, 1973 at a secret congress and its early recruits were primarily well-educated youth from towns throughout Spanish Sahara.\(^{24}\) As it sought to expand, it made contact with refugees in Tindouf, Tan-Tan, and Zouerate who had fled their homes during the violence of 1957-1958.\(^{25}\) As it expanded, the Polisario tried to de-legitimize other anti-colonial organization, seeing itself, much as it does today, as the sole legitimate voice of all Sahrawis.

To be certain, however, there were also other anti-Spanish Sahrawi organizations, such as the Front de Libération et du Rattachement du Sahara à la Mauritanie that operated in the southern part of the territory and sought unification with Mauritania and the Mouvement de Résistance des Hommes Bleus (MOREHOB), which was founded by a pro-Moroccan Sahrawi Bashir Figuigui (known as Edouardo Moha) in 1972. As with the majority of these smaller organizations, MOREHOB was repressed by the Spanish and ceased to exist in all but name by mid-1973. As the Polisario grew in strength, anti-Polisario Sahrawis continued to fight against them, sometimes in support of Morocco as was the case with the Front pour la Libération et l'Unité (FLU) founded by pro-Moroccan refugees in Tan-Tan and recently demobilized Sahrawi soldiers who had previously been enlisted in the Spanish forces.\(^{26}\) Their success, however, was limited and the Polisario continued to expand its ranks.

The political movement that most successfully contested the political dominance of the Polisario was the Union Nacional Saharauí (PUNS), established in 1974. Its goal was to obtain independence for the Western Sahara through a process of accelerated self-determination. Unlike the Polisario, however, PUNS sought to preserve a special relationship with Spain.\(^{27}\) The majority of its support came from traditional elements of Saharan society, including the majority of sheikhs and nobles, and those from the older generation. Additionally, more than 60% of the members of the Djemaa supported the party and identified themselves as party members.\(^{28}\)

In the mid-1970s, there were thus two important Sahrawi nationalist movements vying for power, the PUNS in affiliation with the Djemaa and the Polisario Front. During this time, international movement also contributed to the creation of Sahrawi identity. As the UN spoke of a unified territory called the Western Sahara, the Sahrawis became aware that the territory on which they lived was being considered as a political entity, as were its peoples.\(^{29}\) Identity thus came only with the concept of Western Sahara as a “nation-state”. However, even as a Sahrawi identity was being established, particularly as the international community became involved, that identity was neither rigid nor cohesive, nor were the voices of all Sahrawi represented by the Polisario Front, despite their claims to the contrary. The presence of other nationalist movement highlights this reality. Unfortunately, as the political dynamic in Spain changed due to the impending death of Franco, Spanish policy in

\(^{23}\) Hodges, "Western Sahara.", p. 158.
\(^{24}\) Ibid, p. 162.
\(^{25}\) Thompson, p. 142.
\(^{26}\) Ibid, p. 138.
\(^{27}\) Hodges, "Western Sahara.", p. 171.
\(^{28}\) Ibid, p. 172.
the Sahara did as well, with the end result being the growth of the Polisario to the detriment of other viable nationalist movements.

The Spanish colonial administration had initially supported the PUNS, based on their desire to maintain relations with Spain and their association with the Djemaa. In July of 1974, Spain and the Djemaa, supported by PUNS, approved the Estatuto Político, a plan that would grant internal autonomy to the Western Sahara. Spain’s failure, however, to implement the Estatuto Político discredited the leaders of the Djemaa and PUNS for urging the Sahrawis to take Spanish self-determination at face value. This failure gave significant support to the Polisario, who claimed that PUNS was just a colonial creation. It also led to a reversal by Spain in its support for PUNS. In 1975, Spain began urging the Polisario to unite with PUNS and the Djemaa. This was not easily achieved because the Polisario did not, in fact, represent the entirety of the Sahrawi population. The members of the Djemaa were reluctant to submit to the leadership of the young militants leading the Polisario, and the members of PUNS insisted on preserving their party within a broad patriotic front. The Polisario exacerbated this tension by refusing to accommodate the sensitivities of the leaders of the PUNS and the Djemaa. It went so far as to insist on the PUNS’ dissolution and to actively recruit its members to join its own ranks.

Throughout 1975, relations between the Polisario and the PUNS remained tense and occasional skirmishes broke out. During this time Spain also continued to increase its support for the Polisario as a means to improve negotiations with the militant group and limit attacks on its forces. Spain’s actions led to the eventual dissolution of PUNS, leaving the Sahrawis with few options for political leadership.

As the Polisario established its dominance over political leadership in the Spanish Sahara, some tribal sheiks and members of the Djemaa met with the movement to establish an alliance in November 1975. Accounts differ on the November 1975 pact and the meeting of the Djemaa two weeks after the Madrid pact was signed. According to semi-official Polisario records, two-thirds of the Djemaa membership attended, along with almost as many Sahrawi nobles and chiefs. They declared that they would make no decision binding on the Sahrawi people, would dissolve the Djemaa, and called for the formation of a National Provisional Sahrawi Council for Unity. As a follow-up, the Polisario record asserts that on December 3, 1975, the same leaders met and signed a proclamation declaring unconditional support for the Polisario as the sole and legitimate representative of the Saharan people. The December meeting also established the National Provisional Council.

Despite the presence of some members of the Djemaa, this proclamation by no means had the support of the entire assembly. Furthermore, even those members that did sign were suspicious and resentful of the revolutionary zeal of the youthful militant group; the alliance therefore was uneasy. Additionally, the Moroccan official record differs vastly from that of the Polisario and states correctly that the Djemaa ratified the Madrid pact in November 1975, thus contesting the legality of the Polisario declaration. Furthermore, the Moroccan record states that during a subsequent visit by Khatri Oud Jamani, the president of the Djemaa, to Rabat, the Djemaa swore allegiance to King Hassan II. This allegiance was substantiated when the Djemaa was summoned on February 16, 1976. At the Council meeting, 57 members of the Djemaa voted unanimously to give “full approval to the decolonization of the territory and its reintegration with Morocco and Mauritania.”

However, neither the UN nor Spain accepted the Djemaa as the legal representative of the Sahrawis following the “dissolution” of the council in November 1975. By the time

30 Hodges, “Western Sahara.”, p. 204.
31 Ibid, p. 204.
32 Thompson, p. 135.
34 Thompson, p. 135.
Spain withdrew all of its personnel, the Polisario had successfully used coercion and negotiations to establish itself as the sole representative of the Sahrawi people and on February 27, 1976 declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as the nation-state of the Sahrawi people. Mauritania and Morocco, however, had not given up their claim to the territory, the Madrid Pact, dividing the territory between the two nations, was enforced, and a deadly battle for political control of the territory ensued.

The Conflict over Western Sahara: The Polisario Front and Identity Formation in the Camps in Tindouf

As Spain withdrew its forces from the territory, Moroccan and Mauritanian military forces moved in, waging a battle against the militant Polisario Front who were determined to expel them from the region and exert sole control over the territory. The Polisario Forces were dominated by the Rguibat tribe, who reportedly accounted for a large proportion of Polisario troops, at least during the early years of fighting. As the war progressed, other nomads, demobilized by Spain, reportedly offered their military services to the highest bidder and Algeria seemed to provide greater financial incentives than Morocco. Thus the presence of other tribes in the Polsario’s fighting force was not necessarily an indication of broad tribal support for the movement. "In any case, the numerical strength of the Rguibat and Ouled Delim and their renowned physical endurance, martial traditions, and intimate knowledge of the desert all supported the view that those two tribes predominated both in the fighting forces and in the Polisario leadership."

The breadth of tribes in the Western Sahara were not represented in the Polisario Front’s fighting forces, again suggesting that the movement did not represent the entire population of the territory. Given the Ma El Ainin’s orientation towards Morocco, both psychologically and geographically, it is unlikely that any members of the tribe have been induced by the Polisario Front to join its ranks. Likewise, the Tekna had always oriented towards Morocco and "prayed always in the name of the sultan of Morocco." As John Mercer points out, “the Polisario had gradually absorbed the able-bodied men of all tribes except the pro-Morocco Tekna in the north and the pro-Mauritania Delim in the south.” Nevertheless, the Polisario continued to claim that it was the sole representative of the people and worked hard to establish a state in the refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, where a large number of Sahrawi refugees fleeing the conflict ended up, whether by virtue of it being the closet town across the Algerian border, or whether they were forced there by the Polisario to aid in the building of their nation-state. While their arrival at the camps varied, what was certain was that once in the camps, the Polisario Front exerted complete political domination over the refugees, indoctrinating them ideals of social and political revolution, and forcing them to forget their tribal origins in the name of national unity.

The “Sahrawi leadership consciously developed a political ideology emphasizing political unity and a new social order” and the camps in Tindouf proved to be ideal ground for recruiting adherents to the new order. Once in the refugee camps, all Sahrawis were automatically considered members of the Polisario and were politically indoctrinated. Camps presented the ideal recruiting base for the Polisario. With nowhere to go and no alternatives

36 Thompson, p. 16.
40 Ibid, p. 318.
to the political leadership of the Polisario, the Sahrawis had no choice but to accept the dominant leadership of the militant group. As Toby Shelley, a reporter for the Financial Times, noted, “within the camps, in order to influence the policy of the Polisario Front and the SADR, one must be active in an organization or institutions and so have a vote in deciding its direction.” The camps thus provided a blank space on which to write a new historical narrative and create a Sahrawi national identity. The Polisario created the idea of what it means to be a Sahrawi. This identity was not inherent, but rather constructed and forced upon the people living in the camps.

The atmosphere of war further contributed to the creation of a single Sahrawi identity. The war helped keep society cohesive, prevented criticism, and legitimized the purges of those perceived to be a danger to the revolution. The Polisario justified the total suppression of dissent by claiming that unity was vital to social revolution. As part of this revolution, which aimed to eliminate all forms for subjugation and promote unity in the name of creating a revolutionary society based on the principles of radical communitarianism, social equality, and group loyalty, the Polisario also eradicated any reference to a tribal past. The Constitution of the SADR states that family is the basis of Sahrawi society, and the Polisario has gone so far to limit tribal divisions that the mere mention of tribal of fractional identity is censured in the camps. According to one Polisario leader, “not only does one abstain henceforth from referring to tribal affiliation, but one pushes zeal to the point of refusing to name one’s father.” According to Hodges, “in the name of national unity, the Front abhorred all forms of kinship loyalty, to the point that its members denied tribal affiliation altogether. Caste status, which has been closely associated with tribal membership, was renounced with equal resolve, and there was a strong reforming, egalitarian streak in the Front’s philosophy.”

The Polisario and the SADR hegemonically constructed the new anti-tribal, revolutionary Sahrawi identity through its actions and institutions in the camps. “The Sahrawi [revolutionary] subjectivity that emerged during the 1970s, the nationalist identity, and the concept of citizenship associated with it, was thus sedimented in the everyday life of the camps in a while range of symbols, spaces, practices, and stories.” The work of Pablo San Martin, a professor at the University of Leeds, highlights this physical and mental indoctrination. San Martin notes, “daily life brings a steady emphasis on national identity, ranging from the flying of the Sahroui flag to the recollection of the Republic’s martyrs. Both child an adult are educated in school subjects, guerilla warfare, and political understanding ….Radical social change is a central principle: tribal, racial, and caste differences are said to have disappeared in the common purpose.” Refugees have been bombarded by propaganda, and after thirty years in the camps, informed and objective freedom of opinion is limited. Furthermore, any dissent is suppressed by the dictatorial political regime of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: Political Dictatorship and the Misrepresentation of the Sahrawis

The Polisario uses tribal affiliation to its advantage when it can, and actively suppresses tribal identity when it is apparent that it cannot use it to its advantage. Both the

43 Shelley, p. 176.
44 San Martin, p. 570.
45 Hodges, “Western Sahara.”, p. 344.
46 Ibid, p. 344.
48 San Martin, p. 573
49 Mercer, p. 507.
Polisario Front and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic have continually used nepotism and suppression of other tribal identity to assert Rguibat and non-Sahrawi dominance over the Sahrawi people. Interestingly, the top leadership of the Polisario does not even have tribal origins. Mohamed Abdelaziz was born in Marrakech, and part of his family continues to reside in Morocco. The number of Mauritanian and Moroccan-born Sahrawis holding high-rank in the SADR and the Polisario is striking. As Virginia Thompson, author of *The Western Saharan*, points out, "there is little doubt that by 1978, the Sahraouis, that is native of the former Spanish Sahara, had become a minority in the top echelon of the Polisario command and perhaps in its army as well." In his memoirs published in 1997, Javier Perez de Cuellar, former Secretary-General of the UN substantiated this, noting, "I was never convinced that independence promised the best future for the inhabitants of the Western Sahara....such political leadership as it exists [in the camps] is not impressive and in some cases not Sahrawi in origin."  

The Polisario has also tried to maintain the dominance of certain tribes at the expense of others. This was particularly apparent during the preparations for the referendum, during which the Polisario actively suppressed the rights of minorities. During the identification process for the referendum, in June of 1995, the Polisario suspended its participation in response to new applications from what were defined as the Chorfa (smaller tribes descending from the Prophet Mohammed), Tribus del Norte (tribes traditionally inhabiting the region north of the river Draa with descendants migrating to the Sahara region), and Tribus Costeras y del Sur (fishing and shepherd tribes along the Atlantic Coast), citing that it did not accept these groups since they represented minorities under the Spanish census of 1974. However, it was not necessarily that these groups were unimportant under the Spanish census, but rather that they did not fit into one of the seven largest tribal groupings (Rguibat Sarg, Rguibat Sahel, Izarguien, Ait Lahsen, Arosien, Ouled Delim, Ouled Tidrarin). Furthermore, the 1974 Spanish census was not complete, as it took no account of Sahrawis from the tribes that roamed in Western Sahara or those, for political or economic reasons, had settled in neighboring states. A large number of Sahrawis, including several of the Polisario leaders, had been outside Western Sahara at the time of the census, as many tribes existed on both sides of the artificial frontier and moved readily into and out of the territory according to political and economic circumstances. A rough estimate from the time numbers the individuals from said tribes at approximately 75,000. It is therefore likely that the Polisario tried to eliminate these groupings from the referendum out of fear that they would not vote in the Polisario’s favor. Regardless, it is apparent that the Polisario not only does not represent the entirety of the population, but in fact has also attempted to exclude native Sahrawis from voting in order to maintain its control over the territory.

51 Thompson, p. 250  
52 Ibid, p. 255.  
53 Thobhani, p. 99.  
55 Bensenyő, p. 75.  
### The Results of the 1974 Spanish Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Sub-tribes</th>
<th>Clans</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rguibat Sarg</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rguibat Sahel</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izarguen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ait Lahsen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arosien</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouled Delim</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouled Tidrarin</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: 63,120</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Sub-tribes</th>
<th>Clans</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern tribes</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chorfa and Zuaia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal tribes</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: 10,363</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Polisario and the SADR have thus used political control to keep a select number of like-minded individuals in power. The system of military and political governance has never been democratic, despite claims to the contrary, and in reality both the Polisario and the SADR are dictatorial regimes. The Polisario Front serves as the single political party and state administrator of the SADR and the SADR's leading bodies tend to overlap, in function and composition with those of the Polisario itself, underscoring the reality that the SADR is a military state. Not only has the same individual, Mohamed Abdelaziz, served as Secretary General of the Polisario and President of the SADR for over 30 years, but also the core leadership has remained virtually unchanged. Ministers, ambassadors, and public officials are shifted around from various posts to give the illusion of change, but the leadership of the Polisario and the SADR remain dominated by a select group of individuals loyal to Abdelaziz. The Polisario also suppresses any form of dissent, labeling any defectors and dissidents as pro-Moroccan traitors and accuses them of inciting tribalism.

Leaders and civilians alike have nevertheless tried to reform the system, through both dissent and defections. Infighting within the Polisario began as early as 1976, prior to the declaration of the SADR, when El Ouali was allegedly dismissed from his post only to be reinstated shortly thereafter. In 1988, the tension within the Polisario and the SADR exploded. Although there are few sources about what really happened, the organizational changes that took place following the 1988 demonstration lend credibility to a political dispute of some nature. Arguably, large demonstrations and protests occurred, with cadres from the Political Bureau protesting the actions of the Polisario Front’s Executive Committee and accusing them of centralizing power and developing a political oligarchy. The spark for these demonstrations was the detention of several political opponents of the leaders of the Executive Committee. The Polisario has indeed admitted that human rights abuses occurred during this time, but claims that, as with other national movements, purges and detentions are a natural part of socialist revolutions.

Internal dissent continues to this day. In 2004, the Front Polisario Khat al-Shahid was formed as a reform movement within the Front. Khat al-Shahid still considers the Polisario to be the sole legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people and works both inside and outside of the system to promote reform. Khat al-Shahid accused the Polisario leadership of being undemocratic and of propagating corruption and tribalism. The movement thus seeks to hold the Polisario leadership accountable to the Sahrawi people. The Polisario refuses to recognize the organization, insisting that differences be solved within the established system.

In response to the autocratic tendencies of the Polisario and SADR leadership throughout the past thirty years, there have been a large number of defections from both the leadership of Polisario Front and the refugees in the camps in Tindouf. Defections began

---

57 Bensenyö, p. 77.
59 Thompson, p. 249.
60 Shelley, p. 179.
61 Ibid, p. 179.
as early as the late 1970s and by the mid-1980s the pace of defections has increased, as both leaders and Sahrawi families began leaving. Notable defectors Ramadane Ould Ennes, Ambassador to the African Union, Brahim Hakim, the SADR Foreign Minister, Baba Sayed, the founder of the Polisario’s younger brother, and several other important officials, including the representative to Libya, the representative to the Canary Islands, the former Director of Information, the Chief Coordinator of the Camps as well several key members of the Djemaas and camp and local officials. Defections continue to the present. In 2000, the Polisario representative for the UN identification process, Ghaoutah Ould Mohamed, defected, as did Grand Sheikh Ali El Bouhaili Hnini.

According to returnees, the reasons for leaving the camps and abandoning the Polisario are many, including the terrible living conditions in the camps, the realization that independence is unattainable and that the Polisario has lost the war, and the pain cause by separation of families. Additionally, returnees have cited corruption and authoritarianism among the leadership and tensions caused by tribalism and internal dissension. According to reports, the camps are plagued by serious tribal tensions. The larger tribes, particularly the Rguibat, are reporting to be dominating in positions of power. The tensions is so intense that some believe the Western Sahara under Polisario control could end up being a state where rivalries based on clan, tribal, or ethnic differences and loyalties will cause tremendous destruction if not addressed or if actively suppressed, as the Polisario does in the name of national unity.

While these defections continue, the Sahrawis have also taken their anger with the Polisario to the polls. Most recently, in the Moroccan local elections held in June 2009, voters in the Western Sahara region sent a strong message asserting their identification with Morocco and their displeasure with the Polisario. The highest level of voter turnout (67%) came in the Moroccan-region of the Western Sahara, where local residents asserted their Moroccan identity with enthusiastic participation in the elections, rejecting a call by the Polisario Front to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to keep Sahrawis in the disputed region from voting. Unfortunately, the opportunity to vote was not given to those Sahrawi sequestered in refugee camps controlled by the Polisario. Nevertheless, given the tribal makeup of the Front, the number of defections, and the political reality in the Moroccan Sahara, it is fair to conclude that the Polisario Front is not the sole legitimate representative of the Sahrawi, but rather an elite militant group that uses political indoctrination in an attempt to gain power and support in the region.

Conclusion

The Western Sahara conflict is not only a military dispute about control of territory but a dispute about what it means to be Sahrawi, who the Sahrawis are, and who the others are that define the frontier of “our Sahara.” The Polisario, through war and social revolution, have attempted to define both the identity of the people and the limits of the territory. Yet, both the territorial delineation and the concept of a united Sahrawi people were not innate and neither had a historical precedent in the region or among the peoples of the region. In the process of creating a new national identity, the Polisario people have thus destroyed the rich tribal history of the people and forced their own historical narrative of national unity on the people they control in the camps. However, as evident from this analysis on the origins of the Sahrawis and the development of their national consciousness, the Polisario does not represent the voices of the people of the Sahara. How can the Polisario claim to represent a people that is not wholly present in the camps under its
authority and in fact scattered across Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria? It cannot. How can the Polisario claim to be the sole legitimate representative when it excludes some tribes from voting and elevates others? It cannot. As Dr. Akbarali Thobhani, a professor of African and Middle Eastern Studies at the Metropolitan State College of Denver, has articulated, "contrary to general misconceptions, the conflict in the Western Sahara is not purely one of Moroccans versus the Sahrawis who are all led by the Polisario Front. There are many Sahrawis who are very local to Morocco and are strongly opposed to the Polisario Front. There are thousands of Sahrawis who have defected from the Polisario and returned to Morocco."66 Understanding the dynamics of conflict in the Western Sahara requires looking beyond the recent history of Polisario dominance of Sahrawi identity. Only when the international community and the Polisario recognize this reality will the true voices of the Sahrawi be heard.

---

66 Thobhani, p. 262.
Bibliography


Rachad,

Enclosed are two opeds, one authored by me, and one authored by Yonah Alexander. The purpose is to provide a double hit with the target being the Congress and US policy makers, in anticipation of the upcoming film on the Refugee camps, by Havier Bodem and Penelope Cruz. I would like your opinion before sending it out. It’s very hard hitting against the Polisario but steers clear of any mention of Algeria. Please get back to me as soon as you can. Thank you, Ed
Stop Subsidizing Recruiting Ground for Terrorists: Shut down Polisario Camps
By Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel

Why are US tax dollars being used to subsidize a recruiting ground in North Africa for al-Qaeda terrorists, drug traffickers, and mercenaries?

That’s a question US and international policymakers should ask after reading a new study by the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS), which warns that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is extending its reach across North Africa and the Sahel and actively recruiting from the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf in Algeria.

The report says these camps—which are supported by millions of dollars in US and international relief aid—have become “a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” The study recommends the camps be “shut down” and calls on the US and international community to “prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.”

The ICTS study and news media report that increasing numbers of Polisario Front members have been arrested and accused of drug and arms smuggling, gun battles in Mali, kidnappings for AQIM in Mauritania and Algeria, and fighting as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya.

The AQIM-Polisario connection was most recently demonstrated two months ago when AQIM-linked assailants abducted three Western aid workers from a Polisario headquarters camp, reportedly helped by Polisario insiders who gave assailants arms and directions to the victims.

ICTS says that in the decade between 9/11 and the Arab Spring, terrorist kidnappings, bombings, and other attacks by AQIM and other militant groups in North Africa and the Sahel jumped more than 500 percent. It reports that AQIM is expanding its terrorist ties in an “arc of instability” across Africa, posing “one of the most worrying strategic challenges” for the international community in a region that has been “mostly overlooked by policy-makers.”

The study cites AQIM’s links to other al-Qaeda affiliates and militants, including AQAP in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Polisario militants in Algeria, which it calls a “dangerous threat” to the region and beyond. The study notes evidence that AQIM may have obtained advanced Libyan arms, including surface-to-air missiles, and says intelligence reports confirm AQIM has also “opened links to Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling to Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include Polisario members.”

Other experts concur on the seriousness of the threat. AFRICOM head US General Carter Ham recently called AQIM’s growing links with other militants in the region “very, very dangerous” and a “threat to the US.” And UK Foreign Secretary William Hague has warned that expanding AQIM terror ties could have a “profoundly destabilizing effect on countries in North Africa and the Gulf” already shaken by the Arab Spring.

Ultimately, says the ICTS report, al-Qaeda and other militants in the region seek to exploit Arab Spring instability and expand their terrorist-trafficking network across Africa and into Europe and the Americas. The study finds they are also taking advantage of “the lingering 35-year-old Western Sahara conflict, which is creating an opening for AQIM’s expansion and also recruitment of Polisario members among the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.”

To address the growing risk of recruitment in the camps, ICTS recommends shutting them down and focusing US and international aid on resettling refugees.
For humanitarian as well as security reasons, this recommendation should receive very serious consideration from US and international policy makers, as long as it also takes into consideration of the humanitarian needs of the refugees. Multiple reports have documented abuse of the rights of the refugees, who are confined to the camps and denied freedom to leave. Thousands have been forced to make dangerous escapes across hostile terrain. Tragically, the refugees in the Tindouf camps are among the only refugees in the world who are welcome to resettle elsewhere, if the Polisario would only let them.

Since 1990 international agencies have spent in excess of $1 billion—more than $300 million from the US—effectively perpetuating the dangerous conditions in these camps. Much of the aid has reportedly been diverted to the black market for Polisario profit. AQIM and others are now exploiting the camps as a recruiting ground. Clearly this must stop. The camps should be closed and US and international aid used only for durable solutions to resettle and repatriate refugees, not to deny their rights or subsidize a recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers.

The views expressed in this article are the personal views of Edward M. Gabriel, US Ambassador to Morocco, 1997-2001, who advises the Kingdom of Morocco.
From 9/11 to Arab Spring –
Rising Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel

By Yonah Alexander

As international attention focuses on violence and upheaval in Syria, we must not lose sight of another danger to peace and stability in the region: al-Qa’ida’s frightening new reach into North, West, and Central Africa.

Bin Laden is gone, but his ideas and al-Qa’ida affiliates are alive and kicking. One of the most troubling is al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which has links with weapons and narco-trafficking, militants in Nigeria, and Polisario mercenaries who fought for Qaddafi in Libya.

The International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS) has tracked a disturbing upward trajectory of terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel since 9/11. Our most recent update, released last week, reports the turbulence and events of the Arab Spring are in danger of being exploited by al-Qa’ida and other militant groups attempting to further destabilize the region.

Over the past decade, 1,288 terrorist bombings, murders, kidnappings, and ambushes — against international and domestic targets — have claimed more than 2,000 lives and 6,000 victims in Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia.

It is a grave concern that AQIM is involved jointly with other al-Qa’ida affiliates and militant groups in the region — including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram based in Nigeria, and Polisario militants from Algeria. This network represents a dangerous threat both regionally and inter-regionally. Clearly, al-Qa’ida has established a safe haven and breeding ground in the failed and fragile states bordering the Sahara.

Intelligence reports confirm AQIM has also opened links with Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling into Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks that include members of the Polisario Front. Recent reports also confirm that arms from the Libya conflict, including surface-to-air missiles, may have fallen into AQIM hands in the Sahel.

In addition to feeding Arab Spring instability, AQIM is also exploiting the lingering 35-year old Western Sahara conflict, which creates an opening for AQIM’s expansion and recruitment of Polisario members living in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria. This complicates diplomatic resolution of the Western Sahara issue, a major obstacle to regional economic and security cooperation.

The African nations of the Maghreb and Sahel have long been at the crossroads of history. Today, they hold great potential as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West. The threat from al-Qa’ida undermines this potential and deserves serious attention and effective action from the US and the international community.

The ICTS report offers the following concrete recommendations:

- Strengthen US intelligence to provide more effective collection and data analysis on al-Qa’ida's activities. Provide equipment, training, and monitoring assistance to ensure information is used effectively by cooperating bodies in the region.
• Expand US counterterrorism technical assistance, particularly training for internal security bodies, police agencies, and the military, under the umbrella of multilateral working groups with adequate monitoring and transparency.

• Improve security coordination in the region so countries can more effectively share intelligence and interdict terrorist networks and supply lines.

• Encourage regional governments with a “carrot-and-stick” approach to accelerate economic and social reforms and cooperation to spur economic growth and reduce poverty as an underlying factor fueling social unrest and extremism.

• Shut down the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria because they are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises. The US and international community should prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.

• Resolve the Western Sahara crisis, which is driving a wedge between two of the region’s most influential nations – Morocco and Algeria – inhibiting regional security and economic cooperation.

• Face the intellectual challenge of radical Islam with “home-grown” religious and intellectual leaders who can challenge the misuse of Islam and channel religious tendencies into more productive social development.

• Raise the diplomatic, economic, political, and military costs to Iran high enough to outweigh the benefits of exporting terrorism elsewhere.

Terrorism in the Maghreb — Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia — and the adjacent Sahel — Chad, Mali, and Niger — has emerged as one of the most worrying strategic challenges to the international community. For decades these regions have mostly been overlooked by policy-makers in the West. It is now clear that this cannot continue. If we fail to address this threat, the US, the EU, and our friends in the region will remain hostages to and targets of ideological, theological, and political terrorists.

Yonah Alexander is Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute of Policy Studies
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2012 11:24 AM
To: Rachad Bouhlal
Subject: RE:

OK, next week when you are back. Thank you. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2012 11:16 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject:

Hi ed
We have to talk about this on the phone before any release.
Rachad
Yes, you are exactly right. I caught that after I sent them to you. Also from a legal point of view we actually should not have authored Yonah’s piece. His piece will now be put in the form of bullet point ideas for him to consider writing his own oped. I will hold off on my piece until we talk. Very good points and thank you for your time. I really appreciate your counsel. Ed
Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Each year the Arab American Institute, headed by Jim Zogby, has an annual gala dinner to celebrate the spirit of the Arab American community. I would like to invite you and Mrs. Bouhlal to be with us at this dinner and sit at our table. It promises to be another great year, with Ambassador Theodore H. Kattouf, President AMIDEAST receiving the Najeeb Halaby Award for Public Service, and the Arab Thought Foundation receiving an award for International Commitment. The location, time and date of the dinner is as follows:

Wednesday, April 18, 2012
Renaissance Washington, DC Hotel
999 Ninth Street, NW Washington, DC
5:30 Reception | 6:30 Gala
Black Tie

I hope you will be able to join us at this important event. Ed
Thank you.

Sent from my iPad

On Feb 11, 2012, at 20:15, "Rachad Bouhlal" <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com> wrote:

Ed,

Thank you for the invite. Mrs Bouhlal and myself would be happy to attend and sit at your table.

Thank you again and enjoy the rest of this beautiful sunny weekend.

Rachad

2012/2/11 Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Each year the Arab American Institute, headed by Jim Zogby, has an annual gala dinner to celebrate the spirit of the Arab American community. I would like to invite you and Mrs. Bouhlal to be with us at this dinner and sit at our table. It promises to be another great year, with Ambassador Theodore H. Kattouf, President AMIDEAST receiving the Najeeb Halaby Award for Public Service, and the Arab Thought Foundation receiving an award for International Commitment. The location, time and date of the dinner is as follows:

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Renaissance Washington, DC Hotel

999 Ninth Street, NW Washington, DC

5:30 Reception | 6:30 Gala

Black Tie

I hope you will be able to join us at this important event. Ed
Rachad, do you have time to meet this week? I need to close off on the strategic plan, the congressional plan, and opeds. If so, please have Sandrine get in touch so we can arrange a convenient time with your schedule. Thank you, Ed.
Rachad,

Another item to discuss tomorrow is the Moroccan festival scheduled for May on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. It is the big annual event there and this year’s theme is Morocco. The head of the event wants to meet with you to officially inform you of the event, and invite you and Mrs. Bouhlal to be the Honored Guests of the festival. I will have her submit an email describing the festival and formally requesting an appointment. My wife Kathleen and I are serving as the Honorary Hosts for this year’s event. Ed
A short news item from Algeria's official news agency, which we have translated:

Electronic surveillance for southwestern borders soon

Algérie Presse Service
February 10

Electronic surveillance for the southwestern frontier “will be put in place soon,” announced Col. Abdelmadjid Benbouzid, commander of the 3rd Gendarmerie Group in Béchar, speaking February 9.

The project is part of the Gendarmerie’s efforts to guard the country’s southwestern border, all 2,825 km of it, against smugglers of all kinds, said the colonel at the annual presentation of security forces activities for the past year. “Our border guard units are spread thin along the frontiers with Morocco, Mauritania, Sadr and Mali,” he added, “which makes electronic surveillance necessary”.

The Gendarmerie Group is gearing up for the establishment of two new border guard units and several forward positions in the desert border areas as part of the anti-smuggling protection plan, he concluded.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2012 8:23 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: FW:
Attachments: Gabriel.pdf

Rachad,
Is this the article as you rewrote and approved? Sorry for any confusion. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2012 11:16 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: 

Hi ed
We have to talk about this on the phone before any release.
Rachad
Why are US tax dollars being used to subsidize a recruiting ground in North Africa for al-Qaeda terrorists, drug traffickers, and mercenaries? That’s a question US and international policymakers should ask after reading a new study by the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS), which warns that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is extending its reach across North Africa and the Sahel and actively recruiting from the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf in Algeria.

The report says these camps—which are supported by millions of dollars in US and international relief aid—have become “a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” The study calls on the US and international community to “prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.”

The ICTS study and news media report that increasing numbers of Polisario Front members have been arrested and accused of drug and arms smuggling, gun battles in Mali, kidnappings for AQIM in Mauritania and Algeria, and fighting as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya.

The AQIM-Polisario connection was most recently demonstrated two months ago when AQIM-linked assailants abducted three Western aid workers from a Polisario headquarters camp, reportedly helped by Polisario insiders who gave assailants arms and directions to the victims.

ICTS says that in the decade between 9/11 and the Arab Spring, terrorist kidnappings, bombings, and other attacks by AQIM and other militant groups in North Africa and the Sahel jumped more than 500 percent. It reports that AQIM is expanding its terrorist ties in an “arc of instability” across Africa, posing “one of the most worrying strategic challenges” for the international community in a region that has been “mostly overlooked by policy-makers.”

The study cites AQIM’s links to other al-Qaeda affiliates and militants, including AQAP in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Polisario militants in Algeria, which it calls a “dangerous threat” to the region and beyond. The study notes evidence that AQIM may have obtained sophisticated Libyan arms, including surface-to-air missiles, and says intelligence reports confirm AQIM has also “opened links to Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling to Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include Polisario members.”

Other experts concur on the seriousness of the threat. AFRICOM head US General Carter Ham recently called AQIM’s growing links with other militants in the region “very, very dangerous” and a “threat to the US.” And UK Foreign Secretary William Hague has warned that expanding AQIM terror ties could have a “profoundly destabilizing effect on countries in North Africa and the Gulf” already shaken by the Arab Spring.

Ultimately, says the ICTS report, al-Qaeda and other militants in the region seek to exploit Arab Spring instability and expand their terrorist-trafficking network across Africa and into Europe and the Americas. The study finds they are also taking advantage of “the lingering 35-year-old Western Sahara conflict, which is creating an opening for AQIM’s expansion and also recruitment of Polisario members among the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.”
To address the growing risk of recruitment in the camps, ICTS recommends focusing US and international aid on voluntary return or resettling refugees.

For humanitarian as well as security reasons, this recommendation should receive very serious consideration from US and international policy makers, as long as it also takes into consideration of the humanitarian needs of the refugees. Multiple reports have documented abuse of the rights of the refugees, who are confined to the camps and denied freedom to leave. Thousands have been forced to make dangerous escapes across hostile terrain. Tragically, the refugees in the Tindouf camps are among the only refugees in the world who are welcome to resettle elsewhere, if the Polisario would only let them.

Since 1990 international agencies have spent in excess of $1 billion—more than $300 million from the US—effectively perpetuating the conditions in these camps. Much of the aid has reportedly been diverted to the black market for Polisario profit. AQIM and others are now exploiting the camps as a recruiting ground. Clearly this must stop. In order to prepare the ground for a durable solution to refugee plight, the Security council have been calling for UNHCR to undertake a census that would allow the international community to know the exact figures of the population of the Tindouf camps in order to speed up the international efforts aiming at achieving a political solution to this longstanding regional dispute.

The views expressed in this article are the personal views of Edward M. Gabriel, former US Ambassador to Morocco, 1997-2001.
Rachad,

I want to express my satisfaction with tonight’s meeting. I thought it was productive and helpful. I know these first few months are normally challenging as you get situated in a new country, with new and “extended” staff, and as you begin to get your feet firmly planted on the ground here in the United States. I am at your service to help in any way to make your transition easier. Please know that you can count on me and my staff. I also want to assure you that I want to find the best way to work with you that solidifies our partnership, provides you the comfort level necessary to perform your work, and maximizes my ability to support the Embassy, His Majesty and Morocco. I pledge my support to you and this cause and know we can find a way forward together that allows this to happen efficiently and according to a process that meets your expectations. Thank you, Ed
FYI, fairly important reading. Aida Alami article is the first one. Thanks Ed

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/africa/moroccan-protests-one-year-on.html?_r=1

Moroccan Protests One Year On

By Aida Alami

CASABLANCA — Protesters are set to mark the first anniversary of Morocco's February 20 pro-democracy movement with demonstrations and strikes across the country starting Sunday. But activists say that, rather than a celebration, the protests will be a reminder of the regime that they will not give up before their calls for reform are answered.

"We are advocating for a democratic constitution that will give real power to a government that currently still doesn't have enough weight to respond to our demands," said Youness Bensaid, 23, a Casablanca-based activist.

When the unrest that swept the Arab world after the fall of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia on Jan. 14, 2011, reached Morocco, King Mohammed VI responded quickly, introducing a new constitution to grant greater freedoms with a limited redistribution of power. Protesters scoffed, calling the changes "cosmetic."

A year later and with a new government in office, Morocco still faces economic and social challenges. There are frequent cases of self-immolation such as the one that set off the revolution in Tunisia. In the northeastern city of Taza, protesters demanding relief from soaring prices clashed with the authorities in recent days.

Nabila Mounib, secretary general of the Unified Socialist Party — which is not part of any opposition party to head a new government, but kept the levers of real power in its hands."

Both stories included in the attached PDF.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/africa/moroccan-protests-one-year-on.html?_r=1

Garth D. Neuffer

Director of Press
Moroccan American Center
1220 L Street NW - Suite 411, Washington, DC 20005
(o) 202-470-2055 (cell) 215-840-3692 (fax) 202-536-4210
gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com

Follow us on Twitter – @MorocOnTheMove
“The first question is whether there is going to be a shift in the balance of power between the king and political institutions,” said Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Middle East Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “It is not clear to me yet how forceful the Benkirane government will be,” she said. “The king has taken an exceptional position in the sense he has decided to respond to unrest with reforms rather than repression, but he is no different from other Arab rulers in the sense that he is determined to keep his power intact. He is just going about it in a smarter way.”

Meanwhile, the new justice minister, Mustapha Ramdani, has started cracking down on corruption. But protesters say this is not enough and fear that the government won’t effect radical reforms. Ms. Ottaway said: “With all the problems of the Arab world, Morocco does not seem to be a particularly worrisome place. I do not expect an upheaval now. The question is whether there will be sufficient gradual reform to prevent an upheaval later on. It depends on the king, but also on the new government.”

### FEATURE—Is an Arab Spring in the air for Algeria?

By Lamine Chikhi and Christian Lowe

ALGIERS, Feb 15 (Reuters) - When Moncef Marzouki, a former dissident transformed by the “Arab Spring” into Tunisia’s president, paid an official visit to Algeria on Sunday, red and white Tunisian flags flew from lamp-posts in his honour. Just two days earlier, another former dissident and leading figure of Tunisia’s revolution had been barred from entering. Sihem Bensedrine was allowed into the country after a seven-hour wait only after protests from fellow human rights activists. The “Arab Spring” is knocking on Algeria’s door, but the authorities cannot decide whether to let it in or shut it out. Bensedrine, for one, believes the choice has been made. “I think the Tunisian revolution is not particularly welcome,” Bensedrine told Reuters in the capital, Algiers.

Alone among its neighbours in North Africa, Algeria has been largely untouched by the uprisings which last year ousted leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and touched off the revolt still raging in Syria. Helped by revenues from energy exports that have bequeathed it the world’s 14th biggest foreign exchange reserves, the Algerian authorities handed out pay rises, grants and subsidies that blunted a brief flare-up of protests demanding reform.

The country’s rulers continue to run the country much as they have since independence from France 50 years ago: with a huge state apparatus backed by the powerful security forces and elections dominated by the ruling FLN party and its allies. That is looking more and more out of step with the mood of the times, however, and a parliamentary election set for May 10 could be a watershed.

Pressure is building inside Algeria and abroad to ensure a fair election. As elsewhere in the Middle East, it is likely to give greater power to Islamists who for years have been pushed to the fringes by the strongly secularist state. “People expect Algeria to come into line with the region,” said a diplomat based in Algiers. “There’s an expectation that Islamists will have greater influence.”

**MANAGED TRANSITION**

Most independent observers predict that the ruling establishment will adapt to the new circumstances in the same way it has for decades when its hold on power has been challenged. Algeria will probably follow the model of neighbouring Morocco, the observers say. There, the ruling elite conceded to pressure by allowing a moderate Islamist opposition party to head a new government, but kept the levers of real power in its hands.

Western powers favour this scenario. They depend on the help of Algeria, the biggest military power in the region, to contain the spreading threat from al Qaeda’s north African wing around the southern edge of the Saharan desert. They also fear that any turmoil could disrupt the flow of natural gas through pipelines under the Mediterranean Sea. Algeria supplies about one fifth of Europe’s gas imports.

One factor that could derail managed transition to limited democracy is Algeria’s bloody history: after the military-backed government annulled a democratic election in 1992 fearing an Islamist takeover, security forces and Islamists fought a war that killed an estimated 200,000 people.

The shadow of the conflict still hangs over the country. In the Chifa mountain gorge, once a favourite picnic spot an hour’s drive south of Algiers, security forces have posts on top of almost every ridge, where they hunker down behind concrete, sandbags and razor wire. The insurgency, now affiliated to al Qaeda, has lost momentum but still carries out sporadic kidnappings, ambushes and suicide bombings - a young soldier died this month after stepping on an improvised explosive device.

Few expect a return to the “black years” as they are known in Algeria; the Islamists are much weaker now while the state is richer and stronger. But it is unclear how security forces will react if Islamists muster huge support in the election and demand a share of real power. “An Islamist majority in parliament … would probably trigger a reaction from the military elite,” said Riccardo Fabiani, North Africa analyst with Eurasia Group. “The strongly secular security forces are ready to intervene to guarantee their vested interests.”

Commentators say there are divisions inside the ruling elite. One camp believes the pragmatic thing to do is to allow more democracy. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has said the authorities should not manipulate the upcoming election as they have done in the past. Nearly 20 new parties have been given the green light to compete, including at least one which represents a serious challenge to the establishment.

A commission of judges will oversee the vote count, replacing the interior ministry officials who usually do the job. The European Union has been invited to send observers for the first time. There are subtle signs that a nervous security apparatus is tight control over dissent, however.

Mourad Dhina, an Algerian scientist who used to work at the CERN physics research institute in his adopted home of Switzerland, was arrested last month in Paris after attending a meeting of Rachad, an Algerian Islamist opposition movement whose leaders are based mostly in Europe. He is now in La Sante prison awaiting a hearing to decide if he will be extradited to Algeria, where a court in 2003 found him guilty of having links to armed Islamist groups.

Michael Romig, a spokesman for the AI Karama human rights organisation which Dhina headed up, said it was odd that he had been arrested now. Dhina had lived openly in Switzerland for years and travelled often to France. “We are as confused as everyone,” Romig said.

However, Rachad, of which Dhina is a founder, had in the past few months launched a London-based satellite television station broadcasting into Algerian homes, and placed links on one of its Internet sites on “how to free your country” and “organise and participate in unrest.”
SOCIAL PEACE
Many Algerians do not think the parliamentary election in May will provide the spark that sets off an upheaval. Parliament has limited powers under the constitution, they say, and anyway, most people are apathetic about a political system that they do not feel has any relevance to their lives.

Much of the discontent has been contained by the authorities' spending spree. In one example, thousands of young unemployed people have been taken on the payroll at state-owned firms, even when there is no work for them to do. "I get 15,000 dinars ($200) to do nothing," said Ahmed Selmi, 27, from Haizar, a village about 150 km (95 miles) southeast of the capital, who is employed at a state company but was out drinking coffee with friends at 11 a.m. "I have no task to do there," he said.

Ahmed Benbitour, prime minister of Algeria at the end of the 1990s, said all the state had done with its largesse was to buy itself a temporary reprieve. "We're a long way from having bought social peace," he told Reuters. "All we are doing is putting out fires. The conditions which prevailed for the Arab Spring are present in all Arab countries. There are no theoretical reasons why one country should be able to escape this movement."

The strongest evidence for this argument is in the almost daily protests, strikes and riots that show no sign of abating. A week-long period provides a snapshot.

On Jan. 31, riot police in a suburb of Algiers battled petrol-bomb-throwing residents who accused the authorities of failing to investigate the murder of a young man. A day later, in Tiaret, 250 km west of Algiers, 30 people were injured and buildings ransacked after a local man set himself on fire.

On Feb. 5, residents burned down the local government headquarters in a village near Boumerdes, east of the capital, because heavy snow left them with no electricity. The protesters have not come together into any kind of national movement, and the protesters do not appear to have a political agenda beyond railing against local bureaucrats.

But Abdou Bendjoudi, a 27-year-old opposition activist in the capital, thinks it is just a matter of time before that changes and Algeria stages its own "Arab Spring". He says people have lost faith in a government that has failed to provide real jobs and opportunities for young people or to deliver decent public services.

"There is not a single province where there are not daily protests," Bendjoudi, one of the leaders of a group called the Movement of Independent Youth for Change, said in a cafe. "It is a political message. People are saying they have had enough of the catastrophic management of the country.

"If the authorities do not move now towards democracy, it will be too late."

(Editing by Sonya Hepinstall)
CASABLANCA — Protesters are set to mark the first anniversary of Morocco’s February 20 pro-democracy movement with demonstrations and strikes across the country starting Sunday. But activists say that, rather than a celebration, the protests will be a reminder to the regime that they will not give up before their calls for reform are answered.

“We are advocating for a democratic constitution that will give real power to a government that currently still doesn’t have enough weight to respond to our demands,” said Youness Bensaid, 23, a Casablanca-based activist.

When the unrest that swept the Arab world after the fall of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia on Jan. 14, 2011, reached Morocco, King Mohammed VI responded quickly, introducing a new constitution to grant greater freedoms with a limited redistribution of power. Protesters scoffed, calling the changes “cosmetic.”

A year later and with a new government in office, Morocco still faces huge economic and social challenges. There are frequent cases of self-immolation such as the one that set off the revolution in Tunisia. In the northeastern city of Taza, protesters demanding relief from soaring prices clashed with the authorities in recent days.

Nabila Mounib, secretary general of the Unified Socialist Party — which is not part of the new government after boycotting elections last year but which supports the protest movement — went to Taza to evaluate the situation after about 150 people, including police officers, were hurt. She said there was an urgent need for the government to improve the lives of ordinary citizens and to give the young hope for a better future.

“Morocco’s stability is threatened,” Mrs. Mounib said. “It is absolutely necessary to take emergency measures at all levels. We need a real reform of all institutions. The country does not have any self-respecting economic policy and has a failing education system. The constitution needs to be reformed and meet international democratic standards.”

Analysts say the protest movement failed to galvanize large sectors of society because, after the initial euphoria inspired by the Tunisian revolution, people were deterred by the chaos in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain and by difficulties in Egypt. The Moroccans, they say, are anxious to preserve stability.

Still, while the uprising of Morocco’s youth brought concessions that unions and human rights groups had failed to obtain in the previous decade, observers say that the real victory is a widespread awakening of political awareness.

“For the first time there is clearly a counterbalance to power — the people,” said Abdellah Tourabi, a researcher at the Paris Institute of Political Studies who specializes in Islamic movements in Morocco. “The ‘street’ has become a true political player.”

On Feb. 20, 2011, Mr. Bensaid, a finance student at the Hassan II University in Casablanca, joined the thousands who took to the streets to protest the same problems that cripple many Arab countries: social injustice, corruption and a lack of personal freedoms. A year later, he feels frustrated, he says. “The communication stunt was successful,” said Mr. Bensaid, referring to the new constitution. “Everything that followed was a farce. The king appointed an undemocratic commission, with members committed to the conservative nature of the absolute monarchy.”

Observers say that the key difference between Morocco’s uprising and those in other Arab Spring countries is that the population, deeply attached to its 1,200-year-old tradition of monarchy, never called for regime change. Still, Sunday protests have become a weekly ritual. Except for the occasional police crackdown, most are peaceful, well organized and almost celebratory, with cheerful marchers waving placards and chanting the ills of their country.

Last July, a referendum on the new constitution won 98.5 percent of the vote. Elections followed on Nov. 25, allowing the moderate Islamists of the Justice and Development Party to form a new government under Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane. “The government is taking the necessary measures to implement the new constitution and to consolidate the rule of law in our country,” government spokesman, Mustapha Khalfi, said recently, insisting that major economic reforms would be pushed through.

“The first question is whether there is going to be a shift in the balance of power between the king and political institutions,” said Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Middle East Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “It is not clear to me yet how forceful the Benkirane government will be,” she said. “The king has taken an exceptional position in the sense he has decided to respond with reforms rather than repression, but he is no different from other Arab rulers in the sense that he is determined to keep his power intact. He is just going about it in a smarter way.”

Meanwhile, the new justice minister, Mustapha Ramid, has started cracking down on corruption. But protesters say this is not enough and fear that the government won’t effect radical reforms. Ms. Ottaway said: “With all the problems of the Arab world, Morocco does not seem to be a particularly worrisome place. I do not expect an upheaval now. The question is whether there will be sufficient gradual reform to prevent an upheaval later on. It depends on the king, but also on the new government.”
FEATURE–Is an Arab Spring in the air for Algeria?

* Middle East upheavals putting pressure on Algeria to change
* Islamists challenging for seats in watershed election in May
* Authorities hesitating between more democracy and crackdown
* Violent history casts a shadow over push for reform

By Lamine Chikhi and Christian Lowe

ALGIERS, Feb 15 (Reuters) - When Moncef Marzouki, a former dissident transformed by the "Arab Spring" into Tunisia's president, paid an official visit to Algeria on Sunday, red and white Tunisian flags flew from lamp-posts in his honour. Just two days earlier, another former dissident and leading figure of Tunisia's revolution had been barred from entering. Sihem Bensedrine was allowed into the country after a seven-hour wait only after protests from fellow human rights activists.

The "Arab Spring" is knocking on Algeria's door, but the authorities cannot decide whether to let it in or shut it out. Bensedrine, for one, believes the choice has been made. "I think the Tunisian revolution is not particularly welcome," Bensedrine told Reuters in the capital, Algiers.

Alone among its neighbours in North Africa, Algeria has been largely untouched by the uprisings which last year ousted leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and touched off the revolt still raging in Syria. Helped by revenues from energy exports that have bequeathed it the world's 14th biggest foreign exchange reserves, the Algerian authorities handed out pay rises, grants and subsidies that blunted a brief flare-up of protests demanding reform.

The country's rulers continue to run the country much as they have since independence from France 50 years ago: with a huge state apparatus backed by the powerful security forces and elections dominated by the ruling FLN party and its allies. That is looking more and more out of step with the mood of the times, however, and a parliamentary election set for May 10 could be a watershed.

Pressure is building inside Algeria and abroad to ensure a fair election. As elsewhere in the Middle East, it is likely to give greater power to Islamists who for years have been pushed to the fringes by the strongly secularist state. "People expect Algeria to come into line with the region," said a diplomat based in Algiers. "There's an expectation that Islamists will have greater influence."

MANAGED TRANSITION

Most independent observers predict that the ruling establishment will adapt to the new circumstances in the same way it has for decades when its hold on power has been challenged. Algeria will probably follow the model of neighbouring Morocco, the observers say. There, the ruling elite conceded to pressure by allowing a moderate Islamist opposition party to head a new government, but kept the levers of real power in its hands.

Western powers favour this scenario. They depend on the help of Algeria, the biggest military power in the region, to contain the spreading threat from al Qaeda's north African wing around the southern edge of the Saharan desert. They also fear that any turmoil could disrupt the flow of natural gas through pipelines under the Mediterranean Sea. Algeria supplies about one fifth of Europe's gas imports.

One factor that could derail this managed transition to limited democracy is Algeria's bloody history: after the military-backed government annulled a democratic election in 1992 fearing an Islamist takeover, security forces and Islamists fought a war that killed an estimated 200,000 people.

The shadow of the conflict still hangs over the country. In the Chifa mountain gorge, once a favourite picnic spot an hour's drive south of Algiers, security forces have posts on top of almost every ridge, where they hunker down behind concrete, sandbags and razor wire. The insurgency, now affiliated to al Qaeda, has lost momentum but still carries out sporadic kidnappings, ambushes and suicide bombings - a young soldier died this month after stepping on an improvised explosive device.

Few expect a return to the "black years" as they are known in Algeria; the Islamists are much weaker now while the state is richer and stronger. But it is unclear how security forces will react if Islamists muster huge support in the election and
demand a share of real power. "An Islamist majority in parliament ... would probably trigger a reaction from the military elite," said Riccardo Fabiani, North Africa analyst with Eurasia Group. "The strongly secular security forces are ready to intervene to guarantee their vested interests."

Commentators say there are divisions inside the ruling elite. One camp believes the pragmatic thing to do is to allow more democracy. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has said the authorities should not manipulate the upcoming election as they have done in the past. Nearly 20 new parties have been given the green light to compete, including at least one which represents a serious challenge to the establishment.

A commission of judges will oversee the vote count, replacing the interior ministry officials who usually do the job. The European Union has been invited to send observers for the first time. There are subtle signs that a nervous security apparatus is tightening control over dissent, however.

Mourad Dhina, an Algerian scientist who used to work at the CERN physics research institute in his adopted home of Switzerland, was arrested last month in Paris after attending a meeting of Rachad, an Algerian Islamist opposition movement whose leaders are based mostly in Europe. He is now in La Sante prison awaiting a hearing to decide if he will be extradited to Algeria, where a court in 2003 found him guilty of having links to armed Islamist groups.

Michael Romig, a spokesman for the Al Karama human rights organisation which Dhina headed up, said it was odd that he had been arrested now. Dhina had lived openly in Switzerland for years and travelled often to France. "We are as confused as everyone," Romig said.

However, Rachad, of which Dhina is a founder, had in the past few months launched a London-based satellite television station broadcasting into Algerian homes, and placed links on one of its Internet sites on "how to free your country" and "organise and participate in unrest."

**SOCIAL PEACE**

Many Algerians do not think the parliamentary election in May will provide the spark that sets off an upheaval. Parliament has limited powers under the constitution, they say, and anyway, most people are apathetic about a political system that they do not feel has any relevance to their lives.

Much of the discontent has been contained by the authorities' spending spree. In one example, thousands of young unemployed people have been taken on the payroll at state-owned firms, even when there is no work for them to do. "I get 15,000 dinars ($200) to do nothing," said Ahmed Selmi, 27, from Haizar, a village about 150 km (95 miles) southeast of the capital, who is employed at a state company but was out drinking coffee with friends at 11 a.m. "I have no task to do there," he said.

Ahmed Benbitour, prime minister of Algeria at the end of the 1990s, said all the state had done with its largesse was to buy itself a temporary reprieve. "We're a long way from having bought social peace," he told Reuters. "All we are doing is putting out fires. The conditions which prevailed for the Arab Spring are present in all Arab countries. There are no theoretical reasons why one country should be able to escape this movement."

The strongest evidence for this argument is in the almost daily protests, strikes and riots that show no sign of abating. A week-long period provides a snapshot.

On Jan. 31, riot police in a suburb of Algiers battled petrol-bomb-throwing residents who accused the authorities of failing to investigate the murder of a young man. A day later, in Tiaret, 250 km west of Algiers, 30 people were injured and buildings ransacked after a local man set himself on fire.

On Feb. 5, residents burned down the local government headquarters in a village near Boumerdes, east of the capital, because heavy snow left them with no electricity. The protests have not come together into any kind of national movement, and the protesters do not appear to have a political agenda beyond railing against local bureaucrats.

But Abdou Bendjoudi, a 27-year-old opposition activist in the capital, thinks it is just a matter of time before that changes and Algeria stages its own "Arab Spring". He says people have lost faith in a government that has failed to provide real jobs and opportunities for young people or to deliver decent public services.

"There is not a single province where there are not daily protests," Bendjoudi, one of the leaders of a group called the Movement of Independent Youth for Change, said in a cafe. "It is a political message. People are saying they have had enough of the catastrophic management of the country.

"If the authorities do not move now towards democracy, it will be too late."

_(Editing by Sonya Hepinstall)_
Mr. Ambassador,

Attached is a summary document from Bob and I, on how we see the year ahead, as we discussed last week. Please let us know if you need anything further. Thank you, Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
2012 – Challenges and Opportunities Ahead

Background

Over the course of the last year, the Washington Team achieved several significant objectives that have provided new and important opportunities for the year ahead. In March of last year, Foreign Minister Fassi Fehri had a very successful meeting in Washington with Secretary Clinton which resulted in the Secretary’s reiterating in a public statement the US Government’s support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative as a means of resolving the on-going conflict in the Western Sahara. Secretary Clinton referred to that initiative in a public press conference following the meeting as “serious, credible and realistic.” The Secretary also made clear that the US considers Morocco an important strategic partner in the Middle East and North Africa and gave her approval to a new “strategic dialogue” that could potentially establish a roadmap of common goals and agendas between Morocco and the United States. At year’s end, the Washington Team also achieved a major multi-year goal of securing Congressional language in the Omnibus Appropriations Bill that authorizes the US to fund development projects in the Southern Provinces. This was a major breakthrough and, if implemented, would send a strong signal of a US commitment to the kind of political settlement in the Sahara that would advance and help protect Morocco’s fundamental interests in the region.

Goals

The 2012 Strategic Plan provides a more thorough roadmap for the various goals we hope to achieve in the year ahead, as well as some of the specific activities, events and messages we believe will help achieve those objectives with our various targeted audiences. However several goals deserve special mention as priority objectives this year.

- Generating a sense of “urgency” among US foreign policy decision-makers and opinion-leaders about the need to resolve the Western Sahara issue now, rather than later.

- Implementation of the Appropriations Committee language authorizing the US to spend development funds in the Sahara. This could also require still further new language in the next appropriations bill from Congress.

- Ensuring that the response to Senator Leahy’s language in the Omnibus Appropriations bill is dealt with to Morocco’s satisfaction.

- New Congressional language that would “condition” US funding for the refugee camps in Algeria on UNHCR’s implementation of a developmental approach to refugee assistance that both protects and advances refugee rights and also advances “durable solutions” for those in the camps.

- Establishment of a working strategic dialogue between Morocco and the United States that would define a common work agenda and establish shared goals, complete with mutual commitments for action.
• An accelerated, high visibility campaign to further diminish the credibility of the Polisario.

Impediments

Our ambitions for the coming year are large, and we believe they can be achieved. However, to reach our objectives we need to be mindful of a number of structural and systemic impediments that will need to be overcome.

• This is an election year in the United States and senior political figures in Congress will be intensely focused on the political campaign for the Presidency and the Congress.

• There is a general weariness among much of the American population with conflict in the Middle East and North Africa and a corresponding reluctance to undertake new and important foreign policy commitments in the region. Domestic political, social and economic issues will likely dominate the public agenda in the (election) year ahead for most of the US political leadership.

• The foreign policy bureaucracy is preoccupied with disentangling the United States from conflicts in the region and reluctant to undertake new initiatives.

• This will be Secretary Clinton’s last year as Secretary of State. Getting her attention on our most important issues will be a challenge and likely require very senior level and sustained efforts from Morocco if we are to win her active support for our agendas.

• At the State Department, there is no sense of “urgency” about the need to resolve the problem in Western Sahara and a general belief that the status quo, while not necessarily preferable, is nevertheless both “manageable” and the path of least resistance for the immediate future.

• Passing a budget in a Congress as deeply divided as this one has become is never an easy task, but this year’s budget battle in Congress is likely to be a front line battleground for the election campaign of both parties. This could have serious consequences for our efforts to use the legislative process to achieve the goals we have set for ourselves this year.

• The Polisario is clearly aware that they are losing ground in the United States at an alarming rate and we should expect that they will seek new and dramatic ways to advance their cause with American political leaders. Human rights issues have been their workhorse tool for the last two years and we should expect that they will again seek dramatic and public ways to turn this issue to their advantage.
FYI. And thanks. Attachment was sent as edited by you.

Attached is my Hill oped as edited by the Amb. He made some very thoughtful comments. As you can see the idea of “closing the camps” has to be taken out. There is a concern that no matter how we caveat it, our words will be twisted. This is the exact kind of review I appreciate as it gives us the Moroccan government perspective with a positive alternative and avoids us from making potentially terrible mistakes. **Let me know if you have any changes**, and remember although this represents my personal view, we still have to put a Fara descriptor on it. Thanks

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Hi ed
We have to talk about this on the phone before any release.
Rachad
This is a report we picked up from our contacts in Europe, FYI. Ed

Begin text:

Today, the European Parliament (EP) has given its consent to the EU-Morocco Agreement on reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products and fishery products (369 MEPs in favor, 225 against, 31 abstentions), going against José Bové’s (rapporteur) position. This Agreement is based on the Association Agreement in force since 2000, which provided for the gradual implementation of greater liberalisation of reciprocal trade for these products. It does not make a reference to Western Sahara.

In addition, the EP also adopted a resolution on this Agreement, calling “on the Commission to ensure that the agreement is fully consistent with international law and benefits all the local population groups affected”. Western Sahara is not mentioned as such. This resolution was supported by the main political groups of the EP (including the centre-right EPP, the Socialists, and the Liberals) and was adopted by a significant majority of MEPs (398 in favor, 175 against, and 50 abstentions). Two amendments proposed by the Greens and the extreme left, indicating that “Western Sahara is not part of Morocco and should not be included either explicitly or implicitly within the scope of any agreement the EU signs with the Kingdom of Morocco” were massively rejected.

The EP’s political environment for the debate on the future Fisheries Agreement has slightly improved. However, MEPs will still pay a careful attention to the substance of the upcoming Agreement; and they will unlikely support an Agreement that will not include the position they expressed in December 2011.

END
Rachad,
FYI

From: Edward Gabriel
Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 8:36 AM
To: Jean AbiNader
Cc: Jordan Paul; Fatima Kurtz
Subject: meeting with Amb. Bouhlal

Jean,

I want to make you aware of one issue I discussed with the Ambassador that affects your work. He specifically wanted to review the process for business matters separately from the rest of the organization, although he suggested prescriptions for the other parts of MAC as well.

He wants to be the first to know when something is coming down on the business side. He wants and needs our help on business-related matters, but would appreciate a more precise procedure. In this regard, when you are approached on a trade mission or visit by Moroccan agencies or similar requests (separate from a distinct process to inform him on specific business transactions), we decided the best approach is to respond positively to the requester and let them know that you will get back to them after you communicate with the Ambassador. A short email/memo should then be drafted to me for the Ambassador explaining the purpose, defining the request and outlining your thinking on the event and how to move forward. The Ambassador will work with us to then to divide the work between us. Also, he will, from time to time, ask us for our help on projects when they come through him. In all cases he will keep us informed so we both know what each other is doing in this regard. As a general rule, remember that he is best placed to interact with Moroccan agencies and sees us helping on the US side. There are nuances to each circumstance which we can discuss.

Fatima and Jean, the Ambassador also discussed the cultural side, and would like to institute the same procedure. There are exceptions here, such as when we are asked in our professional capacity to support a specific cause, or lend our name to a charity; the regular kinds of things we do regardless of our work affiliation. Otherwise, as big cultural requests come in, such as the Africa photography exhibit or the “paint the town Moroccan week”, he would like the same procedure so he is the first to know, and will then work with us on what he can do, as well as understanding what we can do, and ideas on how to proceed.

The Ambassador is appreciative and positive in this regard, but wants some formality to how we operate on these subjects, so that he hears about things first from us, rather than other people. We can talk further on this later today. Thanks Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Rachad,

Fatima and I went over the monthly Rabat report this morning and agree with you that we have a problem. In our attempt to be inclusive of the entire team, we are accidentally conveying an impression that you are in agreement with everything we are reporting. While that may be the case in the future, it certainly is not the case today. I understand your concern and want to make sure that the next report correctly reflects the team spirit of our group, as well as accurately depicting the position of the Embassy. I am sorry that this document created such discord and assure you this will not happen in the future. We will not send next month’s report without your concurrence. Ed
Attached is the oped as sent to the Hill. Please note that the descriptor at the bottom requires a legal statement that must be used at all times that I advise Morocco. The Hill may choose not to use it, but that will be up to them to decide. We have no choice under penalty of law. Thanks Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Garth D. Neuffer
Director of Communications | Moroccan American Center
1220 L Street NW - Suite 411, Washington, DC 20005
(o) 202-470-2055 (cell) 215-840-3692 (fax) 202-536-4210
gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com
Follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Rising threat of terrorism in the Sahel and its connection with the Polisario camps

By Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel

Why are US tax dollars being used to subsidize a recruiting ground in North Africa for al-Qaeda terrorists, drug traffickers, and mercenaries?

That’s a question US and international policymakers should ask after reading a new study by the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS), which warns that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is extending its reach across North Africa and the Sahel and actively recruiting from the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf in Algeria.

The report says these camps—which are supported by millions of dollars in US and international relief aid—have become “a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” The study calls on the US and international community to “prioritize permanent refugee resettlement in line with existing international protocols and agreements.”

The ICTS study and news media report that increasing numbers of Polisario Front members have been arrested and accused of drug and arms smuggling, gun battles in Mali, kidnappings for AQIM in Mauritania and Algeria, and fighting as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya.

The AQIM-Polisario connection was most recently demonstrated this past October when AQIM-linked assailants abducted three Western aid workers from a Polisario headquarters camp, reportedly helped by Polisario insiders who gave assailants arms and directions to the victims.

ICTS says that in the decade between 9/11 and the Arab Spring, terrorist kidnappings, bombings, and other attacks by AQIM and other militant groups in North Africa and the Sahel jumped more than 500 percent. It reports that AQIM is expanding its terrorist ties in an “arc of instability” across Africa, posing “one of the most worrying strategic challenges” for the international community in a region that has been “mostly overlooked by policymakers.”

The study cites AQIM’s links to other al-Qaeda affiliates and militants, including AQAP in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Polisario militants in Algeria, which it calls a “dangerous threat” to the region and beyond. The study notes evidence that AQIM may have obtained sophisticated Libyan arms, including surface-to-air missiles, and says intelligence reports confirm AQIM has also “opened links to Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling to Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include Polisario members.”

Other experts concur on the seriousness of the threat. AFRICOM head US General Carter Ham recently called AQIM’s growing links with other militants in the region “very, very dangerous” and a threat to the US. And UK Foreign Secretary William Hague has warned that expanding AQIM terror ties could have a “profoundly destabilizing effect on countries in North Africa and the Gulf” already shaken by the Arab Spring.

Ultimately, says the ICTS report, al-Qaeda and other militants in the region seek to exploit Arab Spring instability and expand their terrorist-trafficking network across Africa and into Europe and the Americas. The study finds they are also taking advantage of “the lingering 35-year-old Western Sahara conflict, which is creating an opening for AQIM’s expansion and also recruitment of Polisario members among the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.”
To address the growing risk of recruitment in the camps, ICTS recommends focusing US and international aid on voluntary return or resettling refugees.

This recommendation should receive very serious consideration from US and international policy makers, for humanitarian as well as security reasons, taking into account the urgent humanitarian needs of refugees. Multiple reports have documented abuse of the rights of the refugees, who are confined to the camps and denied freedom to leave. Thousands have been forced to make dangerous escapes across hostile terrain. Tragically, the refugees in the Tindouf camps are among the only refugees in the world who are welcome to resettle elsewhere, if the Polisario would only let them.

Since 1990, international agencies have spent in excess of $1 billion—more than $300 million from the US—effectively perpetuating the conditions in these camps. Much of the aid has reportedly been diverted to the black market for Polisario profit. AQIM and others are now exploiting the camps as a recruiting ground. Clearly this must stop. US and international aid should be used for durable solutions that support refugee rights and resettlement, not subsidize conditions that create a recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers.

To prepare the ground for durable solutions to the refugees’ plight, the UN Security Council has called for UNHCR to undertake a census to let the international community know the exact figures of the Tindouf camps population, to help speed up international efforts aimed at achieving a political solution to this longstanding regional dispute.

Edward M. Gabriel, former US Ambassador to Morocco, advises the Kingdom of Morocco. For more information, please visit the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
Given the interest in Javier Bardem’s new documentary, we wanted to provide a summary on the film’s topic, coverage and overall sentiment.

The film is premiering today, February 16th, at the Berlin Film Festival. As this is the first of the major film festivals this year, we should look out for it being shown at the other prominent festivals this year, including:

- Sundance (January) - The film was not showcased
- Tribeca (April) - Film line up not yet announced
- Cannes (May) - Film line up not yet announced
- Venice (August/September) - Film line up to be announced in July
- San Sebastian (September) - Film line up not yet announced
- Toronto (September) - Film line up not yet announced

Currently, there has been coverage on the film in the following websites.

- **Hollywood Reporter** (February 15): Interview with Bardem on the film and its aim to raise awareness on the conflict in Western Sahara. Bardem points out how "the Sahrawis [...] have been trying peacefully to demand legal rights, common sense rights, with the knowledge and consensus of the United Nations and yet they still feel they don't have a right."
- **Variety** (February 9): The article highlights how the film "through interviews, Bardem's voiceover, action sequences and even animation, the Alvaro Longoria-helmed "Sons" shows how and why the Western Sahara, abandoned by Spain and annexed by Morocco in its 1975 Green March, became, according to a U.N. statement, a colony -- the last in Africa, noted Bardem -- leaving 200,000 Saharawis living in desert refugee camps, mostly in South-West Algeria."
- **The Guardian** (February 8): An article focused on the Berlin Film Festival mentioning that "Javier Bardem will show the documentary he produced, Sons of the Clouds: the Last Colony, about a forgotten colonial war in the western Sahara."
- **LA Times Blog** (February 8): An article focused on the Berlin Film Festival mentioning the film being showcased.
- **Reuters** (February 6): Divides the Berlin Film Festival on three key themes: Chinese Epic, Vampire Star and Egyptian Protests.
- **El Pais** (February 3): The articles highlights how the film that took 3 years to complete and spanned 6 countries details the multiple political, economic and strategic interests of the countries involved that have prevented a resolution to this conflict that has been in a 'cold war' for more than 35 years.
  - **Plataforma Sahara** (similar article to the one above)
  - **Dajla** (similar article to the one above)
  - **SOGAPS** (similar article to the one above)
  - **Resistencias Saharauis** (similar article to the one above)

Most articles focus on the film itself without discussing the greater implications or taking a specific viewpoint on the issue. In the Reuters piece, it is highlighted that Bardem will speak post-screening in a Q&A session. We should monitor in case anything particularly alarming surfaces.

Finally, below is a synopsis of the film.

"Sons of the Clouds: The Last Colony," will participate in the 62nd Berlin International Film Festival. The movie written and directed by Alvaro Longoria (Morena Films), produced and starring Javier Bardem (Pinguin Films), production by Lilly Hartley
Candescent Films) and with the participation of Canal +, will have its global debut on February 16th under the festival's official special selection. The feature-film documentary follows Bardem on his own journey through the complicated world of international diplomacy and the interest that have detonated the Arab Springs, analysing the harsh history of the habitants of Western Sahara, the last colony in Africa. The film which took 3 years to complete and spanned 6 countries details the multiple political, economic and strategic interests of the countries involved that have prevented a resolution to this conflict that has been in a 'cold war' for more than 35 years.

Additionally, we should keep an eye out for mentions of Wilaya another film about Western Sahara, which to date has only been mentioned in Variety and Hollywood Reporter.
Mr. Ambassador,

Attached is the second paper promised by Bob and me regarding our thoughts on a meeting agenda and issues for the upcoming visit by the Secretary to Rabat. Please let me know if you have further questions. Ed
Secretary Clinton Visit to Morocco

Background

Hillary Clinton’s scheduled February 26 visit to Morocco will very likely be her last trip to Morocco as US Secretary of State. She has made clear that she will not remain in her current position should President Obama win re-election in November. Consequently, her visit later this month will likely represent our best opportunity to secure a commitment from her to make significant progress on several important objectives that we have hoped to achieve during her tenure at the State Department. The visit will offer a good opportunity to consolidate progress made during Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri’s meeting with Secretary Clinton in Washington in March of last year, as well as a new opportunity to take an important step forward in consolidating US support for Morocco’s initiative to resolve the issue in Western Sahara.

Objectives for the Visit

- Secure a public statement of support from the Secretary for Morocco’s reforms and the importance that the US attaches to working with Morocco as a partner in promoting progress in the Middle East and North Africa. In this regard, seek assurance of the Secretary to formally inaugurate the Strategic Dialogue announced one year ago.

- Gain Clinton’s support for committing US development resources to improving the lives of those living in the Southern Provinces as authorized in the December 2011 Omnibus Appropriations Bill that gives the Obama Administration a green light to use US funds in the Sahara provinces.

- Receive a commitment from the Secretary that the Department will respond to the Leahy language in a strong positively worded answer, in order to put this issue to rest, once and for all.

- Encourage the Secretary to reiterate US support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative as “serious, credible and realistic” and to state publicly that events in the region make a resolution of the Western Sahara issue through a political compromise a necessity in order to promote regional cooperation and integration, as well as combat the growing influence and activities of regional terrorist and criminal elements that seek to profit from the uncertainties of Arab Spring developments in the region.

Suggested Points on Western Sahara

- Describe steps Morocco has taken in an effort to improve relations with Algeria and foster a better climate for regional cooperation and resolution of the Sahara. Explain Moroccan perception of the results of these efforts.

- Give Secretary Clinton a full understanding of Morocco’s commitment to resolving this issue as quickly as possible and explain the dangers of continued stalemate, especially as AQIM and other criminal groups seek to destabilize the region.
Express Morocco’s appreciation for Congress’ authorization for the Obama Administration to use US development assistance funds to help improve the lives of those living in the Southern Provinces. Explain how such actions could help create a better climate for resolving the larger problem in the Sahara. Express willingness to work closely with the State Department and US development agencies to identify programs that could be implemented and suggest that a working level meeting in the near future should be arranged to address this opportunity to enhance US/Morocco efforts on this issue. This will be the one and only signal during her tenure that moves the WS issue incrementally forward. She should see it accomplished before she leaves office. This is one of the two most impactful items Clinton can do with Morocco before leaving office.

The other issue that would leave an indelible Clinton signature is the US-Moroccan Strategic Dialogue. She should make sure that this Dialogue is established as an on-going process, and that the first meeting is held prior to her leaving office.

Encourage Secretary Clinton to make a strong public statement of support for the need to resolve the Sahara problem and reiterate the need for compromise as she again expresses the US view of Morocco’s initiative as “serious, credible and realistic.” Anything less will be perceived as the State Department “walking back” previous commitments.

In this regard reiterate Morocco’s commitment that the refugees in the Algerian camps are welcome to come home and will be assisted in building a new life for themselves and their families.

Explain the consequences of the Leahy language to the bilateral relations and the perception by the Moroccan population. Specifically explain the importance of an unequivocal and strong positive response from the State Department in this regard in order to lay this issue to rest, once and for all.
Rachad,

At the Friday congressional staff meeting we spent time going over messaging for congressional meetings. We have now prepared an initial draft of messages, which we have sent to Embassy staff for further refinements, at their request. Once we all have agreed on a final draft we will submit to you for your final approval. I hope this process is OK with you? Please let me know otherwise. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Saida, Mouaad, and Fouad,

Thank you for taking the time to review and edit these documents. As in the past, we know the input from the Embassy diplomats is an invaluable part of this process. Your insights and knowledge will greatly improve all of these papers.

Per our discussion at the Congressional Team meeting yesterday, we have prepared these draft Fact Sheets and a 15 Meeting Outline. Per the advice of the group, the Fact Sheets are designed to be one page (front and back), hitting the critical points on the four issues we discussed:

1. Morocco as a Leader in the Region
2. Recent Reforms and Elections in Morocco
3. Bilateral Relationship – primarily trade and security
4. Refugee Rights

Similar to the fact sheets is a draft one page outline of a typical meeting. It is designed to be a guide, not a script, that members of the team can look at before any typical meeting.

Thanks and please let me know if you any questions. Best, Jordan
Perfect. Thank you.

Ed,

As our two teams discussed yesterday at the congressional meeting, we will review and add (if and when necessary) some ideas/points that, from our perspective, we think should be included in the fact sheets.

You will receive our comments soon.

Rachad

From: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Subject: RE: Fact Sheets and Meeting Outline Drafts
Date: February 18, 2012 11:27:20 AM EST
To: <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com>

Rachad,

At the Friday congressional staff meeting we spent time going over messaging for congressional meetings. We have now prepared an initial draft of messages, which we have sent to Embassy staff for further refinements, at their request. Once we all have agreed on a final draft we will submit to you for your final approval. I hope this process is OK with you? Please let me know...
Saida, Mouaad, and Fouad,

Thank you for taking the time to review and edit these documents. As in the past, we know the input from the Embassy diplomats is an invaluable part of this process. Your insights and knowledge will greatly improve all of these papers.

Per our discussion at the Congressional Team meeting yesterday, we have prepared these draft Fact Sheets and a 15 Meeting Outline. Per the advice of the group, the Fact Sheets are designed to be one page (front and back), hitting the critical points on the four issues we discussed:

1) Morocco as a Leader in the Region
2) Recent Reforms and Elections in Morocco
3) Bilateral Relationship – primarily trade and security
4) Refugee Rights

Similar to the fact sheets is a draft one page outline of a typical meeting. It is designed to be a guide, not a script, that members of the team can look at before any typical meeting.

Thanks and please let me know if you any questions. Best, Jordan
Rachad,
Thank you very much for the quick response and the thoughtfulness of you and the team. I very much appreciate the process that you are establishing and think it will greatly improve our product and effect on behalf of Morocco. Thanks Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Ed,
First, the information in the fact sheets is excellent.

I have made some changes, which I included in the attached fact sheets.

As agreed during last Friday's meeting, our two teams can sit down together and discuss those observations and changes.

Best,

Rachad
Rachad,

Attached is the official request/invitation from Lesley Westbrook, regarding the MD Moroccan event May 4th and 5th. I’d be happy to answer any questions you have and support you in this effort as you deem necessary. My wife Kathleen and I also would be honored to host you for the “Paint the town Moroccan” weekend at our place on the Eastern Shore if this suitable to your schedule. Ed
February 2012

H.E. Rachad BouhlaJ
Ambassador, Kingdom of Morocco
1601 21 Street, NW
Washington DC 20009

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

By way of introduction, I am Co-Chair of the annual fundraiser for our Academy Art Museum, this year scheduled for Saturday, May 5, in Easton, Maryland. The brand of our fundraiser is “PAINT THE TOWN”... each year using a different unique theme. My husband Paolo Frigeno and I were in Morocco in March of 2011; that was my inspiration for creating the focus on Morocco and all that it has to offer. As you know, Ambassador Gabriel and his wife, Kathleen, are actively involved in community affairs on the Eastern Shore and have agreed to be this year’s honorary co-chairs.

We are not just another party... we want to showcase the best of Morocco so that our attendees really get to know something of the country, the important relationship between our two countries and its long history, the crafts/art/music/food/wines. It is our intention to take people somewhere most have never been... the majority of our 400 attendees have not been to Morocco, although there is a high percentage of citizens of our county who are affluent and have traveled extensively throughout the world. The following is an outline of the day’s events.

- The main event will be Saturday, May 5, starting at 6pm with a one-hour performance at our beautiful historic theatre in downtown Easton. We are flying in the phenomenal musician Ali Amir from Morocco who will perform with 4 regional Moroccan musicians to showcase the extraordinary range of music... Berber, Gnaoua, Chaabi, Arabic, Jewish. Following the performance we will serve cocktails and appetizers at the Art Museum... then Dinner Under The Tent nearby... all authentic Moroccan cuisine and wines, a new discovery for most Americans.
- The Souk: We will close one block of our historic downtown Easton between the Avalon Theatre and the Art Museum. The Souk will be open on Saturday, May 5, noon until 7:30pm. We are working with Hassan Samhouni of the Washington Moroccan community to procure the best merchants of Moroccan crafts, clothing, purses, art, fabrics... traditional items to feature and sell in The Souk.
- Art Galleries in Easton: the art galleries in downtown Easton as well as our Academy Art Museum would like to exhibit Moroccan art/artists for potentially a 2-week time period.
- Friday evening: One of our patrons is hosting a dinner at her waterfront estate for our top donors and honored guests.

Mr. Ambassador, specifically we would like to meet with you at your convenience to discuss the following:

- We would like you and Mrs. BouhlaJ to be the Honored Guests for the Saturday, May 5, event. You will have special seating for the performance and for the dinner.
- We would also like you and Mrs. BouhlaJ to attend the Friday, May 4, dinner at the waterfront estate in Easton. Hilda and Arturo Brillembourg are our hosts for that evening.
- We are pleased to bring in musician Ali Amir for our performance. It would be very helpful to our fundraising goals if he were able to use a complimentary ticket on Air Maroc, if possible.
• We plan to serve Moroccan wines. We would appreciate assistance in selecting and procuring the most appropriate wines to expose to our guests.
• We want to make sure that the cuisine for the dinner is as authentic as possible and hope you are able to provide guidance in this regard.
• We would like your thoughts on art and artists to exhibit at art galleries and the Academy Art Museum.

I am sure our initial meeting will produce even more ideas to discuss as well as other questions to answer. I hope your schedule will allow us to get together soon and look forward to meeting you.

Respectfully and with gratitude,

Leslie M. Westbrook
Co-Chair
PAINT THE TOWN MOROCCAN!
Academy Art Museum
Paint the Town

Mòròccàn!

Saturday, May 5, 2012
Rachad, more on your invitation to speak to the Council on Foreign Relations, March 13th. See below on timing. Ed

---

It seems I missed in the initial email that Elliott suggested lunch or late afternoon for the event. Apologies for the oversight. Naomi would like to get at least the basics taken care of as soon as possible, so once we have a date and time from the Ambassador, please let me know. In addition, please let me know how you would like to proceed going forward...

Thanks again.

Caitlin Dearing  
Senior Vice-President of Research, Projects, and Programs  
Moroccan American Center  
202.470.2051  
cdearing@moroccanamericancenter.com  
Visit us at: http://www.moroccoonthemovecom  
Follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove
Memo

Date: February 21, 2012

To: Ed Gabriel

From: Caitlin Dearing

Cc: Jordan Paul; Jean AbiNader

Re: March 9th Event

As part of our 2012 campaign to promote Morocco as a leader, we plan to host an event around the one year anniversary of the March 9th 2011 King’s Speech inaugurating reform in the Kingdom. The event will be a retrospective on the past year, highlighting key reforms and developments. The timing also presents an opportunity to introduce Ambassador Bouhlal to the think tank community.

Elliott Abrams of the Council on Foreign Relations has agreed to host the Ambassador for a roundtable on March 13th. The initial thinking is that it will be a conversation between Elliott and the Ambassador on the last year in Morocco and what the future holds, but the final format is yet to be determined and Elliott has not yet signaled what format he would like or if he would like to bring in an additional speaker. Given Elliott’s stature and his agreement to hold the event on behalf of the Council on Foreign Relations, I suggest that we cede ownership to Elliott, only providing counsel and assistance when requested. Elliott is a demonstrated friend of Morocco and since the Ambassador is the focus of the event, it will be friendly to Morocco regardless.

Per Elliott’s directions, we need to answer the following ASAP:

1. Confirm Ambassador Bouhlal’s availability for March 13th and finalize the date and time with Elliott. Elliott has suggested either a lunch or late afternoon, so pending the Ambassador’s availability, it would be helpful to suggest a few options.
2. Finalize a title with Elliott. Our working suggestion is, “Elections, Reform, and the Arab Spring: Morocco, One Year Later.” This will, of course, be merely a suggestion to Elliott, who will have the final say.

Please let us know if you have any further questions or if you need any further information to make the above requests.
Final messaging with one change. Please see MAC staff consensus below, and let me know if you disagree. Thank you, Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Dear Ed,

We have made all the required changes, with some edits ameliorating the English additions the Embassy made. I have tracked changes for their review. The one change we did not make was with regards to the title of fact sheet 4 on conditioning US aid to the camps. The Embassy’s suggested titled focused solely on the census, which is not the focus of the fact sheet and we therefore think is not an appropriate title. We understand the Embassy’s concern about emphasizing the census, and we have left their additional language at the end of the fact sheet. For Congress, however, the key is the conditioning, not the language that comes after “until and unless” (which would be the census). We are happy to discuss further, but after consultation with Jordan, the consultants, and Bob at the last Congressional meeting, this was the messaging everyone agreed to.
Basic Outline for a 15 Minute Congressional Meeting

Morocco as a historic friend and ally of the US, and a leader in the Region, Recent Reforms, Elections, and New Government

- Morocco has along history of important political reforms and democratic practices
  - Free and Fair elections
  - Women’s Rights
  - Political expression
- Morocco has been a leader in the region during the Arab Spring
  - Cooperation and Coordination with Tunisia
  - Leadership in Libya
  - Authored the UN Security Council Resolution on Syria
- Constitutional Reforms enacted in July
  - Morocco seized the opportunity to press forward with long planned reforms
  - Important new powers to the elected government
  - The issue of Religion remains with HMKMVI
- Results of the Elections
  - PJD wins a plurality
  - The Quote from the PM
  - Akin to the Christian Democrats of Europe
  - Part of a moderate coalition

Trade Stats and Update on the Bilateral Relationship

- Export Stats from the State to Morocco or US to Morocco depending on amount
  - Important aviations and military purchases: Boeing Commercial Planes and F16s
- Bilateral Relationship is historic, unwavering, and a true friendship.
  - It is based on shared values (elections, transparency), shared economic relationship (FTA), and shared security engagements (F-16s, joint exercises)
  - America has no better friend in the North Africa

Conditioning US Assistance to the Camps

- Increased Criminal Behavior
  - Mercenaries for Gaddafi, Shootouts in Mali, Kidnapping in the camps for AQIM, recruitment for the drug cartels
- Growing instability in the region (use Yonah’s map)
- These camps have existed for 35 years at the cost of over 1 billion dollars
  - It is ridiculous for the US to subsidize camps that contribute recruits to our adversaries
• The Congress should condition non-humanitarian assistance to the camps to advance refugee rights and promote durable solutions. In order to create the conditions for such durable solutions to refugee plight, a census of the camps is required - a precondition the Security Council has long called on UNHCR to conduct. A census would allow the international community to know the exact figures of the population of the Tindouf camps with a view of speeding up the international efforts aimed at achieving a mutually acceptable political solution to this longstanding regional dispute.
Morocco is Committed to a Strong Bilateral Relationship with the United States

- Morocco has long-been an ally and partner of the United States. It was the first country to formally recognize the United States and, in 1786, became the first country with which the United States negotiated a formal treaty of commerce and friendship. Today, that friendship and cooperation continue in many fields, highlighted by our common commitment to peace, democracy, combating terrorism and advancing regional security and development. Morocco, a stable, democratizing, and liberalizing Arab and Muslim nation, is an important supporter of key US interests in the Middle East and has played a discrete and helpful role in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (particularly that Morocco plays a discrete and efficient role in the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict). US policy toward Morocco is based on sustained and strong engagement, and shared priorities for reform, conflict resolution, counterterrorism cooperation, and public empowerment. [public engagement]

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm#relations
http://rabat.usembassy.gov/history.html

- (We need to make reference to the fact that our security cooperation has started long before 9/11) Morocco and the United States share a long-standing commitment to security cooperation. During World Wars I and II, Morocco was aligned with the Allied Forces and fought alongside US forces operating in the region. Following Morocco’s independence in 1956, the King Mohammed VI expressed his commitment to be a staunch ally of the United States in the fight against the proliferation of communism in the region. This security cooperation was greatly enhanced in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the commencement of the Global War on Terror. After 9/11, Morocco showed solidarity and renewed its commitment as a strong partner of the US on counterterrorism and military cooperation. By hindering the wave of jihadist recruits to Iraq from North Africa and by implementing successful counterterrorism measures, Morocco established itself as a key player in the global war on terrorism. Morocco is also a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership Initiative (TSCPTI), fully cooperating in the US efforts to prevent and combat terrorism in the Sahel region. Cooperation between Morocco and the US includes data sharing, law enforcement partnership, improvement of capabilities to oversee strategic checkpoints, and termination of terrorist organization financing.

http://rabat.usembassy.gov/modern.html
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L0255298.htm

- The US also contributes military and counterterrorism support to Morocco through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) initiatives. These ties feature regular joint exercises as well as
military sales. Such transfers deepen ties and help promote a modern military in Morocco. Under the FMF program, the US provides security assistance to maintain aging US-origin equipment, including aircrafts and transportation vehicles; American equipment boosts maritime surveillance to address illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, and illicit fishing; procures transport and logistics equipment; and upgrades aerial surveillance.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158268.pdf

- Through the IMET assistance program, of which Morocco is one of the top 20 recipients worldwide, senior military officers have received training in the United States, and 70 Moroccan students are sent annually to the Professional Military Education (PME) classes at US services schools. These courses cover human rights norms and the proper use of US military equipment, and allow for increased collaboration between the US and Moroccan armed forces. As the State Department notes, “the Moroccan military offers a significant force multiplier for US initiatives to promote regional stability on the African continent through military education. The Moroccan military trains several other African and European militaries in their schools and training facilities,” thus [enhancing interoperability] and contributing to peace and security in all of North Africa.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60654.pdf
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158268.pdf

- In recognition of this, the US has doubled military assistance to the country and honored Morocco with “major non-NATO ally status,” which qualifies Morocco for increased US military cooperation. The United States also established a US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement in 2004, signaling the beginning of a new period of cooperation and economic growth between the United States and Morocco. Economic cooperation was furthered in August 2007, when the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a five-year, $697.5 million compact with the Kingdom of Morocco to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth.

http://www.mcc.gov/pages/countries/program/morocco-compact

- The FTA with EU countries and the new TangerMed Harbor with its free industrial zone situated at 10 miles from Spain is an extraordinary opportunity to enter into the European market. The new program launched by Morocco to modernize, in the next 10 years, its agricultural sector (new equipments, new techniques for irrigation especially drop by drop systems, fertilizers, training, etc.) is a unique opportunity for the US to play a big role. The sector of renewable energies aiming at producing 38% of our electricity from renewable energy (9 billions $ of direct investments, and a production of 2000 MW by 2020) and the sector of fisheries represent unique opportunities for American companies.

- In 2008, Morocco chose to further strengthen its bilateral military and economic cooperation with the United States by signing a contract for 24 Advanced F-16 Block 52 aircraft manufactured by Lockheed-Martin. According to the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “the sale will also contribute to the foreign

- Morocco’s strategic trading location, its FTA with EU countries, and the new TangerMed Harbor, a free industrial zone situated at 10 miles from Spain, offer an extraordinary opportunity for US companies to enter into the European market. In addition, recent program initiated by Morocco, including a new program launched to modernize its agricultural sector, the expansion of renewable energies in Morocco, which aims to produce 38% of the country’s electricity from renewable energy by 2020, and the continued expansion of the fisheries sector represent unique opportunities for American investment.
Morocco Is Irreversibly Committed to Democratic Reform and Good Governance

- Since ascending the throne in 1999, King Mohammed VI has consolidated, accelerated, and broadened democratic reform in the Kingdom of Morocco. His staunch commitment to democracy and an active civil society is illustrated in a 2003 speech to the nation, “Indeed, our strength lies in the democratic system we have opted for as an irreversible choice which, coupled with an aggressive (pro-active), committed diplomacy, involving parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society, will help us in the defense of our just cause.”

- Much of what King Mohammed VI has initiated is part of an ongoing process to empower individual citizens and the institutions that represent them. Major achievements include: a number of free and fair parliamentary and local elections; reform of the family code; mandatory inclusion of women in national and local elections; the beginnings of the process of regionalization to bring power and decision making closer to local communities; the equity and reconciliation commission (IER) dealing with past human rights abuses; the human development initiative (INDH) to build sustainable futures for Morocco’s most disadvantaged communities; (sustained efforts to fight illiteracy;) and the recent upgrading of the institution responsible for human rights protections.

- These initiatives highlight Morocco’s ongoing democratic transition. As the Washington Post noted, “[Morocco] has over the past decade undergone a slow but profound transformation from traditional monarchy to constitutional monarchy, acquiring along the way real political parties, a relatively free press, new political leaders—the mayor of Marrakesh is a 33-year-old woman—and a set of family laws that strive to be compatible both with Sharia (no need to use the word Sharia, especially right now) with and with international conventions on human rights.”

- In a speech on March 9, 2011, in line with his continued efforts to promote reform, King Mohammed VI announced a broad revision of Morocco’s constitution in an effort to consolidate democracy in Morocco, devolve power to the regions, broaden individual freedoms, solidify the rule of law, and strengthen human rights. In it, he announced the creation of an advisory commission tasked with consulting with government and civil society leaders, political parties, trade unions, and youth groups to make proposed reforms for Morocco’s Constitution. This marked the start of an unprecedented campaign for constitutional reform, culminating in parliamentary elections on November 25 and the establishment of a new government in late December 2011.

This information has been produced by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP). www.moroccanamericanpolicy.com
MACP is a registered agent of the Government of Morocco.
Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C.
Leaders worldwide praised Morocco for its commitment to reform following the March 9th speech. The United States said it is “encouraged by the proposals put forward by the King to transform Morocco's democratic development through constitutional, judicial and political reforms.” The European Union called the reforms “a major step” signaling “a clear commitment to democracy and respect for human rights.” It added that new measures would continue “the Kingdom's already-launched reform process” and advance “separation of powers,” “independence of the judiciary,” “regionalization,” and “equal rights for men and women.” The 47-member Council of Europe made Morocco its first “partner for democracy” among nations in the region.


After several months of consultation, on June 17 the King announced a new Constitution with unprecedented and far-reaching reforms which was approved by an overwhelming majority of Moroccans through a national referendum on July 1. The Constitution enshrined several key changes to Morocco’s political system, advancing democratization by strengthening the principle of separation of powers and bringing all stakeholders into the political process. The New Constitution:
- Establishes that the Prime Minister will be appointed from the party that wins the most seats in the Parliament in the elections.
- Expands the powers of the Prime Minister as Head of Government and the Parliament, giving them broad legislative powers.
- Empowers Moroccans with more control and leadership at the local government level—making local and regional officials directly accountable to voters.
- Establishes independent agencies to guarantee civil and human rights protections.
- Establishes an independent judiciary with a newly mandated Constitutional Court.


Following the successful revision of the Constitution, the King called for national parliamentary elections on November 25, 2011. Certified as free and fair by international observers, the elections had a voter turnout of 45% - an increase of more than 20% from the last parliamentary elections held in 2007, thus underscoring the support among Moroccans for reform initiated by the King. The new government, led by Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the PJD, is committed to continue to advance democratic reform in Morocco through educational reform, the promotion of international trade and investment, and support for democracy and human rights. The 2011 events thus reinforce Morocco’s tradition of reform, one that will continue to strengthen in the coming years.

Morocco’s Regional Leadership

- In the last decade, Morocco has taken the lead among its neighbors in promoting democracy, human rights, and socioeconomic development. Long before the Arab Spring, Morocco had begun a process of reform and democratization. Its efforts to consolidate democracy and promote human rights through the 2011 revision of the Constitution serves as an example for peacefully promoting democratization without regime change, another demonstration of Morocco’s regional leadership.

- Morocco has been at the forefront of Islamic countries in promoting the rights of women and gender equity. In 2004, based on the unprecedented initiative of King Mohammed VI, Morocco approved the Moudawana, one of the most progressive laws on women’s and family rights in the Arab world. The new law forbids marriage of women under 18 and raised the age of marriage for girls from 15 to 18 and gave wives equal rights as their husbands, (and reinforces equal rights between women and men), notably in the area of division of property upon divorce. It also helps to secure women’s participation in society and politics in order to reinforce their power and eliminate gender discrimination in private and public affairs. The Moudawana has since served as an example for women’s rights activists across the Maghreb and Middle East.

- Morocco launched a pioneering truth and reconciliation effort in 2004 that has served as an example for how to address human rights violations of the past. Established by King Mohammed VI, the Moroccan Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IER) was the first of its kind in the Arab world. As an independent investigative body, it shed light on past human rights violations, provided compensation for the victims, and was the basis for the Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH). The IER’s mission is to not only answer questions about Morocco’s past, but to understand the causes and use them as lessons to construct a stronger, open and more just society.

- Morocco demonstrated its regional leadership on the importance of human rights protection during the crises in Libya and Syria. It participated in discussions with Western powers over the Libyan crisis, one of the few Arab countries and the only North African country openly involved in such talks. In cooperation with the Arab League, Morocco endorsed the no-fly zone over Libya and advocated its support for the Libyan people to democratically determine their future. On Syria, Morocco demonstrated leadership at the UN Security Council, authoring the draft resolution calling for a ceasefire, expressing grave concerns at the deteriorating situation, and condemning gross violations of human rights.

---

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61702.htm
Morocco is committed to regional integration and its participation in the Maghreb Arab Union is a strategic and natural choice for Morocco, the country. At the 30th Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the countries of the Union, M. Saad El Dine Othmani, Morocco's Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister stated, at the 30th meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the countries of the Union that the achievement of the Maghreb integration is, for Morocco, a constitutional priority and a strategic necessity to respond to the growing aspirations of the people of the Maghreb, adding that the Maghreb integration is a popular aspiration given the longstanding civilizational bonds and the common destiny between the people of the member countries.

Morocco had long demonstrated its commitment to building stability in Africa through security cooperation and socioeconomic development. In the past decade, Morocco has contributed to peacekeeping efforts throughout the continent and promoted economic and social development projects as a means of addressing insecurity.

As of October 2009, Morocco had over 1,500 troops, military observers, and police serving in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ranking 17th in terms of worldwide contributions. It is currently involved in peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivoire.

Morocco continues to play a key role in socioeconomic development both in North and sub-Saharan Africa as its businesses increasingly transfer their technical know-how to other African nations. A recent Jeune Afrique article noted, “the expertise and know-how of Moroccan entrepreneurs is widely recognized and solicited throughout the continent.” This effort has been notable particularly in the telecommunications, banking, transportation, health, agribusiness, and engineering sectors, where the Moroccan government and businesses cooperate with their African counterparts and international officials in all phases of a project: financing, planning, and execution.

Part of this development includes training in order to build the human capacity of these countries. Morocco has played a key role in fostering educational development. Currently, 10,000 students from sub-Saharan Africa are enrolled in Moroccan universities. Many Central and West African countries look to Morocco for management training that contributes to the formation of a viable civil service capable of promoting real socio-economic development and democratic change.
Condition US Support for the Camps in Western Sahara to Advance Refugee Rights and Promote Durable Solutions

- Tens of thousands of refugees have been sequestered in refugee camps in southwest Algeria near the town of Tindouf for more than thirty years. Having initially fled or been forced to flee to the camps during hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front, the refugees are now warehoused in Algeria in deplorable physical and moral circumstances. The international community system (community) has done little to protect the rights of these refugees in what has now become, according to UNHCR, one of the longest protracted refugee situations in the world today.

- The refugees are almost completely dependent on international aid, as prospects for livelihood are limited both by the difficult physical environment and Algeria’s refusal to grant refugees the right to work or freedom of movement outside of the camps. The refugees rely on aid for food and non-food items, healthcare, education, water, sanitation, transportation, and other basic services. Anemia and malnutrition remain high, water resources are insufficient, primary school and healthcare centers operate with meager resources and supplies, and there is a dearth of secondary education facilities. These conditions all violate refugee rights under international humanitarian law.

- What is currently a humanitarian crisis is quickly becoming a security crisis as well. The camps are situated close to the porous border area between Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria, a vital crossroads of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorism and trafficking. In recent years, they have become a recruiting ground for AQIM and a hub for opportunistic Polisario members trafficking arms, drugs, people, and goods across the Sahel. Although in addition to the finding that members of the Polisario have long been involved in trafficking in the region and suspected of collusion with AQIM and other militants, the rise of terrorism in the region, in addition to the continued intransigence by the Polisario to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, have exacerbated the security threat posed by the camps.¹

- The increased evidence of ties between the Polisario Front and AQIM and recruitment within the refugee camps has raised concerns among security and

---


This information has been produced by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP). www.moroccanamericanpolicy.com
MACP is a registered agent of the Government of Morocco.
Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C.
refugee experts alike. Dr. J. Peter Pham has noted that connections between AQIM and the Polisario Front, "come[s] as no surprise given that the large numbers of idle young fighters with no prospects in camps presents the terrorist group with a ready pool of potential recruits, both for its military operations as well as the criminal activities it is increasingly involved in." Gil Loescher and James Milner, affiliated with the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford have echoed these warnings with regards to Western Sahara, arguing that, "prolonged and unresolved refugee crises almost universally result in politicisation and militancy of refugee communities with predictable adverse consequences for host state and regional security."  


- **UN Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General** to the Western Sahara, Ambassador Christopher Ross, has also warned about the dangers of these encampments. In a letter to the Group of Friends in 2010, Ross emphasized the dangers of failing to resolve the conflict, noting, "the risk of a drift toward extremism or criminal activities among Sahrawi youth is growing. The danger that a military or paramilitary adventure could escalate into hostilities increases the longer diplomacy fails to produce progress."

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100820/wl_africa_afp/moroccowsaharaspainun

- This reality became more serious on October 23, 2011 when an AQIM splinter group kidnapped three Western aid workers from the camps, reportedly with Polisario insider help. According to Agence France Presse, "unarmed AQIM militants entered the Sahrawi refugee camp in Tindouf, western Algeria, where sympathizers of the Polisario Front gave them weapons and helped them seek out the hostages."

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gfsKPTIgBS_lQzBQK_R-Fdi-z0A?docId=CNG.fb5674e8c48dbb7ef3f59c256d4c3f07.531

- Yet, there are more than just moral and security imperatives for promoting the rights of Sahrawi refugees. It is also in the interest of UNHCR, Algeria, and donors countries to open the Tindouf camps since the long-term care and maintenance programs come at a significant human and material cost. To date, the international community has provided over $1.3 billion dollars to UNHCR, the World Food Program, and MINURSO for the Sahrawi refugees, of which the United States has contributed over $300 million. While this money has provided vital resources to the refugees, it has done little to promote durable solutions, the primary mandate of UNHCR under international refugee law. Rather than help sustain a humanitarian crisis and an increasingly volatile security crisis, US support to UNHCR should be conditioned on its promotion of durable solutions,
including voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in a third country— as a first step towards repatriation.  
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rl/c6112.htm  
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c78.html  
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/algeria fs.01.04.11.pdf  
http://www.wfp.org/countries/Algeria/Operations/WFP-Activities  
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rl/c6112.htm  
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c78.html  
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/algeria fs.01.04.11.pdf  
http://www.wfp.org/countries/Algeria/Operations/WFP-Activities  

• In order to prepare the ground— create the conditions for such a durable solutions to refugee plight, a census of the camps is required - a precondition the Security Council has long called on UNHCR to conduct. there is a prerequisite of a Census that the Security Council have been calling for UNHCR to undertake. A census which would allow the international community to know the exact figures of the population of the Tindouf camps with a view to speeding up the international efforts aiming at achieving a mutually acceptable political solution to this longstanding regional dispute.
Rachad,

Our work with the US Chamber of Commerce continues on a positive path for the March conference. According to Jean Abinader, although a list of potential US companies has not been finalized, there seems to be a good response from the American side, and contacts are already being made to target specific company interests.

In the past, the Moroccan American Trade & Investment Center (MATIC) has offered to help the Chamber and other delegations by sponsoring one of the events during the trip. This has been very useful in order to build a network of contacts among the US companies for follow up. We are considering hosting the luncheon on the second day, in Rabat. Please let me know if you have any questions or comments in this regard.

Also, Jean usually travels with the delegation to provide a private sector point of contact for the US companies once they return to the US. He supports the Embassy's outreach to the companies and ensures continuity in communications with them. I fear without this continuity we may lose opportunities. The question here is whether you agree with him going to Morocco for this purpose? I have not yet figured out if we can afford to send Jean even if you agree, but want to get your thoughts first.

I would appreciate your advice concerning our hosting the luncheon in Rabat and Jean's participation with the delegation.

Thank you. Ed
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>

Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 10:13 AM

To: Rachad Bouhlal

Cc: Jean AbiNader

Subject: Fwd: Follow up from OPIC

Attachments: MaghrebMiddleEastRenewableEnergySummit2012CasablancaSpeakers.pdf; Untitled attachment 00105.htm

Mr. Ambassador,

What would you like us to do in this regard?

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Jean AbiNader" <jabinader@moroccanamericancenter.com>
To: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Subject: FW: Follow up from OPIC

FYI

________________________________
From: Etcheverry, Suzanne [mailto:Suzanne.Etcheverry@opic.gov]
Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 9:43 AM
To: gfilali@invest.gov.ma; Jean AbiNader
Subject: Follow up from OPIC

Dear Ghita and Jean,

It was very nice meeting you a few weeks ago at OPIC and discussing the exciting investment opportunities in Morocco.

As I mentioned, I will be speaking at the Maghreb/Middle East Renewable Energy Summit in Casablanca from April 16 – 17, 2012.

Attached is the brochure for your information.
I am currently planning the schedule for my trip, and would be very interested in meeting people that you think would be useful for me to meet in Morocco, and who would be interested in discussing OPIC support of investment, in particular in renewable resources.

If you have suggestions of people for me to meet, please let me know and I will be happy to follow up with them and arrange a meeting.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Suzanne

Director, Insurance

1100 New York Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20527

Tel: (202) 336-8585

Fax: (202) 408-5142

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Explore exciting developments including:

- MASEN's first Quarzazate solar tender, players involved, the next phase & future solar projects
- New wind farm projects in Morocco
- Hybrid solar-natural gas (ISCC) projects in MENA: An update on the Ain Beni Mathar hybrid project, new projects in Algeria & elsewhere in the region
- Algeria’s ambitious renewable & hybrid projects in the next 30 years: the Hassi R’Mel ISCC, NEAL's proposed ISCC & others
- Opportunities and funding for Tunisia’s solar plan
- Wind projects planned in Tunisia
- Libya’s renewable energy targets – wind farm & solar thermal electricity generating projects under the new NTC government
- Market reform, new wind interconnection code, updates on the Kureimat ISCC, Hurghada wind farm, Zafarana wind farm and new projects in Egypt
- Renewable energy projects update for Bahrain
- Jordan’s renewable electricity performance, new solar and wind farm projects
- Latest wind and solar projects in Oman
- Turkey’s wind farm tenders in 2012
- Qatar’s big push into renewables, new solar-related manufacturing activities for job creation & economic diversification
- Solar thermal electricity generating potential in Saudi Arabia and new projects & tenders
- Ethiopia’s FiT policy and incentives for foreign investment in its renewable energy sector
- Project update on Desertec
- Post Arab Spring: New confidence, regime change & impact on renewable energy plans
- Comparative FiT regimes across MENA & further incentives for the renewable energy sector
- Risks and Returns in investing in Renewable Energy Projects in MENA
- Smart Grids in the integration of Renewables

Who should attend:

Gencos, T & D companies, Utilities Boards, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Clean Energy Investors, EPCs for renewable energy projects, Energy Insurers, Project Sponsors & Developers, Companies involved in wind turbines, CSP, PV & CPV, smart metering, smart grids, building energy efficiency, energy IT, project insurance & risk management...

Register before 28 February 2012 to save US$300
Email: register@magenta-global.com.sg or call: +65 6391 2552
In an age of austerity, financial crisis, rising oil prices and seismic political changes, the Maghreb and Middle East region, looks the most promising and interesting for investors & developers in the renewable energy sector. Held for the 4th time and with the exciting developments in the host country Morocco, this Summit takes the approach that all renewable energy projects should ultimately benefit countries in this region, their people and their industry. Charged with new mandates from the electorate, new governments will see to the success of viable energy projects, all benefits trickling down to enhance their people’s livelihood, more jobs creation and security of continuing power supply.

Up till now, despite having considerable solar and wind potential, renewable energy realistically makes a minimal contribution to power generation across most of the MENA region, particularly in GCC countries where the abundance of oil and gas resources had not encouraged the development of renewable energy. However, the good news is that we are now witnessing countries across the Maghreb/Middle East region pushing for a huge hike in renewable energy capacity over the coming decade to meet high power demand growth, limit the use of oil and gas feedstock in power generation, taking advantage of a forecast drop in solar and wind generated electricity. Indeed, this capacity push has provided the incentives for nurturing new solar-related manufacturing in some countries, creating much needed employment and also help in economic diversification.

This important Summit, accompanied with a upcoming IRENA meeting, seeks to provide a world stage for new & current national energy decision-makers, national & municipal utilities boards, national electricity companies, IPPs, project sponsors & developers, meteorologists, sovereign fund managers, private equity investors, bankers (conventional & Islamic), insurers, lawyers, CEOs of wind turbine, CSP, PV & CPV and hybrid natural gas-solar plants to strategise and help advance the Maghred/Middle East renewable energy markets.

Plan your attendance at this Summit today. With more tenders for solar, wind and hybrid farms coming up for this region this year, this is the Summit you should not miss out! Join us at this Summit to find out more! Send in your Registration Today!

**Sponsorship & Exhibition Opportunities**

4th Annual Maghreb / Middle East Renewable Energy Summit 2012 offers a diverse range of sponsorship opportunities for your organization. With major stakeholders expected to attend the event, you are guaranteed to have your message, product excellence and industry leadership transmitted to top decision makers. Call us today to book one of these primary sponsorship packages:


Limited table top exhibition showcase opportunities are also available for companies to debut new products, generate new business, build & cement key relationships.

Email marketing2@magenta-global.com.sg to secure your place.
Day 1 16 April 2012

8.00 Registration
9.00 Chairman’s Welcome Remarks
9.05 Host Ministerial Keynote Address
His Excellency Dr Fouad Douiri, The Honourable Minister, Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water & the Environment, Morocco (invited)

9.30 IRENA’s Contribution in Developing Renewable Energy Projects in North Africa and the Middle East Going Forward: Latest Updates on Projects in the Pipeline
Mustapha Tounemi, Regional Director, North Africa & West and Central Asia, The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)

10.00 SME’s (Morocco’s Sovereign Wealth Fund) Critical Role in Financing the Success of Renewable Wind and Solar Energy Projects in Morocco
Mohamed Ali Hassou, Director, Energy Development Societe d’Investissements Energetiques, Morocco

10.30 Morning Refreshments

11.00 Rebuilding the Maghreb/Middle East, Post-Unrest: Emerging Renewable Energy Regulatory Framework and Policy Options – The Case of Morocco
Mohamed El Haouari, Director of Development & Planning, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency National Agency (ADEREE), Morocco

• Coverage for FiT for Renewable Energy Projects
• Regulatory Risk Coverage for Projects that do not involve FiTs
Suzanne Etcheverry, Director, Insurance Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), USA

12.00 Algeria Renewable Energy Plans Going Forward: A Case in Point – The Ambitious Renewable & Combined Natural Gas - Renewables Projects Planned in Algeria from 2012 Onwards
Dr Salim Kehal, Director, Centre de Developpement des Energies Renouvelables (CDER), Algeria

12.30 Networking Luncheon

2.00 Saudi Electricity’s Involvement in Renewable Projects in Saudi Arabia & MENA
Engr Saud Al Rashed, Executive Director, Saudi Electricity (SEC)

2.30 Libya’s Revived Renewable Wind and Solar Projects, Under the New NTC Government
Engr Mohammed Al Zaroug, Office of the Chairman, The Renewable Energy Authority of Libya

3.00 Financing & Equity Investments in Renewable Energy projects in the MENA Region
International Power Investor

3.30 Afternoon Refreshments

4.00 Ethiopia’s FiT Policy and Incentives for Foreign Investment in its Renewable Energy Projects
Getahun Moges, Director General, Ethiopian Electricity Agency

4.30 Development of Solar thermal & Photovoltaic Projects & Technology in the Maghreb region
Emile H Ouaknine, President/Chairman, Energy Poles

5.00 New Projects in the Wind and Solar Sector in Turkey in 2012 & thereafter
Atilla Gurbuz, Deputy General Manager, Ministry of Energy & Natural Resources, Turkey

5.30 Questions & Discussion

5.40 End of Day One

Day 2 17 April 2012

9.00 Chairman’s Remarks

9.05 Post-Arab Spring: Egypt’s Wind and Solar Power Projects Progress
• Market reform
• New Wind Interconnection Code
Dr Mohamed Abdel-Rahman, Advisor, Egyptian Electricity Regulatory Agency

9.30 The Continuing Global Climate Change and Impact on Wind & Solar Power Projects in Morocco
Abdelaziz Ouldibba, Director, International Co-operation & Development, National Meteorological Directorate, Morocco

10.00 Morning Refreshments

10.30 Renewable Energy Projects in Morocco Progresses on
Ali Fassi Fihri, Director General, Office National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP), Office National de l’Electricite (ONE), Morocco (invited)

11.00 Update on New Solar Projects in Morocco
Mustapha Bakkoury, CEO/Director General, Morocco Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) (invited)

11.30 The World Bank Group’s Financing Renewable Projects in MENA – An Update
Silvia Pariente-David, Senior Energy Specialist, The World Bank
Joumana Cobein, Country Manager, International Finance Corporation

12.00 Latest Update & Development of the Sahara Wind Power Project
Khalid Benhamaou, CEO, Sahara Wind Inc., Morocco

12.30 Update on Bahrain’s Renewable Energy Projects
Fuad Ahmed Al Shidh, Director, Electricity Production Electricity & Water Authority, Bahrain

1.00 Networking Luncheon

2.00 Meeting Oman’s Electricity Needs: The Advent & Development of Renewable Energy Projects in Oman
Ahmed Al Mazrouy, General Manager, Mazan Electricity Co., Oman

2.30 Sharjah, UAE: Integrating Renewable Power into UAE’s National Grid
Eesa Ahmed Al-Zarooni, LDC Director, Sharjah Electricity & Water Authority (S.E.W.A)

3.00 Wind Power Project Opportunities in Tunisia, Under the New Government
Nafaa Bacari, Head, Wind Energy, Direction des Energies Renouvelables, ANME, Tunisia

3.30 Afternoon Refreshments

4.00 Smart Metering & Renewable Energy in Jordan
Ahmad Thainat, General Manager, IDECO Electricity Company, Jordan

4.30 The Emerging Role of Smart Grids in the Integration of Renewables: Implication for the MENA Region
Dr Frits W Bliek, Project Manager, KEMA Nederland BV

5.00 Panel Discussion:
• Addressing investor concerns about poor or weak investment returns, will the unrest lead to project cancellations or delay in the regions?
• Renewable energy instruments and support schemes – creating the success factors of tomorrow.
• Incentives and feed-in tariff to support wind energy development.
• Identifying barriers/challenges to scaling up wind and solar energy, are essential reforms on track?
• Achieving energy cooperation & stability in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions.
• Developing technical and technological co-operation on projects for trans-Mediterranean power links.

Discussants: Speakers of the Summit

5.30 End of Summit
**REGISTRATION FORM**

**TO +65 63923592**

**How to register**
- **POST** the completed form together with payment to:
  - Magenta Global Pte Ltd.
  - 20 Kallang Avenue, Level 2
  - Pico Creative Centre
  - Singapore 339411

- **EMAIL** your details to us at:
  - register@magenta-global.com.sg

**Contact Information**
- **TEL:** (65) 6391 2552
- **FAX:** (65) 6392 3592

**Payment Details**
- **Bank Transfer**: Payment by telegraphic transfer must be made payable to Magenta Global Pte Ltd
  - Account No: 556-002236-301
  - Swift Code: OCBCSGSG
  - OCBC Bank, Hougang Mall Branch,
  - 90 Hougang Avenue 10,
  - #01-01/02/03 Hougang Mall, Singapore 538766
  - (All bank transfers must be marked clearly with the delegate name and event title. Bank charges are to be deducted from participating company own accounts).

**Booking Conditions**
- Full payment must be received prior to the event for entrance to be guaranteed. If payment is not received a personal credit card will be required to allow entry.
- A confirmation letter and invoice will be sent to you on receipt of your booking. If you are unable to attend, a substitute delegate is always welcome. If you cancel your place in writing 15 working days before the event, a cancellation fee of 10% shall be applicable. Thereafter cancellations are not refundable.
- It may be necessary for reasons beyond the control of the organizers to alter the content, timings or venue. The company will not accept liability for any transport disruption or any claims whatsoever and in such circumstances the normal cancellation restrictions apply.

**Data Protection**
- The personal information provided by you will be held on a database and may be shared with companies in the Magenta Group. Sometimes your details may be made available to external companies for marketing purposes. If you do not wish your details to be used for this purpose, please email the Database Administrator at enquiry@magenta-global.com.sg

**Hotel Information**
- **Official Hotel Details:**
  - Hyatt Regency Casablanca
  - Place des Nations Unies
  - 20000, Casablanca, Maroc
- **Person in charge:**
  - Fatih Tilioui, Sales Manager
  - **Tel:** +212 5.22.43.12.02
  - **M:** +212 (0) 6.60.59.12.02
  - **F:** +212 (0) 5.22.43.12.30
  - **Email:** fatih.tilioui@hyatt.com

**Visa Requirements**
- Visitors to the Morocco must hold a valid passport. Nationals of most countries are required to obtain visas to enter the country and must be obtained prior to arrival in Morocco. Please check with the respective Morocco Embassy, High Commission, Consultate or travel agent for the latest status.
- Invitation letter for travel visa will only be issued after receipt of full payment of fees.

---

**Register Today!**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fee Per Delegate</th>
<th>Priority Fee Register &amp; Pay before 31 January 2012</th>
<th>Early Bird Fee Register &amp; Pay before 28 February 2012</th>
<th>Regular Fee Register &amp; Pay after 28 February 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st delegate</td>
<td>Single Participant USD1,399</td>
<td>USD1,699</td>
<td>USD1,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd delegate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th delegate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Fees quoted are nett and exclusive of all taxes.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st delegate</th>
<th>2nd delegate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salutation:</td>
<td>Salutation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs/Ms/Mdm/Mr/Dr</td>
<td>Mrs/Ms/Mdm/Mr/Dr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position:</td>
<td>Position:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-Mail:</td>
<td>E-Mail:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile no.:</td>
<td>Mobile no.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel:</td>
<td>Tel:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax:</td>
<td>Fax:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3rd delegate</th>
<th>4th delegate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salutation:</td>
<td>Salutation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs/Ms/Mdm/Mr/Dr</td>
<td>Mrs/Ms/Mdm/Mr/Dr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position:</td>
<td>Position:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-Mail:</td>
<td>E-Mail:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile no.:</td>
<td>Mobile no.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel:</td>
<td>Tel:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax:</td>
<td>Fax:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**I am paying by:**
- [ ] Bank Transfer
- [ ] Credit Card

**Card Number:**

**Security Code:**

**Name on Card:**

**Expiry date:**

**Signature:**

(please provide photocopy of front & back of your credit card)

---

**To register, fax registration form to: +65 6392 3592, email: register@magenta-global.com.sg or call Hotline: +65 6391 2552**
Rachad,

On occasion I have been asked to provide my thoughts on US-Moroccan relations as it relates to actions by His Majesty. Attached is an oped I would place in Moroccan newspaper, to correlate with the one year mark since the King’s speech and how the US views it. I’d appreciate your review and comment. Thanks

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
DRAFT Op-Ed: The View of the ‘Moroccan Spring’ from the US

Americans watched the Arab Spring unfold and saw the common aspirations for democracy, freedom, and economic empowerment across North Africa and the Middle East. However, we did not look at the region from a single point of view—to the contrary, the various triggers, reactions, successes, and failures led us to understand the uniqueness of each country involved. Morocco stood out from the very beginning.

His Majesty King Mohammed VI’s historic March 9th speech, calling for a commission to bring together Morocco’s political and civil society leaders, trade unions, and youth to propose wide-reaching reforms, quickly caught the United States’ attention and the reaction and ensuing support were unequivocal. At the time, Senator John McCain, who had visited Morocco a month before the speech, praised His Majesty’s “long-standing commitment to lead Morocco to a future of reform and modernization,” and called Morocco a “positive example to governments across the Middle East and North Africa,”—a powerful endorsement at a time when regional unrest was intensifying.

Later that month, Morocco’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Taeib Fassi Fihri, the highest ranking Arab leader to visit the United States since the Arab Spring began, met with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. She emphasized that Morocco was “well-positioned to lead” in working with the international community to peacefully resolve the crisis in Libya. She further reiterated that the longstanding US policy supporting a peaceful end to the Sahara conflict through autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty “remained constant” and described the Moroccan plan as “serious, realistic, and credible – a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity.”

Just last week, Secretary Clinton reaffirmed the commitment to and continuity of US solidarity and support when she met with Morocco’s new Foreign Minister, Saad-Eddine Al-Othmani in Rabat. She made clear, as she has done numerous times during her tenure, that “US policy toward the Western Sahara has remained constant for many years”, an autonomy solution under Moroccan sovereignty, and took steps with Minister Othmani to further the strategic dialogue between Morocco and the US.

To further strengthen this long-standing support for a resolution to the Sahara conflict, the US Congress approved, for the first time, the use of US program assistance to Morocco in all “regions and territories administered by Morocco,” including the Sahara. These funds will support Morocco’s extensive and ongoing programs aimed at building infrastructure, providing training, and improving the lives of all of its citizens, including the Southern Provinces. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, Chairman of the newly reconstituted Morocco Caucus in the US House of Representatives, applauded Congress’ “vital change in U.S. foreign assistance “ and called its actions “an acknowledgement of the unprecedented reforms in Morocco and reinforces strong support for a solution based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.”
Americans watched as Moroccans from all segments of society proposed, debated, and articulated the reforms necessary to solidify democratization in Morocco. We took note of a process that was largely peaceful and swift, yet thoughtful and thorough, taking place in a spirit of cooperation and desire for genuine reform demonstrated by the Moroccan people and His Majesty, whose vision for irreversible progress was clear. As Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairwoman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted, “King Mohammed’s proposed constitutional changes are a welcome start in what must be a long-term process to increase democracy and enhance stability in Morocco. […] If adopted, expanded, and fully implemented, Morocco’s reform agenda could serve as an example for the region.”

The entire world—not just the United States—closely watched Morocco’s November parliamentary election, the first of-its-kind since the Arab Spring. Once again, we were reminded of Morocco’s commitment to democracy when the country’s political parties united to form a strong governing parliamentary coalition which made the socio-economic and political empowerment of Moroccans its priority for the coming year.

We stood in solidarity with the Moroccan people following the tragedy of the senseless bombing in Jemaa el Fna and were encouraged by Morocco’s commitment to prevent these violent actions of a few to derail the commitment of the millions determined to build a stronger, more inclusive Morocco. The US firmly supports Morocco’s redoubled efforts to combat AQIM and other terrorist groups who are increasingly intent on destabilizing the region and placing obstacles in the way of progress.

The US continues to follow Morocco’s process and progress closely for more many reasons: both countries share a history of more than two centuries of partnership and cooperation, and Morocco is a vital friend in a region grappling with threats to stability, security, and democracy. As Morocco joins the United States on the United Nations Security Council for the next two years, these ties will be more important than ever as both nations partner to tackle the most important international political issues of our time. I am confident that we will not only continue to watch Morocco move forward, but the US will actively work to support our historic friend and partner in peace, progress, and prosperity.
Rachad,

Please find attached a press release on Hillary's visit to Morocco. I would appreciate your attention and review at your earliest convenience.

We would very much like to send it out by COB today.

Thank you

Ed
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Sec. Clinton praises Morocco as leader for peace, democracy in region
Reaffirms Moroccan autonomy solution in Western Sahara as ‘serious, realistic, credible’

Washington, DC (Feb. 28) – Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking to press in Rabat on Sunday with Moroccan Foreign Minister Saad Dine El Otmani, praised Morocco as a leader on Arab Spring reforms and a key partner for peace in the region. She described Morocco’s autonomy initiative to resolve the Western Sahara conflict as “serious, realistic, and credible” and reiterated that US policy “has remained constant.” The US policy supporting a solution based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty to end the decades-old dispute has earned the backing of three US Administrations—Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barack Obama—as well as that of bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress.

Clinton noted that Morocco-US relations date back to 1777, when “Morocco was the first nation to recognize America’s independence.” More than two centuries later, Clinton said, “Morocco once again is leading the way.” She praised last summer’s Constitutional referendum and the November Parliamentary elections, which “signaled an acceleration of reforms that began under his Majesty King Mohammad VI more than a decade ago.” Clinton said Morocco “is a very good model for others who are also seeking to have their own democratic reforms.”

“Morocco and the US are bound by strong longstanding relations that keep developing year after year,” Foreign Minister El Otmani said, describing Clinton’s visit as an opportunity for the two countries to agree on setting up a mechanism for regular political consultation to further reinforce bilateral cooperation. “We also agreed to foster our economic cooperation, raise US investments in the Kingdom and strengthen relations between the two country’s businessmen.” He said the US and Morocco have signed economic cooperation accords including a Free Trade Agreement in 2006, and are both concerned with preserving stability in the region.

Clinton’s visit capped a three-day trip to North Africa that included stops in Algeria and Tunisia, where she met with representatives from Morocco and 70 other nations and international organizations in the “Friends of Syria” coalition. In Rabat, Clinton praised “the important role that Morocco has played” in leading the international effort on Syria, “first within the Arab League and second within the Security Council.” Morocco began a two-year term on the UN Security Council in January, and earlier this month presented a UN Security Council resolution on Syria that won broad support from the international community.

“One can only hope that the third time is a charm and the Polisario finally gets the message to adopt a more flexible, open-minded approach, rather than continue holding fast to unworkable options and repeated threats of war,” said Robert M. Holley, Senior Adviser, Moroccan American Center for Policy. “The region has seen enough bloodshed and needs to move forward together in a spirit of compromise.”

A ninth round of informal talks is set for March 11-13 in Manhasset, NY, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy, Christopher Ross, and aimed at resuming negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front, with the participation of Algeria and Mauritania, to end the conflict.

* For Sec. Clinton’s remarks at Joint Press Briefing, go to: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/02/184667.htm

For more on Clinton’s trip to Morocco, visit MoroccoOnTheMove.com and follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

###

The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) is a non-profit organization whose principal mission is to inform opinion makers, government officials and interested publics in the United States about political and social developments in Morocco and the role being played by the Kingdom of Morocco in broader strategic developments in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. For more, please visit www.moroccanamericanpolicy.org

This material is distributed by the Moroccan American Center for Policy on behalf of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
Thank you for your time and attention. Ed

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, February 29, 2012 06:23 PM  
To: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>  
Subject: Fwd: Press Release 

> 
> Ed, 
> 
> I have attached the press release with some changes to make it more concise and informative. 
> 
> Best, 
> 
> Rachad
Attached is a memo to you from Bob and me regarding some ideas on how to implement tactics and activities concerning the House language. We would be happy to discuss these at your convenience. Ed
Memorandum

TO: Ambassador Bouhlal

FROM: Ed Gabriel and Bob Holley

SUBJECT: Implementation of Congressional Language on WS Spending Authorization

Background:

Implementing Congressional language authorizing the spending of USG assistance funding in Western Sahara is probably one of the two or three most important objectives the Washington Team and Rabat should accomplish this year.

Tuesday, Bob chaired a meeting of MACP plus consultants to discuss ideas that could be put in play to achieve this goal. Bob opened the meeting explaining its purpose and welcoming any and all ideas. Only two things were “off the table,” no war and we cannot ask His Majesty to become personally involved. He explained that we were not making any commitments in the meeting and suggested that we could meet again to discuss tactics for moving forward after MACP’s leadership decided which of the ideas they believed should be put in action.

In the following section Bob lists the ideas proposed by meeting participants and in the final section provides his own personal recommendations.

Ideas:

- Letter from leadership of House Appropriations Committee to State and USAID requesting their views on the way forward on the language.
- Agenda item for Clinton Meetings in Rabat
- Appropriations Committee Staffdel to Rabat and WS to fact find, issue statement, produce letter to Obama administration.
- Visit of Sahrawi local elected officials to DC to advance idea in meetings with targeted audiences.
- Advocacy with US groups that would likely benefit (IRI, etc.) to encourage their assistance in persuading State/USAID.
- Moroccan Ambassador meeting with USAID Administrator.
- Combined effort from Embassy and MACP to urge State to conduct a “policy review.”
- Visit of Foreign Minister to DC to meet with Clinton and other targets to advance the idea.
- A MACP meeting with USAID, MEPI and MCC contractors and officials to advance the idea.
• New legislation that would require State to spend money in Western Sahara.
• Ambassador to advance idea in all of his upcoming meetings with Administration, Congress, others.
• Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to advance idea in meetings with Embassy and USAID personnel in Rabat.
• Request Moroccan NGOs to continually raise idea with AmEmbassy Rabat.
• Bring CEO of Southern development Agency to US for meetings with State, USAID, MCC, Congress, private sector, others to advance idea and describe opportunities.
• Another back channel message to Clinton to encourage implementation.
• Find opportunities to interest Sam Kaplan.
• Persuade GOM to allow MACP personnel to directly lobby the Administration to advance the idea.
• Push the idea with media.
• Target getting Peace Corps engaged in WS

Personal Views and Counsel by Bob.

He believes that we need to focus attention heavily on two tracks to accomplish this objective.

The first is to try to get as many senior GOM officials as possible to raise this issue directly with senior level USG officials at State and USAID. A visit from the Foreign Minister, the Director of SDA and elected Sahrawi officials and the Ambassador’s meetings with senior USG officials should highlight this as a priority objective for Morocco in its relations with the USG. The higher up the food chain at State we go, the better our chances of success. Expect continued resistance at bureau level across the board at State.

The second track that bears some prospect of success are all of those actions above that would bring continuing pressure from Congress on the Administration to execute the language. As Jordan pointed out at the meeting, it is critical that we reach a determination of whether the Administration plans to do this of their own accord before mid April so that a new effort can be launched at that time to write new legislation to oblige such spending. We think that it is possible that once an effort on obligatory legislation is launched, the Administration may move forward on its own if they assess that we have enough support to enact such legislation in order to have better control over what spending they will and will not commit to. On the Hill track, I think it is critically important that the staffdel to Rabat and WS get there as quickly as possible. This should be our priority action right now, in our view. That trip needs to produce a statement and a letter to State and USAID well before mid April.

Many of the ideas listed above are interesting and potentially useful. We will be happy to discuss each of them with all of you at your convenience.
Rachad,

I want to make sure I emphasize the confidential nature of the memo sent regarding the brainstorming session on how to implement the House language. Rather than give you a final memo with priorities listed, I wanted to give you a “raw” view of how we work in a brainstorm session, so you might appreciate the full range of thinking that goes into our work. I see the next step as a meeting with you, Bob and me to go through the memo and figure out what we think is most important and what is best politically to move forward on. It is my desire to open our process as transparently to you as possible, via such memos and Embassy involvement in our meetings, so we can create the kind of “mutual” transparency and trust between us. I hope we are achieving this objective together. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
FYI – Significant coverage from AFP and other media on the three European aid workers kidnapped by an AQIM splinter group from the Polisario’s Tindouf camps Oct. 23. Over the weekend, the al-Qaeda offshoot – which on Saturday also claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Tamanrasset, southern Algeria -- announced it was demanding $37 million in ransom to release the Tindouf kidnap victims. Meanwhile, Italian press has reported that one of the victims – Italian aid worker Rossella Urru has been released in Mali.

Below and attached are stories from:

- **News24 (from AFP),** “Spanish hostages in Mali, Somalia 'are well’”
- **The London Telegraph (from AFP),** “Terror group demands $37m ransom”
- **Magharebia,** “Mali terrorists free Mauritanian gendarme, Italian woman”
- **AFP, “Islamists want 30 mln euros to free Western hostages: source”**
- **Morocco World News, “Italian Aid Worker Kidnapped in Tindouf Believed to Be Set Free”**
- **AFP, “Al-Qaeda offshoot claims Algeria attack”**

### Spanish hostages in Mali, Somalia 'are well'

**Madrid** - Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo on Monday said that two Spaniards held hostage in Mali and two others in Somalia are in good shape.

"In Somalia, they guaranteed to me that everything is fine. In Mali, it was the president of the republic [Amadou Toumani Toure] who gave me an assurance," Garcia-Margallo told the Cadena Cope radio station. "They are well."

"We haven't ceased for a single day to work for the release of the two aid workers whom we have in Mali and the two aid workers whom we have in Somalia," the minister added.

"We are in permanent contact, but this subject must be treated with total discretion."

Garcia-Margallo declined to give details of a trip he made to Mali at the end of last week in order to gather details on the hostage issue.

Two Spanish aid workers, a man and a woman, as well as an Italian woman, **were kidnapped on October 23 2011** in the Tindouf region of southwestern Algeria, which is a **stronghold of the Polisario Front** independence movement in the neighbouring Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara.

The kidnappings were initially attributed by Polisario to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim), which has been highly active in Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania since 2007, including taking hostages.

However, responsibility for the Tindouf kidnappings was in December claimed by a hitherto unknown armed group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya).

The movement has made a ransom demand of $39.5m to release its three hostages, according to a source close to the mediators in Mali.
The two Spanish aid workers held in Somalia, both women, were abducted on October 13 2011, in Dadaab, the world's largest complex of refugee camps in eastern Kenya. The women, who work for Medecins sans frontieres (MSF - Doctors Without Borders), were taken across the border to Somalia by their kidnappers.


the Telegraph (from AFP)

Sunday, March 04, 2012

Terror group demands $37m ransom

AN Al-Qaida splinter group wants 30 million euros ($37 million) to free three kidnapped European aid workers.

"The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa is demanding 30 million euros to free two Spanish nationals and the Italian woman," a source close to the mediators said yesterday. "Their respective countries know about this."

The kidnapping was staged in Tindouf, western Algeria, in a refugee camp run by the Polisario Front which seeks Western Sahara's independence from Morocco. The Front initially blamed the kidnapping on Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

On December 12, a video showing armed men flanking two women - one Spanish and the other Italian - and a Spanish man was made public by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad In West Africa (Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya). Security sources said it had broken off from the main group AQIM in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves just to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group also released another video showing six dark-skinned, turbaned men speaking of their ideological references, including al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam.

Also yesterday, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a police base in southern Algeria which left 23 people wounded according to the paramilitary gendarmerie. One of them was in serious condition. "We inform you that we are behind the explosion that occurred this morning at Tamanrasset," said a message sent to AFP and signed by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.

The national APS news agency quoted the gendarmerie as saying that 15 gendarmes, five members of the civil protection organisation and three passers-by were taken to hospital. One gendarme was in critical condition, the report said. The gendarmerie said "a terrorist" driving a Toyota 4x4 targeted the main entrance of the base in Tamanrasset, 1,970 kilometres south of Algiers at 7.45 am local time yesterday.

The website of the Algerian Arabic-language daily En Nahar said the bomber was blown apart in the blast, which also
caused major damage to the building. It was the first time such an attack had been reported in the area. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamah Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Gariqiyia) surfaced in December, when it claimed to be holding three Westerners kidnapped from a Western Sahara refugee camp in Algeria in October.

Security sources said it had broken off from the main group, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves just to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group released a video of the abducted aid workers and another showing six dark-skinned, turbaned men speaking of their ideological references, including al-Qa'ida founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam. Also in December, Mali and Algeria agreed to step up coordination in efforts to root out al-Qa'ida-linked groups in the region.

Al-Qa'ida-linked groups have been active in Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania for a decade but their activity has picked up since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi scattered the slain Libyan strongman's arsenal across the region. In April 2010, the four countries formed a Committee of Joint Chiefs (CEMOC), based in Tamanrasset, to coordinate their military efforts against AQIM.

---

**Mali terrorists free Mauritanian gendarme, Italian woman**

Kidnapped Mauritanian gendarme Ely Ould Mokhtar and Italian aid worker Rossella Urru were freed Friday (March 2nd) in Mali, ANI reported.

Al-Qaeda splinter group Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Gariqiyia (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, or MUJAO) reportedly released the hostages in exchange for jailed Malian AQIM member Abderrahmane Ould Amadou Al-Azawadi.

The 29-year-old female al-Qaeda hostage was one of three Tindouf aid workers kidnapped last October. Ould Mokhtar was abducted last December during an attack on his police barracks in the eastern Mauritanian city of Adel Bagrou, near the Malian border.

The MUJAO has demanded 30 million euros for the release of the two remaining Western hostages, a source close to mediators told AFP on Saturday.

---

Islamists want 30 mln euros to free Western hostages:

---

Magharebia

Sunday, March 4, 2012

http://www.magharebia.com/cocon awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/03/04/newsbrief-02

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gqjQRzRb1uZYKF95WgkKCAAAASb_w?docId=CNG.d83c2f75f830dc8a0e74514cc86b975.491
GAO, Mali — An Al-Qaeda splinter group wants 30 million euros ($39 million) to free three European aid workers kidnapped in Algeria in October, a Malian source close to the mediators said on Saturday.

"The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa is demanding 30 million euros to free two Spanish nationals and the Italian woman," the source said.

The kidnapping of two Spanish nationals and an Italian woman was staged in Tindouf, western Algeria, in a refugee camp run by the Polisario Front which seeks Western Sahara’s independence from Morocco. The Front had initially blamed the kidnapping on Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

But on December 12, a video showing armed men flanking two women -- one Spanish and the other Italian -- and a Spanish man was made public by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. The splinter group is lead by Malians and Mauritanians, according to experts.

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo was on Saturday returning from the Malian capital Bamako after talks with Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure and other officials about the hostage issue, his office said. Security sources say the Movement for Oneness had broken off from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves to the north African Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group also released another video showing six dark-skinned, turban-wearing men speaking of their ideological references, including Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam.

The group on Saturday claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a police base in southern Algeria which left 23 people wounded according to the paramilitary gendarmerie. One of them was in serious condition.


Saturday, March 3rd, 2012

Italian Aid Worker Kidnapped in Tindouf Believed to Be Set Free

Morocco World News, Rabat, March 3, 2012 -- According to the Italian daily newspaper the Republica, Italian aid worker Rossella Urru, who was abducted last October along with two Spanish humanitarian workers has been freed on Saturday.

According to the Italian newspaper, Rossella Urru was released in exchange for the release of Abderrahmane Ould Amadou al-Azawad, an AQIM militiaman. The hostage exchange also involved the release of Mauritanian gendarme, Ely Ould Mokhtar, kidnapped on December 20
Three European nationals, two Spaniards and one Italian, were abducted last October in the camp of Rabouni near the southwestern Algerian city of Tindouf.

The abduction took place at midnight on October 22, when the aid workers in Rabuni in the Sahrawi camps in southwestern Algeria, were resting. In the struggle with the kidnappers, Gonyalons was slightly injured and one of the guards of the camp was shot. Ainhoa Fernandez is a member of the Extremadura-based Association of Friends of the Saharawi people, while Gonyalons works for the Basque-based NGO Mundubat Basque. For its part, the Italian Rosella Urru works in the Italian Cooperation Committee for the Liberation of Peoples and had started working in the refugee camps three years ago.

The kidnapping was assisted by elements of the Polisario Front as a mediator confessed to AFP. AQIM fighters who went to the Polisario refugee camps to participate in the kidnapping operation were not armed. “They had accomplices in the camps, members and sympathizers AQIM, who provided the weapons and proceeded to identify the hostages for his capture,” AFP added.

According to Western intelligence elements, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, emir of AQIM, who was also behind the kidnapping of three Spanish aid workers in northern Mauritania in late 2009, is believed to be the mastermind of the kidnapping.

The two individuals from Tindouf, Mamina Laaguir Abdelaziz Ahmed Baba, 29, and Aghdafna Mohamed Hamadi Ahmed Baba, 32 are believed to have been directly involved in the kidnapping of two Spaniards and one Italian, who were working for NGO's that provide humanitarian aid to the population living in the camps.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5itMNtgXq2Fzt3u7e0pVNPcFr3Dcg?docId=CNG.02723b6732025f27b3266c9616104121.341

AFP

Saturday, March 03, 2012

Al-Qaeda offshoot claims Algeria attack

GAO, Mali — An Al-Qaeda splinter group claimed Saturday to have carried out a suicide attack on a police base in southern Algeria which left 23 people wounded according to the paramilitary gendarmerie.

"We inform you that we are behind the explosion that occurred this morning at Tamanrasset," a message sent to AFP and signed by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa said.

The national APS news agency quoted the gendarmerie as saying that 15 gendarmes, five members of the civil protection organisation and three passers-by were taken to hospital.

One gendarme was in critical condition, the report said.

The gendarmerie said "a terrorist" driving a Toyota 4x4 targeted the main entrance of the base in Tamanrasset, 1,970 kilometres (1,220 miles) south of Algiers at 7:45 am (0645 GMT) Saturday.

The website of the Algerian Arabic-language daily En Nahar said the bomber was blown apart in the blast, which also caused major damage to the building.

It was the first time such an attack had been reported in the area.

The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya) surfaced in
December, when it claimed to be holding three Westerners kidnapped from a Western Sahara refugee camp in Algeria in October.

Security sources said it had broken off from the main group, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves just to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group released a video of the abducted aid workers and another showing six dark-skinned, turbaned men speaking of their ideological references, including Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam.

Also in December, Mali and Algeria agreed to step up coordination in efforts to root out Al-Qaeda-linked groups in the region.

Al-Qaeda-linked groups have been active in Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania for a decade but their activity has picked up since the fall of Moamer Kadhafi scattered the slain Libyan strongman's arsenal across the region.

In April 2010, the four countries formed a Committee of Joint Chiefs (CEMOC), based in Tamanrasset, a garrison town near the border with Mali and Niger, to coordinate their military efforts against AQIM.
Spanish hostages in Mali, Somalia 'are well'

Madrid - Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo on Monday said that two Spaniards held hostage in Mali and two others in Somalia are in good shape.

"In Somalia, they guaranteed to me that everything is fine. In Mali, it was the president of the republic [Amadou Toumani Toure] who gave me an assurance," Garcia-Margallo told the Cadena Cope radio station. "They are well."

"We haven't ceased for a single day to work for the release of the two aid workers whom we have in Mali and the two aid workers whom we have in Somalia," the minister added.

"We are in permanent contact, but this subject must be treated with total discretion."

Garcia-Margallo declined to give details of a trip he made to Mali at the end of last week in order to gather details on the hostage issue.

Two Spanish aid workers, a man and a woman, as well as an Italian woman, were kidnapped on October 23 2011 in the Tindouf region of southwestern Algeria, which is a stronghold of the Polisario Front independence movement in the neighbouring Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara.

The kidnappings were initially attributed by Polisario to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim), which has been highly active in Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania since 2007, including taking hostages.

However, responsibility for the Tindouf kidnappings was in December claimed by a hitherto unknown armed group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya).

The movement has made a ransom demand of $39.5m to release its three hostages, according to a source close to the mediators in Mali.

The two Spanish aid workers held in Somalia, both women, were abducted on October 13 2011, in Dadaab, the world's largest complex of refugee camps in eastern Kenya. The women, who work for Medecins sans frontieres (MSF - Doctors Without Borders), were taken across the border to Somalia by their kidnappers.
AN AL-Qaida splinter group wants 30 million euros ($37 million) to free three kidnapped European aid workers. "The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa is demanding 30 million euros to free two Spanish nationals and the Italian woman," a source close to the mediators said yesterday. "Their respective countries know about this."

The kidnapping was staged in Tindouf, western Algeria, in a refugee camp run by the Polisario Front which seeks Western Sahara's independence from Morocco. The Front initially blamed the kidnapping on Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

On December 12, a video showing armed men flanking two women - one Spanish and the other Italian - and a Spanish man was made public by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad In West Africa (Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya). Security sources said it had broken off from the main group AQIM in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves just to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group also released another video showing six dark-skinned, turbaned men speaking of their ideological references, including al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam.

Also yesterday, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a police base in southern Algeria which left 23 people wounded according to the paramilitary gendarmerie. One of them was in serious condition. "We inform you that we are behind the explosion that occurred this morning at Tamanrasset," said a message sent to AFP and signed by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.

The national APS news agency quoted the gendarmerie as saying that 15 gendarmes, five members of the civil protection organisation and three passers-by were taken to hospital. One gendarme was in critical condition, the report said. The gendarmerie said "a terrorist" driving a Toyota 4x4 targeted the main entrance of the base in Tamanrasset, 1,970 kilometres south of Algiers at 7.45 am local time yesterday.

The website of the Algerian Arabic-language daily En Nahar said the bomber was blown apart in the blast, which also caused major damage to the building. It was the first time such an attack had been reported in the area. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya) surfaced in December, when it claimed to be holding three Westerners kidnapped from a Western Sahara refugee camp in Algeria in October.

Security sources said it had broken off from the main group, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves just to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group released a video of the abducted aid workers and another showing six dark-skinned, turbaned men speaking of their ideological references, including al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam. Also in December, Mali and Algeria agreed to step up coordination in efforts to root out AQIM-related groups in the region.

Al-Qaida-linked groups have been active in Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania for a decade but their activity has picked up since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi scattered the slain Libyan strongman’s arsenal across the region. In April 2010, the four countries formed a Committee of Joint Chiefs (CEMOC), based in Tamanrasset, to coordinate their military efforts against AQIM.
Mali terrorists free Mauritanian gendarme, Italian woman

Kidnapped Mauritanian gendarme Ely Ould Mokhtar and Italian aid worker Rossella Urru were freed Friday (March 2nd) in Mali, ANI reported.

Al-Qaeda splinter group Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, or MUJAO) reportedly released the hostages in exchange for jailed Malian AQIM member Abderrahmane Ould Amadou Al-Azawadi.

The 29-year-old female al-Qaeda hostage was one of three Tindouf aid workers kidnapped last October. Ould Mokhtar was abducted last December during an attack on his police barracks in the eastern Mauritanian city of Adel Bagrou, near the Malian border.

The MUJAO has demanded 30 million euros for the release of the two remaining Western hostages, a source close to mediators told AFP on Saturday.

Islamists want 30 mln euros to free Western hostages: source

GAO, Mali — An Al-Qaeda splinter group wants 30 million euros ($39 million) to free three European aid workers kidnapped in Algeria in October, a Malian source close to the mediators said on Saturday.

"The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa is demanding 30 million euros to free two Spanish nationals and the Italian woman," the source said.

The kidnapping of two Spanish nationals and an Italian woman was staged in Tindouf, western Algeria, in a refugee camp run by the Polisario Front which seeks Western Sahara's independence from Morocco. The Front had initially blamed the kidnapping on Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

But on December 12, a video showing armed men flanking two women -- one Spanish and the other Italian -- and a Spanish man was made public by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. The splinter group is lead by Malians and Mauritanians, according to experts.

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo was on Saturday returning from the Malian capital Bamako after talks with Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure and other officials about the hostage issue, his office said. Security sources say the Movement for Oneness had broken off from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves to the north African Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group also released another video showing six dark-skinned, turban-wearing men speaking of their ideological references, including Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam.

The group on Saturday claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a police base in southern Algeria which left 23 people wounded according to the paramilitary gendarmerie. One of them was in serious condition.
Italian Aid Worker Kidnapped in Tindouf Believed to Be Set Free

Morocco World News, Rabat, March 3, 2012 -- According to the Italian daily newspaper the Republica, Italian aid worker Rossella Urru, who was abducted last October along with two Spanish humanitarian workers has been freed on Saturday.

According to the Italian newspaper, Rossella Urru was released in exchange for the release of Abderrahmane Ould Amadou al-Azawad, an AQIM militiaman. The hostage exchange also involved the release of Mauritanian gendarme, Ely Ould Mokktar, kidnapped on December 20 close to the border with Mali.

Three European nationals, two Spaniards and one Italian, were abducted last October in the camp of Rabouni near the southwestern Algerian city of Tindouf.

The abduction took place at midnight on October 22, when the aid workers in Rabuni in the Sahrawi camps in southwestern Algeria, were resting. In the struggle with the kidnappers, Gonyalons was slightly injured and one of the guards of the camp was shot. Ainhoa Fernandez is a member of the Extremadura-based Association of Friends of the Saharawi people, while Gonyalons works for the Basque-based NGO Mundubat Basque. For its part, the Italian Rosella Urru works in the Italian Cooperation Committee for the Liberation of Peoples and had started working in the refugee camps three years ago.

The kidnapping was assisted by elements of the Polisario Front as a mediator confessed to AFP. AQIM fighters who went to the Polisario refugee camps to participate in the kidnapping operation were not armed. “They had accomplices in the camps, members and sympathizers AQIM, who provided the weapons and proceeded to identify the hostages for his capture,” AFP added.

According to Western intelligence elements, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, emir of AQIM, who was also behind the kidnapping of three Spanish aid workers in northern Mauritania in late 2009, is believed to be the mastermind of the kidnapping.

The two individuals from Tindouf, Mamina Laaguir Abdelaziz Ahmed Baba, 29, and Aghdafna Mohamed Hamadi Ahmed Baba, 32 are believed to have been directly involved in the kidnapping of two Spaniards and one Italian, who were working for NGO’s that provide humanitarian aid to the population living in the camps.
Al-Qaeda offshoot claims Algeria attack

GAO, Mali — An Al-Qaeda splinter group claimed Saturday to have carried out a suicide attack on a police base in southern Algeria which left 23 people wounded according to the paramilitary gendarmerie.

"We inform you that we are behind the explosion that occurred this morning at Tamanrasset," a message sent to AFP and signed by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa said.

The national APS news agency quoted the gendarmerie as saying that 15 gendarmes, five members of the civil protection organisation and three passers-by were taken to hospital.

One gendarme was in critical condition, the report said.

The gendarmerie said "a terrorist" driving a Toyota 4x4 targeted the main entrance of the base in Tamanrasset, 1,970 kilometres (1,220 miles) south of Algiers at 7:45 am (0645 GMT) Saturday.

The website of the Algerian Arabic-language daily En Nahar said the bomber was blown apart in the blast, which also caused major damage to the building.

It was the first time such an attack had been reported in the area.

The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya) surfaced in December, when it claimed to be holding three Westerners kidnapped from a Western Sahara refugee camp in Algeria in October.

Security sources said it had broken off from the main group, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in order to spread jihad to west Africa and not confine themselves just to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.

The group released a video of the abducted aid workers and another showing six dark-skinned, turbaned men speaking of their ideological references, including Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar but putting more emphasis on historical figures of west African Islam.

Also in December, Mali and Algeria agreed to step up coordination in efforts to root out Al-Qaeda-linked groups in the region.

Al-Qaeda-linked groups have been active in Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania for a decade but their activity has picked up since the fall of Moamer Kadhafi scattered the slain Libyan strongman's arsenal across the region.

In April 2010, the four countries formed a Committee of Joint Chiefs (CEMOC), based in Tamanrasset, a garrison town near the border with Mali and Niger, to coordinate their military efforts against AQIM.
Rachad,
I suppose you have heard by now that Congressman Donald Payne passed away, after a battle with cancer. He was respected as a great champion of American liberal ideas. You may also recall he was the number one worst friend of Morocco on the Hill and try to cause some trouble for us over the years. We are very involved with the candidate that is likely to replace him in New Jersey, who is now running to take Congressman Payne’s position.

More importantly, the next in line to get a ranking member spot is Albio Sires (D-NJ). Albio is a Cuban-American and has signed all of our pro-Moroccan letters. We’ll see how it plays out as a current ranking member may decide to transfer subcommittees and take this assignment. If that happens, Rep. Meeks (D-NY) is the most likely candidate.

In any case, every person eligible for the position is a public supporter of Morocco and the Autonomy/Sovereignty solution.

We have also met with Rep. Payne’s most likely successor 3 times since December and he will be great on our issue.

Ed
Rachad

I am pleased to see that the Moroccan Minister of Tourism will be giving a major address at the Middle East and North Africa Tourism and Development Inaugural Conference April 2-3 at the US Chamber of Commerce here in Washington. This event, as you well know, will be attended by very high level officials of the USG and its agencies.

A number of NGO/trade associations from North Africa will be sponsors of this event and we would like to be able to support Morocco’s participation in any way that we can. If we can help in any way with sponsorship we stand ready. I have attached the package for your information.

Matic is invited to the seminar and will attend. Please let us know how we can be of further assistance at this important event marketing Morocco in the US, and in particular, if you would like us to support the conference through Matic sponsorship. Ed
Sponsor Benefits

PLATINUM SPONSOR ($25,000)
- Chair of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce MENA Tourism and Development Initiative
- VIP Dinner with five ministers of tourism (Invitation only for around 15 people on Sunday, April 1)
- Three complimentary tickets to VIP Dinner
- Company representative provides brief introductory remarks at VIP dinner
- Ten complimentary conference registrations
- Full-page color ad in event program with premier placement
- Priority seating for lunch at table with minister of your choice
- Recognition in event title on all promotion and event materials, signage & website

SILVER SPONSOR ($5,000)
- Participation in MENA Tourism and Development Initiative Development Initiative
- Marketing of company and priority seating for lunch with minister of your choice
- Company representative provides brief introductory remarks at chosen luncheon
- Two complimentary conference registrations
- Quarter-page color ad in event program with priority placement
- Recognition on all promotion and event materials, signage & website

GOLD SPONSOR ($15,000)
- Leading member of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce MENA Tourism and Development Initiative
- Event branding choices:
  - Launch Reception of Tourism Initiative (Monday, April 2)
  - Keynote Lunch (Monday, April 2)
  - Keynote Lunch (Tuesday April 3)
- Company representative provides brief introductory remarks at chosen event
- One complimentary ticket to VIP Dinner
- Five complimentary registrations to the conference
- Half-page color ad in event program with priority placement
- Priority seating for lunch at table with minister of your choice
- Recognition on all promotion and event materials, signage & website

For information please contact:
Kyle Newell
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
knewell@uschamber.com
1-202-525-7648 (Cell)

Custom sponsor packages are also available!
FYI – In today’s news, a column on StrategyPage.com (respected defense/military online news portal), “Terrorists Terrorizing Other Terrorists,” which details Polisario member involvement in the expanding terrorist and trafficking networks across Africa’s Sahel.

Also, a story today in the Latin American Herald Tribune, from the Spanish news agency EFE, with an update from Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo on the Tindouf kidnap victims and two other Spanish nationals abducted.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmwahterr/articles/20120306.aspx

Tuesday, March 6, 2012

Counter-Terrorism:

Terrorists Terrorizing Other Terrorists

American intelligence agencies fear the three largest Islamic terror organizations in Africa (al Qaeda, al Shabaab and Boko Haram) are trying to arrange an alliance, to pool capabilities and coordinate operations. There’s no evidence of that, but there’s no doubt that the three groups know of each other and some members in each organization have been in touch with the others. Meanwhile, each of these groups is quite different, with unique origins, goals and situations. A meaningful coalition of these groups is unlikely.

The oldest of these groups began forming a decade ago when several Islamic radical groups in Algeria, defeated in a 1990s rebellion, fled south and reformed. These men became the local al Qaeda franchise, calling themselves as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (North Africa), or AQIM. This effort included forming new chapters south of Algeria, among tribal rebels and disaffected urbanites in Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania. This was more PR than reality at first. There were already some Islamic terrorists in the region, and these pronouncements appeared to be an attempt to unify pro-Islamic terrorist elements via the Internet and the mass media. So far, the many disaffected groups in the region have shown little interest in uniting, especially under the leadership of al Qaeda. Too many different objectives and al Qaeda has a reputation for being a loser. But the terrorists have extracted over a $100 million in ransoms from kidnapping Western visitors, and millions more by working for drug smugglers. This has enabled the group to expand from less than a hundred paid staff, to over 300. The money went to bribing local officials and tribal leaders, as well as buying vehicles, weapons, satellite phones and much more.

Last year this also led to the formation of a more radical splinter group; MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa). The appearance of MOJWA presented the possibility of a war among Islamic radical groups. MOJWAs, for example, recruited from an even older rebel group; Polisario and that caused some problems. This may have something to do with the declining prospects of Polisario, which has been in bad shape since 1991. Back then,
Morocco finally won its war with Polisario Front rebels, who were seeking independence for the Western Sahara (a region south of Morocco). Polisario remained powerful in Mauritania, where the rebel group has official recognition and maintains several more refugee camps. Because Polisario was so well-subsidized by Algeria, back when Algeria was a radical state, Polisario still had enough diehards out there to keep a lot of people in Western Sahara unhappy. Polisario was known to provide recruits and sanctuary for al Qaeda and other Islamic radicals. For two decades, the UN has been trying to work out a final peace deal between Polisario and Morocco. In the 1990s Algeria cut off all support for Polisario. But that, and UN efforts to mediate the differences, have just not worked. The contested area is largely desert with a population of less than 300,000. Logic would have it that the area is better off as a part of Morocco. But there are still thousands of locals who would prefer to fight for independence rather than submit to Morocco. Some resistance is tribal and cultural, with the Moroccans seen as another bunch of alien invaders (the area was administered, until 1976, as a Spanish colony). If the fighting breaks out again, possibly inspired by Islamic radicals, it could go on for years, just as it does in many other parts of Africa and the immediate neighborhood.

Getting involved in cocaine smuggling provides money, some of which goes towards buying guns and vehicles, making the Polisario fighters more formidable. Mali and Mauritanian police are increasingly arresting members of the Polisario Front who are involved with a major drug smuggling operation (moving cocaine from Guinea-Bissau, where it is flown in from South America, to the Mediterranean coast). Polisario Front members have long been involved in smuggling and other illegal activities but their involvement in moving cocaine is relatively recent. This implies cooperation with al Qaeda, which apparently has worked out deals with Polisario. AQIM is a major player in the drug smuggling network that brings South American cocaine from Guinea-Bissau, where it is flown in from South America, to the Mediterranean coast. But all that money, and radical groups with different agendas, could lead to terrorists terrorizing other terrorists.

In Somalia al Shabaab recently announced a merger with al Qaeda. This was more PR than fact, because al Shabaab like all previous Islamic radical groups in Somalia is suffering defeat and splintering. Six years ago al Shabaab itself was the result of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) moderates (ARS, or Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia) splitting away and joining an attempt to form a new government in Somalia. The radicals in the ICU left and formed al Shabaab. Other remnants of the ICU fled to Eritrea or formed smaller radical groups (which were later destroyed by, or absorbed into, al Shabaab.) The ICU itself goes back to the 1990s, when religious leaders formed militias in an attempt to reduce the banditry and feuding rampant in the country. The ARS wanted to keep Islamic terrorists out of the country, in return for more foreign aid. Al Shabaab offered to shelter al Qaeda and help establish a worldwide Islamic government. Somalia became a base for many al Qaeda members chased out of Pakistan and Arabia, although many of those have since fled to Yemen to escape the many peacekeepers and local militias pressing in on al Shabaab.

Boko Haram formed in the Moslem north of Nigeria about five years ago. Modeling themselves on the Taliban, Boko Haram became larger, and more violent, because of popular anger at rampant corruption and mismanagement in Nigeria. Some Boko Haram leaders were spotted in Somalia several years ago, and others are known to have been in contact with al Qaeda members from West Africa. But for the moment Boko Haram is intent on turning Nigeria (which is half Christian) into an Islamic dictatorship.

The three Islamic terror organizations described here cover a vast area (from the Atlantic Ocean coast of West Africa to the Indian Ocean coast of East Africa) as well as numerous very different cultures. While involved are Islamic radicals, only AQIM is Arab (or at least most of them) while Boko Haram and Somalis are black Africans (generally despised by Arabs). Moreover, the Somalis consider themselves Arabs, which creates even more tension.

http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=475402&CategoryId=12395
Kidnapped Aid Workers in Good Condition, Spanish Government Says

MADRID (EFE) – The four Spanish aid workers kidnapped in Tindouf and Somalia “are doing fine” and the government has been working every day to win their release, Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo said Monday. The foreign minister discussed the situation in the wake of his visit over the weekend to Mali to try to speed the release of the two aid workers abducted last October from a Saharawi refugee camp in western Algeria.

The matter is sensitive and not much can be said in public because “lives are at stake,” Garcia-Margallo told Cope radio. The foreign minister said he had spoken with his European Union and Arab counterparts, and attended the Conference on Somalia in London in an effort to win the hostages’ release. Mali’s foreign minister is expected to visit Spain “very soon,” Garcia-Margallo said.

Italian media reported that Rosella Urru, an aid worker from Italy who was kidnapped from the refugee camp outside Tindouf with Spaniards Ainhoa Fernandez and Enric Gonyalons, had been released. Garcia-Margallo said Feb. 15 in Algeria that the Spanish government had received “proof” that the two Spanish aid workers kidnapped in Tindouf and the two others abducted near the Kenya-Somalia border were alive.

Blanca Thiebaut and Montserrat Serra, two Spanish citizens working with Doctors Without Borders at a Somali refugee camp in the eastern Kenyan town of Dadaab, were kidnapped at gunpoint on Oct. 13. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, but Kenyan officials said they suspected Somalia’s Al Shabaab Islamic militia, which has links to Al Qaeda. Ainhoa Fernandez and Enric Gonyalons were kidnapped 10 days after the incident in Kenya.

Fernandez de Rincon, Gonyalons and Urru were taken away by a group of armed men from the facility near Tindouf where foreign aid workers are lodged. The government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic – the Polisario Front’s name for the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara – arrested several people in connection with the kidnapping and said the captives were taken to a mountainous area on the Mali-Niger border.

A video sent by the captors shows Gonyalons, Rincon and Urru at an unidentified spot in the desert.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is suspected of having staged the kidnapping. The terrorist group has carried out a number of kidnappings in southern Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, but it had never abducted anyone in the Sahrawi refugee camps controlled by the Polisario Front.

The SADR is the name given the Western Sahara by the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, which launched a war for independence against Morocco in 1975 after the North African kingdom annexed the territory on the withdrawal of Spanish forces. The native Saharawis, led by the Polisario Front, have spent decades resisting Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony.
Tuesday, March 6, 2012

**Counter-Terrorism:**

**Terrorists Terrorizing Other Terrorists**

American intelligence agencies fear the three largest Islamic terror organizations in Africa (al Qaeda, al Shabaab and Boko Haram) are trying to arrange an alliance, to pool capabilities and coordinate operations. There's no evidence of that, but there's no doubt that the three groups know of each other and some members in each organization have been in touch with the others. Meanwhile, each of these groups is quite different, with unique origins, goals and situations. A meaningful coalition of these groups is unlikely.

The oldest of these groups began forming a decade ago when several Islamic radical groups in Algeria, defeated in a 1990s rebellion, fled south and reformed. These men became the local al Qaeda franchise, calling themselves as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (North Africa), or AQIM. This effort included forming new chapters south of Algeria, among tribal rebels and disaffected urbanites in Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania. This was more PR than reality at first. There were already some Islamic terrorists in the region, and these pronouncements appeared to be an attempt to unify pro-Islamic terrorist elements via the Internet and the mass media. So far, the many disaffected groups in the region have shown little interest in uniting, especially under the leadership of al Qaeda. Too many different objectives and al Qaeda has a reputation for being a loser. But the terrorists have extracted over a $100 million in ransoms from kidnapping Western visitors, and millions more by working for drug smugglers. This has enabled the group to expand from less than a hundred paid staff, to over 300. The money went to bribing local officials and tribal leaders, as well as buying vehicles, weapons, satellite phones and much more.

Last year this also led to the formation of a more radical splinter group; MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa). The appearance of MOJWA presented the possibility of a war among Islamic radical groups. MOJWAs, for example, recruited from an even older rebel group; Polisario and that caused some problems. This may have something to do with the declining prospects of Polisario, which has been in bad shape since 1991. Back then, Morocco finally won its war with Polisario Front rebels, who were seeking independence for the Western Sahara (a region south of Morocco). Polisario remained powerful in Mauritania, where the rebel group has official recognition and maintains several more refugee camps. Because Polisario was so well-subsidized by Algeria, back when Algeria was a radical state, Polisario still had enough diehards out there to keep a lot of people in Western Sahara unhappy. Polisario was known to provide recruits and sanctuary for al Qaeda and other Islamic radicals. For two decades, the UN has been trying to work out a final peace deal between Polisario and Morocco. In the 1990s Algeria cut off all support for Polisario. But that, and UN efforts to mediate the differences, have just not worked. The contested area is largely desert with a population of less than 300,000. Logic would have it that the area is better off as a part of Morocco. But there are still thousands of locals who would prefer to fight for independence rather than submit to Morocco. Some resistance is tribal and cultural, with the Moroccans seen as another bunch of alien invaders (the area was administered, until 1976, as a Spanish colony). If the fighting breaks out again, possibly inspired by Islamic radicals, it could go on for years, just as it does in many other parts of Africa and the immediate neighborhood.

Getting involved in cocaine smuggling provides money, some of which goes towards buying guns and vehicles, making the Polisario fighters more formidable. Mali and Mauritanian police are increasingly arresting members of the Polisario Front who are involved with a major drug smuggling operation (moving cocaine from Guinea-Bissau, where it is flown in from South America, to the Mediterranean coast). Polisario Front members have long been involved in smuggling and other illegal activities but their involvement in moving cocaine is relatively recent. This implies cooperation with al Qaeda, which apparently has worked out deals with Polisario. AQIM is a major player in the drug smuggling network that brings South American cocaine from Guinea-Bissau, where it is flown in from South America, to the Mediterranean coast. But all that money, and radical groups with different agendas, could lead to terrorists terrorizing other terrorists.
In Somalia al Shabaab recently announced a merger with al Qaeda. This was more PR than fact, because al Shabaab like all previous Islamic radical groups in Somalia is suffering defeat and splintering. Six years ago al Shabaab itself was the result of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) moderates (ARS, or Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia) splitting away and joining an attempt to form a new government in Somalia. The radicals in the ICU left and formed al Shabaab. Other remnants of the ICU fled to Eritrea or formed smaller radical groups (which were later destroyed by, or absorbed into, al Shabaab.) The ICU itself goes back to the 1990s, when religious leaders formed militias in an attempt to reduce the banditry and feuding rampant in the country. The ARS wanted to keep Islamic terrorists out of the country, in return for more foreign aid. Al Shabaab offered to shelter al Qaeda and help establish a worldwide Islamic government. Somalia became a base for many al Qaeda members chased out of Pakistan and Arabia, although many of those have since fled to Yemen to escape the many peacekeepers and local militias pressing in on al Shabaab.

Boko Haram formed in the Moslem north of Nigeria about five years ago. Modeling themselves on the Taliban, Boko Haram became larger, and more violent, because of popular anger at rampant corruption and mismanagement in Nigeria. Some Boko Haram leaders were spotted in Somalia several years ago, and others are known to have been in contact with al Qaeda members from West Africa. But for the moment Boko Haram is intent on turning Nigeria (which is half Christian) into an Islamic dictatorship.

The three Islamic terror organizations described here cover a vast area (from the Atlantic Ocean coast of West Africa to the Indian Ocean coast of East Africa) as well as numerous very different cultures. While involved are Islamic radicals, only AQIM is Arab (or at least most of them) while Boko Haram and Somalis are black Africans (generally despised by Arabs). Moreover, the Somalis consider themselves Arabs, which creates even more tension.
Kidnapped Aid Workers in Good Condition, Spanish Government Says

MADRID (EFE) – The four Spanish aid workers kidnapped in Tindouf and Somalia “are doing fine” and the government has been working every day to win their release, Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo said Monday. The foreign minister discussed the situation in the wake of his visit over the weekend to Mali to try to speed the release of the two aid workers abducted last October from a Saharawi refugee camp in western Algeria.

The matter is sensitive and not much can be said in public because “lives are at stake,” Garcia-Margallo told Cope radio. The foreign minister said he had spoken with his European Union and Arab counterparts, and attended the Conference on Somalia in London in an effort to win the hostages’ release. Mali’s foreign minister is expected to visit Spain “very soon,” Garcia-Margallo said.

Italian media reported that Rosella Urru, an aid worker from Italy who was kidnapped from the refugee camp outside Tindouf with Spaniards Ainhoa Fernandez and Enric Gonyalons, had been released. Garcia-Margallo said Feb. 15 in Algeria that the Spanish government had received “proof” that the two Spanish aid workers kidnapped in Tindouf and the two others abducted near the Kenya-Somalia border were alive.

Blanca Thiebaut and Montserrat Serra, two Spanish citizens working with Doctors Without Borders at a Somali refugee camp in the eastern Kenyan town of Dadaab, were kidnapped at gunpoint on Oct. 13. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, but Kenyan officials said they suspected Somalia’s Al Shabaab Islamic militia, which has links to Al Qaeda. Ainhoa Fernandez and Enric Gonyalons were kidnapped 10 days after the incident in Kenya.

Fernandez de Rincon, Gonyalons and Urru were taken away by a group of armed men from the facility near Tindouf where foreign aid workers are lodged. The government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic – the Polisario Front’s name for the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara – arrested several people in connection with the kidnapping and said the captives were taken to a mountainous area on the Mali-Niger border.

A video sent by the captors shows Gonyalons, Rincon and Urru at an unidentified spot in the desert.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is suspected of having staged the kidnapping. The terrorist group has carried out a number of kidnappings in southern Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, but it had never abducted anyone in the Sahrawi refugee camps controlled by the Polisario Front.

The SADR is the name given the Western Sahara by the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, which launched a war for independence against Morocco in 1975 after the North African kingdom annexed the territory on the withdrawal of Spanish forces. The native Saharawis, led by the Polisario Front, have spent decades resisting Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony.
Rachad,
I will send a condolence letter to the family of Donald Payne, as former Ambassador and Chairman of MAC. I also recommend that you/Kingdom of Morocco do the same. If you decide to send a letter and want help with the content we would be happy to assist. Hope all is well and see you soon. Ed
Rachad,

Assuming this is a correct report, this is a huge step forward. We need to think about how we get the US to this point as well. See below on the operative word changes from the US position. We only need a two word change!

Juppe: Morocco's proposal best plan for Western Sahara

French FM says Morocco's plan for granting disputed territory of Western Sahara autonomous status is only realistic proposal.

RABAT - Morocco’s plan for granting the disputed territory of Western Sahara autonomous status is the only realistic proposal for the territory, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said Wednesday.

"We still think that the Moroccan autonomy plan, which today is the only realistic proposal on the table, forms the serious and credible basis of a solution," he told Morocco's MAP news agency.

But the dispute still needed to be handled within the framework of the United Nations talks, he said.

And it should not be allowed to hamper the ongoing rapprochement between the leaders of Morocco and neighbour Algeria, he added, saying: "We can only encourage them in this direction."

Juppe's comments came ahead of the start of his official visit to Morocco on Thursday and...
Friday -- and soon after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton endorsed the Moroccan plan during a visit there last month.

Clinton, speaking during a visit to Rabat on February 26, described the autonomy plan as "serious, credible and realistic".

She also backed the UN-mediated talks on the issue.

But the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, which is fighting for independence for Western Sahara has rejected the Moroccan plan.

Morocco moved into Western Sahara when Spanish colonisers left in 1975, sparking the conflict with the Polisario Front until a ceasefire in 1991.

The United Nations is due to host another round of talks on the Western Sahara from Sunday to Tuesday in the suburbs of New York. But the UN-sponsored talks to resolve the dispute have made no progress over the past two years.
Will you have time next week to meet? I get home Sunday. Have to be court on Monday. Otherwise I can fit into your schedule. Ed
You pick it Boss and I’ll be there :-) 

Welcome back, I hope you enjoyed your trip.
how does Tuesday at 10, or 3H30 sound?

As for Payne, my staff already took care of it. thank you

Rachad
FYI -- The Atlantic magazine published an article today, “The Coming Arab Identity Crisis,” on prospects for greater unity and integration in North Africa and the Arab world following the Arab Spring. The article notes Morocco’s ethnic diversity and includes quotes from advisor to King Mohammed VI, André Azoulay, leader of the Parti Démocratique Amazigh Marocain, Ahmed Adghimi, and Ambassador Ed Gabriel. See below and attached.


the Atlantic

Thursday, March 08, 2012

The Coming Arab Identity Crisis

By Massoud Hayoun

The Arab Spring could renew Nasser's 60-year-old mission for pan-Arabism, but the movement would face new challenges today.

Just after the 18-day uprising in Tahrir Square ousted President Hosni Mubarak, a Cairene businessman living in Hong Kong told me in rapturous excitement, "Now that we are freeing ourselves from dictators, all we need is to unify. One currency like the E.U., a common goal of economic development, and integrity for our Arab world."

He was not the first Arab idealist to envision pan-Arab unification as a legitimate goal. In 1960, at the height of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabist, socialist movement, Egyptian musical icon Mohammed Abdel Wahab composed Watani al Akbar (in English, My Grand Nation), an ode to the idea of a united Arab super-state that would stretch from Morocco to Iraq. Many of the greatest singers of the Arab world came together on the same stage for the performance.

As independence movements pushed out European imperialists, Arabs were finally no longer second-class citizens in their own countries. Wahab's song for "a perfect unity" captured a goal that today, as democratic movements sweep the region, has returned to once again fill Arabs with hope and pride. "Arab-ness is not a religion."

Just as Nasser's movement could not survive the political realities of his era, today's renewed pan-Arabism faces the same challenge it did in the 1960s: ethnic identity. If Arabs are to come together,-- this time not in a super-state but a union of regional economies -- they will first have to agree on who does and does not count as an Arab. That's a more complicated -- and potentially controversial -- question than outsiders might realize, but it is one that could challenge the Arab world, with or without a renewed pan-Arabism.

As problematic as Nasser's pan-Arabism was, its memory is still one of sentimentality and regret. Israel's bloody 1967 defeat of a unified Arab army and Egypt's virtual take-over of Syria under the banner of Nasserist pan-Arabism soured Arab opinions of a movement that could have elevated the region economically and politically.

As problematic as Nasser's pan-Arabism was, its memory is still one of sentimentality and regret. Israel's bloody 1967 defeat of a unified Arab army and Egypt's virtual take-over of Syria under the banner of Nasserist pan-Arabism soured Arab opinions of a movement that could have elevated the region economically and politically.

The Arab world encompasses a vast array of ethnic, cultural, and religious cleavages and countless skin color gradations. In Nasser's time, pan-Arabists had trouble deciding how to either include or exclude Christian Arabs, Jewish Arabs, Amazighs (more often referred to by the pejorative term Berber), Kurds, and others into the movement for Arab advancement.
"A pan-Arabist would see diversity as fitna [sedition]," said Karim Mezran, professor of Middle Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "An intelligent person wouldn't see diversity that way."

For Arab academics like Mezran, pan-Arabism has become more of a four-letter word than a legitimate aspiration of the Arab people.

"There were a lot of promises in [Nasser's] pan-Arabism that failed miserably," said Osama Abi-Mershed, director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. "The term is pejorative these days. ... Entry into Nasser's United Arab Republic thrust Yemen into a civil war, for example."

Still, there's some hope for regionalism. Earlier this month, Tunisia's newly elected President Moncef Marzouki announced a plan to reunify the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), an economic union that went defunct in 1994 over a dispute between members Algeria and Morocco over control of Western Sahara. Founded in 1956, the UMA included Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

Marzouki told the AFP that a new UMA would politically and economically integrate North Africa to better attract foreign investment and combat terrorism.

But can it work? Georgetown's Abi-Mershed expressed skepticism for the feasibility of a UMA renaissance, saying that non-democratic countries like Algeria would be wary of integration.

"Regimes in power since colonialism, nationalist regimes see regionalism as a threat to autocratic powers," he said. "These regional forces can dilute national authority. They aren't interested in gaining legitimacy by enlarging enfranchisement."

Although they feel it's unlikely, academics say regionalism could do great things for the Middle East.

"A movement for freedom and improvement should unite the Arab state," said Johns Hopkins' Mezran. "It's not the time for calls for racial and religious uniformity -- unity should be in terms of values."

"The European Union," he said, "that's what the [Arab states] should follow. They should seek the progressive integration of market functions. Slowly, states should enter the union -- two states first, then four and five."

The political community agrees. "I see the UMA as an important vehicle to develop economies and combat terrorism," said Edward Gabriel, a former U.S. ambassador to Morocco and a Lebanese-American. "We in the U.S. have short attention spans. If North Africa waits for help from the U.S. and Europe, they may be disappointed."

Although diversity has been a hurdle to Arab unity before, perhaps the rising democratic movements can help make it an asset. What the Arab rulers of previous generations saw as a threat to pan-Arabist identity, Mezran sees as an economic opportunity.

"Minorities are an enrichment because of their global ties and leanings. If you open up and incorporate minorities, they bring their contacts. Maronites [Christian Lebanese] have a lot of connections with Europe and the U.S." he pointed out. "What I know is if you exclude minorities, you close markets."

Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan -- Arab nations with some of the largest populations of the region's ethnic minorities -- are among the largest recipients of remittances in the world, according to the World Bank's most recent figures. In 2010, those four countries received $26.1 billion in remittances.

But the idea of incorporating minorities opens an big question for the Arab-majority regions of the Middle East and North Africa: who actually counts as an Arab? "I think the idea is pretty clear -- you speak Arabic and are of Arab descent, and you are recognized as Arab," Mezran said, later observing the gray areas in that argument. "I'm not fluent. I run into being chastised. But I've never been considered non-Arab."

If Arabism is more than just a language, then makes an Arab an Arab? Georgetown's Abi-Mershed offered a sort of formula for an Arab identity:

**A recipe for Arabism**
There are three dimensions:
A common language
A shared history, with shared cultural values, historical references, and lived context
A willingness to be defined as an Arab ... "which is where it gets problematic."

Since the end of colonialism, North Africa’s Amazighs, who are believed to have lived in the region since long before the 7th century Arab invasion, have worked to reclaim their ethnic identity from Arabized homogeneity. The ancestral Amazigh language is Tamazight, but a century of intermingling and Arab dominance mean many now speak Arabic.

In a series of reforms over the past year, Moroccan King Mohammed VI made Tamazight an official language of Morocco. Still, Moroccan Amazigh leaders say they are polarized by the ethnocentricity of their nation's leaders.

Late last year, I spoke with Ahmed Adghirni, the leader of the Parti Démocratique Amazigh Marocain, who said that despite the new reforms, the nation’s Amazighs are still politically and often economically disenfranchised. His party was banned in April 2008 when Moroccan courts cited a law forbidding racially or linguistically defined political organizations.

"The officialization of Tamazight isn't going to do anything to change the situation and lifestyle of Amazighs," Adghirni said. I am still participating in the development of Amazigh political representation, and consolidating their role in the February 20th protest movements."

Amazighists, as they call themselves, like Adghirni say they oppose Arabist movements such as the UMA.

Explaining his views on the rift between Amazighs and Arabs in North Africa, Ambassador Gabriel offered an example from his own Lebanese Christian community.

"Some Lebanese Christians don't call themselves Arabs, they say they are Phoenicians," Gabriel said, explaining that he is proud of his Arab and Lebanese roots, which he sees as parts of the same identity.

Abi-Mershed says that the Amazigh-Arab divide is to some extent a fabrication of French imperialists. "The Berber-Arab rift has become a legacy of colonialism. Colonialists distinguished between Berbers and Arabs because it suited their divide and rule policy."

Many genetic studies suggest that there is actually little difference between the genetic makeups of North African Amazighs and Arabs.

"When you say what is an Arab you say what is an Arab race," explained Abi-Mershed. "It's a 19th century construct that pretends to be scientific but is not. If you flip through history, there are identities, but there has been so much mixing that race only comes out in 19th century as pseudo-scientific category."

There are some 2.2 million Amazighs in Europe, according to the most recent figures, and that doesn't include the large Amazigh populations that have settled in Boston and French-speaking Canada. Diaspora Moroccans, including Amazighs, contribute an average $7 billion in remittances every year, according to recent findings. They might feel a connection to Morocco, but probably not to the Arab world at large, given that pan-Arabism does little to move you if you do not identify as Arab.

Even more problematic than integrating Amazighs and Christian Arabs into a neo-Arabist movement is integrating Jewish Arabs -- a term that has been used rather infrequently since the 1948 founding of Israel.

Before 1948, Jewish Tunisian singer Habiba Msika was at the forefront of a Tunisian movement against French imperial rule. Egyptian Leila Mourad -- perhaps a more central feature of the mainstream Arab musical-political canon -- was the Jewish Arab voice, and an official singer of, Nasser's 1952 revolution.

But Nasser's pan-Arabism, for which war against Israel was a defining feature and a rallying point, had no place for Jewish Arabs. Many Jews living in Egypt were coerced into leaving the country after 1948. According to some Arab Jews, the early Israeli government also worked to acculturate and Europeanize its Arab Jewish immigrants.
Perhaps the single most notable Arab Jew still thriving in the Arab world is Morocco's André Azoulay, an advisor to King Mohammed VI -- the only remaining Jewish Arab to serve in an Arab government. Azoulay is a native of Essouira, a town that was once majority Jewish.

"I am an Arab. Arab-ness is not a religion. It's a culture, a language, and a community. Judaism is a spirituality," Azoulay. "The European Arab and Muslim communities have a population of close to 10 million. Many are from the Maghreb -- and many are developing their own [business] network. The Jewish Arab community develops that same kind of community."

Azoulay said of the period after 1948, when Arabs and Jews seemed mutually exclusive, "Now that time is over. We are reclaiming our identity and our history."

Hesaid he believes that the UMA will successfully reunify. "What I know and what I think is having a union of the Arab Maghreb countries is so coherent. It's a win-win game for everybody. We have lost time, missed opportunities, missed so many rendezvous to make our growth larger by uniting our efforts and our wealth," he said. "I'm sure it will happen eventually."

For a new, democratic sort of pan-Arabism to ever happen, Arabs will have to reevaluate their perceptions of themselves as well as how their countries are governed.

"No major transnational movement would happen yet," said John Hopkins' Mezran. "The Arabs are inward looking. We have to wait for the states to develop values to project to the outside. Even with the revolution, The revolution is turned to Islamic movement."

Maybe Nasser's pan-Arabism would have to be reworked to succeed today, from an unwieldy Arab Republic to an economic cooperative like the European Union.

Or maybe pan-Arabism doesn't need reconfiguring. Maybe Nasser got it wrong.

"Pan-Arabism, which started long before Nasser's push for a United Arab Republic, was never supposed to be a political project," Mezran explained. "It should be primarily economic and cultural. In history, the Arab and Muslim world was unified for very short periods, but culturally and economically, it has almost always been united."
The Coming Arab Identity Crisis

By Massoud Hayoun

The Arab Spring could renew Nasser's 60-year-old mission for pan-Arabism, but the movement would face new challenges today.

An Amazigh child in Algeria / Reuters

Just after the 18-day uprising in Tahrir Square ousted President Hosni Mubarak, a Cairene businessman living in Hong Kong told me in rapturous excitement, "Now that we are freeing ourselves from dictators, all we need is to unify. One currency like the E.U., a common goal of economic development, and integrity for our Arab world."

He was not the first Arab idealist to envision pan-Arab unification as a legitimate goal. In 1960, at the height of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabist, socialist movement, Egyptian musical icon Mohammed Abdel Wahab composed Watani al Akbar (in English, My Grand Nation), an ode to the idea of a united Arab super-state that would stretch from Morocco to Iraq. Many of the greatest singers of the Arab world came together on the same stage for the performance.

As independence movements pushed out European imperialists, Arabs were finally no longer second-class citizens in their own countries. Wahab's song for "a perfect unity" captured a goal that today, as democratic movements sweep the region, has returned to once again fill Arabs with hope and pride. "Arab-ness is not a religion."

Just as Nasser's movement could not survive the political realities of his era, today's renewed pan-Arabism faces the same challenge it did in the 1960s: ethnic identity. If Arabs are to come together, -- this time not in a super-state but a union of regional economies -- they will first have to agree on who does and does not count as an Arab. That's a more complicated -- and potentially controversial -- question than outsiders might realize, but it is one that could challenge the Arab world, with or without a renewed pan-Arabism.

As problematic as Nasser's pan-Arabism was, its memory is still one of sentimentality and regret. Israel's bloody 1967 defeat of a unified Arab army and Egypt's virtual take-over of Syria under the banner of Nasserist pan-Arabism soured Arab opinions of a movement that could have elevated the region economically and politically.

The Arab world encompasses a vast array of ethnic, cultural, and religious cleavages and countless skin color gradations. In Nasser's time, pan-Arabists had trouble deciding how to either include or exclude Christian Arabs, Jewish Arabs, Amazighs (more often referred to by the pejorative term Berber), Kurds, and others into the movement for Arab advancement.

"A pan-Arabist would see diversity as fitna [sedition]," said Karim Mezran, professor of Middle Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "An intelligent person wouldn't see diversity that way."

For Arab academics like Mezran, pan-Arabism has become more of a four-letter word than a legitimate aspiration of the Arab people.

"There were a lot of promises in [Nasser's] pan-Arabism that failed miserably," said Osama Abi-Mershed, director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. "The term is pejorative these days. ... Entry into Nasser's United Arab Republic thrust Yemen into a civil war, for example."

Still, there's some hope for regionalism. Earlier this month, Tunisia's newly elected President Moncef Marzouki announced a plan to reunify the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), an economic union that went defunct in 1994 over a dispute between members Algeria and Morocco over control of Western Sahara. Founded in 1956, the UMA included Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.
Marzouki told the AFP that a new UMA would politically and economically integrate North Africa to better attract foreign investment and combat terrorism.

But can it work? Georgetown's Abi-Mershed expressed skepticism for the feasibility of a UMA renaissance, saying that non-democratic countries like Algeria would be wary of integration.

"Regimes in power since colonialism, nationalist regimes see regionalism as a threat to autocratic powers," he said. "These regional forces can dilute national authority. They aren't interested in gaining legitimacy by enlarging enfranchisement."

Although they feel it’s unlikely, academics say regionalism could do great things for the Middle East.

"A movement for freedom and improvement should unite the Arab state," said Johns Hopkins' Mezran. "It's not the time for calls for racial and religious uniformity -- unity should be in terms of values."

"The European Union," he said, "that's what the [Arab states] should follow. They should seek the progressive integration of market functions. Slowly, states should enter the union -- two states first, then four and five."

The political community agrees. "I see the UMA as an important vehicle to develop economies and combat terrorism," said Edward Gabriel, a former U.S. ambassador to Morocco and a Lebanese-American. "We in the U.S. have short attention spans. If North Africa waits for help from the U.S. and Europe, they may be disappointed."

Although diversity has been a hurdle to Arab unity before, perhaps the rising democratic movements can help make it an asset. What the Arab rulers of previous generations saw as a threat to pan-Arabist identity, Mezran sees as an economic opportunity.

"Minorities are an enrichment because of their global ties and leanings. If you open up and incorporate minorities, they bring their contacts. Maronites [Christian Lebanese] have a lot of connections with Europe and the U.S." he pointed out.

"What I know is if you exclude minorities, you close markets."

Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan -- Arab nations with some of the largest populations of the region's ethnic minorities -- are among the largest recipients of remittances in the world, according to the World Bank's most recent figures. In 2010, those four countries received $26.1 billion in remittances.

But the idea of incorporating minorities opens an big question for the Arab-majority regions of the Middle East and North Africa: who actually counts as an Arab? "I think the idea is pretty clear -- you speak Arabic and are of Arab descent, and you are recognized as Arab," Mezran said, later observing the gray areas in that argument. "I'm not fluent. I run into being chastised. But I've never been considered non-Arab."

If Arabism is more than just a language, then makes an Arab an Arab? Georgetown's Abi-Mershed offered a sort of formula for an Arab identity:

**A recipe for Arabism**

There are three dimensions:

A common language

A shared history, with shared cultural values, historical references, and lived context

A willingness to be defined as an Arab ... "which is where it gets problematic."

Since the end of colonialism, North Africa's Amazighs, who are believed to have lived in the region since long before the 7th century Arab invasion, have worked to reclaim their ethnic identity from Arabized homogeneity. The ancestral Amazigh language is Tamazight, but a century of intermingling and Arab dominance mean many now speak Arabic.

In a series of reforms over the past year, Moroccan King Mohammed VI made Tamazight an official language of Morocco. Still, Moroccan Amazigh leaders say they are polarized by the ethnocentricity of their nation's leaders.

Late last year, I spoke with Ahmed Adghirni, the leader of the Parti Démocratique Amazigh Marocain, who said that despite the new reforms, the nation's Amazighs are still politically and often economically disenfranchised. His party was banned in April 2008 when Moroccan courts cited a law forbidding racially or linguistically defined political organizations.

"The officialization of Tamazight isn't going to do anything to change the situation and lifestyle of Amazighs," Adghirni said. I am still participating in the development of Amazigh political representation, and consolidating their role in the February 20th protest movements."

Amazighists, as they call themselves, like Adghirni say they oppose Arabist movements such as the UMA.
Explaining his views on the rift between Amazighs and Arabs in North Africa, Ambassador Gabriel offered an example from his own Lebanese Christian community.

"Some Lebanese Christians don't call themselves Arabs, they say they are Phoenicians," Gabriel said, explaining that he is proud of his Arab and Lebanese roots, which he sees as parts of the same identity.

Abi-Mershed says that the Amazigh-Arab divide is to some extent a fabrication of French imperialists. "The Berber-Arab rift has become a legacy of colonialism. Colonialists distinguished between Berbers and Arabs because it suited their divide and rule policy."

Many genetic studies suggest that there is actually little difference between the genetic makeups of North African Amazighs and Arabs.

"When you say what is an Arab you say what is an Arab race," explained Abi-Mershed. "It's a 19th century construct that pretends to be scientific but is not. If you flip through history, there are identities, but there has been so much mixing that race only comes out in 19th century as pseudo-scientific category."

There are some 2.2 million Amazighs in Europe, according to the most recent figures, and that doesn't include the large Amazigh populations that have settled in Boston and French-speaking Canada. Diaspora Moroccans, including Amazighs, contribute an average $7 billion in remittances every year, according to recent findings. They might feel a connection to Morocco, but probably not to the Arab world at large, given that pan-Arabism does little to move you if you do not identify as Arab.

Even more problematic than integrating Amazighs and Christian Arabs into a neo-Arabist movement is integrating Jewish Arabs -- a term that has been used rather infrequently since the 1948 founding of Israel.

Before 1948, Jewish Tunisian singer Habiba Msika was at the forefront of a Tunisian movement against French imperial rule. Egyptian Leila Mourad -- perhaps a more central feature of the mainstream Arab musical-political canon -- was the Jewish Arab voice, and an official singer of, Nasser's 1952 revolution.

But Nasser's pan-Arabism, for which war against Israel was a defining feature and a rallying point, had no place for Jewish Arabs. Many Jews living in Egypt were coerced into leaving the country after 1948. According to some Arab Jews, the early Israeli government also worked to acculturate and Europeanize its Arab Jewish immigrants.

Perhaps the single most notable Arab Jew still thriving in the Arab world is Morocco's André Azoulay, an advisor to King Mohammed VI -- the only remaining Jewish Arab to serve in an Arab government. Azoulay is a native of Essouira, a town that was once majority Jewish.

"I am an Arab. Arab-ness is not a religion. It's a culture, a language, and a community. Judaism is a spirituality," Azoulay. "The European Arab and Muslim communities have a population of close to 10 million. Many are from the Maghreb -- and many are developing their own [business] network. The Jewish Arab community develops that same kind of community."

Azoulay said of the period after 1948, when Arabs and Jews seemed mutually exclusive, "Now that time is over. We are reclaiming our identity and our history."

Hesaid he believes that the UMA will successfully reunify. "What I know and what I think is having a union of the Arab Maghreb countries is so coherent. It's a win-win game for everybody. We have lost time, missed opportunities, missed so many rendezvous to make our growth larger by uniting our efforts and our wealth," he said. "I'm sure it will happen eventually."

For a new, democratic sort of pan-Arabism to ever happen, Arabs will have to reevaluate their perceptions of themselves as well as how their countries are governed.

"No major transnational movement would happen yet," said John Hopkins' Mezran. "The Arabs are inward looking. We have to wait for the states to develop values to project to the outside. Even with the revolution, The revolution is turned to Islamic movement."

Maybe Nasser's pan-Arabism would have to be reworked to succeed today, from an unwieldy Arab Republic to an economic cooperative like the European Union.

Or maybe pan-Arabism doesn't need reconfiguring. Maybe Nasser got it wrong.

"Pan-Arabism, which started long before Nasser's push for a United Arab Republic, was never supposed to be a political project," Mezran explained. "It should be primarily economic and cultural. In history, the Arab and Muslim world was unified for very short periods, but culturally and economically, it has almost always been united."
Rachad,

Attached is the outline of MACP seminar that we will sponsor at the end of the month on N. African security/Western Sahara. We can discuss any nuances or changes as you see fit, but need to proceed on logistics immediately. Thank you, Ed
Scenesetter: The Need for US Leadership to Resolve the Western Sahara Crisis

Proposed Title:
The Need for US Leadership to Resolve the Western Sahara Crisis

Proposed Date, Time, and Venue:
March 27th or March 28th, 10:00AM-12:00PM
Council on Foreign Relations
1777 F Street, N.W., First Floor

Thematic Overview:
In order to generate a higher level of interest in an event preceding the MINUSO rollover, it is proposed that MACP sponsor an event that presents the rationale for heightened US leadership to resolve the Western Sahara crisis. The purpose of the event is to clearly define the policy objectives that support MACP’s messaging on facts on the ground and targeted aid to the camps, as well as our messaging on the need to resolve the Western Sahara in order to advance regional security and stability and resolve a humanitarian crisis in the camps.

At a time when the US is struggling to evolve a “win-win” strategy vis-à-vis transitions following last year’s Arab uprisings, firm and proactive US leadership to resolve the Western Sahara conflict has critical policy implications and strategic regional benefits:

1. It is in the US national interest to do so
   a. We have a realistic policy that is supported by the past three Administrations and Bipartisan Majority in Both Chambers of Congress
   b. The US has a national interest in the stability of the region, of Morocco, and not creating a failed state. This policy addresses all three.

2. It will take a step towards addressing security concerns in the region and the camps
   a. Drugs
   b. Trafficking
   c. Kidnapping
   d. Terrorism
   e. Mercenaries

3. It will demonstrate US action to improve the humanitarian crisis in the camps
a. Warehouseing
b. Durable Solutions

In addition to getting across our messaging on these issues, the event will also provide recommendations on what the US should do to provide leadership:

1. Be forceful is asserting its position supporting autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and getting the negotiations back on the Van Walsum track – a solution that is good for the region and good for US interests.

2. Match US policy with actions by implementing the Congressional language authorizing US assistance to the Western Sahara.
   a) The use of US foreign assistance to underwrite programs in the South will demonstrate that Congress’ efforts to bring about a shift in US policy in the Sahara is supported by the Administration and provide substance to the statements of three successive administrations.
   b) US assistance to the Sahara will demonstrate a concrete US commitment to improving the lives of the Sahrawis, support economic growth and development in a vital area, reduce the attraction of criminal activities pursued in the region, and encourage other countries to expand their efforts in the territory.

3. Stop subsidizing the administration of the camps and start funding durable solutions.
   a) Targeting US assistance will create accountability and oversight over US funds being spent in the region and direct aid to promote durable solutions to the refugee crisis.
   b) Targeting US assistance will bring additional pressure on Algeria and other supporters of the Polisario Front to take steps that fulfill their obligations to the refugees, including a census to create the conditions for durable solutions.
   c) This will address both the humanitarian and security crisis in the camps. By enabling refugees to have options for repatriation, resettlement, or reintegration, one of their core rights under international refugee law, US aid can help eliminate a potential source of instability and insecurity in the region. Targeting aid thus serves a dual purpose of improving a humanitarian crisis and taking initial steps to resolve a security threat.

**Potential Speakers:**

The event would be a MACC-hosted roundtable moderated by Ambassador Gabriel, with three other prominent experts serving as speakers.
Denys Aguettant, Thomas More Institute (Regional/Security)
Les Campbell, National Democratic Institute (Facts on the Ground/US Leadership)
Lorne Craner, International Republican Institute (Facts on the Ground/US Leadership)
Robert Holley (Facts on the Ground/Target US Aid/US Leadership)
J. Peter Pham, The Atlantic Council (Regional/Security/US Leadership)
Merrill Smith, Independent Consultant (Refugees/Target US Aid)
Antonin Tiesseron, Thomas More Institute (Regional/Security)
I. William Zartman, SAIS (Regional/Autonomy/US Leadership)

Ideally, the event will be divided into three elements as noted above. Someone from MAC will discuss US national interest in resolving the Sahara, J. Peter Pham will provide a security analysis, and Merrill Smith will make the humanitarian case. All of them will endorse the recommendations to US policymakers in some capacity.

Expected Results:

Event Audience: We anticipate an audience of approximately 30-40 people from think tanks and the policymaking community in DC.

Media: This event will generate media coverage from a MAC press release, which along with the video will be sent to our targeted list of 500 journalists. We will also target DC-based journalists to attend the event, interview the speakers, and write follow-up articles.

Website: We will post a video of this on the MOTM website and will live tweet from the event.
Unless you picked one of these times, I’d prefer 3:30pm, although I can make either time that fits your schedule. ed
Rachad,
Attached is our monthly report for your review and comment prior to sending, as promised. I have highlighted the area that defines/characterizes “Washington Team”. We will find a way to word this that meets our mutual satisfaction. Thank you. We can discuss this next week. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
WASHINGTON TEAM
FEBRUARY 2012 PROGRESS REPORT

Introduction

The February agenda in Washington continued to be dominated by issues related to the upcoming Presidential election. Foreign policy concerns included Afghanistan (early pullout, Koran burning), Iran-Israel (nuclear enrichment issue), and the visit of the Chinese Vice President. Domestic topics were primarily those that were defined to appeal to the constituencies of the two major political parties.

There was very little movement on Morocco outside of the visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and visits by other high ranking State Department and Defense Department officials to the Maghreb, primarily focused on security concerns. The first visit of a member of the new Moroccan government to the US was also of some interest although she did not have the opportunity for broad media engagement through the Washington Team.

There were a number of programs and media events that highlighted Morocco-related topics including the annual terrorism report from the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS), several news stories related to the ICTS report, Secretary Clinton’s visit, and the need to use US foreign assistance to bring about resolution of the status of the Tindouf refugees.

Looking ahead, it is obvious that, as the Republican primaries come to a close in March, the election campaigning will become even more combative and rhetorical between Democrats and Republicans. The slight improvements in the US economy, which is an advantage to the President, is being offset by some pundits, by the rising cost of gasoline, primarily due to threats from Iran.

It will be a difficult period in which to promote Morocco’s agenda; however, with the Appropriations language allowing US aid to be spent anywhere Morocco governs, there will be opportunities to move on having US-funded projects in the South. This is our dominant objective for the spring.

The list below is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. Since it is difficult to distinguish some of the work of the Moroccan American Center from that of the Embassy, this report includes select activities of the Embassy, MAC, and its consultants as the “Washington Team”.

Campaigns

MoroccoOnTheMove.com (MOTM)

As part of the Team’s efforts to enhance Morocco’s web and social media presence and grow its online audience, we continue to use the MOTM website and
@MorocOnTheMove Twitter handle to repurpose and publish positive Morocco-related news.

The website and @MorocOnTheMove social media program continue to broaden the reach for our messaging, both in quantity and among targeted audiences. After only four months online, more than 220 news postings and other original content from the Team have appeared and the website has received more than 18,000 hits. @MorocOnTheMove sent out more than 700 tweets, gained more than 200 followers, and was retweeted regularly by influential personalities on Twitter, including the State Department and US Embassy in Rabat.

The most visited page of the MOTM website is the “Expert sources” section which contains biographical and contact information for Team members and third-party spokespeople who are familiar with our messaging and are available to provide positive commentary and background on request. This greatly increases the likelihood that journalists, policymakers, and think-tank leaders will seek out these experts for articles, briefings, and events on Morocco and the region.

Morocco as a Leader

Activities:

On February 5, Ambassador Gabriel was interviewed live on the American Arab talk radio show “Radio Baladi” on the topic, “Morocco and the Arab Spring.” Hosted by Ray Hanania, the show highlighted Morocco’s leadership on democratic reforms in the region and was broadcast to audiences in Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio.

In late January, the Team briefed Isobel Coleman, author and Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy, Director, Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative at Council on Foreign Relations, prior to her trip to Morocco to learn more about the mourchidate program and attend North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (PNB-NAPEO) conference in Marrakesh. On February 21, Coleman published an article, “Democracy in development – Morocco and political reform” on the Council on Foreign Relations blog, in which she examined the reform process in Morocco compared to others in the region since the beginning of the Arab Spring.

Following Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Morocco in late February, the Team issued a press release, “Sec. Clinton praises Morocco as leader for peace, democracy in region—Reaffirms Moroccan autonomy solution in Western Sahara as ‘serious, realistic, credible’,” citing Clinton’s remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Saad Dine El Othmani at a briefing in Rabat. It was picked up and posted at more than 200 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, Boston Globe, San Francisco Chronicle, Newsday, Houston Chronicle, Sacramento Bee, Columbus Dispatch, Yahoo News, AOL News, and Afrik-News. Robert M. Holley authored a commentary posted on the MOTM website, “Three Times Not Yet a Charm,” on the implications of the Clinton visit.
In addition, MAP published “Clinton’s visit to Morocco, opportunity to renew support for autonomy initiative” which cited the Atlantic Council’s Peter Pham who is regularly briefed by the Washington Team. An article, “Date of UN talks on the Western Sahara announced,” published by North Africa United, also referenced Pham’s citation MAP.

In late February, an art exhibit, “Beauty and Belief: Crossing Bridges with the Arts of Islamic Culture,” opened at Brigham Young University in Utah with Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal as a guest of honor. Several articles highlighting the exhibit and the participation of Ambassador Bouhlal were published: “BYU opens massive Islamic art exhibit,” by KSL.com and “Islamic Art Extends Bridges in Utah” by OnIslam.net, “Islamic art exhibit opens at BYU's Museum of Art,” Deseret News, and “Islamic art extends bridges in Utah” on ABNA.

Results:

In February, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight Morocco’s role as a leader for democratic reforms and peace in the region for US audiences generated more than 430 positive media placements and 35.5 million favorable media impressions.

The Polisario and Terrorism in the Sahara/Sahel

The Team continued its efforts to bring US media attention to the growing threat from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other terrorist groups in the Sahara/Sahel, as well as growing concerns about AQIM links to members of the Polisario Front in the Tindouf camps. These efforts included journalist outreach; op-eds; briefings of third party spokespersons; and creating fact sheets, chronologies and other supporting documentations for distribution to target audiences.

Activities:

A focal point of the efforts was the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies “Cooperation in combating terrorism: Review of 2011 and outlook for 2012,” which took place on February 2 forum at the National Press Club. The Team compiled and/or assisted in the preparation of the following briefing documents: “4Q 2011 ICTS REPORT UPDATE CHARTS 'Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism’ FINAL”, “Morocco Terrorism” fact sheet and talking points for media and policymakers, “CHRONOLOGY-Polisario Renegades & AQIM Recruits-It's time to Close the Camps” ICTS/Potomac Institute– “Special Update Report: Terrorism in NW&C Africa from 9-11 to Arab Spring” (which documents the 500% rise in attacks by AQIM and other terrorist groups in the region since 9/11) and the ICTS Flyer – “ICTS Terrorism Special Update Report.” The report also details Polisario member involvement with AQIM and traffickers, and finds that the Polisario-run camps have become “a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and criminal enterprises.” It urges the US and international community to take action to “prioritize permanent refugee resettlement.”
Following the event, the Team issued a press release, “Study warns of rising al-Qaeda threat in North Africa—Urges closing Polisario camps which have become recruiting ground for terrorists,” which was picked up and posted at more than 150 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, ABC News, Terrorism Watch, Yahoo News, AOL News, Africa Business, and Star Africa.

For the MOTM website, Professor Alexander recorded a video commentary, “Polisario camps harbor ‘seeds for recruitment and violence’,” where he described the findings of the Potomac report, highlighting the recommendation that the Polisario-controlled refugee camps be closed because they are “they are a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.”

In addition, the Team arranged an interview for Alexander with Jennifer Rubin, of the Washington Post’s “Right turn” blog. Her commentary, “North Africa: Terrorism on the rise” was published the morning of the event and then republished and cited by several other media outlets, including Forbes and The Daily Globe. MAP also published an article on the ICTS study, “Report in Washington calls for closure of Polisario camps in Tindouf,” which was reposted by Moroccan and other media outlets, including Le Matin, E-Marrakech, Rue20, Sahara News, Sahel Intelligence, and Readers Edition.

A February 2012 report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Regional security cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel - Algeria's pivotal ambivalence,” cited the terrorism data provided by the Team from the 2011 ICTS Maghreb and Sahel terrorism report.

Ambassador Ed Gabriel authored an op-ed, “Stop subsidizing recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers,” which was published in The Hill's online “Congress Blog.” which is being distributed to Congress and the media.

Results:

In February, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight for US audiences concerns about rising terrorism in the region and the Polisario connection generated more than 360 positive media placements and 24.8 million favorable media impressions.

Congressional Activities

Congress was in session for three weeks in February and the Washington Team began the annual process of conducting in person briefings with every Congressional office, meeting with twenty-four offices. It also continued disseminating the core messages of the upcoming campaigns:

- Discrediting the Polisario
- Target assistance away from administering the camps and towards promoting durable solutions
Building Support for Facts on the Ground
Promoting Morocco as a leader in the region, especially the reforms of the past year, and the new role on the UN Security Council.

Every office received a thorough briefing on the recent Polisario actions including: the kidnappings in the camps, how the camps are used as a recruiting center for terrorists and criminal enterprises, how members of the Polisario are trafficking in drugs and goods, and how they fought alongside Gaddafi in Libya. The Team also distributed the Potomac Institute Report on terrorism in North Africa that details these activities and walks the members/staff through the map describing the various forces of instability operating near the Polisario camps.

The Team is well aware of that fact that Morocco’s adversaries are planning a campaign that will show the Polisario as victims. Our plan, starting with these meetings and all those that follow, is to brief every office, circulate op-eds and news articles that show the reality of the Polisario, and, by exposing the truth before they begin their efforts, continue to minimize the ability of the Polisario to gain supporters in Congress.

The Washington Team remained in contact with key constituencies on the Appropriations subcommittee for the Facts on the Ground campaign. It briefed the key representatives on the initial State Department reaction to the language which was that the Department was aware of the language and trying to decode what, if anything, to do about it. The key representatives followed by submitting questions to the Secretary about how she planned to implement the language. These follow up questions show that this is an important issue to the Congress and will force State Department to start answering direct questions on the issue.

Looking Ahead

The Team anticipates conducting at least another thirty briefings in March, and will also circulate Ambassador Gabriel’s latest op-ed on the Polisario camps to our Congressional audience, as well as all credible information on the Polisario that reinforces our strong campaign to discredit it. We will continue our emphasis on security concerns in the region and potentially help organize a briefing in Congress on the dangers posed by the camps on both a security and humanitarian level. Finally, we will continue to work closely with Congressional appropriators on implementing the facts on the ground language.

MATIC

MATIC held a group meeting with the US Trade Representatives team responsible for MENA, which was headed to Morocco later in the month, during which time we had an extensive discussion about the need to prioritize Morocco along with Tunisia and Libya going forward. The USTR staff going to Morocco was in contact with the Ambassador also, who assisted in their preparations for the trip.
MATIC met with the Aspen Institute regional director for NAPEO as a follow up to the conference in Marrakech. They are considering a Maghreb-wide delegation to the US in May and wanted to gauge the feasibility of such a program since it would include both private and public sector participation.

MATIC arranged a series of meetings for the AMDI New York office director with various agencies and associations in Washington that have an impact on promoting Morocco in the US. These included the US Chamber of Commerce, the Department of Commerce, OPIC, EX-IM Bank, the National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, the Moroccan Embassy, and MATIC.

Another meeting of importance to Morocco was with Shelly Porges, Director of the Global Entrepreneurship Program, which is opening a project in Morocco, now scheduled for March. She is in contact with the Embassy for assistance in launching the project.

MATIC continued to assist US companies with information regarding trade and investment opportunities in Morocco across a range of sectors.

**MACC**

Throughout the month of February, MACC staff attended a number of events on the Maghreb and the Middle East, including a forum on Libya’s missing weapons hosted by the Stimson Center; a discussion on the Arab Spring hosted by the Henry Jackson Society on Capitol Hill; a panel on freedom of expression in the Middle East held at the National Press Club; and a conference on the Arab Spring and the challenges of reconstruction organized by the United States Institute of Peace.

The Washington Team briefed the senior officers/officials program at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University on the role of the Moroccan American Center. It was attended by high ranking military and government officials from the region including two diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rabat.
Media Coverage for Washington Team by Quarter
January 2010 to February 2012

Media and Web stories or Postings of MAC Press Releases, Communications Initiatives, and Related News from Washington Team (Media Impressions = Circulation, Viewership, & Circulation-equivalent for Web)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>1Q 2010</th>
<th>2Q 2010</th>
<th>3Q 2010</th>
<th>4Q 2010</th>
<th>1Q 2011</th>
<th>2Q 2011</th>
<th>3Q 2011</th>
<th>4Q 2011</th>
<th>1Q 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media Impressions</td>
<td>131.7 MM</td>
<td>145.9 MM</td>
<td>165.2 MM</td>
<td>212.0 MM</td>
<td>342.9 MM</td>
<td>325.1 MM</td>
<td>233.9 MM</td>
<td>340.2 MM</td>
<td>62.4 MM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2nd month of quarter)
Media Coverage for Major Washington Team Initiatives
June 2010 through February 2012

Media and Web stories or Postings of MAC Press Releases, Communications Initiatives, and Related News from Washington Team (Media Impressions = Circulation, Viewership, & Circulation-equivalent for Web)

TOTAL Impressions by Rating for MAC Media/Web coverage (June 2010–Feb 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Impressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>3,533,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Mixed</td>
<td>25,918,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>2,304,126,599</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Defending Morocco's Autonomy
- Open the Camps: Call W. Sahara
- What really happened in Laayoune — refugee plight
- Free Sidi Mouloud — militant attacks
- Fassi Fihri, Clinton tout "Morocco Exception," strategic partnership
- King's Speech 3/9, "Key Ally"
- Mercenaries from Polisario in Libya, tied to al-Qaeda
- Terrorism and Turmoil in Region
- Democracy & Reform leader, new Parliament
- Morocco's Most Viable Camps: "Casablanca" & "Laayoune" 
- "Religious Solution in Sahara"
- "Freedo m - Wolf"
- "Wolf (mult. releases)"
- "Rebut Wolf (mult. releases)"
- "Morocco's Most Viable Camps: Call W. Sahara (mult. leases)"
- "What really happened in Laayoune — refugee plight (mult. releases)"
- "Free Sidi Mouloud — militant attacks (mult. releases)"
- "Fassi Fihri, Clinton tout "Morocco Exception," strategic partnership (video, releases)"
- "King's Speech 3/9, "Key Ally" (multi. releases)"
- "Mercenaries from Polisario in Libya, tied to al-Qaeda (mult. releases)"
- "Terrorism and Turmoil in Region, new Parliament, "Morocco's Most Viable Camps: Call W. Sahara (mult. leases)"
- "Religious Solution in Sahara (mult. releases)"
- "Freedo m - Wolf (mult. releases)"
- "Wolf (mult. releases)"
- "Rebut Wolf (mult. releases)"
Background

The event will be a small, informal, off-the-record meeting with participants who are likely to be well informed about a variety of foreign-policy issues in the Middle East and North Africa, though not perhaps particularly knowledgeable about Morocco specifically. The discussion will cover Morocco’s Constitutional changes and new government, developments in the Maghreb, and broader issues involving the Arab Spring.

Though some high level journalists are invited, because the event is off the record, they will not write about it directly but use what they learn to inform a broader understanding of Morocco and its issues.

Because Elliott Abrams is a good friend of Morocco, this will be a friendly conversation. But there may well be candid questions – from him and other participants – about:

- The success in carrying out the Constitutional reforms;
- The precise nature and extent of power of the new government;
- Morocco’s relationship with Israel;
- Freedom of expression/recent prison sentences for defamation.

Format of the event

4:45-5 pm:

- Informal meet-and-greet; light refreshments will be served.

5-5:15 pm:

- 15-minute opening statement by Ambassador Bouhlal

5:15-6 pm:

- Open discussion

Recommendation

It can be extremely helpful to conduct a brief preparatory session in advance of such meetings, and we would recommend a meeting with MACP on Monday, March 12, to help formulate responses that compellingly convey Morocco’s messages and will resonate with the CFR audience.
Rachad,

Attached is a briefing memo on your event with Elliott Abrams on March 13th. In the memo, we detail the format. You will be asked to speak for 15 minutes and then respond to questions. We have also noted the general line of questioning in the briefing document, and suggested that if you agree, we could have a practice session on Monday. Also, if you have any corrections, please let us know. Ed
Attached is the official statement by Congressman Murphy on the UN negotiations. Ed
Mr. MURPHY of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the renewal of negotiations between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front.

The Western Sahara region has been disputed territory since the Spanish withdrew in 1975. It is claimed by Morocco and the Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the Western Sahara.

Morocco and the Polisario began direct negotiations in 2007, under the auspices of the United Nations. The next round of negotiations begins on Monday, and I hope that a solution will finally be agreed to during the new talks in Manhasset, NY. The people who live in the Western Sahara have suffered as a result of the region's status being in limbo, and they deserve for this longstanding dispute to be resolved.

Morocco has a compromise proposal on the table: democratic autonomy for the region under Moroccan sovereignty. I believe this is a reasonable offer and can serve as a basis for negotiations. Undersecretary of State William Burns previously described the Moroccan initiative as a "serious and credible proposal to provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara." It is also important for the region's residents to be able to express their views on their future, and for negotiators to take those views into account.

Mr. Speaker, after more than 35 years, it is time for all parties to negotiate in good faith to finally bring this crisis to a close. We are witnessing monumental changes in North Africa following revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. It is in the interest of the United States and the parties involved to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue, and more broadly to encourage Morocco to fully implement King Mohammed's proposed constitutional reforms and continue moving toward a more balanced governmental system that serves the many needs of all citizens of Morocco.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Saturday, March 10, 2012 9:59 AM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: FW: Follow up from AMDI

FYI

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

From: Ghita FILALI [mailto:GFilali@invest.gov.ma]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:40 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Cc: Jean AbiNader; Fatima Kurtz
Subject: Follow up from AMDI

M. Ambassador,

Thank you for meeting me a few weeks ago in Washington DC to introduce AMDI mission and objectives and lay out basis for future collaboration.

I've had successful meetings in DC thanks to the involvement of the Moroccan American Center team, and I would like to specially thank Jean and Kristin who have been amazing at putting together the program for me.

I was pleased to hear that all the institutions I met are keen to support AMDI mission.

I have since connected with Ambassador Bouhlal during his last visit to NY and explained to him our mandate as well the objectives of AMDI.

He assured me of the full support of the Embassy to work closely with our agency to promote the Invest in Morocco offer.

We will begin collaborating very soon with his team in view of the upcoming AMDI event in the US, currently scheduled in May.

Thank you again,

Ghita Filali
Rachad,

I am little disappointed we have little or no information on the visit of the FM. We are really unable to be helpful to you if we are not kept informed on events such as this. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

From: John Hamre [mailto:JHamre@csis.org]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:23 PM
To: Undisclosed recipients
Subject: Invitation: Breakfast with Moroccan Foreign Minister on March 16

Dear Colleague:

I am writing to invite you to join me at a small, off-the-record meeting on next Friday, March 16, with Morocco’s new Foreign Minister, Saadeddine El Othmani. We will meet over breakfast between 8:00-9:30am here at CSIS (1800 K Street, NW) in our 4th Floor Conference Room.

Mr. El Othmani is a member of the Justice and Development Party, an Islamist group that was in opposition for more than a decade until it won a plurality in Morocco’s election last November. This is his first visit to Washington as foreign minister. He will speak about the new government’s political platform and agenda, events in North Africa and the Middle East, and U.S.-Moroccan bilateral relations. I hope you can join me for this unique opportunity.

Please RSVP to Dan Holodnik (DHolodnik@csis.org or 202-775-3179). If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the director of our Middle East Program, Jon Alterman (JAlterman@csis.org or 202-775-3295) or to reach me directly at JHamre@csis.org or 202-775-3227.

Sincerely,

John J. Hamre
President and CEO, CSIS
FYI -- This morning, the Capitol Hill newspaper, Roll Call, published this op-ed by Rep. Steve Cohen, "Changes Offer Positive Sign for Western Sahara." Also, Capitol Words published recent Congressional Record remarks by Rep. Christopher Murphy, "Supporting Renewed Negotiations Between Morocco And The Polisario Front." Below and attached. This was timed to coincide with the UN Sahara talks, and will be widely distributed to important policy makers this week in advance of the visit of the FM to Washington. Ed


Roll Call
>
> Monday, March 12, 2012
>
> Opinion
>
> Cohen: Changes Offer Positive Sign for Western Sahara
>
> By Rep. Steve Cohen - Special to Roll Call
>
> You may wonder what these very different places on the globe have in common: Manhasset, Long Island; Vienna, Austria; and Valletta, Malta. Unfortunately, all three represent an enormous piece of diplomatic failure that now helps prolong a decades-old dispute that threatens to put a damper on the most positive outcomes from the Arab Spring while thwarting movements toward democracy, peace and economic development in a key part of the world.
>
> The Western Sahara, a piece of territory the size of Colorado, has perhaps 500,000 people within its borders living, voting and participating under Moroccan sovereignty. The area has been a source of enormous contention for decades, essentially since the Spanish pulled out in 1975. The primary parties are Morocco, the Polisario — whose members live in refugee camps in southern Algeria and number fewer than 100,000 — and the Polisario’s principal backers, Algeria.
>
> This week, the United Nations-sponsored negotiations between the parties resume in Manhasset, the ninth such session in the past several years. Chris Ross, the U.N. secretary general’s special envoy for the Western Sahara, has publicly asked for the parties to negotiate in good faith “with the help of the international community.”
>
> Interestingly, he has also asked that parties respond to concrete proposals that any party makes aimed at resolving the crisis.
>
> One party — Morocco — has put forward just such a proposal. It’s been on the table for years. The kingdom’s proposal — for autonomy for the people of the Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty — has gained the endorsement of the past three U.S. administrations — Clinton, Bush and Obama. A majority of Congress has signaled its support on more than one occasion. The previous U.N. special envoy also
called for negotiations to be conducted solely on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

Is there another serious conflict in the world where there is such overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress for a path to resolution? We think not. But during the past eight negotiating sessions, no progress has been made. There’s been no serious response by the Polisario or their Algerian backers to the Moroccan approach. No suggestions for how to amend it, shape it, even to fundamentally change it.

But this negotiating session should be different. This session should be the one that suddenly changes the equation and leads to a resolution. Of course, it will take a change in behavior by all parties, but particularly the Polisario. Why is there a chance to move rapidly forward to a settlement? Because it takes place with an entirely new political and social backdrop in North Africa.

What is this new paradigm that makes settlement of the Sahara dispute such an urgent — and achievable — priority? First, the main advocates for the Polisario are either gone or are severely weakened. Start with Moammar Gadhafi. Polisario-recruited mercenaries fought to keep him in power, but he’s gone. The new Libyan government has endorsed the Moroccan approach.

Moreover, former Polisario supporters are now backing away from them. The Polisario’s human rights record has been recently criticized by the French. The Spanish government is no longer a major backer. And the Polisario is faced with a mounting protest from within, particularly from its youth groups and their frustration over the Sahara stalemate. The recent “re-election” of the Polisario’s leader, Mohamed Abdelaziz, with 96-plus percent of the vote, seemed an anachronism, a throw-back to a period — not long ago — when elections across much of North Africa were rigged.

The many crises spawned or exacerbated by the unresolved Sahara issue — human trafficking, drug trafficking, al-Qaida recruitment — have now reached a level where the reformed, democratic governments in the region realize they must be confronted.

Lastly, Algeria is becoming increasingly isolated by its pro-Polisario position. All across North Africa, democracy and promotion of human rights are marching forward. Algeria continues to lag far behind. If the Sahara conflict is resolved, it will pave the way for a “new Algeria” joining with its neighbors, most notably Morocco, to promote social and economic integration in what promises to be a much more stable region — a dynamic one in the best sense of the word.

So we hope that the parties now sitting together in Manhasset are serious about this session being very much unlike all those others. Both parties need to be serious. But only one, thus far, has brought forward a serious proposal aimed at a resolution. At the very least, those who oppose it need to explain why and present a workable alternative.

Congressional Record
112th Congress (2011-2012)
Extensions of Remarks
Thursday, March 8, 2012 - Volume 158, Number 38, Pages E354
Supporting Renewed Negotiations Between Morocco And The Polisario Front
by Rep. Christopher S. Murphy (D-CT)
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the renewal of negotiations between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front.
The Western Sahara region has been disputed territory since the Spanish withdrew in 1975. It is claimed by Morocco and the Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the Western Sahara.
Morocco and the Polisario began direct negotiations in 2007, under the auspices of the United Nations. The next round of negotiations begins on Monday, and I hope that a solution will finally be agreed to during the new talks in Manhasset, NY. The people who live in the Western Sahara have suffered as a result of the region's status being in limbo, and they deserve for this longstanding dispute to be resolved.
Morocco has a compromise proposal on the table: democratic autonomy for the region under Moroccan sovereignty. I believe this is a reasonable offer and can serve as a basis for negotiations. Undersecretary of State William Burns previously described the Moroccan initiative as a "serious and credible proposal to provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara." It is also important for the region's residents to be able to express their views on their future, and for negotiators to take those views into account.
Mr. Speaker, after more than 35 years, it is time for all parties to negotiate in good faith to finally bring this crisis to a close. We are witnessing monumental changes in North Africa following revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. It is in the interest of the United States and the parties involved to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue, and more broadly to encourage Morocco to fully implement King Mohammed's proposed constitutional reforms and continue moving toward a more balanced governmental system that serves the many needs of all citizens of Morocco.
Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Opinion

Cohen: Changes Offer Positive Sign for Western Sahara

By Rep. Steve Cohen - Special to Roll Call

You may wonder what these very different places on the globe have in common: Manhasset, Long Island; Vienna, Austria; and Valletta, Malta. Unfortunately, all three represent an enormous piece of diplomatic failure that now helps prolong a decades-old dispute that threatens to put a damper on the most positive outcomes from the Arab Spring while thwarting movements toward democracy, peace and economic development in a key part of the world.

The Western Sahara, a piece of territory the size of Colorado, has perhaps 500,000 people within its borders living, voting and participating under Moroccan sovereignty. The area has been a source of enormous contention for decades, essentially since the Spanish pulled out in 1975. The primary parties are Morocco, the Polisario — whose members live in refugee camps in southern Algeria and number fewer than 100,000 — and the Polisario’s principal backers, Algeria.

This week, the United Nations-sponsored negotiations between the parties resume in Manhasset, the ninth such session in the past several years. Chris Ross, the U.N. secretary general’s special envoy for the Western Sahara, has publicly asked for the parties to negotiate in good faith “with the help of the international community.” Interestingly, he has also asked that parties respond to concrete proposals that any party makes aimed at resolving the crisis.

One party — Morocco — has put forward just such a proposal. It’s been on the table for years. The kingdom’s proposal — for autonomy for the people of the Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty — has gained the endorsement of the past three U.S. administrations — Clinton, Bush and Obama. A majority of Congress has signaled its support on more than one occasion. The previous U.N. special envoy also called for negotiations to be conducted solely on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

Is there another serious conflict in the world where there is such overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress for a path to resolution? We think not. But during the past eight negotiating sessions, no progress has been made. There’s been no serious response by the Polisario or their Algerian backers to the Moroccan approach. No suggestions for how to amend it, shape it, even to fundamentally change it.

But this negotiating session should be different. This session should be the one that suddenly changes the equation and leads to a resolution. Of course, it will take a change in behavior by all parties, but particularly the Polisario. Why is there a chance to move rapidly forward to a settlement? Because it takes place with an entirely new political and social backdrop in North Africa.

What is this new paradigm that makes settlement of the Sahara dispute such an urgent — and achievable — priority? First, the main advocates for the Polisario are either gone or are severely weakened. Start with Moammar Gadhafi. Polisario-recruited mercenaries fought to keep him in power, but he’s gone. The new Libyan government has endorsed the Moroccan approach.

Moreover, former Polisario supporters are now backing away from them. The Polisario’s human rights record has been recently criticized by the French. The Spanish government is no longer a major backer. And the Polisario is faced with a mounting protest from within, particularly from its youth groups and their frustration over the Sahara stalemate. The recent “re-election” of the Polisario’s leader, Mohamed Abdelaziz, with 96-plus percent of the vote, seemed an anachronism, a throw-back to a period — not long ago — when elections across much of North Africa were rigged.

The many crises spawned or exacerbated by the unresolved Sahara issue — human trafficking, drug trafficking, al-Qaida recruitment — have now reached a level where the reformed, democratic governments in the region realize they must be confronted.

Lastly, Algeria is becoming increasingly isolated by its pro-Polisario position. All across North Africa, democracy and promotion of human rights are marching forward. Algeria continues to lag far behind. If the Sahara conflict is resolved, it will pave the way for a “new Algeria” joining with its neighbors, most notably Morocco, to promote social and economic integration in what promises to be a much more stable region — a dynamic one in the best sense of the word.

So we hope that the parties now sitting together in Manhasset are serious about this session being very much unlike all those others. Both parties need to be serious. But only one, thus far, has brought forward a serious proposal aimed at a resolution. At the very least, those who oppose it need to explain why and present a workable alternative.

Rep. Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.) is a member of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the renewal of negotiations between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front.

The Western Sahara region has been disputed territory since the Spanish withdrew in 1975. It is claimed by Morocco and the Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the Western Sahara.

Morocco and the Polisario began direct negotiations in 2007, under the auspices of the United Nations. The next round of negotiations begins on Monday, and I hope that a solution will finally be agreed to during the new talks in Manhasset, NY. The people who live in the Western Sahara have suffered as a result of the region's status being in limbo, and they deserve for this longstanding dispute to be resolved.

Morocco has a compromise proposal on the table: democratic autonomy for the region under Moroccan sovereignty. I believe this is a reasonable offer and can serve as a basis for negotiations. Undersecretary of State William Burns previously described the Moroccan initiative as a "serious and credible proposal to provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara." It is also important for the region's residents to be able to express their views on their future, and for negotiators to take those views into account.

Mr. Speaker, after more than 35 years, it is time for all parties to negotiate in good faith to finally bring this crisis to a close. We are witnessing monumental changes in North Africa following revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. It is in the interest of the United States and the parties involved to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue, and more broadly to encourage Morocco to fully implement King Mohammed's proposed constitutional reforms and continue moving toward a more balanced governmental system that serves the many needs of all citizens of Morocco.
Sure. Will you require our help on communications for the visit of the Minister?

---

Ed,

I was looking forward to our meeting today to discuss, unfortunately, it has become impossible to keep all my meetings scheduled for today because the Minister will be arriving one day earlier than planned. Can we reschedule for Friday afternoon?

Please let me know if it is convenient for you.

Rachad
I'm sorry to have missed our meeting on Friday but I'm sure my office informed you of my absence due to unforeseen health reasons. I very much would like to meet this week at your convenience to get a read out on the meetings last week and how this affects our work plan moving forward, and will make myself available at your convenience. I fear that Monday or Tuesday may be too early for me to move around, although it's possible, but by Wednesday I'm sure to be able to meet. Thank you, Ed

Sent from my iPad
Dear Rachad,
I had an emergency - pancreatic infection - that led to a gall bladder operation. Ended up in the hospital for 5 days. I plan to start working by tomorrow and would be available at your earliest convenience to meet. We have several upcoming events I would like to discuss when you are available. Thank you for your understanding and consideration. Ed

----- Original Message -----  
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 05:33 PM
To: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Subject: Re: meeting this week

> Ed,
> 
> I hope you are feeling better and it was just a health scare and not something serious.
> 
> Fiz told Saida that the doctor told you to rest for two weeks. Please let me know if there is anything I can do.
> 
> As for the meeting, it can wait. Let's meet on the week of March 26th because my week is crazy anyway, but if I manage to move some meetings around, I will let you know.
> 
> In the meantime, get well soon.
> 
> Warm regards,
> 
> Rachad
On Mar 18, 2012, at 5:31 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

> I'm sorry to have missed our meeting on Friday but I'm sure my office informed you of my absence due to unforeseen health reasons. I very much would like to meet this week at your convenience to get a read out on the meetings last week and how this affects our work plan moving forward, and will make myself available at your convenience. I fear that Monday or Tuesday may be too early for me to move around, although it's possible, but by Wednesday I'm sure to be able to meet. Thank you, Ed
> 
> Sent from my iPad
I understand. No problem. Thx

----- Original Message -----
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 08:03 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Fwd: meeting this week

> Ed,
> >
> > Am glad you are out of the hospital and I wish you a speedy recovery.
> >
> > let me see how the week unfolds with a packed schedule and I will get back to you.
> >
> >
> > From: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com <mailto:ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com> >
> >
> > Subject: Re: meeting this week
> >
> > Date: March 19, 2012 7:43:57 AM EDT
> >
> > To: <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com <mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com> >
> >
> >
> > Dear Rachad,
> > I had an emergency- pancreatic infection- that led to a gall bladder operation. Ended up in the hospital for 5 days. I plan to start working by tomorrow and would be available at your earliest convenience to meet. We have several upcoming events I would like to discuss when you are available. Thank you for your understanding and consideration. Ed
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 05:33 PM
> > To: Edward Gabriel
> > Subject: Re: meeting this week
> >
> > Ed,
> > >
> > I hope you are feeling better and it was just a health scare and not something serious.
> > >
> > Fiz told Saida that the doctor told you to rest for two weeks. Please let me know if there is anything I can do.
> > >
> > As for the meeting, it can wait. Let's meet on the week of March 26th because my week is crazy
anyway, but if I manage to move some meetings around, I will let you know.
>
> In the meantime, get well soon.
>
> Warm regards,
>
> Rachad

On Mar 18, 2012, at 5:31 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:
>
> I'm sorry to have missed our meeting on Friday but I'm sure my office informed you of my absence due to unforeseen health reasons. I very much would like to meet this week at your convenience to get a read out on the meetings last week and how this affects our work plan moving forward, and will make myself available at your convenience. I fear that Monday or Tuesday may be too early for me to move around, although it's possible, but by Wednesday I'm sure to be able to meet. Thank you, Ed
I will come to you at 4pm tomorrow, not a problem. Thank you. Ed

-----Original Message-----
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2012 3:13 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Our meeting

> Ed,
> > I hope you are feeling better.
> > I managed to free my schedule tomorrow afternoon, so we can meet either at 4 or 5.
> > If you are unable to make the trip all the way to the embassy, I can meet you somewhere else closer to you.
> > Take care,
> Rachad
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2012 3:39 PM
To: Rachad Bouhlal
Subject: RE: Our meeting

Thank you

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2012 3:32 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Our meeting

> 
> > Great, see you then.
As you may have seen in the media this morning, an attempted coup is under way in Mali, following a mutiny by troops stationed in the north of the country, where a Touareg revolt has been raging since the beginning of the year.

The following report, received shortly before the outbreak of the mutiny/coup d'Etat, may be relevant:

A Saharawi NGO activist based in Oran, NW Algeria, states that the Algerian army has introduced new security measures in SW Algeria, as of the end of February, aimed at preventing all movement by nomadic groups between Algeria, Mauritania and northern Mali. Saharawi refugees from the Tindouf camps can no longer travel as they please beyond the perimeter of the camps. Permits issued by the Saharawi authorities, which were hitherto commonly used by camp residents for travel, in particular to Mauritania, no longer suffice for refugees who wish to travel outside the camps. Refugees who wish to go out of the camps for whatever reason now need a permit to travel on Algerian territory.

According to an Algiers-based Saharawi journalist, the Algerian authorities have have informed the SADR/Polisario via PM Abdelkader Taleb Oumar that Algiers is willing to provide all possible assistance to facilitate family visits between the Tindouf camps and the territories administered by Morocco.

END
Rachad,

Let me ask you if a lunch at the Embassy might not be more appropriate than a dinner for the consultants? Given the schedules of the consultants and other considerations (including travel from NY for at least one person), I think a luncheon is more appropriate. However, if you feel strongly, then we can certainly arrange the dinner. As soon as I hear from you I will work with Sandrine on a date. Thanks
The most convenient would be a lunch for sure. I am estimating 9-10 on our side, including Mac staff. Is that too much to handle at the Embassy?

Hi Ed,

I Hope you feel well.

A lunch at the Embassy would be fine, but the number of guests would be limited. I thought that a dinner would be more convenient but a lunch at the residence is also an option.

Best,

Rachad

Rachad, 
Let me ask you if a lunch at the Embassy might not be more appropriate than a dinner for the consultants? Given the schedules of the consultants and other considerations (including travel from NY for at least one person), I think a luncheon is more appropriate. However, if you feel strongly, then we can certainly arrange the dinner. As soon as I hear from you I will work with Sandrine on a date. Thanks
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Saturday, March 24, 2012 2:44 PM
To: Rachad Bouhlal
Subject: RE: Projet de reponse a Ed/consultant meeting

Ok thanks

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 24, 2012 12:59 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Fwd: Projet de reponse a Ed/consultant meeting

ED
Let me check if we can make it.

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Subject: RE: Projet de reponse a Ed/consultant meeting
Date: March 24, 2012 11:25:13 AM EDT
To: "Rachad Bouhlal" <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com>

The most convenient would be a lunch for sure. I am estimating 9-10 on our side, including Mac staff. Is that too much to handle at the Embassy?

Hi Ed,

I Hope you feel well.
A lunch at the Embassy would be fine, but the number of guests would be limited. I thought that a dinner would be more convenient but a lunch at the residence is also an option.

Best,

Rachad

From: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Subject: consultant meeting
Date: March 23, 2012 9:35:27 AM EDT
To: <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com>

Rachad,
Let me ask you if a lunch at the Embassy might not be more appropriate than a dinner for the consultants? Given the schedules of the consultants and other considerations (including travel from NY for at least one person), I think a luncheon is more appropriate. However, if you feel strongly, then we can certainly arrange the dinner. As soon as I hear from you I will work with Sandrine on a date. Thanks

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
In that case we'll go back to the residence for dinner. Thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 26, 2012 12:31 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Meeting the consultants

Ed,

I hope you are feeling much better.

Concerning my meeting with the consultants, the embassy's meeting-dining room, as you know, can't accommodate everyone, so a casual dinner or lunch at the residence would be better.

Let's agree on a date that is convenient for all.

Thank you,

Rachad
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Monday, March 26, 2012 4:16 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Cc: Robert M. Holley
Subject: Strategic dialogue material/very interesting and important
Attachments: Draft Morocco - US Strategic Partnership VT.doc; SceneSetterforTFFJulyVisit6July11JA.doc

Ambassador,

I hope you find the two attachments helpful when thinking about a strategic dialogue. The first document is what Morocco’s MFA proposed to the State Department in March 2011, following a working session together. The second document is a scene setter written for Taieb in preparation for a later visit with Secretary Clinton, and/or Bill Burns. In that scene setter you will find our take on the structure and importance of a strategic dialogue/commission. I’ve highlighted the strategic dialogue section in yellow, however, I suggest you read the entire paper as it is somewhat instructive on how we worked with the Embassy in the past. Thank you, Ed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morocco / United States Strategic Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned actions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- High-level political dialogue:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to meet once a year in Washington or in Rabat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Share assessment and analysis on:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional issues such as African affairs, Middle East Peace Process, Maghreb, Sahel-Saharan Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Peacekeeping, Terrorism, Environment and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Morocco/US cooperation in the Maghreb:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishment of a Center Institute in Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training center for Governments officials, NGOs, community leaders, youth, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Morocco provides experts and advisors on developing civil society and political cooperation (regional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human rights dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Extension of the Human Rights dialogue and extending it to thematic meetings on Press freedom, civil society, freedom of speech, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strengthening of the existing Human Rights dialogue and exchanging best practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coordination actions at the UN and other international forums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Case 2:16-cr-00365   Document 212-4   Filed 06/02/19   Page 306 of 1649 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific and Cultural cooperation</th>
<th>Economic and trade cooperation</th>
<th>Security cooperation</th>
<th>Military cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of “Excellence centers” in the field of public health, on the basis of the existing health centers and in cooperation with counterparts in the US</td>
<td>Strengthened cooperation on agriculture and renewable energies.</td>
<td>Establishment of a bilateral security committee addressing a wide range of issues, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and human trafficking (3 reports of the State Department)</td>
<td>Morocco to join the Global Counter Terrorism Forum to be officially launched in September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a US/Morocco Business Council:</td>
<td>- Composed of private sector representatives from both countries</td>
<td>- That issues recommendation for an enhanced cooperation in the field and a better implementation of the FTA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco to host the US Conference on Science, Technology and Innovation (Cairo initiative), to be held in June 2011.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Dialogue on crisis management / resolution in Africa.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco/US cooperation in Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | | | - Regional scientific cooperation. Morocco to host the US Conference on Science, Technology and Innovation (Cairo initiative), to be held in June 2011.
<p>| | | | - Military cooperation towards African countries: |
| | | | - Cooperation in the fields of agriculture, water, health and environment. |
| | | | - Morrocco to join the Global Counter Terrorism Forum to be officially launched in September 2011 |
| | | | - Strengthened cooperation on agriculture and renewable energies. |
| | | | - Establish the US/Morocco Business Council: |
| | | | - Composed of private sector representatives from both countries |
| | | | - Cooperation in the fields of agriculture, water, health and environment. |
| | | | - Dialogue on crisis management / resolution in Africa. |
| | | | Morocco/US cooperation in Africa. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint initiatives aiming at the promotion of tolerance, religious dialogue and the fight against racism and antisemitism.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the learning of English language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of beneficiaries of Fulbright scholarships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensifying the exchange programs for scholars, students, artists, and scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2:16-cr-00365 Document 212-4 Filed 06/02/19 Page 308 of 1649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scene Setter – Your Senior Meeting at the State Department

Recent Background:

Reforms -- Your trip to Washington comes on the heels of the successful constitutional reform vote that has received a great deal of attention in the English language press, both online and in hard copy. Most of the coverage has been positive and complimentary of Morocco. That has been especially true when the articles have carried bylines of US journalists. They often contrast Morocco’s achievement with the continuing turmoil and repression elsewhere in the region. Positive commentary has largely pointed to the important ceding of significant executive authorities to the elected head of government, the independence of the judiciary, greater rights for the Amazigh, the strengthening of human rights and gender protections, and the devolution of power to local elected leaders. By and large, the editorial line has been that these are very important steps forward in the democratic evolution of Morocco and an example to the region.

However, the coverage has not been uniformly congratulatory. Local Moroccan and other Middle East based Arab stringers for major US and other English language media outlets (especially their online editions and especially the British press) continue to provide a critical platform for clearly minor political actors in Morocco and have put the emphasis on a skeptical editorial point of view, even embedded in hard news coverage. Little or no attempt is made to define these critical voices as representing a small minority. Rather, these articles continue to allow radical Islamist views and those of the far left to fly under the false flag of the February 20 “democratic youth movement.” A few more analytical pieces have pointed out this fallacy, but the viewpoint continues albeit less than the positive press overall.

We believe we are winning the opinion war in the media, but it requires constant and unrelenting attention. We believe that more outreach to the US media is in order. This is where Congress and other opinion leaders get their information and we need to do whatever we can to ensure that a positive story line dominates the coverage.

Sahara -- Your trip also comes on the heels of another process rich, but content poor, meeting of Chris Ross’s periodic UN gathering on the Sahara. We have been disappointed that statements on this issue subsequent to your last visit to Washington seem once again to have fallen back into the hands of State’s bureaucracy. It is interesting to note that in a briefing with academics traveling to Morocco - following a presentation by the Moroccan desk officer - we inquired as to the position offered by her on the WS. The academics were told that the US policy, according to the Desk Officer, favors a sovereignty/autonomy solution. This is the first and only sign that we have seen a public acknowledgement of the US policy on the Sahara, other than from Hillary Clinton or Bill Burns. This does not however alter the concern we have regarding the view that the NEA is resistant to making clear statements on a Sahara policy.

We were especially surprised by a recent article in Al Jazeera’s English language online edition by Jeremy Keenan from the University of London which took a very critical view of the US “turning a blind eye” to Algerian support for Gaddafi’s regime, calling AFRICOM commander Carter Ham the “one-eyed
general.” The article offered very specific and damning evidence of this support and appeared to have likely been well informed by either French or British intelligence and military sources (or both). If this article is accurate, and the verifiable information it cites certainly seems credible, its most damning charge was that the US has conspired with the British and French to cut a deal with Algeria to let Bouteflika off the hook in public if he would agree to cease support for Gaddafi. This has clearly and seriously undercut our efforts to tar the Polisario with sending fighters to Libya. Politics are what they are, and international politics more so, but this shines a new light on why the US was so put out and harshly and personally critical of our effort in MACP to bash Algeria and the Polisario for their support to Gaddafi. This argument was carrying great weight in undercutting the Polisario in Congress and among some media and opinion leaders. We were drawing unwanted and too visible public attention to this problem while they were working behind the scenes to back the Algerians off its support for Gaddafi’s regime. In our view, the State Department should not have the option of pursuing this policy with Algeria without attention to the impact on Moroccan interests in the region.

Furthermore, we are in receipt of intelligence information that points to the proposition that activity by and support for the Polisario in Europe is on the increase, and they have made inroads in the UK, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries. With the upcoming elections in Spain, the report we received also underscores the possibility of electing a Conservative government that will be hostile to Moroccan policy. These developments will only complicate US positions in the Security Council and in Washington.

Goals for Your Visit:

- Obtain a senior level public announcement of a bilateral US/Moroccan commission to cooperate on issues of common bilateral as well as regional concern on both strategic security and political developments and in the MENA and West African regions.
- Obtain a fresh and unequivocal senior level statement on Sahara that repeats the “serious, credible and realistic” phrase and also incorporates an element stressing the urgency of solving this problem and urges the need for compromise based on “realistic” terms.
- Make sure that the Sahara issue has its own committee or special status within the commission. We believe that for the remainder of the Obama Administration, no further progress will be made on the Sahara issues unless it is part of a regularized commission discussion. Otherwise it will become a struggle just to keep the issue where it is.

We have not been privy to all of the various diplomatic exchanges that have taken place since your last visit to Washington, but our read on the situation at State today, from what we discern from watching their statements and reports in the news, is that little has changed within the bureaucracy since you were last here. Clear statements on the Sahara issue are void in their discourse. State’s behavior in the General Ham affair leads us to conclude that some there still believe they can get away with “improving” relations with Algeria at Morocco’s expense, although State may not characterize it that way. And State’s less than fully enthusiastic and unequivocal endorsement of the run up and the results of the reform vote all leave us with the view that the NEA has not yet been persuaded that they need to take Morocco’s interests more seriously. Like Ambassador Mekouar, we were astonished and taken back at how little State seemed to understand about what was happening on the ground in Morocco in the
run up to the vote. Janet Sanderson’s charges of “rubber bullets and tear gas” and “we’re watching you” approach on the issue was not just out of place, it represented a serious, indeed almost willful, misreading of events on the ground.

In our continuing view, this kind of “dug in” resistance within the State bureaucracy can only be overcome by more frequent high level contact that lifts and regularizes the level of the dialogue to more senior levels and thus bears better prospect of reining in those within NEA (and elsewhere in State) who give every indication that they are still working a different agenda than the Secretary and her Deputy would prefer for Morocco.

**Sahara Statement**

The timing for such a statement is perfect following another process filled attempt by Chris Ross. The arguments in favor of such a statement remain the same. We think it more than appropriate to draw attention to the fact that since your visit and the Secretary’s statement, State has consistently failed to repeat the agreed language. Instead, returning to the same formula you noted was unsatisfactory for Morocco on your last visit. *This should also provide the opportunity to leverage that failure into a further demand that the statement include the two additional elements we noted above – urgency and the need for compromise based on realistic terms.*

**Bilateral Commission**

Unless some in-depth preparations have taken place already of which we are unaware, we are highly skeptical that U/S Burns and/or Secretary Clinton will be prepared on this visit to do more than agree a statement that formally establishes a Commission and states its purpose in general terms. It would be a plus, but might be very difficult without prior in-depth preparations, to have included in such a statement any description of its modalities (working groups are our recommendation) and periodicity (quarterly at the working level and annually at senior level – our counsel). We think it should be possible to define the categories in broad terms in a statement at this point such as “US/Moroccan bilateral relations, and security, social, economic and political development issues in the North and West Africa and the Middle East regions.” This is broad enough to allow discussion of what you want to include in specific categories.

Our advice is to concentrate first and foremost on agreeing to the language of the statement establishing the Commission and then concentrate on agreeing to what the content should be in terms of general issues to be covered, basic modalities of how it would function, and the meeting schedules. This would be a tremendous achievement in itself if all of this can be accomplished on this visit. In our view, trying to accomplish too much at such a senior level in one meeting without in-depth prior preparation risks putting the enterprise in jeopardy. It bears recalling that there is now little interest in this proposal below the Secretary and U/S Burns. The priority is to get something concrete established that will present the bureaucracy with something of a fait accompli so that they will then have to produce results for submission to more senior levels. You could also announce the appointment of a dual secretariat to oversee the commission on a daily working basis, If you can reach such agreement by the time of the meeting. In other words, each country would appoint a principal person to oversee the
work of the committees of the commission. These two individuals would become the overall coordinators for the effort and could be announced at the time of the Burns meeting.

In any case, we suggest that you propose a senior level group to meet in the immediate future (we would suggest in Rabat) to conclude details on a formal statement of purpose and scope for the Commission once the language and statement to establish the Commission has been agreed and announced in Washington at a senior level on this visit.

For such a statement establishing the commission, and if discussions proceed to that depth during your visit, we suggest that the “charter” for the commission begin with a preamble that recalls the strong and historic character of US/Moroccan relations and emphasize our common commitment to a set of shared political and social values based on democratic process, respect for human rights, minority and gender equality, justice before the law, and respect for international agreements in the resolution of regional disputes.

In terms of establishing categories for working groups, we think that the more simply it is presented, the better the chance of its being accepted. We would suggest that you propose only two broad categories at the outset. One working group would work on bilateral issues between the US and Morocco. This group could cover the full range of issues from human rights to economic assistance. It clearly would be managed within State at the Office Director level through periodic interagency meetings to work on issues that are commonly agreed as requiring priority attention.

The second group should focus on regional security, political, and social development issues. This is where US/Moroccan cooperation on political development in the MENA and West Africa region would be coordinated. It is also where Sahara would be discussed. At State, this second group would also likely fall to the Office Director to manage. The inclination will be to keep the workload down and not get overly ambitious lest the process fall victim to overwork. This is why we suggest keeping it to two groups and tightly defining priorities in each group. But we believe the Sahara should be a visible and important part of any committee structure, whether as a stand-alone committee or as part of a larger “regional” committee.

Separate committees under each broad category can be defined at a later time, or evolve from the first meeting and prior to a working group meeting in Rabat. In any case, the WS will need its own concentrated effort at the Fassi Fihri - Burns/Feltman level, and should be agreed upon as an issue that will be regularly discussed with specific action agenda items attached to the effort. We see this as the only way to keep the Sahara dialogue on a progressive track and potentially become an ingrained issue to be dealt with by this Administration and potentially future Administrations.
Let me know if you would like to solicit our advice or help. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

To ensure receipt of our email, please add middleeastprogram@csis.org to your address book.

While revolutionary change has brought Islamists to rule in several Middle Eastern countries, it was evolutionary change that brought Islamists into government in Morocco after more than a decade in opposition. The country's own future trajectory and its inspirational power for other religious opposition movements in the Middle East remain the subjects of considerable debate.

To examine these issues, the CSIS Middle East Program invites you to a roundtable luncheon entitled:

Morocco: The Challenges of Democratic Reform

with

Mr. Mustapha Khalfi
Minister of Communications, Government of Morocco

Wednesday, April 4, 2012
Mustapha Khalfi is the Minister of Communications of the government of Morocco, a portfolio which he has held since early 2012. He is also a member of the ruling Justice and Development Party, and a long-time Islamist political activist. Prior to assuming his new role in the government Mr. Khalfi was Editor-in-Chief of the PJD’s Arabic daily newspaper Attajdid and founded the Moroccan Center for Studies and Contemporary Research in 2009. In 2007, he was a Fulbright/American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow and a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Throughout his career, Mr. Khalfi has published over 200 articles and reports for numerous newspapers and journals. He earned degrees in Physics and Mathematical Sciences from the College of Sciences in Kenitra, Morocco, as well as degrees in Islamic Studies and Political Science from Ibn Tofail University and Mohammed V University at Agdal.

To RSVP, please email middleeastprogram@csis.org
Please see attached. If you require additional information we would be happy to provide it.  Ed
Independent Diplomat

Brief Overview

Following reception of the memo on Independent Diplomat’s activism at the UN dated 8 March 2012, we thought it relevant to provide this short preview of this pro-Polisario lobbyist’s activities in the United States. You will find below information on its employees (past and present), activities (2009-2011), funding, as well as its meetings. The latter are of particular interest as they show access to Congress and various US government agencies, as well as at the UN. It is important to keep in mind that ID also has a presence in Europe (London).

Employees who work on SADR Dossier

Current:
Dean Bialek
Susan P. Emmet
Christina Kiel
Andrew Graham Lewis
Scott Phillip Sheeran
Carne Ross, Executive Director

Former:
Soren Jessen-Peterson (Terminated 15 July 2010)
Karine Lepillez (Terminated 19 January, 2011)
Jennifer Anne Lake, Corporate secretary
Leanne Smith (Terminated 15 June 2010)
Thomas J. Miller (Terminated 15 June 2012)

Independent Diplomat’s Activities

Staff members from both ID Ltd., and ID Inc., (ID’s sister organization in the United Kingdom) provide advice and support to the SADR and assist them in devising diplomatic strategy to achieve their goals. ID analyzes the SADR’s current diplomatic situation by canvassing views of US government, the UN Security Council, and the European Union. ID staff members provide assistance to the SADR on diplomatic communications—letters to the UN Security Council, for example—preparation for international visits and meetings, and drafting speeches.

Solicitation of the views of US government involves meetings with key officials and desk officers in the State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies to gather their views. ID informs SADR of this information and, on that basis, advises how best to tailor an approach to US government.

During meetings, representatives of ID discuss US policies and matters of importance to the SADR and distribute various press releases and “media backgrounders.” Meetings with US officials have a two-fold purpose: One, to discuss and understand US policies affecting the SADR, and two, to brief these officials on initiatives the SADR has undertaken with ID’s assistance. On Western Sahara, meetings with State Department and NSC officials focused on the regional political context of the dispute and the human rights situation in the territory.
Documents filed by ID with FARA indicate that only a small percentage of services performed for the SADR is work covered by FARA.

**Funding**

All funding for work in the US on behalf of the SADR comes from either the SADR or the Polisario:
- 5/12/09: Received contract fees of $6000 from POLISARIO
- 11/2/09: Received contract fees of $5,975 from SADR
- 9/6/10: Received contract fees of $10,458 from SADR
- 1/6/11: Received $10,000 from SADR

Other sources of general funding for Independent Diplomat as noted on its website include:

**Foundations:**
- ACE Rule of Law Fund
- David & Elaine Potter Charitable Foundation
- Gladys Krieble Delmas Foundation
- Humanity United
- Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust
- Mertz Gilmore Foundation
- National Endowment for Democracy
- Oak Foundation
- Open Society Institute
- Sigrid Rausing Trust
- TckTckTck Campaign
- Winston Foundation

**Governments:**
- The Government of Finland
- The Government of Liechtenstein
- The Government of Norway
- The Government of Switzerland

ID also gets pro bono assistance from the following *law firms*:
- Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
- Hogan Lovells LLP
- Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
- White & Case LLP

**Contact (meetings, phone calls)**

**Congress:**
- Perry Cammack, Staffer, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- 5/21/10 (Meeting also attended by Daniel Benaim, Staffer, Senate Foreign Relations Committee)
- Donald Payne, NJ Congressman and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
- 11/06/09
- Joel Starr, Staffer, Office of Senator Inhofe
- 2/19/10
Department of Defense:
Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa in the Office of Secretary of Defense
4/26/10; 8/27/10

Department of State:
Jeff Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs
4/6/10
Elisabeth Hopkins, Director of Assistance to Asia and the Near East in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
4/23/09
Randall Kaailau, Morocco Desk Officer
3/30/09
Margaret Nardi, Deputy Director/Director of the Office of Maghreb Affairs
3/30/09; 5/6/10; 10/21/09
Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
2/11/10; 5/3/10 (Meeting also attended by Deborah Graze, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary DHRL, and Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Deputy Assistant DHRL)
9/26/11
Janet Sanderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs
3/30/10; 9/15/10
Barbara Masilko, Senior Staff, NEA 3/15/10

National Security Council:
Sergio Aguirre, Director for North Africa, National Security Council
10/21/09; 1/19/2010; 2/12/10; 5/21/10; 1/19/12

United Nations:
Elizabeth Cousens, Principal Advisor to the US Ambassador to the UN, US Mission to the UN
2/3/09
1/23/09, 3/1/09, 10/5/2011
Michael Gordon, US Mission to UN
4/29/09
Barbara Masilko, US Mission to UN
3/15/10
Rachad,

Attached is a memo sent to you on February 17th regarding a proposal to address the double taxation question with regard to social security taxes between our two countries. Included in this analysis is a list of countries that have totalization agreements with the US and the ones Morocco has with other countries. There is a growing list of US companies that view this issue as an impediment to their decision to send US employees to Morocco to work on projects in Morocco. Do you have any interest to pursue this further with US companies and if so, could you give us an idea of whether there is an interest in Morocco to pursue an agreement with the US? There are several US companies waiting to make corporate joint venture decisions with Moroccan companies and any signal I could pass on from you would be appreciated. Thank you for your time and consideration of this request and sorry I forgot to bring it up last week when we were together. Ed
17 February 2012

Memorandum

TO: H.E. Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal
From: Ed Gabriel
RE: Eliminating Duplicate Social Security Payments

Mr. Ambassador

This document provides the background on the need to promote the adoption of a “totalization” agreement between Morocco and the US in order to eliminate duplicate social security payments for US employees residing in Morocco for more than six months.

I have also attached a copy of the Social Security Administrations (SSA) Totalization Agreement with Spain which clarifies what type of clauses are included in such agreements.

I appreciate your attention to this concern and look forward to discussing it in detail with you.

Regards,

Ed
PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF THE:
Morocco US Totalization Alliance (MUSTA)
To eliminate duplicate social security payments

Overview

With increased prospects for a greater number of US citizens working in the
Kingdom of Morocco, US employers with operations in Morocco, whether corporate
or NGO, have expressed increased concern with regard to ensuring that the tax
consequences for the employer and employees are dealt with equitably. Morocco
has a tax agreement with the United States (Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income – signed in Rabat 1 August 1977, and Related Exchanges of Notes), but it
does not apply to the estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes, the
Windfall Profits Tax, Federal unemployment taxes, social security taxes, or excise
taxes on premiums paid to foreign insurers. Therefore, US expatriates must
conform to Moroccan social security laws and US employers are required to register
their employees with the Caisse National de Securite Sociale (CNSS) and pay social
security taxes on the basis of an employee’s gross salary and other benefits
granted to the employees.

To alleviate this double taxation in other cases, the US Social Security
Administration (SSA) has signed treaties, often referred to as Totalization
Agreements, with government social insurance programs in various foreign
countries. These treaties serve two main functions: 1) they eliminate dual Social
Security taxation, so that workers from one country working in another country will
not have to pay Social Security taxes to both countries on the same earnings; and
2) they help fill gaps in benefit protection for workers who have divided their
careers between the United States and another country by providing continuity in
their social security payments.

Since a bi-lateral social security agreement/convention does not currently exist
between the US and Morocco, it is necessary to initiate an effort to promote the
mutual adoption of such an agreement at the earliest possible opportunity.

Morocco-US Social Security Issue

It is mandatory for all employers to participate in the Caisse National de Securite
Sociale (CNSS) and they are responsible for enrolling all employees in the program
Expatriate employees are considered part of the Moroccan workforce—they
participate fully in social security and are afforded the same benefits as Moroccans.

Employers contribute approximately 6% of the company payroll to social security,
while employees’ contributions are about 3% of earnings. This amount is
automatically deducted from an employee’s pay so no further action is needed by
the employee to contribute.
**Existing US treaties/agreements**
Per the SSA website, the following countries have signed totalization agreements with the SSA ¹:

- Italy (November 1, 1978)
- Germany (December 1, 1979)
- Switzerland (November 1, 1980)
- Belgium (July 1, 1984)
- Norway (July 1, 1984)
- Canada (August 1, 1984)
- United Kingdom (January 1, 1985)
- Sweden (January 1, 1987)
- Spain (April 1, 1988)
- France (July 1, 1988)
- Portugal (August 1, 1989)
- Netherlands (November 1, 1990)
- Austria (November 1, 1991)
- Finland (November 1, 1992)
- Ireland (September 1, 1993)
- Luxembourg (November 1, 1993)
- Greece (September 1, 1994)
- South Korea (April 1, 2001)
- Chile (December 1, 2001)
- Australia (October 1, 2002)
- Japan (October 1, 2005)
- Denmark (October 1, 2008)
- Czech Republic (January 1, 2009)
- Poland (March 1, 2009)
- Mexico (Signed on June 29, 2004, but not yet in effect)

**Existing Moroccan treaties/agreements**
The Moroccan government has signed 18 bilateral conventions on Social Security payments per the CNSS website. Others are in the process of negotiation:

- France (July 9, 1965)
- Belgium (June 24, 1968)
- The Netherlands (February 14, 1972)
- Spain (November 8, 1979)
- Sweden (January 4, 1980)
- Germany (March 25, 1981)
- Denmark (April 24, 1982)
- Romania (July 27, 1983)
- Libya (August 4, 1983)
- Tunisia (February 5, 1987)

¹ To view all if the agreements in detail visit [http://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html](http://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html)
11. Canada (July 1, 1998)
12. Portugal (November 14, 1998)

*Conventions signed for ratification (06):*
1. Algeria (February 23, 1991)
2. U.M.A (March 10, 1991 – multilateral convention)
3. Italy (February 18, 1994)
4. Québec (May 25, 2000)
5. Egypt (May 12, 2006)
6. Luxembourg (October 2, 2006)

*Conventions in negotiation (03):*
1. Norway
2. Greece
3. Turkey

Morocco’s conventions cover the following basic principles:
- Equality of treatment between Moroccan nationals and the host countries’ nationals in terms of rights and duties relating to social security.
- Determining the needed legislation to avoid undue accumulation of social security contributions or other contributions and employee-born benefits.
- Maintaining the authority of the initially applied legislation in exceptional cases, such as maintaining affiliation if the person is working on another country’s territory.
- Retaining rights in the acquisition process for maintaining contribution, employment, and residence periods complying with one party’s legislation, and cumulating it with corresponding periods achieved with the other party, in order to 1) acquire, maintain, or regain rights and, should it occur, calculate benefits; and 2) enroll in voluntary or optional insurance.
- The transfer of acquired benefits to beneficiaries in line with one party’s legislation, regardless of their place of residence.

**Need for an US-Morocco agreement**
No exceptions to the above can be made unless an agreement is in place. For example, the “detached worker” rule (designed to minimize disruptions in the coverage careers of workers whose employers send them abroad on temporary assignment) or “seconded” expats (those workers on loan for a determined period not exceeding an authorized duration) apply only within the framework of an existing bilateral agreements on social security entered into between Morocco and the United States.

CNSS was contacted regarding this issue in December 2010, and they confirmed that no convention/agreement is in place, none is in the works, and the above rules apply to US expats with no exceptions. They expressed their frustration at this void and their strong desire to see this matter resolved between Morocco and the United States.
Ok. Thanks. It would be helpful to understand steps as we move forward so we can keep our the companies informed, and be able to provide a general understanding to them regarding progress, obstacles etc. Also, when appropriate I can have them meet with you on this subject to convey their direct interest and a sense of the problem. You also said in the email, “By the way there was no meme attached”. Do you mean the names of companies that have an interest in this subject? There are several companies/institutions which I can reveal at an appropriate time and also provide you with a list of more companies interested in joining in support. Thanks Ed

Ed,
I know the importance of this matter and I mentioned it in many of my contacts here. I have invited more than one month ago my ministry to work on a draft to propose to our american partners. I worked on models already signed with other countries. The only problem is that these kind of agreements take some time because many administrations are involved. By the way there was no meme attached.
Rachad
On Mar 27, 2012, at 2:58 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

Rachad,
Attached is a memo sent to you on February 17th regarding a proposal to address the double taxation question with regard to social security taxes between our two countries. Included in this analysis is a list of countries that have totalization agreements with the US and the ones Morocco has with other countries. There is a growing list of US companies that view this issue as an impediment to their decision to send US employees to Morocco to work on projects in Morocco. Do you have any interest to pursue this further with US companies and if so, could you give us an idea of whether there is an interest in Morocco to pursue an agreement with the US? There are several US companies waiting to make corporate joint venture decisions with Moroccan companies and any signal I could pass on from you would be appreciated. Thank you for your time and consideration of this request and sorry I forgot to bring it up last week when we were together. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 5:13 PM
To: Rachad Bouhlal
Subject: RE: Social Security taxes/totalization agreement

Oh, Well I’m not sure what happened. Let me go back. Sorry.

___________________
Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 5:08 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Re: Social Security taxes/totalization agreement

Ed,
I ment no memo attached. Rachad
On Mar 27, 2012, at 4:51 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

Ok. Thanks. It would be helpful to understand steps as we move forward so we can keep our the companies informed, and be able to provide a general understanding to them regarding progress, obstacles etc. Also, when appropriate I can have them meet with you on this subject to convey their direct interest and a sense of the problem. You also said in the email, “By the way there was no meme attached”. Do you mean the names of companies that have an interest in this subject? There are several companies/institutions which I can reveal at an appropriate time and also provide you with a list of more companies interested in joining in support. Thanks Ed

___________________
Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 4:38 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Re: Social Security taxes/totalization agreement

Ed,
I know the importance of this matter and I mentioned it in many of my contacts here. I have invited more than one month ago my ministry to work on a draft to propose to our american partners. I worked on models already signed with other countries.
The only problem is that these kind of agreements take some time because many administrations are involved.
By the way there was no meme attached.
Rachad
On Mar 27, 2012, at 2:58 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

Rachad,
Attached is a memo sent to you on February 17th regarding a proposal to address the double taxation question with regard to
social security taxes between our two countries. Included in this analysis is a list of countries that have totalization agreements with the US and the ones Morocco has with other countries. There is a growing list of US companies that view this issue as an impediment to their decision to send US employees to Morocco to work on projects in Morocco. Do you have any interest to pursue this further with US companies and if so, could you give us an idea of whether there is an interest in Morocco to pursue an agreement with the US? There are several US companies waiting to make corporate joint venture decisions with Moroccan companies and any signal I could pass on from you would be appreciated. Thank you for your time and consideration of this request and sorry I forgot to bring it up last week when we were together. Ed
It appears to be attached, but just in case, here it is again. Thanks

Rachad,

Attached is a memo sent to you on February 17th regarding a proposal to address the double taxation question with regard to social security taxes between our two countries. Included in this analysis is a list of countries that have totalization agreements with the US and the ones Morocco has with other countries. There is a growing list of US companies that view this issue as an impediment to their decision to send US employees to Morocco to work on projects in Morocco. Do you have any interest to pursue this further with US companies and if so, could you give us an idea of whether there is an interest in Morocco to pursue an agreement with the US? There are several US companies waiting to make corporate joint venture decisions with Moroccan companies and any signal I could pass on from you would be appreciated. Thank you for your time and consideration of this request and sorry I forgot to bring it up last week when we were together. Ed
Rachad,
Attached is our compilation of ideas for your communications rollout. I’d be happy to review this with you next week at your convenience and will call your office once you give me the go ahead to meet. Thank you, Ed
MEMORANDUM

TO: Jordan Paul
CC: Garth Neuffer, Naomi Decter
FROM: Calvin Dark
SUBJECT: Communications Plan for Ambassador Bouhlal Rollout
DATE: 3/11/2019

As Morocco seeks to increase support among US media, policymakers and think-tank leaders, the arrival of Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal provides a wonderful opportunity to introduce the Ambassador to the US and communicate Morocco’s positive messages. The MAC Communications Team would like to propose the following activities as a roll-out for the Ambassador in the US over the coming weeks (all, ideally, to be concluded before the beginning of summer vacations in July.)

Media Luncheon with the Ambassador

The Comm. Team proposes to work with the Embassy to organize a media luncheon at the Embassy with the Ambassador and a small group of select reporters to introduce himself as Morocco’s new Ambassador and for a briefing on US-Moroccan relations, including highlighting the importance of targeting US support for the refugee camps and full implementation of the recent Appropriations language. The proposed journalists include:

1) Jennifer Rubin (Washington Post, “Right Turn”) – Jennifer Rubin is very interested in Morocco, understands and supports our messaging, particularly with regards to the Western Sahara, the Polisario and terrorism. Rubin has written several times on key issues concerning our campaigns and maintain and strengthening this relationship will be very beneficial in the future.

2) Massoud Hayoun (The Atlantic) – Massoud Hayoun writes often about the Arab Spring and has written about Morocco’s experience, as it relates to ethnic identity and protection of ethnic minorities. His publication is well-known and well-respected—particularly among the Left—and educating Hayoun/strengthening that relationship will encourage him to explore and write further on Morocco and topics related to our campaigns.

3) Lee Smith (The Weekly Standard) -- Lee Smith is Weekly Standard Senior Editor and author of the respected book on the Middle East, "The Strong Horse." He has reported extensively on the Middle East/Arab Spring and has written favorably several times about Morocco -- about human rights, Western Sahara and the king's March 9, 2011 speech on Constitutional reform.

4) Oren Dorell (USA Today) -- Oren Dorrel, a foreign affairs reporter for USA Today, writes about society and warfare in the Middle East, from Morocco to Pakistan. He has written favorably about the recent Constitutional reforms and referendum.
5) **Eli Lake** (Newsweek/The Daily Beast) -- Eli Lake, Senior National Security correspondent for Newsweek/The Daily Beast, writes extensively about security ramifications for US policy of developments in MENA.

6) **Jackson Diehl** (Washington Post) -- Jackson Diehl is an influential foreign affairs columnist for the Washington Post.

7) **Robert Kagan** (Brookings Institution) -- Robert Kagan, senior fellow at Brookings is historian, author and foreign policy commentator, who is very interested in Morocco. His latest book (2012), *The World America Made*, has won broad acclaim and was mentioned in President Obama's most recent state of the union address.

**Editorial Board Meetings**

The Comm. Team proposes meetings for the Ambassador at the major newspaper editorial boards in DC and NYC to introduce himself and educate editorialists on Morocco-US relations, democratic reforms, appropriations language and efforts to peacefully resolve the Western Sahara conflict. The proposed editorial boards include:

1) Wall Street Journal
2) New York Times
3) Washington Post

**Think Tank Roundtable (Public)**

Ambassador Bouhlal has met off-the-record with policymakers at the Council on Foreign Relations. Given the influence of think tanks in Washington, DC, the Comm. Team proposes an additional, public “conversation-style” roundtable with the Ambassador and a moderator to discuss previously agreed upon topics, followed by a Q&A portion with the audience. Invited guests would include policymakers (from the Hill and Admin) and targeted journalists. Possible locations for this roundtable would be CSIS, Brookings and The German Marshall Fund.

**Website “Feature” Section**

Our website statistics and analysis of web search results indicates that there are many people searching for information about Ambassador Bouhlal. (A Google search for “morocco ambassador bouhlal” yields the current posting on the MoroccoOnTheMove website about Ambassador Bouhlal’s event in Utah as the second result. Also, the most viewed post on the MOTM website over the last 30 days was “Morocco’s New Ambassador to the United States – Mohamed Rachad Bouhlal.”) Because the Embassy website is under construction, and to take advantage of the reach of the MoroccoOnTheMove website, the Comm Team proposes to use the “Features” section of MOTM not only to provide a photo, bio and contact information for the Ambassador, but also to highlight other public activities he participates in. (Note that after only four months on line, the website has had over 20,000 hits.) In addition, the current NPR sponsor tags refer to the MOTM website, so that these “Features” postings would increase the Ambassador’s exposure as he conducts introductory meetings over the coming months.
Attached is the latest MACP paper on the Polisario, which will be used as a handout and on our website. The new website has now surpassed 20,000 hits in four months. Thank you, Ed
The case for redirecting US aid for the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, which are becoming a recruiting ground for AQIM, arms and drug traffickers

Evidence continues to grow that members of the Polisario Front have been engaged in drug and arms smuggling in the Sahel, gun battles and incursions in Mali, kidnappings and collaboration with AQIM, and as mercenaries for Qaddafi in Libya. Given escalating security concerns in the region, rather than subsidize the camps, which are becoming a recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers, US assistance should be redirected to promote durable solutions prioritizing refugee resettlement, thus removing the security threat emanating from the camps and improving the humanitarian situation of the refugees.

AQIM’s growing ties with Polisario members and other militants in the region—Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia—have created what AFRICOM head US General Carter Ham calls a “threat to the US” and UK Foreign Secretary William Hague says could have a “profoundly destabilizing effect on countries in North Africa and the Gulf.” UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has warned that ‘inaction could be catastrophic’ as AQIM and other militants form alliances with traffickers smuggling almost $1 billion in cocaine a year through Africa’s Sahel. A recent ICTS study confirms that the Polisario camps have become “a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises,” and a new Carnegie Paper reports that “deteriorating social and political conditions in the camps in Tindouf represent a tinderbox waiting to explode.” The AQIM-Polisario connection is “major security threat” to the region and to aid workers and refugees forced to live in the Tindouf camps, which rely heavily on international and US aid dollars to exist. Instead, this money should be used for promoting durable solutions to the refugee crisis.

According to multiple reports, the Polisario violates refugee rights and is the leading impediment to refugee resettlement. Refugees in the camps are among the only refugees in the world who are welcome to go elsewhere, if the Polisario would let them. Since 1990 international agencies have spent more than $1 billion perpetuating these conditions in the camps—more than $300 million from the US. Much of it has reportedly been diverted to profit some Polisario leaders. While international aid has provided vital resources to the refugees, it has done little to promote durable solutions, a principal mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) under international refugee law. Rather than perpetuate a humanitarian crisis and an increasingly volatile security crisis, US support to UNHCR should be targeted for the promotion of durable solutions, including voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in a third country.

Now is the time to take action to guarantee the stability and security of the Maghreb and Sahel by resolving the refugee crisis. UNHCR must take action to create the conditions for the implementation of durable solutions including: conduct of a census to identify and provide documentation to Sahrawi refugees; establishment of an intimidation-free, voluntary repatriation program for those Sahrawi refugees who wish to return to their previous homelands and families in Morocco; establishment of a viable resettlement program for those Sahrawi refugees who wish to settle in a third country, and creation of a partnership with the Algerian government to improve prospects for local integration for those who want to remain in Algeria.

Rossella Urru and two other Western aid workers were kidnapped October 23, 2011 in the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria by an AQIM sect reportedly receiving help from Polisario sympathizers.
US and international aid dollars should only be used to support refugee rights and durable solutions, not to deny their rights or subsidize a recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers.

A review of documented incidents and expert reports confirms that the Polisario-run camps are indeed a recruiting ground for AQIM, a hub for opportunistic Polisario members trafficking arms across the Sahel and drugs into Europe, and a threat to the security of the region and reforms of the Arab Spring. The most significant of these recent developments includes:

- **Polisario members have assisted and carried out AQIM kidnappings** – On October 23, 2011, Polisario insiders reportedly helped an AQIM offshoot kidnap three Western aid workers from the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria. The assailants were supplied weapons and directions to the victims, who were at the Polisario headquarters location in the Rabouni camp, and they had to travel through several security checkpoints to make their escape.\(^9\) AQIM offshoot ‘al Qaeda in Polisario camps’ reportedly seized two more victims, French, on November 24.\(^10\) In a separate incident, Mauritanian court records reveal AQIM paid Polisario veterans to kidnap Spanish nationals in 2009.\(^11\)

- **Polisario drug and arms smuggling rings in the Sahel** – In the last two years, Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania have arrested dozens of Polisario members caught leading or operating major drug and arms trafficking rings in the region, linked to AQIM and South American cartels engaged in trans-Atlantic drugs-for-arms trade with end markets in Europe and the Americas.\(^12\)

- **Polisario-related incursions and battles in Mali** – On Dec. 15, a Polisario cadre invaded Mali, killing one person, kidnapping three, and provoking a Mali warning that ‘this isn’t the Wild West.’\(^13\) In Sept. 2011, a gun battle between Polisario and rival drug gangs killed four in north Mali.\(^14\) On March 22, 2012, Mali’s democratically elected government was overthrown in a coup that analysts say was sparked by a “toxic cocktail of rebels, weapons, refugees, drought, smugglers and violent Islamic militants” that spilled into Mali with Tuareg and other pro-Qaddafi forces from the Libya conflict.\(^15\)

- **Polisario mercenaries hired by Qaddafi to fight NATO and Libyan rebels** – Last spring, senior NATO officials were reported to receive reliable information that Qaddafi paid hundreds of Polisario mercenaries $10,000 each to fight for him in Libya.\(^16\)

* For **Full Chronology** of documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region, go to: [http://moroccoonthemove.com/chronology](http://moroccoonthemove.com/chronology)

---

**Chronology:**

Documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region.

**March 12, 2012**
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes a paper underscoring the “disturbing reality” that growing numbers of disenchanted Polisario youth and fighters are being recruited by AQIM and a “vast network” of regional drug traffickers. The paper cites the Oct.23 kidnappings as confirmation that, “the deteriorating social and political conditions in the camps in Tindouf represent a tinderbox waiting to explode.” It also notes that AQIM-Polisario member links pose “a major security threat to the Maghreb and the Sahel.”\(^17\)

**Feb. 21, 2012**
Experts testify to a United Nations Security Council special session that drug cartels and smugglers now traffic almost $1 billion in cocaine a year from Latin America into Africa’s Sahel. They add that traffickers are forming alliances with AQIM and other militants, in a region that has seen an influx of Libyan weapons. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned leaders: “inaction could be catastrophic.”

Feb. 2, 2012
ICTS releases a study reporting that the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria have become “a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises.” The study recommends that Western aid to the camps “prioritize permanent resettlement” for the refugees to confront this new reality. Noting expanding AQIM links with Polisario members, South American drug cartels, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab, as well as AQIM’s access to the influx of Libyan weapons in the Sahel, the study cites a 500% rise in terrorist attacks in the region since 9/11. It argues that AQIM is seeking to extend an “arc of instability” across Africa to exploit turbulence from the Arab Spring and destabilize the region.

Jan. 11, 2012
Algerian and Mauritanian security agencies reportedly break up major drug trafficking and money laundering rings. Officials say the rings are believed to be linked with groups such as al-Qaeda, which is working with the Polisario to traffic arms and drugs from Mauritania to northern neighbors. Mali reportedly also steps up efforts against AQIM and what is believed its latest offshoot, “Al Qaida in Polisario Camps,” said to have abducted two French nationals Nov. 2011.

Jan. 3, 2012
Security expert Dr. J. Peter Pham, Atlantic Council, reports that economic and political reforms in Africa are “threatened by the spread of violent extremism” and “increasing links” between AQIM and other militants in the Sahel, recently “buoyed by the flow of arms and fighters” from Libya. “More ominously, AQIM has increased its linkages with the Polisario,” evident in AQIM’s Oct. 23 kidnappings near Tindouf, which were “aided by Polisario sympathizers” inside the Polisario’s camps. The camps offer “a ready pool of potential recruits” from “large numbers of idle young fighters.”

Dec. 27, 2011
Mali reportedly distances itself from the Polisario, accusing it of kidnapping, drug trafficking, and suspected collusion with a Sahrawi branch of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. A source close to the government says Mali is "angry" with the Polisario, and Malian officials say the Oct. 23 kidnapping was done in collusion with the ‘Sahrawi link’ of AQIM.

Dec. 24, 2011
Mali refuses entry to "eight young Sahrawis" coming from Niger. “They had no papers. There are laws to be respected in Mali especially when it comes to dubious propaganda,” said Malian police.

Dec. 17, 2011
Mali warns the Polisario, “our country is not the Wild West where they can come to kill and kidnap people.” Bamako will "no longer accept the violation of its territorial integrity by the Polisario Front," says a Malian Minister. A local official adds, "everybody here knows who AQIM's accomplices are, they even assisted in abducting the Europeans in Tindouf. His name is Omar al Sahraoui, but neither Mali, nor Algeria, nor the Polisario are doing anything to capture him." In 2010, al Sahraoui, reportedly a Polisario veteran, was sentenced to 12 years in Mauritania for kidnapping Spanish aid workers for AQIM, according to Mauritanian court papers. He was later released in a trade for the aid workers.
Dec. 15, 2011
Members of the Polisario launch an armed incursion into northern Mali, killing one and abducting three others, ostensibly looking for the kidnappers of three Western aid workers taken Oct. 23 from the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria.25

Dec. 10, 2011
A splinter group of AQIM confirms that it is holding the three aid workers kidnapped on Oct. 23 near the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. The group, linked by some to al Sahraoui, calls itself "Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa."26

Nov. 30, 2011
The US House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism & Intelligence hears testimony that AQIM is expanding its ties in the Sahel with the Polisario, as well as militant Nigerian group Boko Haram and Somalia-based al-Shabaab.27

Nov. 28, 2011
UK Foreign Secretary William Hague says AQIM’s expanding terrorist ties to other militant groups in the Sahel could have a “profoundly destabilizing” effect on a region already rocked by the Arab Spring.28

Nov. 24, 2011
AQIM kidnaps two French tourists from their hotel at night in eastern Mali, claiming they are spies. Officials later report that the abductions were coordinated with the Polisario.29

Nov. 7, 2011
Algerian Chief of Staff General Qaid Saleh reportedly reprimands Polisario chief Mohammed Abdul Aziz for allowing an al-Qaeda presence inside the Polisario-controlled camps in Tindouf.30

Nov. 6, 2011
Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin cites alarm at AQIM kidnappings in the Polisario camps. “This is a catastrophe waiting to happen. The need to empty the camps, deprive AQIM of a supply of victims and accomplices, and restore order has never been greater.”31

Oct. 26, 2011
Spanish daily El Pais reports on the Tindouf abductions, noting that, “to cross the checkpoints of the Algerian army and Polisario, kidnappers benefited from support of Polisario’s military.”32

Oct. 25, 2011
Spain requests a UN security mission to the Polisario-run camps. “We’ve asked the UN to send a mission to Algeria to assess the security situation in the camps of Tindouf” – Foreign Minister Trinidad Jimenez. 33

Oct. 23, 2011
An AQIM splinter group kidnaps three Western aid workers from the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, reportedly with Polisario-insider help. “Unarmed AQIM militants entered the Sahrawi refugee camp in Tindouf, western Algeria, where sympathizers of the Polisario Front gave them weapons and helped them seek out the hostages.”34

Sept. 29, 2011
Mauritanian President reports that AQIM and other militants have acquired Libyan arms, including surface-to-air missiles. 35

Sept. 20, 2011
US terrorism expert Yonah Alexander, International Center for Terrorism Studies, says the “Polisario is intensifying activities to transport and smuggle illegal drugs in both North Africa and Europe. The Polisario is working with Al Qaida in both the drug and weapons trade.”36
Sept. 15, 2011
Malian security forces hunt for rival gangs of drug smugglers from Mali, Niger, and the Polisario, after a desert gun battle over ton of cocaine and hashish leaves four dead, according to a Malian army official. 37

Sept. 10, 2011
Analysts say that Libyan dictator Qaddafi’s fall seriously weakens the Polisario in its dispute with Morocco on the Western Sahara, after widespread reports that Polisario mercenaries sided with Qaddafi. 38

May 29, 2011
US Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart urges colleagues in Congress to give "serious attention" to evidence that Polisario members are "participating as mercenaries in Colonel Qaddafi's murderous campaign."39

May 20, 2011
The US Administration expresses concern to Algeria that “credible sources report” that Polisario mercenaries are being paid by Qaddafi “to fight NATO-led forces and kill Libyan protesters and rebels.”40

April 21, 2011
The London Telegraph reports that senior NATO officials have received information that Col. Qaddafi is hiring 450 Polisario mercenaries for $10,000 each to fight Libyan rebels and prop up his regime. 41

Jan. 16, 2011
Former Polisario Chief Police Inspector, Mustapha Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud says “the situation is grave for the youth who are marginalized” in Polisario-run camps in Algeria. “The camps are fertile grounds for Islamic fundamentalist groups and drug traffickers.”42

Jan. 6, 2011
Terrorism cell and arms cache broken up in W. Sahara suggest “links between AQIM and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front.”43 Washington Post columnist J. Rubin writes, “there is ample evidence the Polisario Front... is in league with al-Qaeda.”44

Jan. 3, 2010
US DEA former Director of Operations, Michael Braun, calls conditions ‘dismal for Saharans living in the Polisario-run camps,’ which have become a “breeding-ground for potential future AQIM recruits.” 45

Dec. 21, 2010
Leaders arrested in one of the Sahel’s largest drug-smuggling rings are purported to have close ties to the Polisario Front. Nigerien officials call it, “one of the major drug trafficking networks” in the Sahara. It is known as "Polisario" because 90% of its members come from camps of the Polisario Front. 46

Dec. 9, 2010
Political experts express increasing concern about violence instigated by pro-Polisario militants in Laayoune, Western Sahara. “The situation is becoming more dangerous, because of the violence and because al-Qaeda is now present.” – political analyst T. Tarik.47

Nov. 10, 2010
Algeria reports “Cocaine that comes from Brazil, Peru, and Colombia supports the nucleus of al-Qaeda in the region” – Algerian head of the National Office for Combating Drugs & Addiction, Abdelmalek Sayeh. 48

Oct. 18, 2010
A drug ring linked to AQIM is dismantled in Morocco. VOA cites experts and evidence from Mauritania and Mali indicating that AQIM has worked in the last two years “to recruit Sahrawis who are trained fighters to carry out their operations.”49
Aug. 23, 2010
AQIM frees three Spanish kidnapping victims after Mauritania agrees to release the perpetrator, Omar Sahraoui, who is “believed to have been a senior commander of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.”

July 2010
Mauritania sentences reported Polisario veteran, Omar al Sahraoui, to 12 years for the 2009 kidnapping of Spanish aid workers. Mauritanian court papers document that he was paid by AQIM along with at least three other Polisario veterans to organize and carry out the crime.

April 12, 2010
Security expert calls the Western Sahara conflict a “vicious cycle” that terrorists can exploit; cites “evidence that members of the military arm of the Polisario Front have been involved in illicit activities.”

February 2010
Polisario veteran Omar le Sahraoui is arrested in Mali and extradited to stand trial in Mauritania for kidnapping Spanish aid workers.

Nov. 29, 2009
AQIM claims responsibility for kidnapping three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania. Mauritanian security services later discover that AQIM had hired Omar al Sahraoui—who was reportedly a member of the Polisario’s hierarchy—and at least three other Polisario veterans to organize and carry out the abductions.

---


17 Op. Cit. 6

18 Op. Cit. 4

19 Op. Cit. 5


23 Ibid


25 Ibid


47 “Key members of Sahara drug ring captured are from Polisario.” Middle East Online, December 21, 2010, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=43149>.


Op. Cit. 9

Ibid
Thank you. I will ask my assistant to call your office for a convenient meeting for next week. Ed

-----Original Message-----
From: Rachad [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 30, 2012 11:06 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Ambassador Roll-out

> Thank you so much Ed for the list.
> 
> As I am out of town, I would like to talk to you more about this because I already met few journalists who requested to see me among whom the Washington Post guy on the list.
> 
> I appreciate your communication team's efforts for the outreach.
> 
> Have a nice weekend,
> 
> Rachad
Mr. Ambassador,

We have arranged a time to meet with Congresswoman Karen Bass, the new chairman of the sub-committee on Africa, who took Payne’s place as chairman. This took some doing to get the meeting so it is important we accommodate her schedule if at all possible. This could be one of the most important congressional meetings of your year and we will need to properly prep for it. For your most if not all of your congressional meetings we advise against them simply being conducted as a courtesy visit. They must always be combined with “ask”. Former Whip and Congressman Bill Gray and she are very close and he will be involved in the messaging as well. Can you please mark your calendar for this meeting and we can discuss further next week. Thank you. Ed
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Saturday, March 31, 2012 11:08 AM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Cc: jpaul@moroccanamericanpolicy.com; bgray@grayloeffler.com
Subject: Correction: meeting with Congresswoman Karen Bass, April 18 at 3:30pm

Sorry that’s April 18th for the meeting, not February!

From: Edward Gabriel
Sent: Saturday, March 31, 2012 06:25 AM
To: Boulal Rachad <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com>
Cc: Jordan Paul <jpaul@moroccanamericanpolicy.com>; Bill Gray <bgray@grayloeffler.com>
Subject: meeting with Congresswoman Karen Bass, February 18 at 3:30pm

Mr. Ambassador,
We have arranged a time to meet with Congresswoman Karen Bass, the new chairman of the sub-committee on Africa, who took Payne’s place as chairman. This took some doing to get the meeting so it is important we accommodate her schedule if at all possible. This could be one of the most important congressional meetings of your year and we will need to properly prep for it. For your most if not all of you congressional meetings we advise against them simply being conducted as a courtesy visit. They must always be combined with and “ask”. Former Whip and Congressman Bill Gray and she are very close and he will be involved in the messaging as well. Can you please mark your calendar for this meeting and we can discuss further next week. Thank you. Ed
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 2:43 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: Sorry I will miss you tomorrow

Please let me know when we can meet next. Thanks. I have several things for you. Ed

Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Rachad,
I was planning to discuss this tomorrow but hope to catch up with you soon. In the meantime, I would like to confirm your availability on the 18th to meet with Karen Bass at 330pm. Also, we are hoping to get blocks of your time for other key congressional meetings around that same date. We have requested time from your staff. Thank you for your consideration of this request. Ed
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2012 10:00 AM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: Re: April 18th

Ok. We also have two more very big meetings: Ileana Ross Lehtinen and Howard Berman, chairman and Ranking on Foreign Affairs. Before these meetings we should meet to prepare for expectations and "asks". Thank you

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2012 06:44 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Re: April 18th

Ed,

Thank you for arranging the appointment with congresswoman Karen Bass. Any appointments your office arranges that go through my office are automatically on my schedule. My staff is also working with Jordan on different meetings.

Thanks again,

Rachad

On Apr 4, 2012, at 6:24 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

> Rachad,
> I was planning to discuss this tomorrow but hope to catch up with you soon. In the meantime, I would like to confirm your availability on the 18th to meet with Karen Bass at 330pm. Also, we are hoping to get blocks of your time for other key congressional meetings around that same date. We have requested time from your staff. Thank you for your consideration of this request. Ed
FYI, attached is a MAC report on the presentation of the Minister of Communications, Mustapha Khalfi, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS.
MAMS EVENT REPORT
4 April 4, 2012

1. Title: MOROCCO – THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM
Hosted by CSIS

Participant:
H.E. Mustapha Khalfi, Minister of Communication, Morocco
Jon Alterman, Director of the Middle East Center

2. Overview
While revolutionary change has brought Islamists to rule in several Middle Eastern
countries, it was evolutionary change that brought Islamists into government in Morocco
after more than a decade in opposition. The country’s own future trajectory and its
inspirational power for other religious opposition movements in the Middle East remain the
subjects of considerable debate. Minister Khalfi discussed why Morocco’s third way –
between revolution and retaining the status quo, resulted from unique conditions in the
kingdom.

3. Summary
Minister Khalfi noted that Morocco’s response to the Arab Spring was a result of reforms
that had been instituted over the past six years, and others going back even further, to
Youssefi’s time as prime minister. There were two views anchoring perceptions of the King’s
reform agenda in response to the February 20th movement: from skeptical to positive. The
period between Feb 20th and the election of Nov 25th was a competition between these
views. The election results showed that Moroccans want a serious and credible democracy.
Although the new constitution is not ideal and won’t radically reshape the political system, it
provides many opportunities in its implementation that reflect the King’s speech of Mar 9th
in which he talked about equality, justice, accountability, and other values to be
incorporated into the new constitution.

The Minister elaborated by defining three factors which explain Morocco as an exception:
the monarchy’s leadership role that enhances credibility and stability; the existence of
political parties, including the opposition, which gave them experience in building coalitions;
and the role of civil society, which, in fact, often promotes issues before the political parties
accept them as part of their agendas.

He listed four challenges facing the new government. First of all, implementing the
constitution including power-sharing, expansion of freedoms and liberty, regionalization –
the key to solving the Western Sahara problem, and good governance, including reforming
the judiciary, accountability, and transparency—the key to building citizen trust. Passing
new legislation for the local elections to be held in the fall is the next challenge. It is
necessary to succeed in reconciling people with politics, i.e. make them believe that the
process works for them. Goal is to facilitate the emergence of new local elites who will work
with the youth. The third challenge is the need to resolve social and economic problems,
especially poverty, which in some areas is twice the national average. Related to this is
dealing with the impact of the European financial crisis which affects tourism and exports.
All of this impacts the overwhelming need to create hundreds of thousands of jobs to both
absorb existing unemployed and the 150,000 annual new entrants to the job market.
GOM has established a public-private partnership to address this challenge and to build an educational system that prepares people for the job market. Finally, Minister Khalfi mentioned the growing positive environment for closer regional cooperation, which would also lead to resolving the Western Sahara crisis.

The Minister provided specific examples throughout his presentation of actions being undertaken by the new government to deal with these challenges and the changing political environment in Morocco.

**4. Q & A**

**Q:** (Jon Alterman) Given Adl al Ihsan’s opposition to the monarchy, what is the future for Islamic politics in Morocco—greater diversity or cooperation?

**A:** Both are happening at the same time. The key challenge for all Islamist parties is to link Islam and democracy. Islamists have to decide whether or not to be part of the political party system.

**Q:** (Karim Mezran, the Atlantic Council) How will decentralization lead to solving the Western Sahara crisis?

**A:** The constitution provides for regionalization is all matters: budget, administration, social and cultural policies. Regionalization provides a means for the transition from the current situation to autonomy.

**Q:** Three questions on women’s rights

**A:** The basic protection and rights of women are already enshrined in the moudawa. The constitution calls for full equality and that is part of our national agenda, adopted by parliament. A national watchdog has been proposed to protect women’s rights by monitoring what is going on and if targets are being achieved. Gave details of what steps are being taken.

**Q:** (Haim Malka, CSIS) How to manage expectations?

**A:** People want concrete results. Transparency is the key. In conflict areas, government is encouraging open dialog with all stakeholders. Expect that passing of budget by mid-April will enable government to accelerate efforts to reduce poverty, expand healthcare coverage, and promote other economic and social development projects.

**5. Observation**

40 representatives from various NGOs, including Eric Goldstein from HRW, and think tanks participated in the program. The Minister spoke eloquently, thoughtfully, and credibly about the challenges facing the government as it works to implement the new constitution. He gave multiple examples of what the government has proposed, which strengthened his case. He was strongly behind the autonomy solution for the Western Sahara and the role of the King in providing indispensable leadership and continuity. He directly answered the questions on the future of Islamists and democracy and the prospects for women and minorities and provided many examples of what can be done to implement the various sections of the constitution. He is definitely a formidable resource. It is imperative that we track what is going on in parliament in the coming months to have credible talking points on Morocco’s reform agenda.
OK. Yes, let me get back to you with recommendations.

----- Original Message -----  
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]  
Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2012 01:20 PM  
To: Edward Gabriel  
Subject: April 18th  

> 
> Ed,  
> Am looking forward to all the meetings on the Hill.  
> However, I met Ileana Ross Lehtinen in a different context and got a chance to brief on Morocco and talk about organizing a trip to Morocco. I think it would be better to schedule a different meeting with the Chair of appropriations in stead, in addition to Congressman Berman. What do you think?  
> Rachad
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 12:55 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: Congressional meeting strategy

Dear Rachad,

After discussing options with team members this weekend, I suggest we focus on the Foreign Operations subcommittee members first before going to the full committee on Appropriations. However, this should not take away from any meetings we have with key Foreign Affairs members in the meantime.

The timing on the meeting is tricky because you want to do it sooner rather than later and you also want to make sure you have your asks lined up. Right now we are still uncertain about facts on the ground and Leahy (waiting on Administration).

I know that Mouaad and Jordan are seeing Lowey's person next week and can line up the Lowey meeting, but I would caution going slow on other members for now.

Instead, the meeting with Mario Diaz Balart on the 17th will be critical because he can help with both Ileana and the Appropriations process. If we go into that Mario meeting with everything lined up we can really leverage it. Nobody is closer to Ileana than Mario and Lincoln, and further, Granger also trusts the Balarts completely on Morocco.

We counsel that we take the same approach as last year when we got everything lined up first:

Start with Mario Diaz Balart, then go to Lowey, then the other members (both Dem and R) then finish with Granger. Then you go to Rogers (Chair) and Dicks (Ranking) of the full committees. We are very wired in with Dicks and Rogers and will be able to add much value to these meetings.

The Chairman and the Ranking Member of the full committee are not likely to lead this process and would prefer to follow the subcommittee. If we go to them with everything lined up via their sub committees first, they should support easily.

Of course, there are different ways to skin the cat. I just think that when we show up with support in hand it is more effective than starting with the Chair/Ranking and not being able to answer the question: "Who is supporting this on the subcommittee?"

That is why we used this particular order last year:
1) MDB - you need a sponsor and original supporter. He is our strongest ally and best target
2) Lowey (Subcommittee Ranking Democrat) A fan of Morocco and great friend. She will give her "soft" support.
3) The other members of the sub-committee except Wolf. Last year we had Member/Ambassador meeting plus any value added consultants/MAC, with the staff and secured unanimous support.
4) Then we went to Granger who Mario had been working on while we were rounding up the rest of the support and she signed right up - closing the deal.
5) Then we went to Rogers/Dicks and had almost no work to do. Sub Chair and Ranking plus broad bipartisan support both against Wolf and for the House aid language, and they fell right into line.

Like I said, you can do this a number of different ways. We can go to MDB and then straight to Granger, but I'm partial to our route last year because it worked but we can discuss further when we are together. Ed
Rachad,

Attached is the March summary report for your review and comment. In this report I actually provide two different work descriptions that define our work in relation to one another. They are highlighted in yellow on the first page. The first paragraph, my preferred option, is the paragraph we used last month and agreed upon then. The second paragraph is an attempt by me to better understand your concerns to make sure the report is not confusing the work of the Embassy with that of MAC. While I do not like the second paragraph as well as the first option it does attempt to distinguish between our work and that of the Embassy. Hopefully we can discuss your preferences tomorrow at our meeting.

Also tomorrow I’d like to discuss the “Ambassador’s communications rollout”, and the Communications strategy paper sent to you a few weeks back. We can also close off on any congressional issues you have and any other issues you have for me. Thank you, Ed

Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Compnay, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
WASHINGTON TEAM
MARCH 2012 PROGRESS REPORT

Introduction

In the highly politicized atmosphere in Washington during this US presidential election year, US foreign policy receives little attention except when crises occur. In times past, US presidents could count on “flying the flag,” appealing to American patriotism as a means of building support for policies. Today, every word or action is placed under a magnifying glass to determine or infer hidden meanings that reveal the weakness of the proposed policies. Thus, very little moves in Washington regarding policy that is not related to problems and challenges that cannot be delayed.

This challenging milieu makes the efforts of the Washington Team to move the Obama Administration to approve US funding for projects in the Western Sahara even more daunting. Yet the results to date are largely positive. Despite the negative media coverage of the Amina Filali case and Aminatou Haidar’s regular visits to New York and Washington to speak against Morocco’s human rights record, Morocco continues to find a positive reception in Congress. The Washington Team’s drive to have more than 300 meetings with Congressional offices before the summer recess is making great progress. The key message, that US foreign assistance to the camps should be given on condition that it directly improves the lives of the refugees, is being well received. The Team is also working with members and staff to define what these “conditions” should be and concrete projects that the US should fund in the South.

There is a dilemma in the Washington Team’s activities in that Morocco is not in crisis, therefore, some policy makers would prefer to leave the Kingdom’s issues off the agenda while the Administration deals with Syria, Iran, Iraq, and crises beyond the MENA region. Ending the Western Sahara conflict, while a helpful outcome to US interests in the region, is not given a high priority by some in the government. It was therefore helpful that the remarks following the meeting between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Clinton reaffirmed the centrality of the Western Sahara conflict and the commitment to the bilateral strategic dialogue. This visit, and Secretary Clinton’s visit to Morocco, and the generally high praise that Morocco is receiving for its role on the UN Security Council, continue to make the case that Morocco is a leader in the region, and among America’s friends worldwide.

The Communications report below indicates that positive coverage of Morocco far outweighs negative coverage associated with Amina Filali and Aminatou Haidar. Security concerns related to the region, Morocco’s leadership at the UNSC, continued concerns with the direction of the Arab uprisings, and op-eds that show how Morocco is making progress in its reforms and economic development, all contribute to the positive image of Morocco in the media.
This report Since it is difficult to distinguish some of the work of the Moroccan American Center from that of the Embassy, this report includes select activities of the Embassy, MAC, and its consultants as the “Washington Team”.

OR:

This report is prepared by the Moroccan American Center, including MACP, MACC and MATIC. It is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. While we attempt to only highlight work that MAC has been involved in, in some cases we touch upon the work of others, such as the Embassy or other pro-Moroccan entities. In such related cases, we try to only report on activities where MAC has had a role as well, or where the activity is worthy of highlighting to the Rabat team since it relates to one of the Team’s main objectives. In all cases we try as much as possible to keep this reporting to the principal work of MAC.

Campaigns

MoroccoOnTheMove.com (MOTM)

The Washington Team’s MOTM website and social media program (@MorocOnTheMove) continues to broaden the reach for our messaging, in terms of quantity and targeted audiences. After five months online, nearly 250 postings of news articles and original content by the Washington Team have appeared and the website has received more than 24,000 hits. In that same period, @MorocOnTheMove has sent nearly 900 tweets, has close to 250 followers, and has been retweeted regularly by influential personalities on Twitter. Although we have to improve these numbers even more in the months ahead, this is a strong beginning to our social media efforts.

As part of increasing efforts to engage more regularly with our target audiences, particularly through email and social media, the Washington Team distributed an e-letter, “Reform, stability, and the Western Sahara” to our contacts database of approximately 3,000 policymakers, media, academics, think-tank and NGO leaders, Administration officials, and Congressional staffs. This e-letter highlighted and redistributed materials mentioned in the Communications report including the ICTS report, the Atlantic magazine article, the paper published by the Carnegie Endowment, the Roll Call column, Congressional Record remarks, The Hill op-ed, the Washington Post “Right Turn” column, the POMED column, and positive press about the launch of RAMED, Morocco’s large-scale healthcare program aimed at providing care to disadvantaged citizens, as well as specific items Rabat wants us to highlight though its mediatization requests.

Also, in March, the Washington Team began distribution of a weekly “Morocco highlight e-mail” to our contacts database, in which one or two events, publications, and/or positive press articles are featured. The purpose of this weekly highlight is to draw attention to an important messaging opportunity to the contacts about Morocco. The first “Morocco highlight e-mail” redistributed the March 27 Global Post op-ed.
Morocco as a Leader

During the month of March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to promote Morocco as a model of progress and reform by regularly briefing and engaging influential policy makers, think-tank leaders, and target journalists.

Activities:

On March 8, The Atlantic magazine, a well-respected publication on culture, current events, and politics for more than 150 years, published an article, “The coming Arab identity crisis,” by Massoud Hayoun which focuses on the questions of Arab identity that have resurfaced during the Arab Spring. The Washington Team arranged an interview for its author with Ambassador Edward Gabriel, who is quoted among other influential leaders in the Arab Diaspora. For further distribution, a blog column highlighting the article was posted on “Who’s who in the Arab world? Examining Arab identity,” on the Foreign Policy Association’s Foreign Policy Blog.

On March 13, Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, hosted a roundtable at the Council’s offices in Washington with Ambassador Bouhlal entitled, “Morocco and the Arab Spring.” At the event, which was organized through the Washington Team’s outreach to Abrams and CFR, Ambassador Bouhlal detailed Morocco’s reform process and answered questions about the implementation of the new Constitution.

In early March, the POMED Wire, a blog of the Project on Middle East Democracy, posted a report citing dubious torture allegations against Morocco made on the Sahara Press Service (SPS) website. The Washington Team contacted POMED’s executive director, alerted him to the questionable nature of many SPS publications, which prompted him to inform his bloggers to keep the unprofessional nature of SPS in mind before republishing or sourcing its work. Following the conversation, POMED agreed to post a piece on the POMED Wire authored by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, “Gabriel: Change, reform, and progress in Morocco,” which outlined the year of reform in Morocco and how its “Arab Spring” experience was successful and exceptional.

On March 23, the Foreign Policy Association’s Foreign Policy Blog published a column by Moroccan-American international attorney, Leila Hanafi, “Constitutional reforms in Morocco: Outlook for youth rights.” The article examined the success of the current reform process in Morocco and what measures will be necessary to insure that success is sustained and far-reaching. Knowing that Ms. Hanafi’s articles can be somewhat dubious in content, when she asked the Washington Team for feedback we reviewed the draft at her request in order to ameliorate any adverse consequences.

Results:
In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight Morocco’s role as a leader for democratic reforms and peace in the region generated more than 320 positive media placements and 20 million favorable media impressions.

**The Polisario and Terrorism in the Sahara/Sahel**

During March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to call US attention to the growing threat of AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Sahara/Sahel in order to shape the debate and reinforce perceptions of the Polisario’s negative role in the region. These efforts included journalist outreach, arranging briefings by Washington Team members and third-party spokespeople, and creating fact sheets and other supporting documents for distribution to target audiences.

**Activities:**

Following the March 2 publication by *The Hill* of an op-ed by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, "Stop subsidizing recruiting grounds for terrorists and traffickers," several other media outlets republished or cited the piece, including the *World247.net News network* and the *U.K. Foreign Office/U.K. Government Online*. Also, the Italian-based online newspaper, *Lettera 43*, published an article about terrorism in the Sahel that cited ICTS reports and maps.

To maintain US media attention on the continued detention of the European aid workers kidnapped by members of an AQIM-related group with suspected help from members of the Polisario Front, the Washington Team authored a blog posting on the MOTM website on March 20, “Day 150 – still hostage: Rosella Urru, two others seized by AQIM sect in Polisario camp.” This posting will be a part of a regular series of updates on the kidnapping as the situation develops.

On March 27, the *Global Post* published an op-ed by Jordan Paul, “Why are we perpetuating a source of instability in North Africa?” The op-ed made the case for retargeting non-humanitarian aid destined for the Polisario to stop perpetuating the refugee camps’ deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions and urged US leadership to resolve the Western Sahara conflict.

In late March, the Washington Team compiled a paper, “Spotlight: The case for redirecting US support for the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, which are becoming a recruiting ground for AQIM, arms and drug traffickers.” The paper provides background information and a chronology of documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region. It will be widely distributed in April to key contacts in Congress, the media, and think tanks.

**Results:**

In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight the Polisario’s involvement with rising terrorism in the region generated more than 200 favorable media placements and 21 million media impressions.
Resolving the Western Sahara: Autonomy under Moroccan Sovereignty

Ahead of and following the ninth round of informal talks on the Western Sahara conflict, the Washington Team conducted outreach to journalists, policymakers, and government officials to highlight the urgent need to solve the conflict for security as well as humanitarian reasons and to promote Morocco’s compromise autonomy proposal.

Activities:

To focus US media attention on the informal talks and Morocco’s efforts to offer genuine compromise in the negotiations, the Washington Team issued a press release on March 12, “US, France voice strong support for Morocco’s autonomy plan to resolve Western Sahara dispute, remove obstacle to peace in region.” The release, which highlighted recent public declarations of support for the autonomy plan by US Secretary of State Clinton and French Foreign Minister Juppé, was distributed to PRNewswire and targeted journalists. It was posted by more than 150 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, Forbes, Boston Globe, Dallas Morning News, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sacramento Bee, Yahoo News, AOL News, AfricaBusiness, and Afrik-News. MAP published an article, “Les 9è pourparlers sur le Sahara se tiennent avec en toile de fond un soutien consolidé de Washington au Plan d’autonomie,” that referenced the release and the ICTS report, which was republished by L’Opinion, Le Matin, and several other Moroccan news publications.

Following regular briefings and updates by the Team, two Members of Congress also made strong, public statements of support for Morocco’s autonomy plan as a peaceful, compromise solution to the Western Sahara conflict. In an opinion piece published March 12 in Roll Call, “Changes offer positive sign for Western Sahara”, Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee gave the background on why the autonomy proposal was the best option for peace. In remarks for the Congressional Record, Rep. Chris Murphy of Connecticut said the people of the Western Sahara "deserve for this longstanding dispute to be resolved" and stated that Morocco's compromise proposal is "a reasonable offer and can serve as a basis for negotiations." Murphy acknowledged, "it is in the interest of the United States and the parties involved to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue[.]" MAP ran stories on both Members’ statements, “US Congressman highlights overwhelming bipartisan support for Morocco’s autonomy plan within two chambers of US Congress,” and “Moroccan autonomy proposal, a democratic solution that can serve as a basis for negotiations, US Cong.”

On March 13, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a paper by Professor Anouar Boukhars, “Simmering discontent in the Western Sahara,” in which Boukhars examined a number of internal and external factors that affect resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. The paper – which cited several information sources the Washington Team helped generate – was distributed widely.
to key contacts and targeted journalists and incorporated into our regular information packet on the Western Sahara.

In order to highlight the urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis in the Polisario-controlled camps in southern Algeria through implementation of durable solutions for refugees, Robert Holley authored a blog posting on the MOTM website, “You don’t have to live like a refugee”, which is a play on words from Tom Petty song with the same title.

Results:

In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight to US audiences the broad support for Morocco’s autonomy plan and need for US leadership to help resolve the Western Sahara generated more than 650 favorable media placements and 57 million media impressions.

Upcoming in April

On April 3, the Washington Team will host a roundtable, “The Western Sahara crisis: Why US leadership is needed now,” where an expert panel will offer insights on the crisis in the Western Sahara, the growing threat of terrorism in the region, the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and how US leadership can help bring this conflict to a peaceful end. The roundtable will feature Jean AbiNader, Senior Advisor, Moroccan American Center (Moderator), Ambassador Michael Ussery, Former US Ambassador to Morocco, Dr J. Peter Pham, Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council, and Robert Holley, Senior Policy Advisor, Moroccan American Center for Policy. To encourage attendance and coverage of the roundtable, the Washington Team widely distributed a press advisory to target journalists, as well as an invitation to all major policymakers and US government officials who focus on Morocco. The advisory was picked up and posted by more than 120 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, CNBC, CNN Top News, Boston Globe, African Press Organization, Sacramento Bee, Yahoo News, AOL News, and Afrik-News.

Congressional Activities

The Washington Team conducted over 90 meetings with Congressional offices in March alone, which focused on our core themes: Morocco as a leader, the rising threat of terrorism in the region and the dangers of the Polisario camps, the need to target assistance to the camps, and the need to resolve the issue of the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

These meetings serve to maintain our majority support in Congress, to ensure that the truth is known about the Polisario, to build support for targeting assistance to the camps, and to create a greater awareness of the importance of a strong US-Morocco bilateral relationship. These meetings constitute the base we build every year as we never take for granted our current supporters and always seek to secure the support of additional members. The Washington Team followed up on these
meetings with a series of emails containing updates, recent news, publications so as reinforce our messaging provided at each meeting. The latter also lay the groundwork for our upcoming meetings so that members are aware of the issues to be discussed well in advance.


The Washington Team also produced significant statements around the latest informal round of the negotiations. Rep. Chris Murphy (D-CT) made a statement in support of Morocco on the eve of the Manhasset talks and Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN) published a very favorable Op-ed on the Monday of the talks. These statements and Op-Eds from leftist, democratic members help to reinforce the concept that the autonomy/sovereignty solution has broad based support and is the inevitable solution. The more that this message takes hold, the easier it will be to secure congressional support for establishing facts on the ground (building on the language from last year) and conditioning aid to the camps.

The Washington Team also worked with the office of Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart to pose questions to the Administration during oversight hearings with Secretary Clinton on how they planned to implement the language authorizing US assistance to Morocco to be spent in the southern provinces. This helps to keep the issue in front of the State Department and makes them aware that Congress is intent on seeing action this year. The Washington Team is also working with the Appropriations Committee to develop language and secure support for targeting assistance to the refugee camps away from the status quo and towards durable solutions, including a census and resettlement.

**MATIC**

MATIC worked with the US Chamber of Commerce in setting up its first business delegation to Morocco March 20-22, which including major corporations such as Raytheon, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and others, as well as six companies focused on renewable energies. The Moroccan Embassy arranged for the participation of a number of senior government officials to attend events and lunches and dinners hosted by AMDI and Maroc Export. MATIC hosted a luncheon for the delegation on March 21 and worked with ADEREE, MASEN, and ONE on a panel on renewable energies. Ambassador Kaplan and members of the US Embassy attended the luncheon.

The most important news of the month was an announcement by the China Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund) that it had chosen Morocco for its regional office for North, West, and Central Africa. MATIC has escorted three different CAD Fund delegations in Morocco and helped them survey possible office and apartment sites.
MATIC was involved with them in setting up meetings for and providing logistical support, as well as coordinated with GOM officials. MATIC was the first among several Moroccan entities to make contact with the CAD Fund.

MATIC also set up the latest in a series of meetings for MANAS Development Group [http://www.manasdevelopment.org/](http://www.manasdevelopment.org/) an international company that provides training services to agencies and companies, which resulted in their choosing Morocco as the location for the regional office serving North, West, and Central Africa.

**MACC**

Throughout the month of March, MACC staff attended a number of events on the Maghreb and the Middle East, including an Ambassadors forum hosted by the US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, a roundtable on democracy in the Arab World held at the National Press Club, and a conference on access to justice hosted by the American Bar Association.
Please disregard last email attachment as it contained typographical errors. Instead, refer to this attachment. Ed

Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
WASHINGTON TEAM
MARCH 2012 PROGRESS REPORT

Introduction

In the highly politicized atmosphere in Washington during this US presidential election year, US foreign policy receives little attention except when crises occur. In times past, US presidents could count on “flying the flag,” appealing to American patriotism as a means of building support for policies. Today, every word or action is placed under a magnifying glass to determine or infer hidden meanings that reveal the weakness of the proposed policies. Thus, very little moves in Washington regarding policy that is not related to problems and challenges that cannot be delayed.

This challenging milieu makes the efforts of the Washington Team to move the Obama Administration to approve US funding for projects in the Western Sahara even more daunting. Yet the results to date are largely positive. Despite the negative media coverage of the Amina Filali case and Aminatou Haidar’s regular visits to New York and Washington to speak against Morocco’s human rights record, Morocco continues to find a positive reception in Congress. The Washington Team’s drive to have more than 300 meetings with Congressional offices before the summer recess is making great progress. The key message, that US foreign assistance to the camps should be given on condition that it directly improves the lives of the refugees, is being well received. The Team is also working with members and staff to define what these “conditions” should be and concrete projects that the US should fund in the South.

There is a dilemma in the Washington Team’s activities in that Morocco is not in crisis, therefore, some policy makers would prefer to leave the Kingdom’s issues off the agenda while the Administration deals with Syria, Iran, Iraq, and crises beyond the MENA region. Ending the Western Sahara conflict, while a helpful outcome to US interests in the region, is not given a high priority by some in the government. It was therefore helpful that the remarks following the meeting between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Clinton reaffirmed the centrality of the Western Sahara conflict and the commitment to the bilateral strategic dialogue. This visit, and Secretary Clinton’s visit to Morocco, and the generally high praise that Morocco is receiving for its role on the UN Security Council, continue to make the case that Morocco is a leader in the region, and among America’s friends worldwide.

The Communications report below indicates that positive coverage of Morocco far outweighs negative coverage associated with Amina Filali and Aminatou Haidar. Security concerns related to the region, Morocco’s leadership at the UNSC, continued concerns with the direction of the Arab uprisings, and op-eds that show how Morocco is making progress in its reforms and economic development, all contribute to the positive image of Morocco in the media.

This report is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. Since it is difficult to distinguish some of the
work of the Moroccan American Center from that of the Embassy, this report includes select activities of the Embassy, MAC, and its consultants as the “Washington Team”.

OR:
This report is prepared by the Moroccan American Center, including MACP, MACC and MATIC. It is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. While we attempt to only highlight work that MAC has been involved in, in some cases we touch upon the work of others, such as the Embassy or other pro-Moroccan entities. In such related cases, we try to only report on activities where MAC has had a role as well, or where the activity is worthy of highlighting to the Rabat team since it relates to one of the Team’s main objectives. In all cases we try as much as possible to keep this reporting to the principal work of MAC.

Campaigns

MoroccoOnTheMove.com (MOTM)

The Washington Team’s MOTM website and social media program (@MorocOnTheMove) continues to broaden the reach for our messaging, in terms of quantity and targeted audiences. After five months online, nearly 250 postings of news articles and original content by the Washington Team have appeared and the website has received more than 24,000 hits. In that same period, @MorocOnTheMove has sent nearly 900 tweets, has close to 250 followers, and has been retweeted regularly by influential personalities on Twitter. Although we have to improve these numbers even more in the months ahead, this is a strong beginning to our social media efforts.

As part of increasing efforts to engage more regularly with our target audiences, particularly through email and social media, the Washington Team distributed an e-letter, “Reform, stability, and the Western Sahara” to our contacts database of approximately 3,000 policymakers, media, academics, think-tank and NGO leaders, Administration officials, and Congressional staffs. This e-letter highlighted and redistributed materials mentioned in the Communications report including the ICTS report, the Atlantic magazine article, the paper published by the Carnegie Endowment, the Roll Call column, Congressional Record remarks, The Hill op-ed, the Washington Post “Right Turn” column, the POMED column, and positive press about the launch of RAMED, Morocco’s large-scale healthcare program aimed at providing care to disadvantaged citizens, as well as specific items Rabat wants us to highlight though its mediatization requests.

Also, in March, the Washington Team began distribution of a weekly “Morocco highlight e-mail” to our contacts database, in which one or two events, publications, and/or positive press articles are featured. The purpose of this weekly highlight is to draw attention to an important messaging opportunity to the contacts about
Morocco. The first “Morocco highlight e-mail” redistributed the March 27 Global Post op-ed.

**Morocco as a Leader**

During the month of March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to promote Morocco as a model of progress and reform by regularly briefing and engaging influential policy makers, think-tank leaders, and target journalists.

**Activities:**

On March 8, *The Atlantic* magazine, a well-respected publication on culture, current events, and politics for more than 150 years, published an article, “The coming Arab identity crisis,” by Massoud Hayoun which focuses on the questions of Arab identity that have resurfaced during the Arab Spring. The Washington Team arranged an interview for its author with Ambassador Edward Gabriel, who is quoted among other influential leaders in the Arab Diaspora. For further distribution, a blog column highlighting the article was posted on “Who’s who in the Arab world? Examining Arab identity,” on the Foreign Policy Association’s *Foreign Policy Blog*.

On March 13, Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, hosted a roundtable at the Council’s offices in Washington with Ambassador Bouhlal entitled, “Morocco and the Arab Spring.” At the event, which was organized through the Washington Team’s outreach to Abrams and CFR, Ambassador Bouhlal detailed Morocco’s reform process and answered questions about the implementation of the new Constitution.

In early March, the *POMED Wire*, a blog of the Project on Middle East Democracy, posted a report citing dubious torture allegations against Morocco made on the Sahara Press Service (SPS) website. The Washington Team contacted POMED’s executive director, alerted him to the questionable nature of many SPS publications, which prompted him to inform his bloggers to keep the unprofessional nature of SPS in mind before republishing or sourcing its work. Following the conversation, POMED agreed to post a piece on the *POMED Wire* authored by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, “Gabriel: Change, reform, and progress in Morocco,” which outlined the year of reform in Morocco and how its “Arab Spring” experience was successful and exceptional.

On March 23, the Foreign Policy Association’s *Foreign Policy Blog* published a column by Moroccan-American international attorney, Leila Hanafi, “Constitutional reforms in Morocco: Outlook for youth rights.” The article examined the success of the current reform process in Morocco and what measures will be necessary to insure that success is sustained and far-reaching. Knowing that Ms. Hanafi’s articles can be somewhat dubious in content, when she asked the Washington Team for feedback we reviewed the draft at her request in order to ameliorate any adverse consequences.
Results:

In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight Morocco’s role as a leader for democratic reforms and peace in the region generated more than 320 positive media placements and 20 million favorable media impressions.

The Polisario and Terrorism in the Sahara/Sahel

During March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to call US attention to the growing threat of AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Sahara/Sahel in order to shape the debate and reinforce perceptions of the Polisario’s negative role in the region. These efforts included journalist outreach, arranging briefings by Washington Team members and third-party spokespeople, and creating fact sheets and other supporting documents for distribution to target audiences.

Activities:

Following the March 2 publication by The Hill of an op-ed by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, "Stop subsidizing recruiting grounds for terrorists and traffickers," several other media outlets republished or cited the piece, including the World247.net News network and the U.K. Foreign Office/U.K. Government Online. Also, the Italian-based online newspaper, Lettera 43, published an article about terrorism in the Sahel that cited ICTS reports and maps.

To maintain US media attention on the continued detention of the European aid workers kidnapped by members of an AQIM-related group with suspected help from members of the Polisario Front, the Washington Team authored a blog posting on the MOTM website on March 20, “Day 150 – still hostage: Rosella Urru, two others seized by AQIM sect in Polisario camp.” This posting will be a part of a regular series of updates on the kidnapping as the situation develops.

On March 27, the Global Post published an op-ed by Jordan Paul, “Why are we perpetuating a source of instability in North Africa?” The op-ed made the case for retargeting non-humanitarian aid destined for the Polisario to stop perpetuating the refugee camps’ deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions and urged US leadership to resolve the Western Sahara conflict.

In late March, the Washington Team compiled a paper, “Spotlight: The case for redirecting US support for the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, which are becoming a recruiting ground for AQIM, arms and drug traffickers.” The paper provides background information and a chronology of documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region. It will be widely distributed in April to key contacts in Congress, the media, and think tanks.

Results:
In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight the Polisario’s involvement with rising terrorism in the region generated more than 200 favorable media placements and 21 million media impressions.

**Resolving the Western Sahara: Autonomy under Moroccan Sovereignty**

Ahead of and following the ninth round of informal talks on the Western Sahara conflict, the Washington Team conducted outreach to journalists, policymakers, and government officials to highlight the urgent need to solve the conflict for security as well as humanitarian reasons and to promote Morocco’s compromise autonomy proposal.

**Activities:**

To focus US media attention on the informal talks and Morocco’s efforts to offer genuine compromise in the negotiations, the Washington Team issued a press release on March 12, “US, France voice strong support for Morocco’s autonomy plan to resolve Western Sahara dispute, remove obstacle to peace in region.” The release, which highlighted recent public declarations of support for the autonomy plan by US Secretary of State Clinton and French Foreign Minister Juppé, was distributed to PRNewswire and targeted journalists. It was posted by more than 150 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, Forbes, Boston Globe, Dallas Morning News, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sacramento Bee, Yahoo News, AOL News, AfricaBusiness, and Afrik-News. MAP published an article, “Les 9è pourparlers sur le Sahara se tiennent avec en toile de fond un soutien consolidé de Washington au Plan d'autonomie,” that referenced the release and the ICTS report, which was republished by L’Opinion, Le Matin, and several other Moroccan news publications.

Following regular briefings and updates by the Team, two Members of Congress also made strong, public statements of support for Morocco’s autonomy plan as a peaceful, compromise solution to the Western Sahara conflict. In an opinion piece published March 12 in Roll Call, “Changes offer positive sign for Western Sahara”, Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee gave the background on why the autonomy proposal was the best option for peace. In remarks for the Congressional Record, Rep. Chris Murphy of Connecticut said the people of the Western Sahara "deserve for this longstanding dispute to be resolved" and stated that Morocco's compromise proposal is "a reasonable offer and can serve as a basis for negotiations." Murphy acknowledged, "it is in the interest of the United States and the parties involved to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue." MAP ran stories on both Members’ statements, “US Congressman highlights overwhelming bipartisan support for Morocco’s autonomy plan within two chambers of US Congress,” and “Moroccan autonomy proposal, a democratic solution that can serve as a basis for negotiations, US Cong.”

On March 13, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a paper by Professor Anouar Boukhars, “Simmering discontent in the Western Sahara,” in which Boukhars examined a number of internal and external factors that affect
resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. The paper – which cited several
information sources the Washington Team helped generate – was distributed widely
to key contacts and targeted journalists and incorporated into our regular
information packet on the Western Sahara.

In order to highlight the urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis in the
Polisario-controlled camps in southern Algeria through implementation of durable
solutions for refugees, Robert Holley authored a blog posting on the MOTM website,
“You don’t have to live like a refugee”, which is a play on words from Tom Petty
song with the same title.

Results:

In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight to US audiences the broad
support for Morocco’s autonomy plan and need for US leadership to help resolve the
Western Sahara generated more than 650 favorable media placements and 57
million media impressions.

Upcoming in April

On April 3, the Washington Team will host a roundtable, “The Western Sahara
crisis: Why US leadership is needed now,” where an expert panel will offer insights
on the crisis in the Western Sahara, the growing threat of terrorism in the region,
the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and how US leadership can help bring this
conflict to a peaceful end. The roundtable will feature Jean AbiNader, Senior
Advisor, Moroccan American Center (Moderator), Ambassador Michael Ussery,
Former US Ambassador to Morocco, Dr J. Peter Pham, Director, Michael S. Ansari
Africa Center, The Atlantic Council, and Robert Holley, Senior Policy Advisor,
Moroccan American Center for Policy. To encourage attendance and coverage of
the roundtable, the Washington Team widely distributed a press advisory to target
journalists, as well as an invitation to all major policymakers and US government
officials who focus on Morocco. The advisory was picked up and posted by more
than 120 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street

Congressional Activities

The Washington Team conducted over 90 meetings with Congressional offices in
March alone, which focused on our core themes: Morocco as a leader, the rising
threat of terrorism in the region and the dangers of the Polisario camps, the need
to target assistance to the camps, and the need to resolve the issue of the Western
Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

These meetings serve to maintain our majority support in Congress, to ensure that
the truth is known about the Polisario, to build support for targeting assistance to
the camps, and to create a greater awareness of the importance of a strong US-
Morocco bilateral relationship. These meetings constitute the base we build every
year as we never take for granted our current supporters and always seek to secure the support of additional members. The Washington Team followed up on these meetings with a series of emails containing updates, recent news, publications so as reinforce our messaging provided at each meeting. The latter also lay the groundwork for our upcoming meetings so that members are aware of the issues to be discussed well in advance.


The Washington Team also produced significant statements around the latest informal round of the negotiations. Rep. Chris Murphy (D-CT) made a statement in support of Morocco on the eve of the Manhasset talks and Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN) published a very favorable Op-ed on the Monday of the talks. These statements and Op-Eds from leftist, democratic members help to reinforce the concept that the autonomy/sovereignty solution has broad based support and is the inevitable solution. The more that this message takes hold, the easier it will be to secure congressional support for establishing facts on the ground (building on the language from last year) and conditioning aid to the camps.

The Washington Team also worked with the office of Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart to pose questions to the Administration during oversight hearings with Secretary Clinton on how they planned to implement the language authorizing US assistance to Morocco to be spent in the southern provinces. This helps to keep the issue in front of the State Department and makes them aware that Congress is intent on seeing action this year. The Washington Team is also working with the Appropriations Committee to develop language and secure support for targeting assistance to the refugee camps away from the status quo and towards durable solutions, including a census and resettlement.

**MATIC**

MATIC worked with the US Chamber of Commerce in setting up its first business delegation to Morocco March 20-22, which including major corporations such as Raytheon, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and others, as well as six companies focused on renewable energies. The Moroccan Embassy arranged for the participation of a number of senior government officials to attend events and lunches and dinners hosted by AMDI and Maroc Export. MATIC hosted a luncheon for the delegation on March 21 and worked with ADEREE, MASEN, and ONE on a panel on renewable energies. Ambassador Kaplan and members of the US Embassy attended the luncheon.

The most important news of the month was an announcement by the China Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund) that it had chosen Morocco for its regional office for
North, West, and Central Africa. MATIC has escorted three different CAD Fund delegations in Morocco and helped them survey possible office and apartment sites. MATIC was involved with them in setting up meetings for and providing logistical support, as well as coordinated with GOM officials. MATIC was the first among several Moroccan entities to make contact with the CAD Fund.

MATIC also set up the latest in a series of meetings for MANAS Development Group http://www.manasdevelopment.org/ an international company that provides training services to agencies and companies, which resulted in their choosing Morocco as the location for the regional office serving North, West, and Central Africa.

**MACC**

Throughout the month of March, MACC staff attended a number of events on the Maghreb and the Middle East, including an Ambassadors forum hosted by the US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, a roundtable on democracy in the Arab World held at the National Press Club, and a conference on access to justice hosted by the American Bar Association.
Rachad,

Thank you for your generous time today. I felt it was a very productive session. As promised here are two questions submitted for the record during a hearing with Secretary Clinton last month:

Madame Secretary, I was pleased to read about your visit to North Africa and Morocco over the past weekend. We all agree that this is a very important moment for the region and I believe that you and I are in agreement that Morocco presents a promising model. Congress and this Committee have long been concerned about the resolving the Western Sahara in a realistic manner.

The Omnibus Spending Bill recently passed by Congress and signed by President Obama directs that US program aid designated for Morocco can be used in the Western Sahara in order to extend Morocco's reform agenda and support stability in the region. When in the next year do you expect that we will see the State Department establish or extend a program to this region?

I know you share that concern and have worked to reaffirm the US policy of resolving the conflict over the Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario based on a formula of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty to be negotiated between the parties. This policy began under the Clinton Administration and has continued under both President Bush and President Obama. As you know it is strongly supported by a bipartisan majority of both the US House and Senate. You reiterated the continuation of that policy in Morocco over the weekend. We know that drug cartels are filling the security void in the Sahel and that AQIM is getting stronger. We all agree that resolving this issue would create conditions for better economic and security cooperation in the region. Do you believe that we can come to a resolution on this issue in the near future? Thank you Madam Secretary for your time.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 12:38 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: Follow up to staff meeting yesterday

Rachad,

We had a good staff meeting yesterday and believe we’ve established a process to address our immediate policy issues. Mouad attended the meeting and I’m sure he will give you his own readout. Based upon this morning’s meeting and our discussion on Tuesday I’d like to suggest the following processes for your consideration:

**Congressional meetings involving the Ambassador**

1. Secure time available to the Ambassador. This would be handled by your staff and they would inform us of your availability.
2. Prioritizing upcoming congressional meetings and selecting members to meet with. Our staffs would jointly collaborate, and recommend directly to you through your staff, regarding the order of the meetings. I am always available to directly provide you with any additional thinking in this regard.
3. Prepare a briefing document for your meeting. This will include talking points and issues of importance to the member, and proposed asks and expected results from the meeting. The briefing paper would be developed by our joint staffs at our weekly staff meeting and will involve our congressional, communications and policy people. The final paper would come up to you from both your staff and me. As we do more and more meetings, the briefing document process will become more streamlined with only some smaller “tweaks” for future meetings depending on the member and purpose of meeting.
4. We also think a face to face preparation meeting with you before important congressional visits would be useful. We understand however that this may cause undue pressure on your schedule.
5. It is also my understanding from our meetings that MAC staff will attend congressional meetings with you when you ask us to, when your staff is unable, or when we add some value to the meeting as a result of our familiarity with the member. In all cases, we think a summary of the meeting is important as it will provide us with important information on the nuances of the meeting, and an understanding of where a member stands on various issues. I believe that such reporting is critical and has been extremely helpful in the past, as we have been able to rate the history of each congressional member over time based upon specific actions they took with regard to Morocco.
6. The congressional staff visits continue extremely well with joint cooperation between our staffs. We are proud that our staffs have jointly conducted nearly 100 meetings to date. Congratulations to your and our staffs.

**Rollout for the Ambassador**

Based upon the plan you approved during our meeting on Tuesday, I suggest that your staff (Saida?) participate in our weekly communications meeting (she already does each Thursday) and through that meeting we will jointly implement tasks approved in the plan as a regular part of our business together.

**Facts on the Ground Strategy**

Based upon your approval of our plan two weeks ago, we would conduct a weekly meeting, including our staffs, to oversee the implementation of tasks for the plan.

I look forward to your review and comment and am pleased by the cooperation together. I feel we are making good progress, and as I mentioned to you, as we get used to a new way of doing business together please let me know if I ever do anything you do not feel comfortable with.

Thank you, Ed
FYI, we'll get back to you very soon. Thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Edward Gabriel
Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2012 12:16 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: FW: US soldiers who died in helicopter accident in Morocco

Thanks guys
-----Original Message-----
From: Jordan Paul [mailto:jpaul@moroccanamericanpolicy.com]
Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2012 12:14 PM
To: Calvin Dark
Cc: Edward Gabriel
Subject: RE: US soldiers who died in helicopter accident in Morocco

Cal,

Can you keep an eye out for an Obituary or something that would pin down the LA neighborhood/zip code? I'm looking as well but have only found "Los Angeles." There should be something in one of the Sunday So Cal papers.

Like I said, I'll keep looking as well and between the two of us we should find something.

Thanks, Jordan

-----Original Message-----
From: Edward Gabriel [mailto:ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com]
Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2012 11:52 AM
To: Rachad Bouhlal
Cc: Calvin Dark; Jordan Paul
Subject: RE: US soldiers who died in helicopter accident in Morocco

Thank you. We will research this and get Mouaad the name of the member of Congress. Ed

-----Original Message-----
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 11:44 PM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Re: US soldiers who died in helicopter accident in Morocco

> Ed,
> 
> Thank you for the names of the two marines who died.
I have sent a condolence letter to the leadership of the Department of Defense and the State Department.

But I will definitely send a letter to the families and members representing the districts of the deceased.

I would appreciate if Jordan could provide Mouaad with the name of the congresswoman for Cptl. Robby Reyes.

Thanks again,

Rachad

On Apr 13, 2012, at 7:26 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

Rachad,

You may already be doing something on this but would like to recommend a letter of condolence from you to the families of the deceased and to the members of Congress from their districts. We can do more research if you require it. Info follows:

Cptl. Robby Reyes
Los Angeles, CA
(Not sure how to find which of the dozen or so Reps from LA it would be without a ZIP.)

Cpl. Derek Kerns
Fort Dix, N.J
(Rep. John Runyan)

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Rachad, 

Below is the language our team worked on with the Embassy regarding the appropriations language, including my final input. It was also sent from Jordan to Mouaad. We look forward to your review and thoughts. Thanks Ed

From: Jordan Paul [mailto:jpaul@moroccanamericanpolicy.com] 
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 6:04 PM 
To: Edward Gabriel 
Subject: DRAFT Final Bill Language

Ed, 

Below is the language agreed to in the meeting this morning and signed off on by Bob, Caitlin and the Congressional Team (including the Embassy) and represents our collective judgment on the best way to target assistance for the camps. Please review and let me know what you think. Thanks, Jordan

None of the funds in the bill can be used for UNHCR operations to administer the Polisario run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria until the Secretary of State submits a report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations that UNHCR is dedicating part of the contribution for programs that support durable solutions, including a census, a refugee resettlement grant program, and active permanent resettlement or voluntary repatriation programs for these refugees.
Rachad,
This is not an immediate priority, but I wanted to give you a paper to reflect upon on how we may better serve you on visiting delegations. Attached is a proposal to address delegation visits for your review and comments. It does not require your immediate attention and can wait until we have a chance to discuss when convenient. Thanks Ed

Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
MEMORANDUM

14 APRIL 2012

TO: Ambassador Bouhlal

From: Ed Gabriel

RE: Delegation program Coordination Process

As we move forward to work with the Embassy on programs that involve guests and delegations from Morocco, it may be useful to propose a process for your consideration, when working with the Embassy to coordinate programs for the visitors.

Visitors/Issues:
Most of the visitors are here to promote Morocco as the Leader in the region. This could include issues ranging from women rights, social development, human rights, regionalization, implementation of the new constitution, and Morocco’s progressive interfaith policies, to leaders in women’s economic development, parliamentarians, and others who have a role that contributes to a greater awareness of Morocco’s progressive agenda.

Process:
In the past, the first step consisted of a joint meeting between Embassy staff and MAC to review upcoming programs – the vast majority of these programs are initiated by the Embassy staff. Usually, the Embassy staff prepares a scene-setter, which provides the context for the visit – who is coming, the issues that they will address, and the objectives of the visit.

Once the context has been defined, we discuss five items with Embassy staff:

1. Activities – what is the optimal schedule for the visitors and who is responsible for organizing which events
2. Logistics – what is needed for the overall program: biographies, press releases, local transportation services, types of events, e.g. meal-related or not, budget issues
3. Audience – given the proposed events, who are the key audiences for each activity, for example, the Embassy usually has very strong relations with NGOs and may want to host and event targeting NGOs interested in women’s issues. Another example, MAC has strong relations with the private sector and agencies involved in trade and investment promotion, and can take the lead on those types of events. The key is that information is shared and a schedule agreed upon with defined responsibilities for each team.
4. Media/Communications – primary and secondary objectives are defined and priorities for securing coverage, as well as allocating specific times in the schedule for media relations.

5. Hill meetings, if any, are also considered and time on the schedule is allocated for Hill meetings along with assignments for who is responsible for which meetings.

**Timing:**
Ideally, we will have two to three weeks advance notice of visitors/delegations. This provides sufficient time for the initial organizing meeting and subsequent follow up meetings to finalize details. In the past, we have been able to achieve good results on much shorter notice but it affects media/communications outreach and the ability to target audiences when there is short notice.

For example, will there be any events for Morocco surrounding the World Bank spring meetings next week? Although there is great competition for media attention during that week, there may be opportunities for one on one interviews that could be helpful to Morocco’s messaging.

I apologize for the array of questions and papers being sent to you. I’m sure as we get accustomed to your preferred way of operating, we will not have to bother you as much with such details. Thank you.
Rachad,
Thank you for your thoughtful response and I’m sorry I am sending so much material. I know it will get more efficient as the months go on, but I am pleased we are addressing all needs before us in an efficient manner. Again, thank you for your time and thoughtful consideration of my requests and comments. Ed

Ed,

Sorry to send to email you this late, just came back from a very impressive diner with Prince Salman bin Abdel Aziz Al Saoud, Saoudi Arabian Defense minister.

thank you for the update.
here is my feedback so we can stay on top of things:

1. **Secure time available:** Mouaad will be the focal point for securing time for the House meetings and Saida for Senate meetings while Sandrine and Ouissal will be requesting them.

2. **Prioritizing upcoming congressional meetings and selecting members.**

**must do meetings:**

- first with MDB which is scheduled for the 17th
- meeting Moroccan Caucus, met with Grim with Mouaad and we are working on a dinner for the co-chairs
- meeting with the replacement of Payne, already scheduled for the 18th

**Strategic meetings with Chairmen, committees and subcommittees with Jurisdiction our country**

- House Foreign Affair committee members: Ros-Lehtinen (will do a follow up meeting) and Berman
  - subcommittee: Chris Smith, Gary Ackerman, Karen Bass (scheduled the 18th)
- Senate Foreign Relations: Kerry, Lugar, Casey, Jim Risch
- House Appropriations: hall Rogers, Norm Dicks, Kay Granger, Nita Lowey (Mouaad and Jordan met with her staff)
- House Appropriations: Inouye, Thad Cochran
3. my guys told me that all material for the meetings is prepared by Jordan. This is why I suggested to hold follow up meetings (first one tomorrow at 11am).

4. face to face preparation meeting with you before important congressional visits are very useful but the material and talking points prepared before the meetings can prevent undue pressure on my schedule.

5. MAC staff will attend congressional meetings as agreed between us when need be.

6. am glad that Congressional staff visits are going well and they should continue, Fouad gives me feedback on all the meetings he attends. I also agree that a summary of the meetings is important as it will provide us with important information about where that members stands on different issues.

take care,

Rachad
Attached is an analysis of one of the chief lobbyists against Morocco. We are analyzing it very closely as it will aid us in future meetings on the Hill and with the Administration. We recommend an in-depth read. Ed
Foley Hoag LLP
Brief Overview

Following reception of the memo on Independent Diplomat’s activism at the UN dated 8 March 2012, we thought it relevant to provide relevant information on pro-Algeria and Polisario lobbyist’s activities in the United States. This memo on Foley Hoag, LLP is an addition to the memo previously sent on the activities of Independent Diplomat.

You will find below information on Foley Hoag’s history, current employees, activities, funding, as well as its contacts. The latter are of particular interest as they show access to Congress, State Department as well as media.

Background

Reichler & Soble first registered as foreign agents working on behalf of the SADR on 18 February 1992. The primary contact was through Ambassador Moulud Said.

According to publically available documents, the registrant “will represent SADR on matters that may affect the interests its principles.” It is also noted that the principle “shall reimburse the registrant for costs and expenses and that the registrant will represent the principal in communications with Members of Congress, their staffs, and in communications with the Executive Branch and its agencies.”

During this time, Paul Reichler met with Tim Reiser and Bernadette Paslo (House Subcommittee on Africa) on behalf of SADR (Meetings in March and April 1992); David Schorr met with Mark Murray (House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations) (Meetings in March and April 1992, November 1992); Paul Reichler met with Gare Smith (Office of Senator Kennedy) (June 1992). The firm dissolved and stopped representing any principals on 15 January 1993, thus terminating its relationship with SADR on that date.

The Law Offices of Paul S. Reichler took over all of Reichler & Soble’s foreign principles, including SADR on 1 March 1993. The details of the arrangement are the same as noted above. On 1 January 1994 the name of the firm became Reichler, Milton, and Midel.

On behalf of SADR, Paul Reichler held the following meetings during this time period:

05/07/93 Terry Peel, House Foreign Operations Subcommittee
05/07/93 Moulud Said
05/10/93 Representative Lee Hamilton
05/19/93 Representative Harry Johnston
05/19/93 Cliff Kupchan, House Subcommittee on Africa
05/19/93 Frank Kiehne, Office of Representative Donald Payne
05/19/93 Moulud Said
06/09/93 Representative Harry Johnson
06/09/93 Representative Esteban Torres
06/09/93 Representative Donald Payne
06/09/93 Representative Robert Torricelli
06/10/93 Representative Lee Hamilton
06/10/93 President Abdelaziz
The agreement with SADR was terminated on 1 April 1994. There was no activity on Western Sahara between 1994 and 2007.

**Foley Hoag’s activities**

Reichler, Milton, and Midel joined Foley, Hoag, and Eliot LLP on 1 June 1998. The firm became Foley Hoag LLP sometime in 2002 and signed an agreement with Algeria (not SADR) on May 16, 2007. This contract notes that payment should be through October 2007 at the fixed monthly rate of $30,000/month, but does not specify the length of the contract. There is no indication that the contract has fixed terms, nor is there any subsequent contract or renewal listed on FARA.

In the contract: “Mr. Gare A. Smith will keep the Embassy of Algeria closely apprised regarding the specific nature of his activities and the feedback received from the Congress, federal government officials, and civil society. Mr. Smith will be available for regular consultations with designated representative of the Embassy. He shall provide monthly written reports of activities undertaken in furtherance of the goals of this Agreement.”

As such, Foley Hoag provides council to and conducts lobbying activities for the Government of Algeria. Principal services include:
- Contribute to strengthening relations of friendship and cooperation between Algeria and US
- Work with members and staff of the Congressional and Executive branches of US government to facilitate a greater understanding of Algeria’s concerns and positions on various issues
- Mobilize non-governmental organizational, public, and media support for Algeria
- Promote Algeria’s role of peace and cooperation in world and regional affairs
- Enhance the image of Algeria in the US

**Employees who work on the Algeria/SADR issue**

**Gare Smith**

Mr. Gare Smith personally manages the Foley Hoag services on behalf of the Government of Algeria, under supervision of the Embassy of Algeria to the United States. Mr. Smith keeps the Embassy of Algeria closely apprised regarding the specific nature of his activities, and the feedback received from Congress, federal government officials, and civil society.

**Other Registered FARA Employees of Foley Hoag:**

- Alexander Aber
- Michelle Aldeman
- Essence Arzu
- Jayne Bulenta
- Jannis Brennan
- Clara Brillembourg
- Hemmie Chang
- Rodger Currie
- Euripides Dalmanieras
Funding

The Consulting and Legal Agreement stipulates that the Government of Algeria will pay Foley Hoag a fixed fee of $30,000.00 per month.

Payments reported to FARA:

05/16/07 – 09/30/07: $106,041.82
10/01/07 – 03/31/08: $205,340.00
04/01/08 – 09/30/08: $211,131.63
10/01/08 – 03/31/09: $212,436.88
04/01/09 – 09/30/09: $210,931.00
10/01/09 – 03/31/10: $211,230.73
04/01/10 – 09/30/10: $210,886.66
10/01/10 – 03/31/11: $210,724.00
04/01/11 – 09/30/11: $210,851.00

Contacts (Meetings)

Subjects discussed (all): The promotion of Algeria – US relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self determination. The Right to self-determination for the indigenous people of the Western Sahara.

Congress:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contact name</th>
<th>Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/24/2007</td>
<td>Noelle LuSane</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/21/2007</td>
<td>Noelle LuSane</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/10/2008</td>
<td>Noelle LuSane</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/24/2008</td>
<td>Antonia King</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/31/2008</td>
<td>Antonia King</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/2009</td>
<td>Antonia King</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/24/2009</td>
<td>Antonia King</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18/2010</td>
<td>Antonia King</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/2011</td>
<td>Algene Sajery</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/2011</td>
<td>Algene Sajery</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7/2011</td>
<td>Algene Sajery</td>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/15/2010</td>
<td>Elizabeth Hoffman</td>
<td>Rep. Frank Wolf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/20/2010</td>
<td>Elizabeth Hoffman</td>
<td>Rep. Frank Wolf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2/2010</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Gus Bilirakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/15/2010</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Gus Bilirakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/10/2010</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Gus Bilirakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/31/2011</td>
<td>Rebecca Ulrich</td>
<td>Rep. Jeff Duncan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/2007</td>
<td>Karin Finkler</td>
<td>Rep. Joe Pitts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/16/2008</td>
<td>Karin Finkler</td>
<td>Rep. Joe Pitts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/15/2008</td>
<td>Karin Finkler</td>
<td>Rep. Joe Pitts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/21/2008</td>
<td>Karin Finkler</td>
<td>Rep. Joe Pitts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/15/2010</td>
<td>Amanda Lahr</td>
<td>Rep. Joe Pitts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/16/2008</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/21/2008</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/18/2008</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/2009</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/30/2009</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/14/2009</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14/2012</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18/2010</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/22/2010</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/2010</td>
<td>Dan Murphy</td>
<td>Rep. Patrick Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1/2007</td>
<td>Alan Makovsky</td>
<td>Rep. Tom Lantos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/16/2008</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/9/2008</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/24/2008</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/7/2008</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/22/2009</td>
<td>Helen Hardin</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/20/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/19/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/30/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/28/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/18/2009</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/6/2011</td>
<td>Tina Ramirez</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/5/2011</td>
<td>Stephanie Hammond</td>
<td>Rep. Trent Franks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/24/2008</td>
<td>Katie Hargis</td>
<td>Rep. Vic Snyder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7/2009</td>
<td>Katie Hargis</td>
<td>Rep. Vic Snyder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/21/2010</td>
<td>Katie Hargis</td>
<td>Rep. Vic Snyder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12/2008</td>
<td>Sharon Waxman</td>
<td>Sen. Edward Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/2008</td>
<td>Sharon Waxman</td>
<td>Sen. Edward Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/16/2008</td>
<td>Sharon Waxman</td>
<td>Sen. Edward Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/16/2009</td>
<td>Sharon Waxman</td>
<td>Sen. Edward Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/21/2008</td>
<td>Phil Karsting</td>
<td>Sen. Herb Kohl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/31/2007</td>
<td>Sarah Margon</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/2/2008</td>
<td>Sarah Klotz</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/30/2008</td>
<td>Sarah Klotz</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/2008</td>
<td>Ryan Thompson</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/18/2009</td>
<td>Sarah Klotz</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5/2009</td>
<td>Sarah Klotz</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/24/2009</td>
<td>Joel Starr</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2/2010</td>
<td>Sarah Klotz</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7/2010</td>
<td>Sarah Klotz</td>
<td>Sen. James Inhofe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/14/2009</td>
<td>Frank Lowenstein</td>
<td>Sen. John Kerry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7/2010</td>
<td>Frank Lowenstein</td>
<td>Sen. John Kerry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/2/2011</td>
<td>Frank Lowenstein</td>
<td>Sen. John Kerry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/21/2007</td>
<td>Tim Riese</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/15/2008</td>
<td>Tim Reiser</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7/2008</td>
<td>Tim Reiser</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/5/2009</td>
<td>Tim Reiser</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/2009</td>
<td>Tim Riese</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1/2009</td>
<td>Tim Riese</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7/2009</td>
<td>Tim Riese</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/6/2010</td>
<td>Tim Riese</td>
<td>Sen. Patrick Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/30/2008</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Feingold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/20/2008</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Feingold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/3/2008</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Feingold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/20/2009</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Feingold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/5/2009</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Finegold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/26/2009</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Finegold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/30/2010</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Finegold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/5/2010</td>
<td>Peter Quaranto</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Finegold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/20/2010</td>
<td>Sarah Margon</td>
<td>Sen. Russ Finegold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/26/2011</td>
<td>Tom Buttry</td>
<td>Sen. Tom Harkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1/2011</td>
<td>Tom Buttry</td>
<td>Sen. Tom Harkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/2/2011</td>
<td>Tom Buttry</td>
<td>Sen. Tom Harkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/24/2011</td>
<td>Tom Buttry</td>
<td>Sen. Tom Harkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/13/2011</td>
<td>Hans Hogrefe</td>
<td>Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Media:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/8/2008</td>
<td>Scott Bronstein</td>
<td>Executive Producer, CNN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/6/2008</td>
<td>Scott Bronstein</td>
<td>Executive Producer, CNN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**State Department/Administration:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/26/2007</td>
<td>Bobby Pittman</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/2010</td>
<td>Dan Baer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name and Title</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/19/2010</td>
<td>Dan Baer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/2011</td>
<td>Dan Baer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/2/2010</td>
<td>Elisa Carlson-Reiner, Human Rights Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/19/2010</td>
<td>Elisa Carlson-Reiner, Human Rights Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/3/2010</td>
<td>Elisa Carlson-Reiner, Human Rights Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/2009</td>
<td>Eric Schwartz, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/19/2011</td>
<td>Eric Schwartz, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/3/2010</td>
<td>Harold Koh, Legal Adviser</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1/2010</td>
<td>Jason Ullner, Algeria Desk Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1/2010</td>
<td>Jessica Patterson</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/16/2010</td>
<td>Jessica Patterson, Algeria Desk Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/28/2010</td>
<td>Jessica Patterson, Algeria Desk Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/2/2010</td>
<td>Jessica Patterson, Algeria Desk Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/15/2010</td>
<td>Jessica Patterson, Algeria Desk Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/8/2010</td>
<td>Jessica Patterson, Algeria Desk Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17/2010</td>
<td>Jessica Patterson, Algeria Desk Officer</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5/2010</td>
<td>Maria Otero, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/2010</td>
<td>Maria Otero, Undersecretary of State for</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name and Title</td>
<td>Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/16/2010</td>
<td>Matt Keene, Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/19/2010</td>
<td>Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Below please find the March 2012 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

March 2012 Events Bulletin

March 12
Ambassadors Forum

March 13
Morocco and the Arab Spring

March 20
Will Democracy Succeed in the Arab World - Tunisia As A Model?

Ambassadors Forum

Date: 12 March 2012

1. Title: Ambassadors Forum
   Hosted by the National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce

   Participants:
   Thomas Krajeski: US Ambassador, Bahrain
   Anne Patterson: US Ambassador, Egypt
   James Jeffrey: US Ambassador, Iraq
   Gene Cretz: US Ambassador, Libya
   Samuel Kaplan: US Ambassador, Morocco
   Gordon Gray: US Ambassador, Tunisia
   Gerald Feierstein: US Ambassador, Yemen
   Henry Ensher: US Ambassador, Algeria
   Matthew Tueller: US Ambassador, Kuwait
2. Overview

Since the Arab Spring protests and demonstrations began in December 2010, governments have been overthrown in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Protests continue in parts of the Middle East and North Africa. The National US Arab Chamber of Commerce (NUSACC) Ambassador’s Forum brought together thirteen US Ambassadors to the Arab World to discuss the impact of the Arab Spring on US-Arab commercial relations. Half of the Ambassadors discussed the transformation of regional economies in the wake of the past year’s events, while the second group discussed efforts by oil-rich countries to diversify away from petroleum-based industries.

3. Summary

Following introductory remarks by US-Arab Chamber of Commerce Chairman Don DeMarino, seasoned diplomat Thomas Pickering gave a lengthy discussion on the significance of the 2011 Arab revolts. His guardedly optimistic remarks covered the crisis in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, and the general political changes in the Middle East and North Africa.

Ambassador Gordon Gray championed the opening of Tunisian markets to foreign trade and investment, which will benefit from the country’s proximity to multiple regions and accessible ports. Citing the Agadir Agreement, he noted that Tunisia is the only North Africa country that can trade with all of its neighbors. Looking toward further opportunities for US companies, Gray highlighted large tourism projects, mega infrastructure projects, and franchising. Gray said that OPIC’s $200 million commitment to North Africa can provide further support to foreign entry into regional markets.

Ambassador Samuel Kaplan hailed the Morocco “brand” as its claim to political stability and economic health. Morocco’s historical emphasis on the development of tourism has resulted in an excellent reputation among Americans and businesses of all sizes. According to Kaplan, the Arab Spring has had a positive effect that led to a new government and a new constitution. Although the King maintains the preponderance of power, he is acting in accordance with the enshrined principle of shared government in the Constitution. Pointing to the 150 or so American companies that already operate in Morocco, Kaplan invited newcomers to take advantage of the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement.

Conceding that Libya’s current political situation remained precarious, Ambassador Gene Cretz highlighted the NTC’s pronounced commitment to democracy. The number of political parties is exploding; election plans are proceeding with the aid of the United Nations; and the revolution’s anniversary passed without incident. Turning to the matter of oil, Cretz pointed out that production has recovered dramatically, pushing past expert estimates. He summed up that Libya was in a good spot for American investment, even if contracts were not immediately forthcoming due to security concerns.

Ambassador James Jeffrey discussed Iraq’s economic opportunities, noting that if Morocco’s brand is stability, Iraq’s may be instability. However, Iraq’s enormous hydrocarbon reserves will allow it to eventually compete with Saudi Arabia, and American companies should therefore look closely at investment opportunities. Heavy equipment, chemicals, defense, and information technologies will be key sectors in the near future. Jeffrey warned that Iraq’s business environment is a “daily challenge” - major constraints include a weighty bureaucracy that requires extensive permitting and legislating for larger projects. He pointed out that many countries, Turkey and Iran among them, have learned to adapt accordingly, and US companies should therefore be able to do the same. Jeffrey qualified that his assessment is based on the key assumption that Iraq will remain a unified nation with a steadily improving security situation.

Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson described the huge transformation in Egypt over the last year, which has also seen a relative liberalization of its economy. She said that the next six months will be very unsettled, as political uncertainty may exacerbate a sharp economic decline, but long term prospects for economic growth appear positive. One CITIGroup report predicts that Egypt may emerge from the next decade as a top ten global economy.

Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas Krajeski lamented the island nation’s failure to build on its economic achievements.
prior to recent civil unrest. The government now faces a drop in tourism, an exodus of businesses, and lost investment driven by a perception that unrest has affected the business climate. Krajeski acknowledged that, without a political resolution, Bahrain’s economy could continue to stagnate, causing rising unemployment and deeper social divides. He nevertheless expressed optimism that Bahrain would again realize its potential, most importantly through sector diversification, increased economic participation, and effective exploitation of the US-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement.

Algerian Ambassador Henry Ensher began the second session by comparing Algeria to his home state of California, complete with a Mediterranean climate, large landscapes, a diverse population, effective security forces, and immense cash reserves. But Ensher complained that much of its macroeconomic policy seems designed to thwart foreign investment, particularly in areas outside of the hydrocarbon sector. However, when it comes to defense, healthcare, and agribusiness, opportunities for high returns are ripe. Ensher said that his embassy in Algiers focuses primarily on security cooperation vis-à-vis Libya and the potential for the development of an al-Qaeda sanctuary in northern Mali. He concluded that “if the government would just get out of the way a little bit,” Algeria would immediately see benefits.

Ambassador to the UAE Michael Corbin argued that the UAE has benefited not only from the Arab Spring’s attendant instability, but also its focus on developing alternative energy industries. The World Future Energy summit invites businesses to enter a market destined for greatness in the future world economy. Corbin pointed out that the UAE is a place where the US brand is not only popular, but where it can actually compete with Indian and Chinese manufacturers. He foresees US businesses coming to the UAE and finding an atmosphere conducive to a regional integration and an ideal transportation hub.

Ambassador James Smith claimed that Saudi Arabia wants to become the prime destination for energy in general, not just petroleum products. Smith underscored the impact of increasing domestic consumption, which means Saudi Arabia may soon become a net importer of oil. Smith insisted that and making products out of downstream derivatives is far more efficient in terms of creating jobs and promoting diversification. As consumption in the West continues its decline, alternative energy sources proliferate, and shale oil and shale gas overcome their current challenges, Saudi Arabia faces the risk of falling into irrelevance as a global player.

Ambassador to Qatar Susan Ziadeh echoed previous claims that the nation is open for business. Basking in the glow of rapid GDP growth and expanding trade, Qatar’s emir has further developed his vision for 2030, which places a premium on diversification away from upstream energy production. There is also a tremendous emphasis on the development of petrochemical refinement. Ziadeh explained how education initiatives, such as Education City, have produced a new export sector in educated workers. Qatar is also exploring opportunities to host great numbers of sports events, which has pushed up the schedule for infrastructure development, an area in which American companies enjoy a comparative advantage.

Ambassador to Oman Richard Schmierer furthered the discussion on commercial diversification. He explained that, as a market, Oman has used revenues to attract American companies to invest in its gas sector, where it has seen rapid growth in exports. Tourism is Oman’s highest priority, although they are also focused on consultancy and franchising. The US-Oman Free Trade Agreement has led multiple corporations to base production there. In addition, Oman’s location, outside of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, allows it to market itself as a key location for those foreign investors who want to expand inwards toward Iraq and Iran. The government is consequently investing in new ports, airports, and railroad stations.

Ambassador Matthew Tueller recalled the storied history between the Kuwaiti government and large foreign firms. He said that Kuwaiti leaders frequently express an interest in seeing more American companies move to Kuwait. Like the other Gulf states, Kuwait has embarked on a development plan designed to reduce its dependence on oil revenues, and the new budget will fund over 100,000 projects in transportation, education, healthcare, IT, and alternative energy. Tueller argued that these are all areas in which US businesses possess a comparative advantage.

4. Q & A

Q: Does business have to wait for the Libyan elections before considering investment options?
A: (Cretz) I do not think you have to wait. You can keep saying well let’s wait until any point, but I think now is the time for business, because even if the top names change, those who are dealing with contracts and the economy will be part of the economic fabric of Libya for years to come. The point is you must come and establish yourself, making contacts that will keep you in good standing for years to come. The government is not in a position to make contacts as of now, but you have the power to meet the right people before and after the elections. In addition, they
are reviewing all the different laws from the Qaddafi era, and I will tell you that in terms of transparency and anti-corruption measures, this government is very committed to creating a new environment for business to come. That does not mean the entire rot that characterized the Qaddafi years will be gone, but I might add that one reason they are reluctant to start giving out new contracts is they are very aware of the eyes that are on them in terms of corruption, and they are making great efforts to avoid the taint of corruption.

Q: Many of the jobs in the Saudi sector are occupied by foreign labor, at the same time that there is high youth unemployment rate, so do young Saudis object to working in jobs that foreigners might take? How real is the problem of youth unemployment, politically and economically?

A: (Smith) I think the youth unemployment problem today is overstated, but the challenge for any one generation is understated. The challenge in Saudi Arabia is a bloated public sector as Saudis represent 90% of the public sector and 10% of the private sector, which means the government becomes the biggest obstacle toward developing small and medium enterprises. When you target 3rd party nationals as the problem, you will not solve the problem. You have to create new industry and new enterprises, with this hugely educated young generation coming of age, whom you bring in at entry level management and allow them to develop a career over time. You have to focus on the private sector to do that. It will be a challenge to be sure.

(Schmeier) I think there is a correlation in Oman, a minority country in the sense that the majority of residents are Omanis, and so most of the economy is run by Omanis. But the per capita income is 20,000 dollars a year. When you have a 100,000 dollar per year income, your needs for entering the workforce are much less. But I think Oman is doing a very good job of identifying where employment can be carried out in the most efficient manner.

(Ziadeh) In Qatar, only 250,000 out of almost 2 million are Qatari. Women are making up more and more of the workforce, but the good thing is there is too much work to go around, and the local population cannot fill the jobs.

Q: Why are European businesses in general so much more successful in the Middle East, and in particular the Gulf?

A: (Corbin) It is not the Europeans, it is the Turks, the Chinese, and the Indians. We need to highlight the fact that we have innovation in the US For example, pointing out that we have diet-conscious products, the same thing in healthcare and other areas where we have a real advantage.

(Smith) If you follow the money, it takes you to Riyadh. 51,000 Saudsi are going to school in the US for a reason, they want to connect with American business people. We came home after 9/11, and we were less active in Riyadh for five and half years. The world does not like a void, and so the South Koreans and Chinese filled it. But China wants to be a manufacturer, and Saudi Arabia’s problem is jobs, and so they will not get that from Asia—you will get it from Americans. So if Americans let competition result in a price competition, they will lose. If they present a whole value package that comes with education and training, where they are creating an industry there, creating a job there and here, then you have a winning combination.

(Tueller) I do hear this perception, and European governments do aggressively support foreign travel and visits with large business delegations, but I certainly do not see that in the trade figures. At the end of the day, it comes down to the products. When it comes to women’s education and healthcare, at least in Kuwait, that is where they want the US involved.

5. Observation

The event was attended by approximately 200 people from all areas of business and government. Major media were also present, including Al-Jazeera, C-SPAN, CNN, Foreign Policy Magazine, and the New York Times. Corporate sponsors for the event consisted of American and Arab companies representing a range of sectors, including Aramex (logistics), Dow Chemical (petrochemicals), DynCorp International (training & government services), Emaar (construction & engineering), General Dynamics (defense & security), and Qatar Airways (commercial airlines). The US business community’s strong interest in this event is a reflection of the growing commercial relationship between the United States and the Arab World. As a whole, the event reinforced the notion that the Moroccan “brand” of political stability remains hard to come by in North Africa, and the country therefore has an opportunity to reach out to American businesses. Moroccan businesses must make the case not only that Morocco can earn investors high returns, but that it is suitable as a platform from which foreign companies can expand into Africa.

(Back to top)

Morocco and the Arab Spring

Date: 13 March 2012
1. Title: Morocco and the Arab Spring
   Hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations

   Participants:
   H.E. Rachad Bouhlal: Ambassador, Kingdom of Morocco  
   Elliott Abrams: Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, CFR

2. Overview

Throughout the Arab Spring, Morocco has demonstrated leadership in promoting democratic reform without regime change, revising its Constitution through a national vote in July 2011 and electing a new government in November of that year. At this roundtable, Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal detailed Morocco’s reform processes and responded to questions about the implementation of the new Constitution.

3. Summary

Ambassador Bouhlal opened by providing his overall assessment of the Arab Spring. He noted that the events of 2011 took everyone by surprise and that the protests started in a very dramatic way. That said, the factors that ignited the protests – young populations, high unemployment, feelings of exclusion and injustice, income disparities, and corruption – had been prevalent for decades. While very few countries knew how to react to such protests and indeed are still sorting out the aftermath, what is true is that the region will never be the same.

Turning to Morocco, Ambassador Bouhlal explored the reasons for why the country is so different from the rest of its neighbors with regard to the Arab Spring. First, Morocco’s reforms have been going on for decades, beginning in 1980 with elements of reconciliation, the pardoning of the opposition leader, and continuing with elections in 1997. Thus, while some elements that caused the catalyst for protests were present in Morocco, the country’s dedicated commitment to reform, demonstrated by the presence of an opposition since 1997, created a degree of stability that mitigated a more prominent protest movement. Second, this stability is both maintained by the King and desired by the populace; the country knows where it is heading with the monarchy at the helm. Things are moving and change – certainly one King is not like the next, but they are moving at a stable pace. In the case of King Mohammed VI, he is viewed as a young King in tune with the demands of the people. So even when there were protests for more freedom and reform in Morocco, they never called for the overthrow of the King, who is viewed as uniting the country.

In elucidating these two primary differences between Morocco and the other leaders of the region, Ambassador Bouhlal provided two examples of reform – the reform of the family code and the equity and reconciliation commission. The reform of the family code was notable because it wouldn’t have happened without the leadership of the King. Prior to introducing the reform, it was widely viewed that such reform would be challenging to get through Parliament because of Islamist and Conservative opposition to it. Cognizant of this, the King commenced a drafting process that was all-inclusive – input was solicited from a variety of stakeholders, both in government and among the general populace. As a result, when the reform was presented to the Parliament, it was well-received.

Ambassador Bouhlal stressed that while this process was not perfect, it has nevertheless stood as a model for the Arab world. With regards to the reconciliation commission, Ambassador Bouhlal argued that it was unique because it was initiated without regime change. Again, while not perfect, it has been a key tool in addressing the past, providing retribution to victims, and helping Morocco learn to address human right in the future.

These reforms, among others such as the National Initiative for Human Development, provided the context for the country’s most recent reforms. Ambassador Bouhlal stressed the political debate is something that Morocco is used to and therefore it was not surprising that the King responded so quickly to the February 20th protests. In responding to the demands of the people, King Mohammed VI once again initiated an inclusive process, calling on all elements of society – civil society, unions, political parties – to participate in the draft proposal. The result was a Constitution overwhelmingly approved by the people. True to the Constitution and following November 2011’s elections, the Prime Minister was elected from the head of the party with the highest number of votes, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD). While the King is still in charge of foreign policy, defense, and other matters, the Prime Minister is now the Chief of Government. Speaking of the PJD and the new PM Abdelilah Benkirane, Ambassador Bouhlal stated that it was easy for the PJD to build a majority coalition since the party has been in the opposition for thirteen years. He further noted that Benkirane is very popular among the people, citing an anecdote about a bourgeoisie friend (who would not typically vote for an Islamist party) who voted for the PJD because he was fed up with all the other parties and hoping for a change. In closing, Ambassador Bouhlal noted that Morocco’s reforms have not been perfect and that the country faces continued challenges. That said, people seem to have trust
in the Moroccan government and it will indeed take time to implement all of the new measures found in the Constitution. Morocco will likewise need the support and advice of its allies as it continues its reform program.

4. Q & A

Q: (Ali Turbah, McLarty Associates) What was the motivation beyond the GCC’s overture to Morocco and what is Morocco’s current response?
A: (Ambassador Bouhlal) Morocco did not ask for membership, but special status is maybe okay. Why not? Primarily because Morocco needs to maintain its independent decision-making capabilities – we do not want to be constrained in our position on the Security Council by membership in the GCC. As you have seen, participation in the Arab League means that we sometimes vote as a bloc and we need flexibility on the Security Council. The GCC looks at Morocco with interest because it’s a monarchy that has successfully instituted reform. The first response was why are you doing this? Now it’s how are you doing it and what can be transferred to other monarchies – how to undertake reform and maintain stability. Nevertheless, a special status will bring a mutually beneficial relationship. Already the GCC has greatly supported the tourism sector in Morocco.

Q: (Hillel Fradkin, The Hudson Institute) There has been a lot of talk about models in the Arab Spring – the Turkish model, model, Moroccan model. It seems that the Moroccan model is the most promising. It is obviously hard to recreate the conditions you so helpfully explained. How do you describe the movement of reform going forward – the transition from a traditional monarchy to a constitutional monarchy?
A: (Ambassador Bouhlal) In most other countries, protesters were calling for the removal of leaders. This was not the case in Morocco, not even among Islamists. The King provides unity for the country. The reforms paved the path for elections and a new Prime Minister. Not even the PJD asked for the religious affairs portfolio or that of homeland security. The PJD found a way to deal with the palace, using the Constitution as a reference. It also appears that the PJD is going to confront some of the real issues in Morocco – corruption and transparency. Already it has taken steps to do so, announcing the list of special licenses for bus routes that people have long suspected of being corrupt in practice. But, it will not be easy. Changing a system of clientalism creates losers.

Q: (Maria McFarland, Human Rights Watch) There are huge gaps between the Constitution and a number of Morocco’s current laws. Are there any plans for reforming the penal code or the press code in particular?
A: (Ambassador Bouhlal) The Constitution has to be implemented. It guarantees freedom of the press, but you need to give the government time. The Constitution certainly calls for new laws that we created before its revision and laws need to be reconciled according to it. But, there are some things that are just different in Morocco. For example, in the US, the broadcast media has limits on what can be shown. I do not question those. Likewise, there are limits in Morocco that shouldn't be crossed. I’m not justifying anything, but this is all part of the debate and part of the changes taking place in Morocco. Changes on freedom of expression are certainly expected.
C: (Elliott Abrams) Well that certainly needs to change – if there were restrictions on that here, most of us would be in jail by now!

Q: (Dana M. Marshall, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP) From the economic and social perspective, Morocco has the gold standard in trade – the FTA. Is it working?
A: (Ambassador Bouhlal) It is not perfect. I met with DUSTR Miriam Sapiro and its clear that Morocco needs to implement the FTA. We suggested the creation of a working group. In looking at the figures from 2006-2011, the FTA is working, but we can do more. The Tanger-Med port presents an excellent opportunity to do so. Morocco has an FTA with Europe and sees the potential of using the port as a gateway for the US to the EU.

Q: (Dana M. Marshall, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP) What advice do you have for dealing with Egypt's Islamists?
A: (Ambassador Bouhlal) We are not a model and don’t want to be one, but we are prepared to share our experiences. That said, you can’t duplicate what happened in Morocco in Egypt.

Q: (Berl Bernhard, DLA Piper US LLP) Where is Morocco’s economy going? What are its particular weaknesses?
A: (Ambassador Bouhlal) Morocco has national strategies in a number of sectors – tourism, investment, renewable energies. On the energy front, Morocco has invested $9 billion in renewables and hopes to produce 38% percent of its energy from renewables, including hydraulic, wind, and sun, by 2020. We import 97% of our energy, so we have no choice. But we do want partnerships with foreign companies to implement this renewables strategy. We also have a strong electronics (airplane parts and cables) and automotive sector (Renault factory). In terms of weaknesses, unemployment is high, unemployment among graduates is particular high, and there is a lack of training for graduates – we need more cooperation between university graduates and industries. Illiteracy is also a tremendous problem. In our latest elections, because of the rate of illiteracy, people had to vote for symbols. We aren't proud of that and it's a continued challenge.
Q: (Eric D.K. Melby, Forum for International Policy) Why has fear of security services disappeared among protestors?

A: (Ambassador Bouhlal) I cannot speak to this in Morocco because the protests were never like elsewhere in the region. While there were big protests, police were on one side, protestors were on the other. Things have cooled down recently perhaps due to changes and a new Islamist government. People are still demanding more amendments to the Constitution – occupying ministries and agencies, but things seem to be slowing down overall.

5. Observation

15 policymakers and trade professional attended this off-the-record roundtable held at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ambassador Bouhlal provided a thorough overview of Morocco’s reform process and elucidated the reasons for its unique experience in promoting political and social reform. The audience was engaged throughout the Ambassador’s presentation and asked informed questions in the dialogue that followed. The sole pointed question came from the representative of Human Rights Watch and the Ambassador responded deftly. The Council on Foreign Relations provided an excellent forum to introduce the Ambassador to prominent experts in the think tank community and if the relationship continues to be cultivated, CFR may present more opportunities in the future.

(Back to top)
tourists from what was formerly a thriving vacation destination, and worker strikes and sit-ins have incurred losses of approximately $4 billion in the phosphate industry. The international community must provide Tunis with at least $5 billion in economic assistance, or risk the failure of a Tunisian democracy.

Masmoudi went on to say that for democracy to work in Tunisia, democratic ideals must not be conflated with an “anything goes mentality.” This is especially apparent in the wake of recent freedom of the press issues. The arrests of two journalists—one who depicted God as a cartoon and the other who portrayed a nearly-naked woman on the cover of a magazine—have attracted international criticism. However, Masmoudi argued, Tunisians as a people are conservative and modest. The majority of the population was very offended by both of these journalists and secular parties actually lost votes for publicly condemning the arrests. Democracy must co-exist with the religious and cultural values of a society, or risk alienating the people. It is possible to respect religious and social values while instilling a culture of human rights and liberties.

In fact, it is this popular distrust of an “anything goes mentality” that has allowed extremist groups to gain traction. The Salafists and Wahhabs preach a very simple message: democracy and secularism threaten Tunisians’ identity. Democracy is immoral, godless, and inherently incompatible with Islam; everything is either halal or haram, there is nothing in between. Tolerating actions that offend popular values in the name of democracy will only fuel extremists’ influence and impede democratic reform.

4. Q & A

Q: (Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center) Who exactly represents the Salafist leadership?
A: (Masmoudi) Many of the leaders are individuals who were either living in the Gulf States in exile or were in prison during Ben Ali’s regime. In his absence they are free to spread their message, and this could prove very dangerous. They are extremely well-funded; they sponsor speakers every week that draw crowds of 10 – 50 thousand people. Their rhetoric about preserving the “Tunisian identity” is very appealing to younger generations.

Q: (Independent consultant) How do you see countries like Tunisia progressing toward democracy in the midst of a developing anti-Western, xenophobic, counter-reform movement?
A: (Masmoudi) Many people feel that the West, especially the US, has tried to dominate politics and power in the region, but I can confidently say that this movement is superficial. Tunisians have no qualms with the West itself, perhaps with its international policies, but no feeling that could be accurately characterized as xenophobic. Fortunately Washington began distancing itself from the Ben Ali regime back in 2004, which undermines the idea of America trying to control regional politics.

Q: (Robert Webb, National Press Club) Could you touch on the current situations in Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan?
A: (Masmoudi): For the first time, Algeria has announced that it will permit international observers to monitor the upcoming elections, which is very promising. Jordan, unfortunately, is not doing as well; King Abdullah’s reforms have proven piecemeal and insubstantial. He missed a very important opportunity. The situation in Egypt is unclear, but certainly very troubling.

Q: (International Forum for Electoral Systems) Ennahda is very well-organized and competent group of professionals. What is their strategy for mitigating the Salafist influence?
A: (Masmoudi) The Salafist issue is a top priority for Ennahda. They want to engage peacefully with them and allow them to participate politically, but the party must be cautious. If Ennahda is too open with the Salafists, the latter could potentially infiltrate the party—alienating moderate voters and dominating the political scene.

Q: (Middle East Institute) The importance of tourism as a job creator cannot be underestimated, but tensions between foreigners staying in luxury hotels along the coast, for example, and conservative Tunisians have become fodder for social ills. How can Tunis revive this crucial economic sector without creating serious social conflicts?
A: (Masmoudi) I am confident that Tunisia will always be a tourist destination; in the long term this issue will naturally reconcile itself. For the short term, however, unemployment, currently at approximately 25% and rising, could contribute to large scale social unrest. In the interim, foreign economic assistance could help maintain stability.

5. Observation

This discussion, which was attended by approximately 15 professionals from various Washington think tanks, NGOs, and press agencies, focused almost entirely on Tunisia, and most likely would be of little use to MAC. Masmoudi feels that a successfully democratic Tunisia could be a model for other countries in the region, namely Egypt, Libya,
and Algeria, looking to embark on democratic change. However, his reason for thinking this lies solely in his belief that Tunisia’s democratic aspirations are the most promising in the region, thanks to its highly educated and homogenous population, entrenched women’s rights, diverse economy, and developed infrastructure. Were other countries in the region to follow Tunisia as a model, they would still struggle to educate their populations, promote women’s rights, and develop their economies and infrastructures—all endeavors that are critical to successful democratization.

(Back to top)
We should discuss this on phone or in person. I'll see you shortly. Ed

---

Dear Ed,

I thought I would give you my insight on how today's meeting with Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart went, as I think it was a very interesting one.

Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart is a wonderful man with great qualities. He showed his great sense of hospitality and warmth and expressed his deep admiration to the King.

The exchange went extremely well. We spoke about the reforms process, development efforts, arab spring, Sahara etc...

I also raised the fundamental question of how to implement Congress' decision to spend US money in the South of Morocco, as it was included in last year's report language.

I was surprised that the Congressman and his staff started by raising the issue of UNHCR language. How did he know I was going to raise this issue, especially that Saida and Mouaad told Jordan that I will not raise it.

Rachad.
Dear Rachad,

Again I want to thank you for last night’s dinner. You are a very gracious host and I know everyone enjoyed themselves. I found the conversation and exchanges most helpful and interesting. You provided a very good setting for everyone to relax and feel at home with the conversation.

I am travelling tomorrow to Rabat, on other client matters, and do not want the Mario question to linger until I get back. I’d like to give you my quick thoughts on the meeting and hopefully we can discuss the matter in person after next week. There is probably a short and longer answer to your question, “How did he know I was going to raise this issue, especially that Saida and Mouaad told Jordan that I will not raise it.”

The short answer lies in email we sent you in response to your instructions to us:

Begin original email:
----- Original Message -----
From: Jordan Paul
To: saida Zaid <zaidouelli@hotmail.com>
Sent: Mon Apr 16 15:12:25 2012
Subject: RE: Bill Language

Ed and the team and I briefly discussed this and we really appreciate your candor. First and most importantly, this is the Ambassador's call.

However, we would be remiss if we didn’t give you our best advice. Mario and his staff are up to speed on this issue and are prepared to say yes to this request, in principle. The final language will not be sorted out in this meeting but we can secure his agreement on this project going forward. Frankly, we think it is important that we do this tomorrow. We know that we can meet with Mario on short notice, though it is still important to maximize our time with him. As we discussed on Friday, the timing on this request is important because the Appropriations process is going to be moving forward in the next 6 weeks - not in July like last year. Tomorrow is the perfect time to make this request.

Because of this, we feel he can do both things in this meeting: get to know him and agree on this project.

Of course, it is up to the Ambassador and we fully respect any decision he makes.

Thanks, Jordan
End original email

Rachad, in the email we stated that Mario was up to speed on the issue and was prepared to discuss UNHCR with you. So it was natural for him to ask a question on the matter. This is an issue we have been discussing for several months now and have discussed the general concept in our meetings on the Hill. We have not discussed specific language, as that was just agreed to by our staffs last Friday, and it is pending your approval. Mario does not have specific language but he was well aware of the issue for several months. I think the email answers your question. I suppose we could have called Mario’s office and told him that you did not intend to bring up/discuss the issue and that he should not therefore bring it up. But as you can imagine, that might have been more awkward than saying nothing. We were not instructed to stop him in any way, but rather that you were not going to discuss the matter. As it turned out, you
handled the issue well and deflected the conversation.

The longer answer lies in a failure of our process. I am wondering what I could have done/should have done that would have prevented this from happening. I think we've got the beginning of a good way of interacting, but obviously we failed in this regard. I would like to discuss this further with you to see what we can do in the future to avoid such problems, and I know we can do it. My initial thought is that it will require more than the exchange of emails, or talking through our staffs.

I hope this email will provide you with some understanding until we have more time to thoughtfully discuss the matter, and I am sorry for any misunderstanding in this regard. Ed

Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph:  +1 202 887 1113
Fax:  +1 202 887 1115
Email:  ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website:  www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Can u take a call now from me?

----- Original Message -----  
From: Rachad Bouhlal [mailto:rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 09:33 AM  
To: Edward Gabriel  
Subject: Mario Question  

Ed,

Thank you for the kind words. It was a pleasure to meet them and put names on faces. I really enjoyed it.

As for the Mario Question, you wanted to talk about it in person or on the phone. Anyway, in the same email Jordan sent to Saida he said: "Of course, it is up to the Ambassador and we fully respect any decision he makes".

Moreover, Mouaad said clearly during the congressional meeting last Friday that "we need to wait for the Ambassador’s approval on the language".

I made my decision that it was too early and Mouaad told Jordan the same day.

I still don't understand why would your office talk to anyone in Congress about something I didn't see or at least talked to you about. It just would get us into awkward situations, especially with our closest allies, like what happened yesterday.

Thanks,

Rachad
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 19, 2012 8:57 AM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: FW: Amb Susan Rice Remarks re: WS

Rachad,
I found Ambassador Rice’s comments below interesting and helpful, especially her mention of the King’s initiative to establish a Human Rights Council. I know some of our colleagues believe that the US makes a commitment of support on the rollover to Morocco, but then does not fight in private UNSC session to protect their agreement during the drafting process. I am encouraged however by Bill Burns comments to you and the Minister when he mentioned the King’s counsel and the importance of the M6 initiative. Combined with Susan Rice’s comments, it appears to me they have stronger marching orders this year than last and will therefore work with other members to make sure their agreement holds. Ed

Q&A followed by Rice statement:

Reporter: Question on Western Sahara and then one more on Syria. Are you concerned at all about the changes that have been made to the Secretary-General’s report prior to it reaching what I guess is now its final form, and is this, the South African Ambassador said as he was leaving—that he considered it deplorable that this happened. And then on Syria, could you maybe tell us a bit about what’s expected to come out of the friends of Syria meeting that they’ve announced in Washington that Secretary of State Clinton will be attending in Paris tomorrow.

Ambassador Rice: No, I will leave that to the State Department to comment on your later point. With respect to the Secretary-General’s report, that was a point that the Ambassador of South Africa made repeatedly in the session. I think maybe one other delegation echoed that concern. I think most countries including our own were dealing with the report as it came to us in final form and treating its analysis and recommendations on their face. And we as penholder who will have to draft the resolution, have no alternative but to view the report as it came to us, and it will be the basis for the renewal of the mandate.

From: Calvin Dark
Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 4:13 PM
To: Edward Gabriel; Robert M. Holley; Jean AbiNader; Jordan Paul; Fatima Kurtz; Garth Neuffer; Caitlin Dearing
Subject: Amb Susan Rice Remarks re: WS

FYI...below are Amb. Rice’s remarks during yesterday’s press stakeout re: the UNSC WS debate. Note, she acknowledges the kidnapping of international aid workers AND the fact that Morocco “had opened two National Human Rights Commissions in Dakhla and Laayoune, and the continuing commitment of Morocco to ensure access to all Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council.”

We going to tweet it out/mention @AmbRice and I think we should incorporate it in whatever release we put out re: MINURSO (unless she says anything stronger after the vote.) --CD

Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U. S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
At the Security Council Stakeout
Susan E. Rice
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
New York, NY
April 17, 2012

Ambassador Rice: Good afternoon. The Security Council had sessions both on the Western Sahara and on the situation
between Sudan and South Sudan, and I’ll brief you on both, starting with Western Sahara. The Council heard briefings today from SRSG Abdel-Aziz and the Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Chris Ross on the situation in Western Sahara and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO.

SRSG Abdel-Aziz briefed that MINURSO’s area of operation was relatively quiet over the past year, with the exception of deadly clashes in Dakhla in September 2011 and the abduction of three international aid workers who were kidnapped in October 2011 near the Tindouf Camps in Algeria, the first such abduction incident since MINURSO was established. SRSG Abdel-Aziz reported that there was a decrease in overall violations of the military agreement over the course of the year by all parties. He also outlined challenges to MINURSO's operations in implementing its mandate including freedom of movement and free access to interlocutors.

Ambassador Chris Ross updated the Council on the three rounds of informal talks he’s held over the past year which showed the parties’ willingness to continue to meet, to discuss specific subjects of mutual interest, and to take additional steps to implement prior agreements on Confidence Building Measures and to explore new measures. However, Ambassador Ross reported that no progress was made on the core issues of the future status of Western Sahara.

Ambassador Ross reported to the Council that at the conclusion of the most recent talks in March, the parties agreed to meet for two more rounds of informal talks in June and July, and they welcomed his trip to the region in May, which will include an extensive visit for the first time to Western Sahara.

Council members welcomed the efforts of the Personal Envoy to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution and the agreement of the parties to hold additional informal talks this year.

Many Council members also highlighted the need to improve the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps. They noted that Morocco had opened two National Human Rights Commissions in Dakhla and Laayoune, and the continuing commitment of Morocco to ensure access to all Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council.

Council members also thanked SRSG Abdel-Aziz for his four years of service as head of MINURSO.
FYI – NATO Allied Command’s Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) in Norfolk, VA just released a new report, “Security Threat in the Sahel and Beyond: AQIM, Boko Haram & al Shabaab,” which cites the recent ICTS Study (map on p. 1) and Carnegie Paper on links between AQIM and the Polisario-run camps. In its introduction, CFC warns that an “Arc of Instability” (links to ICTS study) of insurgent and terrorist groups in Africa's Sahel poses a “greater risk for instability not only in the region but for the international community.”

The CFC report references the Carnegie Paper (on p. 3), saying: “The danger of destabilization in Western Sahara is real with AQIM’s ability to smuggle weapons drugs and contraband among neighboring countries. Boukhars indicates that there are also growing links between AQIM and Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The author suggests that, while the Moroccan controlled Western Sahara is generally stable, the Polisario-run Tindouf camps are becoming havens for ‘militancy, illegality and drug smuggling.’ Malian officials have repeatedly claimed that the Polisario is involved in kidnappings and drug smuggling in the region.”

Note: NATO Allied Command created the CFC in 2008 with think tank/NGO Desk Officers to analyze and share information between civilian and military sectors on complex world crises. First page and link to CFC report are below. Full report is attached. This article underscores the work and analysis we have been doing is finding its way into the mainstream press.

Security Threats in the Sahel and Beyond: AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab

April 2012

This document discusses current security threats in the Sahel and surrounding regions, with the rise of groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and al Shabaab. A brief background and current events will be presented for each group, along with a review of regional cross-cutting issues. Related information is available at www.cavicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

Security threats in Africa’s Sahel region, spanning the northern tier of the African continent, have existed for decades. However, in recent years security analysts have focused their attention on the increasingly sophisticated attacks by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the now al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab based in Somalia and the insurgent group Boko Haram based in northern Nigeria. Increased fighting in this “arc of instability” as well as changing tactics among insurgent and terrorist groups might reveal a growing relationship between these groups and as a result pose a greater risk for instability not only in the region but for the international community. The following report will provide a brief review of AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab in the Sahel region based upon open source reports and will also highlight potential linkages.

NEW TERRORISM HOT SPOT: AFRICA’S SAHEL

ICTS – International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies – January 2012

AQIM
According to the BBC, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) dates from the 1990s and grew out of an insurrection mounted by an Islamicist resistance movement protesting the Algerian regime's decision to end...

1 See Telegraph, “Top US General Warns of Coordination Between al Qaeda Linked African Terror Groups”, 01 March 2012

The Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) is an information and knowledge management organization focused on improving civil-military interactions, facilitating information sharing and enhancing situational awareness through the CavinWeb portal and our weekly and monthly publications. CFC products are based upon and link to open-source information from a wide variety of organizations, research centers and media sources. However, the CFC does not endorse and cannot necessarily guarantee the accuracy or objectivity of these sources. CFC publications are independently produced by Knowledge Managers and do not reflect NATO policies or positions of any other organization.
Security Threats in the Sahel and Beyond: AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab

This document discusses current security threats in the Sahel and surrounding regions, with the rise of groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and al Shabaab. A brief background and current events will be presented for each group, along with a review of regional cross-cutting issues. Related information is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

Security threats in Africa’s Sahel region, spanning the northern tier of the African continent, have existed for decades. However, in recent years security analysts have focused their attention on the increasingly sophisticated attacks by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the now al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab based in Somalia and the insurgent group Boko Haram based in northern Nigeria. Increased fighting in this “arc of instability” as well as changing tactics among insurgent and terrorist groups might reveal a growing relationship between these groups and as a result pose a greater risk for instability not only in the region but for the international community. The following report will provide a brief review of AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab in the Sahel region based upon open source reports and will also highlight potential linkages.

AQIM
According to the BBC, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) dates from the 1990s and grew out of an insurrection mounted by an Islamist resistance movement protesting the Algerian regime’s decision to end

---

The Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) is an information and knowledge management organisation focused on improving civil-military interaction, facilitating information sharing and enhancing situational awareness through the CimicWeb portal and our weekly and monthly publications. CFC products are based upon and link to open-source information from a wide variety of organisations, research centres and media sources. However, the CFC does not endorse and cannot necessarily guarantee the accuracy or objectivity of these sources. **CFC publications are independently produced by Knowledge Managers and do not reflect NATO policies or positions of any other organisation.**
parliamentary elections in 1992. Experts believe that these elections would have resulted in the Islamic Salvation Front political party gaining a majority. The Islamist resistance group was originally part of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) but eventually declared its independence in 1998 out of concerns that GIA’s violent methods were hurting the Islamist cause. Once separated from GIA, the group was called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and was popular for its commitment to fighting the Algerian government while simultaneously working to prevent indiscriminate killing of civilians in the process. According to a 2007 report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Osama bin Laden was involved in the GSPC’s early formation. Although the group declared its allegiance to al Qaeda in 2003, it was not officially approved by al Qaeda’s senior leadership until January 2007, at which point GSPC changed its name to AQIM, reports the US National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC). A 2010 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, “Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy”, explains that it is “not clear what AQIM’s unity with or allegiance to al Qaeda means in practice as the group does not appear to take directions from leaders in Afghanistan/Pakistan”.3

AQIM initially pursued a targeted suicide bombing campaign in Algeria, says the Long War Journal. However, by 2008 these attacks tapered off and were replaced with “ambushes against security forces and kidnapping operations”, the latter of which provides millions of dollars in financing for its operations. AQIM collected an estimated USD 70 million in ransom payments between 2006 and 2011. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggests that AQIM conducted 33 attacks in Algeria in 2007 which increased to a high of 40 attacks in 2009. One of the more notable incidents was the bombing of the UN building and a court house in Algiers on 11 December 2007, which killed an estimated 67 people in the simultaneous attacks. Experts further suggest that AQIM is capable of conducting kidnapping operations of foreigners inside and outside of Algeria in order to collect ransom payments and/or for the exchange of militant Islamist prisoners. Hostages are said to be held in remote areas close to the Algerian border with Mali.

AQIM reportedly maintains mobile training camps along the Algeria-Mali border and has taken advantage of the porous borders of the Sahel region in order to move people and supplies. According to a 2011 US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security report, “Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the US Homeland”, AQIM has recently expanded its operations into Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and other countries in response to intensified counter-terrorism crackdowns by North African governments. As AQIM moves south, it has expanded its operations to include local militant groups and has become involved in drug trafficking. The CRS report states that the group has carried out raids on military and police targets, kidnapped and assassinated soldiers and tourists, attacked foreign embassies, and repeatedly clashed with the militaries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Algeria.

The European Union’s (EU) counter-terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerczove, stated in August 2011 that AQIM had “gained access to weapons, either small arms or machine-guns, or certain surface-to-air missiles,” reports Agence France-Presse (AFP). Confirmation of this came in November 2011, when one of AQIM’s commanders, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (also known as Khaled Abou al-Abbas), said in an interview with Mauritania’s private news agency ANI, that the group had obtained weapons as a result of the Libyan conflict, reports Reuters. However he did not state what types of weaponry the group had obtained nor did he disclose how they obtained the weapons. In late November, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague stated that the fighting in Libya had created the potential for “new recruits” for AQIM in the form of former mercenaries “who have left Libya and have little opportunities elsewhere.

The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), a leading academic institute for global counter-terrorism studies, released a report in January 2012 on the new AQIM splinter group called Jamaat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Ifriqiya (The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa- MOJWA). MOJWA comprises young militants who separated from the leadership of AQIM. Although they reportedly have the same goals as AQIM,

---

2 According to the Council on Foreign Relations, GIA gained a reputation for targeting anyone even remotely affiliated with the military and government, in addition to killing civilians and foreign nationals. The GIA sought to establish a Muslim state ruled by sharia law. The Algerian civil war that resulted was ranked as one of the most violent conflicts in the 1990s.
3 United Press International reported on 27 December that senior British officials believe al-Qaeda’s core leadership in Pakistan has begun to move to North Africa.
4 Actual numbers of those killed in the attack varies by source, with others citing 41 killed in the twin attacks.
5 Also known as the Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).
MOJWA seeks to fund their activities through the use of kidnappings for ransom. A Mauritanian man, Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, is the presumed leader of the splinter group, prompting Mauritania to issue a warrant for his arrest for “supporting terror groups in the Sahel”, reports AFP. MOJWA released a statement on 10 December 2011 claiming responsibility for the 23 October abduction of three Europeans in Algeria and threatened to spread jihad beyond North Africa to sub-Saharan West Africa, reports Middle East Online. Until this statement was released, it had been assumed the kidnappings had been carried out by AQIM. ICT reports that “MOJWA is unique in that its leadership is comprised of black Africans, despite a history of tension between Arabs and black Africans. In the past, perceived Arab disregard for blacks had given rise to inter-organizational tension and resentment; another possible reason for the split”.

Additionally, Algerian analyst Mohamed Mokeddem believes the splits in leadership are occurring as a result of “suspicions that the group’s [AQIM] Algerian leadership… is infiltrated by the Algerian security services” and also the new availability of weapons from Libya. Magharebia reports that the split could also represent the broader trend across North Africa of young people turning against unilateral authority on the part of their leaders. “If the Arab Spring represents a civil revolt against despotic leaders, young terrorists could be seen as echoing that sentiment” explains Dah Ould Hamadi, an analyst of Salafist groups and Sahel terrorism. Previously, AQIM had sought to prevent internal resentment and defections by promoting disaffected young fighters to important roles and dividing the Sahara emirate into quasi-autonomous battalions in efforts to provide more titles and defined roles to more fighters, reports Magharebia.

Recent AQIM Developments
Algeria
Reuters reports that Libyan weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles, were discovered by Algerian security forces near the Libyan border on 18 February 2012. This discovery reinforces concerns regarding the smuggling of weapons out of Libya to unknown groups in the region, including AQIM.

Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia reassured Algerians that the government is committed to eradicating terrorism in the country. His announcement came following an attack on a police station in Tamanrasset, which was reportedly carried out by the splinter group MOJWA. Tamanrasset is home to a regional security task force which aims to counter AQIM, with participation from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. This attack is seen as an attempt to halt regional counter-terrorism activities. In related news, AFP reports that the MOJWA has demanded a ransom of EUR 30 million (USD 39 million) for the three aid workers, two Spanish nationals and one Italian national, taken hostage in October 2011 from a refugee camp run by the Polisario Front. The kidnapping was originally tied to AQIM but was later found to have been conducted by MOJWA.

Additional steps taken by Algerian authorities include the prosecution of suspected AQIM members. Most recently, the head of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel, received a death sentence in absentia from Algerian courts on 13 March 2012, says BBC. He was found guilty on charges of “murder, membership of a terrorist organisation and attacks using explosives”, along with 17 others accused in bomb attacks committed in Algiers in 2007. It is alleged that Droukdel, also called Abou Mossab Abdelwadoud, introduced suicide bombings to Algeria following his return from fighting with the insurgency in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika signed a new terror finance law which requires banks in the country to monitor transactions that are suspicious, according to Magharebia.

Western Sahara
In an article from the Carnegie Endowment, Anouar Boukhars explains that the danger of destabilisation in Western Sahara is real with AQIM’s ability to smuggle weapons, drugs and contraband among neighbouring

---

6 AQIM has kidnapped foreigners for ransom; however Magharebia reports that MOJWA is defying the common Sahel terrorist’s practice of focusing on only foreigners for ransom. It is believed that MOJWA may be responsible for the kidnapping of a Mauritanian gendarme.

7 ICT also believes that “like AQIM, it is likely MOJWA will exploit the excess of weapons looted from the fall of the Gaddafi regime to assist their operational activities”.

8 For more information on Libyan Weapons, please see CFC report “Unsecured Libyan Weapons: Regional Impact and Possible Threats”, January 2012.
countries. Boukhars indicates that there are also growing links between AQIM and Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The author suggests that, while the Moroccan controlled Western Sahara is generally stable, the Polisario-run Tindouf camps are becoming havens for “militancy, illegality and drug smuggling”. Malian officials have repeatedly claimed that the Polisario is involved in kidnappings and drug smuggling in the region.

**Mali**

Malian officials assert that AQIM is responsible for the January 2012 attacks in Afuelhok during which time summary executions were carried out by anti-government forces led by Tuareg rebels, says Magharebia. Officials say the style and nature of the attacks resemble those of AQIM. However, the National Liberation Movement for the Azawad (MNLA) spokesman, Mossa Ag Atter, refuted claims that the group is linked to AQIM, further suggesting that “the MNLA shares no interests nor policies with this terrorist organisation”, reports AFP. Meanwhile, AdnKronos reports that AQIM is moving its base in northern Mali to southern Algeria as a result of the on-going conflict between Tuareg rebels and Malian soldiers. The new location is in a mountainous area some 90 kilometres from Timiaouine, Algeria.

**Mauritania**

Elsewhere in the region, Mauritanian officials are increasing border security in an effort to fight AQIM, prevent the kidnapping of foreigners and address the smuggling of illegal immigrants, reports Magharebia. Three new transit points have been established for foreigners travelling in the southern province of Brakna, while the border area has been demarcated to facilitate patrols.

**Boko Haram**

Boko Haram is an Islamist movement based primarily in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. According to the Nigeria Guardian, the group was primarily based in the states of Borno, Yobe, Katsina, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe, and Kano in its early beginnings, but have since expanded to “virtually all northern states and are advancing their frontiers to other parts of the country”. The BBC reports that the group’s official name, Jama’afu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, is Arabic, meaning ‘people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad’. In the north-eastern Nigerian town of Maiduguri where the group was founded, the local people call the group Boko Haram, which, in the local Hausa language, is a phrase loosely translated as “Western education is dangerous” or “Western education is forbidden”.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the charismatic radical young Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusuf created Boko Haram in 2002 with the aim of establishing a fully Islamic state in Nigeria. Yusuf’s followers consisted mainly of impoverished northern Islamic students and clerics. However, he gained other supporters by speaking out against corruption within the Nigerian government. A US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security report from November 2011 states that prior to 2009, the group did not aim to violently overthrow the Nigerian government but primarily engaged in low-level battles with local police forces and non-compliant villagers. This approach changed in 2009 when Nigerian police forces clashed with members of Boko Haram in Borno state, followed by more clashes in the neighbouring states of Bauchi, Yobe and Kano (see map below). The fighting culminated on 30 July, 2009 with a Nigerian army intervention in the northern city of Maiduguri. More than 700 died during the regional uprising and Nigerian soldiers broadcasted the execution of Yusuf. In the aftermath of fighting, Boko Haram was forced underground and many members fled to

---

9 A recent three-day dialogue was held 11-13 March, between Moroccan officials and the Polisario Front, representatives of the Sahrawi people, regarding the autonomy or self-determination of Western Sahara. During the past 36 years, more than 165,000 Sahrawis have fled into camps in Tindouf, southern Algeria.

10 The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that recent fighting between Malian forces and MNLA fights has resulted in the displacement of more than 172,000 Malians from their homes in northern Mali into other towns and neighbouring countries.
neighbouring countries but in 2010, under the leadership of Iman Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram re-emerged with members carrying out violent operations against government targets in northern states. The University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) global terrorism database shows there were 11 armed attacks and two bombings attributed to Boko Haram in 2010. Shehu Sani, in his 2011 article on the history, ideas and revolt of Boko Haram, listed eight explosive-related incidents in addition to armed assaults conducted by Boko Haram in 2010. The two most notable attacks in 2010 involved the freeing of more than 700 inmates from a prison in Bauchi state and a series of bombings on Christmas Eve, 2010, in Jos that killed 80 people. Jos is a town located in central Nigeria at the ‘Middle Belt’ dividing the northern Muslim and southern Christian regions of Nigeria.

In 2011, Boko Haram was allegedly responsible for several attacks throughout the April election cycle which included bombings of polling centres and electoral commission offices. Following several bombings in late May, the BBC reports that Boko Haram demonstrated a change in its tactics with the use of suicide bombings. The most notable of which was a 26 August suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (V-IED) attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja, in which 23 people were killed and an additional 116 injured. On 04 November, the group bombed police stations, churches, a bank and an army base in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state, reports the Christian Science Monitor. According to AFP, the coordinated attacks left more than 150 dead and approximately 100 wounded. In December 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a series of Christmas Day attacks on multiple churches that killed at least 40 people, reports the Telegraph.

A recent report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, suggests that Boko Haram will not be stopped by military force but that northern Nigeria’s communities need to receive socio-economic support from the government to dissuade them from supporting the militant group. The author describes Boko Haram as a “fanatical sect” that is not in line with the majority of Nigeria’s Muslim population.

Recent Boko Haram Developments

Prior to June 2011, there had not been a recorded suicide bomb attack in Nigeria. The Telegraph reports that Boko Haram members had traditionally carried out attacks using hit-and-run assassination methods from the back of motorbikes; however, in recent years Boko Haram has begun targeting high profile targets with greater causalities.

Information on current attacks by Boko Haram was collected by CFC Desk Officers until 15 March 2012. For additional information, please see the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) timeline of Boko Haram attacks.
Nigerian Response
Nigerian officials continue their efforts to counter attacks by Boko Haram in northern areas of the country. Nigerian police officials claimed to have captured the Boko Haram spokesman known as Abdul Qaqa in February 2012 by tracing his mobile phone, however, Boko Haram says the man is not the group’s spokesman but a senior official in charge of “public enlightenment”, reports AFP. Further gains were made with the “recapture” of Kabiru Sokoto, the suspected mastermind of the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a Nigerian church in Madalla, reports BBC. He is said to be affiliated with Boko Haram militants and escaped custody in February during a search of his home. Authorities have also taken additional measures to prevent foreign fighters from joining Boko Haram through the establishment of a repatriation programme for foreigners from Niger and Chad. Nigerian officials claim that Boko Haram militants recruit foreign fighters from neighbouring countries and this repatriation programme is aimed to undermine these efforts. Immigration officials say that nearly 11,000 foreigners from Niger and Chad have been repatriated in the past six months, reports AFP. In response to Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathans’ threat that he will shut down Boko Haram in three months, the group release a video suggesting that they will bring down the government in three months, reports Vanguard.

Security
In February 2012, Boko Haram militants are said to have conducted retaliatory attacks for the arrests of suspected members in the Baga fish market in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri market. One attack killed at least 30 people, just a day after explosions and gunfire struck the same market. This was followed by yet another bombing of a Nigerian church in Jos, on 26 February. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan urged citizens to remain calm, stating “those who seek to divide us by fear and terror will not succeed”. Just two weeks later, on 12 March, al Jazeera reported that at least 14 people died as a result of an additional bombing of a Catholic church in Jos and other attacks in the city. Boko Haram has reportedly carried out the attacks in retaliation for raids on Islamic schools, allegedly conducted by Nigerian security forces, by burning public and private schools. At least 12 schools have also been targeted in Maiduguri alone since late February, reports Daily Trust. Meanwhile, in a move to end the violence, the Nigerian government has approved an amnesty bill for members of Boko Haram, “if it agrees to negotiations and renounces violence”, says United Press International (UPI). Meanwhile, Malian security officials claim that Boko Haram is now supporting the Tuareg-led rebel movement in northern Mali, reports International Business Times. An estimated 100 members of Boko Haram, from Nigeria and Niger, are said to be in Gao, Mali and allegedly led the attack and kidnapping at the Algerian embassy in that city on 05 April. Finally, AP reports, on 08 April the city of Kaduna, fell victim to a suicide car bomb attack, in which at least 38 people were killed. The All Nations Christian Assembly Church and the ECWA Good News Church were damaged during Easter sermons. Nigerian authorities assert that the Boko Haram may be behind the bombing. Another attack occurred later on 08 April in a city of Jos, causing further injuries.

Dialogue
In mid-March 2012, Nigerian officials and Boko Haram leaders were reportedly engaged in indirect dialogue in an effort to end violence in northern regions of the country. Boko Haram asked for the release of all its members from prison in return for a ceasefire. However, Bloomberg reports that current talks are now in jeopardy with mediator Datti Ahmad withdrawing from discussions citing the disclosure of confidential information to media outlets. He expressed his dismay to reporters stating “an opportunity to negotiate and terminate this cycle of violence is being missed”.

Al Shabaab
Somalia has experienced 14 separate governments between 1991 and 2010. According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a lack of effective governance structures and rule of law in Somalia led to the establishment of neighbourhood sharia courts in the 1990s. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) backgrounder on al Shabaab explains that 11 of these neighbourhood courts united and formed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to counter warlords in Mogadishu. The militant Islamist faction of the ICU came to be known as al Shabaab or the “The Youth” in Arabic. Al Shabaab’s original fighting force comprised nearly 400 young members, remnants from the former Somali Islamist movement al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI).
In June 2006, the ICU led a military coup against the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was subsequently put down by Ethiopian forces in December 2006. The involvement of foreign forces in ousting the ICU is said to have “stoked extremist flames” and garnered support for the al Shabaab movement. Recognising the risk of militant groups within Somalia, by the United States, United Nations, African Union and League of Arab States, the UN Djibouti Peace Process of 2008 was convened as an effort to prevent the rise of militant Islamism in Somalia. Ethiopian forces withdrew in January 2009 but by May, al Shabaab launched an offensive and took control of large portions of Mogadishu. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces remained in the capital and managed to secure a few square kilometres of government buildings, however, in June the TFG was forced to declare a state of emergency.

CSIS’s Rob Wise describes the evolution of al Shabaab in two phases: the Emergence (December 2006–Early 2008) and the Transformation (Early 2008–Present). During “The Emergence” phase, a surge in radicalism was seen in response to the foreign intervention aimed at ridding Somalia of Islamic extremism. International intervention resulted in a more radical and violent al Shabaab which understood itself as a nationalist movement. The lack of governance during this period, particularly in southern Somalia aided al Shabaab in recruiting fighters from communities where it filled local needs by distributing food, non-food items and basic services including communications. “The Transformation” phase is referred to by the author as the period when al Shabaab transitioned from a nationalist local movement to an international al Qaeda aligned terrorist group. According to the report this new phase was in response to the presence of Ethiopian troops and seen as a tactical shift. Roland Marchal, Senior Research Fellow at CNRS SciencesPo Paris, suggests that there is a worrisome new trend of East African citizens joining al Shabaab that could produce jihadi movements in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa in the future. The UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea has identified indigenous networks engaged in recruitment, radicalisation and resource mobilisation on behalf of al Shabaab in Kenya. The Muslim Youth Centre has been identified as the largest support network for al Shabaab in Kenya.

Currently, al Shabaab is led by Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman “Abu Zubeyr”, although leadership is shared amongst independent regional groups of leaders in Bay and Bokool, south-central Somalia and Mogadishu, and Puntland and Somaliland. Al Shabaab is also affiliated with a militant group in the Juba Valley led by Hassan Adillahi Hersi “Turki”. CFR suggests that organisationally, regional groups do not necessarily work in concert with one another and there is some evidence of friction. Analysts say it is difficult to know how many fighters agree with the al Shabaab’s ideology and approach, as many are victims of forced recruitment. However, experts estimate that there are likely 300-800 hard-line Islamists. In February 2012, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report titled “No Place for Children”, which cites the recruitment of child soldiers by al Shabaab and the TFG, with al Shabaab also abducting children for forced marriage and rape. HRW says children as young as 10 years old are being recruited by al Shabaab as suicide bombers. In one instance, the Shabelle Media Network of Mogadishu reported the abduction of 200 boys from Afgoye, 30 kilometres from Mogadishu.

The UN Security Council Monitoring Group Report on Somalia and Eritrea from July 2011 found that al Shabaab earns an estimated USD 70 -100 million annually in taxation and extortion operations within their regions of control, especially from the export of charcoal and cross-border contraband into Kenya. The Monitoring Group lists revenue streams by order of importance: taxation and extortion; commerce, trade and contraband; diaspora support; external assistance. However, tracking remittances from Somalia diaspora communities is difficult due to the heavy use of informal money transfer systems.

14 The majority of Somalis are Sufi Muslims, says CFR, and have moderate religious views in a clan oriented culture that rejects foreign presence including Arab jihadi organisations.
15 Al Shabaab was designated a terrorist group by the United States in February 2008.
In a December 2011 interview with *Somalia Report*, the head of an al Shabaab *mukhabaraat*, or intelligence unit, provided an “inside perspective, on condition of anonymity, on how the group operates in Somalia. According to the article, nearly 45 mukhabaraat intelligence units are tasked with collecting information from Somali cities as well as from al Shabaab fighters throughout the country regarding TFG officials, banned relief agencies and AMISOM forces.

*Foreign Affairs* suggests that al Shabaab is weakened by having to *fight on three fronts* against Ethiopian and Kenyan forces; AMISOM; and TFG forces. Kenyan forces launched their offensive against al Shabaab in October 2011, citing national security threats posed by the group. The incursion was not coordinated in advance with AMISOM or the United States and timed with the rainy season, but Ethiopian forces later joined Kenya’s efforts against al Shabaab in December 2011. According to *Somalia Report*, al Shabaab’s *forces have decreased* from between 12,000 and 14,000 fighters to 8,000 since fighting began late last year.

**Recent Al Shabaab Developments**

**Piracy**

The rise of piracy attacks of the coast of Somalia in 2008 has led some experts to question the relationship of pirate gangs with al Shabaab. Discussion of the possible links between piracy and al Shabaab centre around one key point, pirates and al Shabaab have *ideological differences* and may only possibly cooperate for “business purposes”. Further, there is a lack of evidence to confirm if such a relationship exists. Some research suggest that pirate gangs are forced to *pay a portion* of their ransom earnings to al Shabaab for protection and this percentage varies depending on how involved al Shabaab is in the pirate attempt (5-10% protection, 20% weapons training, 50% financing). According to the US Department of State, there may not be clear evidence of a pirate-al Shabaab link but that it “would not be uncommon for criminal gangs working in the same ungoverned space to *share resources or pay kickbacks* to one another.” A *NATO Review* article from 2009 further suggests that, though there may not be formal links, the two groups act as *destabilising multipliers* and benefit from each other’s presence.

**Security**

In January 2012 *Reuters* reported that AMISOM troops *took control* of Mogadishu University and Barakaat cemetery from al Shabaab. This was hailed as a historic gain, marking the first time the force has been able to secure an area on the outskirts of Mogadishu. Al Shabaab spokesman Aduaziz Abu Muscab told journalists at a press conference held outside of Mogadishu on 27 January 2012 that the group was shifting or modifying *fighting tactics* from “hit and run” to a “face to face” offensive. He said that al Shabaab fighters had received training to prepare them for the new offensive. However, Kenyan troops made *further gains* against al Shabaab with the capture of Badhadhe, located 180 kms (110 miles) south of port town Kismayo. This strategic move cuts off al Shabaab from its main coastal supply town. On 22 February, Ethiopian and Somali *troops captured* the central town of Baidoa from al Shabaab. Baidoa is an *al Shabaab stronghold* and the main town in Bay region where its fighters originate. The main road connecting Mogadishu to south-western Somalia and parts of Kenya and Ethiopia passes through the Baidoa and it is considered a major business route, according to *BBC*. Additionally, on 16 March, *BBC* reported that AMISOM and TFG troops forced al Shabaab *from the town* of Galgalo, 20 miles northeast of Mogadishu. On 05 April, the *Pan-African News Agency (PANA)* reports that AMISOM and the TFG announced the formation of a Joint Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) to improve information sharing on terrorist threats, particularly al Shabaab, in Somalia. Authorities it has already proved successful with the defeat of militants in the Dynile area.

**Puntland**

---

16 January 2012 saw the first self-stated link of pirates with al Shabaab, with the pirate *purchase* of two MSF Spanish aid workers (originally kidnapped by al Shabaab from northern Kenya) for the price of USD 100,000 each, or a total of USD200,000. The pirates told *Somalia Report* it was purely a business transaction because al Shabaab needed money and had no way to organise a ransom negotiation.
As al Shabaab faces increased pressure from AMISOM, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces in southern Somalia may now also be attempting to reach into the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in northern Somalia, reports Associated Press. Al Shabaab and a Puntland militia led by Mohamed Said “Atom” recently announced their merger in what analysts believe is a move for the group to fight against the three-front offensive. Security experts believe the militants will attempt to hide in the Golis mountains, between Puntland and Somaliland, due to the extensive network of caves. The destabilisation of Puntland, analysts say, could jeopardise recent gains made by forces fighting al Shabaab and threaten the newly launched oil drilling project in northern Somalia. Further, the African Union has announced that Ethiopian troops will withdraw from Somalia by the end of April 2012.

International Response
The February 2012, UN Security Council Resolution 2036 on the situation in Somalia describes al Shabaab as a continued terrorist threat to the country with established links to al Qaeda. International conferences, such as the 23 February London Conference and the forthcoming Istanbul Conference, aim to prepare the country for the end of the transitional period on 20 August 2012. The UN has authorised AMISOM to take all necessary measures as appropriate with Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. However, experts warn that, even if al Shabaab is defeated, the various clans and nationalist factions will commit to ousting the TFG and compete for power. Foreign Affairs also supports the notion that al Shabaab is susceptible to fragmentation and also suggests there are now distinct movements within the group, nationalists and radicals.

Cross Sahel Links between AQIM, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab
In December 2011, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) listed Boko Haram, AQIM and al Shabaab as African terrorist groups. The AU cited worrying trends of increased violence by the groups in 2011 as well as growing links among them. There is also an observed trend in the kidnapping of foreigners in the Sahel region with 13 Europeans currently held by militant Islamists groups in the region.

CFR suggests that al Qaeda attempted to join with AAI (al Shabaab’s precursor) in the 1990s in Somalia but were unable to integrate and gain acceptance by clan leadership. Following the Ethiopian intervention al Qaeda renewed efforts to link with al Shabaab. Al Shabaab leaders have claimed an affiliation with al Qaeda since 2007; however, some analysts believe this link has been weak. Al Shabaab carried out its first transnational attack in July 2010 at the Soccer World Cup final in Uganda, a country supporting the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Other analysts, such as CSIS’s Wise, suggest closer linkages, explaining that al Qaeda has taken key leadership positions within al Shabaab as a way for ‘Abu Zubair’ to exert control over the regional factions of al Shabaab. The increasing use of suicide bombs is also attributed to closer ties with al Qaeda. During the ‘Transformation’ period, beginning in early 2008, al Shabaab has attempted to utilise information and communications technologies to attract foreign fighters including various video campaigns and internet messages.

On 30 January 2012, al Shabaab made its first official statement confirming its link with al Qaeda. Recently, al Shabaab joined with a smaller anti-government militia called Kamboni – previously allied to Hizbul Islam. The move is seen by experts as a unification effort of extremist groups operating in Somali, led by al Shabaab. Others suggest that this is a publicity stunt for al Qaeda, as they have been weakened by drone strikes in Pakistan, and the merger with al Shabaab and AQIM is a means to project its credibility. Within the African continent, Nigeria’s...
The Nation notes the possibility of links between al Shabaab and AQIM, citing the rapidly changing tactics of al Shabaab towards a more violent approach possibly learned at AQIM training camps.

Evidence of close connections between the three groups is still limited; however, according to VOA, some analysts suggest that Boko Haram and elements of al Shabaab have participated in joint trainings. Additionally, the Algerian deputy foreign minister, Abdelkader Messahel, reported in November 2011 that intelligence reports showed evidence of coordination between Boko Haram and AQIM. The following month, EU counter-terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, warned about the dangers regarding AQIM’s efforts to expand its power base through its alliance with Boko Haram in the region. Recent findings from a US House of Representatives Homeland Security report, caution that Boko Haram’s evolving tactics and targeting may be the result of ties between AQIM in North Africa and al Shabaab in Somalia. Such cross-pollination of weapons, tactics, and bomb-making expertise can quickly increase the capabilities of terrorist groups. Nigerian officials claim that the attack on the UN building in August 2011 in Abuja by Boko Haram was conducted by a Nigerian man returning from Somalia.

Other analysts are not convinced of Boko Haram’s links to other groups. A 12 March 2012 article from the Independent suggests that linkages between Boko Haram and other groups such as AQIM and al Shabaab are perhaps limited to some training but does not include foreign fighters. “Boko Haram is everywhere, or you could say it’s nowhere: both would be correct”, according to a security expert interviewed, making the point that the group is not necessarily cohesive and is often blamed for violence initiated by unrelated criminal gangs. Further, the group is said to have its own sophisticated bomb making unit and domestic sources of weapons, thereby negating the need for external resources. However, on 22 March, Nigerian police disrupted the first verifiable AQIM terrorist cell operating in the country according to Magharebia. Five AQIM operatives were arrested in Kano for the 26 January kidnapping of a German engineer. Nigerian officials worry their presence demonstrates the potential for cooperation with Boko Haram.

Analysts say that al Qaeda is now relying on AQIM to support the greater organisation; however, the Maghreb division is facing its own challenges following increased and coordinated security measures by Sahel states. The groups have also lost some support from local populations following the success of the Arab Spring countries; which demonstrated change through peaceful struggle, not the violent tactics used by al Qaeda and its affiliates. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) further suggests that al Qaeda is seeking to seize on local unrest and discontent to further its foothold in the continent through regional militant Islamist movements. Within the extremist groups themselves, a lack of cohesion could lead to a greater possibility for more dangerous splinter groups to develop. ICT states that “we may see a greater threat of kidnappings in the Sahel region from other splinter groups but it may also indicate that the main leaders of groups such as AQIM will have less power.” However the concern is that young operatives may rashly kill their victims rather than wait for the outcome of lengthy hostage negotiations, reports Magharebia. Additionally, in an effort to make a name for themselves, they may commit horrific acts. According to CSIS, al Shabaab may also undermine itself by turning away from its early nationalistic messages and forcing the recruitment of teenage boys. Wise predicts a splintering of the group as more foreigners gain leadership positions, upsetting Somali fighters and creating rifts among various regional groups. Additionally, they could lose clan support if al Shabaab pushes a purely al Qaeda-driven ideology.

Regional Response
Commander of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Carter Ham, warns that al Qaeda-linked groups, including al Shabaab, Boko Haram and AQIM, are attempting to “synchronise” activities across North Africa and the Sahel region, as reported by the Telegraph. Countries in the Sahel are now refocusing efforts to secure the region.

19 This announcement is taken seriously by international security experts due to the fact that the Algerian government conducts the largest intelligence gathering operation on AQIM of any country in Africa.
20 Specifically, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
22 The below listed information on regional meetings and initiatives is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but to provide a general understanding.
According to Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, “effective and multi-faceted co-operation among the regional countries is […] vital for responding to the challenges facing security and development in the region,” reports Magharebia. In April 2010, at the conclusion of a Sahel-Saharan security summit, Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania established a new military command in the Algerian city of Tamanrasset. The command was established to co-ordinate intelligence-gathering in efforts to combat terrorism, organised crime, arms smuggling and kidnapping. Additionally, military patrols along shared border areas were established in order to monitor and control the movement of terrorist groups. All four of the above countries met for two days in Washington DC in mid-November 2011 to further their multilateral approach to Sahel security, reports Magharebia. Also in mid-November, the country of Burkina Faso joined the regional command unit in Tamanrasset. AFP reports that in November 2011, some 150 anti-terrorism experts from about 30 countries met at an international security conference focused on the threat of armed militant groups in the Sahel. Major concerns discussed at the conference included the inability to control large porous borders and also the need to counter terrorist financing.

The 5 + 5 group23, begun in 1990, is a forum for political dialogue that holds meetings regularly at the ministerial level. The group met for the first time in December 2011, since regime changes occurred across much of North Africa in 2011. According to AFP, the objective of the December meeting was to bring together defence ministers from each of the 10 countries in order to address security issues in the region, with AQIM activities and the influx of weapons from Libya receiving special focus. The meeting resulted in the adoption of an action plan for 2012 on training and exchanges and joint drills and exercises amongst the countries.

Libya hosted a two-day ministerial level conference on border security from 11 to 12 March as part of efforts to increase regional cooperation to address the escalation of “cross-border criminal activities”, reports Tripoli Post. The nine northern African countries attending the conference have adopted the “Tripoli Plan” to enhance information sharing and to develop strategic border communities, reports Reuters. This conference was the first time in more than a year that interior ministers met to discuss regional security concerns. Arms and human smuggling have escalated in recent months due to inadequate border security.

Conclusion

The Sahel region is afflicted by a myriad of challenges which include militant Islamist insurgencies in Nigeria and Mali, the growth of extremist groups, and the kidnappings of foreigners by AQIM and splinter groups. As AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab continue to wage attacks in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa, those most affected are the civilian populations who live in fear of suicide bombs, raids and threats. In Nigeria, as many as 1,000 people have been killed as a result of recent Boko Haram violence, with Maiduguri particularly devastated, reports VOA. Local Nigerian women are demonstrating and calling for an end to violence, meanwhile Daily Trust reports that the Northern Governors Forum has called on Boko Haram and Nigerian authorities to forge a meaningful dialogue. Elsewhere, AMISOM and TFG forces are gaining ground against al Shabaab; however, the terrorist group continues to adapt and pose a serious threat to Somalia and neighbouring countries. Finally, AQIM remains a concern as reports surface about their activities in the Sahel including the acquisition of weapons and recruitment tactics. Although the full extent of relationships among these terrorist and insurgent groups is difficult to document, the danger posed by these groups remains a real threat to the people and governments of the Sahel region.

23 The “5+5” Mediterranean Dialogue Group includes the five southern European countries of Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal and the five North African countries of Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania.
Dear Rachad,
I am back from my trip to Rabat and Detroit, MI and would appreciate getting together to catch up. I also like your bio to prepare my introduction of you this weekend. We can discuss this weekend’s activities when we get together. I’d appreciate it if you or your office could give me convenient times to meet. See you soon, Ed

Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Thank you.

Dear Ed,

Welcome home.
I will get Sandrine to coordinate with Kristen.

Have a nice day,

Rachad

On Apr 30, 2012, at 7:44 AM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

Dear Rachad,

I am back from my trip to Rabat and Detroit, MI and would appreciate getting together to catch up. I also like your bio to prepare my introduction of you this weekend. We can discuss this weekend’s activities when we get together. I’d appreciate it if you or your office could give me convenient times to meet. See you soon, Ed

Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Rachad,

This evening, we received draft language concerning UNHCR for the upcoming bill. The language is attached below and is generally accurate but not verbatim. They said they are moving fast and if we had any changes we have to interact quickly. So, the process has begun, and I suggest we meet on this early next week to coordinate the Moroccan strategy.

In our analysis, this is report language and there is no downside. It addresses all of our concerns: points out the dangers of the camps, reinforces USG support for autonomy/sovereignty as the solution to the WS conflict, and hits UNHCR for not pursuing durable solutions.

We have been reliably informed that we have very short window within which we can suggest “tweeks” to this general language. It should be understood that this language may be different from what the Senate decides to do. It is our belief that the Senate language will be more along the lines of what I submitted to you today. However, the problem in the Senate is Leahy and in the end he will have the final say. They House language is a better bet.

We should attempt to spell out “durable solution” in this House language - similar to the language we proposed today - which states, “durable solutions includes a census and an active permanent resettlement or repatriation program for these refugees.”

Again this is generally accurate but not verbatim:
The Committee is concerned about growing violence and instability in the Sahel region and growing AQIM strength across North Africa. The Committee is increasingly concerned about growing ties between AQIM and members of the Polisario run camps. It is now even more important to redouble our efforts to solve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The committee also urges the Secretary of State to work with UNHCR on the protracted refugee issue especially the pursuit of durable solutions.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 6:42 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Cc: sboutonnet@embassyofmorocco.us
Subject: This weekend

Two things:
What do you like for breakfast? And may I have your bio please. Thank you.

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Please note below that NPR will air the following spot this week:

SUPPORT FOR WAMU 88.5 COMES FROM MOROCCO, WHERE FASHION, FOOD AND MUSIC WILL BE CENTER STAGE DURING EASTON, MARYLAND’S PAINT THE TOWN MOROCCAN CELEBRATION. MORE AT MOROCCO ON THE MOVE DOT COM.
Rachad,

I am sorry I did not get this to you sooner. The modifications will be provided to the committee this evening.

The language as reported earlier says:

*The Committee is concerned about growing violence and instability in the Sahel region and growing AQIM strength across North Africa. The Committee is increasingly concerned about growing ties between AQIM and members of the Polisario run camps. It is now even more important to redouble our efforts to solve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The committee also urges the Secretary of State to work with UNHCR on the protracted refugee issue especially the pursuit of durable solutions.*

We are suggesting that modifications be made as follows:

1. Add a further description of durable solutions to read, *including ensuring a census is completed and developing programs that promote voluntary repatriation or resettlement outside the camps for these refugees*
2. Add a reporting requirement for the Sec. of State to report back to the committees on progress being made.

The combined language as we propose to committee staff now reads:

*Committee is concerned about growing violence and instability in the Sahel region and growing AQIM strength across North Africa. The Committee is increasingly concerned about growing ties between AQIM and members of the Polisario run camps. It is now even more important to redouble our efforts to solve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The committee also urges the Secretary of State to work with UNHCR on the protracted refugee issue especially the pursuit of durable solutions, including ensuring a census is completed and developing programs that promote voluntary repatriation or resettlement outside the camps for these refugees. The Department of State will provide the Committees on Appropriations of both the House and Senate a report of steps being taken to fulfill this requirement.*

We understand that the census language is the most important modification to be made and will work to ensure that such language is included at a minimum. We will do all in our power to ensure that the final language of the committee will be that which is reflected herein. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador,

It is my pleasure to extend an invitation to you and your wife to join us for The Keystone Center 19th Annual Leadership Awards Dinner on June 7th. Dr. Mostafa Terrab and I are both members of the board of this distinguished public policy NGO. OCP and the Gabriel Company will be jointly hosting a table at the event and would be honored to have you as our guest. Mr. Terrab's Senior adviser and US Director, Mr. Kerry McNamara, will be attending the function in place of Mr. Terrab, who will be unavailable to attend the dinner. Attached a detailed program and press release. Dinner logistics follow.

June 7, 2012
6:30 Cocktails
7:30 Dinner Program
EAST HALL OF UNION STATION
50 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, District of Columbia
Business Attire

I hope your schedule will allow you to attend the dinner. Ed
Since 1994, The Keystone Center has proudly presented awards to exemplary thought leaders and decision-makers who embody The Keystone Center’s belief that lasting policy is best crafted by considering diverse perspectives and building consensus.

2012 Award Recipients

Leadership in Energy
Louis R. Chênevert
Chairman and CEO
United Technologies Corporation

Leadership in Environment
Marilyn Black
Founder
GREENGUARD Environmental Institute and Air Quality Sciences, Inc.

Leadership in Health
Drew Altman
President and CEO
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

Leadership in Government
Lisa Murkowski
U.S. Senate

Keystone Founder’s Award
Robert N. Downey
Senior Director
Goldman Sachs

Honorees are selected for their leadership, outstanding problem-solving skills and efforts to seek consensus-based solutions to the most challenging issues facing society. In addition, they exhibit a sense of vision and a capacity to bring about change, have been recognized for their efforts by their peers and other national and international leaders, and have contributed to society in ways that reflect the spirit and mission of The Keystone Center.

Each year The Keystone Center hosts more than 400 leaders from industry, government, and the NGO community at our annual dinner ceremony in recognition of these innovative leaders. Now in its 18th year, the Leadership Awards Dinner has become known as a premier event in Washington.

The Keystone Center seeks to solve our society’s most challenging environmental, energy, and public health problems. We bring together today’s public, private and civic sector leaders to confront these issues and we arm the next generation with the 21st Century intellectual and social skills required to effectively approach the questions they will face. Founded in 1975, The Center is a non-profit organization headquartered in Keystone, Colorado with offices in Denver and Washington, DC.

Inquiries: 970.513.5816
The Keystone Center is a 501 (c)(3) nonprofit organization. All contributions are tax deductible to the extent allowed by law.

SUMMIT SPONSOR—$50,000
Includes two tables (20 seats), acknowledgement by Keystone CEO at the podium, logo placement at event, full page advertisement/congratulatory message in event program, recognition in list of sponsors

TIMBERLINE SPONSOR—$25,000
Includes one table (10 seats), logo placement at event, full page advertisement/congratulatory message in event program, recognition in list of sponsors

ALPINE SPONSOR—$10,000
Includes one table (10 seats), recognition in list of sponsors

BASE CAMP SPONSOR—$5,000
Includes one-half table (5 seats), recognition in list of sponsors

INDIVIDUAL SEAT(S)—$1,000

FULL-PAGE ADVERTISEMENT/CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE IN PROGRAM—$1,000
*Message specifications will be sent upon receipt of this form.

I am unable to attend, but would like to make a contribution of $___________

PAYMENT OPTIONS

I will pay with a check. Please make checks payable to The Keystone Center and mail to:
Attn: Keystone Awards Dinner, The Keystone Center, 1628 Sts John Road, Keystone, CO 80435

I will pay via wire transfer. Please email mmissel@keystone.org for instructions.

For alternative payment methods, please contact Megan Missel at mmissel@keystone.org or 970-513-5837.

The Keystone Center’s Federal tax ID number: 84-0688506
The Keystone Center is a 501 (c)(3) nonprofit organization. All contributions are tax deductible to the extent allowed by law.

NAME: ________________________________________________________________

TITLE: ________________________________________________________________

ORGANIZATION: ______________________________________________________

ADDRESS: ____________________________________________________________

CITY: ___________________________ STATE: ___________ ZIP: _______________

DAYTIME PHONE: __________________ EMAIL: ____________________________

PLEASE FAX TO: 970-262-0152 or email to mmissel@keystone.org
Questions? Please call 970-513-5837
# Annual Leadership Awards Dinner

## Past Recipients

### Leadership in the Environment Award
- **1994** Gustave Speth, U.N. Development Programme Administrator
- **1995** Professor Florence Taylor Robinson
- **1996** John Sawhill, The Nature Conservancy
- **1997** Mildred McClain, Citizens for Environmental Justice
- **1998** Kathryn S. Fuller, World Wildlife Fund
- **1999** Fred Krupp, Environmental Defense Fund
- **2000** George Archibald, International Crane Foundation
- **2001** Patrick F. Noonan, The Conservation Fund
- **2002** Russell E. Train, World Wildlife Fund
- **2003** Teresa Heinz Kerry, Heinz Family Philanthropies
- **2004** Jonathan Lash, World Resources Institute
- **2005** Anne H. Ehrlich, Stanford University
- **2006** John H. Adams, Natural Resources Defense Council
- **2007** Peter A. Seligmann, Conservation International
- **2008** Paul W. Hansen, The Nature Conservancy
- **2009** David Rockefeller, Sailors for the Sea
- **2010** Robert Socolow, Princeton University
- **2011** Christine Eibs-Singer, E + Co

### Leadership in Industry Award
- **1994** Frank Popoff, Dow Chemical
- **1995** H. Laurence Fuller, Amoco Corporation
- **1996** Edgar S. Woolard, DuPont
- **1997** Bob Burt, FMC Corporation
- **1998** John F. Smith, Jr., General Motors Corporation
- **1999** Sidney Taurel, Eli Lilly & Company
- **2000** Responsible Care Initiative of the Chemical Manufacturers Association
- **2001** Archie Dunham, Conoco
- **2002** Marilyn Ware, American Water Works
- **2003** Thomas C. Jorling, International Paper
- **2004** Ralph Peterson, CH2M HILL Companies
- **2005** James E. Rogers, Cinergy
- **2006** Peter A. Darbee, PG&E Corporation
- **2007** John Hofmeister, Shell Oil Company
- **2008** Jeffry Sterba, PNM Resources
- **2009** Hugh Grant, Monsanto
- **2010** Michael T. Duke, Wal-Mart Stores
- **2011** John W. Rowe, Exelon

### Leadership in Government Award
- **1994** Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary
- **1995** Senator Pete V. Domenici
- **1996** Mayor Norman Rice (Seattle, WA)
- **1997** Senator John Chafee
- **1998** Senator John Glenn
- **1999** Congressman Sherwood Boehlert
- **2000** Congressman John D. Dingell
- **2001** Congressman Henry Waxman
- **2002** Senator Richard Lugar
- **2003** Congressman James L. Oberstar
- **2004** Senator Daniel K. Inouye
- **2005** Congresswoman Nancy Johnson
- **2006** Senator Christopher Dodd
- **2007** Senator Olympia Snowe
- **2008** Governor Martin O’Malley (Maryland)
- **2009** Senator Mark Udall
- **2010** Senator John McCain
- **2011** Administrator Lisa Jackson, U.S. EPA

### Leadership in Education Award
- **1998** Donald Kennedy, Stanford University
- **2000** Bruce Alberts, President, National Academy of Sciences
- **2001** Helge Wehmeier, Bayer USA
- **2002** Daniel Ritchie, University of Denver
- **2005** Jane Nelson, Harvard University
- **2006** Rodger Bybee, Biological Sciences Curriculum Study
- **2007** Carlo Parravano, Merck Institute for Science Education
- **2008** Gerald Wheeler, National Science Teachers Association
- **2009** Beverly L. Hall, Atlanta Public Schools
- **2010** Terrance Carroll, Speaker of the House (Colorado)
- **2011** Joel I. Klein, News Corporation

### Spirit of Keystone Award
- **1996** Congressman William J. Tauzin
- **1998** Stephan Schmidheiny, ANOVA Holding Ag
- **1999** John Brown, BP Amoco Corporation
- **2001** Edward M. Gabriel, former Ambassador to Morocco
- **2002** Paul V. Tebo, DuPont
- **2003** William K. Reilly, Aqua International Partners
- **2005** Nicholas L. Reding
- **2006** Kathleen Sebelius, Governor of Kansas
- **2008** Jim Lehrer, PBS
- **2009** George Stephanopoulos, ABC News
- **2010** Gwen Ifill, Washington Week

### Founder’s Award
- **2011** Clint Vince, SNR Denton
April 26, 2012

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The Keystone Center Announces 2012 Leadership Awardees


The Keystone Center established its Leadership Awards program in 1994 to recognize extraordinary leadership by individuals who model the spirit and mission of The Keystone Center: inspiring critical thinking, seeking multiple perspectives in decision-making, and advancing public policy. The Center provides awards in various categories within its areas of practice including energy, environment, public health, and education.

"This year’s honorees exemplify the values on which The Keystone Center has built its 37-year reputation for excellence," said Gary Grappo, President and CEO of The Keystone Center. "Each has demonstrated a sense of vision and a capacity to effect positive change, and we are pleased to recognize their commitment and contributions to society."

Awards will be presented at The Keystone Center’s 19th Annual Awards Dinner, held at Union Station in Washington, DC on June 7th. Shelby Coffey III, Trustee of The Newseum, will serve as emcee.

2012 Keystone Leadership Award recipients include:

**Leadership in Energy**
Louis R. Chênevert
Chairman and CEO, United Technologies Corporation

**Leadership in Environment**
Marilyn Black
Founder, GREENGUARD Environmental Institute and Air Quality Sciences, Inc.

**Leadership in Health**
Drew Altman
President and CEO, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

**Leadership in Government**
Lisa Murkowski
U.S. Senate

**Keystone Founder’s Award**
Robert N. Downey
Senior Director, Goldman Sachs

About The Keystone Center

The Keystone Center helps facilitate and craft decision-making processes for public, private, and civic sector leaders in order to advance complex energy, environmental, and public health issues. Its educational division, Keystone Science School, provides teachers and students with meaningful outdoor learning experiences that incorporate scientific inquiry, leadership development, civic engagement, and academic rigor. Founded in 1975, The Center is a non-profit organization headquartered in Keystone, Colorado with offices in Denver, CO and Washington, DC.

CONTACT:
Robyn Brewer, 970-513-5816
rbrewer@keystone.org
The Keystone Center
www.keystone.org

###
Rachad, this email just returned to me with a server notice it had not been sent. I apologize and thought it went out as soon as we talked an hour or more ago. Sorry but this past hour appears to be a technical mistake. Ed

Rachad,

I am sorry I did not get this to you sooner. The modifications will be provided to the committee this evening.

The language as reported earlier says:

The Committee is concerned about growing violence and instability in the Sahel region and growing AQIM strength across North Africa. The Committee is increasingly concerned about growing ties between AQIM and members of the Polisario run camps. It is now even more important to redouble our efforts to solve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The committee also urges the Secretary of State to work with UNHCR on the protracted refugee issue especially the pursuit of durable solutions.

We are suggesting that modifications be made as follows:

1. Add a further description of durable solutions to read, including ensuring a census is completed and developing programs that promote voluntary repatriation or resettlement outside the camps for these refugees
2. Add a reporting requirement for the Sec. of State to report back to the committees on progress being made.

The combined language as we propose to committee staff now reads:

Committee is concerned about growing violence and instability in the Sahel region and growing AQIM strength across North Africa. The Committee is increasingly concerned about growing ties between AQIM and members of the Polisario run camps. It is now even more important to redouble our efforts to solve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The committee also urges the Secretary of State to work with UNHCR on the protracted refugee issue especially the pursuit of durable solutions, including ensuring a census is completed and developing programs that promote voluntary repatriation or resettlement outside the camps for these refugees. The Department of State will provide the Committees on Appropriations of both the House and Senate a report of steps being taken to fulfill this requirement."

We understand that the census language is the most important modification to be made and will work to ensure that such language is included at a minimum. We will do all in our power to ensure that the final language of the committee will be that which is reflected herein. Thank you.
FYI, Attached is a comparison of the 2011 and 2012 UN MINURSO rollovers, which you may find of use. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

-----Original Message-----
From: Edward Gabriel  
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 12:01 PM  
To: Fatima Kurtz; Jordan Paul  
Subject: FW: MINURSO Resolution and reactions; EU-Morocco talks on "advanced status," e.g. FDI and regional integration

I would be good to see a comparison side by side or in color differences with last's year's resolution. Is that possible? thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Pence, Anne [mailto:apence@cov.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 9:47 AM  
To: Bill Hayes; Joe Matthews; Hugh McDowell; Larson, Alan; Edward Gabriel; Fatima Kurtz  
Subject: MINURSO Resolution and reactions; EU-Morocco talks on "advanced status," e.g. FDI and regional integration

It is "clean" but those involved (e.g. Morocco) may also see messages they may not like -- such as exhortations to provide "unhindered movement", etc. which harken to elements of the SG's report. At same time, the Resolution is positive about Morocco's steps on human rights, and some by the Polisario with UNHCR. It references the Moroccan autonomy proposal, but also a 2007 Polisario proposal. It offers continued support for the Ross process, and mentions that natural resources have been discussed in that context.

Morocco's public comments are interesting too -- stresses the importance of self-determination (but indicates concern that a referendum would cause tension at an already tense time.

Meanwhile, EU-Morocco discussion were held in Luxembourg to prepare for the ag trade liberalization agreement in effect July 1 and to discuss a range of other issues under Morocco's "advanced status," including regional integration, the AMU and the positive trend in Morocco-Algeria relations.

Anne
Security Council
SC/10621

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York Security Council 6758th Meeting (AM)


Unanimously adopting resolution 2044 (2012), the Council called on the parties to cooperate fully with the operations of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of, as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for, United Nations personnel in carrying out the mandate.

Today’s resolution came on the heels of the Secretary-General’s 5 April report, in which he recommended the extension because the Mission remained relevant as a guarantor for the stability of the ceasefire and as a visible commitment of the international community to achieve a resolution of the conflict.

The Mission’s ability to fully monitor and assess the situation on the ground — in a total area of 104,000 km sq. — and to interact with the full spectrum of interlocutors was essential, as illustrated in the context of recent violence following a sports event and of evidence of “simmering community tensions” in the west, which the Secretary-General said was another consequence of the absence of a peace agreement between Morocco and the Frente Polisario and the continuing status quo, the report stated.

Expressing concern about the violations of existing agreements and calling on the parties to respect their relevant obligations, the Security Council called upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.

It further called upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Following the adoption of the resolution, Morocco’s representative said the text reiterated the importance and priority of the initiative of self-determination.

“There is no alternative to negotiations,” he said. “We will not move backwards. Since 2001, we have thought that the referendum approach could result in tension in a society which is still seeking to find solutions by consensus. We believe we will be able to live as neighbours in our neighbourhood.”
However, South Africa’s representative, also speaking after the vote, expressed concern over the resolution’s failure to more fully address human rights issues, especially in light of the Security Council’s recent bold steps in that field, particularly in northern Africa and the Middle East.

“The continuation of that trend will threaten to erode the Mission,” he cautioned. Still, his country voted in favour of the resolution because of the need to resolve the Western Sahara issue in a peaceful manner.

The meeting began at 10:14 a.m. and ended at 10:30 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2044 (2012) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling and reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

“Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), and 1979 (2011),

“Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

“Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to cooperate more fully with the United Nations and with each other and to strengthen their involvement to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

“Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including MINURSO, under close review and reiterating the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

“Expressing concern about the violations of existing agreements, and calling on the parties to respect their relevant obligations,

“Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

“Encouraging in this context, the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other’s proposals,

“Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General and the continued rounds of informal talks, and welcoming the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,
“Welcoming the progress made by the parties in discussing innovative negotiating approaches and discrete subjects, their commitment to deepen the discussions on these and other issues, and the 9 November 2011 meeting of the parties on natural resources and progress made towards demining,

“Welcoming the positive conclusion of the 12-16 September 2011 UNHCR-sponsored seminar on Hassaniya culture and the agreement by the parties to hold two additional seminars in 2012, as well as the holding of a UNHCR-facilitated high-level meeting on Confidence Building Measures for Western Sahara on 24-25 January 2012,

“Stressing the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law,

“Welcoming the opening of National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and the steps taken by Morocco in order to fulfil its commitment to ensure unqualified and unimpeded access to all Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council,

“Also welcoming the implementation of the enhanced refugee protection program developed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in coordination with the Polisario Front, which includes refugee and human rights training and awareness initiatives,

“Reiterating the request that UNHCR maintain its consideration of a refugee registration in the Tindouf refugee camps,

“Looking forward to the implementation of the updated plan of action on confidence building measures adopted in Geneva 24-25 January 2012, including the inauguration of family visits by land, use of new information technology to facilitate communication links between families, and the continuation and expansion of the existing programme by air, and encouraging the parties to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in implementing their agreement,

“Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponsored talks,

“Recognizing that the consolidation of the status quo is not acceptable, and noting further that progress in the negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

“Affirming support for the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Ambassador Christopher Ross and his work in facilitating negotiations between the parties, welcoming his ongoing consultations with the parties and neighbouring states, and looking forward to his regional visit in the near future, including to Western Sahara, as per the communique of the Informal Meeting on Western Sahara 11-13 March 2012,

“Affirming support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Hany Abdel-aziz,

“Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 11 April 2012 (S/2012/197),

“1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2013;
“2. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) with regard to the ceasefire and calls on the parties to adhere fully to those agreements;

“3. Calls upon all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements;

“4. Welcomes the parties’ commitment to continue the process of holding small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, and recalls its endorsement of the recommendation in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations;

“5. Calls upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), and 1979 (2011) and the success of negotiations, inter alia, by continuing their discussion of the ideas in paragraph 120 of the Secretary General’s report (S/2011/249);

“6. Affirms its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context and calls for an intensified pace of meetings and strengthening of contacts;

“7. Calls upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

“8. Invites Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;

“9. Requests the Secretary-General to brief the Security Council on a regular basis, and at least twice a year, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, on the implementation of this resolution, challenges to MINURSO’s operations and steps taken to address them, and expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his briefings and in this regard, further requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

“10. Welcomes the commitment of the parties and the neighbouring states to hold periodic meetings with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to review and, where possible, expand confidence-building measures;

“11. Urges Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures that allow for visits between separated family members, as well as for other confidence-building measures agreed upon between parties;
“12. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

“13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Background

The Security Council had before it the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2012/197), which covers developments since 1 April 2011 concerning the situation on the ground in the Territory, the status and progress of negotiations and challenges to the operations of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

In the report, the Secretary-General recommends the extension of MINURSO’s mandate for a further 12 months until 30 April 2013.

He recommends, therefore, an increase of 15 military observers to bolster monitoring capacities. As the report outlines a series of challenges that demonstrate that MINURSO is unable to exercise fully its peacekeeping, monitoring, observation and reporting functions, he requests the assistance of the Council in reasserting the Mission’s mandated role, ensuring that the minimum conditions for its successful operation are met and upholding peacekeeping standards and United Nations neutrality. He calls on the two parties to cooperate fully with MINURSO in achieving those goals.

He says that during the reporting period, the three rounds of informal talks between the parties, their two meetings on natural resources and confidence-building measures, and the numerous bilateral consultations that his Personal Envoy held with them, confirmed that the parties continue to have the political will to meet, but not as yet to engage in substantive negotiations towards a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, as required by Security Council resolutions.

It is possible that changes in the regional political environment will provide new opportunities, the report states. Absent a new framework, however, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy will continue his established pattern of activities and encourage the development of new ideas.

* * * *

SA blasts UN over Western Sahara rights
2012-04-25 09:13
New York - South Africa on Tuesday accused UN Security Council powers of "conveniently" ignoring human rights abuses in the disputed territory of Western Sahara.

The council again rejected growing demands for the UN peacekeeping force in the Moroccan-controlled territory to have a permanent rights investigation duty.

But the annual resolution renewing the mandate of the UN force did stress the need for Morocco to improve rights in Western Sahara, which it annexed in 1975 following a Spanish withdrawal.
South Africa's UN ambassador Baso Sangqu said the 15-nation council was guilty of "double standards" by taking "bold steps" over the Arab Spring countries but refusing a permanent rights monitoring system for Western Sahara.

The rights of the people of Western Sahara must be "equally defended with the same zeal and commitment", he told the council.

Without naming countries, he said "the selective approach to human rights by this council calls into question the motivation of those who have conveniently looked the other way while human rights abuses are committed in Western Sahara".

France, a permanent member of the council, is a strong backer of Morocco but has strongly denied trying to influence the Western Sahara talks. South Africa and Morocco are current temporary members of the council.

This year's talks on the UN mission were held amid growing UN complaints that its mission in the sparsely populated phosphate-rich territory is being "undermined" by Moroccan tactics.

The Security Council resolution, which renewed the peacekeeping mandate mandate until April 2013, stressed "the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps".

Disharmony and tension

Morocco controls the bulk of the territory. The Polisario Front, which fought a guerrilla war against the Moroccans until a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, governs the Tindouf camps in Algeria which were set up for Sahrawis who fled the conflict.

The resolution called on the two sides "to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights".

The peacekeepers are officially known as the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Efforts to organise a vote for the Sahrawi people have been deadlocked for years however.

The UN-brokered talks have failed to make progress on a political solution between the Polisario Front and Morocco.

Morocco's UN ambassador Mohammed Loulichki said the council had been "quite correct" to again reject "broadening the mandate to bring in questions which have nothing to do with the function" of the UN mission.

"Morocco makes a commitment to the [UN-brokered] negotiations" on the territory, said Loulichki. But he reaffirmed Morocco's claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara and said a referendum could lead to "disharmony and tension".

The Polisario Front's UN envoy, Ahmed Boukhari, also condemned what he called the "intrigues and subterfuges" of council members, including France, and said it had not been strong enough on human rights.

"It does not respond to the demands of international human rights organizations nor to the gravity of the situation on the ground, which reveals that there are dozens of Sahrawi political prisoners, hundreds of disappeared in addition to those who have died in detention in Moroccan secret prisons," he said in a statement.
Remarks by Commissioner Füle at the press conference after the EU-Morocco Association Council in Luxembourg on 23rd April 2012 “Morocco and the EU share the objective of a deepening and strengthening their relations on the basis of the “advanced status”. Today we took note of the very good progress achieved in the discussions on a new comprehensive EU-Morocco Action Plan which will provide us with an operational roadmap for our bilateral relations in the next five years (2012-2016). The new Action Plan will be fully in line with the political, economic and social reform agenda of Morocco and with the EU’s renewed approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy. In particular regarding our Southern partners The Action Plan contains orientations for progressive alignment to EU legal and regulatory acquis in key areas in order to establish closer economic integration with the EU with benefits for Morocco in terms of: foreign investment, market access, competitivity and job creation. It also contains important objectives for the consolidation of the respect of human rights and democratic principles, improved governance and a more active involvement of the civil society.* Our bilateral relations are currently in a positive dynamic phase and I would like to highlight in particular the following the areas:

* The forthcoming entry into force (by 1st July 2012) of the Agreement on liberalisation of trade in agriculture. This is a balanced agreement that will contribute to the development of Morocco’s agriculture and trade while opening new market opportunities for the EU operators.

* The on-going important bilateral negotiations, such as on liberalisation of trade in services and establishment and for a mobility partnership. The former one would pave the way for negotiations for the DCFTA while mobility partnership would allow us to better manage migration.

* Technical and financial assistance continues at a high level (190 € million per annum). Furthermore, I’m happy to announce today a first additional allocation of 80 € million under the new “Spring” facility for Morocco in order to promote economic and social development and human rights/governance. We are still going to discuss some other issues related to regional issues. Morocco is playing very important role in the regional cooperation; we are going to talk also about the Union for Mediterranean and about Maghreb Arab Union and its cooperation with the EU. Let me also say that in this context we welcome the positive trend in Algeria-Morocco relations. The EU looks forward to further progress in this process of regional integration.”

C. Anne Pence  
Senior International Advisor  
Covington and Burling LLP  
202 662 5443  
apence@cov.com

This message is from a law firm and may contain information that is confidential or legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please immediately advise the sender by reply e-mail that this message has been inadvertently transmitted to you and delete this e-mail from your system. Thank you for your cooperation.
Bill, I think you should be upbeat. Amina is very engaged and appears on top of the Kosmos priorities in this regard. It seems your initial reaction was right in thinking that Amina's return to OHNYM would be a good thing as she would be more engaged in the priorities of the MKWG. I was impressed that she was on top of the issues and offered comments on what we view as most important topics, without being prompted. Ed

---Original Message-----
From: Bill Hayes [mailto:whayes@kosmosenergy.com]
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 11:07 PM
To: Edward Gabriel; Joe Matthews; Hugh McDowell; alarson@cov.com; apence@cov.com; Fatima Kurtz
Subject: Re: CONFIDENTIAL/PLEASE DO NOT SHARE: lunch today with Amina and another point on Amrani

Ed:

As always, grateful for your efforts and relaying this information.

Kosmos "gets" Amina's caution in her dealings within the new GoM. We want to emphasize that with her. We will respect her wishes to keep her close and seek her concurrence before Kosmos reaches out to others within the GoM. This (ours) is a delicate situation made more so by the new faces in the government. As you appreciate, we want to balance that with Kosmos' ability to be respectful to the Minister to whom we "report." But, we can wait for the proper time; it just may take some explaining to our Board and others.

Regarding the Moroccan Ambassador's trip to Dallas, our invitation is in and we await a reply.

Your information on Amina's carrying the Kosmos/Onhym messages is great to hear; and more so, the reminders about Correll she apparently emphasizes.

Before I read your note, I was getting somewhat concerned in the past few days that we may have lost some momentum following from a remarkable MKWG in Feb in Rabat (Amina's first). Now, however, it seems we are seeing some fruit of our labors; that is, we are seeing Amina taking the MKWG guidance back to the GoM.

We would welcome meetings with Mr Aziman and Mr Terab's participation - at some level - in the MKWG.

All this points in the right direction for the MKWG and our efforts.

Thanks again.

Bill
To: Alan P. Larson
To: Anne Pence
To: Fatima Kurtz
Subject: CONFIDENTIAL/PLEASE DO NOT SHARE: lunch today with Amina and another point on Amrani
Sent: Apr 23, 2012 2:22 PM

I had lunch today with Amina, and will debrief Hugh tomorrow morning. Although there was no heavy agenda between us, I did pick up a few things from her.

The concern she expressed about controlling all points of contact with the Moroccan government came through loud and clear. She discussed at some length how difficult it is trying to figure out how to work with the new government, especially given the fact they are made up of people they do not know that well. We should be reminded that many of our colleagues have been working together in key Moroccan positions for more than a decade, and now things have changed overnight.

For instance, she said that she’s been trying to get clearance on a meeting for Kosmos with both Ambassadors in the US (including the UN) and has not been able to get an answer. She asked me for my advice on whether I thought she could have an “unofficial” meeting with Bouhlal that didn’t get reported back to MFA, in the event she didn’t get clearance. I suggested she speak directly to the Ambassador and candidly ask him, since he will understand, and is in somewhat the same boat himself. This underscores the delicate nature of the new relationships with the new government and the importance she places on controlling the situation with regard to meetings with her Moroccan colleagues.

She also plans on providing the Minister of Energy with a complete brief on the Kosmos dossier tomorrow morning. She expressed confidence in the Minister and made it clear that they have an excellent working relationship. I can attest to it, since she took a call from him during lunch that was extremely warm and gracious, although formal and respectful on her

This e-mail communication is confidential and is intended only for the individuals or entities named above and others who have been specifically authorized to receive it. If you are not the intended recipient, please do not read, copy, use or disclose the contents of this communication to others. Please notify the sender that you have received this e-mail in error by replying to the e-mail or by telephoning (214) 445-9600, Monday - Friday during the hours of 8:00 A.M. - 5:00 P.M. (CST). Please then delete the e-mail and any copies of it. Thank you. Nothing contained in this disclaimer shall be construed in any way to grant permission to transmit confidential information via this firm's e-mail system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2011 MINURSO Resolution</th>
<th>2012 MINURSO Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Expressing serious</em> concern about the increase in violations of existing agreements and <em>calling on</em> the parties to respect their relevant obligations</td>
<td><em>Expressing concern</em> about the increase in violations of existing agreements and <em>calling on</em> the parties to respect their relevant obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Inviting</em> in this context the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other’s proposals</td>
<td><em>Encouraging</em> in this context, the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other’s proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Welcoming</em> the parties’ agreement to explore innovative negotiating approaches and discrete subjects</td>
<td><em>Welcoming</em> the parties’ agreement to explore innovative negotiating approaches and discrete subjects, their commitment to deepen the discussions on these and other issues, and the 9 November 2011 meeting of the parties on natural resources and progress made towards demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td><em>Welcoming</em> the positive conclusion of the 12-16 September 2011 UNHCR-sponsored seminar on Hassaniya culture and the agreement by the parties to hold two additional seminars in 2012, as well as the holding of a UNHCR-facilitated high-level meeting on Confidence Building Measures for Western Sahara on 24-25 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Welcoming</em> the establishment of a National Council on Human Rights in Morocco and the proposed component regarding Western Sahara, and the commitment of Morocco to ensure unqualified and unimpeded access to all Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
<td><em>Welcoming</em> the opening of National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and the steps taken by Morocco in order to fulfill its commitment to ensure unqualified and unimpeded access to all Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Also welcoming</em> the implementation of the enhanced refugee protection program developed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in coordination with the Polisario front, which will include human rights training and awareness initiatives</td>
<td><em>Also welcoming</em> the implementation of the enhanced refugee protection program developed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in coordination with the Polisario front, which includes human rights training and awareness initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Welcoming</em> the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communiqué of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 and looking forward to the inauguration of family visits by land and the continuation of the existing programme by air, and encouraging parties to cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in implementing their agreement</td>
<td><em>Looking forward to</em> the implementation of the updated plan of action on confidence building measures adopted in Geneva 24-25 January 2012, including the inauguration of family visits by land, use of new information technology to facilitate communication links between families, and the continuation and expansion of the existing programme by air, and encouraging parties to cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in implementing their agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recognizing that the consolidation of the status quo is not acceptable in the long term, and noting further that progress in the negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of the Western Sahara in all its aspects, and

Affirming support for the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Ambassador Christopher Ross, and his work in facilitating negotiations between the parties also welcoming his ongoing consultations with the parties and neighboring states, and

looking forward to his regional visit in the near future, including to Western Sahara, as per the communiqué of the Informal Meeting on Western Sahara 11-13 March 2012,

13. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2012
1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2013
2. Calls on all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO and to ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements
3. Calls on all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements
4. (Same Text as 3. in 2011)
5. (Same Text as 4. in 2011)
6. (Same Text as 5. in 2011)
7. (Same Text as 6. in 2011)
8. (Same Text as 7. in 2011)
9. Requests the Secretary-General to brief the Security Council on a regular basis, and at least twice a year, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices and express its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report
9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in the Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period
10. (Same Text as 9. in 2011)
11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in the Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period
11. Urges Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures that allow for visits between separated family members, as well as for other confidence-building measures that may be agreed upon between the parties
12. (Same Text as 10. in 2011)
13. (Same Text as 11. in 2011)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td><em>Requests the Secretary-General in his next report to examine the existing challenges to MINURSO’s operations, reflecting the situation on the ground</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>(Same Text as 1. in 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>(Same Text as 12. in 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>(Same Text as 13. in 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A
Rachad,

Please do not share the information in the last email/or this one on this Minurso subject, as it contains information to other clients that you may not want to share with your staff. It should have been deleted but I mistakenly sent it too quickly. I do not mind you seeing it however. Ed

-----Original Message-----
From: Edward Gabriel
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 7:15 PM
To: Bouhlal, Rachad (rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com)
Subject: FW: MINURSO Resolution and reactions; EU-Morocco talks on "advanced status," e.g. FDI and regional integration

FYI, Attached is a comparison of the 2011 and 2012 UN MINURSO rollovers, which you may find of use. Ed

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

-----Original Message-----
From: Edward Gabriel
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 12:01 PM
To: Fatima Kurtz; Jordan Paul
Subject: FW: MINURSO Resolution and reactions; EU-Morocco talks on "advanced status," e.g. FDI and regional integration

I would be good to see a comparison side by side or in color differences with last's year's resolution. Is that possible? thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Pence, Anne [mailto:apence@cov.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 9:47 AM
To: Bill Hayes; Joe Matthews; Hugh McDowell; Larson, Alan; Edward Gabriel; Fatima Kurtz
Subject: MINURSO Resolution and reactions; EU-Morocco talks on "advanced status," e.g. FDI and regional integration

It is "clean" but those involved (e.g. Morocco) may also see messages they may not like -- such as exhortations to provide "unhindered movement", etc. which harken to elements of the SG's report. At same time, the Resolution is positive about Morocco's steps on human rights, and some by the Polisario with UNHCR. It references the Moroccan autonomy proposal, but also a 2007 Polisario proposal. It offers continued support for the Ross process, and mentions that natural resources have been discussed in that context.
Morocco’s public comments are interesting too -- stresses the importance of self-determination (but indicates concern that a referendum would cause tension at an already tense time.

Meanwhile, EU-Morocco discussion were held in Luxembourg to prepare for the ag trade liberalization agreement in effect July 1 and to discuss a range of other issues under Morocco’s "advanced status," including regional integration, the AMU and the positive trend in Morocco-Algeria relations.

Anne

24 April 2012

Security Council
SC/10621

________________________________________

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York Security Council 6758th Meeting (AM)


Unanimously adopting resolution 2044 (2012), the Council called on the parties to cooperate fully with the operations of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of, as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for, United Nations personnel in carrying out the mandate.

Today’s resolution came on the heels of the Secretary-General’s 5 April report, in which he recommended the extension because the Mission remained relevant as a guarantor for the stability of the ceasefire and as a visible commitment of the international community to achieve a resolution of the conflict.

The Mission’s ability to fully monitor and assess the situation on the ground — in a total area of 104,000 km sq. — and to interact with the full spectrum of interlocutors was essential, as illustrated in the context of recent violence following a sports event and of evidence of “simmering community tensions” in the west, which the Secretary-General said was another consequence of the absence of a peace agreement between Morocco and the Frente Polisario and the continuing status quo, the report stated.

Expressing concern about the violations of existing agreements and calling on the parties to respect their relevant obligations, the Security Council called upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.
It further called upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Following the adoption of the resolution, Morocco’s representative said the text reiterated the importance and priority of the initiative of self-determination.

“There is no alternative to negotiations,” he said. “We will not move backwards. Since 2001, we have thought that the referendum approach could result in tension in a society which is still seeking to find solutions by consensus. We believe we will be able to live as neighbours in our neighbourhood.”

However, South Africa’s representative, also speaking after the vote, expressed concern over the resolution’s failure to more fully address human rights issues, especially in light of the Security Council’s recent bold steps in that field, particularly in northern Africa and the Middle East.

“The continuation of that trend will threaten to erode the Mission,” he cautioned. Still, his country voted in favour of the resolution because of the need to resolve the Western Sahara issue in a peaceful manner.

The meeting began at 10:14 a.m. and ended at 10:30 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2044 (2012) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling and reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

“Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), and 1979 (2011),

“Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

“Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to cooperate more fully with the United Nations and with each other and to strengthen their involvement to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

“Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including MINURSO, under close review and reiterating the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

“Expressing concern about the violations of existing agreements, and calling on the parties to respect their relevant obligations,
“Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

“Encouraging in this context, the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other’s proposals,

“Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General and the continued rounds of informal talks, and welcoming the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,

“Welcoming the progress made by the parties in discussing innovative negotiating approaches and discrete subjects, their commitment to deepen the discussions on these and other issues, and the 9 November 2011 meeting of the parties on natural resources and progress made towards demining,

“Welcoming the positive conclusion of the 12-16 September 2011 UNHCR-sponsored seminar on Hassaniya culture and the agreement by the parties to hold two additional seminars in 2012, as well as the holding of a UNHCR-facilitated high-level meeting on Confidence Building Measures for Western Sahara on 24 25 January 2012,

“Stressing the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law,

“Welcoming the opening of National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and the steps taken by Morocco in order to fulfil its commitment to ensure unqualified and unimpeded access to all Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council,

“Also welcoming the implementation of the enhanced refugee protection program developed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in coordination with the Polisario Front, which includes refugee and human rights training and awareness initiatives,

“Reiterating the request that UNHCR maintain its consideration of a refugee registration in the Tindouf refugee camps,

“Looking forward to the implementation of the updated plan of action on confidence building measures adopted in Geneva 24-25 January 2012, including the inauguration of family visits by land, use of new information technology to facilitate communication links between families, and the continuation and expansion of the existing programme by air, and encouraging the parties to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in implementing their agreement,

“Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponsored talks,

“Recognizing that the consolidation of the status quo is not acceptable, and noting further that progress in the negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,
“Affirming support for the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Ambassador Christopher Ross and his work in facilitating negotiations between the parties, welcoming his ongoing consultations with the parties and neighbouring states, and looking forward to his regional visit in the near future, including to Western Sahara, as per the communiqué of the Informal Meeting on Western Sahara 11-13 March 2012,

“Affirming support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Hany Abdel-aziz,

“Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 11 April 2012 (S/2012/197),

“1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2013;

“2. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) with regard to the ceasefire and calls on the parties to adhere fully to those agreements;

“3. Calls upon all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements;

“4. Welcomes the parties’ commitment to continue the process of holding small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, and recalls its endorsement of the recommendation in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations;

“5. Calls upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), and 1979 (2011) and the success of negotiations, inter alia, by continuing their discussion of the ideas in paragraph 120 of the Secretary General’s report (S/2011/249);

“6. Affirms its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context and calls for an intensified pace of meetings and strengthening of contacts;

“7. Calls upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

“8. Invites Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;

“9. Requests the Secretary-General to brief the Security Council on a regular basis, and at least twice a year, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, on the implementation of this resolution, challenges to MINURSO’s operations and steps taken to address them, and expresses its intention to meet to
receive and discuss his briefings and in this regard, further requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

“10. Welcomes the commitment of the parties and the neighbouring states to hold periodic meetings with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to review and, where possible, expand confidence-building measures;

“11. Urges Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures that allow for visits between separated family members, as well as for other confidence-building measures agreed upon between parties;

“12. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

“13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Background

The Security Council had before it the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2012/197), which covers developments since 1 April 2011 concerning the situation on the ground in the Territory, the status and progress of negotiations and challenges to the operations of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

In the report, the Secretary-General recommends the extension of MINURSO’s mandate for a further 12 months until 30 April 2013.

He recommends, therefore, an increase of 15 military observers to bolster monitoring capacities. As the report outlines a series of challenges that demonstrate that MINURSO is unable to exercise fully its peacekeeping, monitoring, observation and reporting functions, he requests the assistance of the Council in reasserting the Mission’s mandated role, ensuring that the minimum conditions for its successful operation are met and upholding peacekeeping standards and United Nations neutrality. He calls on the two parties to cooperate fully with MINURSO in achieving those goals.

He says that during the reporting period, the three rounds of informal talks between the parties, their two meetings on natural resources and confidence-building measures, and the numerous bilateral consultations that his Personal Envoy held with them, confirmed that the parties continue to have the political will to meet, but not as yet to engage in substantive negotiations towards a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, as required by Security Council resolutions.

It is possible that changes in the regional political environment will provide new opportunities, the report states. Absent a new framework, however, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy will continue his established pattern of activities and encourage the development of new ideas.

* * * *
SA blasts UN over Western Sahara rights
2012-04-25 09:13
New York - South Africa on Tuesday accused UN Security Council powers of "conveniently" ignoring human rights abuses in the disputed territory of Western Sahara.

The council again rejected growing demands for the UN peacekeeping force in the Moroccan-controlled territory to have a permanent rights investigation duty.

But the annual resolution renewing the mandate of the UN force did stress the need for Morocco to improve rights in Western Sahara, which it annexed in 1975 following a Spanish withdrawal.

South Africa's UN ambassador Baso Sangqu said the 15-nation council was guilty of "double standards" by taking "bold steps" over the Arab Spring countries but refusing a permanent rights monitoring system for Western Sahara.

The rights of the people of Western Sahara must be "equally defended with the same zeal and commitment", he told the council.

Without naming countries, he said "the selective approach to human rights by this council calls into question the motivation of those who have conveniently looked the other way while human rights abuses are committed in Western Sahara".

France, a permanent member of the council, is a strong backer of Morocco but has strongly denied trying to influence the Western Sahara talks. South Africa and Morocco are current temporary members of the council.

This year's talks on the UN mission were held amid growing UN complaints that its mission in the sparsely populated phosphate-rich territory is being "undermined" by Moroccan tactics.

The Security Council resolution, which renewed the peacekeeping mandate mandate until April 2013, stressed "the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps".

Disharmony and tension

Morocco controls the bulk of the territory. The Polisario Front, which fought a guerrilla war against the Moroccans until a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, governs the Tindouf camps in Algeria which were set up for Sahrawis who fled the conflict.

The resolution called on the two sides "to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights".

The peacekeepers are officially known as the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Efforts to organise a vote for the Sahrawi people have been deadlocked for years however.

The UN-brokered talks have failed to make progress on a political solution between the Polisario Front and Morocco.

Morocco's UN ambassador Mohammed Loulichki said the council had been "quite correct" to again reject "broadening the mandate to bring in questions which have nothing to do with the function" of the UN mission.
"Morocco makes a commitment to the [UN-brokered] negotiations" on the territory, said Loulichki. But he reaffirmed Morocco's claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara and said a referendum could lead to "disharmony and tension".

The Polisario Front's UN envoy, Ahmed Boukhari, also condemned what he called the "intrigues and subterfuges" of council members, including France, and said it had not been strong enough on human rights.

"It does not respond to the demands of international human rights organizations nor to the gravity of the situation on the ground, which reveals that there are dozens of Sahrawi political prisoners, hundreds of disappeared in addition to those who have died in detention in Moroccan secret prisons," he said in a statement.

Remarks by Commissioner Füle at the press conference after the EU-Morocco Association Council in Luxembourg on 23rd April 2012 “Morocco and the EU share the objective of a deepening and strengthening their relations on the basis of the “advanced status”. Today we took note of the very good progress achieved in the discussions on a new comprehensive EU-Morocco Action Plan which will provide us with an operational roadmap for our bilateral relations in the next five years (2012-2016). The new Action Plan will be fully in line with the political, economic and social reform agenda of Morocco and with the EU’s renewed approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy. In particular regarding our Southern partners The Action Plan contains orientations for progressive alignment to EU legal and regulatory acquis in key areas in order to establish closer economic integration with the EU with benefits for Morocco in terms of: foreign investment, market access, competitiveness and job creation. It also contains important objectives for the consolidation of the respect of human rights and democratic principles, improved governance and a more active involvement of the civil society.* Our bilateral relations are currently in a positive dynamic phase and I would like to highlight in particular the following areas:

* The forthcoming entry into force (by 1st July 2012) of the Agreement on liberalisation of trade in agriculture. This is a balanced agreement that will contribute to the development of Morocco’s agriculture and trade while opening new market opportunities for the EU operators.

* The on-going important bilateral negotiations, such as on liberalisation of trade in services and establishment and for a mobility partnership. The former one would pave the way for negotiations for the DCFTA while mobility partnership would allow us to better manage migration.

* Technical and financial assistance continues at a high level (190 € million per annum). Furthermore, I’m happy to announce today a first additional allocation of 80 € million under the new “Spring” facility for Morocco in order to promote economic and social development and human rights/governance. We are still going to discuss some other issues related to regional issues. Morocco is playing very important role in the regional cooperation; we are going to talk also about the Union for Mediterranean and about Maghreb Arab Union and its cooperation with the EU. Let me also say that in this context we welcome the positive trend in Algeria-Morocco relations. The EU looks forward to further progress in this process of regional integration.”

C. Anne Pence
Senior International Advisor
Covington and Burling LLP
202 662 5443
apence@cov.com

This message is from a law firm and may contain information that is confidential or legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please immediately advise the sender by reply e-mail that this message has been inadvertently transmitted to you and delete this e-mail from your system. Thank you for your cooperation.
We received some additional information on the new house language. Ed
Attached is the schedule for Saturday, including a list of people/organizations to thank or recognize. My cell phone does not always work at our home on the Eastern Shore. Our home number is 410 745 6903.

Address:
6560 Cedar Cove Road
Royal Oak, MD, 21662

I will see you directly at the Flag ceremony. Ed
PAINT THE TOWN MOROCCAN!
ACADEMY ART MUSEUM FUNDRAISER: MAY 2012

Notes for Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal

* SATURDAY MAY 5, NOON, FLAG CEREMONY, followed by opening comments by organizers and your introduction by Ambassador Ed Gabriel. You will say a few words and thank and recognize people:

  Acknowledgements:

  • The Academy Art Museum: Sponsor
    - Director, Erik Neil
    - Board of Trustees and Staff
    - Creator & Chief Organizer, Leslie Westbrook
    - Joyce Doehler, (pronounced Doe-ler) Co-Chairperson

  • Town of Easton
    - Mayor Robert Willey (pronounced WILL’-EE)
    - Town Council
    - Director of Economic Development, Maureen Scott-Taylor

  • Hassan Samrhouni, President of the Washington American Moroccan Club and Moroccan community

* You and the Mayor will cut the ribbon

* Following the Flag ceremony, at 12:30pm you will tour the souk and see sights on your walk to lunch

* At 1pm you will arrive to lunch at Mason's restaurant. You will have lunch with the museum Director and his wife, Erik and Louisa Neil, and Mrs. Kay Perkins. Buffy and I are also invited to attend this lunch.

* At approximately 3pm, Buffy and I will give you a window tour of the area, including St.Michaels and Oxford MD arriving to our home at 4pm for down time.

* We will depart at 5:30pm for the Avalon Theatre for a music concert by Ali Amir, which begins at 6pm.

* We will walk from the theatre to cocktails at the Academy Art museum, followed by dinner under the tent.

* DINNER will conclude about 10-10:30pm
Rachad,
Thank you for your time on Tuesday to meet. I would propose we discuss the language and appropriations schedule on the new House language as well as important upcoming congressional visits by you. If you agree, I would suggest we include our staffs. On my side I would include Bob and Jordan. Please let me know how you prefer to proceed and what issues/agenda you prefer? Thank you. I am now in Easton and everyone is excited to meet you, Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph:   +1 202 887 1113
Fax:   +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Below please find the MAC 1st Quarter 2012 Journal Article Review. Our research team compiles and reviews recent journal publications relating to Morocco, the Maghreb, and MENA on a quarterly basis. Clicking on any article title below will link you to the executive summary for the article as well as MAC recommendations on the relevance of the article. You can also find publication information, and, where available, a link to a copy of the article. In the event that no link is posted, please email me for a copy of the article. We hope that this information will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on recent journal articles and help to keep you up-to-date on publications and academic trends.

Please do not forward this bulletin as it contains our evaluations of the articles and is proprietary information

Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet

Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in Northwest Africa: Rising Dangers and Policy Options Across the Arc of Tension

Europeanization through Cooperation? EU Democracy Promotion in Morocco and Tunisia

Fatna El Bouih and the Work of Memory, Gender and Reparation in Morocco

The Influence of the Socioeducation Environment on Marriage Formation in Morocco

Is Morocco Immune to Upheaval?

Law on the Books Vs. Law in Action: Under-Enforcement of Morocco’s Reformed 2004 Family Law, the Moudawana

Morocco's New Geopolitics: A Wider Atlantic Perspective

New Socio-Political Actors in North Africa

Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's Pivotal Ambivalence

U.S.-Moroccan Relations: How Special?

Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet

Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher

The Carnegie Papers, Middle East, December 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite intense pressure for regime change in neighboring countries, Arab monarchs still enjoy an extraordinary degree of legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. The events of the Arab Spring afforded these sovereigns an opportunity to take advantage of that legitimacy and engineer a process of controlled, top-down reform that would preclude an escalation of bottom-up demands. For the most part, however, they have not been inclined to take progressive steps toward the democratic governments that Arab protestors are demanding. Reforms have ranged from ostensibly bold, but in reality limited in Morocco, to hesitant and uncertain in Jordan, to practically nonexistent in the Gulf countries.

Reforms undertaken by King Mohammed VI of Morocco are the most significant and progressive among Arab monarchies. Within two weeks of the start of street protests, he announced that a new constitution would be drafted and submitted to a popular referendum, with early parliamentary elections to follow soon afterward. On paper these steps appear to expedite the democratization process, but may not be followed by substantive changes.

The two most controversial issues in the drafting of the constitution concerned the identity of the Moroccan state and the power and role of the King. The first represents the Constitution's strongest aspect. The document officially declares Morocco a pluralistic society in terms of religion, language, and culture. It guarantees freedom of religious practice, recognizes Berber as an official language, and refers to a plurality of cultural influences-Andalusian, Saharan, Christian, Jewish-on Moroccan identity. Changes to the power of the King, however, are more ambiguous. The Constitution does impose new formal limits on the King's power, concerning the appointment of the Prime Minister for example, but reserves three crucial areas-religion, security, and armed forces policy choices-as his exclusive domain. This allows him to maintain control over most decisions unless he is challenged by political parties in the parliament, which is very unlikely given the history of deference and passivity to the King.

Existing political parties, including the PJD, do not appear interested in upsetting the status quo and protest movements focus on the government's shortcomings rather than those of the King. His personal legitimacy remains intact, but a majority of Moroccans remain skeptical. Voter turnout for the parliamentary election was only 45 percent, and many voters deliberately spoiled their ballots as a sign of protest. The new Constitution will likely not quell popular discontent; the February 20th and the Islamist adl wal-lhsan movements will fight for deeper reforms. For now, the new Constitution and elections have bolstered the monarchy and enabled Morocco to maintain order and stability, but do not represent a permanent solution.

Jordan's response to domestic protests has been "considerably more hesitant" than Morocco's. King Abdullah II has only proposed piecemeal reform, while King Mohammed has "moved boldly." Morocco's party system is much better developed than Jordan's and parties can play a meaningful role in parliament.

With the exception of Bahrain, Gulf monarchies have been unaffected by protest movements, and they have failed to take advantage of this important opportunity to introduce top-down reforms and avoid future problems. Instead, they have bought off moderate discontent with economic largesse or severe repression. Qatar supports change elsewhere, but not within its own borders; Omani demonstrators call for reform, not regime overthrow; Saudi Arabia is buying domestic peace with salary increases and housing benefits; UAE has
been left untouched by unrest, but is taking modest preventative measures; and it is unclear if the current turmoil in Kuwait is a product of popular discontent or simply competition among rival elites.

RECOMMENDATION

The author is very critical of Morocco's reform efforts, which he calls "ostensibly bold but in reality limited." He praises King Mohammed VI for swiftly responding to popular discontent, but suggests that, in reality, the monarch may not have to surrender much power because political parties are unwilling to play a more decisive role. He emphasizes the King's popularity, but warns that continued unrest could jeopardize his legitimacy. However, the author does identify Morocco as the frontrunner in terms of democratic change in Arab monarchies. Compared to other Arab monarchies, the author says, Morocco's new constitution is "quite liberal." Morocco's reform efforts appear much more progressive and monumental when examined in context, rather than on their own.

Marina Ottaway is a Senior Associate with the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Marwan Muasher is the Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees the Middle East program.

(Back to top)

Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in Northwest Africa: Rising Dangers and Policy Options Across the Arc of Tension

Michael Werz and Laura Conley

Center for American Progress, April 2012, pp. 1-75

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/04/pdf/climate_migration_nwafrica.pdf
<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/04/pdf/climate_migration_nwafrica.pdf>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article is the second in a series on the intersecting challenges of climate change, human migration, and security, and the subsequent challenges they present to US foreign policy in the 21st century. For its first regional report, the Center for American Progress focused on the unique confluence of these factors in northwest Africa - a region marked by labor migration, desertification, and security risks, namely the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram. Reporting on what they term the "arc of tension," the article tracks the intersections of climate change, migration, and security in Nigeria, Niger, Algeria, and Morocco. Recognizing that these nations are rarely analyzed as a geopolitical region, the authors explain that they chose to focus on these countries as a unit since they are linked by international migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean.
Rachad,
Michael Forscey who you met this weekend, and emailed me below, would enjoy inviting you out for a golf game. I'd be more than happy to reintroduce you two if you are interested or you could contact him directly. Let me know. Ed

-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Forscey [mailto:m4c@forstin.com]
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 9:35 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Ambassador Golf

Ed, enjoyed meeting the ambassador and his wife. I am more than happy to introduce him to Four Streams which I know he will enjoy and can do so virtually any time he picks. Moreover, there are any number of world class courses around here, some private some public, which he will want to see and which I think can be arranged. In addition to Four Streams, there is TPC Avenel, Congressional (a little trickier), Washington Golf, Chevy Chase, among others, as well as worthy places on the Eastern Shore.

Again, I can take him to Four Streams any number of times if he likes it and can arrange for trips to most if not all of the others. Just let me know.

---
Michael A. Forscey
Forscey & Stinson, P.L.L.C.
818 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Phone: (202) 496-3463
Cell: (202) 251-4264
m4c@forstin.com

DISCLAIMER:
This e-mail message may contain confidential, privileged information intended solely for the addressee. Please delete and do not read, copy or disseminate it unless you are the addressee. This e-mail is for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute either an electronic signature or an agreement by the sender.
Rachad,
Thank you for such a productive meeting together. I felt it was excellent and I’m glad you got to see Bob in action, as he can be a great asset, not to mention Jordan of course.

Below is the journalist luncheon proposal with friendly journalists, which we propose you conduct at the Embassy. Please get back to me at your convenience with proposed dates or other comments etc. We would be happy to work directly with your staff as well, whatever is easiest for you. Thank you again, Ed

---

Hi Ed,

Here’s more information and background about the Ambassador’s luncheon with journalists. Below is the description of what has been proposed. The next step is to choose a date (preferably a Tuesday because that works best for these types of journalists, given their deadlines) then to send out an invite from the Embassy. I have included the contact information for each journalist below. If you have any questions or just want to discuss, feel free to call or email me. Thanks –Calvin Dark

Media Luncheon with the Ambassador

The Comm. Team proposes to work with the Embassy to organize a media luncheon at the Embassy with the Ambassador and a small group of select reporters to introduce himself as Morocco’s new Ambassador and for a briefing on US-Moroccan relations, including highlighting the importance of targeting US support for the refugee camps and full implementation of the recent Appropriations language. The proposed journalists include:

1) Jennifer Rubin (Washington Post, “Right Turn”, jandjrubin@cox.net, 703-581-2894 ) – Jennifer Rubin is very interested in Morocco, understands and supports our messaging, particularly with regards to the Western Sahara, the Polisario and terrorism. Rubin has written several times on key issues concerning our campaigns and maintain and strengthening this relationship will be very beneficial in the future.

2) Massoud Hayoun (The Atlantic, mhayoun@theatlantic.com, 818-645-4032 ) – Massoud Hayoun writes often about the Arab Spring and has written about Morocco’s experience, as it relates to ethnic identity and protection of ethnic minorities. His publication is well-known and well-respected—particularly among the Left—and educating Hayoun/strengthening that relationship will encourage him to explore and write further on Morocco and topics related to our campaigns.

3) Lee Smith (The Weekly Standard, lhs462@gmail.com, 718-968-5250) – Lee Smith is Weekly Standard Senior Editor and author of the respected book on the Middle East, "The Strong Horse." He has reported extensively on the Middle East/Arab Spring and has written favorably several times about Morocco -- about human rights, Western Sahara and the king’s March 9, 2011 speech on Constitutional reform.

4) Oren Dorell (USA Today: odorell@usatoday.com, 703-854-3323) -- Oren Dorrel, a foreign affairs reporter for USA Today, writes about society and warfare in the Middle East, from Morocco to Pakistan. He has written favorably about the recent Constitutional reforms and referendum.

5) Eli Lake (Newsweek/The Daily Beast, elilake@gmail.com) -- Eli Lake, Senior National Security correspondent for
Newsweek/The Daily Beast, writes extensively about security ramifications for US policy of developments in MENA.

6) **Jackson Diehl** (Washington Post) -- Jackson Diehl is an influential foreign affairs columnist for the Washington Post.

7) **Robert Kagan** (Brookings Institution, robert.kagan@gmail.com, his assistant Tesia Schmidtke-202-797-6272) -- Robert Kagan, senior fellow at Brookings is historian, author and foreign policy commentator, who is very interested in Morocco. His latest book (2012), *The World America Made*, has won broad acclaim and was mentioned in President Obama's most recent state of the union address.
Please notice the meeting schedule of Gare Smith, who represents Algeria.
For Six Month Period Ending 03/31/2012

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant
   Foley Hoag LLP

   (b) Registration No.
   4776

   (c) Business Address(es) of Registrant
   1875 K Street, NW
   Suite 800
   Washington, DC 20006

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following?
   (a) If an individual:
      (1) Residence address(es)
      (2) Citizenship
      (3) Occupation
      Yes ☐ No ☒
      Yes ☐ No ☒
      Yes ☐ No ☒
   (b) If an organization:
      (1) Name
      (2) Ownership or control
      (3) Branch offices
      Yes ☐ No ☒
      Yes ☐ No ☒
      Yes ☐ No ☒
   (c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in Items (a) and (b) above.

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4, AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C', state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.
   Yes ☐ No ☒

   If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C?
   Yes ☐ No ☒

   If no, please attach the required amendment.

---

1 The Exhibit C', for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)
4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period?
   Yes ☐   No ☒
   If yes, furnish the following information:
   Name                      Position                      Date Connection Ended

   (b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period?
   Yes ☒   No ☐
   If yes, furnish the following information:
   Name                      Residence Address              Citizenship              Position              Date Assumed

   SEE ATTACHMENT A

5. (a) Has any person named in Item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal?
   Yes ☐   No ☒
   If yes, identify each such person and describe the service rendered.

   (b) During this six month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity?    Yes ☐   No ☒
   Name                      Residence Address              Citizenship              Position              Date Assumed

   (c) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period?    Yes ☐   No ☒
   If yes, furnish the following information:
   Name                      Position or Connection              Date Terminated

   (d) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their connection with any foreign principal during this 6 month reporting period?    Yes ☐   No ☒
   If yes, furnish the following information:
   Name                      Position or Connection              Foreign Principal              Date Terminated

6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(b) of the supplemental statement?    Yes ☐   No ☒
   If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.
II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period?  
   Yes ☐  No ☒

   If yes, furnish the following information:
   
   Foreign Principal: ___________________________  
   Date of Termination: ___________________________

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal(s)\(^2\) during this 6 month reporting period?  
   Yes ☐  No ☒

   If yes, furnish the following information:
   
   Name and Address of Foreign Principal(s): ___________________________  
   Date Acquired: ___________________________

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principal(s)\(^2\) whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

   Republic of Djibouti
   Republic of Guyana
   Corporation for the Promotion of Exports and Investments of Ecuador
   Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria

10. (a) Have you filed exhibits for the newly acquired foreign principal(s), if any, listed in Item 8?  
    Exhibit A\(^3\)  Yes ☐  No ☒  
    Exhibit B\(^4\)  Yes ☐  No ☒

    If no, please attach the required exhibit.

    (b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during this six month period?  
    Yes ☐  No ☒

    If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits?  
    Yes ☐  No ☐

    If no, please attach the required amendment.

\(^2\) The term “foreign principal” includes, in addition to those defined in section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a)(9)). A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 258.)

\(^3\) The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form NSD-3 (Formerly CRM-157) sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

\(^4\) The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form NSD-4 (Formerly CRM-155) sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.
III - ACTIVITIES

11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?  

   Yes ☒  
   No ☐

   If yes, identify each foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity\(^5\) as defined below?  

   Yes ☒  
   No ☐

   If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates, places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

SEE ATTACHMENT B

13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits your foreign principal(s)?  

   Yes ☐  
   No ☒

   If yes, describe fully.

---

\(^5\) The term "political activity" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.
14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise?  
Yes ☑   No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011</td>
<td>Government of the Services rendered under Contract</td>
<td>$210,706.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/31/2012</td>
<td>People's Democratic Republic of Algeria including expenses for transportation and computer research.</td>
<td>$210,706.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $210,706.23

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign7, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?  
Yes ☑   No ☐

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D to your registration?  
Yes ☑   No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date ________________________________

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE
During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value8 other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?  
Yes ☑   No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

| Foreign Principal | Date Received | Thing of Value | Purpose |
15. (a) **DISBURSEMENTS-MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?  Yes ☑ No ☐

(2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal?  Yes ☐ No ☑

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>To Whom</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2011</td>
<td>Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria</td>
<td>Local transportation (taxi) and computer research, Westlaw expenses</td>
<td>$706.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/31/2012</td>
<td>Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$706.23

Total
(b) **DISBURSEMENTS-THINGS OF VALUE**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value\(^\text{10}\) other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Foreign Principal</th>
<th>Thing of Value</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(c) **DISBURSEMENTS-POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value\(^\text{11}\) in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

- **Date**: 03/04/2012
- **Amount or Thing of Value**: $250.00
- **Political Organization or Candidate**: Kirsten Gilliband for Senate
- **Location of Event**: Fundraising Event

*Personal contribution made by Janis H. Brennan*

---

\(^{10}\) Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, *kickbacks* and the like.
V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. (a) During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials? 
Yes ☐ No ☒

If Yes, go to Item 17.

(b) If you answered No to Item 16(a), do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration? 
Yes ☐ No ☒

If Yes, please forward the materials disseminated during the six month period to the Registration Unit for review.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? 
Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- Radio or TV broadcasts ☐
- Magazine or newspaper ☐
- Motion picture films ☐
- Letters or telegrams ☐
- Advertising campaigns ☐
- Press releases ☐
- Pamphlets or other publications ☐
- Lectures or speeches ☐
- Other (specify) ☐

Electronic Communications

- Email ☐
- Website URL(s): ____________________________
- Social media websites URL(s): ____________________________
- Other (specify) ☐

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

- Public officials ☐
- Legislators ☐
- Government agencies ☐
- Newspapers ☐
- Editors ☐
- Civic groups or associations ☐
- Libraries ☐
- Educational institutions ☐
- Nationality groups ☐
- Other (specify) ☐

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

- English ☐
- Other (specify) ____________________________

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? 
Yes ☐ No ☒

23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act? 
Yes ☐ No ☒

---

12 The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.
VI - EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)  
30 April 2012
30 April 2012
30 April 2012
30 April 2012

(Print or type name under each signature or provide electronic signature)

Gare Smith  
Janis Brennan

13 This statement shall be signed by the individual agent, if the registrant is an individual, or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.
4. (b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes

If yes, furnish the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RESIDENCE ADDRESS</th>
<th>CITIZENSHIP</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>DATE ASSUMED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joubin-Brett, Anna</td>
<td>4 Place de Vendun Grenoble, France 38000</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>01/01/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walek, David</td>
<td>279 South Ave. Weston, MA 02493</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>01/17/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane, Peter</td>
<td>20 Thoreau Circle Beverly, MA 01915</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Director of Litigation Technology Services</td>
<td>03/02/2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTACHMENT B
ITEM 12 SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT period ending on 03/31/2012
Government of the People’s Republic of Algeria: To promote Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination
No. 4776

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MEETINGS HELD</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/04/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Mr. Tim Rieser in the office of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/06/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Stephanie Hammond in the office of Congressman Trent Franks (R-AZ).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/07/2011</td>
<td>Meeting with Ms. Sharon Waxman, Senior Advisor to Under Secretary of State.</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/12/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Stephanie Hammond of the office of Congressman Trent Franks (R-AZ).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/15/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Mr. Jason Ullner, the Algeria Desk Officer at the Department of State.</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/02/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Elyse Anderson of the office of Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Meeting Description</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/06/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Mr. Dan Baer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights &amp; Labor.</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/08/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Mr. Tom Buttry of the office of Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/12/2011</td>
<td>Phone call and exchanges with Mr. Tim Rieser of the office of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/15/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Elyse Anderson of the office of Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/20/2011</td>
<td>Exchanges with Mr. Tim Rieser of the office of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/05/2012</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Algene Sajery of the office of Congressman Donald Payne (D-NJ).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/26/2012</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Jessica Lee of the office of Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/21/2012</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Stephanie Hammond from the office of Congressman Trent Franks (R-AZ).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/27/2012</td>
<td>Exchanges with Mr. Tim Rieser of the office of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/29/2012</td>
<td>Exchanges with Ms. Stephanie Hammond of the office of Congressman Trent Franks (R-AZ).</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/06/2012</td>
<td>Phone call with Ms. Algene Sajery of the office of Congressman Donald Payne (D-NJ)</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/28/2012</td>
<td>Meeting with Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights &amp; Labor</td>
<td>The promotion of Algeria-U.S. relations and respect for human rights, including the right to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We should discuss this. Obviously this is something Stu is promoting outside his representation of OCP, as an Economic expert and someone who has promoted N. African integration. State is looking to give some notice to Morocco that this may becoming out as a proposal to Morocco by the State Department and something the Economic Bureau wants to deliver for Hillary this year. We should discuss how you want to handle this as I believe it requires some thought and analysis to see how important it really is and whether it meets Moroccan interests. I'm available at your convenience to discuss more and see how you want to proceed. I am a little cautious on this one. Although in principle I know it is probably a good idea, I don't want it to interfere with your other priorities, which I'm worried could happen if it is proposed by others outside the Embassy incorrectly. Please keep this between us until we can talk further and it is nothing to worry about at this point. Ed

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Cheek, Marney" <mcheek@cov.com>
Date: May 9, 2012 20:51:19 EDT
To: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Cc: "Eizenstat, Stuart" <seizenstat@cov.com>, "Pence, Anne" <apence@cov.com>
Subject: US Promotion of Regional Integration in the Maghreb

Ed,

As I mentioned, Stu Eizenstat understands that the State Department is considering an important initiative to promote greater economic integration -- and greater economic growth and job creation - in the Maghreb.

The proposal would focus, in part, on the Morocco FTA. The first component would be to begin discussions on regional cumulation, which is provided for in the FTA. The second component would be to liberalize some of the tariff rules for a small number of products (those in Annex 5-A of the FTA, which include figs, dates, and television parts, among other products) to make it easier for Moroccan companies and foreign investors in Morocco to achieve economies of scale by using inputs from the entire region in products ultimately destined for the U.S. market. (For example, a Moroccan company making fig jam and exporting it to the US may be able to grow its business if it also can source figs from Tunisia. Ultimately, the main value-added work of making jam would still be done in Morocco.)

We see important benefits for Morocco in these proposals. First, Morocco would serve as the hub for US trade initiatives in the region, since the FTA is the foundation for the United States’ regional trade initiative. Second, these liberalized trade rules are designed to attract greater foreign direct investment, and that FDI would likely flow to Morocco. Third, Morocco for some time has wanted to see greater benefits from the FTA. There would be a renewed focus on the FTA and the U.S. Government would have an interest in promoting Morocco and the FTA to the U.S. business community (and, indeed, European and other investors as well) so that the more liberal trade rules yield results.

This is by no means an overhaul of the FTA -- most tariff rules would remain the same. But it is an effort for the State Department to create incentives for greater economic cooperation and foreign investment in the region in an incremental fashion. (Notably, the small changes envisioned would not require U.S. Congressional approval.) Finally, while we would defer to you on this, it would seem to us that there may
be some political benefits to promoting greater economic ties between Morocco and its neighbors.

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Marney

Marney L. Cheek | Covington & Burling LLP
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20004
Tel: (202) 662-5267 | Fax: (202) 778-5267
mcheek@cov.com

This message is from a law firm and may contain information that is confidential or legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please immediately advise the sender by reply e-mail that this message has been inadvertently transmitted to you and delete this e-mail from your system. Thank you for your cooperation.
Rachad,

Good news. The language stays as originally reported to us by the House Committee, plus they added additional language on census and resettlement. See below. The Full committee markup is on Thursday. After Thursday the language cannot be changed until the conference committee, which follows Senate action and will most likely convene in the Fall. So, we only have two days before our language is solidly in the House bill. We will send to you today talking points and the contacts for two House Members, Chairman Rogers and Ranking member Dicks of the Full Appropriations Committee, suggesting that you simply thank each member for the inclusion of the language in the house subcommittee bill. You will not have to lobby, but rather simply let them know of your gratitude for inclusion in the House bill. Please call me at your convenience and I can walk you through this in more detail. Ed

Under Title I, Department of State.

Western Sahara—The Committee is concerned about the growing acts of violence and terrorism in the Sahel region in North Africa and the rising influence of Al Qaeda across North Africa. Additional, Al Qaeda’s growing ties with members of the Polisario, residents of Tindouf camps, and other militants in the region highlight the importance of redoubling diplomatic efforts to resolve the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara, which can lessen the political unrest and economic crises that resulted from the conflict and the resolution of the protracted refugee situation in Algeria. The Committee recommends the Secretary of State treat as a more urgent priority a negotiated settlement to the dispute, based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and work with the parties of the conflict, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), and other relevant international partners to reach a durable solution, including a census, refugee resettlement, and/or voluntary repatriation.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Attached for your use are talking points to two members of Congress. Since they are addressing literally trillions of dollars in various appropriations measures for both the Defense and State appropriations, it will be difficult to draw their attention to our language. Most likely, they will now even know about our language. It is best that you simply thank them if you can get them on the phone. Usually they will return your calls later in the day. If they don’t it is only because with the markup they are exceptionally busy.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
TO: Ambassador Bouhlal

FR: Ed Gabriel, MAC team

RE: Phone Call with Rep. Hal Rogers (R-KY) regarding the House Foreign Operations Bill

The number for the office of Chairman Rogers is 202-225-4601.

Most of the time, the Congressman will not be available and will call back later in the day.

Background

Rep. Hal Rogers is a Republican from Kentucky. Rep. Rogers is Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the most powerful person on the Committee. He has a reputation as a skillful insider with significant influence over a wide range of areas.

He was born in rural Kentucky and has represented the 5th district for 13 terms, making him the longest serving Kentucky republican ever elected to federal office.

Rep. Rogers has been a consistent supporter of Morocco. He visited Morocco when Ed Gabriel was serving as US Ambassador in Rabat. He has sent a staffer on the Congressional Staff Delegation to Morocco. In 2004 he voted in favor of the Free Trade Agreement. In 2007 and 2009 he signed both House letters supporting the Moroccan Autonomy plan.

As a strong supporter of Morocco and resolving the dispute over the Western Sahara based on Autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, Rep. Rogers should be supportive of the report language.

Rep. Rogers has a very busy week as they are marking up 4 of the biggest Appropriations bills (Homeland, Defense, and Military Construction, in addition to our bill) and will likely not want to talk for a long time. Rep. Rogers will want to hear that this language has the support of key Republicans on the subcommittee like Kay Granger and Mario Diaz-Balart.

Goal

To Thank Chairman Rogers for his support over the years and thank him for the positive report language that was included by the Subcommittee.

Talking Points

- Thank Chairman Rogers for his support over the years.
Thank him for the positive language that was included by the Subcommittee under the leadership of Republican Chairwoman Granger and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart on the issue of resolving the Western Sahara based. **MAKE SURE to use the correct member reference above for each call you make. One of the talking points references the Republican member who helped us, the other references the Democratic member who helped us.**

Morocco very much appreciates this attention from the Congress and we believe your actions will prove very helpful to security and stability in the region.

If he asks for more information you can explain how the positive report language notes how the deteriorating security situation makes it imperative to resolve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

Resolving the dispute based on Autonomy/Sovereignty is the long time position of Chairman Rogers, the Congress (House and Senate Majorities) and both President Bush and President Obama. AND MOROCCO SUPPORTS THIS US POSITION.

The language also emphasizes the need to resolve protracted refugee issue posed by the refugee camps that have been run by the Polisario for over 35 years by conducting a census of who is living there and working on programs that emphasize resettlement outside of the camps.

Thank him again for all of his support and for this important language.
TO: Ambassador Bouhlal

FR: Ed Gabriel, MAC team

RE: Phone Call with Rep. Norman Dicks (D-WA)

The number for the office of Rep. Dicks is 202-225-5916.

Most of the time, the Congressman will not be available and will call back later in the day.

Background

Rep. Norman Dicks is the Ranking Member of the full Appropriations Committee from the state of Washington. He represents Washington’s 6th congressional district, located in the northwestern corner of the state. He is a tireless advocate for environmental conservation and defense policy, as Boeing is a major employer in his district. He was first elected to Congress in 1976. He recently announced that he will not be running for reelection.

Rep. Dicks is a reliable supporter of Morocco. He signed both the 2007 and the 2009 Congressional letters in support of the Moroccan Autonomy Plan, and also voted in favor of the 2006 Free Trade Agreement. He is a long time friend of Ed Gabriel.

Rep. Dicks has a very busy week as they are marking up 4 of the biggest Appropriations bills (Homeland, Defense, and Military Construction, in addition to our bill) and will likely not want to talk for a long time. As the Ranking Member, it will be important to him to know that the policy recommendation (resolve based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty) is also the policy of the Obama administration.

Goal

To Thank Ranking Member Dicks for his support over the years and thank him for the positive report language that was included by the Subcommittee.

Talking Points

- Thank Chairman Dicks for his support over the years.

- Thank him for the positive language that was included by the Subcommittee on the issue of resolving the Western Sahara based. Also note that we always enjoy working with Rep. Lowey (the Ranking Member – Democrat – on the Subcommittee). **MAKE SURE to use the correct member reference above for each call you make. One of the talking points references the Republican member who**
helped us, the other references the Democratic member who helped us.

- Morocco very much appreciates this attention from the Congress and we believe your actions will prove very helpful to restore regional security and stability.

- If he asks for more information you can explain how the positive report language notes how the deteriorating security situation makes it imperative to resolve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

- Resolving the dispute based on Autonomy/Sovereignty is the long time position of Ranking Member Dicks, the Congress (House and Senate Majorities) and President Obama, President Bush, and President Clinton. AND MOROCCO SUPPORTS THIS US POSITION.

- The language also emphasizes the need to resolve protracted refugee issue posed by the refugee camps that have been run by the Polisario for over 35 years by conducting a census of who is living there and working on programs that emphasize resettlement outside of the camps.

- Thank him again for all of his support and for this important language.
Below are the two sections that apply to Morocco in the House Foreign Operations Report which will go before the full Committee tomorrow at 10. The report language on the Western Sahara we knew about but it is now public. More importantly, the House also put in funding for FMF for Morocco, which is terrific news, which is thanks in large part to Congresspersons Granger, Lowey and Diaz-Balart. This provides an excellent opportunity to strike down Leahy language in conference as the House has now spoken definitively on FMF funding. We still have to get through the House full committee markup tomorrow but things are looking very good. Then the next step will be to protect the House language in conference after the Senate passes language. We will next try to get the Senate to be more favorable so that their final bill will be more pro-Morocco when it gets to the conference committee.

Western Sahara.—The Committee is concerned about the growing acts of violence and terrorism in the Sahel region in North Africa and the rising influence of Al Qaeda across North Africa. Additionally, Al Qaeda’s growing ties with members of the Polisario, residents of the Tindouf camps, and other militants in the region highlight the importance of redoubling diplomatic efforts to resolve the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara, which can lessen the political unrest and economic crises that resulted from the conflict and the resolution of the protracted refugee situation in Algeria. The Committee recommends the Secretary of State treat as a more urgent priority a negotiated settlement to the dispute, based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and work with the parties of the conflict, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other relevant international partners to reach a durable solution, including a census, refugee resettlement, and/or voluntary repatriation.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM

Morocco.—The Committee supports not less than $8,000,000 for Morocco, which is the same as the request. The Committee supports making additional funds available for Morocco from funds described under Middle East Response under this heading, subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2012 11:23 AM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: FW: Speaker Boehner Appoints Elliott Abrams to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

FYI

This can only help Morocco. This is the commission that investigated Morocco after the Christian expulsions. Nothing happened with that investigation. Still it always helps to have another ally if anything were to come before the commission.

Subject: Speaker Boehner Appoints Elliott Abrams to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Posted by Speaker Boehner Press Office

May 15, 2012

Press Release

WASHINGTON, DC - House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) issued the following release announcing his appointment of Elliott Abrams to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom:

"Elliott Abrams is an honorable public servant who has served the American people with integrity and distinction. I am pleased to announce his appointment to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, where I am confident he will be a strong advocate for people throughout the world who are facing oppression and coercion for their faith. The free exercise of religion is a fundamental right our Founding Fathers acknowledged in the Constitution. They viewed this individual right as superior to any tyrannical action of government.

Preserving this sacred right the last two centuries is why the persecuted people of the world look to America as the brightest beacon of freedom.

"The commission's goal is to highlight serious threats to religious liberty throughout the world so the President and Congress can make measured and wise decisions in response. The work of the commission is as important now as it ever has been. Americans and their representatives in Washington must have the best possible information as we form our foreign policies. I want to acknowledge the valuable service of outgoing commissioner Ted Van Der Meid, who has been a steadfast voice for religious liberty."

NOTE: Elliott Abrams is a lawyer and foreign policy expert who served in the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.
Please see attached. This is a very important phone call. See you tomorrow. Ed
TO: Ambassador Bouhlal

FR: Ed Gabriel, MAC team

RE: Phone Call with Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) regarding FMF assistance to Morocco

We believe the Senate may mark up the Senate Foreign Ops bill as early as May 22 (our best information), the day before your meeting with Sen. Inouye. We are not optimistic about the bill and are concerned that Sen. Leahy will continue to try and condition FMF assistance to Morocco.

As Sen. Leahy is the Subcommittee Chairman, he is in charge of drafting the bill and it is very difficult to put any pressure on him. In fact, the only person in any real position to help keep the FMF restrictions out of the bill is Sen. Inouye – the Chairman of the full committee.

His phone number is 202-224-3934

Most of the time, the Chairman will not be available and will call back later in the day. It is very important that you persist to get a phone call conversation with him before COB Friday.

Background

Senator Daniel Inouye is a Democrat from Hawaii. He was first elected to the U.S. Senate in 1962 and is the most senior member of the US Senate. Sen. Inouye is decorated WW II War hero and has strong views on minority and human rights stemming from his own personal history and advocacy for justice for Japanese-Americans following WW II.

Senator Inouye is the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, which oversees all discretionary spending legislation in the Senate. He is the only member of the Senate with the ability pressure Sen. Leahy into removing FMF restrictions in the first draft of the bill. As subcommittee Chairman, Sen. Leahy has a large amount of autonomy on producing the draft and only Sen. Inouye as full committee Chairman can exert any pressure on Sen. Leahy.

The Senator is very supportive of Morocco. In 2004, he sent his staffer Charlie Houy, on a Senate Appropriations Congressional Delegation to Morocco. That same year Senator Inouye voted in favor of the Free Trade Agreement. In 2010 he, along with a bipartisan majority of 54 US Senators, signed a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, urging her to make the resolution of the Western Sahara stalemate a US foreign policy priority in North Africa.

It is unlikely that Sen. Inouye will be aware of the FMF issue. He will need to be educated on why the FMF is being conditioned and how it affects the US-Morocco bilateral relationship.
While Sen. Inouye will likely be sympathetic to our concerns it will be difficult to convince him to overrule Sen. Leahy. That is a strategic decision for him and it will need to be balanced against his other priorities with Sen. Leahy. It is still important to brief him on this issue. This way, even if he decides not to help us early in the process, he will be aware of the issue and can help us when this bill goes into conference later in the year.

**GOAL**

**To convince Sen. Inouye to protect Morocco’s FMF funding from any restrictions in the Senate Foreign Operation Bill.**

**Talking Points**

Thank Sen. Inouye for his previous support for Morocco over the years and for signing the 54 signature Senate letter in 2010

Explain that last year, the final appropriations bill condition all of Morocco’s FMF assistance ($10 million) until the Department State produced a report on the positive steps Morocco is taking to improve human right conditions in the Western Sahara

Sen. Leahy has long requested an additional report on steps Morocco is taking to further protect human rights throughout Morocco and of course this is the prerogative of any Senator and regular business between branches of the American Government.

Morocco is, of course, supportive of any report requested by a Senator from the State Department, but strongly opposes having our military support delayed. Last year Morocco’s FMF funding became a part of this debate.

Morocco uses this FMF funding to purchase American military hardware, including $2.5 billion in F-16s and tanks produced by General Dynamic. Morocco views these purchases as strengthening the important economic and military relationship between our countries. These purchases also enhance the interoperability of our military forces during joint training sessions and foreign missions.

We are concerned that something like last year may be included again this year and would like to work with you to eliminate any FMF restrictions.

Morocco is strategic partner of the US in the region, on the UN Security Council, and as well as leader in the North Africa in the Arab Spring.

Morocco is leader on human rights in the region and has been used as an example by Sec. Clinton and other members of the Obama Administration.

These FMF restrictions severely and adversely affect the bilateral relationship because it directly affects the close military relationship and bilateral relationship. **Morocco will take such restrictions as an affront to its long cooperative relationship with the United States.**

We need your support on this issue.
Below please find the April 2012 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

April 2012 Events Bulletin

April 3
The Western Sahara Crisis: Why US Leadership is Needed Now

April 4
Morocco - The Challenges of Democratic Reform

April 5
Islamists in Power: Views from Within

April 11
Western Sahara Conference & Essay Contest Award Ceremony

April 18
Climate Change, Migration, and Security: Challenges and Policy Options in Northwest Africa

April 23
The Arab Spring, a Year On: How's America Faring?

April 24
Lord's Resistance Army, Boko Haram, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa

April 24
The Political Economy of the 'Maghreb Spring' and its Aftermath
The Western Sahara Crisis: Why Us Leadership is Needed Now

Date: 3 April 2012

1. Title: The Western Sahara Crisis: Why Us Leadership is Needed Now
   Hosted by the Moroccan American Center for Policy

   Participants:
   **Michael Ussery**: Former US Ambassador to Morocco
   **Dr. J. Peter Pham**: Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council
   **Robert Holley**: Senior Adviser, Moroccan American Center
   **Jean AbiNader**: Moderator: Senior Adviser, Moroccan American Center

2. Overview

Foreign policy experts and former US diplomats participated in a roundtable focused on the urgent need for concrete US action in support of its long-standing policy for a solution to the Western Sahara conflict based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty—a policy backed by the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations and reiterated by bipartisan majorities of both the US House and Senate. Now, more than ever, according to the panel, the Western Sahara dispute contributes to instability in the Sahara/Sahel region—home to deteriorating humanitarian conditions for Sahrawi refugees and an increasingly volatile security situation.

3. Summary

Jean AbiNader introduced the speakers and reviewed the evolution of American foreign policy since the 1980s, which saw priorities shift from Cold War security issues to a greater diversity of regional economic and political disputes. AbiNader argued that America has an opportunity to help the Tindouf refugees while simultaneously stabilizing the increasingly worrisome security atmosphere in North Africa.

Michael Ussery focused on the deterioration of the refugee camps themselves, noting that some of those born in the camps years ago are now grandparents, a condition that Ussery deemed unacceptable. He emphasized that is in the interest of the United States to encourage an improvement in refugee conditions for humanitarian and security reasons, reiterating that the Western Sahara issue is the key stumbling block to an Arab Maghreb Union that would fully realize the region's economic potential. Noting that international attention has been diverted elsewhere, Amb. Ussery lamented that, even during his time at the State Department, when the crisis was far more violent, the conflict was never considered one of the top twenty-five most important foreign policy issues facing the country. Ussery argued that any solution must now come from the top down, as the US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue and the Autonomy Plan should be addressed hand in hand. He concluded by outlining specific steps that Washington could take: embracing the Autonomy Plan at the MINURSO renewal in April and opening up the Western Sahara to US development aid.

AbiNader commented that the State Department appears to be the main obstacle to such initiatives, and Amb. Ussery agreed that such policies amount to tying our hands behind our backs when it comes to addressing political, security, and commercial interests. He clarified that in the Western Sahara, the US is blocking itself, while in Tindouf, Algeria remains the primary impediment to securing improvements for the Sahrawi people.

Dr. J. Peter Pham expressed concern that the Sahel, the bridge that connects all of Africa, has in many places become occupied by al-Qaeda offshoots that are increasingly more pragmatic in their operations and local relationships. They are eschewing ideological rigidity for whatever is effective. He cited the example of a 2009 kidnapping that was contracted out by AQIM to a former Polisario member and smuggler, who dutifully assembled a so-called “A-Team” to carry out the operation. This man was not connected to al-Qaeda and did not share its ideology, but the militants hired him because they were in desperate straits and were seeking financial support through ransom. Dr. Pham called this the new *modus operandi* in the region—criminal groups of all persuasions cooperating to overcome the challenges inherent to operating in a desolate environment. He referenced the Tuareg rebellion in Mali, where the nationalist Azawad Front has aligned with two radical Islamist groups in its conquest of northern territory.

Turning to the humanitarian crisis in Tindouf, Dr. Pham said that while the refugees have few prospects for a better
life, the one thing many of them have is military training, which if combined with arms from Libya’s weapons depots, could empower militant groups that recruit from the camps. Dr. Pham likened the situation to Afghanistan in 2001, when American policymakers ignored a clear and present danger until it was too late. Ultimately, terrorists require territory and basic infrastructure with which to operate, and the Sahel is fast becoming al-Qaeda’s new safe haven as members flee the US offensive in South Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. Dr. Pham suggested that, should the West fail to counter these extremists in the Sahel, the world could see the Mali drama repeated elsewhere.

Robert Holley opened with a discussion of Peter van Walsum, who, in his last report to the UN Secretary General, lamented that the Polisario leaders, who do not reside in the Tindouf camps, propagate the notion that the Sahrawi refugees prefer “to stay there indefinitely rather than accept a negotiated solution that falls short of independence.” Holley then detailed his many interviews with Sahrawis that escaped the camps, most of whom left family behind. Nearly all of the refugees informed him that if he carries only one message home to American leaders, it should be to emphasize their desire to reunite with their loved ones. They also told him that many in the camps expressed interest in returning to the Western Sahara without a guarantee of independence. The situation in Tindouf, said Holley, is the only refugee situation where the victims can return home without the threat of death or persecution. The dilemma is therefore offering the refugees freedom of movement and a choice, to which the Polisario and Algeria remain an obstacle. Holley explained that American leaders should back up their overwhelming support for the Autonomy Plan with actions, push international agencies to implement programs that give Sahrawi refugees a right of return, and decouple the politics of the Western Sahara conflict from the humanitarian aspects of the camps.

4. Q & A

Q: What is in it [solving the Sahara conflict] for the Polisario?
A: (Holley) You have people in the area who have learned to become practical. If you’re providing assistance to thousands of people, which the international community has done for 25 years, and you only have 40,000 or 50,000 people there, you can imagine what is happening to the extra resources. If you do not have a real economy beyond contraband, international aid is a huge source of income for the Polisario and its partners. That is the practical reason. Politically, if you think the legitimacy of your cause is based on making people believe that these refugees do not want to leave until they get their independence, then that is the point for not letting them leave. Allowing them to leave detracts from that argument.

(Ussery) The people in the camps are somewhere between being pawns and prisoners, and over time the situation has become quite severe. There are forces outside the camps that are saying it is in the refugees’ best interest for them to stay where they are as victims.

(Pham) The African Union engages in this charade that the Polisario is a country, with a flag and a seat on the AU, receiving all the resources that come from that, with no obligation to deliver resources to anybody in return because the international community takes care of that for them. So, what benefit is it to the Algerians? If you think about the Arab Spring, these dictators are gone or on trial, and the one place that has not had a reform or revolution is Algeria. If this issue goes away, how do you explain to your populace that after all the years you have spent on this crisis it has suddenly disappeared like a mirage in the desert? It would be a huge blow to the legitimacy of the Algerian regime.

Q: If I am Assistant Secretary of State, for example, and want to use the tools I have to bring closure to this, what do I have to offer to Algeria?
A: (Pham) If the Malians crumble, Algeria is next, so I hope they pick up on the alarm. Over the years the US has done several things. One, we have accepted that they have swept many things under the rug. We covered up for them on the Libya issue and their involvement with Qaddafi. It is time to be candid with them, and tell them that if they try to isolate Morocco, we will no longer overlook these kind of actions. The other thing is the money. Taxpayers should be appalled that we are contributing a third of the cost for maintaining these refugee camps. Then there is the problem of the African Union itself. It has undergone admirable development since its formation, which was evident in how it reacted to the Mali coup. On the other hand, it cannot go around pretending that the Polisario is a country because that damages its credibility. Morocco should put in more effort to get invited back to the AU. At the same time, the AU is weaker without Morocco, and that is Africa’s loss. So I think it is time for the AU to reexamine itself, and as a friend, the US should be able to tell them that.

Q: (AbiNader) What are the carrots or sticks the US can wield to induce cooperation from Algeria?
A: (Ussery) Algeria used to be the go-to country in the Arab and African world if you needed a clever, practical mediator. They were invited to be at almost every international table. So I do not know the answer, whether we need to leverage our position with other UNSC members and start from there, or at least have good dialogue at that level and make it an inescapable reality.

(Holley) Leveraging the Algerians requires two things. One, the status quo in the region is changing, which will
hopefully serve as a wakeup call for those governments to change their vision for the future, otherwise they’re going to face the same fate as some of the others in the region. But from my view, the single most important thing we could do to leverage Algerian policy specifically is to start to behave as though we believe in the policy we say we have. We have to actually do things that provide others with the impression that we mean what we say on the issue. In this case, we have three administrations back to back that support a solution that would leave Morocco sovereign, while granting broad autonomy. We have broad bipartisan support in Congress, and yet we have done nothing other than to restate our policy. Once we start aiding development in the territory, or conditioning aid in ways that promote durable solutions and refugee rights, then others will believe the US actually holds to this policy and means what it says.

Q: (Amb. Ed Gabriel) The question I have is how do we take America’s stated policy and turn it into implementation? Mike said, if it is not in the top 25 issues, it will not get there. So how do you get the US to have a sustained effort to fix this thing and implement its policy?

A: (Ussery) I have hope that our Secretary of State Clinton still has the energy and stamina to get this thing at least kicked off, including getting some dialogue going with other UNSC members. We have to get down there and get active on the ground. We need to bring inevitability to the Sahara issue. Once we tip one way, the other side will have to accept that it will never be their way. So if we do what we can unilaterally, and then we bring in the UNSC members, that does not exactly speed things up, but it helps us from going backwards.

(Pham) I would add that we are going to be sending a new Ambassador out there in the next seven months, and so one small step would be the instructions given to him or her. In the confirmation hearings, the question should be asked whether they will go out and engage. Everyone is in favor of talking - we even talk to each other - but we never move on these issues. Then there is the budget cycle and the appropriations language, so we just need to keep pushing on.

(Holley) You have to do things that are visible and tangible, or else people will continue to harbor doubts. The reputation of American foreign policy in terms of commitments is what it is. But when you begin to do things that people actually see, they are more inclined to believe what you say. So we might provide local technical assistance to government officials as Morocco transitions more authority to local elected officials, or help local NGOs build capacity for development or education policy, or make EXIM bank funds available for exploitation in industries in the territory. Those are visible things that people can actually see. The same thing applies in the camps. If we say to people we think refugees ought to be given a choice, then we should make money available to the UNCHR for resettlement grants and voluntary repatriation programs. When people see you are following your own policy, you have a greater chance of persuading people to go along with that policy, as opposed to questioning our commitment.

Q: What are the wider implications of the existence of these camps, and how are they destabilizing the region? Is there any real threat to US interests?

A: (Pham) There is an emerging body of evidence that people recruited from the camps, or veterans of the Polisario military, have engaged in kidnappings for ransom in the name of AQIM. Governments in the region have leveled accusations of people being recruited to engage in drug trafficking or contraband, which of course has its own negative consequences. So you have a pool of people who are hopeless, who have no other options, whose only skills involve weapons, and then someone comes along and offers to hire them for those skills. No one ever sets out in life and says, “I really want to be a drug mule across the Sahara,” but if that is the only option, it is an understandable choice. The military commander of the Azawad movement was a colonel in the Libyan military, which shows that when you combine the aftermath of the Libya conflict with this pool of potential recruits, there is a real chance for continued instability.

Q: We have heard a lot about the claims of human rights abuses in the Tindouf refugee camps, but is there are no human rights abuses in the Western Sahara, why will the government of Morocco not allow free access to various monitoring entities?

A: (Holley) Morocco has made the Western Sahara open to every single one of the 34 special rapporteurs from the UN Human Rights Commission. This is not an issue. There are no international human rights organizations that are being denied entry into either Morocco or the Moroccan Sahara, and they come frequently, and talk to whomever it is they want to talk to. It is like asking a special rapporteur to come investigate in the United States. If you are talking about places that are closed to the human rights community, such as North Korea, Cuba, or the Polisario camps, then maybe you do need to take some special measures. But when talking about places where any human rights organizations are welcome to go, this question is kind of a red-herring.

5. Observation

The event was attended by approximately 30 policymakers and journalists. It made a strong case for US leadership
on the Western Sahara crisis, which if left unresolved could exacerbate the increasingly tenuous security situation in North Africa. The participants expressed optimism that the current administration, through the State Department, could lay the foundation for improving the lives of the refugees, although all present were skeptical that a lasting political solution was imminent or even within reach. The connections between al-Qaeda and the Polisario remained sketchy and seem to be handled mostly through criminal interlocutors.

Morocco – The Challenges of Democratic Reform

Date: 4 April 2012

1. Title: Morocco – The Challenges of Democratic Reform
   Hosted by CSIS

   Participant:
   H.E. Mustapha Khalfi: Minister of Communication, Kingdom of Morocco
   Jon Alterman: Director, Middle East Center, CSIS

2. Overview

While revolutionary change has brought Islamists to rule in several Middle Eastern countries, it was evolutionary change that brought Islamists into government in Morocco after more than a decade in opposition. The country’s own future trajectory and its inspirational power for other religious opposition movements in the Middle East remain the subjects of considerable debate. Minister Khalfi discussed why Morocco’s third way – between revolution and retaining the status quo, resulted from unique conditions in the kingdom.

3. Summary

Minister Khalfi noted that Morocco’s response to the Arab Spring was a result of reforms that had been instituted over the past six years, and others going back even further, to Youssefi’s time as prime minister. There were two views anchoring perceptions of the King’s reform agenda in response to the February 20th movement: from skeptical to positive. The period between February 20th and the election of November 25th was a competition between these views. The election results showed that Moroccans want a serious and credible democracy. Although the new constitution is not ideal and won’t radically reshape the political system, it provides many opportunities in its implementation that reflect the King’s speech of March 9th in which he talked about equality, justice, accountability, and other values to be incorporated into the new constitution.

The Minister elaborated by defining three factors which explain Morocco as an exception: the monarchy’s leadership role that enhances credibility and stability; the existence of political parties, including the opposition, which gave them experience in building coalitions; and the role of civil society, which, in fact, often promotes issues before the political parties accept them as part of their agendas.

He listed four challenges facing the new government. First of all, implementing the constitution including power-sharing, expansion of freedoms and liberty, regionalization - the key to solving the Western Sahara problem, and good governance, including reforming the judiciary, accountability, and transparency - the key to building citizen trust. Passing new legislation for the local elections to be held in the fall is the next challenge. It is necessary to succeed in reconciling people with politics, i.e. make them believe that the process works for them. The goal is to facilitate the emergence of new local elites who will work with the youth. The third challenge is the need to resolve social and economic problems, especially poverty, which in some areas is twice the national average. Related to this is dealing with the impact of the European financial crisis, which affects tourism and exports. All of this impacts the overwhelming need to create hundreds of thousands of jobs to both absorb existing unemployed and the 150,000 annual new entrants to the job market. The Government of Morocco has established a public-private partnership to address this challenge and to build an educational system that prepares people for the job market. Finally, Minister Khalfi mentioned the growing positive environment for closer regional cooperation, which would also lead to resolving the Western Sahara crisis.

The Minister provided specific examples throughout his presentation of actions being undertaken by the new
government to deal with these challenges and the changing political environment in Morocco.

4. Q & A

Q: (Jon Alterman) Given Adl al Ihsan’s opposition to the monarchy, what is the future for Islamic politics in Morocco - greater diversity or cooperation?
A: Both are happening at the same time. The key challenge for all Islamist parties is to link Islam and democracy. Islamists have to decide whether or not to be part of the political party system.

Q: (Karim Mezran, the Atlantic Council) How will decentralization lead to solving the Western Sahara crisis?
A: The constitution provides for regionalization in all matters: budget, administration, and social and cultural policies. Regionalization provides a means for the transition from the current situation to autonomy.

Q: How are women’s rights being protected in Morocco?
A: The basic protection and rights of women are already enshrined in the mouadwana. The constitution calls for full equality and that is part of our national agenda, adopted by parliament. A national watchdog has been proposed to protect women’s rights by monitoring what is going on and if targets are being achieved.

Q: (Haim Malka, CSIS) How can you manage people’s expectations for rapid change?
A: People want concrete results. Transparency is the key. In conflict areas, the government is encouraging open dialogue with all stakeholders. I expect that the passing of budget by mid-April will enable the government to accelerate efforts to reduce poverty, expand healthcare coverage, and promote other economic and social development projects.

5. Observation

Forty representatives from various NGOs, including Eric Goldstein from HRW, and think tanks participated in the program. The Minister spoke eloquently, thoughtfully, and credibly about the challenges facing the government as it works to implement the new constitution. He gave multiple examples of what the government has proposed, which strengthened his case. He was strongly behind the autonomy solution for the Western Sahara and the role of the King in providing indispensable leadership and continuity. He directly answered the questions on the future of Islamists and democracy and the prospects for women and minorities, and he provided many examples of what can be done to implement the various sections of the constitution. He is definitely a formidable resource. It is imperative that we track what is going on in parliament in the coming months to have credible talking points on Morocco’s reform agenda.

---

Islamists in Power: Views from Within

Date: 5 April 2012

1. Title: Islamists in Power: Views from Within
Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panel 1:
Building New Regimes After the Uprising

Panelists:
Mustapha Elkhalfi: Minister of Communications, Justice and Development Party, the Kingdom of Morocco
Abdul Mawgoud Rageh Dardery: Member of Parliament, Freedom and Justice Party, Egypt
Nabil Alkofahi: Head of International Relations, Muslim Brotherhood, the Kingdom of Jordan
Sahbi Atig: Member of National Constituent Assembly, Ennahda, Tunisia
Marwan Muasher: Moderator: Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panel 2:
Writing a New Constitution
2. Overview

Islamist parties have emerged as the strongest contenders in recent elections in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, and are likely to continue to do well in future elections in other countries. It is clear that Islamist parties will have a dominant impact on the outcome of Arab transitions, but there is little understanding in Washington of what that will mean for governing. This political reality raises many challenges and questions about the future of politics in the Arab World: how strong of a role will religion play in government? How will Islamists groups address the issue of individual freedoms, particularly those of women? Will Islamists respect the outcome of future elections even if they don’t win? What are their strategies for reducing unemployment and how business-friendly will the new economic environment be? On April 5, high-level representatives of Islamist parties from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Libya participated in a one-day conference convened by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to address these questions.

3. Summary

Panel 1:

Marwan Muasher opened the first panel by detailing two types of reform in the Arab world in the past year – reform from above in order to avoid transition and regime change, as was the case in Morocco and Jordan; and reform with regime change, as was the case in Egypt and Tunisia. He then asked the participants to respond to the following questions about governance in the aftermath of reform: What will be the rights of women and minorities in the new political system? How will Islamist parties address economic challenges? What does an Islamic state look like? Before turning the conversation over to the panelists, Muasher underscored that all parties should be committed to pluralism and, not exclude Islamist parties.

Sahbi Atig stressed that Ennadha was committed to a true democratic system and sought to link Islamic values with modernity. Recent elections were the first time that Tunisians had the opportunity to express their will at the ballot box and the result was that all parties were included in the Constituent Assembly, a reflection of the diverse reality of Tunisian society. Going forward, governance will be done by consensus. Numerous committees have been set up to address issues of governance, national reconciliation, and a new constitution; and all parties are represented on these committees. Atig noted that there is no contradiction between Islam and democracy or between Islam and rights. Islam and Arabism will form the foundation of the Tunisian state, but individual freedoms will be respected and upheld. The key is to guarantee that dictatorship will never return to Tunisia by creating a civil state, an independent judiciary, and an independent commission to provide oversight for free and fair elections. Turning to the new constitution, Atig noted that sharia will provide legal references for it, but that there will be other sources of law as well – these issues are currently being debated among all parties. Beyond the challenges of governance and reconciliation, Atig detailed Tunisia’s economic challenges, namely attracting domestic and foreign investments in the aftermath of the revolution. He concluded by calling for transitional justice and accountability to address both the political and economic ruptures of the past.

Abdul Mawgoud Rageh Dardery argued that the problem in Egypt was not the failure of a dictator, but the culture of dictatorship. Living in a free society is difficult and requires intellectual and psychological preparation – it is therefore going to take time to witness a sea change in Egyptians’ views of governance. Dardery detailed the recent
implementing the Constitution is important in order to widen the trust of the
preserved political pluralism in
which enshrined a bill of
violence to a culture of human dignity and Egypt will only be able to reach that goal with the participation of all of its citizens.

Mustapha Elkhalfi presented what Muasher termed the “third way” of reform – neither an overthrow of the old system nor the continuation of the status quo. Rather, a serious and sustained process of reform within the framework of the monarchy. Muasher questioned whether or not reform from above could work and Elkhalfi presented his defense of the third way. He detailed the importance of reform without any instability and the key role of the King in previous reforms such as the Equity and Reconciliation Commission and the reform of the family code. Now Morocco is moving toward a second generation of political reforms. Elkhalfi noted the role of the youth movement in mobilizing civil society and the political parties to demand an end to corruption and authoritarianism. He likewise noted the response of the King on March 9th, which offered a renewed commitment to good governance and a real elected government. Although at the beginning critics argued that the reformers were limited and/or superficial, the reforms passed the first test of the March 9th speech – the referendum on the new constitution, which enshrined a bill of rights, good governance, rule of law, and transparency into Moroccan law.

Turning to Morocco’s recent elections, which Elkhalfi described as the second test, many Moroccans were waiting to see if the government would succeed in implementing the constitution or not and if the country would succeed in giving voice to the people to promote democratic reform. Elkhalfi described the outcome – the true third path that Morocco has taken as a “revolution of the ballot box.” The Justice and Development Party (PJD) gained a majority of the votes, a true change in power given their former position in the opposition. However, only 45% of Moroccans turned out to vote, a reality that Elkhalfi underscored as providing urgency to the implementation of the Constitution – implementing the Constitution is important in order to widen the trust of the Moroccan people in the government. The PJD-led government is prepared to tackle these challenges and, along with the other political parties in its coalition, regain the trust of the Moroccan people.

Despite these difficulties, Elkhalfi does believe there is a Moroccan exception. He provided three main reasons for this: the role of the monarchy, the role of civil society, and the presence of political pluralism in the country. First, the Moroccan monarchy is unique in its role as unifier of the country and source of religious legitimacy. The King has preserved political pluralism in the country and found a means of linking modernity with Islamic history through gradual reform. This reform, which began under King Hassan II, has accelerated since the 1997 period of “alternance” and under the leadership of King Mohammed VI, who is leading the country toward democracy. Second, Morocco’s dynamic and active civil society has provided an important link between state and society. There are nearly 50,000 civil society organizations working in Morocco, ranging from groups that work on women’s and human rights to those that work on youth issues and development, all of which have worked to create a culture of citizenship and rights in Morocco. These groups have pushed the country toward political and social reform and in turn are being pushed themselves do to more by the February 20th movement. The civil society has a very important role to play in implementing the Constitution and in confronting problems linked to illiteracy, poverty, corruption, and poor governance. Third, in Morocco there has always been at least a minimal degree of political pluralism that has been strengthened by the integration of moderate political parties into government, including Islamist parties. Different groups are therefore able to work together to form a strong coalition and address the challenges of governance, of which there are many.

Foremost, the new government must implement the Constitution. Morocco succeeded in surviving the Arab Spring and the Constitution provides a roadmap for reform to address the political, economic, and social demands of the
people. However, implementing the Constitution requires reshaping the system of governance through organic laws. The new government will thus need to draft new laws, including a revised press code to ensure freedom of the press and expression, judicial reform to fight corruption and establish independent institutions, and laws to enhance the social, economic, and political participation of women. Second, the government must work to institute the regionalization and decentralization program it has committed itself to in order to resolve the Sahara conflict and empower local and regional governance. Third, it must work confront the challenges of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and poor health indicators – core economic and social problems that require urgent attention. Last, the government must improve regional cooperation. The countries of North Africa cannot confront these challenges alone and must work together to ensure development and reform across the region.

Nabil Alkofahi spoke about issues of governance in Jordan. He underscored that Jordan had not undergone as many changes in recent month as Morocco had. Although the country is similar to Morocco in that both countries have monarchs without blood on their hands and that both have begun a process of reform, Alkofahi stressed that Jordan is unique because it has suffered serious setbacks in the last ten years as opposed to progress. Elections in 2007 were fraudulent, the government has stalled in implementing reform, and protests continue throughout the country. According to Alkofahi, the core problem is that the regime is not serious about reform and is only responding partially to pressure. Although the Muslim Brotherhood believes that the King should be part of efforts to solve the problems associated with poor governance, there is no consensus on this issue at the national level, as many people see the King as the problem. What the country needs is free and fair elections in order to make gains like those in other countries.

Panel 2:

One of the major challenges that Islamist parties in power face is drafting a new constitution. The panelists discussed how a new constitution could be drafted to act as an instrument of reconciliation and how it should define the place of Islam and sharia. The panel also addressed the growing chasm dividing Islamic parties from liberals and leftists.

Panel 3:

The panelists outlined their party’s short- and long-term plans to address the present economic crisis. The panel also discussed the varying roles of the state, private sector, and international finance institutions in promoting economic development.

4. Q & A

Panel 1:

Q: (World Bank) The economy played a major role in the Moroccan elections. Will the success of the PJD be determined by economic factors in spite of other successes?
A: (Elkhalfi) We will not be able to address any other issues without first addressing this. This is the most important factor after addressing problems associated with poor governance and corruption, as these are at the core of Morocco’s economic problems. The PJD is working to develop a partnership with the private sector for reform and working to undertake financial and legislative measures to improve economic opportunities. Part of this will be reviving the Free Trade Agreement with the US. Education is another vital component of our plans because we need to train people for the jobs that are available.

Q: What is the relationship between civil society and the military in Tunisia? Is there concern that what happened in Algeria in 1991 could happen elsewhere?
A: (Atig) This is not an issue in Tunisia – the army plays a side role. It is quite different than in Egypt and Algeria, where the military plays a more active role. Our principle going forwards is no violence – violence is a redline.

Q: The King of Morocco was courageous in engaging in reform. How far do you see this going?
A: (Elkhalfi) What is unique is the Moroccan case is that we drafted the constitution before the election. And the constitution has clearly determined the relationship between different centers of power. The drafting of the constitution with all parts of society participating also established the climate of and institutional tools for cooperation between the monarchy and the government. The monarchy and the government have thus established an environment of trust and confidence that has facilitated successful cooperation. In the past, the PJD limited its participation in the elections because it needed to ensure that the government was working in the best interests of the people and also needed to build the trust of the voters. This is the attitude it takes in governing and in implementing the new Constitution.
Q: (Rawan Masmoudi, CSID) We've heard a lot of abuses of the new Constitution recently, and there are lawyers who are trying to have a legal case against the King himself for abusing the new Constitution. Do you have any comments about that? What is the government doing about this?

A: (Elkhalfi) The country is still working under old laws and there is a problem with a number of those laws in light of the new Constitution. We need new laws and they are being drafted – for example, one regarding the establishment of an independent, democratic council for the press. This is why I underscored that the first democratic challenge for Morocco is the implementation of the Constitution. And we need to do it quickly with laws that implement both the text and spirit of the new Constitution.

Panels 2 and 3:

Questions from these panels were not relevant to Morocco or to American foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa.

5. Observation

Approximately 350 policymakers, journalists, and experts attended this conference on the future of Islamist governance in the Middle East. All of the panelists provided convincing arguments for the future of stable, democratic, and transparent governments under Islamist rule and assuaged concerns about the protection of individual freedoms under the new Islamist-led regimes. From Morocco to Egypt, each party representative outlined a coherent plan to address the challenges of governance and economic growth. Morocco stood out on the first panel as providing a successful third way of reform, due in part to Minister Elkhalfi’s articulation of the reform process in Morocco and his position as a member of a truly new government. Nevertheless, the same questions continue to be raised about the implementation of the Constitution and alleged abuses of it by the political elite, including the monarchy. Morocco is being closely followed because of its reputation as a model for the region and these questions are being raised as a result of Morocco being the “exception.” Members of the government are well-placed to respond to these questions and elaborate on the steps being taken to both implement the constitution and draft new laws to limit the abuse of it, and Minister Elkhalfi responded deftly to the questions raised at this panel. Future visits by PJD and other government officials at events in Washington would provide a great opportunity to further tell this story of a third way of reform. That said it is obvious that although Morocco will continue to be looked at as an exception in the region, concrete steps must be taken to ensure continued reform and the implementation of the constitution.

For complete transcripts and videos of the event, please visit:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/05/islamists-in-power-views-from-within

(Back to top)

Western Sahara Conference & Essay Contest Award Ceremony

Date: 11 April 2012

1. Title: Western Sahara Conference & Essay Contest Award Ceremony

Hosted by the American Task Force for Western Sahara (ATFWS)

Participants:

Jennifer Bubke: MA Candidate, International Politics, School of International Service, American University
Audra Grant: Political scientist, RAND Corporation
Darlene Voeltz: Professor Emeritus, Rochester University
I. William Zartman: Professor Emeritus, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

2. Overview

The Western Sahara conflict is one of the world’s oldest frozen disputes and remains a key obstacle to economic development and political stability in North Africa and the Sahel. Its languishing effects on poverty, extremism, and geopolitics prevent the region from reaching its full potential. After many rounds of formal and informal negotiations between the Polisario Front and Morocco, there has been no political progress. Morocco’s Autonomy Plan has
garnered support in the West and within some international institutions, but the African Union and Algeria remain opposed to its central provision. The American Task Force on the Western Sahara gathered several academic experts on the Maghreb to consider a possible way forward. The ATFWS also presented its grand prize to the winner of its Western Sahara Essay Contest.

3. Summary

Following a short video featuring former US Ambassador to Morocco Edward Gabriel and current Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, contest winner Jennifer Bubke opened with a broad overview of the impact of the Western Sahara crisis on the MENA region. She said that over the past 30 years, the US has taken several approaches to the dispute. American leaders first pushed the passage of the Madrid Agreement, then took a more neutral position, followed by ‘positive neutrality,’ decreased interest, and, finally, support for Rabat’s Autonomy Plan.

Darlene Voeltz was impressed by Morocco’s progress in diversifying its economy and raising the standard of living. Life expectancy and literacy rates have risen as the fertility rate had decreased, all while education has greatly improved. Literacy rates among younger children show even greater progress. Morocco’s port expansion catapulted Morocco from a family-based economy to one of the Mediterranean’s premier destinations for seaborne cargo. Free trade zones and landmark trade agreements with the US and EU have had an equally important effect on employment, value-added exports, and foreign investment. Voeltz thought that Morocco should be proud to be the home of the first zero-carbon automobile manufacturing plant, to be built by Nissan and Renault. Turning to the political process, Voeltz praised the government for making real progress on due process and gender rights. She concluded that many of Morocco’s long-term problems, such as corruption, are rooted in culture. Thus, Western governments should be patient, rewarding democratic progress in ways that pave the way for the next stage.

Audra Grant discussed democracy in the larger Maghreb. She presented Morocco as a beacon of reform, where a peaceful democratic transition has yet to yield to the kind of violence seen elsewhere in the region. In addition, the King’s human rights initiatives are taking a more prominent role, reinforcing perceptions that the palace is truly committed to real reforms. But Grant acknowledged emerging concerns—the monarch retains influence over matters of huge importance; the PJD has showed troubling signs of division among moderates and conservatives; the government has yet to devise creative solutions in order to overcome the failure of old trade strategies to maintain previous levels of growth; recent elections were marred by low turnout, especially among youth; the government is not capitalizing on social media and NGOs to involve youth in politics; and female representation in government is still disproportionately low.

Turning to the Western Sahara, Grant admitted that multiple rounds of talks had produced no progress, just as the Arab Spring has amplified some calls for self-determination among Sahrawi refugees. The socioeconomic conditions in the territory have barely improved, despite large military and non-military investments in the territory. She suggested that a solution may be found in the Moroccan constitution, which could devolve significant power to local governments. Concluding that greater autonomy for local governments is the only long-term approach to stability, Grant added that language and cultural rights might form an intermediate stepping stone to more controversial political rights.

William Zartman focused exclusively on the Western Sahara crisis, laying out five reasons why American policymakers need a solution to the dispute. First, an independent state in the Western Sahara is not in US interests. Such a nation would be scarcely viable in economic terms, having phosphates and a small fishery, but being “mostly a sandbox.” The territory is by nature unstable and influence over its government could be bought at a cheap rate, attracting many of America’s adversaries to the region. Thus, reasoned Zartman, Washington should want this territory under responsible management. He continued that, although it is no secret that the Western Sahara issue blocks regional efforts to integrate economically, now more than ever neighboring countries must look toward each other for further investment. They cannot rely on Western powers for future growth. Economic cooperation could ameliorate emigration from the region, which is a thorn in the side of the entire Northern Hemisphere. Studies of Maghrebis in Europe indicate that immigrants come in search of economic and spiritual satisfaction. Failure to find these things makes them vulnerable to radicalization. Third, settlement of the Western Sahara conflict would not mend deep rivalries, but it would remove the focal point that is most likely to lead to a war in North Africa. Fourth, the Tindouf refugee camps represent a direct security threat to US interests at home and abroad, and closing them would facilitate Washington’s counter-terror strategy. In light of recent events in Libya and Algeria, this rationale takes on even greater urgency. Finally, Zartman pointed out that the US should want to see a legal, internationally accepted solution to such a longstanding border conflict, if only because it can help set a precedent and expedite other resolutions around the world. He concluded that the Autonomy Plan would undoubtedly stand up in a court of international law, particularly when compared with similar proposals involving
4. Q & A

Q: Given the widely publicized danger of terrorism throughout the Sahel, what are the prospects for an American counter-terror campaign akin to those run in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan? Will American drones begin flying over Mali or Mauritania soon?
A: (Zartman) I obviously cannot comment on whether that will ever happen or not, because I just do not know. But my sense is that the current administration wants to avoid boots on the ground wherever possible, and I do not foresee that happening anytime soon.

Q: We have heard a lot about what is good for the United States and what is good for Morocco, but what do the Sahrawis want?
A: (Grant) Well I would suspect they want some sort of autonomy, although it is very hard to estimate how many Sahrawis want full independence or not. I am guessing, however, that the longer the Western Sahara languishes in poverty, and the longer Morocco views the problem as a military problem rather than a development challenge, the greater the likelihood that more Sahrawis will push for full independence.

5. Observation

This event was attended mostly by American University students and the Moroccan press. The proceedings are valuable to MAC because William Zartman, a highly respected Maghreb scholar, was unequivocal in his insistence that the US should demonstrate full-throated support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan, which he characterized not only as legal, but wise. He made a powerful argument that an independent Western Sahara could grow into a serious threat for the United States and its partners in North Africa.

(Back to top)
Senator Tom Daschle opened the panel by arguing that the nexus between climate change, migration, and security is one of the most substantial challenges facing US today. It is a challenge that threatens the political, economic, and global stability of many nations around the world, with the potential to negatively impact our international governance systems. These challenges affect America’s interest abroad as they hamper economic growth, investment, and development. Senator Daschle praised the work of the Center for American Progress for bringing visibility to these challenges. He likewise praised the report, noting that it convincingly argues that the US is entering unchartered waters in the 21st century. Furthermore, the report accurately calls for a new conceptual framework and understanding to address the complex crises scenarios caused by the increasing interplay between climate change and security.

In the case of northwest Africa, recent events have shown that these three elements are interacting in increasingly dangerous ways. Instability in Libya and Mali add additional urgency to addressing these issues. Referencing an article in which Thomas Friedman argues that the Arab awakening was driven not only by political and economic stresses, but, less visibly, by environmental, population and climate stresses as well, Senator Daschle called for a rebalancing of diplomacy, development, and defense in the Middle East to address long-term sources of instability such as those outlined in Friedman’s article.

Dr. Kit Batten echoed these thoughts, starting that in addition to supporting democratic movements, the US also needs to address climate issues, including conflict over land and water. She argued that climate change is only one source of stress on migration and security, in addition to other social, political, and economic stressors. USAID recognizes this and confronts climate change within the political and economic context of each country in which it is working. Ultimately, it is the national government and the overall political and economic climate that dictate whether or not climate change contributes to instability and causes migration. She explained that conflict does not always occur where there is climate change and migration and that effective governance can help mitigate the effects of climate change, just as poor governance can exacerbate its effects. Batten referenced a recent USAID study that showed that peace-building can positively impact climate change to highlight this point. Thus, USAID works not only to promote development in a climate sensitive manner, but also works with weak states to help build institutions capable of addressing potential ramifications of climate change, including conflict over resources.

Sherri Goodman agreed, noting that climate change is a threat multiplier, not the sole source of instability. She provided three observations and three recommendations related to the links between climate change and instability. Her first observation was that population growth will alter migration in the coming decade, but that this reality won’t tell us how migration is going to occur. Secondly, the modeling on patterns of migration is not complete and more work should be done to understand such patterns. That said, humans are not always predictable and models of migration in one area will not necessarily transfer to other places, particularly since migrants move both to and from areas of environmental difficulties. Third, all migration is not the same. The task of researchers and experts is to understand different patterns and distinguish between them. In her recommendations, Goodman called for lowering the risks associated with mass development by looking at how to do smart development, diplomacy, and planning; reducing illegal migration; and doing more research on how to use development, defense, and diplomacy to address these issues.

Michael Werz spoke about his report, stating that he hopes it will be a launching pad for further discussion on the issue with the aim of reconfiguring foreign policy in the 21st century. He said that while the relationship between climate change and migration, as well as security, is not a certain one, uncertainty cannot and should not be taken as a reason not to act. Instead, it should lead to cautious and prudent planning.

4. Q & A

Q: (King) Is there a role for NATO to play on this issue?
A: (Goodman) NATO is a military organization that tends to get involved after there is a crisis, whereas this issue is more about prevention. The EU is going to be the most active in confronting these challenges and should get involved at an early stage. After a crisis, NATO certainly has a role to play in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and in helping respond to a disaster.
(Werz) You don’t want to think about a military response unless it’s necessary. Military responses to migration issues are already a problem. For example, the EU uses military force to control immigration and such a response is not addressing the core issues of such immigration.

Q: (King) Other countries seem to be involved in confronting the challenges posed by climate change and security. How is the US approach different?
A: (Batten) US assistance is primarily rooted in technical assistance and capacity building – getting the countries themselves to be the drivers of their own growth. There is some infrastructure development, but the US is not operating like China in Africa, as the US prefers to empower nations to respond to these challenges themselves, with US assistance, not direction.

(Werz) The US has a longer-term strategy. The question should be: how can the US partner with some of the countries taking the lead on these issues, particularly up and coming democracies? Brazil is a good example of development and the US should think about opportunities for triangular aid. Thinking about these partnerships will be a worthwhile path to pursue.

Q: (Refugees International) Do you have any comment on the impact of climate change on the Tuareg rebellion in Mali and subsequent displacement of many people from northern Mali into neighboring countries like Niger, which is experiencing a drought and a severe food shortage crisis?

A: (Werz) This is exactly why we are looking into these issues – in order to be prepared for some of these future conflicts. Do you want to wait until you have a failed state? Or should you build capacity in aid-recipient countries so that they are prepared to confront these challenges? We are arguing for the latter and arguing for a new development and diplomacy framework that accurately takes into account the nexus between climate change, migration, and conflict.

5. Observation

Approximately 100 representatives from government, international NGOs, and think tanks attended the event. While the event was supposed to address the links between climate change, migration, and conflict in northwest Africa, the panelists ended up discussing the links at a global level, thus limiting the utility of the event for those focused on the Maghreb. Nevertheless, the panelists provided an interesting analysis of the nexus, which has gained increased attention from development agencies and is a core component of their efforts to promote human security – an issue the Moroccan American Center has begun to address through its campaign to expand US assistance to the Western Sahara. The event was likewise effective in highlighting northwest Africa as an area of strategic concern for US interests. Reference to the incidents of terrorism in Algeria, taken from Professor Alexander’s report, also backed up Morocco’s core security message.

Furthermore, much of the reasoning presented at the event is applicable to the Western Sahara conflict – autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only viable option for the future of the Western Sahara given the need for strong states and institutions to confront the threat of climate change, migration, and conflict. A review of the report itself further substantiates this reasoning, as it notes, “major US imperatives in the region, including counterterrorism and reform, would be served by supporting, for example, Morocco’s efforts to peacefully settle the Western Sahara dispute or Nigeria efforts to quell ethno-religious violence. Establishing effective governance in Western Sahara and domestic stability in northern Nigeria will allay economic uncertainty in the region and reassure other states confronting North-South and Christian-Muslim divides.” Although these arguments were not articulated during the panel discussion, the report was handed out to all participants, and as a result, the event offered a venue for disseminating some of Morocco’s key messages to a high-level audience.

For a video of the event and a complete copy of the report, please visit: http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2012/04/ccmsafrica.html

(Back to top)
2. Overview

As countries touched by the Arab Uprisings build new governments and institutions, US engagement in the Middle East and North Africa must adapt to a radically different political context. Most notably, the scope of relevant political actors in the region has expanded, and American foreign policy needs to happen on a society-to-society level rather than a government-to-government level. A year after uprisings swept the region, the three panelists discussed the challenges America faces in dealing with new governments after the Arab Uprisings, US interests in the region, and how the US must alter its strategy toward the Middle East.

3. Summary

Aaron David Miller opened the discussion by asking the panelists to shed some light on US engagement in the Middle East and North Africa a year into the uprisings. Time is the ultimate arbiter for so many things, and some would argue that it is too early to draw conclusions about how America is faring in the wake of tumultuous changes that have transformed the Arab world. However, narrowing the scope to an examination of US policy, interests, and credibility makes an accurate assessment feasible.

Nathan Brown remarked that any assessment should primarily consider Washington’s response to the uprisings. Attempting to gauge how events in the region have been beneficial or detrimental to American interests is neither relevant nor possible at this point. He identified three principal challenges confronting a successful US response to the Arab Uprisings. First, the American foreign policy apparatus needs to adapt. The era of “take-me-to-your-leader” policy is over. Instead of interacting with a few top-tier individuals, US policymakers need to engage with entire societies. Second, the US expects emerging power dynamics to fall into the same patterns. Brown noted, “as old actors disappear, we expect replacements, when in reality, the fundamental structures are shifting.” Third, the process is extremely difficult for these societies. Egypt represents one of the most obvious cases as the transition process there is messy. The US response in Egypt has been moderately successful thus far. American foreign policymakers recognized their limitations from the start and did not try to impose specific outcomes, which would have immediately backfired. The US was prudent to focus and take a firm stand on a few key issues—retaining the Camp David Accords and promoting economic and political liberties—as central to American foreign policy objectives. Additionally, it is starting to reach out to new actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Ellen Laipson turned the conversation to a broader discussion of American engagement in the Middle East. She stressed the importance of examining the US’ role in the region in a global context. Absent the events of the Arab Spring, this is a trying time for the US. Redistribution of power internationally suggests that the US has less influence and leverage over foreign affairs than it once did. The somewhat inward focus on domestic economic well-being and curtiling resources available for international engagement make this a somewhat awkward time for American foreign policy. It is a time of transition for both Arab governments and American diplomacy, and thus far, the US has not had any significant successes.

Laipson laid out three basic principles for American engagement in the region. First, “it’s not about us.” The “Arab Spring” is truly a spontaneous, authentic phenomenon with historic consequences. Second, there is a sharpening bifurcation of the Middle East. There is the prosperous, relatively stable, non-democratic, oil-exporting Middle East, and the populist, economically stressed, democratizing Middle East. Faced with such differences, it is difficult for the US to have an overarching regional strategy that successfully embraces both blocs. The result is two often conflicting policies. Third, sometimes less is more. The current atmosphere in the region will be less receptive to a robust American presence, and US involvement must be scaled back.

Egypt is the most troubling case, according to Laipson. Many Egyptians have come to associate the fall of Mubarak with a repudiation of the United States. This is very frightening for long-term American interests. In fact, it appears all too similar to the early years of the Iranian revolution, when the association of the Shah with Washington became an embedded principle and an identity of the revolution. Certainly the protestors in Tahrir Square did not act from passionate anti-Americanism, but emerging political actors are finding it a useful position to maintain. Widespread distrust will have negative structural implications for American engagement, and if the US cannot improve its image within Egypt, problems there will spillover into other countries in the region. Granted, the situation in Egypt is largely unsettled, so these concerns may be transitory. Tunisia and Libya, thankfully, are unfolding far more favorably for the US. Tunisia is a homogenous, democratizing, prosperous country that very much wants to partner with America. In Libya, while the outcome of its transition is still in the balance, popular sentiment toward the US is positive for the most part.
Expanding on her “less is more” principle, Laipson explained that the US needs to rethink its engagement strategy. State-to-state relations play a less prominent role in American foreign policy as society-to-society interactions become more important. Soft power executed by democracy building and humanitarian organizations, for example, is less visible but often more effective. American foreign policy needs to be agile and responsive to these new political environments, and this requires a focus on non-security related engagement. In the past, economic assistance has been the principal tool for wielding US influence and engagement in the region. The 2013 budget increases US aid to the region by approximately a billion dollars, for a total of eight billion dollars. Five billion, however, will be spent on preexisting security relationships—to Israel, Egypt, and Iraq. Very little is available for new and expanded economic promotion activities; the budget does not reflect as dramatic an adjustment as is necessary. In fact, Washington plans to scale back various education, health, and basic development services that stimulate job creation. A leadership deficit and weak public-private partnership are two major challenges confronting US engagement in the region. There is also a marked absence of regional leaders; no one wants a return of the strong-man model, but organized and competent leaders are desperately needed to mobilize their citizens. Neither the US nor governments in the region have proven adept at partnering the public and private sectors. Private sector interests often clash with local interests, and investors have little patience to work with weak and indecisive government.

Michael Singh started by saying that interests, obstacles, strategy, and tools constitute the hierarchy of international relations. An assessment of how the US is faring should examine the status of these factors in the region. American interests in the region, namely energy, commerce, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, and economic and political development have not been substantially affected by the uprisings. Obstacles, strategy, and tools for pursuing these interests, however, are in disarray. The events of the “Arab Spring” have resulted in radically different political contexts, and three chief obstacles to American engagement have emerged. First, as the spectrum of relevant political actors expands, American officials face increasingly complex array of domestic political forces. Prior to the revolution, American engagement in countries like Egypt did not require a nuanced understanding of domestic politics, as American diplomats only dealt a select group of top officials. Now, however, issues like the Camp David Accords, which were previously confined to the purview of government elites, are making their way into popular political dialogue. American officials must learn to adapt to this emerging nexus of foreign and domestic politics. Second, new governments are going to be more hostile to the US, the West, and Israel. Egyptians associate the US with Mubarak and view the peace treaty with Israel as bargains made by old regimes against the interest of the people. Third, the resulting political situation is more prone to regional conflict than the old order. In the absence of clear regional leadership, governments may look to external conflicts to unite their populations. These new obstacles require an updated US strategy in Middle East.

US foreign policymakers should take specific actions to update its regional strategy. First, they should elucidate Washington’s priorities and red lines. The US should counter any slide into irrelevance by asserting itself as a regional leader, rather than a cautious observer. Additionally, the US should reach out to its allies in the region. Democracy promotion and political reform are needed more now than ever, and the US should not take a back seat. That being said, attempting to control the reform process will prove counterproductive. These countries are undergoing historic transitions, and the US has a clear interest in the outcomes. Washington will benefit from promoting democracy and discouraging a tyranny of the majority. There is a large gap between the moment when citizens demand their own rights and the moment they demand rights for their entire society; elections do not create democracy. America needs to promote liberal values, regardless of who is in power.

Before beginning the question and answer period, Miller reflected on the panelists’ statements. A country’s policy has to serve its interests, he said, and that policy has to be clearly defined. What the world is witnessing in the Middle East are transactions, not transformations. The events of the “Arab Spring” are not revolutions, but rather, transformations could happen, but they have not yet. Great powers, particularly the US, do not manifest the kind of agility and tactical dexterity required in this kind of situation. American foreign policy on core issues has a lot of inertia, and has not changed in 30 years. Concerning Iran, Gaza, Israel, and weapons among other things, the US will be a cautious and incremental player. Washington will be slow to give up on investments like Bashar al Assad. The US is still involved in the “devil’s bargain” in places like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and even with Egypt’s SCAF. Further, American foreign policy often presents logical contradictions; US officials cooperate with the worst, most violent insurgent insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq but refuse to talk to Hamas or Hezbollah.

4. Q & A
Q: (Miller) Nathan, what exactly did you mean when you said that Camp David is not dead yet?

A: (Brown) In some ways, Camp David is more alive than ever, but it is also deeply threatened. In Mubarak’s absence, no one has presented an alternative to the treaty. The forces that were critical of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship have indicated that they respect Egypt’s existing relationships; no one will push for war with Israel. Egyptians do not like the terms of the treaty, especially its economic aspects and the demilitarization of Sinai. The treaty is safer than it was before, but it could fray in the context of a regional crisis.

Q: (Miller) So essentially the Egyptian public now owns the treaty, and that has created a new normative standard which the Islamists, for reasons of practicality, have come to acquiesce in it. What does this mean for the prospects of an Israeli-Palestinian deal?  

A: (Brown) The two are connected. The prospects for Israeli-Palestinian deal were almost nonexistent before Mubarak’s departure, and today any peace process remains highly unlikely. Nothing has changed, except the Israelis won’t find Egypt to be the helpful partner in mediating the former’s relationship with Palestine as they did in the past.

Q: (Miller) We have not witnessed the disruption of a major oil producer, save Libya. Why have the monarchs of the GCC fared much better than their less fortunate counterparts?

A: (Laipson) Our relations remain strong with the Gulf States, excluding Bahrain. Iran represents a unifying factor; we share specific goals on this issue. However, the Gulf Arabs have expressed misgivings about our intentions as we abandoned Mubarak. They are squirming under our pressure to comply with sanctions toward Iran. They depend on us to stop Iran, and engage with us, but they do not entirely trust our policy processes. If the US were to relocate the Fifth Fleet because of instability in Iran, it would undermine the logic of our human rights policy. Bahrain may force us to shift, creating tension with Saudi Arabia.

Q: (Miller) We need to stand up for what we believe in and promote a liberal order. We have created problems for ourselves in the past when our words exceeded our capacity. On the issue of democratization, how do we promote democratic reform if our actions elsewhere contradict our principles? Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria offer examples of where our words exceed our capacity to affect results.

A: (Singh) Economic and political development are our key interests. We want both, and both benefit us in a real way. In response to all this talk about our conflicting interests and values, it is worth saying that interests are often in conflict with one another. A country always needs to manage these conflicts in a smart way. We cannot allow our rhetoric or promises to exceed our willingness to act. We tend to raise expectations too high, so we should have a frank, realistic conversation to yield better results.

Q: (Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center) If Tehran is able to come to an understanding on the nuclear issue, it will likely emerge as a strong regional power. How will the Gulf States and Israel respond?

A: (Laipson) The reactions in the Gulf to an resolution would be confusing. Elites, as well as businesspeople and the general public in the Gulf would be relieved. The governments, however, would face uncertainty. Gulf governments have feared that Iran will become the US’ strategic partner in the region if the nuclear issue is resolved. (Singh) The prospect of an understanding that falls short of stopping the program entirely is not welcome by leaders in the Gulf. They want the US to deal with the issue forcefully. The Israelis share this sentiment. It is a very diverse society, but their view of red lines includes full suspension of enrichment, and our view may be a little more lax. (Laipson) If a resolution meant internationalizing the fuel cycle the Gulf countries may be in favor of coming to an understanding. A regional, internationally monitored fuel bank to support nuclear energy programs and prevent them from becoming military programs could benefit all partners involved.

5. Observation

The discussion was attended by approximately 35 professionals, students, NGO workers, policymakers, and members of the press. The panelists focused almost entirely on Egypt, stressing the dire need for the US to reform its engagement strategy there. Nathan Brown offered a much more optimistic picture of American involvement in Egypt. He insisted that many features of the US response to Mubarak’s departure represents a success, while Ellen Laipson countered that the US has not seen any significant successes anywhere in the region, save Tunisia. All of the panelists stressed the significance of new emerging political contexts and actors and the overarching sense of uncertainty in the region. No one mentioned Morocco, Algeria, or broader security threats in the region.

(Back to top)
1. Title: Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Boko Haram, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa

Hosted by the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

Participants:
- **Ambassador Donald Y. Yamamoto**: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, US Department of State
- **Ambassador Daniel Benjamin**: Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of State
- **Amanda J. Dory**: Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense

2. Overview

The US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs heard testimony from senior officials from the State Department and Defense Department who conduct oversight of US counterterrorism efforts in Africa. The panelists examined instability in Africa caused by the rising influence of radical Islamist and terrorist organizations. The Committee also examined potential deficiencies and successes of US bilateral and regional initiatives and evaluated collaboration and coordination among military and civilian agencies to promote stability on the African continent.

3. Summary

Following opening remarks by committee chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ambassador Donald Yamamoto began his statement by acknowledging that effective counterterrorism depends upon coordination of military, political, economic, diplomatic, and social resources. He explained how the current situation in Mali presents a microcosm of four larger, interrelated crises afflicting multiple nations in Africa: a crisis of legitimacy for civilian authorities, a lack of dialogue with rebel groups, massive flows of refugees, and the looming threat of terrorism. According to Yamamoto, the Obama administration is meeting these challenges with a four pillar approach that emphasizes institution building, fostering sustainable economic growth, expanding education, and mitigating armed conflict. He added that the State Department is committed to linking security cooperation with respect for human rights and effective democratic reforms, as ameliorating popular grievances will help to diminish the strength of extremist groups who attempt to capitalize on misery and desperation.

Ambassador Daniel Benjamin rejected claims that terrorism in Africa is not a threat to the United States or its allies. He interpreted the positive results US agencies have seen as a testament to two signature programs that encourage security cooperation among African partner nations. Echoing Yamamoto’s statement that counterterrorism requires a multi-pronged strategy, Benjamin conceded that counter-terror efforts in North Africa can appear daunting, particularly when targets can hide in great expanses of ungoverned territory. As a result, he explained, the US government aims to address ‘upstream’ drivers of extremism, an objective that seeks to bypass the difficult challenge of finding needles in haystacks. Benjamin said that, although al-Qaeda’s ideology remains unpopular in most African communities, the turmoil in Mali, coupled with the recent return of mercenaries and weapons from Libya, have increased the internal pressures facing governments in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Benjamin expressed concern that AQIM’s newfound mobility and its interest in deadly weapons from Libyan arsenals could endanger Western interests on a global level. Linking Boko Haram and al-Shabaab with AQIM, Benjamin insisted that the US government was making great progress against all three organizations in Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Somalia.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda Dory discussed recent progress in addressing security concerns across Africa. She touted the significant roles played by the AU in Somalia and Sudan, as well as the quick response by ECOWAS to the coup in Mali. Unfortunately, American partners in Africa still lack key capabilities in terms of training, equipment, doctrine, and civil-military relations. Dory said Defense Department engagement in Africa consisted of two prongs: 1) the maintenance of constant pressure on al-Qaeda and its allies across the continent, and 2) the establishment of small outposts manned by special operations forces who can counter extremist groups. She lauded a 2012 NDAA provision that provided the Defense Department with specific guidance to improve a counterterrorism course for African officers and non-commissioned officers. Following regime change in Libya, American commanders also incorporated improved MANPAD awareness and IED training for African partners.
Q: (Rep. Ros-Lehtinen) Please describe the goals and status of US efforts to counter the LRA, and how the success is being gauged. Also please describe the relationship between private and US-funded efforts to establish monitoring and alert systems for LRA-affected communities. What happens to non-leadership defectors from the LRA? Finally, how frequent have defections been since the initiation of US efforts to counter the LRA?

A: (Yamamoto) The key is interoperability and training programs by the four countries involved against the LRA. The goals and objectives are threefold in order to isolate Kony and the other leaders, to support and assist those who are defecting, also to help with rehabilitation and reconciliation efforts. One thing that has proven effective is the provision of basic cell phones. USAID has provided around 200,000 dollars worth of cell phone towers, which helps warn when LRA groups are in the area. It is only a matter of time, as Uganda is working very hard on reconciliation and is seeing some fruits from their efforts.

(Yamamoto) The DoD deployment is in support of the anti-LRA strategy that spans the US government. The first is on civilian protection, the second is reintegrating former LRA members, and the third is removing Kony and key leaders from the battlefield. So DoD is working with local militaries in the region. We have a variety of metrics for measuring success, which includes our level of access to deliver humanitarian goods and numbers on defections and captures from the battlefield. Some of the metrics that are important to us are building trust and relationships with partner militaries. We also focus on reducing the amount of time for intelligence gathering to produce actionable intelligence for Ugandan forces.

Q: (Rep. Berman) Ms. Dory, on the third objective, given 100 military advisors working with local military partners, why haven’t we been able to kill or capture Kony?

A: (Dory) One of our biggest problems is expectations management. It is a huge territory of challenging terrain and a very dense jungle. A second challenge relates to logistics support for field forces. Given the four different militaries and the terrain, it is very challenging.

Q: (Rep. Berman) Didn’t the Dodd-Frank legislation require the administration to provide a map to give us a sense of the relationship between conflicts, mining, and the LRA rebels?

A: (Yamamoto) We have been tracking mines and materials produced. The Congo produces many of the materials we use in our daily lives. The map is coming out soon. One of the issues is that these are artesian mines that spring up and close, but we do have mapping ready.

Q: (Rep. Berman) How do our executive agencies balance the desire to cooperate on terrorism with our desire for protection of human rights and political rights?

A: (Benjamin) An integral part of anti-terrorism assistance is always human rights training, as human rights is always a component of what we do. It is also an integral part of our message to these countries, and we tell them they must observe human rights norms in order to tamp down radicalization.

(Yamamoto) In Ethiopia we have the NCO and officer training program, and we have learned that those trained troops are much more disciplined and very effective for civilian control. So these efforts are getting the message now, and we are improving coordination and cooperation.

Q: (Rep. Smith) Again on Kony, if you could tell us what is being given by the US and African countries toward the killing and capture of Kony? And how degraded is his capability to capture child soldiers and commit murder? Have we gotten credible leads?

A: (Yamamoto) The priority is very high, and in discussions with regional defense ministers and related officials, we find they are very committed to cooperating to cordon off his escape routes and capture him. On Kony himself, we have been able to degrade his force down to a few hundred loyalists, but the number of attacks has increased, although we are trying to limit those areas of operations.

(Dory) The message in terms of encouraging defections and providing monetary compensation is going out through airwaves, radio, civilians in the area, and previous members. The intelligence community assesses that he has been significantly degraded and is currently focused on surviving and evading.

Q: (Rep. Bass) How are you fighting extremism among youth?

A: (Benjamin) We recognize that those most at risk of radicalization are the young. We are conducting programs that complement what USAID does in the sense that they do the longer term work that provides key social services that ameliorate grievances, while we are looking at hot spots, where we see particularly intense radicalization, and are trying to figure out what we can do to provide alternatives to potential recruits, often with civil society actors and local groups that enjoy more credibility.

Q: (Rep. Schmidt) How are State and DoD coordinating resources to combat threats throughout the region?
A: (Benjamin) I think we have very close coordination, particularly through the Trans-Saharan partnership and its corollary in East Africa. We feel there is an excellent give and take on these issues.

(Dory) What Africa Command has been able to do is develop cross-cutting regional campaign programs, for example a Northwest Africa campaign program that aligns with State’s two programs which can be understood within the DoD structure.

Q: (Rep. Schmidt) Turning to Boko Haram, I know several Congressmen asked the State Department to list them as a terrorist organization. What is the status of the request?
A: (Benjamin) We are very concerned about Boko Haram and are closely engaged with the Nigerians, but the State Department does not comment on prospective designations.

Q: (Rep. Rivera) It is my understanding that the Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria have become a recruiting ground for AQIM, and a hub for opportunistic drug traffickers, as well as a threat to some of the reforms of the Arab Spring. Since 1990, international support for the camps has exceeded one billion dollars. So it seems the US taxpayer is being called upon to partly fund camps being exploited by regional terrorist groups.
A: (Benjamin) I have seen such reports of AQIM involvement, but whenever we have dug deeper we have found such reports spurious. But we can check again to ensure we have up to date information.

5. Observation

Representatives were primarily focused on US and African efforts to kill or capture Joseph Kony and his subordinates of the Lord’s Resistance Army. As a result, al-Qaeda activities in the Sahel and Maghreb received minimal attention. Two panel members essentially ducked the one question on allegations that Polisario members collaborate with AQIM operatives in Algeria and beyond. This event is of minimal value to MAC.

The Political Economy of the ‘Maghreb Spring’ and its Aftermath

Date: 24 April 2012

1. Title: The Political Economy of the ‘Maghreb Spring’ and its Aftermath
   Hosted by the Maghreb Center

   Participants:
   Ahmed El-Hamri: Former Economist and Program Director for the Maghreb Region, World Bank
   Robert Prince: Lecturer, University of Colorado at Denver
   Francis Ghiles: Senior Research Fellow, Barcelona Center for International Affairs
   Nejib Ayachi: Moderator: President, Maghreb Center

2. Overview

The so-called “Arab Spring”, which should more appropriately be labeled the “Maghreb Spring” or the “North Africa Spring,” was triggered by exacerbated economic inequalities and stalled social development for large segments of the population, particularly youth, within a context characterized by the lack of basic human and political rights, rule of law deficits, and high levels of corruption and nepotism. The panel discussion assessed economic development strategies adopted in North Africa since independence, focusing on the recent past. Participants weighed reforms recently adopted in Morocco as well as those integrated in Tunisia’s “Jasmine Plan” for economic and social development.

3. Summary

Ahmed El-Hamri described the basic economic models pursued in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria from the late 1950s onwards. The early years saw inconsistent approaches to growth, with Algeria reinforcing the role of government in economic management and state-owned enterprises (particularly in the oil and gas sector), while Tunisia and Morocco placed more emphasis on private initiatives. In Algeria, state-owned companies employed the majority of Algerian workers. The only private investment was in small, unproductive industries. Tunisia’s economic policy was characterized by liberalism in the late 1950s, socialist-type government intervention throughout the 1960s, and a market economy from 1970 to 1985, although the government maintained stringent protections against foreign
competition for local producers. The signature features were improved GDP growth rates to as much as 5%, greater focus on social modernization and population control, and state involvement in the economy, despite the notable failure of collectivism in preceding years. Turning to Morocco, El-Hamri said Rabat has made a relatively successful shift from an agrarian-focused economy to one with greater prowess in manufacturing. El-Hamri noted that all three countries suffer from a shortfall in value-added exports and “reinvestment projects.” He also gave credit to the Moroccan government for taking steps to involve women more intimately in the economy.

Robert Prince observed that, although Tunisia earns frequent praise for its relatively advanced economy, such expansion is not sustainable. In particular, growing inequality, geographically unbalanced development, limited roles for women, and horrendous working conditions may exacerbate social problems and, subsequently, economic development. Prince likened Tunisia’s democratization process to that of the Philippines, where a dictator was overthrown and elections were fairly run, but where today people remain mired in abject poverty. Prince argued that Bourguiba’s economic reforms are subject to unfair criticism, which often overlooks the prominent effects of European woes on Maghreb economies. He assessed that the Tunisian economic model has undergone very little change in the past 20 years, and the state will probably have to stay moderately involved in order to get the nation out of the current crisis.

Francis Ghiles noted that the Maghreb economies were typical of developing nations, where governments continue to play major parts in dominant sectors. He lamented the underutilization of the highly skilled diaspora in North Africa and mused that local idiosyncrasies might be rooted in the bureaucratic practices introduced by Ottoman and French occupiers. Drawing attention to the stark contrast laid bare by Europe’s divergent approaches toward Eastern Europe and North Africa, Ghiles posited that a European commitment on par with 1989 could greatly help the Maghreb climb out of the doldrums. More importantly, Europe has failed to offer the kind of political support extended to Eastern European nations, many of whom were promised membership in the EU and NATO should they reform. Such leverage is missing in trans-Mediterranean relations, a situation that hurts Western efforts to lay solid democratic foundations across the Middle East. Ghiles reiterated the popular view that Maghreb nations must train their graduates for jobs that are in demand, not jobs they want. Ghiles concluded that a primary obstacle to further political and economic progress is the tendency of developed nations to view North Africa and the Middle East as a problem rather than an opportunity.

4. Q & A

Q: What do you think will happen in Libya?
A: (Ghiles) I remain pessimistic about the situation in Libya, particularly when you look at recent reports of infighting among the many militias from Tripoli to Misrata. One of the big issues for all these countries going forward is what model will they follow? There is a sense that the Western model is broken. Here we are, mired in partisanship, facing great crises, and we seem unable to do anything about it. So how will they organize their societies, especially when they are still very dependent on the West in the short term?

Q: What about the lack of rural infrastructure in Morocco?
A: (El-Hamri) The government has been toying with such ideas for a long time, and I believe they are still pursuing rural development very aggressively.

5. Observation

The event was attended by a dozen or so retired officials and think tank personnel. The discussion was wide ranging despite the event’s publicized focus on the political economy of North African nations. Ghiles was particularly enlightening, and he supported his views with multiple anecdotes and references to academic research. However, much of the focus was on Tunisia and Algeria. Morocco earned praised for its handling of gender equality and liberalization, but virtually no discussion was given to the relationship between Morocco’s new parliament, its economic promises, and prospects for successfully carrying out those plans.
Now that the House is in order until the conference committee, we recommend you focus on calling Inouye as the Senate markup is Tuesday. Thanks Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph:  +1 202 887 1113
Fax:  +1 202 887 1115
Email:  ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website:  www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Ambassador, per our conversation last night, below is an email from Jean on his recent contact at Aspen/NAPEO. I think it is an important read and should be held as confidential. Ed

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Jean AbiNader" <jabinader@moroccanamericancenter.com>
Date: May 18, 2012 10:30:31 EDT
To: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Subject: Meeting with NAPEO/Aspen

Dear Ed,
I met yesterday with one of my contacts at ASPEN/NAPEO.
The source was quite upset because it appears that Morocco will be dropped as a host site from an academic/education delegation visiting Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria the first week of June.

Brief recap:
- The delegation is one of three that was defined late last year by NAPEO (private equity/venture capital and the creative arts were the others) to take place in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in 2012. The others have been completed.
- After initially ignoring the education delegation, State/NEA decided that it wanted the embassies to participate and to control the program. This resulted in the program being shifted from late May to early June to accommodate State. So Aspen/NAPEO had to go back to the private-public boards in each country and re-do the schedules.
- As recently as two weeks ago, there was continuous communication between Aspen/NAPEO with the Morocco local board and the US Embassy.
- It became clear that nothing was done to set up the two-three events that had been previously agreed among the parties.
- Aspen/NAPEO asked the Economic Bureau at State what to do and the consensus is to drop Morocco from the delegation itinerary. NEA is not yet on board. This will mean again going back to the local boards in Tunis and Algiers to rearrange their schedules.

Problems identified:
According to the source, key issues are:
- NEA conflict with the Economic Bureau over NAPEO projects, even objecting to participation of Julie Egan.
- Lack of US embassy support for NAPEO projects – Aspen particularly critical of cultural attaché and Ambassador Kaplan for lukewarm or non-existent support, causing failure of Morocco to stay on the itinerary.
- Morocco local board does not have an institutional approach to working with NAPEO. No real structure in place rather a loose committee with leadership that has other priorities.
- NAPEO finds it very difficult to work with local board in Morocco and Embassy under these conditions, which may lead to erosion of other regional opportunities for Morocco, e.g. two other US delegations are visiting Tunisia right after the education group.

Let me know if you need further elaboration.

Best,

Jean AbiNader
Moroccan American Center
In last year's final Foreign Operations bill, Senator Leahy conditioned all of Morocco's FMF assistance ($10 million) by the Senate on the State Department submitting a report on the positive steps Morocco is taking to improve human rights in the Western Sahara.

We have two requests:

1) That the FMF money come without negative conditions or restrictions by Senate language.

2) That the bill not contain any other negative language that would adversely affect the US-Morocco bilateral relationship.
This is a very good sign.

----- Original Message -----
From: Edward Gabriel
Sent: Saturday, May 19, 2012 05:00 PM
To: rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com
Subject: This is our proposed language

In last year's final Foreign Operations bill, Senator Leahy conditioned all of Morocco's FMF assistance ($10 million) by the Senate on the State Department submitting a report on the positive steps Morocco is taking to improve human rights in the Western Sahara.

We have two requests:

1) That the FMF money come without negative conditions or restrictions by Senate language.

2) That the bill not contain any other negative language that would adversely affect the US-Morocco bilateral relationship.
FYI

below is the statement made by the US Mission to the UN Human Rights Council during Morocco’s Universal Periodic Review yesterday.

United States

“The USA warmly welcomes his Excellency, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Moustapha Ramid, and the delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco. We commend the government for creating a special committee to draft a new constitution based on input from all sectors of civil society. The new constitution sets high standards for the individual liberties, gender-equality, and cultural diversity. Despite these positive efforts, we are concerned by recent arrests of journalists, bloggers and artists which demonstrate restrictions on the freedom of opinion and expression. We’re also concerned about continued allegations of police brutality against peaceful demonstrators and torture of prisoners and detainees at the hands of police and security forces. Finally, we are concerned that some civil society organisations advocating on behalf of minority populations, including Saharawis, have not yet been registered.

Bearing in mind these concerns, the USA makes the following recommendations. One, investigate all allegations of police brutality and torture and prosecute all security force officials accused of harsh treatment. Two, finalise in collaboration with press associations and rights groups, a legal framework that ensures full freedom of expression. And three, promptly approve the license application of all civil society organisations, that meet legal requirements, including those organisations advocating for minority populations.”
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Sunday, May 27, 2012 12:49 PM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: WS report

The information contained in this report has not been corroborated by third party sources and therefore its accuracy cannot be verified.

WESTERN SAHARA
18/05/12

According to a Moroccan personality, close to the Palace:

i. During the French presidential election, the Benkirane government sounded out the Hollande camp in order to seek reassurances that, if the left were to win, French support for Morocco would continue unaltered. There were direct contacts with Pierre Moscovici, a senior member of the Socialist Party leadership who is close to Hollande. Moscovici suggested that French policy towards Morocco (and in particular support for Rabat's autonomy plan) would probably remain largely unchanged, but stressed that nothing could be confirmed 100% until after the second round of voting (May 6).

ii. Immediately after Hollande's victory in the second round, but before the constitution of the new Socialist-led government, Foreign Minister Othmani travelled to Paris to meet Moscovici for further information on the positions of the incoming administration. Othmani was at that stage convinced that Moscovici himself would get the Foreign Affairs portfolio.

iii. A wave of panic ran through the Benkirane government when the make-up of the new government was finally announced on May 16, with Laurent Fabius as Foreign Minister. Benkirane sees Fabius [1], like Hollande himself, as a pure product of the Mitterrand era – and as such capable of reverting to Mitterrand's regional policy, seen as less favourable to Morocco and its claim to Western Sahara than that of successive right-wing administrations.

iv. It was specifically in order to sound out the incoming Socialist government and test its reactions that the Benkirane government has “withdrawn confidence” in Christopher Ross, in belated reaction to the UN Secretary General's last report (dated April 24).

v. However, rather than calming their jittery nerves, the French reaction has alarmed Benkirane and Othmani all the more. Even though the position stated by the Quai d'Orsay was essentially the same as before, the statement was made by Foreign Ministry spokesman Bernard Valéro, who has been in the job for years, rather than by Fabius – and it was Fabius that Benkirane wanted to hear. The Paris correspondent of Maghreb Arabe Presse has been instructed by his superiors in Rabat to interview Fabius on the incoming government's Morocco policy, but has not yet managed to do so. In the meantime, Benkirane and Othmani are convinced that France's new Socialist government will be more reserved towards Morocco and more open towards Algeria than was the case under Sarkozy.

vi. At the Palace, on the other hand, there is no panic or particular concern. Indeed, the King's advisors on the Western Sahara question have been exchanging sarcastic Tweets about Benkirane and Othmani's panic attacks (!). The Palace knew in advance that, once elected, Hollande would not deviate from France's traditional stance on the Sahara and support for Morocco's territorial integrity.

vii. King Mohamed VI, for his part, has been spending an extended holiday with his mother in Paris.

According to a member of Polisario's National Secretariat:

i. The victory of Hollande, and the make-up of the new Socialist-led government, could augur a break with the policy of
unconditional support for Morocco adopted by the outgoing Sarkozy government. Polisario has been in touch with its friends in France, in particular those who are close to the Socialists, to explore such a possibility, and all have confirmed that French Maghreb policy will have to be put on a new and more balanced footing.

ii. Polisario's French friends claim that unconditional support for Morocco will no longer be considered appropriate, and that human rights issues will emerge as an important element of France's Maghreb policy. The Islamist wave in North Africa will be judged on its degree of integration into a democratic process that respects human rights and the rights of peoples. The Sahara question will be an integral part of this policy of support for democracy and human rights in the Maghreb.

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

[1] Fabius is also known to have firm friendships in Algiers, and none such in Rabat.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3:54 PM
To: Bouhlal, Rachad
Cc: Jordan Paul
Subject: Senate Bill

This is all the staff could come up with on the internet regarding the Senate appropriations. Unfortunately, it looks like we were not successful in deflecting the Leahy language in the Senate, although we are in good shape for the conference committee. Ed

From: Kristen Kouttab [mailto:kkouttab@moroccanamericancenter.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3:12 PM
To: Edward Gabriel; Jordan Paul
Subject: RE: Just heard the Senate Bill

I searched S. 3241, which is for appropriations for DOS, Foreign Ops, and related programs for fiscal year ending Sept 30, 2013. Reported by Leahy and placed on the Senate calendar.

The word searches "Morocco" and "Sahara" turned up the following item of interest. Sahara also showed up under counter-terrorism funding, but the only mention of "Western Sahara" was in the section with Morocco. No hits on Tindouf, Algeria, or census.

MOROCCO
(g) Morocco- Prior to the obligation of funds appropriated by this Act under the heading `Foreign Military Financing Program' for assistance for Morocco, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations on steps taken during the previous 12 months by the Government of Morocco to--

(1) protect freedom of expression, association, and assembly regarding the status and future of the Western Sahara, and due process of law;

(2) release prisoners of conscience;

(3) support a human rights monitoring and reporting role for the United Nations Mission in Western Sahara in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; and

(4) provide unimpeded access to human rights organizations, journalists, and representatives of foreign governments to the Western Sahara.

AFRICA
(c) Counterterrorism Programs-
(1) Of the funds appropriated by this Act, not less than $55,000,000 should be made available for the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership program, and not less than $25,000,000 should be made available for the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism program.

(2) Of the funds appropriated by this Act under the heading `Economic Support Fund', $10,000,000 shall be made available for programs to counter extremism in East Africa, in addition to such sums that may otherwise be made available for such purposes.
Rachad,

A report from Jean on his recent visit to Morocco. We are happy to collaborate as you see fit. Ed

Hi Ed

As you know, I was in Morocco last week to teach a graduate level negotiations seminar for the Executive MBA program at Al Akhawayn’s Executive Education Center at the TechnoPark in Casablanca. Before going to Casa, I met with some of our trade and investment promotion partners to get and update on what is going on and to offer our continued support. Below are my notes from the meetings.

- **AMDI**
  Met with Driss Sekkat, new Business Development Manager for everywhere but Europe. He and Saloua Dlimi are our main points of contact. They advised us that MFA will be coordinating their delegation to the US as part of the strategic dialogue program planned by the Ambassador. This may not affect their auto show specific trip to Detroit in September as that is where the suppliers and manufacturers will be. They were glad to have the information of the possible US-Maghreb Economic Forum in Detroit in October since being their earlier may give Morocco an advantage.

- **MCC/APP**
  Met with Morad Abid, the DG, and Malika, the Deputy DG to continue our discussions about the steps leading up to the end of the compact in September 2013. They are already downsizing. Looks like they will have allocations for 90+% of the MCC funds by end of program.

  Their sources in MCC are not optimistic about a second compact because of general attitude towards foreign assistance in US (do we know funding appropriations for MCC for 2013-14?). They have been advised that there is a clique in MCC that is still upset with the GOM’s taking over the Fez Medina project. They have been told that any second compact would be smaller, less than $170m, should focus on human development and building capacity for consumer protection facilities, and stay away from infrastructure (long term) projects.

  Enterprise support (enables capacity building/coaching to promote sustainability for SMEs) has been cut $12m without any explanation - political decision they were told. $ is available but seems the funds got caught up in a turf war between 2 MCC VPs and Morocco got the short end of the argument.

  MCC has told APP that it should not take Moroccan companies to the fancy foods show in DC this year because there are people on the Hill complaining against the subsidies for growing olives in competition with US growers. (Maroc Export will have its own delegation.) This is certainly something that we can explore and we need to counter arguments that this is hurting US companies. MCC’s response has been to run from the program rather than have their legislative staff take it on.

- **US Embassy**
  Met with Michael DeTar, outgoing economic counselor, and Jane Kitson, SCO, who was in Rabat for meetings. There was also a US presence at an energy show that was held later that week that Jane was going to attend. Someone from OPIC was making a presentation.

  Michael and Jane were quite friendly and helpful. We covered three topics: totalization, NAPEO, and entrepreneurism in Morocco.

**Totalization:**

Treaty is negotiated by the Treasury Department. Small number of Americans affected and small negotiating staff at Treasury are main reasons Morocco is not a priority. Totalization issue is now part of Kaplan’s talking points when he comes to US for 2 weeks this
AmCham is now officially part of the US Chamber network, this happened last week. So AmCham could do a doorknock (Hill visits) and have totalization on their agenda.

He really likes the idea of a coalition of companies/schools working this issue because otherwise it won't get the attention/priority from USG. GOM is key as well since State can push Treasury on this issue.

Another wrinkle that Jane brought up: under Moroccan law, age limit for work is 60. So Americans over 60 could not work in Morocco full time. Spain, Germany, France have negotiated a waiver to this in their totalization agreements. Affects companies with highly skilled workers, e.g. Jacobs, who have seasoned staff in the field.

NAPEO:
The Embassy is generally not supportive because they see Aspen's strength as managing events, not supporting a long term effort that will have results. They were opposed the educational delegation because the Embassy wanted it to focus on vocational/technical, not universities and higher education. Needs of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco are different so setting up delegations for all three countries is difficult to address their different priorities. Embassy believes that Aspen does not have enough resources/staffing for a substantive, well-coordinated effort across Maghreb. It appears that he is more supportive of more involved effort from US side although NAPEO assumption is that local boards will carry the weight once NAPEO facilitates initial efforts.

Morocco has long history with US assistance so the Moroccans are not as anxious as Tunisia and Algeria to have US programs unless there is an obvious connection to Moroccan needs. In the case of the educational delegations, the local NAPEO board did not see the value of a 1 1/2 day program, built around a reception and two roundtables with experts as a benefit to Morocco so they were hesitant to make the effort. Michael has a very high regard for the local NAPEO board. Michael was skeptical that having experts come to Morocco, most for their first time, without French or Arabic, and under a tight timeframe, was not the best recipe for effectiveness.

Entrepreneurism:
Both were generally skeptical of short term results of overall entrepreneurship projects due to compelling need to have a full enabling environment for programs to succeed. People are willing but institutions and systems are not in place. Morocco will get a black eye in report this fall for failing to move on an agreement with Buffet company that has approval from national investment committee (Hassan II Fund qualified) that took 5 years and for 2 years since, nothing has happened. State will have to report on it and it will affect Morocco's ratings for "business friendly" environment. Michael feels that Morocco has to move more aggressively to implement changes that really help business, ranging from labor codes to customs to basic services. Laws are passed, actions don't follow.

FTA came under particular mention as Moroccan companies are raising the issue of the perceived lack of impact with the new government. That's way Said Benabdullah (Maroc Export) was in US in March, to try to identify means to ratchet up bilateral efforts to promote more T&I.

- ADEREE
Met with Said Moulina to get some clarification regarding how to insure that US companies make the right connections when they are pursuing renewable energy project.
We discussed the current projects and regulations in place and the possibility of Morocco focusing next on biomass, particularly trash to energy conversion. As always, a useful meeting and reassuring regarding the progress that Morocco is making in renewables.

- MAROC EXPORT
I have been on a panel with Saad Benabdallah, the DG, previously, and he eventually remembered the program. He is quite proactive in his approach and innovative in moving to promote trade from Morocco. Definitely a big thinker and is very proud of his close relationship with Ambassador Bouhlal. He believes that a meeting among Maroc Export, the Ambassador, you, and me to develop a roadmap for the next three years for promoting Morocco is very important.

Key points we discussed:
1. Quite necessary to improve results for Morocco from the FTA
2. Have to support Morocco's capability to follow up with US companies
3. Important to get AMDI involved and the Artisan folks as well
4. Welcomes MATIC's support, energy, and experience
5. He will convey meeting points to Amb Bouhlal for follow up.

We gave him a detailed review of MATIC from the beginning since he was thinking of setting up a business council, didn't know we worked on the various trade shows, and is also concerned that there are too many events floating around that are disconnected or
being done for the wrong reasons.

He says that he's not a business guy but he is a thinker and an organizer. Saad just funded a senior business leaders' conference hosted by the FT on high value luxury goods in Morocco this week. 4 days. He worked on in for 2 years. We talked about similar opportunities in the US. It was a very positive meeting and it will be quite good to work through the Ambassador on moving forward.

The balance of the week was spent leading the graduate seminar: professionals from ONE, Cargill, MTIC (managers of TechnoPark). Always interesting and useful to talk with them in class and outside. The class will be coming to Bentley University in Boston for their last course next month. Unfortunately, it was too expensive to do it in Washington.

Thanks.
Mr. Ambassador,
Pursuant to our meeting this morning, attached is a list of ideas to advance the WS issue to the next logical step. Hope you find this useful. Ed/Bob

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel  
President  
The Gabriel Company, LLC  
1220 L Street, NW  
Suite 411  
Washington, DC 20005  
Ph: +1 202 887 1113  
Fax: +1 202 887 1115  
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com  
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Senior US officials, specifically including the US Ambassador in Morocco should be encouraged, indeed required, to visit the Western Sahara. Such a visit is now prohibited by State Department. While perhaps arguably useful in the past, today this prohibition conveys the impression that the United States is so unconcerned with the problems in the Sahara/Sahel and the Western Sahara that it does not need the first-hand views of its most senior diplomats to help inform and guide the process of resolving these issues.

The United States should take every available opportunity to clearly state, in unambiguous terms, its chosen policy of support for a mutually acceptable political solution based on the only reasonable and viable option available, that of sovereignty and autonomy. Doing anything else only continues to encourage the Polisario Front that it does not need to compromise. This has the effect of making the United States a part of the problem, not the solution.

The United States should also use its influence in the Security Council to make clear that this is indeed the only realistic way forward and help end the charade that any meaningful compromise can be found through old formulas that have already failed and are, in any case, clearly to be avoided.

The policy decision to restrict US access to the Western Sahara and deny US development assistance funds to the region should be reversed, as Congress has now both authorized and urged. Morocco has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the territory to improve its basic infrastructure and quality of life and would welcome US participation in meeting genuine humanitarian and development needs in the area. This kind of engagement would demonstrate through concrete actions that the United States is fully committed to its support for autonomy. Further, it would build confidence among the Sahrawi people to endorse such an outcome. Such actions would also help project an image elsewhere in the Sahara/Sahel that there are viable, peaceful alternatives to the chaos being promoted by a rapidly expanding revolutionary jihadist population in the region. Most importantly, funding that leads to improved governance and economic development will aid in stabilizing the region.

The rest of the State Department should align their internal decision-making criteria vis-à-vis the Western Sahara with Secretary Clinton’s verbal statements of support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative. Inside the State Department, there is bureaucratic stalling that inhibits creative approaches and initiatives that could lead to resolution of the conflict. As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote recently, “As a result [of Obama’s priority on domestic political affairs], his grand redefinition of U.S. foreign policy is vulnerable to dilution or delay by upper-level officials who have the bureaucratic predisposition to favor caution over action and the familiar over the innovative.” Nowhere is this more evident than in US policy on Western Sahara where senior officials below the level of Secretary Clinton routinely misses opportunities to support the Moroccan initiative and instead proffer bland statements of support for the “UN process,” as though this was somehow a substitute for US national interest or even consistent with what the US has clearly stated is its alleged policy priority. This kind of ambivalence serves to add only further confusion to an already difficult situation and perpetuates the problem rather than contributing anything useful towards a solution.

Existing US foreign assistance programs in Morocco targeting social and economic development should include the inhabitants of the Western Sahara, again as Congress has now specifically authorized, especially those focusing on health, education, entrepreneurship, and similar capacity-building initiatives.

The people of the Western Sahara have clearly demonstrated their commitment to democratic participation within the Moroccan context by large turnouts in local and national elections despite Polisario Front calls for boycotts and cancellations. Continued support for NGO, civil society, and local government programs will enhance the US presence in the region and US support for their democratic participation. It will also add much needed US support to the only area in the increasingly volatile Sahara/Sahel region that continues to be an island of stability, security, social and economic progress and democratic practice. Surely an example the US would encourage others in the immediate region to emulate.

The US should help establish conditions for a successful autonomy arrangement by engaging US agencies including USAID, USTDA, OPIC, and EX-IM Bank in support of enhancing private sector
investments in Western Sahara. America’s European partners are already investing in key sectors in the region. There is no reason that the United States should not follow suit.

- The United States should recognize the Western Sahara conflict as an impediment to US economic investment and opportunity in North Africa. Once the conflict is resolved, the US might have better leverage with Algeria by responding to its need to attract US investments in their energy sector, tourism, infrastructure and a much needed broader diversification of their economy. More importantly, this offers the US an array of opportunities to promote broader regional economic integration. Morocco’s free trade agreement with the US will benefit the Maghreb countries, principally Algeria, clearly demonstrating the benefits of settling the conflict.

- The UN should implement its mandate to encourage Sahrawi leadership in both the Tindouf camps and Western Sahara region to work together on matters of mutual interest affecting the region. One of the original confidence building measures, this dialogue can help build towards the broader integration on interests on both sides of the berm.

- The United States should urge the UNHCR and the Security Council to urge Algeria to respect their legal obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol and reduce the burden associated with maintaining the camps in a hostile physical environment. UNHCR should immediately begin a public information campaign in the camps to inform the refugees of their rights under international law, including identification, documentation, access to travel documents, and freedom of movement. If the UNHCR carries out a census in the camps, those results, along with freedom of movement that includes voluntary repatriation for the refugees, and more accountability for international food and medical assistance, would drastically change conditions in the camps making them obsolete, thus greatly reducing the humanitarian crisis and the vulnerability of the refugee population to other dangerous enticements.

- In addition to a voluntary repatriation program, the US should work with UNHCR and the UN Security Council to encourage and provide support for any Algerian efforts to allow the refugees to settle elsewhere in Algeria if they choose an option other than repatriation to Morocco. Again, this should help reduce regional tensions and dangers.
Rachad,

This may be a great opportunity for us. Can you look over the materials and advise us on how you may want to proceed. Thanks

Jean AbiNader

Important opportunity for Morocco.
Jean

Justin Gray
President and Chief Executive Officer
Gray Global Advisors, LLC
300 New Jersey Avenue, NW, Suite 650
Washington, DC 20001
202-461-2100 (office)
202-449-8323 (fax)
jgray@grayglobaladvisors.com
To: The Honorable Edward Gabriel; Jean AbiNader
From: Justin Gray
Date: May 29, 2012
Re: Transatlantic Leadership Forum for the State Legislative Leadership Foundation

Ed and Jean,

The State Legislative Leaders Foundation (“SLLF”) recently reached out to me and asked for assistance in helping them organize their upcoming Transatlantic Leadership Forum. They have a specific interest in doing this next event in Morocco. In pursuit of planning and executing this event, they were hoping to meet with you and senior leadership from the Embassy. For your reference, below is a brief summary of SLLF.

About SLLF:

The SLLF was established in 1972 as a nonprofit corporation dedicated to working with state legislative leaders in their efforts to reform the institution of the state legislature. SLLF’s earliest funding derived from a multi-million dollar Ford Foundation grant which was earmarked for a seven-state pilot project known as The Program for Legislative Improvement. The seven states selected for this project included: Ohio, Colorado, Minnesota, Arizona, Louisiana, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Today, the SLLF is nationwide and has an advisory council of over 68 major U.S. companies.

SLLF seeks to educate and inspire our nation’s current and future state political leaders regardless of party, politics or ideology. SLLF gives these leaders regular opportunities to take part in university-based educational programs that focus on many of the critical issues of our day. SLLF programs are designed to give them a sense of the high value of public service and the vital role they, as elected representatives of the people, play in our democracy.

SLLF leadership programs seek to educate leaders on a wide range of issue areas with national and global importance. For example, prior SLLF leadership programs have focused on how state legislators can impact key issue areas such as: healthcare; education; innovation and entrepreneurship; technology; economic recession and recovery; environment and energy; digital literacy; and “democracy 2.0” using digital media. With the advent of digital media, SLLF has also taken a strong interest in how legislators can utilize new tools to engage the public and encourage civic participation. SLLF’s most recent program, which was held in Providence, RI this past May, was on the topic of restoring the people’s trust in government.

SLLF Transatlantic Leadership Forum:

SLLF is looking for a host country for its next Transatlantic Leadership Forum. The upcoming Transatlantic Leadership Forum will bring together a group of forty (40) to sixty (60) individuals composed of senior US State Legislative Leaders and their counterparts from across the globe, representatives of the US business community and special guests to discuss matters of global importance with an impact on politics, foreign policy and the economy. SLLF is flexible on dates to hold their next conference and would welcome suggestions as to what dates would be the optimal for the conference in Morocco. Past Transatlantic Leadership Forums have been held in Barcelona, Spain (July 2011) and Dublin, Ireland (August 2010). Attached is more detailed background on SLLF and the Transatlantic Leadership Forum.
About Us

History

Staff

Board of Directors

Advisory Council

Office Locations

Calendar

STAFF

“The State Legislative Leaders Foundation staff is without equal. With an average tenure well over 20 years, each person brings tremendous experience, exceptional skills, and complete dedication to the job. They are an honor to work with and the successes and accomplishments we have enjoyed over those past 40 years are a celebration of their talents.” Stephen G. Laws

Stephen G. Laws
President

Stephen joined SLF in 1972 just after it was established and through the following decade honed his political skills by working directly with state legislative leaders across the country on a series of legislative reform studies. In 2001, the Board of Directors appointed him President and Chief Executive Officer.

Stephen created the blueprint for bringing political, business and academic leaders together on college campuses to examine critical public policy issues and aspects of leadership. Over the course of his tenure the SLF has grown into the preeminent nonpartisan legislative leadership organization in the land reaching Senate Presidents, Speakers of the House, Majority and Minority leaders, and future leaders, with its unrivaled university-based educational programs.

In addition to overseeing all SLF activities, he is a frequent speaker on legislative leadership, ethics, and legislative performance. He also has extensive experience in the international arena where he has organized scores of programs in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

Stephen received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Bridgeport. He also attended graduate school at American University. He is married to the former Evelyn Corrigan and is the proud father of four grown children, two grown stepchildren, and grandchildren of two perfect girls.

Mariela V. VandelVoort
Executive Vice President

Mariela VandelVoort has been with the State Legislative Leaders Foundation since 2001 and has served as Vice President since 1993 and Executive Vice President since 2010. She is the heart and soul of the Foundation.

Over the years Mariela has been involved with creating, planning and managing many of the Foundation's national and international educational programs. She has also assisted in editing several major research studies and virtually every significant piece of correspondence prepared by the Foundation's President, Steve Laws. She works closely with the Board of Directors and has responsibility for the annual board meetings and the organization and management of the National Speakers Conference.

Mariela is a graduate of Newcomb college of Tulane University, she and her husband have two adult children – Betty (a graduate of Smith College and Suffolk Law School) and John (a graduate of Union College and now serving as a pilot in the Air Force) – and a beautiful granddaughter, Kimberly Elizabeth.
The SLLF is governed by a board of up to 45 House Speakers, Senate Presidents, Majority Leaders, Minority Leaders, and Pro Tempores.

Directors are elected to three year terms and are eligible for reelection. Legislative leaders may be nominated for membership on the board by a current director or on the recommendation of the President.

The Board meets regularly to review all ongoing SLLF programs and policies, approve the annual operating budget, oversee all fiscal audits, and discuss future SLLF initiatives.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS 2012

CHAIR
Hon. Lois M. DeBerry
House Speaker Pro Tempore Emeritus
Tennessee

VICE CHAIR
Hon. Eric Turner
House Speaker Pro Tempore
Indiana

DIRECTORS

Hon. B. Patrick Bauer
House Minority Leader
Indiana

Hon. Roger H. Bedford, Jr.
Senate Minority Leader
Alabama

Hon. Sharon Weston Broome
Senate President Pro Tempore
Louisiana

Hon. Michael E. Busch
Speaker of the House
Maryland

Hon. John F. Campbell
Senate President Pro Tempore
Vermont

Hon. Al Carlson
House Majority Leader
North Dakota

Hon. Mike Chenault
Speaker of the House
Alaska

Hon. Matt Dean
House Majority Leader
Minnesota

Hon. Jeff Fitzgerald
Speaker of the House
Wisconsin

Hon. Gordon D. Fox
Speaker of the House
Rhode Island

Hon. Joe Hackney
House Minority Leader
North Carolina

Hon. Robert W. Harrell, Jr.
Speaker of the House
South Carolina
About Us

History
FAQ's
Board Of Directors
Staff
Advisory Council
Office Locations
Calendar

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
Altria Client Services, Inc.
American Beverage Association
American Traffic Solutions, Inc.
Amen
Archer Daniels Midland Company
Astellas Pharma US, Inc.
AstraZeneca
AT&T Corporation
Bentley Systems, Inc.
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
Brown-Forman Corporation
Chevron Corporation
Coca-Cola Refreshments
Comcast
Community Financial Services
Covanta Energy Corporation
CTIA
CVS Caremark
Diageo
Distilled Spirits Council of the United States
Entertainment Software Association
General Electric Company
GlaxoSmithKline
Google
Grocery Manufacturers Association
GTECH
IBM
IMS Health
International Paper
Intuit
JM Family Enterprises, Inc.
Kraft Foods Global, Inc.

LKQ Corporation
Mark Anthony Brands, Inc.
McDonalds Corporation
MedImmune, Inc.
Motion Picture Association of America
Motorola Solutions
National Beer Wholesalers Association
National Seating and Mobility
Nestle Waters North America
News Corporation
Novo Nordisk
Nuclear Energy Institute
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
Pernod Ricard
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers (PhRMA)
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Raytheon Company
Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA)
Reynolds American
SAS Institute
Security Finance Corporation
Target Corporation
The Carpet and Rug Institute
The Home Depot
The Procter & Gamble Company
TracFone Wireless, Inc.
Unilever United States, Inc.
United Health Care
United States Fireworks Safety Commission
Verizon
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Waste Management, Inc.
WE Energies
Wine Institute
This summer, sixteen US Legislative Leaders, thirteen of their European, Canadian, and Asian counterparts, representatives of the US business community, and special guests convened in Barcelona for SLLF’s 13th Annual Transatlantic Leadership Forum. Home of the extraordinary architecture of Antoni Gaudi, Barcelona is Europe’s 6th largest city and an economic powerhouse for the region.

The program, our first in Spain, was called “A Cry for Freedom: The Arab Spring and its Political Impact on the Mediterranean Region”. Hosted by Member of the Spanish Parliament Hon. Jordi XUCLÀ i COSTA, the agenda focused on the ‘Arab Spring’ and Catalonian regionalism. The participants from Catalonia hold a special appreciation for freedom and independence - Catalonia has won and lost its autonomy multiple times in its lengthy history. The discussions were sometimes intensely passionate. Participants from Egypt, for example, were critical of European and US policies towards the Middle East and said so. According to SLLF President Steve Lakis, the biggest issue - one that overrides all else with respect to policy in the region - is the Palestinian question. It’s difficult to envision progress on most other issues without a resolution to this seemingly intractable conflict.
Sixteen members of SLLF’s Board of Directors and several of its Advisory Council members gathered with leaders from across Europe in the chamber of the Irish Parliament to discuss the economy of Ireland and the future of the Euro and the European Union. The European Union and the Euro: Prospects for the Future brought together policymakers from across Europe and the United States with experts on the economies and politics of Ireland and the EU. The discussions were informative and spirited.

Dr. John Fitz Gerald from the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in Dublin painted a hopeful, but challenging picture of the future of the Irish economy. He noted that economic growth had been inspired by universal access to education in the 1960’s and free market expansion in the 1980’s, but now was being stymied by a housing bust and increased pressure on the nation’s social welfare network. He suggested that the Irish government has made the difficult, but correct choices, but would need to continue to make those hard choices to see the country through this region.

Ernst Wehlteke, former President of the Deutshe Bundesbank, argued that the Euro and the European Union would not only survive its recent crises, but would emerge stronger and more agile if we shift our focus from looking at causes of the crisis to working towards solutions. Those solutions should include increased transparency in the international banking system, stronger regulation of hedge funds and a better managed credit rating system that did not give NINJNA (No Income, No Jobs, No Assets) Loans.

The Hon. John Bruton, as a former Irish Prime Minister and EU Ambassador to the United States, brought a unique portfolio to his presentation. In leading a discussion of Europe and the United States, he suggested three key differences that define the relationship: expectations of government, confidence in the use of force to address international challenges and the importance of state sovereignty and autonomy. Further, he noted that the European nations and the United States have a mutual interest in the strength of the European Union. On Saturday, David Marsh of the London and Oxford Group and author of Europe and the European Union offered insights into where the EU came from and where it is going. Most interestingly, he indicated that because of different regional economic prospects, the future of the union may have to rely on two monetary units, one for Northern countries and one for Southern members.

In addition to these highly informative sessions, participants also enjoyed all that Ireland has to offer including a walking tour of historic Dublin, a trip to the countryside and a tour and dinner at the Guinness Storehouse. Perhaps the highlight of the trip was an official dinner in St. Patrick’s Hall of the famous Dublin Council (where England turned over power to Michael Collins in 1922 establishing Irish independence). It was, by all accounts, an amazing conference for one and all.
Rachad,
Attached is a quick compilation of information on Congressmen Grimm and McDermott. In particular you should read McDermott’s summary as it provides a few important insights. Thanks Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph: +1 202 887 1113
Fax: +1 202 887 1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Rep. Michael Grimm (R-NY)

Congressman Michael Grimm has represented New York’s 13th congressional district since January 2011. He is a supportive and active friend to Morocco. In February 2011 his Chief of Staff, Chris Berardini, met with Mouaad Ibriz and Jordan Paul to discuss US-Morocco bilateral relations. Chris has travelled to Morocco and is a key supporter of Morocco in Congress; the meeting was very positive. On November 29, 2011, Representative Grimm issued a statement congratulating Morocco on the region’s first free and fair parliamentary elections, and noted that he looks forward "to working with my counterparts in the new Moroccan Parliament to strengthen the historic US-Morocco bilateral relationship." In August 2011 he signed the Congressional letter to HM Mohammed congratulating him on the success of the July 1 referendum and welcoming the progress that the new Constitutional reforms will bring.

Rep. Jim McDermott (D-WA)

Congressman Jim McDermott has represented Washington’s 7th congressional district since January 1989. He met with a MACP Consultant from the Moffett Group in March 2011; the meeting notes indicate that it was neither positive nor negative.

We believe he was the only Member at the Moroccan American Coalition convention, held in Denver in 2008, and he had a great time. He loves Morocco and the community. Doesn’t have enough good things to say about them, although his floor statement below is damning of the government.

Mustapha Khalfi, currently the Minister of Comm. & Government Spokesperson, was a recipient of the Fulbright/American Political Science Association (APSA) Congressional Fellowship in 2006, and served as an intern for Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA), taking a course at Johns Hopkins University, and receiving a visiting scholarship at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Importantly, below is McDermott’s statement on the FTA in 2004, which is pretty damning of Morocco’s position on the WS.

Begin Congressional floor text:
United States - Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
By: Jim McDermott
Date: July 22, 2004
Location: Washington, DC

UNITED STATES-MOROCCO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT -- (House of Representatives - July 22, 2004)

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 738, I call up the bill (H.R. 4842) to implement the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, and ask for its immediate consideration.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the President and his Trade Representative say that the U.S.-Morocco free trade agreement is a good idea because it will strengthen our economic ties with moderate, I emphasize moderate, Muslim countries.

Well, first of all, two-way trade flow between the United States and Morocco is around a billion dollars a year. Morocco is a tiny economy with little economic significance. The U.S. Commerce Department indicated the trade agreement will have a negligible impact on trade and negligible impact on our economies.

Furthermore, while I recognize that King Mohammed VI has made great strides recently, particularly with regard to the rights of women, we should not forget two very important issues. One, Morocco is a monarchy and the king is deemed the country's religious leader. This FTA is really about strengthening ties with moderate monarchies; Jordan, Bahrain and others have preceded it.

There are dozens of Muslim countries that are vibrant democracies, Egypt, that we should have chosen to pursue trade agreements before we chose Morocco.

But, two, the way in which Morocco has handled the Western Sahara is really a stain on their nation. In 1975, when the Western Sahara went free from Spain, the Moroccans moved in immediately and said this is our country. It is a very, very wealthy country in natural resources. Both oil is being drilled for by Kerr McGee and other American and British companies, and the fishing industry off the coast is very proficient.

So before signing an agreement with them, with a nation that has been occupying a territory to which it has no legal claim for 25 years, a nation that has erected a 2,000-kilometer wall to keep the inhabitants of Western Sahara from fleeing, with a country that has no respect for the right of self-determination, we should have ensured that the area of Western Sahara was justly and peacefully resolved. It would have been a lever we could have used to get them to resolve this.

The U.N. has said you should have an election and they just never quite get around to having it for 25 years.

I am really pleased, however, that the chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the ranking member, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), have worked with me to insert language into the official committee documents to indicate that in no way does the free trade agreement cover trade investment in the Western Sahara.

The issue is this: If you drill oil in the Western Sahara and the Moroccans take it into Morocco, is it then eligible for tariff-free dealings with the United States? And the answer should be no, and there should really never have been a trade agreement until that legal claim was relinquished or we had some sort of agreement on all of this.

What we do have is a letter which the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts) inserted in the RECORD. I suspect I have one very similar to his but he will insert it also in the RECORD. I will include a letter from the Trade Representatives saying that in dealing with Morocco we are
dealing with Morocco as understood by the United Nations and the United States, and we are not using this as a kind of end-around to go out and get more oil.

One wonders why did we go to Morocco? What is it about Morocco? It is a little tiny country, very little trade with us. What is being done here that really needs to be done?

I think we need to protect the indigenous people of the Sahrawi who live in Western Sahara. They need to have the protection from this United States reaching in and taking their resources by the back door. I thank the chairman for bringing this issue to the floor.
OK, thanks. Good luck today. Ed

Thanks Ed,
Very useful for my meeting.
Congressman Grimm has just ask to postpone the diner, he has an urgent matter.
Rachad

On May 31, 2012, at 12:20 PM, Edward Gabriel wrote:

Rachad,
Attached is a quick compilation of information on Congressmen Grimm and McDermott. In particular you should read McDermott’s summary as it provides a few important insights. Thanks Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street, NW
Suite 411
Washington, DC 20005
Ph:  +1 202 887 1113
Fax:  +1 202 887 1115
Email:  ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website:  www.thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

<Grimm McDermott Notes.doc>
Rachad,

As you can see from this email, the State Legislators Group I sent you material on earlier in the week, are actually coming to DC June 6-13. If you can meet with them it would allow you to get a more complete understanding of their proposal. I would like to have Ralph or Justin attend the meeting as well so we would have some continuity on follow up. Let me know if you want to proceed and who and how? I've attached the doc sent to you in the last email. Thank you, Ed

From: Jean AbiNader [mailto:jabinader@moroccanamericancenter.com]
Sent: Friday, June 01, 2012 11:28 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: FW: The State Legislators are coming to DC Wednesday-Wednesday

Might be an opportunity for them to meet the Ambassador.
Jean

From: Ralph Nurnberger [rnurnberger@grayglobalstrategies.com]
Sent: Friday, June 01, 2012 11:21 AM
To: Jean AbiNader
Subject: The State Legislators are coming to DC Wednesday-Wednesday

Justin just called me. The heads of the legislator group that is considering holding their convention in Morocco will come to DC June 6 - 13. Might you (or Ed? someone from the embassy?--up to you) have time to meet with them?

I would not be available on June 6; open on June 7 after 10:30; although I need not be at such a meeting.

Thanks for considering this--hope this might work.

Ralph
To: The Honorable Edward Gabriel; Jean AbiNader
From: Justin Gray
Date: May 29, 2012
Re: Transatlantic Leadership Forum for the State Legislative Leadership Foundation

Ed and Jean,

The State Legislative Leaders Foundation (“SLLF”) recently reached out to me and asked for assistance in helping them organize their upcoming Transatlantic Leadership Forum. They have a specific interest in doing this next event in Morocco. In pursuit of planning and executing this event, they were hoping to meet with you and senior leadership from the Embassy. For your reference, below is a brief summary of SLLF.

About SLLF:

The SLLF was established in 1972 as a nonprofit corporation dedicated to working with state legislative leaders in their efforts to reform the institution of the state legislature. SLLF’s earliest funding derived from a multi-million dollar Ford Foundation grant which was earmarked for a seven-state pilot project known as The Program for Legislative Improvement. The seven states selected for this project included: Ohio, Colorado, Minnesota, Arizona, Louisiana, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Today, the SLLF is nationwide and has an advisory council of over 68 major U.S. companies.

SLLF seeks to educate and inspire our nation’s current and future state political leaders regardless of party, politics or ideology. SLLF gives these leaders regular opportunities to take part in university-based educational programs that focus on many of the critical issues of our day. SLLF programs are designed to give them a sense of the high value of public service and the vital role they, as elected representatives of the people, play in our democracy.

SLLF leadership programs seek to educate leaders on a wide range of issue areas with national and global importance. For example, prior SLLF leadership programs have focused on how state legislators can impact key issue areas such as: healthcare; education; innovation and entrepreneurship; technology; economic recession and recovery; environment and energy; digital literacy; and “democracy 2.0” using digital media. With the advent of digital media, SLLF has also taken a strong interest in how legislators can utilize new tools to engage the public and encourage civic participation. SLLF’s most recent program, which was held in Providence, RI this past May, was on the topic of restoring the people’s trust in government.

SLLF Transatlantic Leadership Forum:

SLLF is looking for a host country for its next Transatlantic Leadership Forum. The upcoming Transatlantic Leadership Forum will bring together a group of forty (40) to sixty (60) individuals composed of senior US State Legislative Leaders and their counterparts from across the globe, representatives of the US business community and special guests to discuss matters of global importance with an impact on politics, foreign policy and the economy. SLLF is flexible on dates to hold their next conference and would welcome suggestions as to what dates would be the optimal for the conference in Morocco. Past Transatlantic Leadership Forums have been held in Barcelona, Spain (July 2011) and Dublin, Ireland (August 2010). Attached is more detailed background on SLLF and the Transatlantic Leadership Forum.
STAFF

"The State Legislative Leaders Foundation staff is without equal. With an average tenure well over 20 years, each person brings tremendous experience, exceptional skills, and complete dedication to the job. They are an honor to work with and the successes and accomplishments we have enjoyed over those past 40 years are a celebration of their talents."—Stephen G. Laits

Stephen G. Laits
President

Stephen joined SLF in 1972 just after it was established and through the following decade honed his political skills by working directly with state legislative leaders across the country on a series of legislative reform studies. In 1981, the Board of Directors appointed him President and Chief Executive Officer.

Stephen created the blueprint for bringing political, business and academic leaders together on college campuses to examine critical public policy issues and aspects of leadership. Over the course of his tenure the SLF has grown into the preeminent nonpartisan legislative leaders organization in the land reaching Senate Presidents, Speakers of the House, Majority and Minority leaders, and future leaders, with its unrivaled university-based educational programs.

In addition to overseeing all SLF activities, he is a frequent speaker on legislative leadership, ethics, and legislative performance. He also has extensive experience in the international arena where he has organized scores of programs in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

Stephen received his BA in Political Science from the University of Bridgeport. He also attended graduate school at American University. He is married to the former Evalee Parent and is the proud father of four grown children, two grown stepchildren, and grandfather of two perfect girls.

Marda B. VanDeVoort
Executive Vice President

Marda VanDeVoort has been with the State Legislative Leaders Foundation since 2001 and has served as Vice President since 1998 and Executive Vice President since 2010. She is the heart and soul of the Foundation.

Over the years Marda has been involved with creating, planning and managing many of the Foundation’s national and international educational programs. She has also assisted in editing several major research studies and virtually every significant piece of correspondence prepared by the Foundation’s President, Steve Laits. She works closely with the Board of Directors and has responsibility for the annual board meetings and the organization and management of the National Speakers Conference.

Marda is a graduate of Newcomb College of Tulane University; she and her husband have two adult children, Betty (a graduate of Smith College and Suffolk Law School), and John (a graduate of Union College and now serving as a pilot in the Air Force) — and a beautiful granddaughter, Kinley Elizabeth.
The SLLF is governed by a board of up to 45 House Speakers, Senate Presidents, Majority Leaders, Minority Leaders, and Pro Tempores.

Directors are elected to three year terms and are eligible for reelection. Legislative leaders may be nominated for membership on the board by a current director or on the recommendation of the President.

The Board meets regularly to review all ongoing SLLF programs and policies, approve the annual operating budget, oversee all fiscal audits, and discuss future SLLF initiatives.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS 2012

CHAIR
Hon. Lois M. DeBerry
House Speaker Pro Tempore Emeritus
Tennessee

VICE CHAIR
Hon. Eric Turner
House Speaker Pro Tempore
Indiana

DIRECTORS

Hon. B. Patrick Bauer
House Minority Leader
Indiana

Hon. Roger H. Bedford, Jr.
Senate Minority Leader
Alabama

Hon. Sharon Weston Broome
Senate President Pro Tempore
Louisiana

Hon. Michael E. Busch
Speaker of the House
Maryland

Hon. John F. Campbell
Senate President Pro Tempore
Vermont

Hon. Al Carlson
House Majority Leader
North Dakota

Hon. Mike Chenault
Speaker of the House
Alaska

Hon. Matt Dean
House Majority Leader
Minnesota

Hon. Jeff Fitzgerald
Speaker of the House
Wisconsin

Hon. Gordon D. Fox
Speaker of the House
Rhode Island

Hon. Joe Hackney
House Minority Leader
North Carolina

Hon. Robert W. Harrell, Jr.
Speaker of the House
South Carolina
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Leader Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Hon. Bernie Hunhoff</td>
<td>House Minority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Hon. Tim Jones</td>
<td>House Majority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Hon. Martin M. Looney</td>
<td>Senate Majority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Hon. Fiona Ma</td>
<td>Assembly Speaker Pro Tempore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Hon. W. Ken Martinez</td>
<td>House Majority Floor Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Hon. Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr.</td>
<td>President of the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Hon. Terie Norelli</td>
<td>House Minority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Hon. Robert Nutting</td>
<td>Speaker of the House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Hon. John Oceguera</td>
<td>Speaker of the Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Hon. John A. Pérez</td>
<td>Speaker of the Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Hon. Dominic F. Pileggi</td>
<td>Senate Majority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Hon. Chip Rogers</td>
<td>Senate Majority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Hon. Calvin K. Y. Say</td>
<td>Speaker of the House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Hon. Michael Schneider</td>
<td>Senate President Pro Tempore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Hon. Gary Stevens</td>
<td>President of the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Hon. Joe Straus</td>
<td>Speaker of the House</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About Us

History
FAQ's
Board Of Directors
Staff
Advisory Council
Office Locations
Calendar

Advisory Council

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
Altria Client Services, Inc.
American Beverage Association
American Traffic Solutions, Inc.
Amgen
Archer Daniels Midland Company
Astellas Pharma US, Inc.
AstraZeneca
AT&T Corporation
Bentley Systems, Inc.
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
Brown-Forman Corporation
Chevron Corporation
Coca-Cola Refreshments
Comcast
Community Financial Services
Covanta Energy Corporation
CTIA
CVS Caremark
Diageo
Distilled Spirits Council of the United States
Entertainment Software Association
General Electric Company
GlaxoSmithKline
Google
Grocery Manufacturers Association
GTECH
IBM
IMS Health
International Paper
Intuit
JM Family Enterprises, Inc.
Kraft Foods Global, Inc.

LKQ Corporation
Mark Anthony Brands, Inc.
McDonalds Corporation
MedImmune, Inc.
Motion Picture Association of America
Motorola Solutions
National Beer Wholesalers Association
National Seating and Mobility
Nestle Waters North America
News Corporation
Novo Nordisk
Nuclear Energy Institute
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
Pernod Ricard
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers (PhRMA)
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Raytheon Company
Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA)
Reynolds American
SAS Institute
Security Finance Corporation
Target Corporation
The Carpet and Rug Institute
The Home Depot
The Procter & Gamble Company
TracFone Wireless, Inc.
Unilever United States, Inc.
United Health Care
United States Fireworks Safety Commission
Verizon
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Waste Management, Inc.
WE Energies
Wine Institute
This summer, sixteen US Legislative Leaders, thirteen of their European, Canadian, and Asian counterparts, representatives of the US business community, and special guests convened in Barcelona for SLLF’s 13th Annual Transatlantic Leadership Forum. Home of the extraordinary architecture of Antoni Gaudi, Barcelona is Europe’s 6th largest city and an economic powerhouse for the region.

The program, our first in Spain, was called “A Cry for Freedom: The Arab Spring and its Political Impact on the Mediterranean Region”. Hosted by Member of the Spanish Parliament Hon. Jordi XUCLÀ i COSTA, the agenda focused on the ‘Arab Spring’ and Catalonian regionalism. The participants from Catalonia hold a special appreciation for freedom and independence - Catalonia has won and lost its autonomy multiple times in its lengthy history. The discussions were sometimes intensely passionate. Participants from Egypt, for example, were critical of European and US policies towards the Middle East and said so.

According to SLLF President Steve Lakis, the biggest issue - one that overrides all else with respect to policy in the region - is the Palestinian question. It’s difficult to envision progress on most other issues without a resolution to this seemingly intractable conflict.
Sixteen members of SLLF’s Board of Directors and several of its Advisory Council members gathered with leaders from across Europe in the chamber of the Irish Parliament to discuss the economy of Ireland and the future of the Euro and the European Union. The European Union and the Euro: Prospects for the Future brought together policymakers from across Europe and the United States with experts on the economies and politics of Ireland and the EU. The discussions were informative and spirited.

Dr. John Fitz Gerald from the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in Dublin painted a hopeful, but challenging picture of the future of the Irish economy. He noted that economic growth had been inspired by universal access to education in the 1960’s and free market expansion in the 1980’s, but now was being stymied by a housing bust and increased pressure on the nation’s social welfare network. He suggested that the Irish government has made the difficult, but correct choices, but would need to continue to make those hard choices to see the country through this region.

Ernst Wehlteke, former President of the Deutshe Bundesbank, argued that the Euro and the European Union would not only survive its recent crises, but would emerge stronger and more agile if we shift our focus from looking at causes of the crisis to working towards solutions. Those solutions should include increased transparency in the international banking system, stronger regulation of hedge funds and a better managed credit rating system that did not give NINJNA (No Income, No Jobs, No Assets) Loans.

The Hon. John Bruton, as a former Irish Prime Minister and EU Ambassador to the United States, brought a unique portfolio to his presentation. In leading a discussion of Europe and the United States, he suggested three key differences that define the relationship: expectations of government, confidence in the use of force to address international challenges and the importance of state sovereignty and autonomy. Further, he noted that the European nations and the United States have a mutual interest in the strength of the European Union. On Saturday, David Marsh of the London and Oxford Group and author of Europe and the European Union offered insights into where the EU came from and where it is going. Most interestingly, he indicated that because of different regional economic prospects, the future of the union may have to rely on two monetary units, one for Northern countries and one for Southern members.

In addition to these highly informative sessions, participants also enjoyed all that Ireland has to offer including a walking tour of historic Dublin, a trip to the countryside and a tour and dinner at the Guinness Storehouse. Perhaps the highlight of the trip was an official dinner in St. Patrick’s Hall of the famous Dublin Council (where England turned over power to Michael Collins in 1922 establishing Irish independence). It was, by all accounts, an amazing conference for one and all.
Very good news from Congresswomen Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. See her letter to Hillary Clinton. Ed
June 8, 2012

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Madam Secretary:

I am writing to reiterate my concern over the lack of progress in resolving the current stalemate over the Western Sahara. Protracted United Nations negotiations over the Western Sahara have failed to produce substantive progress, while refugee camps nominally managed by the UN have persisted for decades, at the expense of over $1 billion from international donors. Reports also indicate that some activities in the camps may be contributing to regional instability.

I would appreciate your views as to what new actions (including offering relocation opportunities for those refugees who wish to do so) that the U.S. can encourage the UN to take to end this impasse, mitigate the refugee crisis, reduce the costs to the U.S. and international donors of the UN’s activities regarding Western Sahara, and seek a fair, just, and enduring solution to the status of the Western Sahara—which is the objective of the proposal for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty—in order to promote regional integration and protect U.S. security interests in the region.

Sincerely,

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Chairman
The information contained in this report is from a generally reliable source but has not been corroborated by third party sources.

(i) According to a Moroccan senior civil servant who attended sessions of the Morocco-Tunisia High Commission, chaired by the two countries’ Islamist prime ministers in Rabat on June 15, the Sahara question was raised in these meetings. Morocco's PJD, which until it came to power had little to say about the Sahara issue, now wants to place it at the heart of the government’s North Africa policy. Moroccan Prime Minister Benkirane told his Tunisian counterpart that the coming Maghreb countries summit, slotted for October 10, 2012 in Tunisia, will not have the desired outcome unless the countries of North Africa succeed in settling the Sahara conflict via the only viable option — that is autonomy for the territory under Moroccan sovereignty. Noting that the UN has not succeeded in imposing a solution, Benkirane argued that the Maghreb countries have to find a way to end the Sahara conflict. The Moroccans were surprised to find that Tunisia’s prime minister, Hamadi Jebali, appeared convinced by their approach, which would represent a major evolution in Tunisia’s traditional position of neutrality on the Sahara issue.

(ii) According to a journalist at the UN headquarters, where the Special Committee of the 24 on Decolonisation is currently looking into the Sahara conflict, Morocco has officially asked the UN Secretary General for a “assessment pause” in negotiations with Polisario. Talks will go nowhere as long as Polisario persists in rejecting everything and proposing nothing, argue the Moroccans. Moroccan diplomats hinted that without such an assessment, it would be “pointless” for their country to participate in a new negotiations session.

(iii) A member of Polisario’s national secretariat tells us that during their recent visit to Tindouf, a delegation of African foreign ministers (including those of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia) asked Polisario leaders, including Mohamed Abdelaziz, to keep a lower profile than usual at the African summit of July 9, 2012. According to the source, who expressed some concern at this development, members of the Polisario national secretariat interpreted this as a first step towards a reconsideration of Sadr’s position in the African Union.

(iv) According to a member of a Sahrawi NGO in Algiers who was present at the Sahrawi Martyrs Day commemorations in Tindouf, Sadr defence minister Mohamed Lamine Bouhali is working with his close aides on a reorganisation of Sahrawi armed forces and security services, aimed at shifting their focus from a doctrine of war and military operations against Moroccan positions to a strategy of “destabilisation” on the whole of Moroccan territory. The reason for such a shift is clear: Polisario no longer has the means to purchase weapons of war and Algeria is not disposed to assist it in procurement. Algeria no longer supplies Polisario with heavy war weaponry, providing only side arms used by security services and for policing purposes.

END

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Dear Team,

Below please find the May 2012 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

May 2012 Events Bulletin

May 7
Islamism and the Arab Spring

May 9
Crisis in the Sahel: Bitter Fruit of the Arab Spring

May 10
The Arab Awakening: Implications for al-Qaeda and the Future of Terrorism

May 10
Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East

May 11
Opportunities to Advance Human Rights Reporting

May 14
Is the Arab Spring Marginalizing Women?

May 15
Delivering Dignity in the Arab World through Political and Economic Reform
Islamism and the Arab Spring

Date: 7 May 2012

1. Title: Islamism and the Arab Spring
Hosted by Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the Reserve Officers Association

Participants:
Michael Doran: Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Samuel Helfont: Associate Scholar, FPRI; Ph. D. Candidate, Princeton University
Marina Ottaway: Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Eric Trager: Ira Weiner Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Tally Helfont: Moderator: FPRI

2. Overview

Despite the secular nature of many of the protest movements associated with the Arab uprisings, Islamist parties have swept democratic elections across the region, contributing to unease and uncertainty both domestically and abroad. US policymakers and analysts are divided thus far in their responses to this turn of events. How should the US deal with the new regimes that bear a distinctly Islamist character? What will be the state of US alliances in the new Middle East and North Africa and how will they affect core American interests in the region? It is critical for Washington to understand the individual groups that are gaining power in the Middle East and North Africa and to define its interests and goals in dealing with these new power holders. FPRI’s panel discussion addressed these challenges and their implications for US foreign policy.

3. Summary

Tally Helfont asked the panelists to address a few specific questions: What has the Arab Spring taught observers about the nature of Islamism? What are the Islamists’ objectives? What is the future of Islamism in the region? What does it mean to be a moderate Islamist?

Michael Doran replied that all of Ms. Helfont’s questions lead to one central concern: “Is Islamism a strategic threat to the US?” It is not, he concluded. Washington’s four vital national interests—free flow of oil, nuclear non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and protection of Israel—are not jeopardized by the emergence of powerful Islamist actors in the Middle East and North Africa. Oil is concentrated in the Gulf, which has proved very stable in comparison with the rest of the region. Some would argue that the Islamists’ electoral success represents a net victory for al-Qaeda, and thus a blow to US counter-terror operations. However, recent events have failed to disrupt the gradual trend of al-Qaeda’s political marginalization. The group finds a happy home in Afghanistan, failed states, and semi-failed states, but is willingness to kill fellow Muslims has pushed it to the periphery elsewhere. Local populations simply will not stand for this kind of violence, and the group cannot maintain a political foothold. Protection of Israel, Doran admitted, is a thornier subject. Mubarak was a staunch supporter of the Camp David Accords, but in his absence, the demilitarization of Sinai appears less certain. However, the Egyptian military is loath to engage in a war with Israel at the expense of its aid relationship with the US. Doran noted that his insights rest on the premise that the US doesn’t have a competitor for regional influence; if China, for example, decided to intervene and undermine American interests as the Soviet Union did in the 1950s, the situation would change radically.

Samuel Helfont focused on Islamism’s impact on regional politics. He divided the pre-Arab Spring Middle East into two camps: Pro-Western moderates supporting the status quo and the Islamists. Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and most of the GCC comprised the first bloc while Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and
Jordan comprised the second. Throughout the region, Islamists rebelling against their secular Arab governments have attracted mostly uniform responses, except in Syria, where rapidly-escalating conflicts have prevented shared interests from coalescing into a lasting alliance. The old Islamist bloc is breaking down. Tehran’s unwavering support for Assad has stressed its relations with former friends. Hamas and Turkey, for example, have alienated Iran as they shift support from Assad to the opposition. Iran’s actions have adopted a certain discontinuity, as it claims that the Arab Spring is its brainchild while simultaneously backing Assad. Many Gulf regimes are non-democratic autocrats like Assad, but they support the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. As the conflict in Syria persists, Helfont warned, it will be increasingly difficult for these groups to come together. Negative ripple effects will shape the future Middle East, and could create conflicts elsewhere. There is already a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Syria has stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. The US has a very strong interest in resolving this issue, or at least “keeping it at a simmer.” Washington’s only real option is to make its interests explicit. “We need to establish red lines, particularly concerning anti-terrorism and support for foreign wars.” The US cannot intervene militarily, but must be clear about what is and what is not acceptable to avoid any misunderstandings.

Marina Ottaway shifted the discussion to defining Islamism. Islamist movements are very much national movements, she explained. They share certain ideas and characteristics, but are specific to each country; there is no established consensus among them. She reflected on her personal exposure to Islamist groups: “A few years ago at Carnegie we held periodic meetings with leaders of various Islamist movements. We discovered that they were having similar internal debates without realizing it.” Some Islamists are democratic, like Turkey’s AKP, while others talk about establishing a Caliphate. The two principal Islamist groups that concern the US and its policy interests are the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Members of the Brotherhood are familiar with the political process and believe in democratic government. The Salafists, conversely, have traditionally avoided politics. They historically believed that a society must adhere to the tenets of the Qur’an and the Sunna, which stipulate obedience to the ruler. They are gradually entering the political arena and will most likely increase their presence in the coming years.

Throughout the region, the Islamists’ recent electoral successes can be attributed more to their organizational superiority and political experience than their ideology, Ottaway continued. In Morocco, for example, the PJD was the only party that released a comprehensive manifesto and followed an effective campaign strategy. The PJD organized people rather than “politicizing” them. Moroccan Salafists are also gaining support and political skills. In Tunisia and Egypt, for example, a palpable tension is growing between the Islamists and the secularists. They mix neither socially nor politically; the Islamists see the secularists as par of the old elite, and the secularists feel their interests and influence threatened by these new actors.

Eric Trager spoke briefly about various ideologies that characterize Islamists as a group and then argued that Egypt is the most important country vis-à-vis American interests. Liberalism is mutually exclusive with theocracy, and the basic tenet of Islamism is that Sharia should be implemented as the basis of law, Trager asserted. However, interpretations vary among different groups. Salafists seek to recreate the community during the time of the Prophet by directly implementing Sharia. The Muslim Brothers follow a broader interpretation of Sharia. They understand freedom as the freedom to live under religious law, and thus, see the secularists as oppressive. Both groups intend to craft political systems in which law derives from Sharia, which means that all political dialogue will arise from religion. This can only lead to a competitive theocracy, not a competitive democracy.

Trager then compared recruitment processes for the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. In Egypt, being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is not comparable to being a Democrat or a Republican in the US. The group imposes a very strict and rigorous recruitment system. All together it is a five to eight year process and prospective members are tested at every level. Those who eventually join the Brotherhood are very unlikely to leave it. Joining the Salafists, conversely, is much easier. One simply declares that he is committed to living according to the life of the Prophet and to follow a sheikh. The group is lacking a structured hierarchy; they are less organized and less political. The recruitment process clearly favors the Salafists, Trager concluded. If they are able to organize, they will be very successful politically. He concluded by reiterating that Egypt is heading toward a competitive theocracy between two very anti-American parties.

4. Q & A

Q: (Tally Helfont) Could each panelist briefly respond to the other panelists’ comments and give suggestions for future US engagement in the region?

A: (Doran) I agree with Eric’s refutation of Islamists as a homogenous group, but I do not think that the Salafists are capable of presenting a unified front or working toward a common strategic goal. They will fight amongst themselves, and with the Brotherhood, and in the end, they will hate each other more than they hate the US. In terms of American engagement, I agree with Sam. Washington’s priority need to be deciding on red lines and
making them perfectly clear. The US should also focus on Syria, where it has an opportunity to shift the balance against Iran.  

(Samuel Helfont) I also agree with Eric’s basic points, but I don’t think debating Sharia is productive from a policy standpoint. Sharia is used in the Arab world as a catch-all; it is comparable to being in favor of “freedom” here in the US and gives little indication of a group’s actual political concerns. Washington needs to focus on establishing red lines in terms of concrete policies rather than Sharia, which is so ambiguous. Regardless of whether or not policies are part of Sharia, we need to have a position on them.  

(Ottaway) I disagree with Eric. Some Islamists are looking to implement a version of Sharia that is consistent with 13th century interpretations of Islam, but it is impossible to define what it means to different Islamist groups. I also don’t agree with his description of the Muslim Brotherhood. A minority of the Brotherhood’s supporters actually went through the recruitment process. The US should not automatically take a hard line against Islamists, or jump to the conclusion that they will undoubtedly pursue policies antithetical to American interests.  

(Trager) Sharia can be interpreted many ways, but there are some critical sentiments. It is plausible that the Salafists will not be able to keep it together, and the Brotherhood does have many more supporters than members. However, this is due to their ability to organize. The groups within the Brotherhood are small and Islamist, and they show no signs of breaking off and creating new liberal factions. The US needs to maintain a certain realism about its communications with the Muslim Brotherhood.  

Q: What is the future of the Egypt’s Coptic Christians? Where can they go? Is it reasonable to expect them to go on living in Egypt?  
A: (Trager) Reliable figures about how many Coptic Christians have already emigrated are not available, but it is probably about 100,000. Wealthier Egyptians are considering moving to the US, Canada, or Europe. However, many are extremely poor and don’t have this option. Church burnings have exacerbated sectarian tensions and intensified fears of persecution and exclusion from the political process.  

(Ottaway) The position of the Copts was not great before the Islamists, and there are some positive developments that should be acknowledged. The Brotherhood made an effort to protect the churches on Christmas, so the Christians could attend services. Sharia was already the driving ideology behind Egypt’s constitution, and there is nothing in Sharia that stipulates depriving Christians of their rights. This question should be approached with an open mind; they could be fine.  

Q: Can you comment on economic concerns?  
A: (Doran) I think the state of affairs is not as disturbing as it may seem. These countries, especially Egypt, need things that only the US can provide. The Egyptian economy is on the verge of collapse and it desperately needs the support of the US. There are no external supporters waiting in the wings to replace US assistance. Anti-Americanism may appear prevalent, but this movement is really about changing Egypt. Our vital interests are secure for the most part.  

(Trager) Reserves are low and this presents a real problem. That the Islamists need Washington to bail them out will probably benefit US interests in the long run. So far they have held up an IMF loan, but that concerned an internal standoff with the military. At the end of the day, Egypt needs the US, and that will make any emerging leaders more receptive to American policy there.  

Q: How do you picture the region after 10 years of Islamist governance?  
A: (Ottaway) The Islamists will unquestionably lose votes in the next election. They cannot solve all of their countries’ problems. Whether or not a viable secular opposition will materialize is a different issue. They secularists continue to insult those they should be courting.  

(Trager) There is a benefit to ongoing competition, but the US should not want something for Egypt more than the Egyptians want it for themselves. The more Washington gets involved, the more American interests become a political foothold.  

Q: (Tally Helfont): Can you speak about developments that could jeopardize our military considerations?  
A: (Samuel Helfont) There is a proxy war in Syria between Iran and the Gulf States. If this escalates, Saudi arms could very well be used against Iranian troops in Syria. If chemical weapons go missing, there will be serious issues. Syrian refugees flowing into Turkey also present a troubling situation. Opposition forces are actively organizing within Turkey’s borders, and Syrian forces are staging open attacks in Turkey. Turkey could invoke article 5 of NATO, as they are technically under attack from a foreign country. If the US fails to respond, it would undermine the treaty.  

(Doran): The Obama Administration seeks to reduce its Gulf presence. A war in Syria, revolution or instability in Saudi Arabia, or an Israeli attack in Iran would all compel Washington to intervene. If the US fails to curb Iran’s nuclear aspirations, nuclear weapons could proliferate in the region, which would inherently change American military engagement there.
Q: Is establishing the Caliphate a unifying goal among Islamists?
A: (Doran) The Caliphate is more symbolic than an aspiration. It is like Americans wanting everyone to be free and rich.
(Ottaway) It’s like worrying about the Holy Roman Empire making a comeback, it isn’t going to happen.

Q: How far can Washington push Turkey to advance American interests with respect to the Arab Spring?
A: (Doran) As I said before, the Obama Administration wants to extricate the US from the region. The Arab Spring presents Washington with a strategic opportunity, and acting multilaterally will not suffice. The US needs to put together another “coalition of the willing” and work with the Turks, the Saudis, and the French. Assad is far from finished, and a prolonged period of violence and disruption in Syria presents strategic threats to surrounding countries such as Israel, Turkey, and Lebanon.
(Samuel Helfont) The US must be very clear with Turkey considering what it is willing to do. The Turks want to stop the inflow of refugees; if the US is not willing to help, Washington needs to leave no room for misunderstandings.
(Ottaway) The Turks have their own interests and will not help the US pursue its own.

5. Observation

This event was a webcast. The panelists focused on the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists as the two principal competing Islamist groups and only briefly touched on other parties like the PJD or Ennahda. Marina Ottaway argued that the PJD has been successful because they are effective organizers and skilled politicians, not Islamist ideologues. She suggested that Benkirane’s party will most likely lose votes in the next election, as other parties—including the Salafists—gain political experience. In terms of American foreign policy in the region, the panelists agreed that Washington must put forward coherent and concrete policies, clearly communicating its stance on various issues so as to avoid any misunderstandings. With the exception of Ms. Ottaway, they insisted that establishing “red lines” should be a principal tenet of US engagement in the region. Ms. Ottaway made an interesting point when she argued that a hard-line approach would not serve American interests and that Washington should approach these emerging actors with an open mind and willingness to collaborate.

Crisis in the Sahel: Bitter Fruit of the Arab Spring

Date: 9 May 2012

1. Title: Crisis in the Sahel: Bitter Fruit of the Arab Spring
   Hosted by the Heritage Foundation

   Panelists:
   Alexis Areiff: Analyst in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service
   J. Peter Pham, Ph.D: Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council
   Manoela Borges: Desk Officer for Mauritania and Mali, Department of State
   James Philips: Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs, The Heritage Foundation
   Morgan Roach: Moderator: Research Associate, The Heritage Foundation

2. Overview

As one of Africa’s least governed spaces, the Sahel region offers militant groups the advantage of operating with relative ease. Last year’s civil war in Libya, resulting in the demise of the Qaddafi regime, has exacerbated this longstanding problem. With a gaping power vacuum across the region, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and regional rebel and criminal groups have the opportunity to expand their influence. This poses significant security concerns not only for the region, but also for the United States. At this event, panelists discussed the implications the crisis in the Sahel on US foreign policy and provided recommendations on how the US should respond to this growing threat.

3. Summary

Morgan Roach opened the event by detailing the current crisis in Mali. She noted that the return of 2,000 armed
Tuaregs who had been fighting for Qaddafi in Libya exacerbated the ongoing conflict between the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the central government, which in turn led to the coup in Bamako. The situation in the North quickly descended into chaos as Azawad has been unable to assert leadership over the various actors in the region, including Ansar al-Dine, AQIM, and other independent criminal networks. The violence has caused thousands of civilians to flee, thus exacerbating a food and humanitarian crisis across the Sahel. Roach underscored that the situation in Mali threatens to distort regional stability and asked the panelists to provide their own assessment of the situation, as well as recommendations for US policy toward Mali and the Sahel.

James Phillips primarily analyzed events in Libya, arguing that what is happening in the Sahel is largely fallout from the conflict in Libya. The availability of arms from Qaddafi’s warehouses and the return of heavily armed Tuaregs to the region have bolstered dissident political and criminal movements, creating serious security problems. Phillips likewise detailed some of the primary actors operating in this zone of lawlessness, which in his estimation includes Libya. Although AQIM is one of weaker al-Qaeda franchises according to Phillips, it has been strengthened by its acquisition of Libyan weapons, including MANPADS. Phillips argued that AQIM is nevertheless limited in its attempts to spread across the Sahel because of its domination by Algerian Islamists. How its involvement in Mali plays out is yet to be seen – at present, it appears that AQIM is splintering into disparate groups, with some cells remaining dominated by Algerians, and others becoming more open to members from the Sahelian countries. Phillips’ primary recommendation was that the US must help the countries of the region reclaim missing Libyan weapons.

Dr. J. Peter Pham explored two primary issues: current challenges to states in the Sahel region and the current crisis in Mali. With regard to the former, he stated that there are three primary challenges to governance in the Sahelian countries. First, the weakness of state institutions and the prevalence of corruption present a serious challenge to governance in the Sahel. Second, internal divisions across the Sahel belt make it difficult for states to exert control over the entirety of their territory. In Mali, for example, there are divisions not only between the North and South, but also within the North between the “black” tribes (Fulani, Songhai) and the “white” tribes (Tuareg, Moors). Third, the radicalization of youth, due to a large demographic bulge and a lack of economic opportunities, presents a threat to the stability of these states.

Turning to Mali, Dr. Pham argued that the country is a failing, if not failed state. He drew three primary lessons from the current situation in Mali and provided a number of recommendations for confronting the current crisis. First, the primary lesson learned is that pragmatism is required in US policy responses because pragmatism is the primary strategy of groups operating in the North. Pham argued that experts should stop labeling groups under one grouping or another, such as “Islamist” or “separatist” or “nationalist” because doing so means making assumptions about their actions that limit our understanding of these groups. In the case of Mali, because experts had labeled groups as nationalist or Islamist, they assumed that they wouldn’t work together because they had different interests. In actuality, they did link up and work together toward a common cause because they had a pragmatic rather than ideological strategy. The MNLA didn’t have enough manpower despite the influx of Libyan weapons, so it turned to Iyad Ag Ghaly, a former Tuareg nationalist turned Salafist leader and founder of Ansar al-Dine, which in turn had connections with the former GSPC and current AQIM (Ghaly is the cousin of AQIM commander Hamada Ag Hama). Ghaly lent his support and thus a wall of separation between “nationalists” and “Islamists” came down. The MNLA nevertheless got more than it asked for, as Andar al-Dine has asserted its authority in Kidal and AQIM has done so in Gao and Timbuktu. Who has the upper hand now? According to Dr. Pham, it seems that the Islamists do. Sharia law and Islamic punishments have been imposed in Kidal and Gao. Likewise the recent burning of a Sufi mausoleum indicates that the Islamists are indeed in charge. Second, the diversity of ethnic groups and the divisions between them cannot be understated. Northern Mali is a scarcely inhabited place populated by a number of groups. Although Tuaregs represent the plurality of inhabitants, there are various militant groups operating in the region, both “black” vs. “white” as well as “Arab” versus “Islamist.” Third, the situation in Northern Mali is at the very least an indictment of US counterterrorism policy in the region. The situation happened so quickly that it calls into question US assistance efforts on security issues. There is nothing wrong with the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but the model must be questioned given recent events. Dr. Pham questioned how the Malian army fights terrorism when it is unable to control a counterinsurgency.

Given these challenges, Dr. Pham called for a long-term commitment to the Sahel, both for security assistance and development assistance. For Mali specifically, Dr. Pham stressed that there needs to be a commitment to stopping the crisis from spreading beyond its borders to other insecure states in the region, including Niger, Mauritania, Libya, and Algeria – all states that are facing instability and security threats. The borders in this region are fluid and it does not appear that there is a force capable of restoring the Malian government at this time, but the threat must be contained at all costs. Dr. Pham called on the US to work with ECOWAS and the African Union to reconstitute a legitimate government in Bamako and retrain the military. Only then can one think about addressing the situation in the North, where no one really knows who is in charge. Dr. Pham noted that resolving the conflict with the North will
be a multi-year endeavor and that in the meantime restoring order and leadership in Bamako is the most important thing that needs to be done.

Manoela Borges detailed current US engagement with Sahelian countries to address both the security crisis in Mali and the humanitarian crisis across the Sahel. The US is working to build the capacity of these states to handle threats on their own; however, the current capacity of these states to do so is low. The TSCTP helps with building security capacity, but more regional cooperation is needed. Although security threats to the Sahel are of concern to the US and its interests, Borges did highlight that because AQIM has not made threats against the US, the State Department is being extraordinarily careful to not “Americanize” the threat. In Mali specifically, State is pursuing diplomatic engagement at the regional level through ECOWAS, and the bi-lateral level through direct engagement with concerned countries. Borges reiterated Dr. Pham’s recommendation that the priority of the US is, as it must be, to restore democratic governance to Mali and establish a timeline for elections before turning to the North. Mali first needs a legitimate government in order to address longer-term concerns.

Alexis Areiff focused on US policy in the region. She noted that the Sahel has only become an area of concern to the US from a security perspective in the last decade; there has been a growing focus on the region because of the attacks of September 11th and the growing influence of the theory linking weak and failing states to terrorism, insecurity, and transnational security threats. Areiff expressed similar concerns to Dr. Pham as to the relevance of US counterterrorism policy in the aftermath of the coup in Mali. She posited, “Who are the US partners in the region if we can no longer work with militaries after they have led coups, such as in Mali, Niger, and Mauritania?” Debates over the US military presence are thus understandable. Areiff also mentioned that the US has competing policy objectives in the region – one the one hand it wants to work with democratically elected governments to counter terrorism in the region, but on the other hand, it wants to counter terrorism in the region with national partners to build their capacity – two issues that are not always in synch given coups in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Areiff questioned how viable the TSTCP policy was given its need for partner governments in the region.

4. Q & A

Q: (Roach) The Malian coup leader was trained by the US military. Do you have any comments or insights on the implications of this?
A: (Borges) Following the coup, the US undertook a policy review of all forms of assistance to Mali. We terminated security assistance and applied legal sanctions to the military following the review. We still have a policy hold on other forms of assistance, with the exception of humanitarian assistance and assistance for democratic elections. As for the military training of Captain Sanogo, the US trains future leaders in countries with very little capacity. This was an unfortunate coincidence.
(Pham) We need not paint everything with one broad stroke – we need more flexible policy vehicles for dealing with coups.

Q: (Daniel Moro, SAIS) What is your assessment of Algeria’s reaction to the situation in Mali?
A: (Areiff) The crisis in Libya pushed all of Algeria’s buttons. Algeria wasn’t helpful in promoting Western policy on Libya because it supported Qaddafi, feared a security vacuum, and opposed a NATO intervention on its borders. This was indicative of its reaction to the Arab Spring – just this weekend the Prime Minister called the Arab Spring a catastrophe. With regards to the security threat, Algeria has tried to marshal a regional response to terrorism, taking the leadership role with smaller Sahelian nations and excluding Morocco. But this has not always been welcome by Sahel states, which have a love/hate relationship with Algeria and its meddling. The threat to Algeria is nevertheless very real – the kidnapping of aid workers from the camps in Tindouf and the kidnapping of diplomats in Mali by the AQIM-splinter group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Africa (MUJAO), highlights how Algeria has been hit on all sides. I don’t, however, see a strategic response from Algeria.
(Pham) Algeria has been ambivalent. It has not yet been hit by the Arab Spring, which has affected all if its neighbors in various ways. There was a relatively peaceful revolution in Tunisia, a violent one in Libya, and Morocco tried to get ahead of the parade through reforms. Algeria’s response to regional issues is heavily influenced by its rivalry with Morocco, which obstructs not only counterterrorism cooperation but also economic integration, which is urgently required to address the security threats we have been talking about today. What is particularly interesting is that Algeria clearly doesn’t want an independent Azawad, but has for thirty years supported the creation of an “Azawad on the sea” while supporting independence for the Western Sahara.
(Borges) Algeria’s involvement in the region is complex, but very important. Its relationship with the Tuaregs and its mediation in previous Tuareg conflicts has been essential. The US is engaged with Algeria and ECOWAS to coordinate a response to the situation in Mali.

Q: (H.E.M. Maman S. Sidikou, Ambassador of Niger to the US) We have heard allegations of links between Boko...
Haram and AQIM and now are hearing reports that in addition to the presence of those two groups in Mali, there are reportedly Pakistanis and other jihadis arriving in Mali. What is al-Qaeda’s strategy for the region? We need to understand it in order for countries to provide solutions for themselves.

A: (Pham) AQIM’s strategy has two principal pillars. First, it uses the Sahel as a real base for its primary target – the Kabylie region in northern Algeria. It also uses the Sahel to bring in money for its aims by engaging in trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. Second, it wants to spread its ideology and bolster its connections with other armed groups. We have seen this in its links with Boko Haram. However, there have been divisions within AQIM. Some cells have been accused of being too interested in making money and not focusing enough on ideology. In detailing the reasons for its split, MUJAO has claimed both the AQIM was not extremist enough and that it was too Arab. So, what can be done? It will be a long-time before Mali is sorted out, so our priorities have to be about containing it. We need to prioritize resources to strengthen the government in Bamako.

(Arieff) This gets back to the pragmatism and the opportunism of different actors. AQIM has been opportunistic in getting involved in northern Mali. But it may have overreached by jumping in without much thought. We need to find a way to turn it into a setback.

(Borges) Every week is seems as though there are new groups popping up in Mali. We need to understand them in order to be able to develop an appropriate policy response.

5. Observation

Approximately 40 policymakers and regional experts attended the event at the Heritage Foundation. The panelists all discussed the current security crisis in Mali and the Sahel, echoing concerns about the fallout from the revolution in Libya that have been present in the media and in think tank circles for over a year. Although spreading the message about the importance of the Sahel and advocating for US engagement on this issue among a wider audience is always helpful, the panelists did not add much new to current thinking on the security threat in the Sahel, nor did they provide novel recommendations for how to confront it. The representative from the State Department provided the usual statement about all that the US is doing in the region in order to justify its actions to date. Interestingly, following Dr. Pham’s important reference and warning about the possibility of an Azawad on the sea in the Western Sahara, Borges appeared almost defensive about Algeria’s role and leadership on security issues in the region. Rather than weakening Algeria’s position in the region, it appears that the events of Libya and Mali have in fact strengthened it, at least in the minds of some policymakers, despite widespread acknowledgement of Algeria’s obstinacy to US interests in Libya and to a negotiated resolution of the Western Sahara.

The panel highlighted yet again that the threat of security in the Sahel is at last receiving widespread attention and that there is increased engagement from the think tank and policy community on the region. However, with the exception of Dr. Pham, no one acknowledged the obstacle of the Western Sahara to regional counterterrorism cooperation, nor did anyone recommend US efforts to promote Algerian-Moroccan cooperation. Areiff mentioned Algeria’s explicit decision to leave Morocco out of its regional counterterrorism initiative, but unfortunately did not detail the implications of that decision. The security argument alone is thus not enough to spur US action on the Western Sahara; it will need to be continually linked to the importance of regional counterterrorism cooperation and economic integration in order to be effective in promoting a resolution of the Western Sahara.

For a video of the event and a complete copy of the report, please visit: http://www.heritage.org/events/2012/05/crisis-in-the-sahel

(Back to top)
2. Overview

The Arab Awakening has raised a number of questions about the future viability of al-Qaeda in the region. Many analysts claimed that the revolutions that took place in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt were a blow to al-Qaeda’s ideology – mass protests resulting in regime change showed that civilians could affect popular change without violence. In addition, the presence and victory of Islamist parties highlighted that those seeking a greater role for Islam in the political space could do so through political parties and elections, rather than through terror. Others argued that the fall of governments that were strong allies in the global war on terror and the violence used to achieve some of these revolutions could only result in increased insecurity. Even if new governments are willing to take a hard line against Islamic terrorism, they are much weaker than their predecessors who ruled autocratically. At this event, expert panelists explored whether the Arab Awakening has marginalized al-Qaeda or whether it has presented opportunities, such as sectarian tensions, that it can exploit.

3. Summary

Jane Harman, President of the Wilson Center, introduced the event. She underscored that the threat of al-Qaeda is different, but that it is still out there. She likewise noted that the rise of Islamist parties as a “game changer.” Al-Qaeda’s polling number are currently very low and Harman posited that this was perhaps due to the success of Islamist political parties, who have shown that there is another way for people to express their views – through the political process.

Jon Alterman spoke first about al-Qaeda’s primary failure. The real threat of the organization was that it would go from the extreme fringe to the mainstream of Islamic thinking, capitalizing on popular dissatisfaction that was real and present. That has failed; al-Qaeda has been unable to win broad support. Why not? Alterman noted three primary reasons. First, it killed a lot of Muslims – more than non-Muslims in fact. Second, it never presented a positive agenda. Third, states linked up strongly against al-Qaeda, mobilizing the cleric establishment to delegitimize al-Qaeda’s Islamic message. Taking away its religious legitimacy was essential in limiting al-Qaeda’s mass appeal. However, because these latter efforts were state-led, what do you do now that these states have failed and popular grievances have not gone away? Alterman suggested that despite this primary failure, the durability of al-Qaeda’s ideas remain. He argued that there will not be an al-Qaeda insurgence as a global organization, but that its ideas will ensure on a smaller scale. For example, continued chaos in Syria and Yemen will boost al-Qaeda, but it will be forced to operate on a smaller scale because politics by and large has set al-Qaeda back. Alterman offered his conclusions on the legacy of all of this. For one, the Arab Awakening signifies the demise of Salafi jihadism. However, it also signifies the end of Salafi “quietism.” Previously, those Salafis who were not involved in terrorism stayed out of politics and avoided criticizing the ruler because of an unspoken agreement between the clerics and the state. The Arab Awakening has changed that agreement and now the Salafis engage in politics and criticize leaders. The rise of Salafi politics may thus be the long term impact of al-Qaeda.

Barak Barfi talked about al-Qaeda’s challenges and opportunities as a result of the Arab Awakening and then focused on the specific case of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Barfi stressed that al-Qaeda’s propaganda against rulers no longer holds because the Arab Awakening has proven that change can come about without violent rebellions. Al-Qaeda has thus suffered setback in the short-term. Barfi cautioned, however, that in the long-term, al-Qaeda might benefit from inevitable political and economic problems that result from the potential failings of democracy. He stressed that democracy is not a cure all and that will be a gap between expectations and realities in many countries that have experienced a transition – this gap will be a recruiting tool from al-Qaeda. Barfi also warned that many Salafi scholars argue that Islam is not compatible with democracy and that Islamist groups are in fact using their current power to create constitutions based on sharia law. If they fail do so, al-Qaeda will again have a raison d’être.

Turning to its regional affiliate in North Africa, Barfi argued that the political arena AQIM works in differs from that of the other affiliates. Although its home country of Algeria has not been impacted by the Arab Spring, it has still had to grapple with its outcomes. It is nevertheless well-placed to benefit from insecurity and instability in North Africa because AQIM exploits ungoverned spaces and conflict zones. The crisis in northern Mali, an area that has never known government because it is simply too large of a space to govern, illustrates the potential of al-Qaeda, which is now out of hiding and operating in plain sight in Timbuktu. Barfi nevertheless sees a silver lining in the Mali coup:
Amadou Toumani Touré was never really a strong supporter of the global war on terrorism against AQIM and there were allegations that some senior officials were involved in drug trafficking and smuggling operations with the group. Touré's government likewise never had a strategy for dealing with the Tuaregs. While the situation is too much in flux to make predictions, there is the potential to have a stronger counterterrorism ally in Mali as a result of the coup and subsequent chaos.

Daniel Byman expressed concern with the "good news story" experts have been telling about counterterrorism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and cautioned that counterterrorism efforts may in fact suffer because of the revolutions for three primary reasons. First, as governments are changing, there is the potential for less counterterrorism cooperation. For example, Egypt is much more focused on other threats to the regime that it is on cooperation with the United States. Second, new governments are weaker than their predecessors, who ruled with an iron fist and enforced order at the expense of liberty. It is not yet evident that new governments will be as able to enforce order and thus limit the impact of small extremist groups. Third, it's possible that the transitions will fail and that people may be willing to try alternative means of political change. Byman argued that people may feel that they tried the political process and failed and therefore turn to more radical means, as was the case in Algeria. Thus, while the al-Qaeda core is weakened, the power of the affiliates is growing at a local and regional level. These affiliates have the potential to exploit the Arab Spring and tap into some of the inevitable failings of the Arab Spring revolutions.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross presented a study he completed on al-Qaeda statements during the Arab Spring. Recognizing a critical gap in Western understanding of al-Qaeda's reaction to the Arab Spring, Gartenstein-Ross sought to understand whether the Arab Spring had strengthened or weakened al-Qaeda. The study found a surprising amount of agreement among jihadi observers of the Arab Spring, likely because it only assessed the first year. Gartenstein-Ross predicted that this would not be the case in the years to come, but that nevertheless the study provided a number of themes important for our understanding of al-Qaeda today. First, jihadi observers viewed the Arab Spring as a pan-Islamic uprising, which is spreading because Arab leaders failed. This is a good thing in their minds. Second, there was broad agreement about the geopolitical implications of regime change: US influence in the region is weak or at least on the decline; America is a bad ally (ex: Mubarak); the Arab Spring is a strategic setback for Israel; surviving apostate regimes are the biggest losers of the Arab Spring; and the clergy that supported these regimes have been de-legitimized. Third, al-Qaeda and the jihadi movement will gain from the Arab Spring. Statements indicate that al-Qaeda expects greater freedom of mobility under new regimes, both because they are not as repressive and because they will not be able to control territory as effectively. Fourth, al-Qaeda is aware of its need for a strategic response to the Arab Spring. In conclusion, the study revealed that al-Qaeda does not view the upheaval as a death knell and that it is optimistic about its ability to capitalize on it.

4. Q & A

Q: (Hoffman) Could al-Qaeda exploit sectarian tensions in the region?
A: (Byman) This is a double-edged sword. The core wants to focus on the United States and on overthrowing governments, but among the affiliates, sectarian tensions matter more. It could drive affiliate groups in a way the core has resisted, but it’s risky.
(Barfi) It could lead to a backlash – al-Qaeda's killing of Muslims is one of the primary reasons why people have turned against it.

Q: (Oxford Analytica) Are you concerned about the institutionalization of terrorism because of the presence of Salifis in power?
A: (Alterman) Salafi politics is based on populism, rather than violence. Salafi parties want to make Islam a total part of people’s lives. What is concerning, however, is the rise of anti-intellectual trends and intolerance among Salafi groups.
(Gartenstein-Ross) I’m not concerned about groups in government turning to violence, but whether or not they will shelter violent groups or actors. If those governments fail, it may strengthen al-Qaeda. In that case, Islamists may argue that the revolutions didn't go far enough and were in fact only a half-measure. Likewise, if there are no real changes in these governments, we may see violence; Islamist parties have made electoral gains, but if they have no real power, as happened in 1991 Algeria, they may resort to violence.
(Barfi) We are starting to see important terrorist leaders entering into politics - putting down their guns to campaign. It will be harder for some terrorist groups to continue to be against participating in politics when their leaders are. However, this could also create vacuums for more extreme groups to operate. This was the case in Gaza. When Hamas joined the political process, other, more extreme Salafist groups emerged on the street.

Q: (Wilson Center) How will al-Qaeda central respond to movements among its affiliates?
A: (Hoffman) As discussed, there are opportunities for the affiliates to exploit and capitalize on instability in the
Middle East and North Africa. How al-Qaeda central is able to capitalize on their movement is unclear. But, the global war on terror is going to be important for at least the next decade.

Q: (Hoffman) Where will al-Qaeda as a movement be in the next ten years?
A: (Alterman) It will be its set of ideas that lasts. It will be harder to find the center and hard to stamp out.
(Byman) A lot depends on whether or not it is given a cause like it has been given before [Iraq]. Al-Qaeda has made mistakes, but it is a learning organization.
(Gartenstein-Ross) It will be influence by global trends like the increasingly common presence of weak and failing states and increased resource scarcity. But, al-Qaeda will only continue to present a robust regional challenge, not a strategic challenge.
(Barfi) It is going to come down to the affiliates to take the mantel from al-Qaeda central and the old generation. We may even see the creation of new affiliates – for example in Syria. If the West doesn't get involved, the jihadists will step in.

5. Observation

Approximately 30 policymakers and experts attended the event, including Jane Harman, the President of the Wilson Center. Her presence indicates that the issue of terrorism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is a core area of interest for the Wilson Center. Unfortunately, the speakers focused primarily on al-Qaeda central and not on affiliates operating in the region where the revolutions of the Arab Spring took place. With the exception of Barfi’s discussion of AQIM, panelists did not provide insight on al-Qaeda’s future in North Africa. Likewise, they did not provide any recommendations on how to engage new governments on counterterrorism cooperation. While it’s obvious that the implications of the Arab awakening on al-Qaeda’s operation is not yet clear, a discussion on moving forward with US counterterrorism policy would have been helpful, particularly for our issue. The panelists were nevertheless all well-informed and Barfi in particular may be potential new resource for MAC on security issues.

For a video of the event, please visit: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-arab-awakening-implications-for-al-qaeda-and-the-future-terrorism

(Back to top)
establishing street-level security and disarming militias to ministerial reform and transitional justice. Yet, across the region, transforming the mandate and institutions of the security forces and regulatory bodies that oversee them will be a vital step toward establishing peace and democratic rule. For the USIP Center of Innovation for Security Sector Governance 3rd annual conference, current practitioners, government leaders, and former ambassadors gathered to discuss the pressing question of security sector reform in North Africa and the Middle East.

3. **Summary**

Panel 1:

Dr. Radwan Masmoudi addressed the crucial balance between justice and stability, a vexing goal for all post-revolutionary states. Those who served the regime in a brutal capacity must be punished, but in a way that avoids igniting a civil war. Furthermore, the skilled bureaucrats who served the regime in isolation from its corrupt practices must be integrated into the new government in order to preserve precious talent.

Madga Boutros argued that an overlooked component of the Egyptian revolution has been a popular repudiation of the security apparatus, comprising the police, the military, and the intelligence services. The primary goal of activists, she said, is to increase accountability within the security services while limiting their role in Egypt’s political economy. As part of a civil society group dedicated to passing security reform legislation through the new parliament, Boutros confirmed that the SCAF wishes to hand over power to a new president, provided the generals are allowed to preserve the military’s interests in manufacturing and natural resources. Boutros concluded with a warning that economic development and democracy could follow only in the wake of security sector reform.

Dr. Murhaf Jouejati insisted that the Syrian National Council’s priority was not the fall of Bashar al-Assad, but the cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, he discussed the kinds of challenges that would face Syrians should Assad’s regime implode. Priorities would include securing Assad’s biological and chemical weapons; corralling the remnants of the Baathist regime and its allies in the security services; stopping any looting; and shrinking the army into a small, disciplined, apolitical force whose sole function is to safeguard the sovereignty of Syrian territory. Jouejati was adamant that the most important reforms depend upon a total change in mentality in that the Syrian people must begin to see their government as accountable before meaningful progress can be made.

Najla Elmangoush played an integral part in the Libyan revolution and she recounted the enormous impact of propaganda on the evolution of hostilities. Turning to security sector reform, Elmangoush expressed concern that Qaddafi loyalists, some of whom fled Libya, continue to actively destabilize the country. Despite a dire need for coordinated security forces, militias and other armed groups continue to clash at the local level. Thus, Libya’s most pressing problem is one of integrating militants and former rebels into a unified military and police command.

Hesham Sellam reiterated that Hosni Mubarak’s old security apparatus remains intact and largely shielded from security sector reforms. He expressed skepticism that a new president would be able to rein in the security ministries, particularly when considering the fact that a new parliament did very little to weaken the SCAF. Consequently, many activists favor a full focus on making the military, police, and intelligence services more transparent and subservient to civilian leadership.

Panel 2:

The second panel began with the former Ambassador to Tunisia, Rust Deming, who is convinced that a prerequisite for the overthrow of any autocratic government is a politically motivated, economically empowered middle class. Yet Tunisia, with its famously vibrant middle class, had until recently failed to make that transformation. Deming found that government officials provided two arguments against a full-fledged democratic reform program: 1) caution and a slow pace would avoid a collapse of the transition process; 2) a democratic government would inevitably empower Islamists. According to Deming, the attacks of September 11, 2001 only vindicated these fears, which may or may not have been an excuse to avoid any reform at all. In addition, the Ben Ali’s had massive commercial interests that might be damaged by democratic reforms, and Ben Ali himself fretted over the persecution he may face should he relinquish power. Thus, Deming left his post in Tunisia wondering when some sort of revolution might occur. When it finally did, Deming observed that Ennahda appeared to be the only party structure with deep roots, that young people were quickly alienated from the political process, and that the security services were rendered dysfunctional. Despite this, Deming remained optimistic that Tunisians could draft a constitution, reconcile religious freedom with a free press, employ underutilized graduates, and initiate a national reconciliation process to reintegrate valuable technocrats from the old regime.

Serving US Ambassador to Kuwait, Deborah Jones asked why those nations that are party to the Gulf Cooperation...
Council (GCC) have yet to experience the same widespread upheaval seen in Tunisia or Syria. She acknowledged that US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as President Obama’s “abandonment” of Hosni Mubarak set off alarm bells in Riyadh and Kuwait City, where monarchs wondered how far such activism might extend. Their response was to quell unrest in Bahrain and court partnerships with close American allies, including Morocco and Jordan. Jones cautioned the audience against assuming that the people of the Gulf want an Egypt-style uprising. Many of them see royal families as having distributed wealth and improved access to housing and education—this relationship between the rulers and the people forms one of the most important institutions among the GCC nations.

Former Ambassador to Morocco Thomas Riley framed the issue of security sector reform in terms of North Africa’s broader, long-term problems: high unemployment, the youth bulge, and a lack of opportunity. According to Riley, ignoring the underlying economic challenges will directly undermine all other efforts. He noted that those nations with extensive resources, such as Algeria or Saudi Arabia, are simply buying time until the day when their oil and gas disappear, at which point they will have to provide fulfilling employment opportunities to their people. Without investment in economic diversification and education, however, such governments might find themselves toppled. Riley complained that the US repeatedly fails to follow up on political or economic programs with audits to determine their effectiveness, and encouraged local populations to push for more oversight.

Former Ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine recalled that before Ben Ali stepped down in Tunisia, planning was already underway in Yemen to launch demonstrations and bring the government into paralysis. Yet even after Ben Ali’s regime fell, events in Yemen defied expectations, as successive “turning points” failed to push out Saleh and his coterie. Bodine detailed how the security service essentially split into three groups controlled by their respective families. The resulting stalemate produced a distinctly Yemeni approach to the problem, complete with long, extended, somewhat theatrical negotiations. Bodine thought the Yemenis were wise, once an agreement was brokered, to schedule a referendum that could signal a clear break with the past. This was essential, for one of Saleh’s closest advisers served in a transitional role. Moving on to Yemen’s acute security crisis in the South and North, Bodine thought any political settlements with the Houthi rebels would have to wait until the new government had established bona fides with the majority of the population. She concluded by warning US policymakers not to overemphasize the counter-terror aspects of US-Yemen relations. In the near-term, the regular armed forces will be unable to handle al-Qaeda or the Houthi, and the US must examine other development-centric approaches to quelling extremism. For Yemen, al-Qaeda is increasingly a counterinsurgency matter, and it would be a mistake for the US to remain wholly focused on counterterrorism.

4. Q & A

Q: Does the US legacy of supporting authoritarian regimes hinder it in establishing effective relations now?
A: (Jones) Those of us sitting in our positions as of February 2011 got an earful from host governments on our fecklessness. In Kuwait, there was great concern, as stability is a critical factor for any country that relies on exporting a resource to survive. When we went into Iraq, we actually caused a bit of a transformation in the GCC states—a problem that was previously approached through cooperation with non-government actors became dominated by security considerations and concern for domestic stability above all. Obviously we have long faced a tension between our economic interests and our moral obligations, but the best thing we can do is to focus on pragmatic programs that will help states develop.

(Riley) The answer is yes. But I would make an observation, which is that in Tunisia, Wikileaks actually improved many people’s perception of the US because all of a sudden they had clear evidence that US officials were accurately reporting on corruption and that they understood what was really going on. So with that unexpected transparency also came the fact that we were not being fooled by these governments.

(Bodine) Over the last decade, our attention was so focused on security that we lost the rhetoric of development and governance, and in many places we lost the programs on development and governance. If we return to having a security-centric approach, and we miss these two other factors, that is how we will be judged going forward.

Q: In Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, the security institutions are large and entrenched, whereas in Libya and in Yemen the problem is the opposite. So what is the biggest problem these countries face?
A: (Bodine) Libya and Yemen actually face very different security sector reform issues. In Libya you have freestanding militias that must be integrated into a newly created defense and security system. In Yemen, there are existing units that must be reformed and restructured, but we are not building from the ground up.

5. Observation

The event was attended by over 100 representatives from US government agencies, NGOs, and foreign governments. All of the speakers agreed that security sector reform is vital if Arab nations are to move forward with economic liberalization and a broader political transformation. Unfortunately, the recommendations were extremely
vague, and no speakers gave any details on exactly how security sector reform is to take place when the most powerful institutions in most of these nations are, in fact, the security services. In places like Yemen and Libya, where the military is a weak institution, where is the body capable of controlling disparate militias? Ambassador Riley stated that the most important pressure comes from the bottom up because it is difficult for military leaders who are trying to appear nationalist to ignore the cries of millions. However, we have seen massive demonstrations in Egypt in past weeks that suggest the military does not give in easily when it comes to issues about which it cares deeply.

**Opportunities to Advance Human Rights Reporting**

Date: 11 May 2012

1. **Title:** Opportunities to Advance Human Rights Reporting  
   Hosted by the Fund for Peace

   Participants:
   - **Mark P. Lagon:** Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, Council on Foreign Relations; International Relations and Security Chair, Master of Science in Foreign Service Program, Georgetown University
   - **David Keyes:** Executive Director, Advancing Human Rights
   - **Jean AbiNader:** Senior Adviser, Moroccan American Center
   - **Krista Hendry:** Moderator: Executive Director, the Fund for Peace

2. **Overview**

   As the global human rights discourse evolves to confront today’s challenges, there continue to be a number of limitations in the capacity of organizations to effectively promote and protect human rights throughout the world. These limitations include weak global compliance, uneven regional efforts, and the inability of human rights organizations to apply punitive measures or provide technical advice to actually address human rights violations, rather than just highlight them. Too often organizations may find themselves investing significant time reporting on human rights at the expense of concrete programs that can turn rhetoric into real, positive change. In addition, the global human rights discourse continues to be challenged by those that argue that universal reporting fails to take into account local cultures or social values, and treats open countries more harshly than closed nations. As a result, while the global human rights movement has achieved much success in promoting a human rights culture through international treaties, laws, and institutions, progress in the implementation of human rights norms across the world has been much more limited. This event explored the current challenges of human rights reporting with the aim of developing practical recommendations on how to translate an increased awareness of norms into effective implementation.

3. **Summary**

   Krista Hendry opened the event by explaining that although the Fund for Peace primarily focuses on underlying conditions of conflict, human rights are both a condition of conflict and a symptom of conflict, so the topic is an essential part of its work. Presenting the topic of the panel discussion, she asked two questions: are human rights organizations doing reporting accurately enough? Are they doing enough to implement human rights and put reporters and monitors out of jobs?

   Mark Lagon discussed the conclusions of a recent CFR report on human rights reporting and implementation. The report assessed how global institutions are doing overall in promoting and protecting human rights. It found that overall there is heightened attention and discussion of human rights, but uneven regional efforts. Implementation also lags way behind, as the focus remains on treaties and norm creation, which are overemphasized. Lagon noted that monitoring is broad and deep and that there is increasing peer-based security of human rights violations. Capacity building nevertheless remains a real problem and more effort is needed to realize human rights, not just talk about them.

   Turning to more specific conclusions, Lagon noted that there has been a recent backlash on freedom of expression throughout the world as well as against other political and civil rights. In addition, there has been a skewed dialogue
about some rights at the United Nations and there thus needs to be a rebalancing of rights. On the positive side, the report found that the business community is becoming involved in human rights promotion and protection beyond corporate social responsibility because the community is at last realizing it is in their self-interest.

Lagon made several recommendations. First, more needs to be done to empower regional organizations, NGOs, and civil society to act. Second, inter-governmental organizations need to focus more on technical assistance and implementation. Third, the global architecture at the UN needs to be refined, particularly the Human Rights Council. Fourth, the system needs to be less uptight on economic and social rights. Fifth, democracy and human rights are not separate and one of the most important things the international community can do to promote human rights is to bolster democratic institutions. Finally, there is plenty of human rights reporting and monitoring of varying quality, and more attention needs to be paid to economic and social rights.

David Keyes spoke about the philosophy of his organization, Advancing Human Rights, with a quote from famed Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky, which emphasized the role of democracy in promoting human rights and the distortion created by treating open and closed societies as equal when assessing human rights. Advancing Human Rights thus works for a clear and compelling focus on human rights violations in closed societies.

Keyes provided a number of examples of this contradiction in human rights reporting. For example, the UN Human Rights Council has nations like Saudi Arabia assessing human rights in democracies, something that Keyes and others believe undermines the Council’s legitimacy. He also noted that the largest human rights group in the world did as many reports about Israel during the last year as it did about Libya, Syria, and Iran combined, further undermining their human rights reporting. Turning to misconceptions about the disparity between human rights reporting in open versus closed societies, he argued that the US would not lose credibility by reporting on totalitarian societies. Likewise, the argument that human rights organizations need to be even-handed in reporting on democracies and dictatorships is a fallacy. It is easier to focus on open societies because it is difficult to get information from closed societies. Human rights organizations likewise argue in favor of the idea that open societies are “low-hanging fruit” for improvement. For the former argument, Keyes stressed that this is less true given new online tools available. For the latter, he argued that this argument is simply not sufficient. Human rights organizations must therefore shift their focus to closed countries, arguing that they no longer have an excuse to say they weren’t aware of the violations. Keyes called for a return to the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a renewed focus on the individual.

Jean AbiNader provided insights from an ongoing study about human rights reporting across North Africa. The study examined ways to advance human rights reporting by looking at North Africa as a case for what works and what can be done better. The study is also examining if a regional analysis of human rights would be helpful. AbiNader underscored that a case study on North Africa was particularly timely given the events of the Arab Spring. Many experts have expressed qualms about human rights under Islamist-led governments. AbiNader questioned how these new governments were going to approach human rights and the distortion created by treating open and closed societies as equal when assessing human rights. Advancing Human Rights thus works for a clear and compelling focus on human rights violations in closed societies.

Keyes provided a number of examples of this contradiction in human rights reporting. For example, the UN Human Rights Council has nations like Saudi Arabia assessing human rights in democracies, something that Keyes and others believe undermines the Council’s legitimacy. He also noted that the largest human rights group in the world did as many reports about Israel during the last year as it did about Libya, Syria, and Iran combined, further undermining their human rights reporting. Turning to misconceptions about the disparity between human rights reporting in open versus closed societies, he argued that the US would not lose credibility by reporting on totalitarian societies. Likewise, the argument that human rights organizations need to be even-handed in reporting on democracies and dictatorships is a fallacy. It is easier to focus on open societies because it is difficult to get information from closed societies. Human rights organizations likewise argue in favor of the idea that open societies are “low-hanging fruit” for improvement. For the former argument, Keyes stressed that this is less true given new online tools available. For the latter, he argued that this argument is simply not sufficient. Human rights organizations must therefore shift their focus to closed countries, arguing that they no longer have an excuse to say they weren’t aware of the violations. Keyes called for a return to the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a renewed focus on the individual.

Jean AbiNader provided insights from an ongoing study about human rights reporting across North Africa. The study examined ways to advance human rights reporting by looking at North Africa as a case for what works and what can be done better. The study is also examining if a regional analysis of human rights would be helpful. AbiNader underscored that a case study on North Africa was particularly timely given the events of the Arab Spring. Many experts have expressed qualms about human rights under Islamist-led governments. AbiNader questioned how these new governments were going to approach human rights and how they would define it. Based on a central tenet of his report about life (individual rights), liberty (collective rights), and the pursuit of happiness (economic and social rights), AbiNader noted that it seems that at present the focus of many uprisings is on economic rights as countries work to confront basic problems of health, education, and jobs. This seems to likewise be the focus of the US response to the Arab Spring, which has been based on economic aid rather than demands for political reconciliation or justice.

These competing challenges are a real concern in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and underscored two primary concerns about human rights reporting that emerge from the study. First, AbiNader stressed that human rights reporting is done from a Western perspective, assuming the universality of human rights. AbiNader argued that organizations should look at human rights in context, if only to help countries better promote human rights within the unique set of circumstances defined by their countries laws, institutions, customs, and societies. Second, the study revealed that although democracies are a guarantor for human rights, it isn’t clear whether or not democracy is the only political system that can effective protect human rights. In conclusion, AbiNader recommended that human rights organizations take context into account when assessing human rights in order to better inform responses according to local, often competing priorities. He also emphasized more capacity building in order to move from rhetoric to implementation.

4. Q & A

Q: (Hendry) There seems to be a debate between the panelists about whether or not human rights and democracy go hand in hand. What are the ways in which you can best protect human rights?
A: (Lagon) They are not one and the same – it’s like a chicken and egg type situation. But democracies mean more
than elections – they mean the creation of real institutions that protect the rights of citizens and a flexibility in
governing so that governments can incorporate the will of pluralistic groups. It is in that sense that democracies
best protect human rights.

(ABI NADER) Compare, for example, Tunisia and Morocco. Our study found that Morocco, a monarchy, was a better
guarantor of religious dialogue, human rights, and civil unity than say Tunisia where the leader [ben Ali] was
"elected."

(KEYES) I am a believer in unalienable rights, but these rights will look different in different places. It won’t always
look exactly like in America, but that’s okay.

Q: (Robert Holley, Moroccan American Center) I have never been fond of democracy promotion efforts because
democracy is a process, just as human rights is a process. It takes time to get from A-Z and while you have to
judge progress, you should do so in a way that helps the process rather than criticizes it, particularly since there is
always misinformation that ends up getting included. Governments are not the only ones adept at disinformation
and misinformation; local political actors are also good at that. What do you do to sort out information from
disinformation and misinformation?

A: (KEYES) It is the hardest part of my job. Distilling information is difficult, particularly in the internet age where it’s
almost impossible. I don’t have a comprehensive answer to your questions, but we rely on word of mouth to build a
network of people will trust and hope that the power of the people will come across

(HENDRY) Triangulation of data is how we do it. Polls and blogs can lie, but if you compare the information across
various sources, it is at least a start. We also work to build local capacity to get information more regularly.

Q: Civil society actors also have their own agenda. I work in the development field and I feel like sometimes there is
almost a racism about it – if someone is poor and black, they must be innocent and telling the truth. But there is a
difference between facts and opinion so there is a requirement to filter even voices from the field. How do you
respond to that?

A: (LAGON) First, it’s important to remember that NGOs have their own agenda, everyone has their own agenda.
Second, lenses for how you see the world matter. Third, the bigotry you speak of is also the soft bigotry of low
expectations. There is of course the question of capacity, but we can’t forget the question of will either.

(ABI NADER) There needs to be an open discussion about this issue that you are talking about how there is a difference
between fact and opinion and how perceptions from the field need to be seen in context.

(LAGON) Yes, we need to start a dialogue about universal human rights and what they mean. And about human
dignity.

(HENDRY) The dignity and welfare aspect is really important because if we can improve those things then we can
better protect human rights. We found through our work that human rights abusers are often people who have been
abused themselves.

(KEYES) I have seen that in my work as well. And we don’t do civil society building even though that is important. I
would also say that we can and must exert more pressure at the governmental level.

(ABI NADER) Part of the problem is that the US has competing foreign policy priorities throughout the world. It has
multiple concerns of security, stability, and promoting human dignity.

(KEYES) There is a challenge in balancing security concerns with some of the issues we are talking about, but we
have swung very very far from the balance on that one. Look at the US relationship with Mubarak for example
where the US was willing to ignore abuses because of the security relationships. I would like to see human rights
issues brought up more in today’s diplomacy.

Q: Is public education part of capacity building? It is not just governments and civil society that need better capacity.

A: (ABI NADER) Groups that I have worked with like Civitas and Street Law are doing exactly that – they have great
programs, but they lack funding. These issues are also generational, that is why public education is so important.

Q: What is the role and responsibility of the private sector in promoting human rights? For example, you can talk
about the quality of Transparency International’s rankings, but it has gone far in forcing companies to talk about and
tackle corruption if only because it limits their profits. This idea of risk analysis is thus helpful.

A: (LAGON) Corporations are taking on a more substantial role, but companies are also so focused on their “green”
rankings right now that it is not the priority at the moment. If you can focus on rule of law, you can mobilize the
market. That will be a driver for businesses to promote and protect human rights.

(ABI NADER) It is a great driver, but there are issues with the findings because they only are able to document cases
of corruption from those who come forward.

(HENDRY) We need all sectors to become involved because the challenge is so great. The Fund for Peace works with
the oil and mining sectors in rural areas – they have a great economic impact and the ability to promote human
rights, but they have to believe it is in their interest.
Q: (Jordan Paul, Moroccan American Center) The “see” and “feel” test is often helpful in assessing freedom in a country – when you get off the plane in Tripoli it feels different than in Rabat, and that’s not really reflected in the reports, which focus on violations across the board without this “sense” of a place. How do we ensure that this is accurately reflected in human rights reports?

A: (Keyes) Organizations need to speak more about this and make it clear that there is a difference between a democracy and a dictatorship. We can start by challenging human rights groups. Right now, some operate by finding human rights abuses and then following them - it’s crazy. Fundamental values are universal, but there is a huge difference between open and closed societies. We could start by gearing the work of human rights organizations toward closed societies clearly and unapologetically. Governments in between democracies and dictatorships also need to be addressed on their own merits. (Lagon) There is a distinction between different types of governments, but we need to raise these issues with everyone because there does need to be balance. (Keyes) We do care about human rights abuses in open societies, but we also need to care about them in closed societies. We have a role to play in pressuring governments to do more. The only long-term guarantor of peace and stability is human rights protection, of course with balancing realpolitik concerns. (AbiNader) We need to learn how to ask questions that take into consideration local context and perceptions and then figure out how that process can fit into and impact implementation.

5. Observation

Approximately 20 experts and development workers attended the panel discussion on opportunities for improving human rights reporting. The panelists each had a unique perspective and expertise on the issue of global human rights, which made for an interesting and insightful discussion. There was general consensus that much can be done to improve human rights reporting and implement widely-acknowledged human rights norms. Although there was some debate about the importance of democratic governance for human rights protections, the panelists agreed that human rights reporting should focus more on closed societies, can do more to appreciate the local context of universal human rights, and should work to improve capacity building to help countries improve their human rights records.

Is the Arab Spring Marginalizing Women?

Date: 14 May 2012

1. Title: Is the Arab Spring Marginalizing Women?
Hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars

Participants:
Jane Harman: Director, President, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center
Rend Al-Rahim: Co-founder, Executive Director, Iraq Foundation
Rola Dashti: Chairwoman, Kuwait Economic Society
Rangita de Silva de Alwis: Director, Women in Public Service Project 2012, Wellesley College
Haleh Esfandiari: Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center
Moushira Khattab: Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
Lila Labidi: Visiting Research Professor, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
Caryle Murphy: Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
Fatima Sbaity Kassem: Former Director, UN Center for Women, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) in Baghdad, Amman, and Beirut
Robin Wright: Journalist, Foreign Correspondent at notable publications

2. Overview

There is a concern that a year after the Arab uprisings, women across the region are at risk of becoming marginalized politically and economically. There is a growing rift between secular and Islamist women amidst worries of Salafists undermining women’s rights. Yet, it is clear that no society can do without the active participation of its women. In a conference addressing the role of women in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, women leaders from the Middle East and the United States discussed the implications for women’s rights under the
3. Summary

Panel 1:

Following a brief introduction by moderator Haleh Esfandiari, Fatima Sbaiti-Kassem began the discussion by stating that the Arab uprisings raised aspirations for equality and expectations of imminent social change. In Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, popular movements successfully toppled repressive regimes. However, in Syria and Bahrain, and to a lesser extent in Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, popular demands are being crushed or co-opted by ruling autocrats and monarchs. Everywhere these social movements are a clear indication that the “wall of fear” of lifelong rulers and despot has been irreversibly razed. The uprisings were not religious or feminist movements, but women played a visible and vocal role in the protests. Yet, the emergence of Islamist actors after the uprisings has relegated women in many countries to the periphery of the political process. They are losing ground on women’s rights and political participation. Political parties’ concern with retaining new found power overshadows the advancement of women’s rights, and many of the Islamists downplay their religiosity to retain popular support. Nevertheless, reforms increasing female political participation, the withdrawal of reservations on CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women), and a more connected network of vocal women provide hope in advancing women’s issues.

Lilia Labidi focused her presentation on problems on the ground in Tunisia and possible solutions to resolve them. She described a “second Tunisia” consisting of rural areas where women face high poverty and illiteracy rates and lack the legal and economic rights. The illiteracy rate of women over 15 living in rural Tunisia is 40%; they are effectively second-class citizens. For decades, the state has taken care of urban women and it has not been present in rural areas, leaving the work to NGOs. If even the government—specifically the Ministry of Women’s Affairs—lacks the means to service these areas, NGOs will not be able to compensate and play the role of the state in working for these women. Labidi stated that the government must work to increase its presence in all parts of the country to provide public services and remedy this pressing issue.

Moushira Khattab’s titled her presentation “Lost in Translation: The Case of Egyptian Women.” She compared the condition of women’s legal rights and their participation in the economic and political spheres before and after the revolution. Egyptian women played an instrumental role in the revolution, representing nearly 50% of the protesters on Tahrir Square. After Mubarak’s fall, they emerged hopeful and confident. A short 15 months later, however, they were excluded from the constitutional assembly and made up fewer parliamentary seats than before the uprising. Women’s issues have been washed away amidst a surging sea of Islamist politics, Khattab lamented. This increased religiosity has led to an open criticism at the highest levels of government of laws guaranteeing women’s most basic rights. Presidential hopeful Mohamed Morsi publicly stated that laws barring female genital mutilation overstep their bounds and this issue should be a parent’s choice. A two-pronged approach—working on both the grassroots level and the policy level—is necessary to improve the state of women’s rights in Egypt. Women’s status should not be linked to regime; states that adopted CEDAW are bound by law to protect their rights, and this fact needs to become embedded in their societies.

Panel 2:

To start the second panel, Rend Al-Rahim illustrated the situation in Iraq. Iraq experienced its own awakening in 2003. Until 2005, the situation of women in Iraq was rapidly improving. The country instituted a progressive family law code, as well as a 25% parliamentary quota for women. Parliamentary gender quotas are somewhat controversial, but Al-Rahim insisted that they are beneficial. “They show women in action, bring their faces to the public domain, and familiarize society to women in positions of power.” The December 2005 elections, however, brought Islamist parties to power and led to a resurgence of tribal culture. They conflated Islam, conservatism, and tradition. Polygamy, which is legal but constrained in Iraq, became more prevalent. Illegal practices such as unregistered, temporary, and child marriages increased, along with honor killings and the practice of giving girls to settle tribal disputes. Today laws are weakly enforced and even women who know they can seek legal redress fear to do so because they fear backlash. However, alliances between religious and secular women on specific issues and the activism of women’s NGOs are acting to promote women’s rights.

Rola Dashti expressed concern that women are going from being marginalized to being excluded, relegated to the home and traditional jobs. The women who played a role in the protests are no longer visible in the public sphere, leaving women to try and regain the progress they made previously before they can move forward. Extremist agendas always focus on social issues, Dashti explained. The so-called “moderate” Islamists will always become
more radical and more repressive. Women and the youth were the drivers behind the revolution, asking for justice, freedom, and human dignity. According to Dashti, political Islamists are the beneficiaries of revolutions they did not start, using women's issues to polarize society and avoid addressing economic issues. She questioned the assumption that Islamists would become more moderate and accommodate women’s rights for fear of being voted out of power, explaining that laws may be altered so that fair elections may not take place in the future.

Caryle Murphy explained that Saudi women, who have lived under Islamist rule for centuries, were encouraged by other women in the region to launch protest movements. Due to a low tolerance for female activism, Murphy continued, Saudi women prefer to work behind the scenes, avoiding street protest, confrontation, and outside aid. The Arab Awakening made the Saudi government realize that they have to act. Murphy noted that progress has been made possible by the king, who issued a soft response to the driving campaign, decreed that women can vote and compete in the 2015 elections, and backed reforms to promote women’s employment and reduce domestic violence.

Rangita De Silva de Alwis discussed women’s roles in post-conflict situations. She explained that post-conflict situations are opportunities for constitutions to be rewritten, problems to be addressed, and legal transformations to occur. De Silva de Alwis said legal reform must embody international law and inclusive security that ensures safety for women. Both Morocco and Tunisia have raised reservations to CEDAW, she noted. Women’s rights activists bear the burden of holding their governments accountable to CEDAW. In post-conflict situations, strong and powerful women’s movements are needed to mobilize women against rights violations. She stressed that women cannot wait to demand their rights after a revolution; instead, they need to anticipate problems and be proactive to ensure they are not excluded. She cited Iran as a cautionary tale, where women waited until it was too late to demand their rights.

4. Q & A

**Q:** (Paulette Lee, communications consultant) Could Islam and its various interpretations be employed to improve the situation of women in the region?

**A:** (Labidi) Ben Ali was always a steadfast promoter of women’s rights. Immediately after the revolution, women who had never before worn the hijab began to cover their heads. Women, especially those living in rural areas, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Islamists.

(Esfandiari) The changes that took place under the old regimes in Egypt and Tunisia really only affected upper-class women. The situation in Iran was very different, because women’s rights had permeated throughout society.

Immediately after the revolution, Khomeini repealed the family law code in the name of religion. In response, women staged protests and wrote letters. Interestingly, most of the protestors were not secular, well-educated, cosmopolitan women, but the more conservative, less-educated, women living in rural areas. They didn’t want to lose their rights to divorce or child custody.

**Q:** (Barbara Slavin, Atlantic Council) To what extent are women’s rights promoters tainted as pro-western or aligned with the old regimes?

**A:** (Kassem) I’d like to briefly go back to the question concerning interpretations of Islam. We tend to assume that all Muslims are extremists or Salafists. Islamist parties vary, and some are genuinely moderate. Interestingly, studies show that women, especially poor or uneducated women, are more religious than men. They are especially vulnerable to misinterpretations of Islam, as Sharia is often conflated with traditions. When religious clerics become leaders of Islamist parties, women find themselves in a double jeopardy. In response to Barbara’s question, yes, people tend to turn toward the Islamists because they are anti-western. People want their laws to grow from their own roots, not from the West. An imported democracy will never succeed in the Middle East.

(Khattab) There are many interpretations of Islam and they are used to pursue varying agendas. A hard-lined interpretation is effective for killing an issue, and an “enlightened” interpretation can be used to promote something.

**Q:** For the entire region, what would be the most effective target area, social reform, or program for integrating more women into business and politics, for example, to improve women’s rights?

**A:** (Khattab) Social, economic, and political reforms are all critical and equally important. One cannot happen without the others. If I were to pick one area, however, I would say we should focus on education. It is the basic requisite for any effective citizen. Going back to the perception of women’s rights activists as pro-western, it is true. CEDAW is a dirty word in Egypt; people say that it encourages extramarital affairs, or children born to single mothers.

**Q:** (Wright) More women than ever in the region are wearing the hijab. It seems to me that it is more about identity than piety. To what can we attribute this increase?

**A:** (Rahim) I was struck to see how many women in Iraq are wearing it these days. In that country, I would
contribute it to a lot of issues including an increased religiosity in society as a whole. It is also in part a response to years of oppression, sanctions, wars, and violence. Religion is a host that can bring comfort in a very difficult time. The public domain was dangerous, and women turned to the private domain, which included prayer, religion, solidarity, and safety. More recently, with the retreat of al-Qaeda, fewer women are covering their heads. (Dashti) The hijab is also a source of freedom for many women, strange as that may sound. Families are more lenient with daughters who go out covered, which encourages young women to wear a hijab in order to leave their homes. Additionally, the hijab has become a kind of a fashion trend. Girls wear colorful veils, with a lot of makeup and tight jeans. I don’t think it has very much to do with religion.

Q: (Freelance journalist from Saudi Arabia) Many women seem to actually go against their own interests and assert that pushing for women’s rights is in some way antithetical to Islam?
A: (Rahim) Pushing for women’s rights is in no way against Islam. The problem is in Islam’s various interpretations. There is a serious issue of chauvinism among those who interpret the Qur’an; they are all men and they conflate the religion with tradition, perpetuating a system that represses women. Women in the Iraqi Parliament have said that women’s rights are against Islam, but in reality, they are part of Islamist parties and they cannot go against party lines.

Q: (Didi Cutler) During the Iraq war, a group of women drivers in Saudi were punished very severely. They were arrested, lost their jobs, had their passports confiscated. Can the more gentle punishment enforced by the Saudi government this time be attributed to an evolution, or to King Abdullah?
A: (Murphy) After the first incident, the Mufti issued a Fatwa claiming that women driving is against Islam. Today, no one believes this. They oppose women driving on a cultural and traditional basis.

Q: (Josh Polcheck, State Department) It is important to note that no political force—nationalist, secularist, or Islamist—in the region is empowering women. Not a single party in Morocco or Tunisia nominated a woman to a ministerial position. Why has modernity as an ideology which calls for political citizenship lost its hold in the Arab world?
A: (Wright) It all depends on your definition of modernity; we should not conflate it with Westernization. I would argue a majority of women in the region want to be part of the 21st century. (Dashti) Modernists, or liberals, have traditionally been more concerned with spreading ideology than seeking power. The Islamists, conversely, are very focused on maintaining power. Liberals need to rethink their strategy, and focus on political power.
(Rend) I have to disagree. The modernizers were in power. Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Assad were secular modernizers. Today, there is a stigma associated with modernizers because they are associated with these regimes. The word “modernizer” invokes corruption, authoritarianism, and rentier economics.

Q: (Margaret Rodgers) We’ve come to the conclusion that the Arab Awakening is excluding women, but I want to know why.
A: (Dashti) We’ve never come to a conclusion about where women belong in our societies. Educational curriculum is segregated and teaches that women are meant to be mothers, wives, teachers, or caregivers. Women in the Middle East are not citizens. In Kuwait, a 50-year-old woman needs permission from a male guardian to get married. Political Islamists cannot deliver on economic and development issues, so they engage society in social issues, which polarizes people and distracts them from real problems.

5. Observation

This event was attended by approximately 35 professionals, students, NGO employees, journalists, women’s rights activists, and members of the policy community. All of the panelists were very critical of emerging Islamist parties, insisting that they shift focus from pressing economic problems to social issues in order to polarize their societies and retain political power. Morocco was not a focal point of the discussion, but the panelists did refer to the country a few times. Fatima Sbaity-Kassem said that “popular demands are being crushed or co-opted by ruling autocrats and monarchs” in Morocco, Jordan, Syria, and Bahrain. Rangita De Silva de Alwis noted that both Morocco and Tunisia are pushing back against CEDAW, and women’s rights groups in both countries must hold their governments accountable. A member of the audience from the State Department, Josh Polcheck, noted—inaccurately—that not a single party in Morocco or Tunisia nominated a woman to a ministerial position.
Date: 15 May 2012

1. **Delivering Dignity in the Arab World through Political and Economic Reform**
   Hosted by the Center for International Private Enterprise

   Participants:
   - **Larry Diamond**: Director, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University
   - **Michele Dunne**: Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council
   - **John D. Sullivan**: Executive Director, Center for International Private Enterprise
   - **Steve Clemons**: Moderator: Editor at Large, The Atlantic; Publisher, The Washington Note

2. **Overview**

   Last year’s uprisings made clear that people were willing to make great sacrifices to build states and societies capable of delivering dignity to their citizens. This event sought to explore the key linkages between political and economic reform in the Arab world and identify the opportunities and challenges to institutionalizing democratic values in economies throughout the region.

3. **Summary**

   Steve Clemons opened by marking his skepticism of the objectives of such organizations as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). He characterized these organizations as focusing too much on democratic rather than economic reforms. Remarking upon Hernando de Soto’s work, which characterizes the Arab Spring as “an entrepreneurial revolution,” Clemons argued that the price of wheat was as much a cause for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as any one of the trending indicators that have consumed the academic spotlight, such as the youth bulge or the rise of connecting media. He expressed his hope that the panelists would explore the economics of the Arab Spring in their talking points.

   Larry Diamond agreed, saying that the transition of Arab states from authoritarian rule was a series of many transitions at once, both political and economic. Despite undergoing a revolution, the “failed logic” of statism and socialism survives today in Arab countries. Diamond stated that open and competitive politics alone would not satisfy populations, nor would broad commitments to democracy carry them through a time of crisis. Diamond argued that a successful transition from authoritarian rule would require a break from the fundamental core of the Arab social contract, and that populations must dismantle the old systems of trading freedom for economic stability. Underlining that political freedom must be accompanied by economic freedom, Diamond emphasized the necessity of a number of reforms. “Paring down” (if not eliminating) corruption would be paramount, as would be the implementation of “social shock absorbers” – perhaps along the lines of the cash transfer programs that have recently gained traction in Latin America. He also declared that the assault on corruption should take place from two vectors: from the top down, through powerful anti-corruption committees, and from the bottom up, with an engaged populace reporting demands for bribes.

   Michelle Dunne, whose focus in the Arab Spring has been upon Tunisia and Egypt, expressed a slightly different interpretation of events. She characterized those regimes as having achieved a measure of economic reform without having yet delivered on the political. Both, she declared, would be necessary if the new governments are to retain legitimacy. With issues like the failure of the private sector to generate income, the youth bulge, and inflation still hampering goals for economic prosperity, populations are less likely to be patient with regimes when confronted with their records of human rights abuse, political stagnation, and police brutality.

   In a sense this disenchantment was inevitable, Dunne cautioned. Even prior to the revolution, states like Egypt had been attempting to make the transition to a cash transfer system over the past decade. Shifts at the macroeconomic level can sometimes take decades to take effect and changes in the system often amount to “political dynamite” for the very reason that they are so closely associated with the population’s livelihood. Regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, she stated, must be aware that while the “bloom is off the rose” in terms of enthusiasm for the revolution, the population remains committed to change. Those in power must be sure that they do not squander what opportunity they have to retain legitimacy.

   In his discussion of political and economic reform, John Sullivan chose to highlight the insuperable layers of bureaucracy that separate the average business from success in the region. For Muhammad Bouazizi (the Tunisian street merchant whose self-immolation set the Arab Spring in motion) the process to legally register his business
required that he go through 55 individual steps, a process lasting 150 days and requiring more than twelve times his monthly income, said Sullivan. In addition to creating a dual-layered economy, one that fast-tracked those with the means to bribe their way through the bureaucracy, the Tunisian system stymied growth at the poorest levels. Sullivan maintained that problems like these are still to be found in every sector of Tunisian and Egyptian economies, from small and medium enterprises to state-owned companies. The frustration that many Arab populations experience is due to the fact that reforms have yet to eliminate the crony capitalist system that prompted the revolutions in the first place.

Steve Clemons remarked that the issues of economic reform currently confronting new governments are not new problems – regimes have been attempting to deal with these challenges for decades. The panel uniformly attributed the longevity of the region’s economic troubles to the fact that regimes depended on the crony capitalist system for their survival. “When the nature of rule is predatory extraction,” said Larry Diamond, “it is very hard to tinker on the margins” for reform. This prompted a discussion on the fact that regimes today face the same issue as their predecessors and that many would prefer to appear to be democratic reformers while still defending the old authoritarian system. Drawing upon Morocco as an example, Diamond stated that King Mohammad VI “was in no way serious about economic reform.” This prompted a discussion between the panelists as to whether the China model of delivering economic without political reforms was an applicable model for the Arab World. The panel remained skeptical on this point.

4. Q & A

Q: What role can the international community, particularly the United States, play in encouraging economic reforms?
A: (Sullivan) I want to underline the importance of international initiatives such as the “Know Your Banker” program, an anti-bribery convention in the UN that targets corrupt multinationals and greater enforcement of existing policies through the mobilizing of NGOs such as Transparency International.
(Clemons) I feel that it must be born in mind that the relative size of the US economy – and therefore its power – has diminished compared to the older system.
(Dunne) This should not be used as an excuse for inaction. The US is still a key player. The US should examine incentivizing aid that it delivers to states like Jordan and Morocco.

Q: What role is there for women in the new societies of the Middle East – especially in Egypt and Tunisia?
A: (Dunne) There are both positive and negative trends to be found in these societies. In some sense, women’s causes have been marginalized during the revolution by figures, particularly Islamists and Salafists, dismantling progressive action taken in the past with regards to women’s rights. Yet in this new environment of expanded political freedom, women’s organizations have begun to form and play a political role.
(Diamond) I want to add that female empowerment over the coming decade may be inevitable, as women often make up 60% of the population of universities.
(Sullivan) The revolutions also prompted the rise of women’s associations in the informal sector.

Q: What do we know about the new regimes and their economic policies?
A: (Sullivan) Much still remains uncertain. Many Islamist candidates come from a business background and may be well-suited to recognize economic reform problems.
(Dunne) Thus far Tunisian economic policies have been moderately effective.

5. Observation

Approximately 40 scholars and think tank representatives attended this event. The general theme of the event was that more attention should be given to economic reforms in post-revolutionary states, both by the academics studying them and by the states themselves. While the focus of both the panel and the audience remained for the most part on Egypt and Tunisia, to the extent Morocco was mentioned the coverage was negative. A consensus seems to have arisen among the panelists that the Moroccan monarchy desires to perform limited economic and political reforms at the margins while leaving the old system effectively intact.
1. Title: Welcome Luncheon for Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal  
Hosted by the National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce  

Speaker:  
**H.E. Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal:** Ambassador to the United States, Kingdom of Morocco  

2. Overview  
The National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce hosted a luncheon to welcome Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal. The Ambassador briefly discussed Morocco’s current state of affairs, economic challenges, and political reforms. He then responded to questions from the audience members.  

3. Summary  
Ambassador Bouhlal began his address by thanking the audience for their engagement and investments in Morocco. He explained that Morocco is in a period of progressive political reform and substantial changes are being carried out across the board. The Kingdom ratified a new constitution in July 2011, which brought about political reforms including a balance of powers between the King and the Parliament. Responsibility and accountability in government, protection of individual liberties, and promotion of human rights are all values enshrined in the new constitution. Following its victory in November’s Parliamentary elections, the moderate Islamist Party for Justice and Development has built a coalition government; the parties in power are working together to stimulate growth and enact important social reforms. Recent events in during the Arab Spring and the Euro Crisis, however present this new government with difficult challenges. Instability in the region led to a drop in revenue from the tourism industry. Economic problems in Europe, Morocco’s largest trade partner, have spilled into the kingdom. A severe drought has diminished this year’s wheat yield. Ambassador Bouhlal concluded by noting that, despite these difficulties, there are very promising business developments taking place in the automotive, renewable energy, aeronautic, and agricultural industries.  

4. Q & A  

**Q:** ( Audience Member from Northrop Grumman) What can Morocco, in conjunction with the United States and other Sahel countries, do to improve security in the Sahel region?  
**A:** (Bouhlal) After the fall of Gaddafi, a proliferation of weapons flowed into the Sahel region. This adds another troubling element in a region where governance is already difficult. We are working closely with the US as well as other countries in the region to promote stability there.  

**Q:** ( Audience Member from USDA) Other than wheat and grains, which other food products present promising trade prospects?  
**A:** (Bouhlal) Morocco is becoming a big producer of olive oil. The US imports a lot of olive oil, and growers in California only produce enough to satisfy a small percentage of the market. In the other direction, Morocco imports a lot of food products from the US. We also export large amounts of fish to Europe.  

**Q:** ( Audience Member from AIAC Investment) What countries represent most of the tourists who visit Morocco?  
**A:** (Bouhlal) In 1943 when General Patton came to Morocco, he said that the country is a combination of the bible and Hollywood. Because of its proximity, most of Morocco’s tourists come from Europe—France, Spain, Italy, etc. Recently, however, there has been a surge in American visitors. They love to invest in hotels in Marrakesh and elsewhere. Additionally, more people from Russia and India have been visiting.  

**Q:** ( Audience Member from Emerald Planet TV) I know that Morocco hopes to get 38% of its energy from renewable sources by 2020; could you expand on investment in renewable energy technology there?  
**A:** (Bouhlal) We don’t have oil reserves, so we have always looked toward renewable energy for the future. As technology progresses, this has become an attainable goal. We are investing in wind and solar energy. We have also changed regulations and are encouraging renewable energy companies to sell their excess production back to the grid. Additionally, we are connected to Europe and Algeria, so we can actually export energy internationally. We don’t want investors to simply build plants, we want to continue to develop the technology and improve the program.  

**Q:** ( Audience Member from a construction company) Could you touch on the construction industry in Morocco? Are
there opportunities for activities in the residential or hotel and hospitality sector?

A: (Bouhlal) The construction business is doing very well in Morocco. We are trying to eradicate the slums and are constructing approximately 120 – 150 thousand new homes per year. Companies from all over the world are involved in these initiatives. Cities and infrastructure in Morocco are undergoing a rapid modernization. The new Mediterranean port, a huge investment, is already handling 3 million containers.

Q: What is happening with the youth? Is the economy growing rapidly enough to provide jobs?

A: (Bouhlal) We are doing our best. Growth averaged 5% in the past, and we need 7% to provide the necessary employment. If we are able to build on what we already have and improve our strongest sectors, I have no doubt we will be able to create jobs.

5. Observation

Approximately 60 professionals from businesses engaged or invested in Morocco attended the event. They represented various industries, including aeronautics, automobiles, renewable energy, construction, and agriculture, among others. The event was a luncheon, and, before the Ambassador’s address, guests had an opportunity to meet other professionals involved in business with Morocco. The National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce circulated fact sheets detailing trade between US States and Morocco and the Free Trade Agreement.

The Crisis in Northern Mali: Implications for a Region in Flux

Date: 31 May 2012

1. Title: The Crisis in Northern Mali: Implications for a Region in Flux

Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Atlantic Council

Participants:
Rudolph Atallah: Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council
Anouar Boukhars: Co-Project Leader, Mauritania Working Group, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Assistant Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College
H.E. Maman Sidikou: Ambassador of Niger to the United States
J. Peter Pham: Moderator: Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council

2. Overview

Much international attention has focused on Mali’s capital Bamako in the wake of the March 22nd coup overthrowing Mali’s elected government, but developments in the northern part of the country may have greater regional implications. Separatist Tuareg rebels, bolstered by militants and weapons flowing from Libya, have succeeded in driving out government forces. As a result, a number of Islamist groups are expanding their presence in the region. The Carnegie Endowment hosted a panel of experts to provide an update on the situation and discuss the broader regional implications for the Sahel, North Africa, and West Africa.

3. Summary

Dr. J. Peter Pham opened with a synopsis of recent events in Mali. He discussed the March 22 “accidental coup” and the international community’s role in resolving the political crisis and rebuilding the government. He explained briefly that the north of Mali has been experiencing prolonged conflict as a result of separatist aims to take control. “Northern Mali is turning into a Star Wars bar of extremists from across the region. The last thing Africa needs right now is another failed state.” He added that “pragmatism” unifies the ideologically diverse groups in power—Tuareg-led separatists, Ansar Dine Islamists, AQIM, and MUJAO.

Following Pham’s introduction, Rudolph Atallah gave a historical overview of revolts in Mali. During the 1950’s “wave of change” in Africa, the Tuaregs began to look toward independence. Mali’s independence in 1960 resulted in the first Tuareg rebellion in 1962. They feared that control from Bamako would lead to modernization and henceforth “exterminate” their culture. Mali’s military responded with force, effectively “alienating all Tuaregs.” Drought pushed the Tuaregs to move into neighboring countries Algeria and Libya. These events laid the foundation for the current turmoil, Atallah argued. In the summer of 1990, Aghali Alambo and his Popular Movement for the Liberation of Aghad (MPLA) led another case.
Tuareg uprising. Algeria successfully mediated peace accords between Mali and the insurgents, but another uprising led to a coup in 1992, ousting the president. That year, ethnic groups signed a national pact which integrated Tuareg youth into the military. A period of relative stability followed the pact, until 2006 when another uprising broke out. Atallah explained that this series of insurrections laid the foundation for the most recent crisis. Anouar Boukhars pointed out that Mali’s military does not represent the Malian people, and the country has never been so divided. He noted that the current crisis was triggered by the Libyan revolution, but its roots lie in longstanding domestic tensions. Gradual political decay and breakdown of state institutions, a lack of a credible settlement to historic Tuareg grievances, increased terrorist activity, the fall of Gaddafi, and a political vacuum are all factors that contributed to the success of the insurgents’ coup. The Malian government’s legitimacy was minimized by democratic stagnation, an overreliance on the patronage of its neighbors, including Libya, an illicit drug trade, and an undersized military. The coup was effectively a collective rejection of political elites; rebel leaders are gaining popular support by denouncing corruption in the Malian government. Boukhars concluded by enumerating some challenges Mali will face in the future: (1) supporting a civil government and keeping the army intact; (2) the heterogeneous nature of the insurgency; and (3) the threat of coexistence of Islamist movements (groups are trying to outsource a ‘more authentic’ form of Islam).

Maman Sidikou, Nigerien Ambassador to the US, presented a regional perspective and shed light on ways in which the crisis affects neighboring countries. He cited the influx of Libyan arms, kidnappings, and control by AQIM of drug-smuggling routes. The situation is of global concern and correspondingly requires a global response; it could potentially destabilize the entire region, he argued. “Terrorists are consolidating their position by the day in northern Mali and the international community just talks.” The African Union and ECOWAS need to intervene. The US could provide training, intelligence, and logistical support. Algeria should also assist. He explained that al-Qaeda is the “driving force” behind the crisis, and that Mali could “turn into another Afghanistan.” The Ambassador asked why the US and its allies were willing to intervene in Libya, but have failed to do so in Mali. He warned that if the international community does not act soon its credibility could be jeopardized.

4. Q & A

Q: We need to look back. Only a few people saw this coming. Before we go forward, why and how did we miss seeing this crisis in advance?
A: (Boukhars) There were definitely red flags; it was only a matter of time before something would break out. (Atallah) The investments in the northern area of Mali were going to military infrastructure therefore upsetting Tuaregs who believed that they needed to strike before anything happened to them. (Sidikou) Rebellions happen in many countries, including Niger, but the difference with Mali is that the international community tends to close its eyes to this one in particular. We need to ask about the responsibilities of regional powers. It’s not that we didn’t see the coming crisis, but the pace went very fast.

Q: (Malian Ambassador to the US) I would like to make a few clarifications. The constitution and institutional structure of Mali allow the military to occupy 2/3 of the country and army and terrorist groups operate their own prisons across the state. Secondly, there are fewer Tuaregs in the country than you think; they originate from Amazil and Berber people and are therefore from Morocco/Libya etc. Lastly, I must contend with your description of popular ambition against the elites in Mali. The military was not all against the elites because the highest ranks of soldiers did not join this movement.
A: (Boukhars) People are trying to capitalize on momentum of anger at the political elite. The highest soldiers did not join the movement because they were exactly the targets. Legitimacy in this case stems from never having been associated with power.
(Pham) We need to be pragmatic and not get lost in ideologies. Some groups needed a boost and made alignments as a result rather than because of beliefs.

Q: Will the groups start fighting each other? Where does Colonel Gamou stand?
A: (Atallah) The colonel is resting for now. Until things are pulled together in the south, it will be quiet. The MNLA is concentrating on their image in the media for right now. Trying to resolve differences will be hard. (Sidikou) Gamou sees al-Qaeda’s presence in Northern Mali as a result of all this. Al-Qaeda has resources and ideology that are helping to determine the outcome. (Boukhars) The multiplicity of jihad groups present in Mali doesn’t mean that the extremist groups erode differences in Mali. People support them not because of ideology but because of material and security delivery.

Q: (Bob Holley) Given the depth, intensity, and longevity of problems, do you think that there is a prospect that autonomy might heal the rift and provide structure? In addition, what would neighboring countries think of this solution?
A: (Atallah) I hope they would go back to the pact of 1992, in all honesty the south has to get its act together before
anything can happen.
(Boukhars) The political order needs to be restored before anything else. But autonomy is the only game in town. This could set a bad precedent.
(Sidikou) In Niger, most heads of regions are Tuaregs. No one wants the same thing. An institutional framework is needed to restore normalcy, the problem is the actors who shouldn’t be there.
(Pham) It would need to be decision of Malians. The last thing Africa needs is another failed state.
(The Malian Ambassador) The leaders are already Tuaregs and no coup can be justified.

Q: Can the panel speak of military integration? Tuaregs joining into the larger military? What do Tuaregs as a whole think and what does the rest of the military think? What lessons did we learn for the future?
A: (Sidikou) We integrated Tuaregs into the army in Niger and all I can really tell you is that results tend to be context-specific.
(Atallah) The area of Mali is so big and so vast that it is impossible to control. Large army numbers are imperative, making integration a necessity.

Q: (Marina Ottaway) I hear two points of view in this discussion. The first is that negotiation needs to happen or improvement is impossible. The other is that the first step is a military solution. Who will have to intervene?
A: (Sidikou) Negotiation would have to be done fast. I don’t understand why countries aren’t taking action in Mali when they know it’s worse than Afghanistan in terms of harboring terrorists.
(Atallah) Algeria’s amnesty program had some success in getting bad guys to work for the government. The USA has worked with all these governments, but the problem is that if American troops intervened, they would be considered foreign fighters. The USA can’t just go into Mali. By doing so, it would give terrorists a raison d’être. I think we need to leverage guys to turn on the bad groups.
(Boukhars) No military intervention would be useful until the mess in the South is solved. Distrust of the French is still there, so they can’t do anything. Niger and Mauritania wouldn’t be able to give many soldiers because their armies are so small, but Algeria could probably help out.

5. Observation

The proceedings were attended 50-60 people from think tanks, press agencies, and federal offices. The experts provided valuable insight into the crisis in Mali, but failed to give much prediction about the future or possible solutions. Comments tended to focus on the Tuaregs and their impact on the Northern part of the country. Although Morocco and the Western Sahara were not mentioned, the event underscored that experts are increasingly paying attention to security issues in the Sahel.

(Back to top)
Islamism and the Arab Spring

Date: 7 May 2012

1. Title: Islamism and the Arab Spring
   Hosted by Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the Reserve Officers Association

   Participants:
   Michael Doran: Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
2. Overview

Despite the secular nature of many of the protest movements associated with the Arab uprisings, Islamist parties have swept democratic elections across the region, contributing to unease and uncertainty both domestically and abroad. US policymakers and analysts are divided thus far in their responses to this turn of events. How should the US deal with the new regimes that bear a distinctly Islamist character? What will be the state of US alliances in the new Middle East and North Africa and how will they affect core American interests in the region? It is critical for Washington to understand the individual groups that are gaining power in the Middle East and North Africa and to define its interests and goals in dealing with these new power holders. FPRI’s panel discussion addressed these challenges and their implications for US foreign policy.

3. Summary

Tally Helfont asked the panelists to address a few specific questions: What has the Arab Spring taught observers about the nature of Islamism? What are the Islamists’ objectives? What is the future of Islamism in the region? What does it mean to be a moderate Islamist?

Michael Doran replied that all of Ms. Helfont’s questions lead to one central concern: “Is Islamism a strategic threat to the US?” It is not, he concluded. Washington’s four vital national interests—free flow of oil, nuclear non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and protection of Israel—are not jeopardized by the emergence of powerful Islamist actors in the Middle East and North Africa. Oil is concentrated in the Gulf, which has proved very stable in comparison with the rest of the region. Some would argue that the Islamists’ electoral success represents a net victory for al-Qaeda, and thus a blow to US counter-terror operations. However, recent events have failed to disrupt the gradual trend of al-Qaeda’s political marginalization. The group finds a happy home in Afghanistan, failed states, and semi-failed states, but is willingness to kill fellow Muslims has pushed it to the periphery elsewhere. Local populations simply will not stand for this kind of violence, and the group cannot maintain a political foothold. Protection of Israel, Doran admitted, is a thornier subject. Mubarak was a staunch supporter of the Camp David Accords, but in his absence, the demilitarization of Sinai appears less certain. However, the Egyptian military is loath to engage in a war with Israel at the expense of its aid relationship with the US. Doran noted that his insights rest on the premise that the US doesn’t have a competitor for regional influence; if China, for example, decided to intervene and undermine American interests as the Soviet Union did in the 1950s, the situation would change radically.

Samuel Helfont focused on Islamism’s impact on regional politics. He divided the pre-Arab Spring Middle East into two camps: Pro-Western moderates supporting the status quo and the Islamists. Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and most of the GCC comprised the first bloc while Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan comprised the second. Throughout the region, Islamists rebelling against their secular Arab governments have attracted mostly uniform responses, except in Syria, where rapidly-escalating conflicts have prevented shared interests from coalescing into a lasting alliance. The old Islamist bloc is breaking down. Tehran’s unwavering support for Assad has stressed its relations with former friends. Hamas and Turkey, for example, have alienated Iran as they shift support
from Assad to the opposition. Iran’s actions have adopted a certain discontinuity, as it claims that the Arab Spring is its brainchild while simultaneously backing Assad. Many Gulf regimes are non-democratic autocrats like Assad, but they support the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. As the conflict in Syria persists, Helfont warned, it will be increasingly difficult for these groups to come together. Negative ripple effects will shape the future Middle East, and could create conflicts elsewhere. There is already a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Syria has stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. The US has a very strong interest in resolving this issue, or at least “keeping it at a simmer.” Washington’s only real option is to make its interests explicit. “We need to establish red lines, particularly concerning anti-terrorism and support for foreign wars.” The US cannot intervene militarily, but must be clear about what is and what is not acceptable to avoid any misunderstandings.

Marina Ottaway shifted the discussion to defining Islamism. Islamist movements are very much national movements, she explained. They share certain ideas and characteristics, but are specific to each country; there is no established consensus among them. She reflected on her personal exposure to Islamist groups: “A few years ago at Carnegie we held periodic meetings with leaders of various Islamist movements. We discovered that they were having similar internal debates without realizing it.” Some Islamists are democratic, like Turkey’s AKP, while others talk about establishing a Caliphate. The two principal Islamist groups that concern the US and its policy interests are the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Members of the Brotherhood are familiar with the political process and believe in democratic government. The Salafists, conversely, have traditionally avoided politics. They historically believed that a society must adhere to the tenets of the Qur’an and the Sunna, which stipulate obedience to the ruler. They are gradually entering the political arena and will most likely increase their presence in the coming years.

Throughout the region, the Islamists’ recent electoral successes can be attributed more to their organizational superiority and political experience than their ideology, Ottaway continued. In Morocco, for example, the PJD was the only party that released a comprehensive manifesto and followed an effective campaign strategy. The PJD organized people rather than “politicalizing” them. Moroccan Salafists are also gaining support and political skills. In Tunisia and Egypt, for example, a palpable tension is growing between the Islamists and the secularists. They mix neither socially nor politically; the Islamists see the secularists as part of the old elite, and the secularists feel their interests and influence threatened by these new actors.

Eric Trager spoke briefly about various ideologies that characterize Islamists as a group and then argued that Egypt is the most important country vis-à-vis American interests. Liberalism is mutually exclusive with theocracy, and the basic tenet of Islamism is that Sharia should be implemented as the basis of law, Trager asserted. However, interpretations vary among different groups. Salafists seek to recreate the community during the time of the Prophet by directly implementing Sharia. The Muslim Brothers follow a broader interpretation of Sharia. They understand freedom as the freedom to live under religious law, and thus, see the secularists as oppressive. Both groups intend to craft political systems in which law derives from Sharia, which means that all political dialogue will arise from religion. This can only lead to a competitive theocracy, not a competitive democracy.

Trager then compared recruitment processes for the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. In Egypt, being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is not comparable to being a Democrat or a Republican in the US. The group imposes a very strict and rigorous recruitment system. All together it is a five to eight year process and prospective members are tested at every level. Those who eventually join the Brotherhood are very unlikely to
leave it. Joining the Salafists, conversely, is much easier. One simply declares that he is committed to living according to the life of the Prophet and to follow a sheikh. The group is lacking a structured hierarchy; they are less organized and less political. The recruitment process clearly favors the Salafists, Trager concluded. If they are able to organize, they will be very successful politically. He concluded by reiterating that Egypt is heading toward a competitive theocracy between two very anti-American parties.

4. Q & A

Q: (Tally Helfont) Could each panelist briefly respond to the other panelists’ comments and give suggestions for future US engagement in the region?
A: (Doran) I agree with Eric’s refutation of Islamists as a homogenous group, but I do not think that the Salafists are capable of presenting a unified front or working toward a common strategic goal. They will fight amongst themselves, and with the Brotherhood, and in the end, they will hate each other more than they hate the US. In terms of American engagement, I agree with Sam. Washington’s priority need to be deciding on red lines and making them perfectly clear. The US should also focus on Syria, where it has an opportunity to shift the balance against Iran.

(Samuel Helfont) I also agree with Eric’s basic points, but I don’t think debating Sharia is productive from a policy standpoint. Sharia is used in the Arab world as a catch-all; it is comparable to being in favor of “freedom” here in the US and gives little indication of a group’s actual political concerns. Washington needs to focus on establishing red lines in terms of concrete policies rather than Sharia, which is so ambiguous. Regardless of whether or not policies are part of Sharia, we need to have a position on them.

(Ottoway) I disagree with Eric. Some Islamists are looking to implement a version of Sharia that is consistent with 13th century interpretations of Islam, but it is impossible to define what it means to different Islamist groups. I also don’t agree with his description of the Muslim Brotherhood. A minority of the Brotherhood’s supporters actually went through the recruitment process. The US should not automatically take a hard line against Islamists, or jump to the conclusion that they will undoubtedly pursue policies antithetical to American interests.

(Trager) Sharia can be interpreted many ways, but there are some critical sentiments. It is plausible that the Salafists will not be able to keep it together, and the Brotherhood does have many more supporters than members. However, this is due to their ability to organize. The groups within the Brotherhood are small and Islamist, and they show no signs of breaking off and creating new liberal factions. The US needs to maintain a certain realism about its communications with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Q: What is the future of the Egypt’s Coptic Christians? Where can they go? Is it reasonable to expect them to go on living in Egypt?
A: (Trager) Reliable figures about how many Coptic Christians have already emigrated are not available, but it is probably about 100,000. Wealthier Egyptians are considering moving to the US, Canada, or Europe. However, many are extremely poor and don’t have this option. Church burnings have exacerbated sectarian tensions and intensified fears of persecution and exclusion from the political process.

(Ottoway) The position of the Copts was not great before the Islamists, and there are some positive developments that should be acknowledged. The Brotherhood made an effort to protect the churches on Christmas, so the Christians could attend services. Sharia was already the driving ideology behind Egypt’s constitution, and there is nothing in Sharia that stipulates depriving Christians of their rights. This question should be approached with an open mind; they could be fine.

Q: Can you comment on economic concerns?
A: (Doran) I think the state of affairs is not as disturbing as it may seem. These countries, especially Egypt, need things that only the US can provide. The Egyptian economy is on the verge of collapse and it desperately needs the support of the US. There are no external supporters waiting in the wings to replace US assistance. Anti-Americanism may appear prevalent, but this movement is really about changing Egypt. Our vital interests are secure for the most part.

(Trager) Reserves are low and this presents a real problem. That the Islamists need Washington to bail them out will probably benefit US interests in the long run. So far they have held up an IMF loan, but that concerned an internal struggle with the military. At the end of the day, Egypt needs the US, and that will make any emerging leaders more receptive to American policy there.

Q: How do you picture the region after 10 years of Islamist governance?
A: (Ottaway) The Islamists will unquestionably lose votes in the next election. They cannot solve all of their countries’ problems. Whether or not a viable secular opposition will materialize is a different issue. They secularists continue to insult those they should be courting.

(Trager) There is a benefit to ongoing competition, but the US should not want something for Egypt more than the Egyptians want it for themselves. The more Washington gets involved, the more American interests become a political foothold.

Q: (Tally Helfont): Can you speak about developments that could jeopardize our military considerations?
A: (Samuel Helfont) There is a proxy war in Syria between Iran and the Gulf States. If this escalates, Saudi arms could very well be used against Iranian troops in Syria. If chemical weapons go missing, there will be serious issues. Syrian refugees flowing into Turkey also present a troubling situation. Opposition forces are actively organizing within Turkey’s borders, and Syrian forces are staging open attacks in Turkey. Turkey could invoke article 5 of NATO, as they are technically under attack from a foreign country. If the US fails to respond, it would undermine the treaty.

(Doran): The Obama Administration seeks to reduce its Gulf presence. A war in Syria, revolution or instability in Saudi Arabia, or an Israeli attack in Iran would all compel Washington to intervene. If the US fails to curb Iran’s nuclear aspirations, nuclear weapons could proliferate in the region, which would inherently change American military engagement there.

Q: Is establishing the Caliphate a unifying goal among Islamists?
A: (Doran) The Caliphate is more symbolic than an aspiration. It is like Americans wanting everyone to be free and rich.

(Ottaway) It’s like worrying about the Holy Roman Empire making a comeback, it isn’t going to happen.

Q: How far can Washington push Turkey to advance American interests with respect to the Arab Spring?
A: (Doran) As I said before, the Obama Administration wants to extricate the US from the region. The Arab Spring presents Washington with a strategic opportunity, and acting multilaterally will not suffice. The US needs to put together another “coalition of the willing” and work with the Turks, the Saudis, and the French. Assad is far from finished, and a prolonged period of violence and disruption in Syria presents strategic threats to surrounding countries such as Israel, Turkey, and Lebanon.

(Samuel Helfont) The US must be very clear with Turkey considering what it is willing to do. The Turks want to stop the inflow of refugees; if the US is not willing to help, Washington needs to leave no room for misunderstandings.
The Turks have their own interests and will not help the US pursue its own.

5. Observation

This event was a webcast. The panelists focused on the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists as the two principal competing Islamist groups and only briefly touched on other parties like the PJD or Ennahda. Marina Ottaway argued that the PJD has been successful because they are effective organizers and skilled politicians, not Islamist ideologues. She suggested that Benkirane’s party will most likely lose votes in the next election, as other parties—including the Salafists—gain political experience. In terms of American foreign policy in the region, the panelists agreed that Washington must put forward coherent and concrete policies, clearly communicating its stance on various issues so as to avoid any misunderstandings. With the exception of Ms. Ottaway, they insisted that establishing "red lines" should be a principal tenet of US engagement in the region. Ms. Ottaway made an interesting point when she argued that a hard-line approach would not serve American interests and that Washington should approach these emerging actors with an open mind and willingness to collaborate.

(Back to top)
ongoing conflict between the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the central government, which in turn led to the coup in Bamako. The situation in the North quickly descended into chaos as Azawad has been unable to assert leadership over the various actors in the region, including Ansar al-Dine, AQIM, and other independent criminal network. The violence has caused thousands of civilians to flee, thus exacerbating a food and humanitarian crisis across the Sahel. Roach underscored that the situation in Mali threatens to distort regional stability and asked the panelists to provide their own assessment of the situation, as well as recommendations for US policy toward Mali and the Sahel.

James Phillips primarily analyzed events in Libya, arguing that what is happening in the Sahel is largely fallout from the conflict in Libya. The availability of arms from Qaddafi’s warehouses and the return of heavily armed Tuaregs to the region have bolstered dissident political and criminal movements, creating serious security problems. Phillips likewise detailed some of the primary actors operating in this zone of lawlessness, which in his estimation includes Libya. Although AQIM is one of weaker al-Qaeda franchises according to Phillips, it has been strengthened by its acquisition of Libyan weapons, including MANPADS. Phillips argued that AQIM is nevertheless limited in its attempts to spread across the Sahel because of its domination by Algerian Islamists. How its involvement in Mali plays out is yet to be seen – at present, it appears that AQIM is splintering into disparate groups, with some cells remaining dominated by Algerians, and others becoming more open to members from the Sahelian countries. Phillips’ primary recommendation was that the US must help the countries of the region reclaim missing Libyan weapons.

Dr. J. Peter Pham explored two primary issues: current challenges to states in the Sahel region and the current crisis in Mali. With regard to the former, he stated that there are three primary challenges to governance in the Sahelian countries. First, the weakness of state institutions and the prevalence of corruption present a serious challenge to governance in the Sahel. Second, internal divisions across the Sahel belt make it difficult for states to exert control over the entirety of their territory. In Mali, for example, there are divisions not only between the North and South, but also within the North between the “black” tribes (Fulani, Songhai) and the “white” tribes (Tuareg, Moors). Third, the radicalization of youth, due to a large demographic bulge and a lack of economic opportunities, presents a threat to the stability of these states.

Turning to Mali, Dr. Pham argued that the country is a failing, if not failed state. He drew three primary lessons from the current situation in Mali and provided a number of recommendations for confronting the current crisis. First, the primary lesson learned is that pragmatism is required in US policy responses because pragmatism is the primary strategy of groups operating in the North. Pham argued that experts should stop labeling groups under one grouping or another, such as “Islamist” or “separatist” or “nationalist” because doing so means making assumptions about their actions that limit our understanding of these groups. In the case of Mali, because experts had labeled groups as nationalist or Islamist, they assumed that they wouldn’t work together because they had different interests. In actuality, they did link up and work together toward a common cause because they had a pragmatic rather than ideological strategy. The MNLA didn’t have enough manpower despite the influx of Libyan weapons, so it turned to Iyad Ag Ghaly, a former Tuareg nationalist turned Salafist leader and founder of Ansar al-Dine, which in turn had connections with the former GSPC and current AQIM (Ghaly is the cousin of AQIM commander Hamada Ag Hama). Ghaly lent his support and thus a wall of separation between “nationalists” and “Islamists” came down. The MNLA nevertheless got more than it asked for, as Andar al-Dine has asserted its authority in Kidal and AQIM has done so in Gao and Timbuktu. Who has the upper hand now? According to Dr. Pham, it seems that the
Islamists do. Sharia law and Islamic punishments have been imposed in Kidal and Gao. Likewise the recent burning of a Sufi mausoleum indicates that the Islamists are indeed in charge. Second, the diversity of ethnic groups and the divisions between them cannot be understated. Northern Mali is a scarcely inhabited place populated by a number of groups. Although Tuaregs represent the plurality of inhabitants, there are various militant groups operating in the region, both “black” vs. “white” as well as “Arab” versus “Islamist.” Third, the situation in Northern Mali is at the very least an indictment of US counterterrorism policy in the region. The situation happened so quickly that it calls into question US assistance efforts on security issues. There is nothing wrong with the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but the model must be questioned given recent events. Dr. Pham questioned how the Malian army fights terrorism when it is unable to control a counterinsurgency.

Given these challenges, Dr. Pham called for a long-term commitment to the Sahel, both for security assistance and development assistance. For Mali specifically, Dr. Pham stressed that there needs to be a commitment to stopping the crisis from spreading beyond its borders to other insecure states in the region, including Niger, Mauritania, Libya, and Algeria – all states that are facing instability and security threats. The borders in this region are fluid and it does not appear that there is a force capable of restoring the Malian government at this time, but the threat must be contained at all costs. Dr. Pham called on the US to work with ECOWAS and the African Union to reconstitute a legitimate government in Bamako and retrain the military. Only then can one think about addressing the situation in the North, where no one really knows who is in charge. Dr. Pham noted that resolving the conflict with the North will be a multi-year endeavor and that in the meantime restoring order and leadership in Bamako is the most important thing that needs to be done.

Manoela Borges detailed current US engagement with Sahelian countries to address both the security crisis in Mali and the humanitarian crisis across the Sahel. The US is working to build the capacity of these states to handle threats on their own; however, the current capacity of these states to do so is low. The TSCTP helps with building security capacity, but more regional cooperation is needed. Although security threats to the Sahel are of concern to the US and its interests, Borges did highlight that because AQIM has not made threats against the US, the State Department is being extraordinarily careful to not “Americanize” the threat. In Mali specifically, State is pursuing diplomatic engagement at the regional level through ECOWAS, and the bi-lateral level through direct engagement with concerned countries. Borges reiterated Dr. Pham’s recommendation that the priority of the US is, as it must be, to restore democratic governance to Mali and establish a timeline for elections before turning to the North. Mali first needs a legitimate government in order to address longer-term concerns.

Alexis Areiff focused on US policy in the region. She noted that the Sahel has only become an area of concern to the US from a security perspective in the last decade; there has been a growing focus on the region because of the attacks of September 11th and the growing influence of the theory linking weak and failing states to terrorism, insecurity, and transnational security threats. Arieff expressed similar concerns to Dr. Pham as to the relevance of US counterterrorism policy in the aftermath of the coup in Mali. She posited, “Who are the US partners in the region if we can no longer work with militaries after they have led coups, such as in Mali, Niger, and Mauritania?” Debates over the US military presence are thus understandable. Areiff also mentioned that the US has competing policy objectives in the region – one the one hand it wants to work with democratically elected governments to counter terrorism in the region, but on the other hand, it wants to counter terrorism in the region with national partners to build their capacity – two issues that are
not always in sync given coups in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Areiff questioned how viable the TSTCP policy was given its need for partner governments in the region.

4. Q & A

**Q:** (Roach) The Malian coup leader was trained by the US military. Do you have any comments or insights on the implications of this?

**A:** (Borges) Following the coup, the US undertook a policy review of all forms of assistance to Mali. We terminated security assistance and applied legal sanctions to the military following the review. We still have a policy hold on other forms of assistance, with the exception of humanitarian assistance and assistance for democratic elections. As for the military training of Captain Sanogo, the US trains future leaders in countries with very little capacity. This was an unfortunate coincidence.

(Pham) We need not paint everything with one broad stroke – we need more flexible policy vehicles for dealing with coups.

**Q:** (Daniel Moro, SAIS) What is your assessment of Algeria’s reaction to the situation in Mali?

**A:** (Areiff) The crisis in Libya pushed all of Algeria’s buttons. Algeria wasn’t helpful in promoting Western policy on Libya because it supported Qaddafi, feared a security vacuum, and opposed a NATO intervention on its borders. This was indicative of its reaction to the Arab Spring – just this weekend the Prime Minister called the Arab Spring a catastrophe. With regards to the security threat, Algeria has tried to marshal a regional response to terrorism, taking the leadership role with smaller Sahelian nations and excluding Morocco. But this has not always been welcome by Sahel states, which have a love/hate relationship with Algeria and its meddling. The threat to Algeria is nevertheless very real – the kidnapping of aid workers from the camps in Tindouf and the kidnapping of diplomats in Mali by the AQIM-splinter group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Africa (MUJAO), highlights how Algeria has been hit on all sides. I don’t, however, see a strategic response from Algeria.

(Pham) Algeria has been ambivalent. It has not yet been hit by the Arab Spring, which has affected all if its neighbors in various ways. There was a relatively peaceful revolution in Tunisia, a violent one in Libya, and Morocco tried to get ahead of the parade through reforms. Algeria’s response to regional issues is heavily influenced by its rivalry with Morocco, which obstructs not only counterterrorism cooperation but also economic integration, which is urgently required to address the security threats we have been talking about today. What is particularly interesting is that Algeria clearly doesn’t want an independent Azawad, but has for thirty years supported the creation of an “Azawad on the sea” while supporting independence for the Western Sahara.

(Borges) Algeria’s involvement in the region is complex, but very important. Its relationship with the Tuaregs and its mediation in previous Tuareg conflicts has been essential. The US is engaged with Algeria and ECOWAS to coordinate a response to the situation in Mali.

**Q:** (H.E.M. Maman S. Sidikou, Ambassador of Niger to the US) We have heard allegations of links between Boko Haram and AQIM and now are hearing reports that in addition to the presence of those two groups in Mali, there are reportedly Pakistanis and other jihadis arriving in Mali. What is al-Qaeda’s strategy for the region? We need to understand it in order for countries to provide solutions for themselves.

**A:** (Pham) AQIM’s strategy has two principal pillars. First, it uses the Sahel as a real base for its primary target – the Kabilia region in northern Algeria. It also uses the Sahel to bring money for its aims by engaging in trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. Second, it wants to spread its ideology and bolster its connections with other armed groups. We have seen this in its links with Boko Haram. However, there have been divisions within AQIM.
Some cells have been accused of being too interested in making money and not focusing enough on ideology. In detailing the reasons for its split, MUJAO has claimed both the AQIM was not extremist enough and that it was too Arab. So, what can be done? It will be a long-time before Mali is sorted out, so our priorities have to be about containing it. We need to prioritize resources to strengthen the government in Bamako.

(Arieff) This gets back to the pragmatism and the opportunism of different actors. AQIM has been opportunistic in getting involved in northern Mali. But it may have overreached by jumping in without much thought. We need to find a way to turn it into a setback.

(Borges) Every week is seems as though there are new groups popping up in Mali. We need to understand them in order to be able to develop an appropriate policy response.

5. Observation

Approximately 40 policymakers and regional experts attended the event at the Heritage Foundation. The panelists all discussed the current security crisis in Mali and the Sahel, echoing concerns about the fallout from the revolution in Libya that have been present in the media and in think tank circles for over a year. Although spreading the message about the importance of the Sahel and advocating for US engagement on this issue among a wider audience is always helpful, the panelists did not add much new to current thinking on the security threat in the Sahel, nor did they provide novel recommendations for how to confront it. The representative from the State Department provided the usual statement about all that the US is doing in the region in order to justify its actions to date. Interestingly, following Dr. Pham’s important reference and warning about the possibility of an Azawad on the sea in the Western Sahara, Borges appeared almost defensive about Algeria’s role and leadership on security issues in the region. Rather than weakening Algeria’s position in the region, it appears that the events of Libya and Mali have in fact strengthened it, at least in the minds of some policymakers, despite widespread acknowledgement of Algeria’s obstinacy to US interests in Libya and to a negotiated resolution of the Western Sahara.

The panel highlighted yet again that the threat of security in the Sahel is at last receiving widespread attention and that there is increased engagement from the think tank and policy community on the region. However, with the exception of Dr. Pham, no one acknowledged the obstacle of the Western Sahara to regional counterterrorism cooperation, nor did anyone recommend US efforts to promote Algerian-Moroccan cooperation. Areiff mentioned Algeria’s explicit decision to leave Morocco out of its regional counterterrorism initiative, but unfortunately did not detail the implications of that decision. The security argument alone is thus not enough to spur US action on the Western Sahara; it will need to be continually linked to the importance of regional counterterrorism cooperation and economic integration in order to be effective in promoting a resolution of the Western Sahara.

For a video of the event and a complete copy of the report, please visit: http://www.heritage.org/events/2012/05/crisis-in-the-sahel

(Back to top)

The Arab Awakening: Implications for al-Qaeda and the Future of Terrorism

Date: 10 May 2012
1. Title: The Arab Awakening: Implications for al-Qaeda and the Future of Terrorism

Hosted by Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Panelists:

**Jon Alterman:** Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

**Barak Barfi:** Research Fellow, New America Foundation

**Daniel Byman:** Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

**Daveed Gartenstein-Ross:** Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

**Bruce Hoffman:** Moderator: Professor and Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies and Security Studies Program, Georgetown University

2. Overview

The Arab Awakening has raised a number of questions about the future viability of al-Qaeda in the region. Many analysts claimed that the revolutions that took place in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt were a blow to al-Qaeda’s ideology – mass protests resulting in regime change showed that civilians could affect popular change without violence. In addition, the presence and victory of Islamist parties highlighted that those seeking a greater role for Islam in the political space could do so through political parties and elections, rather than through terror. Others argued that the fall of governments that were strong allies in the global war on terror and the violence used to achieve some of these revolutions could only result in increased insecurity. Even if new governments are willing to take a hard line against Islamic terrorism, they are much weaker than their predecessors who ruled autocratically. At this event, expert panelists explored whether the Arab Awakening has marginalized al-Qaeda or whether it has presented opportunities, such as sectarian tensions, that it can exploit.

3. Summary

Jane Harman, President of the Wilson Center, introduced the event. She underscored that the threat of al-Qaeda is different, but that it is still out there. She likewise noted that the rise of Islamist parties as a “game changer.” Al-Qaeda’s polling number are currently very low and Harman posited that this was perhaps due to the success of Islamist political parties, who have shown that there is another way for people to express their views – through the political process.

Jon Alterman spoke first about al-Qaeda’s primary failure. The real threat of the organization was that it would go from the extreme fringe to the mainstream of Islamic thinking, capitalizing on popular dissatisfaction that was real and present. That has failed; al-Qaeda has been unable to win broad support. Why not? Alterman noted three primary reasons. First, it killed a lot of Muslims – more than non-Muslims in fact. Second, it never presented a positive agenda. Third, states linked up strongly against al-Qaeda, mobilizing the cleric establishment to delegitimize al-Qaeda’s Islamic message. Taking away its religious legitimacy was essential in limiting al-Qaeda’s mass appeal. However, because these latter efforts were state-led, what do you do now that these states have failed and popular grievances have not gone away? Alterman suggested that despite this primary failure, the durability of al-Qaeda’s ideas remain. He argued that there will not be an al-Qaeda insurgence as a global organization, but that its ideas will ensure on a smaller level. For example, continued chaos in Syria and Yemen will boost al-Qaeda, but it will be forced to operate on a smaller scale because politics by and large has set al-Qaeda back. Alterman offered his conclusions on the legacy of all of this. For one, the Arab Awakening signifies the demise of Salafi jihadism. However, it also signifies the end of Salafi “quietism.” Previously,
those Salafis who were not involved in terrorism stayed out of politics and avoided criticizing the ruler because of an unspoken agreement between the clerics and the state. The Arab Awakening has changed that agreement and now the Salafis engage in politics and criticize leaders. The rise of Salafi politics may thus be the long term impact of al-Qaeda.

Barak Barfi talked about al-Qaeda’s challenges and opportunities as a result of the Arab Awakening and then focused on the specific case of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Barfi stressed that al-Qaeda’s propaganda against rulers no longer holds because the Arab Awakening has proven that change can come about without violent rebellions. Al-Qaeda has thus suffered setback in the short-term. Barfi cautioned, however, that in the long-term, al-Qaeda might benefit from inevitable political and economic problems that result from the potential failings of democracy. He stressed that democracy is not a cure all and that will be a gap between expectations and realities in many countries that have experienced a transition – this gap will be a recruiting tool from al-Qaeda. Barfi also warned that many Salafi scholars argue that Islam is not compatible with democracy and that Islamist groups are in fact using their current power to create constitutions based on sharia law. If they fail do so, al-Qaeda will again have a raison d’être.

Turning to its regional affiliate in North Africa, Barfi argued that the political arena AQIM works in differs from that of the other affiliates. Although its home country of Algeria has not been impacted by the Arab Spring, it has still had to grapple with its outcomes. It is nevertheless well-placed to benefit from insecurity and instability in North Africa because AQIM exploits ungoverned spaces and conflict zones. The crisis in northern Mali, an area that has never known government because it is simply too large of a space to govern, illustrates the potential of al-Qaeda, which is now out of hiding and operating in plain sight in Timbuktu. Barfi nevertheless sees a silver lining in the Mali coup: Amadou Toumani Touré was never really a strong supporter of the global war on terrorism against AQIM and there were allegations that some senior officials were involved in drug trafficking and smuggling operations with the group. Touré’s government likewise never had a strategy for dealing with the Tuaregs. While the situation is too much in flux to make predictions, there is the potential to have a stronger counterterrorism ally in Mali as a result of the coup and subsequent chaos.

Daniel Byman expressed concern with the “good news story” experts have been telling about counterterrorism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and cautioned that counterterrorism efforts may in fact suffer because of the revolutions for three primary reasons. First, as governments are changing, there is the potential for less counterterrorism cooperation. For example, Egypt is much more focused on other threats to the regime that it is on cooperation with the United States. Second, new governments are weaker than their predecessors, who ruled with an iron fist and enforced order at the expense of liberty. It is not yet evident that new governments will be as able to enforce order and thus limit the impact of small extremist groups. Third, it’s possible that the transitions will fail and that people may be willing to try alternative means of political change. Byman argued that people may feel that they tried the political process and failed and therefore turn to more radical means, as was the case in Algeria. Thus, while the al-Qaeda core is weakened, the power of the affiliates is growing at a local and regional level. These affiliates have the potential to exploit the Arab Spring and tap into some of the inevitable failings of the Arab Spring revolutions.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross presented a study he completed on al-Qaeda statements during the Arab Spring. Recognizing a critical gap in Western understanding of al-Qaeda’s reaction to the Arab Spring, Gartenstein-Ross sought to understand whether the Arab Spring had strengthened or weakened al-Qaeda. The study found a surprising amount of agreement
among jihadi observers of the Arab Spring, likely because it only assessed the first year. Gartenstein-Ross predicted that this would not be the case in the years to come, but that nevertheless the study provided a number of themes important for our understanding of al-Qaeda today. First, jihadi observers viewed the Arab Spring as a pan-Islamic uprising, which is spreading because Arab leaders failed. This is a good thing in their minds. Second, there was broad agreement about the geopolitical implications of regime change: US influence in the region is weak or at least on the decline; America is a bad ally (ex: Mubarak); the Arab Spring is a strategic setback for Israel; surviving apostate regimes are the biggest losers of the Arab Spring; and the clergy that supported these regimes have been de-legitimized. Third, al-Qaeda and the jihadi movement will gain from the Arab Spring. Statements indicate that al-Qaeda expects greater freedom of mobility under new regimes, both because they are not as repressive and because they will not be able to control territory as effectively. Fourth, al-Qaeda is aware of its need for a strategic response to the Arab Spring. In conclusion, the study revealed that al-Qaeda does not view the upheaval as a death knell and that it is optimistic about its ability to capitalize on it.

4. Q & A

Q: (Hoffman) Could al-Qaeda exploit sectarian tensions in the region?
A: (Byman) This is a double-edged sword. The core wants to focus on the United States and on overthrowing governments, but among the affiliates, sectarian tensions matter more. It could drive affiliate groups in a way the core has resisted, but it's risky.
(Barfi) It could lead to a backlash – al-Qaeda's killing of Muslims is one of the primary reasons why people have turned against it.

Q: (Oxford Analytica) Are you concerned about the institutionalization of terrorism because of the presence of Salafis in power?
A: (Alterman) Salafi politics is based on populism, rather than violence. Salafi parties want to make Islam a total part of people's lives. What is concerning, however, is the rise of anti-intellectual trends and intolerance among Salafi groups.
(Gartenstein-Ross) I'm not concerned about groups in government turning to violence, but whether or not they will shelter violent groups or actors. If those governments fail, it may strengthen al-Qaeda. In that case, Islamists may argue that the revolutions didn't go far enough and were in fact only a half-measure. Likewise, if there are no real changes in these governments, we may see violence; Islamist parties have made electoral gains, but if they have no real power, as happened in 1991 Algeria, they may resort to violence.
(Barfi) We are starting to see important terrorist leaders entering into politics – putting down their guns to campaign. It will be harder for some terrorist groups to continue to be against participating in politics when their leaders are. However, this could also create vacuums for more extreme groups to operate. This was the case in Gaza. When Hamas joined the political process, other, more extreme Salafist groups emerged on the street.

Q: (Wilson Center) How will al-Qaeda central respond to movements among its affiliates?
A: (Hoffman) As discussed, there are opportunities for the affiliates to exploit and capitalize on instability in the Middle East and North Africa. How al-Qaeda central is able to capitalize on their movement is unclear. But, the global war on terror is going to be important for at least the next decade.

Q: (Hoffman) Where will al-Qaeda as a movement be in the next ten years?
A: (Alterman) It will be its set of ideas that lasts. It will be harder to find the center and hard to stamp out.
(Byman) A lot depends on whether or not it is given a cause like it has been given before [Iraq]. Al-Qaeda has made mistakes, but it is a learning organization.
(Gartenstein-Ross) It will be influence by global trends like the increasingly common presence of weak and failing states and increased resource scarcity. But, al-Qaeda will only continue to present a robust regional challenge, not a strategic challenge. (Barfi) It is going to come down to the affiliates to take the mantel from al-Qaeda central and the old generation. We may even see the creation of new affiliates – for example in Syria. If the West doesn’t get involved, the jihadists will step in.

5. Observation

Approximately 30 policymakers and experts attended the event, including Jane Harman, the President of the Wilson Center. Her presence indicates that the issue of terrorism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is a core area of interest for the Wilson Center. Unfortunately, the speakers focused primarily on al-Qaeda central and not on affiliates operating in the region where the revolutions of the Arab Spring took place. With the exception of Barfi’s discussion of AQIM, panelists did not provide insight on al-Qaeda's future in North Africa. Likewise, they did not provide any recommendations on how to engage new governments on counterterrorism cooperation. While it’s obvious that the implications of the Arab awakening on al-Qaeda’s operation is not yet clear, a discussion on moving forward with US counterterrorism policy would have been helpful, particularly for our issue. The panelists were nevertheless all well-informed and Barfi in particular may be potential new resource for MAC on security issues.

For a video of the event, please visit:

(Back to top)

Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East

Date: 10 May 2012

1. Title: Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East
   Hosted by the USIP Center of Innovation for Security Sector Governance

   Participants:
   **Panel 1: Panel of Representatives from the Region**
   - **Magda Boutros**: Director, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights
   - **Najla Elmangoush**: Former Member, Public Engagement Unit, Libyan National Transitional Council
   - **Dr. Murhaf Jouejati**: Chairman, National Consensus Movement; Member, Syrian National Council
   - **Dr. Radwan Masmoudi**: President, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
   - **Hesham Sallam**: Researcher - Egypt
   - **Robert Perito**: Moderator: Director, Security Sector Governance Center, US Institute of Peace

   **Panel 2: Panel of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Region**
   - **Ambassador Barbara Bodine**: Former US Ambassador to Yemen (1997-2001)
   - **Ambassador Rust Deming**: Former US Ambassador to Tunisia (2000-2003)
   - **Ambassador Deborah Jones**: Former US Ambassador to Kuwait (2008-2011)
Robert Perito: Moderator: Director, Security Sector Governance Center, US Institute of Peace

2. Overview

Much has changed in the region over the last year: Libya and Yemen joined Tunisia and Egypt on the path toward democratic reform, Syria hangs in the balance. The security challenges and needed reforms vary by country, from establishing street-level security and disarming militias to ministerial reform and transitional justice. Yet, across the region, transforming the mandate and institutions of the security forces and regulatory bodies that oversee them will be a vital step toward establishing peace and democratic rule. For the USIP Center of Innovation for Security Sector Governance 3rd annual conference, current practitioners, government leaders, and former ambassadors gathered to discuss the pressing question of security sector reform in North Africa and the Middle East.

3. Summary

Panel 1:

Dr. Radwan Masmoudi addressed the crucial balance between justice and stability, a vexing goal for all post-revolutionary states. Those who served the regime in a brutal capacity must be punished, but in a way that avoids igniting a civil war. Furthermore, the skilled bureaucrats who served the regime in isolation from its corrupt practices must be integrated into the new government in order to preserve precious talent.

Madga Boutros argued that an overlooked component of the Egyptian revolution has been a popular repudiation of the security apparatus, comprising the police, the military, and the intelligence services. The primary goal of activists, she said, is to increase accountability within the security services while limiting their role in Egypt’s political economy. As part of a civil society group dedicated to passing security reform legislation through the new parliament, Boutros confirmed that the SCAF wishes to hand over power to a new president, provided the generals are allowed to preserve the military’s interests in manufacturing and natural resources. Boutros concluded with a warning that economic development and democracy could follow only in the wake of security sector reform.

Dr. Murhaf Jouejati insisted that the Syrian National Council’s priority was not the fall of Bashar al-Assad, but the cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, he discussed the kinds of challenges that would face Syrians should Assad’s regime implode. Priorities would include securing Assad’s biological and chemical weapons; corralling the remnants of the Baathist regime and its allies in the security services; stopping any looting; and shrinking the army into a small, disciplined, apolitical force whose sole function is to safeguard the sovereignty of Syrian territory. Jouejati was adamant that the most important reforms depend upon a total change in mentality in that the Syrian people must begin to see their government as accountable before meaningful progress can be made.

Najla Elmangoush played an integral part in the Libyan revolution and she recounted the enormous impact of propaganda on the evolution of hostilities. Turning to security sector reform, Elmangoush expressed concern that Qaddafi loyalists, some of whom fled Libya, continue to actively destabilize the country. Despite a dire need for coordinated security forces, militias and other armed groups continue to clash at the local level. Thus, Libya’s most pressing problem is one of integrating militants and former rebels into a unified military and police command.
Hesham Sellam reiterated that Hosni Mubarak’s old security apparatus remains intact and largely shielded from security sector reforms. He expressed skepticism that a new president would be able to rein in the security ministries, particularly when considering the fact that a new parliament did very little to weaken the SCAF. Consequently, many activists favor a full focus on making the military, police, and intelligence services more transparent and subservient to civilian leadership.

Panel 2:

The second panel began with the former Ambassador to Tunisia, Rust Deming, who is convinced that a prerequisite for the overthrow of any autocratic government is a politically motivated, economically empowered middle class. Yet Tunisia, with its famously vibrant middle class, had until recently failed to make that transformation. Deming found that government officials provided two arguments against a full-fledged democratic reform program: 1) caution and a slow pace would avoid a collapse of the transition process; 2) a democratic government would inevitably empower Islamists. According to Deming, the attacks of September 11, 2001 only vindicated these fears, which may or may not have been an excuse to avoid any reform at all. In addition, the Ben Ali’s had massive commercial interests that might be damaged by democratic reforms, and Ben Ali himself fretted over the persecution he may face should he relinquish power. Thus, Deming left his post in Tunisia wondering when some sort of revolution might occur. When it finally did, Deming observed that Ennahda appeared to be the only party structure with deep roots, that young people were quickly alienated from the political process, and that the security services were rendered dysfunctional. Despite this, Deming remained optimistic that Tunisians could draft a constitution, reconcile religious freedom with a free press, employ underutilized graduates, and initiate a national reconciliation process to reintegrate valuable technocrats from the old regime.

Serving US Ambassador to Kuwait, Deborah Jones asked why those nations that are party to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have yet to experience the same widespread upheaval seen in Tunisia or Syria. She acknowledged that US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as President Obama’s “abandonment” of Hosni Mubarak set off alarm bells in Riyadh and Kuwait City, where monarchs wondered how far such activism might extend. Their response was to quell unrest in Bahrain and court partnerships with close American allies, including Morocco and Jordan. Jones cautioned the audience against assuming that the people of the Gulf want an Egypt-style uprising. Many of them see royal families as having distributed wealth and improved access to housing and education—this relationship between the rulers and the people forms one of the most important institutions among the GCC nations.

Former Ambassador to Morocco Thomas Riley framed the issue of security sector reform in terms of North Africa’s broader, long-term problems: high unemployment, the youth bulge, and a lack of opportunity. According to Riley, ignoring the underlying economic challenges will directly undermine all other efforts. He noted that those nations with extensive resources, such as Algeria or Saudi Arabia, are simply buying time until the day when their oil and gas disappear, at which point they will have to provide fulfilling employment opportunities to their people. Without investment in economic diversification and education, however, such governments might find themselves toppled. Riley complained that the US repeatedly fails to follow up on political or economic programs with audits to determine their effectiveness, and encouraged local populations to push for more oversight.

Former Ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine recalled that before Ben Ali stepped down in Tunisia, planning was already underway in Yemen to launch demonstrations and bring the government into paralysis. Yet even after Ben Ali’s regime fell, events in Yemen defied
expectations, as successive “turning points” failed to push out Saleh and his coterie. Bodine detailed how the security service essentially split into three groups controlled by their respective families. The resulting stalemate produced a distinctly Yemeni approach to the problem, complete with long, extended, somewhat theatrical negotiations. Bodine thought the Yemenis were wise, once an agreement was brokered, to schedule a referendum that could signal a clear break with the past. This was essential, for one of Saleh’s closest advisers served in a transitional role. Moving on to Yemen’s acute security crisis in the South and North, Bodine thought any political settlements with the Houthi rebels would have to wait until the new government had established bona fides with the majority of the population. She concluded by warning US policymakers not to overemphasize the counter-terror aspects of US-Yemen relations. In the near-term, the regular armed forces will be unable to handle al-Qaeda or the Houthi, and the US must examine other development-centric approaches to quelling extremism. For Yemen, al-Qaeda is increasingly a counterinsurgency matter, and it would be a mistake for the US to remain wholly focused on counterterrorism.

4. Q & A

Q: Does the US legacy of supporting authoritarian regimes hinder it in establishing effective relations now?
A: (Jones) Those of us sitting in our positions as of February 2011 got an earful from host governments on our fecklessness. In Kuwait, there was great concern, as stability is a critical factor for any country that relies on exporting a resource to survive. When we went into Iraq, we actually caused a bit of a transformation in the GCC states—a problem that was previously approached through cooperation with non-government actors became dominated by security considerations and concern for domestic stability above all. Obviously we have long faced a tension between our economic interests and our moral obligations, but the best thing we can do is to focus on pragmatic programs that will help states develop.
(Riley) The answer is yes. But I would make an observation, which is that in Tunisia, Wikileaks actually improved many people’s perception of the US because all of a sudden they had clear evidence that US officials were accurately reporting on corruption and that they understood what was really going on. So with that unexpected transparency also came the fact that we were not being fooled by these governments.
(Bodine) Over the last decade, our attention was so focused on security that we lost the rhetoric of development and governance, and in many places we lost the programs on development and governance. If we return to having a security centric approach, and we miss these two other factors, that is how we will be judged going forward.

Q: In Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, the security institutions are large and entrenched, whereas in Libya and in Yemen the problem is the opposite. So what is the biggest problem these countries face?
A: (Bodine) Libya and Yemen actually face very different security sector reform issues. In Libya you have freestanding militias that must be integrated into a newly created defense and security system. In Yemen, there are existing units that must be reformed and restructured, but we are not building from the ground up.

5. Observation

The event was attended by over 100 representatives from US government agencies, NGOs, and foreign governments. All of the speakers agreed that security sector reform is vital if Arab nations are to move forward with economic liberalization and a broader political transformation. Unfortunately, the recommendations were extremely vague, and no speakers gave any details on exactly how security sector reform is to take place when the
most powerful institutions in most of these nations are, in fact, the security services. In places like Yemen and Libya, where the military is a weak institution, where is the body capable of controlling disparate militias? Ambassador Riley stated that the most important pressure comes from the bottom up because it is difficult for military leaders who are trying to appear nationalist to ignore the cries of millions. However, we have seen massive demonstrations in Egypt in past weeks that suggest the military does not give in easily when it comes to issues about which it cares deeply.
reporting accurately enough? Are they doing enough to implement human rights and put reporters and monitors out of jobs?

Mark Lagon discussed the conclusions of a recent CFR report on human rights reporting and implementation. The report assessed how global institutions are doing overall in promoting and protecting human rights. It found that overall there is heightened attention and discussion of human rights, but uneven regional efforts. Implementation also lags way behind, as the focus remains on treaties and norm creation, which are overemphasized. Lagon noted that monitoring is broad and deep and that there is increasing peer-based security of human rights violations. Capacity building nevertheless remains a real problem and more effort is needed to realize human rights, not just talk about them.

Turning to more specific conclusions, Lagon noted that there has been a recent backlash on freedom of expression throughout the world as well as against other political and civil rights. In addition, there has been a skewed dialogue about some rights at the United Nations and there thus needs to be a rebalancing of rights. On the positive side, the report found that the business community is becoming involved in human rights promotion and protection beyond corporate social responsibility because the community is at last realizing it is in their self-interest.

Lagon made several recommendations. First, more needs to be done to empower regional organizations, NGOs, and civil society to act. Second, inter-governmental organizations need to focus more on technical assistance and implementation. Third, the global architecture at the UN needs to be refined, particularly the Human Rights Council. Fourth, the system needs to be less uptight on economic and social rights. Fifth, democracy and human rights are not separate and one of the most important things the international community can do to promote human rights is to bolster democratic institutions. Finally, there is plenty of human rights reporting and monitoring of varying quality, and more attention needs to be paid to economic and social rights.

David Keyes spoke about the philosophy of his organization, Advancing Human Rights, with a quote from famed Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky, which emphasized the role of democracy in promoting human rights and the distortion created by treating open and closed societies as equal when assessing human rights. Advancing Human Rights thus works for a clear and compelling focus on human rights violations in closed societies.

Keyes provided a number of examples of this contradiction in human rights reporting. For example, the UN Human Rights Council has nations like Saudi Arabia assessing human rights in democracies, something that Keyes and others believe undermines the Council’s legitimacy. He also noted that the largest human rights group in the world did as many reports about Israel during the last year as it did about Libya, Syria, and Iran combined, further undermining their human rights reporting. Turning to misconceptions about the disparity between human rights reporting in open versus closed societies, he argued that the US would not lose credibility by reporting on totalitarian societies. Likewise, the argument that human rights organizations need to be even-handed in reporting on democracies and dictatorships is a fallacy. It is easier to focus on open societies because it is difficult to get information from closed societies. Human rights organizations likewise argue in favor of the idea that open societies are “low-hanging fruit” for improvement. For the former argument, Keyes stressed that this is less true given new online tools available. For the latter, he argued that this argument is simply not sufficient. Human rights organizations must therefore shift their focus to closed countries, arguing that they no longer have an excuse to say they weren’t aware of the violations. Keyes called for a return
Jean AbiNader provided insights from an ongoing study about human rights reporting across North Africa. The study examined ways to advance human rights reporting by looking at North Africa as a case for what works and what can be done better. The study is also examining if a regional analysis of human rights would be helpful. AbiNader underscored that a case study on North Africa was particularly timely given the events of the Arab Spring. Many experts have expressed qualms about human rights under Islamist-led governments. AbiNader questioned how these new governments were going to approach human rights and how they would define it. Based on a central tenet of his report about life (individual rights), liberty (collective rights), and the pursuit of happiness (economic and social rights), AbiNader noted that it seems that at present the focus of many uprisings is on economic rights as countries work to confront basic problems of health, education, and jobs. This seems to likewise be the focus of the US response to the Arab Spring, which has been based on economic aid rather than demands for political reconciliation or justice.

These competing challenges are a real concern in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and underscored two primary concerns about human rights reporting that emerge from the study. First, AbiNader stressed that human rights reporting is done from a Western perspective, assuming the universality of human rights. AbiNader argued that organizations should look at human rights in context, if only to help countries better promote human rights within the unique set of circumstances defined by their countries laws, institutions, customs, and societies. Second, the study revealed that although democracies are a guarantor for human rights, it isn’t clear whether or not democracy is the only political system that can effective protect human rights. In conclusion, AbiNader recommended that human rights organizations take context into account when assessing human rights in order to better inform responses according to local, often competing priorities. He also emphasized more capacity building in order to move from rhetoric to implementation.

4. Q & A

Q: (Hendry) There seems to be a debate between the panelists about whether or not human rights and democracy go hand in hand. What are the ways in which you can best protect human rights?
A: (Lagon) They are not one and the same – it’s like a chicken and egg type situation. But democracies mean more than elections – they mean the creation of real institutions that protect the rights of citizens and a flexibility in governing so that governments can incorporate the will of pluralistic groups. It is in that sense that democracies best protect human rights.

(AbiNader) Compare, for example, Tunisia and Morocco. Our study found that Morocco, a monarchy, was a better guarantor of religious dialogue, human rights, and civil unity than say Tunisia where the leader [ben Ali] was “elected.”

(Keyes) I am a believer in unalienable rights, but these rights will look different in different places. It won’t always look exactly like in America, but that’s okay.

Q: (Robert Holley, Moroccan American Center) I have never been fond of democracy promotion efforts because democracy is a process, just as human rights is a process. It takes time to get from A-Z and while you have to judge progress, you should do so in a way that helps the process rather than criticizes it, particularly since there is always misinformation that ends up getting included. Governments are not the only ones adept at disinformation and misinformation; local political actors are also good at that. What do you do to sort out information from disinformation and misinformation?
**A:** (Keyes) It is the hardest part of my job. Distilling information is difficult, particularly in the internet age where it’s almost impossible. I don’t have a comprehensive answer to your questions, but we rely on word of mouth to build a network of people who will trust and hope that the power of the people will come across.

(Hendry) Triangulation of data is how we do it. Polls and blogs can lie, but if you compare the information across various sources, it is at least a start. We also work to build local capacity to get information more regularly.

**Q:** Civil society actors also have their own agenda. I work in the development field and I feel like sometimes there is almost a racism about it – if someone is poor and black, they must be innocent and telling the truth. But there is a difference between facts and opinion so there is a requirement to filter even voices from the field. How do you respond to that?

**A:** (Lagon) First, it’s important to remember that NGOs have their own agenda, everyone has their own agenda. Second, lenses for how you see the world matter. Third, the bigotry you speak of is also the soft bigotry of low expectations. There is of course the question of capacity, but we can’t forget the question of will either.

(AbiNader) There needs to be an open discussion about this issue that you are talking about how there is a difference between fact and opinion and how perceptions from the field need to be seen in context.

(Lagon) Yes, we need to start a dialogue about universal human rights and what they mean. And about human dignity.

(Hendry) The dignity and welfare aspect is really important because if we can improve those things then we can better protect human rights. We found through our work that human rights abusers are often people who have been abused themselves.

(Keyes) I have seen that in my work as well. And we don’t do civil society building even though that is important. I would also say that we can and must exert more pressure at the governmental level.

(AbiNader) Part of the problem is that the US has competing foreign policy priorities throughout the world. It has multiple concerns of security, stability, and promoting human dignity.

(Keyes) There is a challenge in balancing security concerns with some of the issues we are talking about, but we have swung very very far from the balance on that one. Look at the US relationship with Mubarak for example where the US was willing to ignore abuses because of the security relationships. I would like to see human rights issues brought up more in today’s diplomacy.

**Q:** Is public education part of capacity building? It is not just governments and civil society that need better capacity.

**A:** (AbiNader) Groups that I have worked with like Civitas and Street Law are doing exactly that – they have great programs, but they lack funding. These issues are also generational, that is why public education is so important.

**Q:** What is the role and responsibility of the private sector in promoting human rights? For example, you can talk about the quality of Transparency International’s rankings, but it has gone far in forcing companies to talk about and tackle corruption if only because it limits their profits. This idea of risk analysis is thus helpful.

**A:** (Lagon) Corporations are taking on a more substantial role, but companies are also so focused on their “green” rankings right now that it is not the priority at the moment. If you can focus on rule of law, you can mobilize the market. That will be a driver for businesses to promote and protect human rights.

(AbiNader) It is a great driver, but there are issues with the findings because they only are able to document cases of corruption from those who come forward.
(Hendry) We need all sectors to become involved because the challenge is so great. The Fund for Peace works with the oil and mining sectors in rural areas – they have a great economic impact and the ability to promote human rights, but they have to believe it is in their interest.

Q: (Jordan Paul, Moroccan American Center) The “see” and “feel” test is often helpful in assessing freedom in a country – when you get off the plane in Tripoli it feels different than in Rabat, and that’s not really reflected in the reports, which focus on violations across the board without this “sense” of a place. How do we ensure that this is accurately reflected in human rights reports?

A: (Keyes) Organizations need to speak more about this and make it clear that there is a difference between a democracy and a dictatorship. We can start by challenging human rights groups. Right now, some operate by finding human rights abuses and then following them - it’s crazy. Fundamental values are universal, but there is a huge difference between open and closed societies. We could start by gearing the work of human rights organizations toward closed societies clearly and unapologetically. Governments in between democracies and dictatorships also need to be addressed on their own merits.

(Lagon) There is a distinction between different types of governments, but we need to raise these issues with everyone because there does need to be balance.

(Keyes) We do care about human rights abuses in open societies, but we also need to care about them in closed societies. We have a role to play in pressuring governments to do more. The only long-term guarantor of peace and stability is human rights protection, of course with balancing realpolitik concerns.

(ABI Nader) We need to learn how to ask questions that take into consideration local context and perceptions and then figure out how that process can fit into and impact implementation.

5. Observation

Approximately 20 experts and development workers attended the panel discussion on opportunities for improving human rights reporting. The panelists each had a unique perspective and expertise on the issue of global human rights, which made for an interesting and insightful discussion. There was general consensus that much can be done to improve human rights reporting and implement widely-acknowledged human rights norms. Although there was some debate about the importance of democratic governance for human rights protections, the panelists agreed that human rights reporting should focus more on closed societies, can do more to appreciate the local context of universal human rights, and should work to improve capacity building to help countries improve their human rights records.

(Back to top)

Is the Arab Spring Marginalizing Women?

Date: 14 May 2012

1. Title: Is the Arab Spring Marginalizing Women?
   Hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars

   Participants:
   Jane Harman: Director, President, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center
2. Overview

There is a concern that a year after the Arab uprisings, women across the region are at risk of becoming marginalized politically and economically. There is a growing rift between secular and Islamist women amidst worries of Salafists undermining women’s rights. Yet, it is clear that no society can do without the active participation of its women. In a conference addressing the role of women in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, women leaders from the Middle East and the United States discussed the implications for women’s rights under the emerging Islamist regimes.

3. Summary

Panel 1:

Following a brief introduction by moderator Haleh Esfandiari, Fatima Sbaity-Kassem began the discussion by stating that the Arab uprisings raised aspirations for equality and expectations of imminent social change. In Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, popular movements successfully toppled repressive regimes. However, in Syria and Bahrain, and to a lesser extent in Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, popular demands are being crushed or co-opted by ruling autocrats and monarchs. Everywhere these social movements are a clear indication that the “wall of fear” of lifelong rulers and despots has been irreversibly razed. The uprisings were not religious or feminist movements, but women played a visible and vocal role in the protests. Yet, the emergence of Islamist actors after the uprisings has relegated women in many countries to the periphery of the political process. They are losing ground on women’s rights and political participation. Political parties’ concern with retaining new found power overshadows the advancement of women’s rights, and many of the Islamists downplay their religiosity to retain popular support. Nevertheless, reforms increasing female political participation, the withdrawal of reservations on CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women), and a more connected network of vocal women provide hope in advancing women’s issues.

Lilia Labidi focused her presentation on problems on the ground in Tunisia and possible solutions to resolve them. She described a “second Tunisia” consisting of rural areas where women face high poverty and illiteracy rates and lack the legal and economic rights. The illiteracy rate of women over 15 living in rural Tunisia is 40%; they are effectively second-class citizens. For decades, the state has taken care of urban women and it has not been present in rural areas, leaving the work to NGOs. If even the government—specifically the Ministry of Women’s Affairs—lacks the means to service these areas, NGOs will not be able to compensate and play the role of the state in working for these women. Labidi stated that
the government must work to increase its presence in all parts of the country to provide public services and remedy this pressing issue.

Moushira Khattab’s titled her presentation “Lost in Translation: The Case of Egyptian Women.” She compared the condition of women’s legal rights and their participation in the economic and political spheres before and after the revolution. Egyptian women played an instrumental role in the revolution, representing nearly 50% of the protesters on Tahrir Square. After Mubarak’s fall, they emerged hopeful and confident. A short 15 months later, however, they were excluded from the constitutional assembly and made up fewer parliamentary seats than before the uprising. Women’s issues have been washed away amidst a surging sea of Islamist politics, Khattab lamented. This increased religiosity has led to an open criticism at the highest levels of government of laws guaranteeing women’s most basic rights. Presidential hopeful Mohamed Morsi publicly stated that laws barring female genital mutilation overstep their bounds and this issue should be a parent’s choice. A two-pronged approach—working on both the grassroots level and the policy level—is necessary to improve the state of women’s rights in Egypt. Women’s status should not be linked to regime; states that adopted CEDAW are bound by law to protect their rights, and this fact needs to become embedded in their societies.

Panel 2:

To start the second panel, Rend Al-Rahim illustrated the situation in Iraq. Iraq experienced its own awakening in 2003. Until 2005, the situation of women in Iraq was rapidly improving. The country instituted a progressive family law code, as well as a 25% parliamentary quota for women. Parliamentary gender quotas are somewhat controversial, but Al-Rahim insisted that they are beneficial. “They show women in action, bring their faces to the public domain, and familiarize society to women in positions of power.” The December 2005 elections, however, brought Islamist parties to power and led to a resurgence of tribal culture. They conflated Islam, conservatism, and tradition. Polygamy, which is legal but constrained in Iraq, became more prevalent. Illegal practices such as unregistered, temporary, and child marriages increased, along with honor killings and the practice of giving girls to settle tribal disputes. Today laws are weakly enforced and even women who know they can seek legal redress fear to do so because they fear backlash. However, alliances between religious and secular women on specific issues and the activism of women's NGOs are acting to promote women’s rights.

Rola Dashti expressed concern that women are going from being marginalized to being excluded, relegated to the home and traditional jobs. The women who played a role in the protests are no longer visible in the public sphere, leaving women to try and regain the progress they made previously before they can move forward. Extremist agendas always focus on social issues, Dashti explained. The so-called “moderate” Islamists will always become more radical and more repressive. Women and the youth were the drivers behind the revolution, asking for justice, freedom, and human dignity. According to Dashti, political Islamists are the beneficiaries of revolutions they did not start, using women’s issues to polarize society and avoid addressing economic issues. She questioned the assumption that Islamists would become more moderate and accommodate women’s rights for fear of being voted out of power, explaining that laws may be altered so that fair elections may not take place in the future.

Caryle Murphy explained that Saudi women, who have lived under Islamist rule for centuries, were encouraged by other women in the region to launch protest movements. Due to a low tolerance for female activism, Murphy continued, Saudi women prefer to work behind the scenes, avoiding street protest, confrontation, and outside aid. The Arab
Awakening made the Saudi government realize that they have to act. Murphy noted that progress has been made possible by the king, who issued a soft response to the driving campaign, decreed that women can vote and compete in the 2015 elections, and backed reforms to promote women’s employment and reduce domestic violence.

Rangita De Silva de Alwis discussed women’s roles in post-conflict situations. She explained that post-conflict situations are opportunities for constitutions to be rewritten, problems to be addressed, and legal transformations to occur. De Silva de Alwis said legal reform must embody international law and inclusive security that ensures safety for women. Both Morocco and Tunisia have raised reservations to CEDAW, she noted. Women’s rights activists bear the burden of holding their governments accountable to CEDAW. In post-conflict situations, strong and powerful women’s movements are needed to mobilize women against rights violations. She stressed that women cannot wait to demand their rights after a revolution; instead, they need to anticipate problems and be proactive to ensure they are not excluded. She cited Iran as a cautionary tale, where women waited until it was too late to demand their rights.

4. Q & A

Q: (Paulette Lee, communications consultant) Could Islam and its various interpretations be employed to improve the situation of women in the region?
A: (Labidi) Ben Ali was always a steadfast promoter of women’s rights. Immediately after the revolution, women who had never before worn the hijab began to cover their heads. Women, especially those living in rural areas, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Islamists. (Esfandiari) The changes that took place under the old regimes in Egypt and Tunisia really only affected upper-class women. The situation in Iran was very different, because women’s rights had permeated throughout society. Immediately after the revolution, Khomeni repealed the family law code in the name of religion. In response, women staged protests and wrote letters. Interestingly, most of the protestors were not secular, well-educated, cosmopolitan women, but the more conservative, less-educated, women living in rural areas. They didn’t want to lose their rights to divorce or child custody.

Q: (Barbara Slavin, Atlantic Council) To what extent are women’s rights promoters tainted as pro-western or aligned with the old regimes?
A: (Kassem) I’d like to briefly go back to the question concerning interpretations of Islam. We tend to assume that all Muslims are extremists or Salafists. Islamist parties vary, and some are genuinely moderate. Interestingly, studies show that women, especially poor or uneducated women, are more religious than men. They are especially vulnerable to misinterpretations of Islam, as Sharia is often conflated with traditions. When religious clerics become leaders of Islamist parties, women find themselves in a double jeopardy. In response to Barbara’s question, yes, people tend to turn toward the Islamists because they are anti-western. People want their laws to grow from their own roots, not from the West. An imported democracy will never succeed in the Middle East. (Khattab) There are many interpretations of Islam and they are used to pursue varying agendas. A hard-lined interpretation is effective for killing an issue, and an “enlightened” interpretation can be used to promote something.

Q: For the entire region, what would be the most effective target area, social reform, or program for integrating more women into business and politics, for example, to improve women’s rights?
A: (Khattab) Social, economic, and political reforms are all critical and equally important. One cannot happen without the others. If I were to pick one area, however, I would say we
should focus on education. It is the basic requisite for any effective citizen. Going back to the perception of women’s rights activists as pro-western, it is true. CEDAW is a dirty word in Egypt; people say that it encourages extramarital affairs, or children born to single mothers.

Q: (Wright) More women than ever in the region are wearing the hijab. It seems to me that it is more about identity than piety. To what can we attribute this increase?
A: (Rahim) I was struck to see how many women in Iraq are wearing it these days. In that country, I would contribute it to a lot of issues including an increased religiosity in society as a whole. It is also in part a response to years of oppression, sanctions, wars, and violence. Religion is a host that can bring comfort in a very difficult time. The public domain was dangerous, and women turned to the private domain, which included prayer, religion, solidarity, and safety. More recently, with the retreat of al-Qaeda, fewer women are covering their heads.
(Dashti) The hijab is also a source of freedom for many women, strange as that may sound. Families are more lenient with daughters who go out covered, which encourages young women to wear a hijab in order to leave their homes. Additionally, the hijab has become a kind of a fashion trend. Girls wear colorful veils, with a lot of makeup and tight jeans. I don’t think it has very much to do with religion.

Q: (Freelance journalist from Saudi Arabia) Many women seem to actually go against their own interests and assert that pushing for women’s rights is in some way antithetical to Islam?
A: (Rahim) Pushing for women’s rights is in no way against Islam. The problem is in Islam’s various interpretations. There is a serious issue of chauvinism among those who interpret the Qur’an; they are all men and they conflate the religion with tradition, perpetuating a system that represses women. Women in the Iraqi Parliament have said that women’s rights are against Islam, but in reality, they are part of Islamist parties and they cannot go against party lines.

Q: (Didi Cutler) During the Iraq war, a group of women drivers in Saudi were punished very severely. They were arrested, lost their jobs, had their passports confiscated. Can the more gentle punishment enforced by the Saudi government this time be attributed to an evolution, or to King Abdullah?
A: (Murphy) After the first incident, the Mufti issued a Fatwa claiming that women driving is against Islam. Today, no one believes this. They oppose women driving on a cultural and traditional basis.

Q: (Josh Polcheck, State Department) It is important to note that no political force—nationalist, secularist, or Islamist—in the region is empowering women. Not a single party in Morocco or Tunisia nominated a woman to a ministerial position. Why has modernity as an ideology which calls for political citizenship lost its hold in the Arab world?
A: (Wright) It all depends on your definition of modernity; we should not conflate it with Westernization. I would argue a majority of women in the region want to be part of the 21st century.
(Dash) Modernists, or liberals, have traditionally been more concerned with spreading ideology than seeking power. The Islamists, conversely, are very focused on maintaining power. Liberals need to rethink their strategy, and focus on political power.
(Rend) I have to disagree. The modernizers were in power. Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Assad were secular modernizers. Today, there is a stigma associated with modernizers because they are associated with these regimes. The word “modernizer” invokes corruption, authoritarianism, and rentier economics.
Q: (Margaret Rodgers) We’ve come to the conclusion that the Arab Awakening is excluding women, but I want to know why.
A: (Dashti) We’ve never come to a conclusion about where women belong in our societies. Educational curriculum is segregated and teaches that women are meant to be mothers, wives, teachers, or caregivers. Women in the Middle East are not citizens. In Kuwait, a 50-year-old woman needs permission from a male guardian to get married. Political Islamists cannot deliver on economic and development issues, so they engage society in social issues, which polarizes people and distracts them from real problems.

5. Observation

This event was attended by approximately 35 professionals, students, NGO employees, journalists, women’s rights activists, and members of the policy community. All of the panelists were very critical of emerging Islamist parties, insisting that they shift focus from pressing economic problems to social issues in order to polarize their societies and retain political power. Morocco was not a focal point of the discussion, but the panelists did refer to the country a few times. Fatima Sbaity-Kassem said that “popular demands are being crushed or co-opted by ruling autocrats and monarchs” in Morocco, Jordan, Syria, and Bahrain. Rangita De Silva de Alwis noted that both Morocco and Tunisia are pushing back against CEDAW, and women’s rights groups in both countries must hold their governments accountable. A member of the audience from the State Department, Josh Polcheck, noted— inaccurately—that not a single party in Morocco or Tunisia nominated a woman to a ministerial position.
3. Summary

Steve Clemons opened by marking his skepticism of the objectives of such organizations as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). He characterized these organizations as focusing too much on democratic rather than economic reforms. Remarking upon Hernando de Soto’s work, which characterizes the Arab Spring as “an entrepreneurial revolution,” Clemons argued that the price of wheat was as much a cause for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as any one of the trending indicators that have consumed the academic spotlight, such as the youth bulge or the rise of connecting media. He expressed his hope that the panelists would explore the economics of the Arab Spring in their talking points.

Larry Diamond agreed, saying that the transition of Arab states from authoritarian rule was a series of many transitions at once, both political and economic. Despite undergoing a revolution, the “failed logic” of statism and socialism survives today in Arab countries. Diamond stated that open and competitive politics alone would not satisfy populations, nor would broad commitments to democracy carry them through a time of crisis. Diamond argued that a successful transition from authoritarian rule would require a break from the fundamental core of the Arab social contract, and that populations must dismantle the old systems of trading freedom for economic stability. Underlining that political freedom must be accompanied by economic freedom, Diamond emphasized the necessity of a number of reforms. “Paring down” (if not eliminating) corruption would be paramount, as would be the implementation of “social shock absorbers” – perhaps along the lines of the cash transfer programs that have recently gained traction in Latin America. He also declared that the assault on corruption should take place from two vectors: from the top down, through powerful anti-corruption committees, and from the bottom up, with an engaged populace reporting demands for bribes.

Michelle Dunne, whose focus in the Arab Spring has been upon Tunisia and Egypt, expressed a slightly different interpretation of events. She characterized those regimes as having achieved a measure of economic reform without having yet delivered on the political. Both, she declared, would be necessary if the new governments are to retain legitimacy. With issues like the failure of the private sector to generate income, the youth bulge, and inflation still hampering goals for economic prosperity, populations are less likely to be patient with regimes when confronted with their records of human rights abuse, political stagnation, and police brutality.

In a sense this disenchantment was inevitable, Dunne cautioned. Even prior to the revolution, states like Egypt had been attempting to make the transition to a cash transfer system over the past decade. Shifts at the macroeconomic level can sometimes take decades to take effect and changes in the system often amount to “political dynamite” for the very reason that they are so closely associated with the population’s livelihood. Regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, she stated, must be aware that while the “bloom is off the rose” in terms of enthusiasm for the revolution, the population remains committed to change. Those in power must be sure that they do not squander what opportunity they have to retain legitimacy.

In his discussion of political and economic reform, John Sullivan chose to highlight the insuperable layers of bureaucracy that separate the average business from success in the region. For Muhammad Bouazizi (the Tunisian street merchant whose self-immolation set the Arab Spring in motion) the process to legally register his business required that he go through 55 individual steps, a process lasting 150 days and requiring more than twelve times his monthly income, said Sullivan. In addition to creating a dual-layered economy, one that fast-tracked those with the means to bribe their way through the bureaucracy, the
Tunisian system stymied growth at the poorest levels. Sullivan maintained that problems like these are still to be found in every sector of Tunisian and Egyptian economies, from small and medium enterprises to state-owned companies. The frustration that many Arab populations experience is due to the fact that reforms have yet to eliminate the crony capitalist system that prompted the revolutions in the first place.

Steve Clemons remarked that the issues of economic reform currently confronting new governments are not new problems – regimes have been attempting to deal with these challenges for decades. The panel uniformly attributed the longevity of the region’s economic troubles to the fact that regimes depended on the crony capitalist system for their survival. “When the nature of rule is predatory extraction,” said Larry Diamond, “it is very hard to tinker on the margins” for reform. This prompted a discussion on the fact that regimes today face the same issue as their predecessors and that many would prefer to appear to be democratic reformers while still defending the old authoritarian system. Drawing upon Morocco as an example, Diamond stated that King Mohammad VI “was in no way serious about economic reform.” This prompted a discussion between the panelists as to whether the China model of delivering economic without political reforms was an applicable model for the Arab World. The panel remained skeptical on this point.

4. Q & A

Q: What role can the international community, particularly the United States, play in encouraging economic reforms?
A: (Sullivan) I want to underline the importance of international initiatives such as the “Know Your Banker” program, an anti-bribery convention in the UN that targets corrupt multinationals and greater enforcement of existing policies through the mobilizing of NGOs such as Transparency International.
(Clemons) I feel that it must be born in mind that the relative size of the US economy – and therefore its power – has diminished compared to the older system.
(Dunne) This should not be used as an excuse for inaction. The US is still a key player. The US should examine incentivizing aid that it delivers to states like Jordan and Morocco.

Q: What role is there for women in the new societies of the Middle East – especially in Egypt and Tunisia?
A: (Dunne) There are both positive and negative trends to be found in these societies. In some sense, women’s causes have been marginalized during the revolution by figures, particularly Islamists and Salafists, dismantling progressive action taken in the past with regards to women’s rights. Yet in this new environment of expanded political freedom, women’s organizations have begun to form and play a political role.
(Diamond) I want to add that female empowerment over the coming decade may be inevitable, as women often make up 60% of the population of universities.
(Sullivan) The revolutions also prompted the rise of women’s associations in the informal sector.

Q: What do we know about the new regimes and their economic policies?
A: (Sullivan) Much still remains uncertain. Many Islamist candidates come from a business background and may be well-suited to recognize economic reform problems.
(Dunne) Thus far Tunisian economic policies have been moderately effective.

5. Observation

Approximately 40 scholars and think tank representatives attended this event. The general theme of the event was that more attention should be given to economic reforms in post-
revolutionary states, both by the academics studying them and by the states themselves. While the focus of both the panel and the audience remained for the most part on Egypt and Tunisia, to the extent Morocco was mentioned the coverage was negative. A consensus seems to have arisen among the panelists that the Moroccan monarchy desires to perform limited economic and political reforms at the margins while leaving the old system effectively intact.

(Back to top)

Welcome Luncheon for Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal

Date: 24 May 2012

1. Title: Welcome Luncheon for Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal
   Hosted by the National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce

   Speaker:
   **H.E. Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal**: Ambassador to the United States, Kingdom of Morocco

2. Overview

   The National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce hosted a luncheon to welcome Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal. The Ambassador briefly discussed Morocco’s current state of affairs, economic challenges, and political reforms. He then responded to questions from the audience members.

3. Summary

   Ambassador Bouhlal began his address by thanking the audience for their engagement and investments in Morocco. He explained that Morocco is in a period of progressive political reform and substantial changes are being carried out across the board. The Kingdom ratified a new constitution in July 2011, which brought about political reforms including a balance of powers between the King and the Parliament. Responsibility and accountability in government, protection of individual liberties, and promotion of human rights are all values enshrined in the new constitution. Following its victory in November’s Parliamentary elections, the moderate Islamist Party for Justice and Development has built a coalition government; the parties in power are working together to stimulate growth and enact important social reforms. Recent events in during the Arab Spring and the Euro Crisis, however present this new government with difficult challenges. Instability in the region led to a drop in revenue from the tourism industry. Economic problems in Europe, Morocco’s largest trade partner, have spilled into the kingdom. A severe drought has diminished this year’s wheat yield. Ambassador Bouhlal concluded by noting that, despite these difficulties, there are very promising business developments taking place in the automotive, renewable energy, aeronautic, and agricultural industries.

4. Q & A

   **Q**: (Audience Member from Northrop Grumman) What can Morocco, in conjunction with the United States and other Sahel countries, do to improve security in the Sahel region?
A: (Bouhlal) After the fall of Gaddafi, a proliferation of weapons flowed into the Sahel region. This adds another troubling element in a region where governance is already difficult. We are working closely with the US as well as other countries in the region to promote stability there.

Q: (Audience Member from USDA) Other than wheat and grains, which other food products present promising trade prospects?
A: (Bouhlal) Morocco is becoming a big producer of olive oil. The US imports a lot of olive oil, and growers in California only produce enough to satisfy a small percentage of the market. In the other direction, Morocco imports a lot of food products from the US. We also export large amounts of fish to Europe.

Q: (Audience Member from AIAC Investment) What countries represent most of the tourists who visit Morocco?
A: (Bouhlal) In 1943 when General Patton came to Morocco, he said that the country is a combination of the bible and Hollywood. Because of its proximity, most of Morocco’s tourists come from Europe—France, Spain, Italy, etc. Recently, however, there has been a surge in American visitors. They love to invest in hotels in Marrakesh and elsewhere. Additionally, more people from Russia and India have been visiting.

Q: (Audience Member from Emerald Planet TV) I know that Morocco hopes to get 38% of its energy from renewable sources by 2020; could you expand on investment in renewable energy technology there?
A: (Bouhlal) We don’t have oil reserves, so we have always looked toward renewable energy for the future. As technology progresses, this has become an attainable goal. We are investing in wind and solar energy. We have also changed regulations and are encouraging renewably energy companies to sell their excess production back to the grid. Additionally, we are connected to Europe and Algeria, so we can actually export energy internationally. We don’t want investors to simply build plants, we want to continue to develop the technology and improve the program.

Q: (Audience Member from a construction company) Could you touch on the construction industry in Morocco? Are there opportunities for activities in the residential or hotel and hospitality sector?
A: (Bouhlal) The construction business is doing very well in Morocco. We are trying to eradicate the slums and are constructing approximately 120 – 150 thousand new homes per year. Companies from all over the world are involved in these initiatives. Cities and infrastructure in Morocco are undergoing a rapid modernization. The new Mediterranean port, a huge investment, is already handling 3 million containers.

Q: What is happening with the youth? Is the economy growing rapidly enough to provide jobs?
A: (Bouhlal) We are doing our best. Growth averaged 5% in the past, and we need 7% to provide the necessary employment. If we are able to build on what we already have and improve our strongest sectors, I have no doubt we will be able to create jobs.

5. Observation

Approximately 60 professionals from businesses engaged or invested in Morocco attended the event. They represented various industries, including aeronautics, automobiles, renewable energy, construction, and agriculture, among others. The event was a luncheon, and, before the Ambassador’s address, guests had an opportunity to meet other professionals involved in business with Morocco. The National US-Arab Chamber of
The Crisis in Northern Mali: Implications for a Region in Flux

Date: 31 May 2012

1. Title: The Crisis in Northern Mali: Implications for a Region in Flux
   Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Atlantic Council

   Participants:
   **Rudolph Atallah:** Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council
   **Anouar Boukhars:** Co-Project Leader, Mauritania Working Group, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Assistant Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College
   **H.E. Maman Sidikou:** Ambassador of Niger to the United States
   **J. Peter Pham:** Moderator: Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council

2. Overview

   Much international attention has focused on Mali’s capital Bamako in the wake of the March 22nd coup overthrowing Mali’s elected government, but developments in the northern part of the country may have greater regional implications. Separatist Tuareg rebels, bolstered by militants and weapons flowing from Libya, have succeeded in driving out government forces. As a result, a number of Islamist groups are expanding their presence in the region. The Carnegie Endowment hosted a panel of experts to provide an update on the situation and discuss the broader regional implications for the Sahel, North Africa, and West Africa.

3. Summary

   Dr. J. Peter Pham opened with a synopsis of recent events in Mali. He discussed the March 22 “accidental coup” and the international community’s role in resolving the political crisis and rebuilding the government. He explained briefly that the north of Mali has been experiencing prolonged conflict as a result of separatist aims to take control. “Northern Mali is turning into a Star Wars bar of extremists from across the region. The last thing Africa needs right now is another failed state.” He added that “pragmatism” unifies the ideologically diverse groups in power—Tuareg-led separatists, Ansar Dine Islamists, AQIM, and MUJAO.

   Following Pham’s introduction, Rudolph Atallah gave a historical overview of revolts in Mali. During the 1950’s “wave of change” in Africa, the Tuaregs began to look toward independence. Mali’s independence in 1960 resulted in the first Tuareg rebellion in 1962. They feared that control from Bamako would lead to modernization and henceforth “exterminate” their culture. Mali’s military responded with force, effectively “alienating all Tuaregs.” Drought pushed the Tuaregs to move into neighboring countries Algeria and Libya. These events laid the foundation for the current turmoil, Atallah argued. In the summer of 1990, Aghali Alambo and his Popular Movement for the Liberation of Aghad (MPLA) led another Tuareg uprising. Algeria successfully mediated peace accords between
Mali and the insurgents, but another uprising led to a coup in 1992, ousting the president. That year, ethnic groups signed a national pact which integrated Tuareg youth into the military. A period of relative stability followed the pact, until 2006 when another uprising broke out. Atallah explained that this series of insurgencies laid the foundation for the most recent crisis.

Anouar Boukhars pointed out that Mali’s military does not represent the Malian people, and the country has never been so divided. He noted that the current crisis was triggered by the Libyan revolution, but its roots lie in longstanding domestic tensions. Gradual political decay and breakdown of state institutions, a lack of a credible settlement to historic Tuareg grievances, increased terrorist activity, the fall of Gaddafi, and a political vacuum are all factors that contributed to the success of the insurgents’ coup. The Malian government’s legitimacy was minimized by democratic stagnation, an overreliance on the patronage of its neighbors, including Libya, an illicit drug trade, and an undersized military. The coup was effectively a collective rejection of political elites; rebel leaders are gaining popular support by denouncing corruption in the Malian government. Boukhars concluded by enumerating some challenges Mali will face in the future: (1) supporting a civil government and keeping the army intact; (2) the heterogeneous nature of the insurgency; and (3) the threat of coexistence of Islamist movements (groups are trying to outsource a ‘more authentic’ form of Islam).

Maman Sidikou, Nigerien Ambassador to the US, presented a regional perspective and shed light on ways in which the crisis affects neighboring countries. He cited the influx of Libyan arms, kidnappings, and control by AQIM of drug-smuggling routes. The situation is of global concern and correspondingly requires a global response; it could potentially destabilize the entire region, he argued. “Terrorists are consolidating their position by the day in northern Mali and the international community just talks.” The African Union and ECOWAS need to intervene. The US could provide training, intelligence, and logistical support. Algeria should also assist. He explained that al-Qaeda is the “driving force” behind the crisis, and that Mali could “turn into another Afghanistan.” The Ambassador asked why the US and its allies were willing to intervene in Libya, but have failed to do so in Mali. He warned that if the international community does not act soon its credibility could be jeopardized.

4. Q & A

Q: We need to look back. Only a few people saw this coming. Before we go forward, why and how did we miss seeing this crisis in advance?
A: (Boukhars) There were definitely red flags; it was only a matter of time before something would break out.
(Atallah) The investments in the northern area of Mali were going to military infrastructure therefore upsetting Tuaregs who believed that they needed to strike before anything happened to them.
(Sidikou) Rebellions happen in many countries, including Niger, but the difference with Mali is that the international community tends to close its eyes to this one in particular. We need to ask about the responsibilities of regional powers. It’s not that we didn’t see the coming crisis, but the pace went very fast.

Q: (Malian Ambassador to the US) I would like to make a few clarifications. The constitution and institutional structure of Mali allow the military to occupy 2/3 of the country and army and terrorist groups operate their own prisons across the state. Secondly, there are fewer Tuaregs in the country than you think; they originate from Amazil and Berber people and are therefore from Morocco/Libya etc. Lastly, I must contend with your description of
popular ambition against the elites in Mali. The military was not all against the elites because the highest ranks of soldiers did not join this movement.

A: (Boukhars) People are trying to capitalize on momentum of anger at the political elite. The highest soldiers did not join the movement because they were exactly the targets. Legitimacy in this case stems from never having been associated with power.

(Pham) We need to be pragmatic and not get lost in ideologies. Some groups needed a boost and made alignments as a result rather than because of beliefs.

Q: Will the groups start fighting each other? Where does Colonel Gamou stand?

A: (Atallah) The colonel is resting for now. Until things are pulled together in the south, it will be quiet. The MNLA is concentrating on their image in the media for right now. Trying to resolve differences will be hard.

(Sidikou) Gamou sees al-Qaeda’s presence in Northern Mali as a result of all this. Al-Qaeda has resources and ideology that are helping to determine the outcome.

(Boukhars) The multiplicity of jihad groups present in Mali doesn’t mean that the extremist groups erode differences in Mali. People support them not because of ideology but because of material and security delivery.

Q: (Bob Holly) Given the depth, intensity, and longevity of problems, do you think that there is a prospect that autonomy might heal the rift and provide structure? In addition, what would neighboring countries think of this solution?

A: (Atallah) I hope they would go back to the pact of 1992, in all honesty the south has to get its act together before anything can happen.

(Boukhars) The political order needs to be restored before anything else. But autonomy is the only game in town. This could set a bad precedent.

(Sidikou) In Niger, most heads of regions are Tuaregs. No one wants the same thing. An institutional framework is needed to restore normalcy, the problem is the actors who shouldn’t be there.

(Pham) It would need to be decision of Malians. The last thing Africa needs is another failed state.

(The Malian Ambassador) The leaders are already Tuaregs and no coup can be justified.

Q: Can the panel speak of military integration? Tuaregs joining into the larger military? What do Tuaregs as a whole think and what does the rest of the military think? What lessons did we learn for the future?

A: (Sidikou) We integrated Tuaregs into the army in Niger and all I can really tell you is that results tend to be context-specific.

(Atallah) The area of Mali is so big and so vast that it is impossible to control. Large army numbers are imperative, making integration a necessity.

Q: (Marina Ottaway) I hear two points of view in this discussion. The first is that negotiation needs to happen or improvement is impossible. The other is that the first step is a military solution. Who will have to intervene?

A: (Sidikou) Negotiation would have to be done fast. I don’t understand why countries aren’t taking action in Mali when they know it’s worse than Afghanistan in terms of harboring terrorists.

(Atallah) Algeria’s amnesty program had some success in getting bad guys to work for the government. The USA has worked with all these governments, but the problem is that if American troops intervened, they would be considered foreign fighters. The USA can’t just go into Mali. By doing so, it would give terrorists a raison d’être. I think we need to leverage guys to turn on the bad groups.

(Boukhars) No military intervention would be useful until the mess in the South is solved. Distrust of the French is still there, so they can’t do anything. Niger and Mauritania wouldn’t
be able to give many soldiers because their armies are so small, but Algeria could probably help out.

5. Observation

The proceedings were attended 50-60 people from think tanks, press agencies, and federal offices. The experts provided valuable insight into the crisis in Mali, but failed to give much prediction about the future or possible solutions. Comments tended to focus on the Tuaregs and their impact on the Northern part of the country. Although Morocco and the Western Sahara were not mentioned, the event underscored that experts are increasingly paying attention to security issues in the Sahel. 

(Back to top)
The following information is from a generally reliable source but has not been corroborated by third party sources. I find the information herein important. Ed

WESTERN SAHARA / SITUATION REPORT
13/07/12

On July 2, SADR President and Polisario General Secretary Mohamed Abdelaziz, in his capacity as commander in chief of the SADR armed forces, presided over a graduation ceremony for special forces trainees at the Smara camp near Tindouf. After the usual military parade and martial arts display, SADR Defence Minister Mohamed Lamine Bouhali delivered a speech in which he proclaimed that a return to armed struggle had become “unavoidable”. The special forces graduation ceremony, he said, was a reflection of “the spirit of the youth, who are convinced that what has been taken by force [i.e. the independence of Western Sahara] can only be restored by force.” Bouhali's remarks were reproduced in a dispatch by Polisario's SPS news agency[1], and subsequently picked up on by Algeria's APS. Although not entirely without precedent, the SADR Defence Minister's statement about the inevitability of war is unusually categorical and comes after an extended period in which Polisario leaders had by and large dropped any references to armed struggle[2].

Discussing Bouhali's speech with us, a leading member of one of Polisario's civil society organisations initially dismissed the surprisingly bellicose tone as a mere rhetorical flourish, dictated by the context in which it was made (i.e. a passing-out ceremony for supposedly elite troops). When pressed, the source conceded that there was perhaps something more to it than that: with nothing to show for all their efforts to push the Western Sahara question forward via United Nations channels, the Polisario leadership finds itself under pressure from the increasingly frustrated youth in the camps, who have raised the slogan of a resumption of armed struggle; in response, members of the leadership from time to time take up the same slogan by way of demonstrating their undiminished and uncompromising radicalism.

The source goes on to argue that “nobody in the Tindouf camps” really believes in a return to armed struggle, for the simple reason that “the Sahrawi refugees, and especially the youth, are not motivated by this option”. And if some young dissidents – by which the source seems to mean the Youth of the Sahrawi Revolution group which emerged in the camps last year in the early days of the Arab Spring– go on about the need to go back to war, it is only in order to embarrass the present leadership. This rather dismissive attitude towards the young dissidents is perhaps above all indicative of the source's own pro-leadership inclinations, and it would no doubt be a mistake to write off the challenge of the Youth of the Sahrawi Revolution and other such groupings altogether. Despite the leadership's attempts to quash the movement[3], there were renewed clashes between young protesters and Polisario security in the camps on July 8, according to as yet unconfirmed reports from [4]
Nonetheless, the source's basic evaluation of Bouhali's comments – that they were intended to ward off pressure from below and do not reflect a sincere conversion to a pro-war line – appears to be essentially correct. Polisario's leadership is well aware that there can be no return to armed struggle without Algiers' assent. During Polisario's 13th congress in December of last year, a source quoted General Secretary Mohamed Abdelaziz as admitting, in private, that a return to war could not be envisaged because “as soon as the first shot is fired” against the Moroccans, all of Polisario's friends – including Algeria – would withdraw their support for the Saharawi cause. There is no indication that Algeria has become any more inclined to support military action since then. Indeed, Sahrawi sources told us in June that Algiers is now starving Polisario of arms: it stopped supplying heavy weaponry some time ago, and now only provides side arms, essentially for policing purposes.

Worse still, the confused and highly dangerous situation which has opened up in northern Mali seems to be causing the Polisario leadership to look over its shoulder at Algiers more anxiously than ever. In the run-up to the 19th African Union assembly being held this month in Addis Ababa, a member of Polisario's National Secretariat confided to us that the Front's leadership fears moves to have the SADR's membership suspended[5]. The source claimed that certain parties – whom he did not name[6] – had been lobbying the diplomatic missions of various African countries with documents containing what they claimed was proof of the involvement of Polisario members in armed groups active in northern Mali. According to the National Secretariat member, these lobbyists, while recognising that some countries such as South Africa will remain steadfast in their support for Polisario, believe that Algeria would not oppose the SADR's suspension from the African Union if confronted with proof that members of Polisario and of the SADR's armed forces have been implicated in the takeover of northern Mali by Tuareg separatist and radical Islamist groups.

A North African diplomat at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa asserts that in the northern Mali conflict, Polisario had been rooting for a victory by the Tuareg-separatist MNLA[7] - a loosing bet, as it turns out, the MNLA having been swiftly sidelined by the Tuareg Islamist Ansar Dine group and its allies AQMI and MUJAO. The North African diplomat adds that, although there have been no formal discussions on the question of the SADR's membership during the preparatory meetings for the AU assembly, non-official documents written by various “observers and analysts” attacking the SADR's full membership of the African Union as anomalous have indeed been doing the rounds. These anti-SADR screeds highlight allegations of Polisario involvement not only in northern Mali but also in last year's Libyan conflict, when Sahrawi military personnel were said to have fought on the side of the Qaddafi regime. If these allegations were backed up with incontrovertible evidence, the diplomat argues, the SADR would find itself in a “very difficult position” within the African Union.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President
The Gabriel Company, LLC
Strikingly, SPS published the dispatch in Arabic only, neglecting to translate it into English, Spanish or French.

One Saharawi source alluded to a somewhat similar declaration by an unspecified member of the Polisario leadership in early June, but we have not been able to track this down in the public record.

In January of this year, the Youth of the Saharawi Revolution set up a small 'protest camp' near the seat of the General Secretariat of the Polisario Front in the Tindouf camps, which was broken up by Polisario security forces; three of the protesters were arrested and detained by the SADR Gendarmerie.

In mid-June, the same source told us that a delegation of African foreign ministers visiting Tindouf had asked Polisario's leaders to keep a lower profile than usual at the African Union gathering in July 9. According to the source, members of the Polisario National Secretariat interpreted this as a first step towards a possible challenge to SADR’s full membership of the African Union.

Similarly, addressing a meeting of political commissars of the Polisario Front on June 9, General Secretary Mohamed Abdelaziz accused the Moroccan intelligence services of "attempting to compromise the struggle of the Saharawi people by linking it to terrorism and drug trafficking."

It may be recalled that a member of the Saharawi National Council, speaking to us shortly after the fall of Timbuktu at the beginning of April, described the victory of the rebellion in northern Mali as a “major event” from the point of view of the Saharawi people. On the one hand, it would be to the SADR's advantage to establish solid relations with a new Tuareg state – it would no longer be a matter for the Saharawis of choosing whether (or how) to deal with armed islamist groups but rather of building relations with legitimate structures representing the Tuareg people. On the other, if the Tuaregs were able to exercise their right to self-determination, then the case in favour of the Saharawis exercising the same right could only be strengthened.
According to a Saharawi journalist in Tindouf, Polisario's security services have for the past few weeks been imposing a nighttime curfew in the refugee camps (8 p.m. to 6 a.m.), for “security reasons” relating to the “fight against organised crime, theft and armed attacks”, which are said to have increased noticeably of late.
You may be interested in the following, a translation of Algérie Presse Service's account of an interview with SADR Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek. Most pertinent sections in bold.

Ould Salek on the liberation of hostages and stalled talks with Morocco


Rome — Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, Sadr’s foreign minister, talked to Italian geopolitics periodical Limes about the liberation of European aid workers kidnapped from the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf and the stalled peace talks after Morocco withdrew confidence in the United Nation’s mediator, Christopher Ross.

On the Sahrawis’ role in the liberation of the three European hostages — an Italian woman and two Spaniards — Ould Salek said he was “moved and immensely happy” for the release of these three aid workers “who have been part of our family for quiet some time”. He added that “immediately” after the kidnapping, Sadr officials established contacts with their counterparts in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as the Italian and Spanish governments.

“Our sole objective was to liberate the hostages,” he said. “We decided to use diplomacy and intelligence work and avoid military action; the Spanish and Italian authorities had asked us to be extremely careful”. He added that there was constant exchange of information on the hostages’ health conditions and whereabouts, declaring that Sahrawi leaders knew perfectly well in what region of Mali they were held.

He pointed out that the serious instability that hit Mali and the Sahel region “dramatically complicated” negotiations with the kidnappers. “This whole region is a powder keg; at one moment between May and June we feared the worst” for the hostages.

“Mali is in a state of total anarchy. In this corridor that goes from Chad through Niger, Mali and Mauritania to the Western Sahara the partisans of radical Islam were trying to spread chaos. In that region conflicts, terrorist attacks and kidnappings proliferate, and some end in a bad way,” explained Mr. Salek.

Sahrawi leaders, he continued, have always argued that efforts to resolve the Sahrawi conflict go in the direction of greater stability for the whole region.

“There is no doubt that Moroccan occupation of our territories is a destabilising factor,” he stressed. “You can’t take it out of my head that Moroccan intelligence services are behind that strange group that formed specifically to kidnap the aid workers. Moroccan intelligence has been trying to destabilise the region since 2005 to reduce humanitarian aid and thus pressure Polisario into accepting political concessions.”

Asked about the current state of affairs in the Sahara conflict, Ould Salek said Morocco’s rejection of Sahrawis’ demands and its disrespect of so many un resolutions gives rise to a “growing desire” to return to armed struggle on the part of the Sahrawi people, especially the younger generation. “But I rule out the existence of sleeper jihadist cells in the refugee camps or the occupied territories”.

Describing Morocco’s unilateral decision to withdraw confidence in Christopher Ross as “a very grave step”, he recalled that the United States and the un have reiterated their confidence in the man “who was always in the service of a much hoped-for just resolution of this conflict”.

Morocco defied the international community and stopped negotiations, declared the Sahrawi minister. These talks advanced slowly and showed minimal results but, he argued, at least they kept the path of dialogue open and helped contain demands for a return to armed struggle. “I fear it will become increasingly difficult to resist the call to arms”.


The information contained in this report are from public news and private sources, none of which has been corroborated by third parties. Ed

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
July 25, 2012

Executive Summary

Political Trends

• The newly elected parliament has gone into summer recess without having discussed any laws or constitutional issues or taken a single vote on any matter.
• There is still no new government and President Bouteflika has begun his annual performance-evaluation interviews with the ‘interim’ ministers.
• With Ahmed Ouyahia reportedly ruled out, the main sticking point in selecting a new government appears to be the choice of prime minister.
• With the political reform process looking increasingly irrelevant, there has been some speculation that President Bouteflika may not bow out in 2014 after all and opt to run for a fourth successive term of office.

Foreign Relations

• Bouteflika and France’s newly elected President Hollande have exchanged letters which tentatively look beyond the sterile dispute over official declarations relating to the colonial period which has been a blockage in Franco-Algerian relations.
• French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius visited Algiers in mid-July, and is now talking of a possible official visit by Hollande at the end of this year, during which a new “very high-level partnership” might be signed.
• Paris’ most urgent imperative is to bring Algeria on board with international moves to crush the hardline islamist entity in northern Mali, but Algiers is reluctant to either give its assent to an intervention by French troops or commit troops of its own to a potentially destabilising adventure.
• The need to secure Algerian cooperation in northern Mali may be one reason behind perceived shifts in the French government’s attitude towards Morocco, notably on the Western Sahara question. Another may be efforts to persuade Algeria to mobilise its considerable hard currency reserves in support of international financial bail-out funds.

Security

• Levels of violence dipped in June but rose again in July, as jihadist groups geared up for Ramadan, seen as a particularly propitious period for jihad.
• AQMI split-off MUJAO has carried out another suicide bombing against a gendarmerie facility in the south of the country.
• In light of the threat of MUJAO launching attacks against oil and gas installations in the south, the authorities have reportedly stepped up security around facilities in and around the Hassi Rmel gas hub, and are evaluating advanced electronic surveillance systems for the southern borders.
Political Trends

On July 2, the parliament that elected in May in what was supposed to be a key step in the process of political and institutional reform, went into summer recess, without having discussed a single law or taken a single vote on any issue. Neither had it had the chance to see in the long-awaited new government – which three weeks later has still not been formed. Indeed, the very idea of naming a new prime minister and cabinet has effectively been pushed back until after the summer break: on July 22 Bouteflika launched the round of performance-evaluation interviews with cabinet members that he holds every year during Ramadan, regardless of the fact that they are technically only caretaker ministers, in a clear sign that he is in no hurry to announce a new line-up.

There have been suggestions in the Algerian press that the delay in forming a new cabinet is chiefly due to the refusal of the various political parties with representation in the new parliament to join a coalition government. But there have been few signs of any real negotiations or even active attempts to persuade parties hitherto in the opposition to come on board, and it ought to have been possible for the Presidency and the DRS to pull together a cabinet from the FLN and the RND, which together have a clear majority, had the will existed. True, both the FLN and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the RND remain riven with internal crises, as are virtually all of Algeria's political parties (the moderate islamist MSP, having withdrawn from the ruling coalition, is facing a minor split led by former Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul, precisely over the question of participation in government). But the biggest sticking point is doubtless the choice of Prime Minister, insofar as this risks being widely interpreted – rightly or wrongly – as an indication of the regime's choice of successor for Bouteflika. Discussing the issue towards the end of June – at which time they claimed a new government would be unveiled “soon” – usually candid sources close to the Presidency were somewhat cagey, although they did seem adamant that Ouyahia would not be reappointed. In this sense, the continued delay in choosing a new Prime Minister underlines the fact that, with Ouyahia out of the running, there is no obvious successor to Bouteflika. Candidates who are now being considered for the position of Prime Minister – the name of Abdelmalek Sellal, currently Minister of Water Resources, has been floated by sources – appear to be compromise figures, probably lacking presidential stature.

Such is the impasse that there is now rising speculation in the Algerian media that President Bouteflika may not bow out at the end of his current term of office, as has been generally assumed for some time, and could instead seek to embark on a fourth term of office. Given Bouteflika's declining vigour this may not be the most likely scenario, and it would certainly be at variants with the perceived message of his May 8 speech in Setif (see previous reports), in which he seemed to indicate that the time had come for his generation to hand over the reins of power to the post-independence generations. But the very fact that such a scenario is now being seriously discussed is testimony to just how sclerotic the Algerian political system is. Promises to reform it now seem increasingly irrelevant: although the initial plan unveiled by Bouteflika in April 2011 (and to which he continues, on occasion, to pay lip-service) was to have the newly elected parliament propose constitutional amendments which might then be submitted to approval by referendum, there was no discussion whatsoever of constitutional matters in the two short months the new parliament sat before breaking up for the summer, the constitutional reform committee that was supposed to generate ideas and proposals has not been established,
and it is widely assumed that the whole process has been postponed until a later, and unspecified, date.

In the meantime, Bouteflika has been officiating over the celebrations to mark the first 50 years of Algeria's independence, and over the military promotions ceremony which coincides every year with independence day. For such a momentous date, Algeria's 50th anniversary celebrations were on the whole surprisingly low-key. Neither were the military promotions particularly spectacular, but they did in their quiet way mark another step in the generational shift within the armed forces and the all-important DRS – as exemplified by the elevation of Gen. Bachir Tartag, who took over as head of the DRS's crucial Directorate of Internal Security at the end of last year, to the rank of major-general.

Foreign Relations

Freshly installed in the Elysée Palace, France's new Socialist President François Hollande, on whom great hopes have been pinned in terms of breaking the deadlock in relations with Algeria, marked the historically charged 50th anniversary of Algeria's independence with a short but polite letter to President Bouteflika. While it was by no means earth-shattering, Hollande's missive marked a tentative step in the direction of at least recognising, if not apologising for, the crimes of colonialism:

I heard your call, on May 8, for an objective reading of history, uninfluenced by wars of remembrance or by passing differences [between France and Algeria]. Frenchmen and Algerians have a shared responsibility: to tell the truth. They owe it to their forebears, but also to their youth. France considers that there is now space for a lucid and responsible examination of its painful colonial past, as well as for a confident momentum forward.

President Bouteflika reciprocated with a letter to mark France's national day on July 14 that showed some readiness to engage with Hollande's overture:

Relations between Algeria and France pre-date the colonial period, which left a particularly strong mark our common history, and lasting scars on both our peoples. For Algerians, the resulting wounds are deep, but we wish, like you, to look to tomorrow and try to build a future of peace and prosperity for the youth of both our countries. To that end, it is time to exorcise the past by submitting it, together and in the appropriate frameworks, to a brave and lucid examination that will strengthen our bonds of esteem and friendship.

Whether this will be sufficient to wipe the slate clean and “reset” relations between Paris and Algiers remains to be seen, but the tone is certainly a positive one. In the new Socialist administration's first days in office, when ministerial teams were still settling in and no clear schedules had yet been established, there was even some speculation that Hollande might visit Algiers this summer, although the tentative date for an official visit has since been pushed back several times. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius is now talking about a presidential visit “at the end of the year”, during which a “new, very high-level partnership” between the two countries might be signed.

Ostensibly, it was largely to prepare for just such a trip that two high-level French delegations jetted into Algiers in July. On closer examination, however, other, more pressing matters topped the agenda. The first visit took place on the eve of Algerian independence day, when a team headed by François Hollande’s African affairs advisor Hélène Le Gall arrived for talks with top officials. The fact that it was Le Gall – a career diplomat whose
main area of interest and expertise is sub-Saharan Africa\[1\] – who headed the delegation was in itself a pointer to the most urgent issue at stake: the intractable crisis opened up in northern Mali by the Tuareg revolt, the coup in Bamako and the hardline islamist takeover in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Northern Mali seems also to have been one of the most important topics raised by Fabius when he visited on July 15-16.

Extremely concerned at the prospect of AQMI and its allies Ansar Dine and MUJAO establishing an 'Afghanistan in the Sahel', Paris has been urging Algeria to make an active contribution to multilateral efforts to restore the authority of the central government in the north of Mali. This much has been discussed openly in the press, on both sides of the Mediterranean, and indeed François Hollande himself has been quoted as telling a council of ministers meeting on July 13 that any solution to the problem of Mali “must pass through Algiers”. Less publicly, French intelligence sources have hinted that the successive French visitors have been lobbying Algiers to give at least tacit assent to an intervention by French special forces (perhaps under the cover of an agreement with the African Union\[2\]).

In its public pronouncements, Algiers has so far held fast to its rejection of outside involvement in the region, as well as to its long-established doctrine of refusing to conduct military operations of its own beyond its borders. Consolidation of a jihadist entity on their southern frontiers may yet force their hand, but the Algerians certainly have powerful reasons to be wary of sending their own troops over the border. There is the danger of becoming bogged down in an unwinnable conflict that would almost certainly have a destabilising effect at home, to begin with. On top of that, in the case of a multilateral operation Algiers fears that its armed forces would effectively be used as auxiliaries by outside powers (France, of course, but perhaps also the United States, which is reported to have been exerting similar pressure), to which it would effectively be surrendering a fragment of its cherished sovereignty.

In parallel to these contacts with Algiers, Parisian diplomatic and political circles have begun to notice a subtle shift in the French government’s attitude towards Morocco. More specifically, there is a feeling that under Hollande, Paris is no longer prepared to back Rabat unconditionally and to the hilt on the Western Sahara question. And this is seen as flowing precisely from the drive to mend fences with Algiers.

Following this logic, Paris salons perceive two imperatives at work. On the one hand, and plausibly enough, the need to secure Algiers' acquiescence for a military intervention, in one form or another, in northern Mali. On the other hand, and rather less obviously, it is suggested that the incoming Socialist government, anticipating a further worsening of the European monetary and financial crisis that might stretch the French state's finances to near breaking point, could be seeking to prepare the way for Algeria – whose foreign currency reserves hit $200bn earlier this year and are still growing – to contribute to a bailout in one form or another, if and when necessary.

The idea of Algeria lending directly to the French Treasury would almost certainly prove too unpalatable to public opinion on either side of the Mediterranean to be politically feasible. But it is by no means out of the question that Paris may be involved in persuading Algeria to lend more money to the International Monetary Fund, as
was requested in April, in order to shore up its ability to provide emergency assistance to governments facing financial meltdown.

Security

Levels of violence in June were below average, with 23 incidents overall including 11 jihadist operations proper (i.e. initiated by AQMI or MUJAO). Jihadist activity picked up somewhat in July, with 12 operations in the first three weeks of the month (against only four operations initiated by the security forces). The first week of July was particularly busy, with six jihadist operations reported. Past experience suggests that the coming few weeks may see intense jihadist activity programmed to coincide with the holy month of Ramadan (began on July 20), which is seen as particularly auspicious for jihad[3].

While Algiers and its environs remained quiet, on June 29 Algeria’s southern provinces saw their second suicide bombing since early March (see AMSR #113 of April 3). This time it was the city of Ouargla, in the centre of Algeria's largest oil basin, that was hit: a suicide car bomber targeted the town’s Gendarmerie headquarters, killing one gendarme and wounding two others, in addition to the bomber himself. The operation, like the Tamanrasset suicide car bombing in March, was claimed by MUJAO the following day. On July 10, El-Khabar said security forces reinforced their presence in the nearby oil town of Hassi Messaoud, looking for “terrorist elements” that might have “taken refuge” there.

Although the Ouargla bombing was operationally speaking relatively unsuccessful — the car could not break through the concrete barriers at the building’s entry, hence the low death toll — it remains a worrying development for Algerian authorities. MUJAO, a recently established organisation based across the border in northern Mali, has now proved capable of planning and carrying out two suicide attacks in four months in Algeria's deep south, a region where suicide bombings were hitherto unknown and terrorist activity was limited to mostly smuggling or, at worst, kidnapping of foreign nationals. In both operations, MUJAO targeted security forces, but the possibility that it might attempt to hit oil and gas installations cannot be discounted. Since the Ouargla attack, it has been reported that the security forces in Hassi Rmel, Algeria's main gas hub, have begun stepping up security at production sites and other facilities.

Along Algeria’s southern border itself, the situation was remarkably quiet. The only incident reported came on June 25 when the army intercepted a group of jihadists, believed to belong to MUJAO, south of Reggane (wilaya of Adrar). Two jihadists were killed, one wounded and one captured. This makes June the quietest month on Algeria’s southern borders for at least the past two years (for comparison, there were five incidents in this area in May alone). There is no clear explanation for this sudden lull, and a media blackout is not to be ruled out. In the meantime, a group of experts from the Defence and Interior Ministries is reported to have been examining the feasibility of installing advanced electronic border control systems, inspired by systems used along the US-Mexico and Saudi Arabia-Iraq borders, and is said to be due to submit its report to the two ministries and the presidency in the near future.

Beyond Algeria’s southern border, the most notable development was MUJAO's liberation of several hostages. Three European hostages — two Spanish aid workers and one Italian — it kidnapped from Tindouf, Algeria, in October 2011 (see AMSR #108 of October 24, 2011) were freed in mid-July. A MUJAO spokesman told AFP (quoted in El-Khabar, 19/7) that the organisation released them because “our conditions have been met”, amid reports that the jihadist group had received a hefty ransom and had three detainees in Mauritanian prisons set free. Two days earlier, MUJAO had released three of the seven Algerian diplomats its took hostage in Gao, northern Mali, in early April. The Algerian authorities deny having paid a ransom, but there are strong suspicions that money did change hands in exchange for the diplomats – which would represent a major dent in Algiers' longstanding policy of opposition of ransom payments to terrorist groups.
Le Gall had been appointed ambassador to Kigali in late 2011, but in February of this year it emerged that the Rwandan government had refused to accept her letter of credence, apparently because that she was held to be too close to then Foreign Minister Alain Juppé.

There had been suggestions that the French – and indeed the Algerians – could participate in an operation launched under the auspices of the Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but Algeria is believed to have been hostile to the idea. French diplomacy seems to believe that the African Union – of which Algeria is a member, unlike ECOWAS – might be a more promising channel.

Last year the month of August, which coincided with Ramadan, saw nearly double the usual level of jihadist activity and a major suicide bombing against the military academy in Cherchell, Tipaza (see AMSR #107 of September 23, 2011).
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2012 9:43 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: FW: PBS NewsHour interviews Morocco's Youssef Amrani - "Arab Nations Consider How to Apply More Diplomatic Pressure on Syria"
Attachments: PBS NewsHour 'Arab Nations Consider How to Apply More Diplomatic Pressure on Syria' 25July2012.pdf

In the News

FYI – Last night, PBS NewsHour senior correspondent Judy Woodruff interviewed Yousseff Amrani, Morocco's Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs, live during the 6:00 PM PBS NewsHour program, discussing the subject of Syria and international efforts to address the worsening situation.

See below and attached for transcript and link to video replay.


PBS NEWSHOUR

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

ANALYSIS

Arab Nations Consider How to Apply More Diplomatic Pressure on Syria

PBS NewsHour’s senior correspondent Judy Woodruff interviews Youssef Amrani, Morocco’s Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs

For Video Replay, go to: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec12/syria2_07-25.html

Transcript

JUDY WOODRUFF: A White House spokesman said today that the use of heavy weapons in Aleppo showed the -- quote -- "depth of depravity" by the government of Bashar al-Assad. For more on the conflict in Syria, we turn to Youssef Amrani. He is Morocco's minister delegate for foreign affairs, the second highest ranking official in the ministry. Morocco is a member of the Arab League and currently is the only Arab country with a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Minister, thank you for being with us.

YOUSSEF AMRANI, Moroccan Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure.
JUDY WOODRUFF: What is your understanding right now of where the conflict in Syria stands, who has the upper hand?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Today, I think the situation is worsening.

"We should work with the opposition, we should work with the neighboring countries to see -- to find a political solution, because a humanitarian crisis will be not -- could not be managed."

- Youssef Amrani, Moroccan minister and diplomat

We are witnessing a humanitarian crisis, and if nothing is done right away, the country will go into civil war. We have tried. Morocco, as a member of the Security Council, we have tried. We have taken the lead in the Security Council, but we were vetoed by Russia and China. Now the importance and priority must be given to save the civilians, to stop the violence against civilians and to prepare the necessary conditions for a political and democratic transition.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And how should that be done? You're here in Washington today. You met with congressional leaders. You were at the White House meeting with White House officials. What are you looking for? What are you asking for?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: We're looking for the strengthening of the opposition, that it should have the necessary measures to be able to build up in a sovereign way its future. Then we need to support all the...

JUDY WOODRUFF: Build up, and in what manner? What sort of help...

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Well, the future of Syria must be democratic and should include all different groupings of the Syrian society. And, of course, the independence and the national integrity of Syria should be respected. Of course, this means that we need to -- that the current regime is not able to lead the democratic transition.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And you are asking the United States for more help? As you know, the U.S., other Western countries have been reluctant to get involved militarily.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Yes. Listen, the U.S. has been committed since the beginning as far as a political solution. Morocco, also, as you correctly stated, the only Arab country in the Security Council, we have taken all the decisions taken by the Arab League to the Security Council. Today, we need more pressure and we need to see, because we think that we are stuck in the Security Council with these vetoes, and we think... I think to move forward.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And when you say more pressure, what kind of pressure are you talking about?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Well, more sanctions, more international support and to work with the Russians to see if they can help to find a political solution and a way out, because the status quo actually is not acceptable for the Syrian community.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Now, we know that some members of the Arab League, some of the Gulf states, are actually sending military support, military help to the opposition.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Yes.

JUDY WOODRUFF: We know that Turkey has closed the border to prevent trucks from going from Turkey -- from Iran into Turkey.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: The borders.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Are you asking in any way for military -- more military support for the opposition?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: You see, for us, the priority is a negotiated solution to move forward, because we don't forget that there are a lot of weapons in Syria, and especially even chemical weapons. We need to avoid any catastrophe. So, that's why we are giving every chance to peace and negotiation. Then, if we fail on this issue, maybe we can think about alternative solutions.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And at what point do you decide that diplomacy isn't working? Because this has been tried and tried and tried again.
YOUSSEF AMRANI: We have to continue trying, because it is important, in the Security Council and elsewhere. But we should work with the opposition, we should work with the neighboring countries to see -- to find a political solution, because a humanitarian crisis will be not -- could not be managed.

JUDY WOODRUFF: So, are you saying it's a mistake for any outside country right now to send more military support to the opposition?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Let's give...

JUDY WOODRUFF: Or intelligence support?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Of course, intelligence is essential. It's important. Let's give some more chance to negotiation. We hope that Russia and China will understand that, for their own interests, it is better to have a safe and political outcome to this crisis, because nobody can manage the humanitarian issue knowing the interconnection between the terrorist organizations in the neighboring countries.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Well, that brings me to the question. One of the reasons the U.S. and other countries have been reluctant to get involved, to support the opposition is because they don't know what a successor government is going to look like. We just saw in that report al-Qaida starting to show up among the opposition. How can you be sure that the next government won't be as repressive as this government?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Listen, we had some experiences in Libya, in Tunisia, in the Maghreb, that were successful. I think that we have to believe that, thanks to dialogue, thanks to negotiation, we will be able to move forward, because any escalation in violence won't be a solution. And we -- as Morocco, we believe we give more chance to this dialogue and we hope to succeed. We know today we are a little bit stuck in the Security Council because of these vetoes, but we will try. Morocco is hosting the next meeting of the Friend of Syria. We are thinking...

JUDY WOODRUFF: Friends of Syria.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Friends of Syria. We are thinking of some ideas, because I think we should continue to make more pressure on the regime. And maybe we find out. As you know, two, three days ago, the Arab League has sent some messages to Bashar al-Assad to try to see if he can leave.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Any response from him?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Not yet.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Do you think there will be one?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: I actually cannot answer this question. I hope that the Syrian people continue to fight.

JUDY WOODRUFF: You agree with those who say it's just a matter of time before his government falls?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: It is also a matter of time. And we have to continue believing that -- believing in -- the Syrian people are trying their best to overcome this dictator regime.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Minister Youssef Amrani of Morocco, we thank you very much for talking with us.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Thank you very much.
Arab Nations Consider How to Apply More Diplomatic Pressure on Syria

JUDY WOODRUFF: A White House spokesman said today that the use of heavy weapons in Aleppo showed the -- quote -- "depth of depravity" by the government of Bashar al-Assad. For more on the conflict in Syria, we turn to Youssef Amrani. He is Morocco’s minister delegate for foreign affairs, the second highest ranking official in the ministry. Morocco is a member of the Arab League and currently is the only Arab country with a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Minister, thank you for being with us.

YOUSSEF AMRANI, Moroccan Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure.

JUDY WOODRUFF: What is your understanding right now of where the conflict in Syria stands, who has the upper hand?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Today, I think the situation is worsening.

"We should work with the opposition, we should work with the neighboring countries to see -- to find a political solution, because a humanitarian crisis will be not -- could not be managed."

Youssef Amrani, Moroccan minister and diplomat

We are witnessing a humanitarian crisis, and if nothing is done right away, the country will go into civil war. We have tried. Morocco, as a member of the Security Council, we have tried. We have taken the lead in the Security Council, but we were vetoed by Russia and China. Now the importance and priority must be given to save the civilians, to stop the violence against civilians and to prepare the necessary conditions for a political and democratic transition.
JUDY WOODRUFF: And how should that be done? You're here in Washington today. You met with congressional leaders. You were at the White House meeting with White House officials. What are you looking for? What are you asking for?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: We're looking for the strengthening of the opposition, that it should have the necessary measures to be able to build up in a sovereign way its future. Then we need to support all the...

JUDY WOODRUFF: Build up, and in what manner? What sort of help...

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Well, the future of Syria must be democratic and should include all different groupings of the Syrian society. And, of course, the independence and the national integrity of Syria should be respected. Of course, this means that we need to -- that the current regime is not able to lead the democratic transition.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And are you asking the United States for more help? As you know, the U.S., other Western countries have been reluctant to get involved militarily.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Yes. Listen, the U.S. has been committed since the beginning as far as a political solution. Morocco, also, as you correctly stated, the only Arab country in the Security Council, we have taken all the decisions taken by the Arab League to the Security Council. Today, we need more pressure and we need to see, because we think that we are stuck in the Security Council with these vetoes, and we think ... I think to move forward.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And when you say more pressure, what kind of pressure are you talking about?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Well, more sanctions, more international support and to work with the Russians to see if they can help to find a political solution and a way out, because the status quo actually is not acceptable for the Syrian community.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Now, we know that some members of the Arab League, some of the Gulf states, are actually sending military support, military help to the opposition.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Yes.

JUDY WOODRUFF: We know that Turkey has closed the border to prevent trucks from going from Turkey -- from Iran into Turkey.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: The borders.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Are you asking in any way for military -- more military support for the opposition?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: You see, for us, the priority is a negotiated solution to move forward, because we don't forget that there are a lot of weapons in Syria, and especially even chemical weapons. We need to avoid any catastrophe. So, that's why we are giving every chance to peace and negotiation. Then, if we fail on this issue, maybe we can think about alternative solutions.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And at what point do you decide that diplomacy isn't working? Because this has been tried and tried and tried again.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: We have to continue trying, because it is important, in the Security Council and elsewhere. But we should work with the opposition, we should work with the neighboring countries to see -- to find a political solution, because a humanitarian crisis will be not -- could not be managed.

JUDY WOODRUFF: So, are you saying it's a mistake for any outside country right now to send more military support to the opposition?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Let's give...

JUDY WOODRUFF: Or intelligence support?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Of course, intelligence is essential. It's important. Let's give some more chance to negotiation. We hope that Russia and China will understand that, for their own interests, it is better to have a safe and political outcome to this crisis, because nobody can manage the humanitarian issue knowing the interconnection between the terrorist organizations in the neighboring countries.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Well, that brings me to the question. One of the reasons the U.S. and other countries have been reluctant to get involved, to support the opposition is because they don't know what a successor government is going to look like. We just saw in that report al-Qaida starting to show up among the opposition. How can you be sure that the next government won't be as repressive as this government?
YOUSSEF AMRANI: Listen, we had some experiences in Libya, in Tunisia, in the Maghreb, that were successful. I think that we have to believe that, thanks to dialogue, thanks to negotiation, we will be able to move forward, because any escalation in violence won't be a solution. And we -- as Morocco, we believe we give more chance to this dialogue and we hope to succeed. We know today we are a little bit stuck in the Security Council because of these vetoes, but we will try. Morocco is hosting the next meeting of the Friend of Syria. We are thinking...

JUDY WOODRUFF: Friends of Syria.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Friends of Syria. We are thinking of some ideas, because I think we should continue to make more pressure on the regime. And maybe we find out. As you know, two, three days ago, the Arab League has sent some messages to Bashar al-Assad to try to see if he can leave.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Any response from him?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Not yet.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Do you think there will be one?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: I actually cannot answer this question. I hope that the Syrian people continue to fight.

JUDY WOODRUFF: You agree with those who say it's just a matter of time before his government falls?

YOUSSEF AMRANI: It is also a matter of time. And we have to continue believing that -- believing in -- the Syrian people are trying their best to overcome this dictator regime.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Minister Youssef Amrani of Morocco, we thank you very much for talking with us.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: Thank you very much.
Morocco: A new strategic partner?

By Jennifer Rubin

At a time when the United States is struggling to devise an “Arab Spring” policy and is running low on strategic allies (as Egypt evolves as a wild card rather than a reliable ally), Morocco’s deputy foreign minister, Youssef Amrani, was at the Brookings Institute to talk about the Middle East, the U.S-Morocco relationship and more.

The soft-spoken diplomat has a degree from Boston University and more than 30 years in Morocco’s foreign ministry. In a 30-minute interview I asked him why he is in the United States. He answered: “I’m here to strengthen this relationship between Morocco and the United States.” Indeed, he doesn’t conceal his aims. “We’re ambitious and want to move toward a larger partnership, more strategic.”

Relations between the United States and Morocco are solid, but what Amrani’s kingdom is after is a more comprehensive relationship rather than simply a discrete list of agreements. His country is looking for “political dialogue, joint dialogue,” he explains, on a whole range of issues concerning Africa and the Middle East.

There is good reason for both sides to work cooperatively. Amrani is quick to remind me, “We bring some vision from Africa and from the Arab world.”

Morocco is attempting a peaceful transition to a constitutional democracy while also devolving power to local authorities and modernizing its schools and judiciary. Along with a family code that provides for greater rights for women, Morocco is trying to accomplish in a decade what took centuries in Western Europe. He recalls that for 10 years Morocco has been working for reform under the auspices of a reformist king, Mohammed VI. “The king had the leadership to promote reform,” he explains. This meant that both economic and political reforms were required. “It was his top priority,” Amrani said. The dual track of political and economic reform included the realization that Morocco must “share values with the West, democracy and free trade.” He then launched into a defense of free markets that would make U.S. economic conservatives blush. Today the most important factor, he told me enthusiastically, is the private sector. When he told me that is “where the jobs are,” he sounded a bit like Bibi Netanyahu, also a Western-educated Middle East leader who understood private-sector growth was the key to economic success.
When we turn to the Middle East more generally, he is, well, diplomatic. Morocco has traditionally been reticent about offering advice or serving as a “model” for the region. He won’t comment on the specifics of the Egyptian election, but he did say, “To be successful it needs civil society, political parties and political will.” He continued, sounding much like some Brookings Institute fellows: “Egypt needs leadership, needs the association of all the Egyptian sensibilities [an inclusive political system] and development of institutions.” (I wonder if the Obama administration has thought about Egypt this systematically.)

Syria is a far different situation, of course. He began with a caveat: “We must be respectful of national sovereignty.” But then he added that that Syrians need “their own system based on democracy and respect for human rights.” He said, “There is no choice but to speed up the process.” He warned that bloodshed “only encourages extremists.”

Indeed, evidence of opportunistic extremists abounds. He cited Iraq. (“The country was collapsing and al-Qaeda came in to create instability.” And he ran through the situation in Mali, where a failed state allowed a separatist, extremist movement to take hold.

There is a reason, of course, that Morocco is so concerned about the vacuum into which extremists rush when regimes break down. Morocco has been struggling to reach a resolution of the dispute over the Western Sahara, which the Polisario, a popular-front type terror group, seeks to make into an independent state. The United States has praised Morocco’s proposal for autonomy, but the Algerian government (where camps of refugee are held by the Polisario) has balked. He says, “Now we need compromise, pragmatism . . . We need countries to be engaged to find a solution.”

There is urgency for Morocco in resolving the dispute, not only to alleviate the humanitarian crisis but also to doff the toxic alliance that has developed between the Polisario and al-Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb. “It is a major security threat,” he says of the Polisario-AQIM partnership. “Not only for Africa and the Maghreb, but for Europe.” The brew of drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping and terrorism, if allowed to bubble over, has the potential to undermine government throughout the Maghreb and beyond.

I ask him what the United States should be doing in the Arab world more generally. “What I say will surprise you,” he began. “We should do our own homework first. We need order in our own countries. Then we can ask for partners to help us.” He cautioned again, “Help should accompany these reforms to support transition [to democratic rule].”

Morocco hasn’t generally been a political football in the United States. Politicians from both parties have praised the new constitution and urged that the autonomy plan be implemented. Amrani said, “We have a stable relationship that transcends political parties.”

Amrani vouches for shared values between the countries. In doing so it is hard not to see Morocco as the exception to the rule of violence, extremism and anti-Western sentiment in the Arab world. Maybe the U.S. should take him up on his suggestion for a “strategic partnership.” The U.S. can use all the help in the Middle East it can get these days.

By Jennifer Rubin | 10:30 AM ET, 07/26/2012
Dear Team,

Below please find the July 2012 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

July 2012 Events Bulletin

July 12
Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islam

July 19
The Federal Budget and Appropriations for FY2013: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa

July 31
Finding a Way Forward: The US, Morocco, and a Changing North Africa

Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islam

Date: 12 July 2012

1. Title: Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islam
   Hosted by the National Endowment for Democracy

   Participants:
   **Mokhtar Benabdallaoui**: Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, the National Endowment for Democracy;
   Director, Doctoral Center for Studies for Politics and Religion, Hassan II University
   **Samer Shehata**: Assistant Professor, Georgetown University
   **Zerxes Spencer**: Moderator: Fellowship Manager, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Program, the National Endowment for Democracy

2. Overview
This event highlighted the research of Mokhtar Benabdallaoui, a Spring 2012 Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at NED. Benabdallaoui addressed why Islamists have embraced democracy instead of fundamentalism and why the appeal of Islamists exceeds that of leftists and liberals in the Arab world. He assessed the challenges of shaping Islamist political thought in a democratic direction, the prospects of Islamist governments accepting diversity and differences of opinion, and the ways in which Islamists may reconcile conflicting religious and political ideas from across the Arab world. Drawing upon the example of Islamist political parties in four countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon—Benabdallaoui considered how ascendant Islamists have influenced societies across the Middle East and concluded with an assessment of the main stakeholders in the Arab Spring, their propensity for reform, and the prospects for further change in the region. Samer Shehata provided comments on the presentation and the paper.

3. Summary

Benabdallaoui began with a description of the similar characteristics of the revolts within the Middle East. These uprisings were all spontaneous, which the governments of the region and the world failed to predict, they all had minimal central planning, the protests were organic, and the people involved were from a diverse background. The uprisings were unpredictable due to the prevalent, but wrong idea, especially among the Arab regimes, that Arab culture and democracy were incompatible. The new forms of media, like facebook and twitter, along with new social factors, like rising levels of education, urbanization, the nuclear family structure, and women’s involvement in society, also went largely unnoticed by the regimes and increased the chances for popular uprisings.

Benabdallaoui next discussed the reasons for the different outcomes of these revolutions - why some resolved peacefully and others descended into violence. A strong allegiance to tribe, sect, and religion caused some of these revolts to slip into bloodshed and civil war, like in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, because societal participation was based narrowly around these factors. High levels of social integration on the other hand caused successful, non-violent transitions. Social integration caused identity to be formed around citizenship and allegiance to the nation, thus allowing for smoother transitions. Another important variable was the level of institutionalization among these societies. Low levels of institutionalization, marked by unpopular “inherited presidencies,” encouraged disaffected citizenry to join in protests and become heavily involved with the Arab Spring. An institutionalized military, with loyalty to the nation over tribe or sect, encouraged smoother transitions as they were less likely to shoot their countrymen on orders of a discredited leadership.

Benabdallaoui felt that it was important to distinguish between social Islamization and traditional political Islamism, which Western scholars often conflate. Social Islamization is spontaneous, is a source of collective and individual identity, and can be an assertion of modernity. Traditional political Islamism, in contrast, is imposed from the top-down, is used to mobilize and govern instead of being an expression of belief, and is a complete model for behavior and governance. Political Islamism is a political order, a social model, an economic theory, and an ethical framework. Once a political group focuses on a single aspect of political Islam there is the real danger of radicalization. Groups with a narrow focus tend to boil identity down to a narrow issue, which limits the expression of more complete identities. An emphasis on ethnicity leads to racism while an emphasis on religion leads to fundamentalism. Benabdallaoui underscored that democracy is good form of governance, particularly in this context, because the emphasis is on diversity and the dangers of a narrow focus are averted.

Benabdallaoui went on to discuss the transition from classic/traditional political Islamism to what he called the new Islamism. Traditional Islamism is rigidly orthodox, dogmatic, fundamentalist, and totalitarian. These trends are not tied to Islam; any system that bases its legitimacy on religion will exhibit these characteristics. Society has begun to shift to a more inclusive version of Islamism, the new Islamism. This shift can be seen in the changing goals of Islamists; for example, many have dropped the idea of a religious caliphate and are moving towards an acceptance of democracy. New Islamism has also dropped the idea of implementation of Sharia, considers mosques as purely places of worship instead of political or propaganda centers, and has accepted the idea of a civil state, which offers, among other things, legal equality to all citizens and women’s rights. He also stressed that political Islam is a diverse movement based on numerous interpretations of religious texts.

Benabdallaoui next discussed the state of Arab countries and provided an analysis of major trends in the Arab world, classifying groups of countries according to six distinct categories. First, he began by evaluating several individual countries that have revolted, but that cannot yet be placed in any definitive category. Tunisia has had the best transition by far, largely due to its excellent leadership, well-integrated society, and historical ties to Europe. Egypt has also had a fairly good transition. Libya’s transition was dependent on NATO and external actors, without which it would have descended into civil war, thus showing the continued importance of the international community. Due to
tribal divisions, Yemen has been mired in civil war. Second are those countries in the Throes of Change, including Bahrain and Syria. These countries were characterized by high levels of sectarianism. Third, Countries of Reform were Jordan and Morocco, which were characterized by a fast and reform-focused regime response to internal unrest followed by inadequate implementation. He highlighted Morocco’s reforms as being limited, especially in areas like human rights and press freedoms. Fourth, Countries of Continuity, which includes GCC countries. These countries can buy-off their populations, but this is a quick-fix and unsustainable in the long-term. These countries have merely postponed the day when they will have to address the grievances of their populaces. Fifth were the Countries of Ostensible Exception: Algeria, Sudan, and Iraq. These are countries which have largely escaped large-scale protests, but this is due to recent and devastating wars/civil wars which left the populations more concerned with day to day survival than democracy. Once there is stability within these countries they will most likely have to face protests and civilian unrest. Finally, there is the Exception, which is Lebanon. Lebanon is the only Arab state which is “controlled by society”. There is a democratic oligarchy within Lebanon which brings about stagnation and decay in the political system, but also a certain amount of tolerance among the sects which are forced to work together.

Benabdallaoui next went more in-depth about the issues which Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco have to face in the near future. The primary concern of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the economy and job creation. The Brotherhood may be willing to make concessions to the US, on Israel for example, in order to gain economic support. The problem is that any Israel concession would make them unpopular so the Brotherhood must weigh these two priorities and carefully balance them. He believes that the military can play a constructive role and will push the Brotherhood to be more open to political opponents. He views Tunisia and the Ennahda party as a model for other countries in transition. Turning to Morocco, Benabdallaoui stressed that the PJD is a group that wants to solve the Brotherhood to be more open to political opponents. He views Tunisia and the Ennahda party as a model for other countries in transition. Turning to Morocco, Benabdallaoui stressed that the PJD is a group that wants to solve the Brotherhood to be more open to political opponents. He views Tunisia and the Ennahda party as a model for other countries in transition. Turning to Morocco, Benabdallaoui stressed that the PJD is a group that wants to solve the Brotherhood to be more open to political opponents. He views Tunisia and the Ennahda party as a model for other countries in transition. Turning to Morocco, Benabdallaoui stressed that the PJD is a group that wants to solve

Benabdallaoui next discussed where political Islam stands today and what the future holds for these groups. It must be kept in mind that many votes for Islamists were protest votes against the existing regime and these groups are not as popular as they appear. He believes that inclusion of Islamists will moderate them and they should therefore be included in the political process. The fact that Islamist parties are in power in much of the region is a good thing because they will spur intra-regional trade because of friendly connections between these movements. The religious identity of these movements gives them the maneuvering room to launch reforms touching on religion that secularists would be unable to accomplish. He is confident that the new Islamism is spreading and that Islamists are on the path to democracy.

Benabdallaoui concluded his presentation with an overview of US policy options in the region. The US has two options: it can either continue to rely on authoritarianism at an increasingly high cost, with poorer results, or the US can rely on democracy. Democracy will promote cultural exchange, freedom, and economic opportunities because all Islamists share free market ideas. Democracy will also serve the US goal of regional stability.

Samer Shehata gave a critique of the paper and presentation. He began by saying that both were excellent and he had only small points to make. One was that the project was very ambitious and expansive, perhaps too much so, and he stressed that political Islam was extremely important and understudied. Shehata critiqued the lack of an examination of distinctions and differences between the states saying, that “Egypt is not equivalent to Tunisia”. He also wanted more discussion of the differences between the various Islamist groups, mentioning that the PJD is very different then Hezbollah and the local context quite different as well. He lamented the lack of a discussion on political economy and the related question of a youth bulge, which is vital to understanding the Arab Spring, and mentioned that the discussion of the military within the region could be expanded upon. He also pointed out that the reasons for the inclusion of the distinctions between social and political Islam was unclear. Benabdallaoui concluded by quickly responding to a few points; he mentioned that he included a discussion of political and social Islam because the two seemed so often conflated in the West.

4. Q & A

Q: (Yaffine Borffman, Asia Center) Does Hezbollah have a chance to introduce Sharia in Lebanon?
A: It is not a possibility or a goal for Hezbollah. In Lebanon, one sect can’t govern alone and needs the support of several other groups, which increases the political openness and tolerance for other groups in the country.

Q: (William Zartman, SAIS) What is the role of the salafists in these various countries?
A: Their role is crucial. Salafists consider religion to be a personal choice and have only become political very recently. Salafists have very different religious interpretations depending on the country.

Q: (Lahita Fennale, Female Muslim Lawyers for Human Rights) There is a lot of talk about ‘principles of Islamic law,’ but these are not written anywhere. What are these principles?
A: Things like justice and equality. The sentences in various documents, like constitutions, are very different from the principles of Sharia, which are more general.

Q: (Mark Platter, International Forum for Democratic Studies) How does Iran fit into your categories?
A: Iran’s position is weaker and weaker within the region, Hezbollah’s as well. Hezbollah will have difficulties remaining in power, especially with Syria in conflict. In fact, Hezbollah is one of the few ways for the Syrian regime to get support or have a safe haven. Syria might start relying on Hezbollah instead of the former situation.

Q: (Jonathan Pottern, Stimson Center) How have the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan managed to survive?
A: It relates to the lack of legitimacy, which drove the popular response. In the monarchies, the response to popular dissatisfaction was very fast and the regimes had a high level of legitimacy because they could claim descent from the Prophet. This is another reason why Islamists are important. As religious actors they can compete with the monarchies for their religious role. The interaction and debate over religion will serve to de-sacralize the public sphere because it opens Islam up for debate.

Q: (Dan Liebermann) Do you think that external influence would push civil war into revolution in countries like Yemen and Syria?
A: It is certain that without NATO, Qaddafi would have won. In some cases like Libya, external actors are vital. Yemen is different though. In Yemen, the splits are within groups, within tribes - not between groups.

Q: What of the youth? How much do leaders understand dignity and youth engagement?
A: Dignity is important; there is no answer without dignity. This is why the GCC can’t resolve its problems with money. They can only put off the time when their populations will demand dignity and respect.

Q: (Georgetown University) What is the role of the security forces and the impact on legitimacy due to the use of these forces?
A: Security operations can limit legitimacy. In Morocco, the 1970’s were very difficult times, but didn’t impact the legitimacy of the regime. The issue of inherited presidencies is more important when looking at legitimacy. Also the fast response of the crown in Morocco to unrest convinced people that there was a chance for reform.

Q: (Mahjid al-Salaami, journalist from Palestine and Gaza) Is the democratic transition in Gaza with Hamas a possible example for the region?
A: Hamas and Fatah have actually lost a lot of credibility in the last two years. The majority of the people do not support either Hamas or Fatah. The issue of the Sinai border is going to be determined by Morsi depending on if the Brotherhood will prioritize the economy or its popularity.

5. Observation

This event was attended by around 60-70 people who formed a good mix of interns, students, professionals, and academics. This presentation was a very good overview of the results of the Arab Spring at this particular moment and provided a good categorization of the countries in the region. The discussion on political Islam was very informative and descriptive, addressing some concerns with political Islam without equating political Islamism with the broader religion. This presentation can address, and refute, many claims and denigrations of Islam as being incompatible with democracy and Islamists being equated with terrorists. The presentation did gloss over much of the potential for back-sliding in the region and underplayed certain negative aspects to the Arab Spring, like the role of the Egyptian military for example. The presentation is a good optimistic viewpoint on the Arab Spring, Islamists, and the future outlook for democracy in region.
1. Title: The Federal Budget and Appropriations for FY2013: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa

Hosted by the Project On Middle East Democracy (POMED)

Panelists:

Stephen McInerney: Executive Director, POMED
Tamara Cofman Wittes: Senior Fellow and Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, the Brookings Institution
Jennifer Winsor: Associate Dean for Programs and Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
Cole Bockenfeld: Moderator: Director of Advocacy, POMED

2. Overview

As many countries in the Arab world embark on political transitions of various types and others continue to protest authoritarian rule, US funding and assistance for the Middle East will have far-reaching implications for the region’s future as well as the nature of American policy and relations. As uprisings broke out across the Arab world, President Obama promised in May 2011 that the US would support democratic principles with “all of the diplomatic, economic, and strategic tools at our disposal,” and that this support would take precedence to other strategic interests. Though the Administration deserves credit for intensifying its focus on support for democracy, it has failed to fulfill the commitments of last May’s lofty pronouncement. POMED’s event brought together experts to analyze and discuss the Administration’s approach to budgets, spending, and foreign assistance in the region, and to also interpret what that means in terms of the Administration’s broader priorities and thinking vis-à-vis US policy against the backdrop of dramatic political changes.

3. Summary

Steve McInerney, author of POMED’s report on the Federal Budget and Appropriations for FY13: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, opened by touting the Obama Administration’s successes in Tunisia. Considering the virtual nonexistence of a bilateral aid package between Washington and Tunis before Ben Ali’s ouster, American policymakers mobilized resources incredibly quickly, demonstrating impressive agility and creativity in providing much-needed support. US aid to Tunisia increased from $2 million in January 2011 to approximately $200 million today. US aid has also been critical in supporting transitions in Libya and Yemen. US support for Jordan has also dramatically increased, where the Obama Administration is energetically supporting reform. Assistance elsewhere, however, has undergone few dramatic changes. In fact, the administration’s commitment to supporting serious democracy and governance promotion in many GCC states, Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza has diminished. The past year has seen a dramatic escalation of tensions between the US and Egypt driven in large part by Egyptian government attacks on NGOs, including the criminal prosecution of employees of American democracy promotion organizations. As a result, US assistance to Egypt, which traditionally has occupied the center focus in the region, is colored by a troubling uncertainty. Funds aimed at bolstering the Egyptian economy rather than democracy promotion, however, are met with less resistance.

The structure of military aid to the region is excessively rigid and inflexible, making any adjustments or rebalancing between military aid and economic aid extremely difficult. While the Arab uprisings have sparked some discussion among key actors about the possibility of shifting a greater proportion of US assistance to economic aid as opposed to military aid, that process is greatly impeded by long-term agreements on military aid and by the influence of US defense manufacturing companies. This holds especially true in Egypt, where policymakers encountered difficulties revising the aid relationship to properly respond to the facts on the ground.

Tamara Wittes discussed the broader challenges posed by the current budget environment and presented several recommendations for maximizing assistance funds to the region. The US must leverage its funds, devising a creative and flexible strategy to get the most out of investments. Money should be lumped into a regional fund and allotted to specific countries upon satisfaction of certain requirements; this will “incentivize good behavior” and provide policymakers with flexibility. The Administration requested $9 billion in foreign assistance for the Middle East and North Africa—an 11.6 percent increase over the current levels for FY12. Most of this increase can be attributed to the request of $700 million in funding for the MEPI Incentive Fund. Congress has slashed international affairs budgets in recent years, resulting in decreases in funding for every other region in the world; as such, the Administration has shown creativity in finding sufficient resources for the MENA region within a decreasing overall budget. Wittes also echoed McInerney’s call to shift away from military assistance and toward support for enterprise,
democracy efforts, and civil society capacity-building.

“The US responds to crises, not opportunities,” Jennifer Winsor began. This trend transcends Presidents. After the fall of the Berlin wall, American policymakers doled out massive amounts of money in an attempt to transform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into democracies. However, the process did not happen overnight as policymakers as hoped. Democratic transformation takes place over decades, not in the heat of a crisis. The US must invest in a country’s civil society to properly build the foundation for democracy, rather than endeavoring to enact immediate change. The situation in the Arab countries is even more complex than post-Cold War Europe; there is no clear-cut “good guys vs. bad guys” dichotomy. American Administrations never do enough to promote human rights and democracy. US objectives in Egypt, for example, are completely unclear. Policymakers’ activities there are conflicting and inconsistent.

4. Q & A

Q: Democratic transitions can be slow and grueling. How should the US remain patient and engaged in such a difficult environment?
A: (Wittes) This is true, the US must practice strategic patience to ride out a bumpy transition. In the past, however, we supported democratic transitions in South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, after having supported autocrats in those countries quite robustly. We need to consistently and clearly articulate universal democratic principles and core political rights—equality, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc.

Q: US-Egypt bilateral relations desperately need to be reset, but the SCAF vehemently opposes any reduction in military assistance. Is conditionality in this instance an effective tool for leveraging US assistance?
A: (Wittes) There are two possible ways to leverage US assistance—retrospectively, which essentially involves sanctions and tends to produce some negative feelings on the part of the recipient, or prospectively, which requires recipients to meet conditions to continue receiving aid. The prospective model is increasingly attractive and employed by projects like the Millennium Challenge Fund and the MEPI Incentive Fund.
(Winsor) We want to get the most bang for our buck. Even if they are ultimately unsuccessful, Congress must pressure the Administration to put more emphasis on human rights and democracy.
(McInerney) Support for democratic principles absolutely must be a priority. In Morocco, for example, more support would go far. We can no longer afford to waive conditions for human rights and democracy n the name of national security. Algeria’s most recent elections, for example, were fraudulent at best, and the US said nothing.

Q: Is interest in Libya waning as the country moves from a conflict zone to a post-conflict country?
A: (McInerney) More assistance to Libya would be helpful. Substantial direct support in conjunction with civil society organizations focused efforts on the elections and election monitoring, which already happened. Prior to US assistance, Libyan political parties and civil society organization had little to no capacity. The US played a modest, but critical role in the success of Libya’s elections. Now that the elections have passed, the proper strategy and focus for engaging in Libya is not entirely clear.
(Wittes) Until last October, Libya was a conflict zone so aid centered on humanitarian supplies. We were successful in our efforts to help Libya implement a social infrastructure. Now, moving past the conflict situation, Libya is a wealthy country. Money to invest in the country can come from within—from the government. US assistance can focus on civil society organizations that the government neglects to assist.

Q: Is this the time to discuss changing aid to Israel from a more regional perspective?
A: (Wittes) I don’t see a failure to bringing Israel into the picture. Military assistance undoubtedly dominates economic assistance, and this needs to be redressed. A balance must be struck, just as in other countries in the region.

Q: The US-Egypt aid relationship desperately needs revisiting—the average Egyptian is not even aware that Egypt receives US aid—what does this tell us?
A: (Wittes) Our aid relationship to Egypt has been almost exclusively government-to-government. The NGO crisis reflects the SCAF’s reluctance to alter the nature of assistance; they want assistance, but only in a manner they can control. However, it is crucial to remember than none of our interests can be met if we fail to invest in democracy and good governance. Stability in Egypt and in the region as a whole—which is absolutely crucial to achieving our security interests—will not be established until governments undergo democratic reforms; conflict will persist until the people feel their demands are being heard. The question of how to invest is not an interests-versus-values issue. Promoting democracy and good governance benefits both our interests and our values.

5. Observation
Approximately 40 professionals, journalists, students, and members of the policy community attended this event, which launched POMED’s FY2013 report on US foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa. The panelists’ remarked that the Administration’s ability to continue to provide foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa at relatively consistent levels, with moderate and steady increases, represents a success in today’s constrained budget environment. Looking beyond the numbers, however, US assistance to the region relies too heavily on funds for security support rather than democracy and human rights efforts. In his testimony, Stephen McInerney said that more direct assistance for governance and democracy programs in Morocco would go far, and in his report, he wrote that the Morocco is a “permissive” environment for this kind of work. Compared to countries like Egypt and many of the Gulf States, where US governance programs have been met with resistance, Morocco has been a receptive partner. The event and report cast Morocco in a very positive light, and made a case for increasing US direct assistance to Rabat.

POMED Report Morocco Section:

In general, Morocco appears to have undertaken more serious reform in the past 18 months than most other states in the region, but without seriously shifting political power from the monarchy to elected institutions as demanded by protesters. US assistance to Morocco is rather modest and has not seen any significant changes in reaction to the events of 2011; it is the smallest aid recipient of the seven Arab countries with a USAID mission and a longstanding assistance relationship. Funding requests for FY13 are consistent with what has been provided over the past few years—a total of $32.6 million, including $15.1 million in security assistance, $7.7 million in assistance for democracy and governance programming, and $9.7 million in other economic aid. The democracy and governance program in Morocco is the smallest such program in any country in the region with a significant aid relationship. This is surprising given Morocco’s sizable population, the very high demand for civil society and political party development aid, and the relatively permissive environment for such work. The next year, however, will offer some real opportunities to reconsider the structure of US assistance to Morocco and address concerns that governance and democracy programs are too small in scope and excessively focused on improving the technical expertise of government institutions. In the next year, USAID is scheduled to complete a five-year strategy to guide its programming from 2012-2017. Several of USAID’s multiyear programs in Morocco will be completed in FY13, which will leave room for new projects to begin in FY14 in line with the new five-year strategy.

The targeted audience included legislative assistants, as well as senior foreign policy and homeland security staffers to Members of the House and Senate.

3. Summary

Haim Malka mentioned that Morocco typically has a low priority in news and for policymakers because Morocco rarely has crises. This is a mistake since Morocco is an important regional ally for the US in a region that is increasingly “consequential” for US policy. The goal of the discussion was to examine the public debates and the socio-economic challenges that Morocco faces.

Ambassador Bouhlal gave a brief history of the bilateral relationship that Morocco has enjoys with the US. Her stressed Morocco’s commitment to reform under Mohammad VI, and emphasized that in all these reforms Morocco has been careful to include public participation and encourage feedback.

Audra Grant focused on the changes that Morocco has undergone since the Arab Spring. She stressed that Morocco has a long history of liberalization under both King Mohammad VI and his father King Hassan II. The regime’s constitutional reforms in 2011 helped to prevent the destabilization that occurred in other parts of the Arab world. According to Grant, what prompted these reforms was the February 20th movement, which, unlike other Arab Spring protest movements, was peaceful and wasn’t focused on ending the regime. The reforms prompted by the protests liberalized the political system and limited monarchical power. Grant emphasized that Morocco is unique in the Arab World because the regime has legitimacy due to the monarchy’s historic religious legitimacy, the fact that it has promoted stable governance, and that the monarchy has promoted sustained liberalization. The protest movement was also fractured in terms of its goals and methods and the quick reaction of the monarch in offering reforms served to limit the political crisis. Morocco traditionally absorbs political dissent through reforms. Despite these reforms, the King maintains supremacy in critical policy areas and the populace has shown less confidence in the political institutions in recent years. Problems of high unemployment, poverty, and the Western Sahara issue must be overcome.

Dr. J. Peter Pham discussed the specifics of the constitutional reform and what they mean for Morocco. He stressed that keeping the context of these reforms in mind was important to understanding the importance of Morocco. Due to the constant reformist nature of King Mohammad VI and the final years of King Hassan II, issues that drove populations to revolt in other countries were often already dealt with in Morocco. Human rights abuses were dealt with by the reconciliation commission and reparation payments, for example. The Arab Spring sped up the reform process with the new constitution. Pham stressed the uniqueness of these reforms compared to the rest of the Arab World. Morocco is the only country to acknowledge multiple sources of its culture - Arab, Berber, African, and others - in its constitution. Morocco also puts forward a more liberal version of Islam in its constitution, stating only that Islam is the religion of the state, instead of basing law solely on Sharia as in being raised in most other Maghreb countries. The new constitution also put the Amazigh language on an equal footing with Arabic and placed limits on the King’s power.

Alexis Arieiff examined both the nature of the reforms and the US-Moroccan relationship. She agreed that the reforms have strengthened the Prime Minister, the legislature, and the judiciary, but stressed that the King still retains his position as the “ultimate arbiter” in the Moroccan system. Due to the quick reforms offered by the King, he nevertheless still retains his public popularity and legitimacy. The wrangling of the PJD with the palace over many issues has shown that the new arrangements in the constitution have been put into practice.

Arieiff stressed that the US views Morocco as a strong ally and partner in the region. The Administration has been very supportive of the reforms and is comfortable working with the PJD, operating on the idea of ‘actions being more important than words/philosophy.’ Morocco has been supported by Presidents from both parties and has been cooperative on issues ranging from Syria to trade and terrorism. In terms of Western Sahara, the US continues to support a negotiated solution that keeps the stability of Morocco in mind.

4. Q & A

**Q:** (Malka) Are the Moroccan people satisfied with the reforms? Is a new wave of protest inevitable if there is no political accommodation between the PJD and the monarchy that allows the government to fix what it needs to?

**A:** (Grant) There are fears that the primacy of the King could lead to a circumventing of the reform process. Future protests are largely dependent on economic performance. If the PJD is unable to improve the economy then protests are likely. The government response to the economic situation is key.

(Arieiff) It is difficult to gauge the satisfaction with the reforms. The populace seems willing to give the PJD a chance, especially since the rest of the region provides such a negative example of what happens with violent protests that
set out to overturn regimes.

Q: (Malka) What of Islamist movements, do they have a chance to reinvigorate the protest movements?
A: (Pham) Moroccans are largely happy with the direction of reforms - there may be arguments about the speed, but the government has maneuvering room. It is also important to keep in mind that the "Moroccan street" is really a varied bunch that has a broad range of desires. Some protesters are protesting so that the ministries will offer them jobs, while others are genuine protesters in the American sense of the term. Moroccans by and large reject extremism although there is always a small fraction of the populace that will buy-in, especially in such an extremist region.

Q: (This was a comment about the situation in Western Sahara and the refugee camps. No question was asked.)
A: (Pham) I just want to comment on this situation. One of the important things to keep in mind is that the US pays for these camps, but lacks basic information about how that money is spent. The US doesn't even have information on the number of people in these camps. This is an interesting situation I don’t think you see anywhere else.

Q: (Kevin Coin, Project on Middle East Democracy) What about the changes in freedom of expression in Morocco with the recent beatings and arrests?
A: (Arieff) There are two issues which are limited in Morocco; one is direct criticism of the King and the other Western Sahara issue. In practice, tolerance for expression has waxed and waned. Broadly there has been acceptance of expression in Morocco, especially over the February 20 Movement. Recently, it seems the government has gotten more extreme in its response to smaller protestors, although there has been no official policy change. Interestingly the PJD has prosecuted more people both for insulting the King as well as insulting Islam. (Grant) The King, Western Sahara, and Islam are the three taboos in Morocco. The press has been allowed more freedom, but there are clear redlines. There are no real rules - the lines are somewhat arbitrary. There has been progress in recent years, but limits remain on press freedoms.
(Pham) I think it’s important for the regional context to be kept in mind. The amount of information, range of information, and the tolerance in Morocco are substantially better than in any other country in the region.

Q: (Malka) What of Algeria and the regional relationship?
A: (Grant) There is always an opportunity, the recent confidence building measures are a good start. There is, however, a broader conflict between the two than just the Western Sahara. This is over regional dominance and status. (Arieff) The potential is there. High level Algerians have often mentioned a “new start,” but there have been few concrete signs. (Pham) Regional cooperation is in the interests of all states. This shouldn’t be made at the expense of the realities on the ground. The US has soft-pedaled the Algerian relationship because Algeria is important to the region. The US has downplayed the connections to Malian rebels and this needs to be addressed before regional cooperation.

Q: (Tony Bullock, Ogilvy) What is the view of the Moroccan government and the Polisario on groups in Mali?
A: (Grant) The MNLA was condemned by Morocco as an independent state in northern Mali. This antagonized the Berber population in Morocco. There might be the potential here for a transnational Berber identity. This is something that bears watching. (Pham) I don’t know about the Polisario, they haven’t released anything yet. There are real dangers of a new failed state within the region. While the record of the Malian government towards its Tuareg population wasn’t great, the dangers of a failed state in the area are much greater. The breakdown of the state will open the region for many terrorist and drug trafficking groups and has the potential to destabilize the entire region. (Grant) Secession would not be viewed kindly by any African government. (Arieff) At this point we’re looking at either consolidation or conflict between the Islamist groups. The issue has moved past the Tuareg issue. Morocco is really worried about this situation, which could provide impetus for increased regional cooperation. Kidnappings in the camps also threaten the international image of the Polisario. This situation is threatening to everyone in the region.

Q: What is the US and international policy on resource extraction from the Western Sahara?
A: (Areiff) I am not a lawyer – that is a question for the State Department.

5. Observation

There were about 60 people attending this event. The audience was comprised predominately of interns and staffers from Congress, but a few regional experts attended as well. This was an excellent panel about the status of Morocco’s reforms. The discussion of these reforms was comprehensive and very supportive to Morocco. The uniqueness of the Moroccan reform path in a region known for repression was stressed again and again. There was a brief discussion of the dangers and hurdles that Morocco faces in the near future, but these were downplayed.
July 2012 Events Bulletin

July 12
Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islam

July 19
The Federal Budget and Appropriations for FY2013: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa

July 31
Finding a Way Forward: The US, Morocco, and a Changing North Africa

Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islam

Date: 12 July 2012

1. Title: Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islam
   Hosted by the National Endowment for Democracy

   Participants:
   Mokhtar Benabdallaoui: Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, the National Endowment for Democracy; Director, Doctoral Center for Studies for Politics and Religion, Hassan II University
   Samer Shehata: Assistant Professor, Georgetown University
   Zerxes Spencer: Moderator: Fellowship Manager, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Program, the National Endowment for Democracy

   2. Overview

   This event highlighted the research of Mokhtar Benabdallaoui, a Spring 2012 Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at NED. Benabdallaoui addressed why Islamists have embraced democracy instead of fundamentalism and why the appeal of Islamists exceeds that of leftists and liberals in the Arab world. He assessed the challenges of shaping Islamist political thought in a democratic direction, the prospects of Islamist governments accepting diversity and differences of opinion, and the ways in which Islamists may reconcile conflicting religious and political ideas from across the Arab world. Drawing upon the example of Islamist political parties in four countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon—Benabdallaoui considered how ascendant Islamists have influenced societies across the Middle East and concluded with an assessment of the main stakeholders in the Arab Spring, their propensity for reform, and the prospects for further change in the region. Samer Shehata provided comments on the presentation and the paper.
3. Summary

Benabdallaoui began with a description of the similar characteristics of the revolts within the Middle East. These uprisings were all spontaneous, which the governments of the region and the world failed to predict, they all had minimal central planning, the protests were organic, and the people involved were from a diverse background. The uprisings were unpredictable due to the prevalent, but wrong idea, especially among the Arab regimes, that Arab culture and democracy were incompatible. The new forms of media, like facebook and twitter, along with new social factors, like rising levels of education, urbanization, the nuclear family structure, and women’s involvement in society, also went largely unnoticed by the regimes and increased the chances for popular uprisings.

Benabdallaoui next discussed the reasons for the different outcomes of these revolutions - why some resolved peacefully and others descended into violence. A strong allegiance to tribe, sect, and religion caused some of these revolts to slip into bloodshed and civil war, like in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, because societal participation was based narrowly around these factors. High levels of social integration on the other hand caused successful, non-violent transitions. Social integration caused identity to be formed around citizenship and allegiance to the nation, thus allowing for smoother transitions. Another important variable was the level of institutionalization among these societies. Low levels of institutionalization, marked by unpopular “inherited presidencies,” encouraged disaffected citizenry to join in protests and become heavily involved with the Arab Spring. An institutionalized military, with loyalty to the nation over tribe or sect, encouraged smoother transitions as they were less likely to shoot their countrymen on orders of a discredited leadership.

Benabdallaoui felt that it was important to distinguish between social Islamization and traditional political Islamism, which Western scholars often conflate. Social Islamization is spontaneous, is a source of collective and individual identity, and can be an assertion of modernity. Traditional political Islamism, in contrast, is imposed from the top-down, is used to mobilize and govern instead of being an expression of belief, and is a complete model for behavior and governance. Political Islamism is a political order, a social model, an economic theory, and an ethical framework. Once a political group focuses on a single aspect of political Islam there is the real danger of radicalization. Groups with a narrow focus tend to boil identity down to a narrow issue, which limits the expression of more complete identities. An emphasis on ethnicity leads to racism while an emphasis on religion leads to fundamentalism. Benabdallaoui underscored that democracy is good form of governance, particularly in this context, because the emphasis is on diversity and the dangers of a narrow focus are averted.

Benabdallaoui went on to discuss the transition from classic/traditional political Islamism to what he called the new Islamism. Traditional Islamism is rigidly orthodox, dogmatic, fundamentalist, and totalitarian. These trends are not tied to Islam; any system that bases its legitimacy on religion will exhibit these characteristics. Society has begun to shift to a more inclusive version of Islamism, the new Islamism. This shift can be seen in the changing goals of Islamists; for example, many have dropped the idea of a religious caliphate and are moving towards an acceptance of democracy. New Islamism has also dropped the idea of implementation of Sharia, considers mosques as purely places of worship instead of political or propaganda centers, and has accepted the idea of a civil state, which offers, among other things, legal equality to all citizens and women’s rights. He also stressed that political Islam is a diverse movement based on numerous interpretations of religious texts.
Benabdallaoui next discussed the state of Arab countries and provided an analysis of major trends in the Arab world, classifying groups of countries according to six distinct categories. First, he began by evaluating several individual countries that have revolted, but that cannot yet be placed in any definitive category. Tunisia has had the best transition by far, largely due to its excellent leadership, well-integrated society, and historical ties to Europe. Egypt has also had a fairly good transition. Libya’s transition was dependent on NATO and external actors, without which it would have descended into civil war, thus showing the continued importance of the international community. Due to tribal divisions, Yemen has been mired in civil war. Second are those countries in the Throes of Change, including Bahrain and Syria. These countries were characterized by high levels of sectarianism. Third, Countries of Reform were Jordan and Morocco, which were characterized by a fast and reform-focused regime response to internal unrest followed by inadequate implementation. He highlighted Morocco's reforms as being limited, especially in areas like human rights and press freedoms. Fourth, Countries of Continuity, which includes GCC countries. These countries can buy-off their populations, but this is a quick-fix and unsustainable in the long-term. These countries have merely postponed the day when they will have to address the grievances of their populaces. Fifth were the Countries of Ostensible Exception: Algeria, Sudan, and Iraq. These are countries which have largely escaped large-scale protests, but this is due to recent and devastating wars/civil wars which left the populations more concerned with day to day survival than democracy. Once there is stability within these countries they will most likely have to face protests and civilian unrest. Finally, there is the Exception, which is Lebanon. Lebanon is the only Arab state which is “controlled by society”. There is a democratic oligarchy within Lebanon which brings about stagnation and decay in the political system, but also a certain amount of tolerance among the sects which are forced to work together.

Benabdallaoui next went more in-depth about the issues which Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco have to face in the near future. The primary concern of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the economy and job creation. The Brotherhood may be willing to make concessions to the US, on Israel for example, in order to gain economic support. The problem is that any Israel concession would make them unpopular so the Brotherhood must weigh these two priorities and carefully balance them. He believes that the military can play a constructive role and will push the Brotherhood to be more open to political opponents. He views Tunisia and the Ennahda party as a model for other countries in transition. Turning to Morocco, Benabdallaoui stressed that the PJD is a group that wants to solve the economic and social problems of the country. The problem is that they have been given no real power and the party serves as the scapegoat for the King. The weakness of the PJD is due to the fact that the party has a weak mobilization capacity and there is a fractured political arena, which limits the capacity for change in the country. The Justice and Charity movement in Morocco bears further study as a group which focuses on bottom-up change and has distanced itself from the February 20th Movement.

Benabdallaoui next discussed where political Islam stands today and what the future holds for these groups. It must be kept in mind that many votes for Islamists were protest votes against the existing regime and these groups are not as popular as they appear. He believes that inclusion of Islamists will moderate them and they should therefore be included in the political process. The fact that Islamist parties are in power in much of the region is a good thing because they will spur intra-regional trade because of friendly connections between these movements. The religious identity of these movements gives them the maneuvering room to launch reforms touching on religion that secularists would be unable to accomplish. He is confident that the new Islamism is spreading and that Islamists are on the path to democracy.
Benabdallaoui concluded his presentation with an overview of US policy options in the region. The US has two options: it can either continue to rely on authoritarianism at an increasingly high cost, with poorer results, or the US can rely on democracy. Democracy will promote cultural exchange, freedom, and economic opportunities because all Islamists share free market ideas. Democracy will also serve the US goal of regional stability.

Samer Shehata gave a critique of the paper and presentation. He began by saying that both were excellent and he had only small points to make. One was that the project was very ambitious and expansive, perhaps too much so, and he stressed that political Islam was extremely important and understudied. Shehata critiqued the lack of an examination of distinctions and differences between the states saying, that “Egypt is not equivalent to Tunisia”. He also wanted more discussion of the differences between the various Islamist groups, mentioning that the PJD is very different then Hezbollah and the local context quite different as well. He lamented the lack of a discussion on political economy and the related question of a youth bulge, which is vital to understanding the Arab Spring, and mentioned that the discussion of the militaries within the region could be expanded upon. He also pointed out that the reasons for the inclusion of the distinctions between social and political Islam was unclear. Benabdallaoui concluded by quickly responding to a few points; he mentioned that he included a discussion of political and social Islam because the two seemed so often conflated in the West.

4. Q & A

Q: (Yaffine Borffman, Asia Center) Does Hezbollah have a chance to introduce Sharia in Lebanon?
A: It is not a possibility or a goal for Hezbollah. In Lebanon, one sect can’t govern alone and needs the support of several other groups, which increases the political openness and tolerance for other groups in the country.

Q: (William Zartman, SAIS) What is the role of the salafists in these various countries?
A: Their role is crucial. Salafists consider religion to be a personal choice and have only become political very recently. Salafists have very different religious interpretations depending on the country.

Q: (Lahita Fennale, Female Muslim Lawyers for Human Rights) There is a lot of talk about ‘principles of Islamic law,’ but these are not written anywhere. What are these principles?
A: Things like justice and equality. The sentences in various documents, like constitutions, are very different from the principles of Sharia, which are more general.

Q: (Mark Platter, International Forum for Democratic Studies) How does Iran fit into your categories?
A: Iran’s position is weaker and weaker within the region, Hezbollah’s as well. Hezbollah will have difficulties remaining in power, especially with Syria in conflict. In fact, Hezbollah is one of the few ways for the Syrian regime to get support or have a safe haven. Syria might start relying on Hezbollah instead of the former situation.

Q: (Jonathan Potton, Stimson Center) How have the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan managed to survive?
A: It relates to the lack of legitimacy, which drove the popular response. In the monarchies, the response to popular dissatisfaction was very fast and the regimes had a high level of legitimacy because they could claim descent from the Prophet. This is another reason why Islamists are important. As religious actors they can compete with the monarchies for their
religious role. The interaction and debate over religion will serve to de-sacrilize the public sphere because it opens Islam up for debate.

**Q:** (Dan Liebermann) Do you think that external influence would push civil war into revolution in countries like Yemen and Syria?

**A:** It is certain that without NATO, Qaddafi would have won. In some cases like Libya, external actors are vital. Yemen is different though. In Yemen, the splits are within groups, within tribes - not between groups.

**Q:** What of the youth? How much do leaders understand dignity and youth engagement?

**A:** Dignity is important; there is no answer without dignity. This is why the GCC can’t resolve its problems with money. They can only put off the time when their populations will demand dignity and respect.

**Q:** (Georgetown University) What is the role of the security forces and the impact on legitimacy due to the use of these forces?

**A:** Security operations can limit legitimacy. In Morocco, the 1970’s were very difficult times, but didn’t impact the legitimacy of the regime. The issue of inherited presidencies is more important when looking at legitimacy. Also the fast response of the crown in Morocco to unrest convinced people that there was a chance for reform.

**Q:** (Mahjid al-Salaami, journalist from Palestine and Gaza) Is the democratic transition in Gaza with Hamas a possible example for the region?

**A:** Hamas and Fatah have actually lost a lot of credibility in the last two years. The majority of the people do not support either Hamas or Fatah. The issue of the Sinai border is going to be determined by Morsi depending on if the Brotherhood will prioritize the economy or its popularity.

**5. Observation**

This event was attended by around 60-70 people who formed a good mix of interns, students, professionals, and academics. This presentation was a very good overview of the results of the Arab Spring at this particular moment and provided a good categorization of the countries in the region. The discussion on political Islam was very informative and descriptive, addressing some concerns with political Islam without equating political Islamism with the broader religion. This presentation can address, and refute, many claims and denigrations of Islam as being incompatible with democracy and Islamists being equated with terrorists. The presentation did gloss over much of the potential for backsliding in the region and underplayed certain negative aspects to the Arab Spring, like the role of the Egyptian military for example. The presentation is a good optimistic viewpoint on the Arab Spring, Islamists, and the future outlook for democracy in region.

(Back to top)
2. Overview
As many countries in the Arab world embark on political transitions of various types and others continue to protest authoritarian rule, US funding and assistance for the Middle East will have far-reaching implications for the region’s future as well as the nature of American policy and relations. As uprisings broke out across the Arab world, President Obama promised in May 2011 that the US would support democratic principles with “all of the diplomatic, economic, and strategic tools at our disposal,” and that this support would take precedence to other strategic interests. Though the Administration deserves credit for intensifying its focus on support for democracy, it has failed to fulfill the commitments of last May’s lofty pronouncement. POMED’s event brought together experts to analyze and discuss the Administration’s approach to budgets, spending, and foreign assistance in the region, and to also interpret what that means in terms of the Administration’s broader priorities and thinking vis-à-vis US policy against the backdrop of dramatic political changes.

3. Summary
Steve McInerney, author of POMED’s report on the Federal Budget and Appropriations for FY13: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, opened by touting the Obama Administration’s successes in Tunisia. Considering the virtual nonexistence of a bilateral aid package between Washington and Tunis before Ben Ali’s ouster, American policymakers mobilized resources incredibly quickly, demonstrating impressive agility and creativity in providing much-needed support. US aid to Tunisia increased from $2 million in January 2011 to approximately $200 million today. US aid to Jordan has also dramatically increased, where the Obama Administration is energetically supporting reform. Assistance elsewhere, however, has undergone few dramatic changes. In fact, the administration’s commitment to supporting serious democracy and governance promotion in many GCC states, Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza has diminished. The past year has seen a dramatic escalation of tensions between the US and Egypt driven in large part by Egyptian government attacks on NGOs, including the criminal prosecution of employees of American democracy promotion organizations. As a result, US assistance to Egypt, which traditionally has occupied the center focus in the region, is colored by a troubling uncertainty. Funds aimed at bolstering the Egyptian economy rather than democracy promotion, however, are met with less resistance.

The structure of military aid to the region is excessively rigid and inflexible, making any adjustments or rebalancing between military aid and economic aid extremely difficult. While the Arab uprisings have sparked some discussion among key actors about the possibility of shifting a greater proportion of US assistance to economic aid as opposed to military aid, that process is greatly impeded by long-term agreements on military aid and by the influence of US defense manufacturing companies. This holds especially true in Egypt,
where policymakers encountered difficulties revising the aid relationship to properly respond to the facts on the ground.

Tamara Wittes discussed the broader challenges posed by the current budget environment and presented several recommendations for maximizing assistance funds to the region. The US must leverage its funds, devising a creative and flexible strategy to get the most out of investments. Money should be lumped into a regional fund and allotted to specific countries upon satisfaction of certain requirements; this will “incentivize good behavior” and provide policymakers with flexibility. The Administration requested $9 billion in foreign assistance for the Middle East and North Africa—an 11.6 percent increase over the current levels for FY12. Most of this increase can be attributed to the request of $700 million in funding for the MEPI Incentive Fund. Congress has slashed international affairs budgets in recent years, resulting in decreases in funding for every other region in the world; as such, the Administration has shown creativity in finding sufficient resources for the MENA region within a decreasing overall budget. Wittes also echoed McInerney’s call to shift away from military assistance and toward support for enterprise, democracy efforts, and civil society capacity-building.

“The US responds to crises, not opportunities,” Jennifer Winsor began. This trend transcends Presidents. After the fall of the Berlin wall, American policymakers doled out massive amounts of money in an attempt to transform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into democracies. However, the process did not happen overnight as policymakers as hoped. Democratic transformation takes place over decades, not in the heat of a crisis. The US must invest in a country’s civil society to properly build the foundation for democracy, rather than endeavoring to enact immediate change. The situation in the Arab countries is even more complex than post-Cold War Europe; there is no clear-cut “good guys vs. bad guys” dichotomy. American Administrations never do enough to promote human rights and democracy. US objectives in Egypt, for example, are completely unclear. Policymakers’ activities there are conflicting and inconsistent.

4. Q & A

Q: Democratic transitions can be slow and grueling. How should the US remain patient and engaged in such a difficult environment?
A: (Wittes) This is true, the US must practice strategic patience to ride out a bumpy transition. In the past, however, we supported democratic transitions in South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, after having supported autocrats in those countries quite robustly. We need to consistently and clearly articulate universal democratic principles and core political rights—equality, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc.

Q: US-Egypt bilateral relations desperately need to be reset, but the SCAF vehemently opposes any reduction in military assistance. Is conditionality in this instance an effective tool for leveraging US assistance?
A: (Wittes) There are two possible ways to leverage US assistance—retrospectively, which essentially involves sanctions and tends to produce some negative feelings on the part of the recipient, or prospectively, which requires recipients to meet conditions to continue receiving aid. The prospective model is increasingly attractive and employed by projects like the Millennium Challenge Fund and the MEPI Incentive Fund.
(Winsor) We want to get the most bang for our buck. Even if they are ultimately unsuccessful, Congress must pressure the Administration to put more emphasis on human rights and democracy.
(McInerney) Support for democratic principles absolutely must be a priority. In Morocco, for example, more support would go far. We can no longer afford to waive conditions for human
rights and democracy n the name of national security. Algeria’s most recent elections, for example, were fraudulent at best, and the US said nothing.

Q: Is interest in Libya waning as the country moves from a conflict zone to a post-conflict country?
A: (McInerney) More assistance to Libya would be helpful. Substantial direct support in conjunction with civil society organizations focused efforts on the elections and election monitoring, which already happened. Prior to US assistance, Libyan political parties and civil society organization had little to no capacity. The US played a modest, but critical role in the success of Libya’s elections. Now that the elections have passed, the proper strategy and focus for engaging in Libya is not entirely clear.
(Wittes) Until last October, Libya was a conflict zone so aid centered on humanitarian supplies. We were successful in our efforts to help Libya implement a social infrastructure. Now, moving past the conflict situation, Libya is a wealthy country. Money to invest in the country can come from within—from the government. US assistance can focus on civil society organizations that the government neglects to assist.

Q: Is this the time to discuss changing aid to Israel from a more regional perspective?
A: (Wittes) I don’t see a failure to bringing Israel into the picture. Military assistance undoubtedly dominates economic assistance, and this needs to be redressed. A balance must be struck, just as in other countries in the region.

Q: The US-Egypt aid relationship desperately needs revisiting—the average Egyptian is not even aware that Egypt receives US aid—what does this tell us?
A: (Wittes) Our aid relationship to Egypt has been almost exclusively government-to-government. The NGO crisis reflects the SCAF’s reluctance to alter the nature of assistance; they want assistance, but only in a manner they can control. However, it is crucial to remember than none of our interests can be met if we fail to invest in democracy and good governance. Stability in Egypt and in the region as a whole—which is absolutely crucial to achieving our security interests—will not be established until governments undergo democratic reforms; conflict will persist until the people feel their demands are being heard. The question of how to invest is not an interests-versus-values issue. Promoting democracy and good governance benefits both our interests and our values.

5. Observation

Approximately 40 professionals, journalists, students, and members of the policy community attended this event, which launched POMED’s FY2013 report on US foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa. The panelists’ remarked that the Administration’s ability to continue to provide foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa at relatively consistent levels, with moderate and steady increases, represents a success in today’s constrained budget environment. Looking beyond the numbers, however, US assistance to the region relies too heavily on funds for security support rather than democracy and human rights efforts. In his testimony, Stephen McInerney said that more direct assistance for governance and democracy programs in Morocco would go far, and in his report, he wrote that the Morocco is a “permissive” environment for this kind of work. Compared to countries like Egypt and many of the Gulf States, where US governance programs have been met with resistance, Morocco has been a receptive partner. The event and report cast Morocco in a very positive light, and made a case for increasing US direct assistance to Rabat.

POMED Report Morocco Section:
In general, Morocco appears to have undertaken more serious reform in the past 18 months than most other states in the region, but without seriously shifting political power from the monarchy to elected institutions as demanded by protesters. US assistance to Morocco is rather modest and has not seen any significant changes in reaction to the events of 2011; it is the smallest aid recipient of the seven Arab countries with a USAID mission and a longstanding assistance relationship. Funding requests for FY13 are consistent with what has been provided over the past few years—a total of $32.6 million, including $15.1 million in security assistance, $7.7 million in assistance for democracy and governance programming, and $9.7 million in other economic aid. The democracy and governance program in Morocco is the smallest such program in any country in the region with a significant aid relationship. This is surprising given Morocco’s sizable population, the very high demand for civil society and political party development aid, and the relatively permissive environment for such work. The next year, however, will offer some real opportunities to reconsider the structure of US assistance to Morocco and address concerns that governance and democracy programs are too small in scope and excessively focused on improving the technical expertise of government institutions. In the next year, USAID is scheduled to complete a five-year strategy to guide its programming from 2012-2017. Several of USAID’s multiyear programs in Morocco will be completed in FY13, which will leave room for new projects to begin in FY14 in line with the new five-year strategy.

For a complete copy of the report, please visit:

Finding a Way Forward: The US, Morocco, and a Changing North Africa

Date: 31 July 2012

   Hosted by Kosmos Energy
   Capitol Visitors Center, Congress

   Participants:
   **Ambassador Rachad Bouhla**l: Ambassador to the United States, the Kingdom of Morocco
   **Alexis Arieff**: Analyst in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service
   **Dr. Audra Grant**: Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
   **Dr. J. Peter Pham**: Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, the Atlantic Council
   **Haim Malka**: Moderator: Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program,
   Center for Strategic and International Studies

2. Overview

This educational event provided a forum for discussing current events in Morocco and the broader Maghreb region. The targeted audience included legislative assistants, as well as senior foreign policy and homeland security staffers to Members of the House and Senate.
3. Summary

Haim Malka mentioned that Morocco typically has a low priority in news and for policymakers because Morocco rarely has crises. This is a mistake since Morocco is an important regional ally for the US in a region that is increasingly "consequential" for US policy. The goal of the discussion was to examine the public debates and the socio-economic challenges that Morocco faces.

Ambassador Bouhlal gave a brief history of the bilateral relationship that Morocco enjoys with the US. He stressed Morocco’s commitment to reform under Mohammad VI, and emphasized that in all these reforms Morocco has been careful to include public participation and encourage feedback.

Audra Grant focused on the changes that Morocco has undergone since the Arab Spring. She stressed that Morocco has a long history of liberalization under both King Mohammad VI and his father King Hassan II. The regime’s constitutional reforms in 2011 helped to prevent the destabilization that occurred in other parts of the Arab world. According to Grant, what prompted these reforms was the February 20th movement, which, unlike other Arab Spring protest movements, was peaceful and wasn’t focused on ending the regime. The reforms prompted by the protests liberalized the political system and limited monarchical power. Grant emphasized that Morocco is unique in the Arab World because the regime has legitimacy due to the monarchy’s historic religious legitimacy, the fact that is has promoted stable governance, and that the monarchy has promoted sustained liberalization. The protest movement was also fractured in terms of its goals and methods and the quick reaction of the monarch in offering reforms served to limit the political crisis. Morocco traditionally absorbs political dissent through reforms. Despite these reforms, the King maintains supremacy in critical policy areas and the populace has shown less confidence in the political institutions in recent years. Problems of high unemployment, poverty, and the Western Sahara issue must be overcome.

Dr. J. Peter Pham discussed the specifics of the constitutional reform and what they mean for Morocco. He stressed that keeping the context of these reforms in mind was important to understanding the importance of Morocco. Due to the constant reformist nature of King Mohammad VI and the final years of King Hassan II issues that drove populations to revolt in other countries were often already dealt with in Morocco. Human rights abuses were dealt with by the reconciliation commission and reparation payments, for example. The Arab Spring sped up the reform process with the new constitution. Pham stressed the uniqueness of these reforms compared to the rest of the Arab World. Morocco is the only country to acknowledge multiple sources of its culture - Arab, Berber, African, and others - in its constitution. Morocco also puts forward a more liberal version of Islam in its constitution, stating only that Islam is the religion of the state, instead of basing law solely on Sharia as in being raised in most other Maghreb countries. The new constitution also put the Amazigh language on an equal footing with Arabic and placed limits on the King’s power.

Alexis Arieff examined both the nature of the reforms and the US-Moroccan relationship. She agreed that the reforms have strengthened the Prime Minister, the legislature, and the judiciary, but stressed that the King still retains his position as the “ultimate arbiter” in the Moroccan system. Due to the quick reforms offered by the King, he nevertheless still retains his public popularity and legitimacy. The wrangling of the PJD with the palace over many issues has shown that the new arrangements in the constitution have been put into practice.

Arieff stressed that the US views Morocco as a strong ally and partner in the region. The Administration has been very supportive of the reforms and is comfortable working with the
PJD, operating on the idea of ‘actions being more important than words/philosophy.’ Morocco has been supported by Presidents from both parties and has been cooperative on issues ranging from Syria to trade and terrorism. In terms of Western Sahara, the US continues to support a negotiated solution that keeps the stability of Morocco in mind.

4. Q & A

Q: (Malka) Are the Moroccan people satisfied with the reforms? Is a new wave of protest inevitable if there is no political accommodation between the PJD and the monarchy that allows the government to fix what it needs to?
A: (Grant) There are fears that the primacy of the King could lead to a circumventing of the reform process. Future protests are largely dependent on economic performance. If the PJD is unable to improve the economy then protests are likely. The government response to the economic situation is key.
(Arieff) It is difficult to gauge the satisfaction with the reforms. The populace seems willing to give the PJD a chance, especially since the rest of the region provides such a negative example of what happens with violent protests that set out to overturn regimes.

Q: (Malka) What of Islamist movements, do they have a chance to reinvigorate the protest movements?
A: (Pham) Moroccans are largely happy with the direction of reforms - there may be arguments about the speed, but the government has maneuvering room. It is also important to keep in mind that the “Moroccan street” is really a varied bunch that has a broad range of desires. Some protesters are protesting so that the ministries will offer them jobs, while others are genuine protesters in the American sense of the term. Moroccans by and large reject extremism although there is always a small fraction of the populace that will buy-in, especially in such an extremist region.

Q: (This was a comment about the situation in Western Sahara and the refugee camps. No question was asked.)
A: (Pham) I just want to comment on this situation. One of the important things to keep in mind is that the US pays for these camps, but lacks basic information about how that money is spent. The US doesn’t even have information on the number of people in these camps. This is an interesting situation I don’t think you see anywhere else.

Q: (Kevin Coin, Project on Middle East Democracy) What about the changes in freedom of expression in Morocco with the recent beatings and arrests?
A: (Arieff) There are two issues which are limited in Morocco; one is direct criticism of the King and the other Western Sahara issue. In practice, tolerance for expression has waxed and waned. Broadly there has been acceptance of expression in Morocco, especially over the February 20 Movement. Recently, it seems the government has gotten more extreme in its response to smaller protestors, although there has been no official policy change. Interestingly the PJD has prosecuted more people both for insulting the King as well as insulting Islam.
(Grant) The King, Western Sahara, and Islam are the three taboos in Morocco. The press has been allowed more freedom, but there are clear redlines. There are no real rules - the lines are somewhat arbitrary. There has been progress in recent years, but limits remain on press freedoms.
(Pham) I think it’s important for the regional context to be kept in mind. The amount of information, range of information, and the tolerance in Morocco are substantially better than in any other country in the region.

Q: (Malka) What of Algeria and the regional relationship?
A: (Grant) There is always an opportunity, the recent confidence building measures are a good start. There is, however, a broader conflict between the two than just the Western Sahara. This is over regional dominance and status.
(Arieff) The potential is there. High level Algerians have often mentioned a “new start,” but there have been few concrete signs.
(Pham) Regional cooperation is in the interests of all states. This shouldn’t be made at the expense of the realities on the ground. The US has soft-pedaled the Algerian relationship because Algeria is important to the region. The US has downplayed the connections to Malian rebels and this needs to be addressed before regional cooperation.

Q: (Tony Bullock, Ogilvy) What is the view of the Moroccan government and the Polisario on groups in Mali?
A: (Grant) The MNLA was condemned by Morocco as an independent state in northern Mali. This antagonized the Berber population in Morocco. There might be the potential here for a transnational Berber identity. This is something that bears watching.
(Pham) I don’t know about the Polisario, they haven’t released anything yet. There are real dangers of a new failed state within the region. While the record of the Malian government towards its Tuareg population wasn’t great, the dangers of a failed state in the area are much greater. The breakdown of the state will open the region for many terrorist and drug trafficking groups and has the potential to destabilize the entire region.
(Grant) Secession would not be viewed kindly by any African government.
(Arieff) At this point we’re looking at either consolidation or conflict between the Islamist groups. The issue has moved past the Tuareg issue. Morocco is really worried about this situation, which could provide impetus for increased regional cooperation. Kidnappings in the camps also threaten the international image of the Polisario. This situation is threatening to everyone in the region.

Q: What is the US and international policy on resource extraction from the Western Sahara?
A: (Areiff) I am not a lawyer – that is a question for the State Department.

5. Observation

There were about 60 people attending this event. The audience was comprised predominately of interns and staffers from Congress, but a few regional experts attended as well. This was an excellent panel about the status of Morocco’s reforms. The discussion of these reforms was comprehensive and very supportive to Morocco. The uniqueness of the Moroccan reform path in a region known for repression was stressed again and again. There was brief discussion of the dangers and hurdles that Morocco faces in the near future, but these were downplayed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The View From Fez</strong></td>
<td>More Turbulence for Morocco's Troubled Airline Industry</td>
<td>Royal Air Maroc has been fined for violating baggage handling rules and imposing additional undisclosed fees to customers. This issue was also at the root of ONDA's recent problems with Easyjet and Ryanair. Both airlines complain of increased costs to fly to Morocco, Ryanair declaring that Morocco violated a contract and &quot;imposed&quot; a new monopoly handling company which drove up costs. This has increased the damage to Morocco's tourism industry which &quot;is being rocked by the withdrawal of a large number of flights by low cost airlines&quot; like Ryanair and Easyjet.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Libya opens doors to Moroccan workers</td>
<td>Moroccans who fled Libya after the outbreak of the revolution are now returning. With a poor job market at home many Moroccans have sometimes been forced to look abroad. Ahlam Chenbouti’s husband “struggled to find a job and after several long months of being out of work, he has decided to return to Libya.” The recent visit of the Libyan Prime Minister, who promised to improve working conditions encouraged this trend. Moroccans living in Europe are returning to their home country because of the economic crisis and Morocco has put “support mechanisms” in place for those returning permanently.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco postpones trial of M20F activists</td>
<td>A Casablanca court, on August 24, postponed the trial of six activists from the youth-led February 20 Movement until August 31. The defendants were arrested on July 22 and charged with participation in an unauthorised rally. The court also rejected a defence request for the provisional release of the detainees.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Moroccans stage peaceful marches</td>
<td>Morocco's youth-led February 20 Movement staged demonstrations on August 26 to demand the release of detained activists and political prisoners. Under heavy police presence, about 400 protesters marched through the streets of Casablanca's Bernoussi quarter. Some 200 people also rallied in Rabat. &quot;We want to peacefully express our demands for greater social justice,&quot; activist Younis Fikri said. According to the Moroccan Human Rights Association, nearly seventy February 20th members are currently detained in various cities of the kingdom.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the beginning of the school year falling just after the end of Ramadan, many Moroccan families find their budgets strained. School expenses have been increasing. At the same time equal access to education and the quality of the system are beginning to be questioned by political parties like the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. National Education Minister Mohamed El Ouafa has promised upgrades to educational infrastructure and teaching standards.

Residents of Algeria were frustrated with the government over “repeated blackouts” during the month of Ramadan due to higher than normal demand. Blackouts, often followed by a cut-off of water services, generated a wave of protests and riots in Algeria this summer. In response, the government “decided to launch a major investment programme worth $2.5 billion” which will more than double power generation by 2016. Sonelgaz, the company running the power grid, “was expecting assistance from the government for the expansion programme in light of [the companies] obligation to hold prices steady.”

A young Moroccan protester received a three-month jail sentence for eating in public during the holy month of Ramadan, AFP reported on August 28. The Rabat court on Friday also ordered him to pay a fine. Young Moroccans formed an online protest group last month called Masayminch (“We're not fasting”) to defend the right of non-believers to eat, drink or smoke in public during Ramadan.

Al-Qaeda splinter group Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) extended the deadline given to Algerian authorities to August 31st before carrying out its threat to kill one of the Algerian diplomats held since April. The group is asking for the release of several members held in Algerian custody. Marouan Ezzi, a lawyer close to the reconciliation file in Algeria, said ransom is unlikely given the UN initiative to criminalise the practice. “Algeria will use its good relations with dignitaries and tribal chiefs in northern Mali to reach a solution to the case and ensure the return of diplomats.”

James Traub responds to Mamkafinch’s critique of his Foreign Policy piece which, he says, misunderstood his position on Morocco’s “third way.” Traub was “not endorsing either the attitude of the outside world or Moroccan policy.” Traub differs from the critics saying that the new Constitution does provide meaningful changes, assuming the legislature and executive “have the will to grasp them.” Traub believes that if the PJD doesn’t “seize its mandate” popular protests will resume and Moroccans will, over time, lose reverence for the King making him “a more direct target of their criticism.”

Twelve activists from the disputed Western Sahara began a 48-hour hunger strike inside a prison in the Moroccan-controlled city of Laayoune to denounce their detention conditions. Morocco’s Communication Minister Mustafa el-Khalfi said authorities were not aware of the hunger strike.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 24, 2012</td>
<td><strong>AllAfrica</strong> Morocco: Ban Ki-Moon Welcomes Leadership of HM King Regarding Lofty International Ideals</td>
<td>“Ban Ki-Moon commended the leadership of HM King regarding the lofty international ideals and highlighted the significant contribution of the Kingdom of Morocco, an active member of the Security Council and a major contributor to peacekeeping operations.” Ban also praised the King for his international commitments to “preventing conflict and consolidating sustainable peace.” The UN will not, however, be removing Chris Ross as envoy to Western Sahara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 2012</td>
<td><strong>AllAfrica</strong> Morocco: Moroccan Journalist Wears His Heart On His Sleeve</td>
<td>Journalist Omar Radi, a member of the February 20 Movement, has challenged the Moroccan government over controversial laws like public eating during Ramadan and the sexual laws of the country. He was a spokesman for MALI a group which “open[ly] flaunt[ed]... the Islamic obligation to fast during the daylight hours of Ramadan.” He also supports greater press freedoms but says there has been no improvement since Benkirane took over as PM since “[t]he government has no power whatsoever.... [i]t is the Palace which decides on the limits of what is allowed.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Bikyamasr</strong> UN rebukes Morocco calls for Western Sahara envoy change</td>
<td>The United Nations has refused pressure from the Moroccan government to change its peace envoy to the Western Sahara. Morocco accused UN envoy Christopher Ross of being “unbalanced and biased.” Ban Ki-moon’s office reported that “the United Nations does not intend to modify the terms of its mediation, whose purpose is to promote the achievement of a mutually acceptable political solution to this conflict.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 26, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Morocco News Board</strong> RFK Ctr’s Kerry Kennedy: Political Operative or HR Activist?</td>
<td>Kerry Kennedy, the President of the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, arrived in Laayoune leading a human rights delegation to “Moroccan Sahara” and the refugee camps. “Our delegation will seek to assess the human rights situation on the ground,” said Kennedy. The Center’s statements, “may seem... to encourage the United Nations to create a new human rights entity in the region but the truth is that it will hurt the Moroccan territorial integrity and promote a totally negative image of Morocco as a brutal violator of human rights in the region.” The RFK Center has “become a political broker” instead of a human rights group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 26, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Morocco News Board</strong> RFK Center Kerry kennedy Champions Western</td>
<td>The Robert Kennedy Center has been heavily biased against Morocco and in favor of the Western Sahara separatists during its trip to Laayoune, excluding groups from its meetings “that don't agree with their point of view.” Leaders of the delegation, Kerry Kennedy and Mary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sahara Separatists Position</strong>&lt;br&gt;August 28, 2012</td>
<td>Lawlaor, show “blatant bias.” “It is unclear on what basis Kerry Kennedy and the RFK center claim to be ‘independent’” as Algeria finances the RFK Center. The Center seeks to support the Polisario by creating a “biased report on human rights situation” in the Tindouf camps.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Daily Star</strong>&lt;br&gt;Morocco economic crisis weighs on consumer confidence&lt;br&gt;August 27, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco’s consumer confidence index fell for the third straight quarter. A majority of households expected food prices to continue rising over the next 12 months, alongside a decline in the standard of living. The European economic crisis is cutting growth forecasts amid price rises and simmering social discontent. 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Blog</strong>&lt;br&gt;A Brush With Morocco’s Secret Police in Laayoune, Moroccan-Occupied Western Sahara (Photos)&lt;br&gt;August 27, 2012</td>
<td>Kerry Kennedy writes about an incident where she witnessed the beating of Soukaina Jed Ahlou, President of Sahrawi Women Forum by Moroccan police. The police were both uniformed and undercover and several other Sahrawi’s witnessed the beating. Kennedy’s daughter snapped several photos of the incident and other photos of Ahlou were taken after her release from the hospital. 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong>&lt;br&gt;Morocco Is on the Path to Change&lt;br&gt;August 28, 2012</td>
<td>The Arab monarchies have survived the Arab Spring because they are linked to national identity and are the traditional arbiters of society. Monarchies have stayed above the fray of politics by creating other institutions to represent the people. “Morocco and Jordan... are trying to satisfy their citizens by liberalizing instead of democratizing.” These countries are attempting to keep the status quo with limited reforms. This can’t “indefinitely quiet the restive middle classes” who want real pluralism and participation, but it’s a start. 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence Professionals</strong>&lt;br&gt;Lockheed Martin Delivers Final F-16s to Morocco&lt;br&gt;August 30, 2012</td>
<td>The final three of 24 F-16 fighter aircraft for the Royal Moroccan Air Force have departed Lockheed Martin’s facility in Texas on their way to their new home in Morocco. &quot;We are modernizing our fleet and we’ve chosen the F-16, not only because it is a high-quality airplane, but also because of the close relationship we have with the United States,&quot; said Deputy Inspector of the Royal Moroccan Air Force, Brigadier General Abdelali Houari. “The delivery of these aircraft places Morocco among the very elite group of air forces of the world who operate the advanced multirole F-16,” said Ralph D Heath, executive vice president of Lockheed Martin’s Aeronautics business. 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
September 4, 2012

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- Ahmed Ouyahia has been replaced by Abdelmalek Sellal as Prime Minister, at the head of a new government.
- Sellal is close to Bouteflika – in whose successive election victories he has played a key role – and also to DRS chief Tewfik, a sign that the Bouteflika-Tewfik tandem is still functioning.
- A clutch of old-guard Bouteflika loyalists, including FLN leader Belkhadem and former Interior Minister Zerhouni, have left the government, signalling the decline of the once powerful clan of western Algerians around the President.
- All key ministries – Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Energy, Defence – stay in the same hands as before, and overall there has been little change in the make-up of the government, with just three leaders of tiny, newly established parties, being rewarded with portfolios.
- The departure of Ouyahia may, however, augur a shift in economic strategy, towards more investor-friendly policies.

Foreign Relations

- One of the jihadist groups that now hold sway in northern Mali claims to have executed one of the Algerian diplomats it is holding hostage.
- Algiers remains reluctant either to get involved in military action beyond its own borders or to give its assent for an operation involving French or other non-African forces.
- With Paris pressing for an ECOWAS-led operation with French logistical and air support, Algiers’ unease continues to grow.

Security

- Contrary to expectations, there has been no “Ramadan surge” by AQMI, suggesting that the group may be suffering the effects of attrition.
- The south of the country, including the borders with Libya and Mali, have been largely quiet – although it is possible that an undeclared news blackout may be in force.
- The security forces are reported to have captured the head of AQMI’s judicial council, who was allegedly on his way to join up with the group’s units in northern Mali.
Finally, more than four months after the parliamentary elections that were supposed to be a major way-station on the path to political change, Algeria has a new Prime Minister, in the person of former Minister for Water Resources Abdelmalek Sellal, and a new government. The cabinet line-up unveiled on September 4, exactly 24 hours after it was announced that Sellal would be replacing Ahmed Ouyahia as head of government, is scarcely a radical transformation, however.

All key ministries stay in the same hands as before: Daho Ould Kablia stays on as Interior Minister, Mourad Medelci as Foreign Minister, Karim Djoudi as Finance Minister, Youcef Yousfi as Minister of Energy and Mining and Abdelmalek Guenaïzia as Assistant Defence Minister. Many lesser ministries have likewise failed to change hands, and while technically 15 out of 35 cabinet members are new entries, almost all have either held ministerial positions in the past or worked as senior civil servants in the departments they now head. There is no real political opening: the scenario of handing power (or the appearance of power) to tame islamist parties, à la marocaine, turned out to be a non-starter long ago, and reported soundings since the elections of parties across the political spectrum with a view to bringing them into government appear to have come to nought, or near to nought: three leaders of tiny, newly established parties who have agreed to play ball – Amara Benyounes of the Mouvement Populaire Algérien, Mohand Oussaïd Belaïd of the Parti des Libertés et de la Justice, and Amar Ghoul[1] of the TAJ – have been rewarded with cabinet positions, the remainder of the government being made up of members of the RND and the FLN and non-party technocrats, as before. Neither is there much by the way of generational renewal – the average age of incoming cabinet members may be slightly lower than the outgoing government, but scarcely enough for President Bouteflika to be able to claim that he has made good on his implied promise to clear the way for the rising, post-independence generations.

Overall, therefore, the whole operation is more of a reshuffle than a radical break with the past. This is very much in keeping with the established pattern under Bouteflika's presidency, when changes of government have generally been the occasion for at best incremental change. Even so, on closer inspection the advent of the Sellal government does entail some subtle yet potentially significant shifts.

Arguably the most important changes are the departures rather than the new arrivals. Ahmed Ouyahia's removal – expected for months, including by Ouyahia himself – was in a sense balanced by the departure of Abdelaziz Belkhadem, hitherto Minister of State without portfolio and personal representative of the President: on the one hand, this pre-empts speculation that the RND, of which Ouyahia is General Secretary, is losing out to the FLN, headed by Belkhadem; on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, it removes from government simultaneously both the figures credited with ambitions to succeed Bouteflika in 2014. There have been some suggestions in the Algerian media that leaving government frees Ouyahia to start working seriously on preparing for the presidency, but there is no real indication that this was what Bouteflika intended. Indeed, there has been no sign yet that the succession question has been settled one way or another, and it seems likely that the tops of the regime – Bouteflika, DRS chief Tewfik, and their closest advisors – would rather postpone a decision on this matter (just as they seem to be pushing back to next year, or even beyond, the promised constitutional reform, which, if it were to include the creation of the position of Vice-President, might provide the occasion for designating a de facto successor).

Also of note is the departure of a clutch of ministers who, along with Belkhadem, made up the bulk of the Bouteflika old guard, having served the President faithfully and held ministerial office for the most part uninterruptedly since shortly after he came to power in 1999. Belkhadem himself entered government as Foreign
Minister in 2000 and took over the FLN from the 'renegade' Ali Benflis in 2005. Other ousted old guard members include Yazid Zerhouni, once Bouteflika's right-hand man as Interior Minister from 1999 to 2010; Abdelhamid Temmar, who had held various portfolios connected with economic reform since 1999; Hachemi Djiar, a presidential advisor from 1999 to 2004, minister as of 2006; Nacer Mehal, loyal director of official news agency APS from 2000 and Minister of Communications as of 2010; Said Barkat and Djamel Ould Abbes, both ministers since 1999. Of these, furthermore, Zerhouni, Temmar, Mehal and Ould Abbes all hail from western Algeria and could be said to one degree or another to be part the clique of westerners that was seen as monopolising power after Bouteflika – himself born in Oujda, Morocco, into a family hailing from Nedroma in the Wilaya of Tlemcen – became President. Belkhadem, although originally from Aflou in the Hauts Plateaux, has also long been associated with this group. There have been signs for some years already that the cohesion and relevance of this “presidential clan” were on the decline; the Bouteflika old guard's exit from government would seem to provide further confirmation that it is largely a thing of the past.

Sellal himself, it is worth noting, hails not from the west of Algeria but from Constantine in the east. In some respects he might be seen as a long-standing Bouteflika loyalist, having served as his campaign manager in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections and been a member of each successive government of the Bouteflika presidency (generally holding comparatively low-profile portfolios: Youth & Sport, Transport, Public Works and Water Resources). But he is above all understood to be very close to the DRS and to its head, Tewfik – indeed it appears to have been through this channel that his relationship with Bouteflika began, back in 1999, when as interim Interior Minister Sellal played an important role in orchestrating the election of Bouteflika (who owed his selection as the candidate of the military in large part to Tewfik). The elevation of Sellal – a faithful servant of the state rather than a politician in the usual sense of the word, who has no known presidential ambitions – can thus be seen as another sign that the Bouteflika-Tewfik tandem is still operational.

It has been widely suggested that the switch from Ouyahia to Sellal does not augur any changes in terms of policy. In light of the minimal changes in the government line-up that have followed the appointment of Sellal, this might seem to be a reasonable assumption. However it is an assumption that is not shared by one source – a friend of Sellal's who also has regular access to the Presidency – at least as far as economic policy is concerned. With Ouyahia gone, the source suggests, the “economic nationalist” line that he championed will be dropped, and Sellal will inaugurate a new swing back to policies that are more accommodating for foreign investors. A more or less abrupt U-turn on investment policy would, once again, be entirely consistent with the pattern established over the years by Bouteflika, who is remarkably un-dogmatic when it comes to economics and who appears to have been subject to lobbying for almost a year now from economic advisors such as Abdellatif Benachenhou to ditch Ouyahia's “failed” eco-nationalist line.

Foreign Relations

As the crisis in northern Mali drags on, it becomes increasingly poisonous for Algiers. On September 1, the AQMI spin-off calling itself the Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (Mujao) announced that it had executed one of the Algerian diplomats it kidnapped in Gao this spring, after the Algerian authorities rejected its demands for the freeing of jihadists arrested in Ghardaia on August 15 (see below). The Algerian authorities say they are still trying to verify the reports, but have promised a “painful response” if they turn out to be true. In the meantime, another even more shadowy group, calling itself the Mouvement des fils du Sahara pour la Justice Islamique has popped up unexpectedly with a video message lambasting the Algerian
authorities for failing to take action to protect rank and file Algerian diplomats, demanding the application of sharia in Algeria and threatening to resume armed struggle.

Although it would doubtless like to have done with the islamist pseudo-state on its southern border, Algiers is in a quandary as to what to do about it. For the time being, Algiers is sticking to its doctrine of no military deployments outside of Algerian territory (which in this case would almost certainly entail the execution of the remaining Algerian hostages), but at the same time seems reluctant to give its assent to anyone else to do the job. In the early summer, Paris and Washington both reportedly pressed Algiers to either take part in an operation against the Ansar Dine-MUJAO-AQMI entity in northern Mali, or at least to give its assent to a joint French-ECOWAS intervention, but the Algerians seem to have been extremely reluctant to agree to any non-African (and a fortiori French) involvement.

In July French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius let slip that the use of force in northern Mali was “probable, at some point or another”, and since then there have been repeated claims that an intervention involving French forces is “imminent”. At the end of July, Alassane Ouattara, President of Ivory Coast and current ECOWAS chairman, told the French press that a military intervention, most likely to be carried out by ECOWAS forces on the ground with logistical and air support from the French, was a matter of urgency and could be expected “within weeks rather than months”. More recently, Algerian daily El-Khabar (31/08) claims to have obtained “leaked Libyan documents” that reveal a French military presence at the Karadabiya air base near Sirt, northern Libya, in which the newspaper sees a sign of French preparations for war in northern Mali.

At the beginning of September, Mali's interim President Dioncounda Touré is reported to have formally requested a military intervention by ECOWAS forces to reconquer the northern half of his country from the jihadist groups that now hold sway there – an initiative that was announced, rather tellingly, via the French Foreign Ministry's website. There seems to be some hope that an intervention sanctioned by both ECOWAS and the African Union (together, perhaps, with the United Nations), as opposed to a joint French-ECOWAS operation, might win Algeria's approval. But the fact remains that ECOWAS will be hard pushed, in terms of personnel and logistics not to mention air power, to put together an adequate force, and so the question of French involvement remains posed, at least implicitly.

And the Algerians still appear to be extremely wary of this. The French involvement in overthrowing Col. Qaddafi in neighbouring Libya is still a fresh and bitter memory, and Algiers takes an equally dim view of Paris' support for the opposition to President Bashar Al-Assad of Syria. Viewed from Algiers, developments on Algeria's borders and in the broader region merely confirm apprehensions which, viewed from the outside, appear almost paranoiac. As Algerian daily L’Expression (07/09) puts it, when discussing the role of MUJAO:

The geopolitical situation in Mali is, of course, complex. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that there are unmistakable clues. Why are the Sahrawis mentioned by MUJAO every time [it makes a statement], amplified by Agence France Presse? “Who, apart from Morocco,” asks Sahrawi Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, “has been trying for 30 years to sully the reputation of the Sahrawis and, by extension, Algeria, which supports the independence of the Western Sahara in accordance with the will of the UN?” Even so, at the level of the UN Security Council, Morocco enjoys the protection of a world power, which has major interests in Mali, and also in Morocco. Since the Libyan episode, that same power has been the ally of Qatar and is hostile towards Algeria, which represents a genuine stumbling-block for its neo-colonialist strategy.

Security

After a relatively quiet June, jihadist activity picked up in July and August, returning to levels comparable with the average recorded over previous months. July saw a total of 25 reported security incidents, of which 19 were AQMI-initiated operations, and August saw a total of 25 incidents, of which 15 AQMI operations. Contrary to
expectations, the “Ramadan effect” failed to materialise this year: the holy month of fasting, seen as particularly propitious for jihad and martyrdom, has often been the occasion for AQMI to intensify its efforts, and in particular to launch suicide bombings, but this year’s Ramadan (July 20 to Aug. 20) saw 19 AQMI operations, barely higher than average, and no suicide operations at all[8]. This stands in remarkable contrast to last year’s Ramadan, which coincided with August and saw 30 AQMI operations and 40 incidents over all, including two suicide bombings, suggesting that AQMI’s operational capabilities in the north of the country are being worn down – giving the lie to last year’s alarmist reports that the organisation was being strengthened by inflows of weaponry and explosives from Libya.

Apart from the killing of a jihadist by the army near the town of Meftah on the southern approaches to the capital, on August 21, Algiers and its environs remained quiet. Even AQMI's stronghold in Kabylia was unusually calm in August, with only three operations initiated by AQMI recorded for the whole month; the security forces, on the other hand, were relatively active in tracking jihadists down (in just one incident on August 30, according to a Defence Ministry statement[9], the army killed as many as nine jihadists in the area of Béni Amrane in central Boumerdès).

The south has also been remarkably quiet – although it is possible that this may in part be due to an undeclared news blackout. Only one incident was recorded on Algeria’s southern borders over the summer: according to Echorouk, on July 23 the security forces using helicopters intercepted “a convoy of AQMI and MUJAO fighters” near Tiznaouaten, wilaya of Tamanrasset, on the border with Mali, destroyed three offroaders and killed all 12 men on board and recovered 14 Kalashnikovs. The jihadists “had been trying to hijack fuel tankers”, according to the Arabic-language daily – seemingly in order to supply the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance which controls northern Mali, which has been subjected to a fuel embargo since their takeover in April. Three weeks later, on August 15, security forces manning a roadblock at Berriane, Wilaya of Ghardaïa, arrested three members of AQMI heading for northern Mali, reportedly including Tayeb Necib (aka Abderrahmane Abou Ishak Essoufi), head of AQMI’s “judicial council” and a member of the organisation's council of elders.

For his part, AQMI's national emir Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abou Mosaab Abdelouadoud) issued an audio recording around August 28 in which he berated the Algerian authorities for their treatment of Syrian refugees in Algeria, “which borders on persecution”. “These brothers came to Bouteflika seeking refuge from Bashar,” he said, “only to find they have jumped from the frying pan into the fire”. Syrian refugees “were taken in” by the Algerian regime’s lip service to “self determination and national liberation” and failed to notice that the Algerian government “has opposed all Arab revolutions and considered the revolutionaries to be criminals; so no wonder it is treating Syrian refugees like criminals”.

END

[1] Ghoul, who was a member of the MSP, broke with Bouguerra Soltani's moderate islamist party when it opted to quit the government, essentially to be able to hold onto his ministerial position, subsequently founding the TAJ on no clear ideological basis.

[2] The position of Deputy Prime Minister that was created for him after he gave up the Interior portfolio in 2010 has now been abolished, its prerogatives never having been clearly defined.

[3] It is, however, worth noting that there are a couple of throwbacks to the early years of the Bouteflika presidency among the newly appointed ministers, notably the new Health Minister Abdelaziz Ziai and the new Housing Minister Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who both held various ministerial positions in the first years of Bouteflika's presidency as well as serving as presidential advisors and/or diplomatic messengers.

[4] And, it might be added, Yazid Zerhouni.

[5]
Movement of the Sons of the Sahara for Islamic Justice. An organisation going by a similar name was said to have been responsible for a handful of raids on oil companies in south-east Algeria in 2007, and possibly also for an attack against military aircraft on the tarmac at In Amenas airport in the same region, but had not been heard of since.

Even though, according to El-Khabar, the Libyan document says French “experts” are there to train and aid Libyan forces. On September 3 the same newspaper said a “Western manned surveillance plane” crashed in the Hamada Hamra area in the Libyan desert, close to the border with Algeria. The crew “was immediately rescued by helicopters”. The newspaper did not say what country the aircraft or personnel belonged to.

Shortly before the beginning of Ramadan, on August 1, police foiled what appears to have been an attempted vehicle-borne suicide bomb attack against the security headquarters of Khenchela (east).

The very fact that the Defence Ministry issued a formal statement is unusual: the Algerian authorities generally do not report terrorist or security incidents officially and newspaper reports are usually attributed to “informed security sources”.

See AMSR #109, September 30, 2011.
Please find our 2nd Quarter 2012 Journal Article Review. Our research team compiles and reviews recent journal publications relating to Morocco, the Maghreb, and MENA on a quarterly basis. Clicking on any article title below will link you to the executive summary for the article as well as MAC recommendations on the relevance of the article. You can also find publication information, and, where available, a link to a copy of the article. In the event that no link is posted, please email me for a copy of the article. We hope that this information will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on recent journal articles and help to keep you up-to-date on publications and academic trends.

**Please do not forward this bulletin as it contains our evaluations of the articles and is proprietary information.**

---

**‘Change Within Continuity’: The Equity and Reconciliation Commission and Political Reform in Morocco**

**Emerging Order in the Middle East**

**Le Maroc et le printemps arabe dans un monde en plein changement (Morocco and the Arab Spring in a Changing World)**

**Morocco’s New Constitution and the Western Sahara Conflict – a Missed Opportunity?**

**The Rise of Islamist Actors: Formulating a Strategy for Sustained Engagement**

**Silent Complicity: The International Community and Algeria’s Democratic Façade**

**The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations**

**The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean Relations**

**Writing as Resistance: Berber Literature and the challenges surrounding the Emergence of a Berber Literary Field in Morocco**

**Youth Perceptions in Morocco: Political Parties in the wake of Legislative Elections: Findings from Qualitative Research in Morocco Conducted in March and April 2012**

---

**‘Change Within Continuity’: The Equity and Reconciliation Commission and Political Reform in Morocco**

Rachel Linn

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This article examines the Instance Equite et Reconciliation (IER) in Morocco. The article argues that the IER, formed by royal decree, represents "an attempt by the palace to co-opt a critical public discourse on past abuses into a state-managed forum". The opposition was willing to go along with this cooption because they felt that it would increase the opportunities for democratization. This divergence in objectives greatly impacts the chances for implementation of the commission’s recommendations, but the commission has responded to the demands of the majority of the victims and reflects the social and cultural values of Moroccan society.
The IER was established by King Mohammed VI in January 2004 and was the first Truth Commission to be held in Arab-Islamic country. The IER was formed to investigate four decades of "forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and torture from Moroccan independence in 1956 to 1999." The regime presented the IER as proof to the international community that Morocco was enlightened on human rights and was committed to democratic reform. Controversially, the IER was limited by a stipulation that no individual perpetrators were to be implicated in its work. The IER was unique amongst Truth Commissions for several reasons. The IER did not occur following a regime change, but instead from an "unbroken, powerful regime." All other Truth Commissions had been preceded by regime change up until this point. The IER was also the first explicit Truth Commission to be held by an Arab/Islamic state.

The article argues that the IER was undertaken due to palace strategies for managing discontent, which "gave rise both to the abuses that necessitated the IER and a gradual reform process" in the 1990's "that eventually enabled a commission." The Moroccan King inherited from the French colonial authority a powerful modern state as well as a set of repressive and undemocratic emergency laws. Once the state faced discontent and riots, the "prerequisites for widespread abuse were already available." King Hassan II launched a repressive campaign from the 1950s until the 1970s, when he began a process of limited political inclusion. This process picked up in the 1990s as King Hassan began permitting consultation and reform in areas that didn't impact royal prerogatives. During the 1990s, there was increased Western criticism of human rights and democratization, which set the stage for the formation of the IER once King Mohammed VI took over from his father in 1999.

The IER enabled King Mohammed VI to position himself as a reformer, which he solidified by removing hard-line figures from the old regime, such as Interior Minister Driss Basri. The IER was a subject of much debate between regime hardliners, who saw it as showing weakness, and softliners, largely made up of King Mohammed VI's appointees who argued that targeted reforms could strengthen the monarchy. The King ultimately went with the softliners, perceiving the IER "as a means to disarm public criticism and strengthen his image as a modern, compassionate monarch."

The IER also served to co-opt many local groups that had previously been in opposition to the monarchy. Many opposition groups/individuals, such as Driss Benzekri, a human rights activist, believed that even though the IER was somewhat gutted and had flaws, it could also "have a positive impact through its ability to propose institutional reforms" and therefore decided to support the commission. The IER was seen as the "best opportunity since independence to push democratic reform".

The decision not to allow the naming of guilty individuals in the IER was made for several reasons: other examples of similar commissions, like South Africa's, had succeeded without apportioning guilt, the opposition was skeptical of the judicial system in Morocco, and there was often a lack of evidence to get convictions even if the judicial system were used. Many commissioners felt that it was more important to establish institutional responsibility, for future institutional reform, instead of focusing on criminal sanctions. This focus on social justice and fair treatment, over retribution and punishment, is a cultural and social norm within Islamic societies that encouraged opposition groups to support the lack of prosecution for guilty parties.

The article nevertheless concludes that the ultimate impacts of the IER have been limited. Individual reparations were completed quickly and completely, but reparations to the judiciary, state security sector, and political system have not been implemented. This mixed bag of results is due to the monarchy's control of implementation of the IER recommendations and the desire of the palace to secure the monarch's power and societal position. The "majority of the IER recommendations related to institution reform would...involve introducing substantial limits on royal prerogatives" and are therefore blocked. The war on terror has shielded Morocco from outside pressure as both Europe and the US "prioritize concerns for security...and [the] stability of western-friendly regimes in the Middle East and North Africa over concerns for human rights." The Casablanca suicide bombings of 2003 also dampened some of the internal pressures for reform. The palace uses this freedom of maneuver, in the context of the war on terror, to apply state repression broadly and not limit it to terrorist suspects.

The regional implications of the IER are not yet clear. Immediately after the IER report was published, Morocco sent the commissioners to numerous regional and international conferences, but they were met with limited interest, especially from other Middle Eastern countries. Regional implications are probably limited and the ultimate significance for the IER will depend on the reform process within Morocco itself, largely driven by a King who has "yet to demonstrate that [he] is ready to abandon [his] monopoly on power."

RECOMMENDATION

This piece focuses on Morocco and the IER; however, it is not especially flattering towards the King or the progress that Morocco has made on human rights or democracy. The article does refer to steady reform and liberalization of the country and regime and also points out the King Mohammed VI is very different from his father. The fact that the IER is the first Truth Commission to be launched by the regime which committed the abuses is certainly a bragging point for Morocco. The article criticizes the King for cynical motives and a desire to hold onto power. This article can be used for brief quotes to show marked improvement in the areas of human rights over time as well as some flattering regional comparisons, but the overall impression is rather negative towards the Moroccan monarchy.

(Back to top)

Emerging Order in the Middle East

Sinan Ulgen, Nathan J. Brown, Marina Ottaway, and Paul Salem
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/middle_east_order1.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines the recent rise of Islamist movements and the decline of secular groups in the Middle East. The article looks at some of the underlying causes and broad impacts this rise has had, and gives recommendations for the appropriate Western response. While primarily focused on Egypt and Tunisia, the article examines these changes with a broad regional focus.

Islamic political movements have risen throughout the region on a wave of popular discontent. Islamist movements were the best placed to take advantage of this discontent because they had an "extensive social presence and organizational capacities." These Islamist movements arose in
Islamists, the article claims, are the major winners of the limited democratic changes in the region. They have successfully managed this transition and have begun to build up "structures and comprehensive programs addressing a host of political, economic, and public policy issues" and begun adapting themselves to a democratic system. Even in countries, like Morocco, where the old regime is still in place, the PJD has "accepted limited constitutional reform and taken a leading role in the cabinet." The PJD, like other Islamist groups, has also been insistent on "joining the ruling elite" and becoming politically engaged, which is a break from much of the rhetoric of Salafi groups when they were in opposition. Islamist groups throughout the region have begun to "embrace democratic mechanisms and politics more generally" and they "have ceased to regard themselves as opposition movements and increasingly see themselves as actual or potential governing parties."

Governance, and public notoriety both in the domestic and international scenes, has also pushed these groups to "become more cautious with their rhetoric" to reassure international actors that they can work together, primarily in the economic sphere. Islamic groups do want Western economic help and support, and groups have expressed a willingness to participate in international economic fora. For example, the PJD has already "demonstrated [its] readiness to participate in international platforms of economic dialogue such as the World Economic Forum." That said, there is little that outside actors can do to shape the development of Islamist movements. These groups are not "looking for ideological guidance" and the group solidarity is strong so they are unlikely to fracture due to western "flirtations."

In addition, Islamist movements are primarily domestically focused, which severely limits the West's ability to influence them. In the areas of security sector reform and economics, where instability has adversely impacted economic performance, these movements "show a real interest in learning from the experience of other countries." Demands for acceptance of a "broad ideological agenda" endorsing secularism, for "commitments to core values such as women's rights," or for "cooperation with a full Western security agenda" are all unlikely to succeed. More limited goals, such as maintenance of existing treaty obligations and a general commitment to a peaceful settlement of international disputes, however, might be effective. Western pressure will be most effective if it is "uniform;" the West must begin to "build bridges to entire societies" instead of a small number of elite political actors.

The West must nevertheless be concerned about the rise of these movements for two reasons. First, there are questions about the ultimate goals of these parties and how they will react to holding power. There are dangers that the Arab-Israeli conflict could heat up again and that Islamists could undermine/rollback gains in women's rights. Second, the West should concern itself with the deep divisions between the Islamists and the secular/modernist forces, which were the traditional allies of the West and are now being marginalized. The Arab Spring and the rise of Islamist groups have increased regional instability and created "new risks from terrorist networks." These factors have also had dramatic repercussions for every actor in the region, sinking the popularity of states like China, Russia, and Iran while providing a new starting point for others like Egypt.

The article concludes that the West should attempt short-term oriented policies in order help Arab governments, which are faced with short-term pressures of job creation and fiscal constraints. In order to do this the West can increase financial assistance, provide technical experts on debt management, and help to establish secure and predictable regulatory frameworks for public-private partnerships. The most important consideration for the West, however, is to remain consistent in including Islamists in any discussion of bilateral or multilateral issues. The West must acknowledge that democratic transitions are "long-term complicated processes that do not follow straight-forward trajectories" and act accordingly by supporting a long-term transition to democracy to help countries overcome short-term difficulties.

RECOMMENDATION

This article is helpful for understanding the larger issues of Islamist movements and how their rise during the Arab Spring has impacted the region. There is little specifically on Morocco as the article focused instead on Tunisia and Egypt, which experienced mass protests and regime change. This article does remain broad enough to inform on Morocco and the PJD, but is not specific enough to be distributed widely within MAC. The small bits there are on Morocco are rather anti-monarchy making is seem that King Mohammed VI and Mubarak are on the same level. I would not recommend this article for the MAC site.
Parliament. However, for the moment, these are merely statements of intention, as considerable efforts are required to concretize these changes as was the case with the reform of the family code, which clashes with the views of conservative judges and many of society. In addition, despite some obvious improvements, the author argues that the makeup of the political system remains intact: the King reigns and governs, directs the council of ministers, controls religious discourse, and presides over the superior council of the judiciary, thus not granting significantly more power to the people. The author likewise disagrees with the official results of the constitutional referendum – although the voter participation rate was 73%, the government failed to note that the participation rate was only 45% of people of voting age.

He applies the same logic to the victory of the PJD in the November 2011 elections – claiming that the PJD received only 5% of the vote when calculating voter participation of eligible, rather than registered, voters. Nevertheless, the PJD victory was at least symbolically important as the group doubled its share of the votes from previous parliamentary elections. It has a difficult path ahead as it seeks to implement the Constitution and develop a working relationship with the King, who will be consulted on all major decisions. The author views the King’s appointment of five royal advisors (Menouini, Azziman, El Himma, Zenagu, and Fassi Fihri) as evidence that there will be a battle for power between the Palace and the Parliament, but also notes that Benkirane’s strong personality and the PJD’s relative power within the Cabinet (12 out of 31 ministers) indicate some balance of power. Regardless, it is obvious that the PJD will have to work hard to implement reforms and work for the economy in order to meet the demands of the protestors. While they have been isolated, many of their core grievances remain and they will likely reappear if the promises of the Constitution are not realized.

RECOMMENDATION

Despite some words of praise for Morocco’s response to the Arab Spring, the author is largely critical of both the process and the outcome, arguing that the political system in Morocco remains relatively intact in spite of the reform of the Constitution and that both the "yes" on the Constitutional referendum and the PJD victory were not indicative of widespread support. It is important to acknowledge that these kinds of arguments are being made, in Europe and the US alike, but I would not recommend this article for further review.

(Back to top)

Morocco’s New Constitution and the Western Sahara Conflict – a Missed Opportunity?
Anna Theofilopoulou

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines Morocco’s attempts to introduce political reform following the February 20th Movement protests and also analyzes Morocco’s handling of the Western Sahara conflict. In both cases she argues that the Moroccan government has pursued short-term and short-sighted goals that serves to both limit reforms and prevent the ultimate solution to Western Sahara. The article claims that “real democracy in Morocco and the Western Sahara could help both the Kingdom and its adversaries in resolving the conflict.”

The article argues that, following the Arab Spring protests in Morocco, the King quickly “tried to pre-empt and co-opt the protestors” by promising change and constitutional revisions. The promises of reform quieted the protests, but the King failed to follow through on the promised changes. Mohammad VI appointed a committee of experts to draft the constitution, which was “headed by a constitutional law professor with a history of condoning autocracy.” The King also set up a consultative body, which was deemed illegitimate by many protest groups who refused to participate. Once submissions to the consultative body were made “there was no follow up or debate” and the constitutional draft was only shown to the group only one day before the King presented the constitution in a televised speech during which he announced the date for the Constitutional referendum to take place two weeks later.

The referendum was similarly stacked against the protestors by the King. Muhammad VI quoted a passage of the Qur’an “[enjoining] the public to follow his ‘way’” and the Ministry of Religious Affairs “instructed imams to urge a ‘yes’ vote during Friday sermons.” The mainstream parties all supported the Constitution, with the PJD saying that the Constitution contained enough safeguards for democracy. Protestors against the new Constitution staged demonstrations that were met with pro-monarchy crowds, which protestors claimed were “organized and paid by the Ministry of Interior.” Voting was also widely seen as fraudulent.

The author notes that the text of the new Constitution “addresses all key demands of the protestors,” but “the changes made are less than meets the eye.” The events of the 2011 elections show that the Constitution shows that Morocco “has a long way to go towards a real parliamentary monarchy.” The 45% turnout for voting in the parliamentary elections, while 8% higher than previous elections, shows the “cynicism, indifference, and apathy” of Moroccans who felt that “it would not really matter whether they voted or not.” Benkirane, leader of the PJD party that won the most seats in the election, formed his coalition with the monarchy, by building up its cities, developing its infrastructure, and by providing financial aid and other incentives to the people. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the PJD will have to work hard to implement reforms and work for the economy in order to meet the demands of the protestors. While they have been isolated, many of their core grievances remain and they will likely reappear if the promises of the Constitution are not realized.

The article argues that Morocco’s handling of the Western Sahara conflict has followed a similar trend of seeking to do the bare minimum without offering fundamental change. For example, Morocco has accepted UN proposals for resolving the conflict “in principle,” but with the intention of interpreting them to secure Moroccan interests. Morocco relocated thousands of people into Western Sahara in order to create facts on the ground and to skew voting lists to be used in a referendum to determine the status of Western Sahara, in Morocco’s favor. Morocco also attempted to influence MINURSO to accept this population as legitimate residents of Western Sahara while proceeding to “inject resources into [Western Sahara], by building up its cities, developing its infrastructure, and by providing financial aid and other incentives to thousands of Moroccans to move [into Western Sahara].” Internationally, Morocco attempted to influence the Security Council, specifically France, so that “decisions would benefit the Moroccan position.”

During all this time the primary goal of Morocco was to deadlock and “delay the process” while expecting friendly nations to step in to support Morocco’s interests. Once MINURSO had settled on the voting lists, Morocco appealed all rejected voters as a stalling tactic. King Hassan II was
willing to consider alternative solutions to the “zero-sum game of the [UN] Settlement Plan,” but the Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri, “convinced the King to remain with the Settlement Plan.” Upon ascending the throne, Mohammad VI was willing to consider new plans, but “it was a case of too little too late.” Autonomy plans, put forward by each of the actors, were rejected by the Polisario, Morocco, or both. James Baker, Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, put forward an autonomy plan which Morocco stalled on and “employed[ed] all means in its disposal…to get Baker to change the proposal” until finally rejecting it in 2004. Morocco’s stalling and negative reactions to several proposals led the UN to attempt to salvage something of MINURSO’s efforts by passing Resolution 1541, which “weakened the [Security] Council’s support of the Peace Plan” and led Baker to resign. These two events were hailed as “a triumph of Moroccan diplomacy” by the Foreign Minister.

The Moroccan autonomy plan was announced in 2007, but the Security Council was “not quite prepared to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.” Instead the Security Council passed Resolution 1754, which set the stage for formal and informal meetings between the conflicting parties where “nothing resembling negotiations” happened in either the formal or informal setting. Instead, Resolution 1754 “set the path for irresolution for the conflict,” which served Morocco’s short-term interests in preventing any non-Moroccan solution to the conflict. In furtherance of this, Morocco has also expanded its lobbying efforts in the US Congress and news media where “individuals without real grasp of the conflict present simplistic views on how the conflict could be resolved using solely the Moroccan proposal,” which shows Morocco’s continued “strategy of short-sighted inflexibility.”

In conclusion, the article states that the new Constitution has failed to change the Moroccan political system in any meaningful way. The Constitution’s impact “depends on the way it is implemented,” as “the text has potential.” Realizing this potential requires the Parliament to adopt legislation and provide the maximum space for “political forces,” which Parliament is unlikely to be able to accomplish. Those in power in Morocco still believe that “cosmetic changes and repression will bring the desired results” obviating the need for real reforms. Similarly, “Morocco never had a long-term strategy for resolving the Western Sahara conflict, other than to insist on its sovereignty over the Territory,” and has actively avoided referendums which Morocco would have won had it “followed a well-thought strategy of winning over the local Saharan population.” Given Morocco’s history, it is now impossible to trust that Morocco will negotiate fairly or stand by its promises in the Western Sahara, dooming its own autonomy plan. As a study on autonomy arrangements in non-democracies by Khakke shows “autonomy can only truly exists within a democratic system,” which is a conclusion that Moroccan authorities continue to ignore. Moroccan supporters must stop “blindly supporting [Morocco’s] every position” and instead must demand more “in terms of its internal politics” and “in its handling of the Western Sahara conflict.”

RECOMMENDATION

This article is very critical about both Morocco’s recent constitutional reforms as well as Morocco’s handling of the Western Sahara issue. While the tone of the article is very negative, many of the facts cited and the history presented show Morocco in a favorable light. Morocco is mentioned specifically as pouring money into infrastructure and development of Western Sahara and there are quotes from opposition members praising the constitutional reforms. Even the article admits that much of the impetus for reform has been left to the Parliament and that the text of the Constitution provides an opening for meaningful change to occur. This article shows even those negatively disposed towards Morocco admit that Morocco has its bright spots. The article really fails to prove its thesis and fails to make a connection between the Western Sahara conflict and the democratic reforms. The two topics seem very much divided in the paper; it isn’t until the conclusion that the Khakke study, which apparently shows a link, is even mentioned and even that is briefly and poorly explained. The discussion of Western Sahara ends in 2009, well before the protests even occurred. The connection between the two issues, the crux of the paper, is very vague and anomalous. While the tone is very negative, this article provides a source for favorable quotes and facts that come from a source biased against Morocco and can be useful in that regard.

(Back to top)

**The Rise of Islamist Actors: Formulating a Strategy for Sustained Engagement**

Quinn Mecham

Project on Middle East Democracy Policy Brief, April 27, 2012

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Recent electoral victories among Islamist political parties as well as the emergence of new Islamist actors across the Middle East and North Africa necessitate a new strategy for American engagement in the region. In the past, US policymakers prioritized their relationships with singular actors in authoritarian regimes, taking little stock of Arab countries’ domestic politics. These regimes opposed US engagement with Islamist parties—many of whom comprise the groups rising to power today—and American diplomats chose to prioritize their existing relationships with regime leaders. As a result, the US has found itself ill-prepared to understand the rise of these new victorious political parties in the context of a new political dynamism. US policymakers must abandon the old model and reach out to new actors based on the degree of their political relevance, rather than their perceived alignment with US positions. Meaningful engagement with Islamist groups provides the opportunity to support pluralism, strengthen evolving political institutions, and positively impact political processes in Muslim countries.

Some Islamist groups like Somalia’s al-Shabaab or transnational groups like al-Qaeda use political violence to achieve their ends, but the last decade has witnessed an explosion of Islamist political parties which reject violence and have competed in elections in over 20 countries worldwide. The success of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), for example, has highlighted the political opportunities that exist for moderate Islamist parties which focus on more universal political values rather than strict implementation of Sharia. Increased political openness throughout the Muslim world has encouraged Islamist groups to blend religious and cultural authenticity with pragmatic political strategies.

US policy toward non-violent Islamist movements and political parties has been inconsistent both across countries and between groups within countries. This has left the US vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy and political discrimination against Islamists. Most frequently, American diplomats rejected engagement with these groups primarily to avoid upsetting existing relationships with autocratic allies. Another motivation underlying this reluctance, however, is American policymakers’ fear that their engagement with Islamists could be perceived as an endorsement of their ideology—an ideology that may differ from US preferences in social or cultural norms, or in support for violence. With the ouster of several long-standing US allies as a result of the Arab uprisings, emerging governments could prove less friendly to a number of US interests, including human rights, liberal democratic values, long-standing economic relationships, and the security of Israel. This new “Islamist challenge”
This shift toward engagement was codified in Secretary Clinton’s address to the National Democratic Institute in late 2011—she articulated a belief that Islamist politics can be compatible with democracy and affirmed support for a full democratic transition in Egypt, even if it leads to a government led by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This shift in US rhetoric has also been met with regular high-level meetings between American policymakers and officials from Islamist parties throughout the region. This is a practical step in the right direction, but it fails to fully recognize the new opportunities that engagement with a broad range of Islamist actors—even those with anti-Western views—can provide to the US. Just as the US misunderstands many Islamist groups, Islamists often misunderstand US interests and behavior. As these Islamist parties begin to formulate foreign policy in their respective countries, their misconceptions about the US could have negative implications for longstanding bilateral relationships. For that reason, consistent engagement on a wide range of issues provides an opportunity to clarify American values and priorities that Islamist groups often fail to sufficiently grasp.

Policy Recommendations:

1. Recognize the similarities between Islamist groups and other political groups, including the way they respond to the political incentives of their systems.
2. Proactively engage with a wide range of Islamist organizations, particularly those that have committed themselves to competing in electoral processes.
3. Distinguish the appropriate level of political engagement based on the political relevance of the Islamic group, not on the basis of its religious ideology.
4. Support political pluralism and equal treatment, without distinction for religion or gender.
5. Promote an independent media and freedom of speech.
6. Work to strengthen legal systems that provide equal access regardless of religious ideology.
7. Publicly reinforce US support for democracy and good governance where Islamist parties operate.
8. Work together with Islamist groups to support freedom of association.

RECOMMENDATION

POMED’s analysis and recommendations represent a prevalent narrative in the policy community: US engagement in the Middle East and North Africa must evolve to accommodate a rapidly growing and diversifying body of political actors and must shift from military to economic assistance. The notion that American diplomatic engagement in the region requires reexamination and redesign is a relatively non-contentious issue, but American policymakers disagree on how exactly to proceed. POMED argues that the US should focus efforts on specific actors and groups based purely on their political relevance, while others insist that US engagement should target groups based on their alignment with American policy positions. Morocco’s PJD represents the convergence of these two camps—it is the most powerful, politically relevant party in the country, and it’s moderate Islamic ideology and democratic trajectory coincides with American policy positions. This article is useful in that it highlights the advantageous position of the PJD for engagement with the US; that being said, the article does not directly discuss the PJD.

Silent Complicity: The International Community and Algeria’s Democratic Façade
John P. Entelis
Project on Middle East Democracy, Policy Brief, June 28, 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although Algeria suffers from many of the same problems that led to uprisings in other parts of North Africa, the country has not experienced significant political change in the past year. In this article, John Entelis analyzes Algerian politics over the past year to explain this “exception,” condemns the international community’s failure to engage Algeria to spur political reform, and provides recommendations for renewed US engagement with Algeria.

The conditions that created mass discontent elsewhere in North Africa are present in Algeria, including prevalent youth unemployment, limits on political expression, and widespread corruption. In spite of this, Algeria has not witnessed significant political upheaval in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. To be sure, protests are a regular feature of Algerian political life and have been long before the Arab uprisings started in late 2010, but they have not yet escalated to demands for regime change. According to Entelis, this is largely because Algeria remains afflicted by the legacy of its civil war in the 1990s, when election results were upset by a military coup; this legacy, combined with oil-generated wealth, has inhibited uprisings similar to those in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. In the past year, the anti-regime activity nevertheless intensified, forcing the government to respond, which it did so by lifting the 19-year-old emergency laws, increasing food subsidies, and promising parliamentary elections.

The government sought to portray the latter as genuinely democratic and politically legitimate – a model of democratic participation on par with the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia. They allowed international election monitors and pushed a voter mobilization campaign, stressing voting as a national duty. Yet, in the run-up to the election, two counter narratives also existed, according to Entelis. The first projected the illegitimacy of the election based on low voter turnout of 25-30%, figures based on declining participation rates over the last few elections and widespread political malfeasance. The second narrative focused on the expected victory of Islamist parties should the elections be free and fair; Islamist-oriented parties developed strong campaigns to get out the vote. When the elections took place in May 2012, both of these narratives proved false. Voter turnout was suspiciously high at 43% and Islamist parties won only 47 seats in the 462-member national assembly, leading many to believe that the vote was seriously fraudulent. As Entelis notes, rather than a step towards democracy, the May 2012 elections were yet another example of political maneuvering from the top, “a smoke and mirrors strategy intended to give the appearance of authentic contestation while preserving the status quo.”
The regime pointed to the election results as proof of its legitimacy and was aided by influential members of the international community’s in pushing this narrative. Both the US and the EU praised the elections despite widespread reports of fraud. According to Entelis, this is because the US relationship with Algeria is narrowly focused on security cooperation and oil; the US is the largest purchases of Algerian oil. This policy has come at the expense of democracy and human rights, leading many Algerians to view the US as complicit in the political status quo.

Entelis argues that this policy is a mistake and concludes his paper with several policy recommendations for the US:

- If an opportunity arises, publicly acknowledge the allegations of fraud in the recent parliamentary elections and insist that, as similar events in neighboring countries have proven, manipulating elections in order to preserve an authoritarian political order can have disastrous consequences.
- Establish a bilateral economic assistance package to Algeria, which includes democracy and governance assistance.
- Encourage the Algerian regime to take seriously the need to resolve the Western Sahara conflict with its Moroccan neighbor, failure to do so will both sustain terrorist activity in the region and forestall the transition to a genuine democracy in both countries. In making this recommendation, Entelis argues that Algeria is complicit in the conflict through its financial support of the Polisario despite its claims of neutrality. Its primary objective in its support is to limit Morocco’s power in North Africa. Entelis underscores that Algeria must be held accountable for arming and training Polisario fighters and that it can help deescalate the conflict by removing support for the guerrilla movement. Entelis also makes reference to language in the FY2013 foreign appropriations bills and advocates including both in a final draft in order to improve human rights in Morocco and force Algeria to take a more accommodating role in the Western Sahara conflict in order to advance regional stability.
- Encourage the Algerian government to explore opportunities for strengthening ties and expanding trade with neighboring countries in North Africa.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The article is important in highlighting Algeria’s veiled attempts at political reform – something that is not as widely discussed as it should be by DC-based think tanks and other experts. It is also important in calling out the United States for its contradictory policies in the Maghreb region – calling for democratic reform on human rights issues in most of the other countries in the region, while remaining silent on Algeria and going so far as praising it. Entelis’ argument that this is largely due to the economic and security relationship between the US-Algeria is widely acknowledged, but bears repeating. The article also makes several points that help MAC’s messaging on politics in the Maghreb and on the Western Sahara. His recommendation on the Western Sahara is particularly poignant, as it supports much of what MAC has been trying to do over the past few years: force the US to call out Algeria for its support of the Polisario and play a more mediating role in the conflict. Although Entelis recommends that US military aid to Morocco be Conditioned, because he also mentions the importance of the House language, this report should be disseminated to our target audiences (and has in fact already been posted on the MOTM website).

---

**The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations**

Oliver Schlumberger


**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Oliver Schlumberger challenges the viability of the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) to serve as a normative power with regards to its influence on Arab state members. A primary purpose of the UFM, after it replaced the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 2008, was to encourage democratization and a closer relationship with Israel. By being a “norm entrepreneur,” it was supposed that Europe could encourage “respect for human rights, the rule of law, and pluralistic, inclusive, transparent and accountable modes of political decision making.” It fails in these objectives, says Schlumberger, because the structure of the UFM and the actors participating in the institutions all empower, rather than challenge, authoritarian regimes.

Arab regimes have been resistant to pan-Mediterranean economic and political institutions, for two reasons:

(a) Deteriorated Arab–Israeli relations and an unwillingness, on the Arab side, to enter into what might become a creeping normalization of relations with Israel; and

(b) Fears about a renewal of what in the past was sometimes perceived as European paternalism.

Cooperation between the Arab members of the EMP and Israel deteriorated at periods of peak Arab–Israeli tensions, such as the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the 2008 bombing of the Gaza strip. Arab leaders also pushed against EU dominance of the initiative. As Schwarzer (2009) put it: “No equal partnership has been established between the northern and southern states. The Mediterranean Union is still seen in the southern region primarily as an EU project, if not as a project of French political interests.”

Because of Arab leaders’ resistance to an institution that they perceived as a challenge to their authority, they were able to insist in changes to the new UFM that broadened their powers and provided checks to European influence. As a result, through actors, institutions, and policies pursued, the UFM has empowered rather than curtailed the authoritarian leaders of the Arab member states.

This resulted from the constituent makeup of the organization. Rather than representing societies within the member nations, “the UFM’s institutions almost exclusively represent their respective governments, or rather: heads of state in the majority of Arab cases where these do not form part of the respective governments.” This stands in stark contrast to pre-UFM organizations such as the EMP, which favored cooperation at the societal and cultural levels.

Institutionally, actors in the UFM were given greater “ownership” of projects and programs in comparison to the EMP. Effectively this gives the Arab regimes veto power over programs that would support civil society and generate competitors or instability within their respective nations. Given that level of control, “the UFM cannot become a vehicle for any sort of meaningful political reform. By contrast, institutional reform has created an instrument for Arab regimes that makes it yet easier to avoid any reform of domestic autocratic governance.”

European actors in the EU have also curtailed their political objectives. “Emphasis,” says Schlumberger, “is now placed on joint projects as
opposed to larger-scale and more macro-level programmes." Mutual interests in technical co-operation seem to deliberately gain in importance compared to political areas of dissent between north and south.

Accounting for these factors, Schlumberger provides two possible trajectories for the EU – Arab relationship as a result of the UfM. The first, the 'Schuman–Sarkozy Scenario', predicts that admittedly modest foundational links will over time result in deeper integration among UfM parties. The logic of this argument states that after a long period of low-level functional co-operation the UfM may eventually grow and come to "convince Arab rulers to cede power in favour of their hitherto disenfranchised populations. Normalization of relations with Israel and democratization, then, will not come about tomorrow, but they can and will come about."

The alternative, which Schlumberger prefers and dubs the "Realist Scenario" is more grim in its assessment of the UfM's chances to bring about change. Schlumberger reasons that "even a power that might consider itself 'normative' by nature will eventually not run the risk of devising (let alone implementing) policies that contradict its own material interests and preferred policy outcomes in international relations. It will therefore prefer pragmatism and self interest over a normative vision, even if that latter was grounded in a functional logic."

Given this limitation, EU leaders have given up on the spread of democratic reforms beyond rhetorical challenges directed at their own populations. The EU, says Schlumberger, has "largely given up on previously established larger and normatively based foreign policy goals in its relations with the Arab world."

**RECOMMENDATION**

Significant events have come to pass in the Mediterranean Arab states since the writing of this article. Several of the authoritarian regimes that Schlumberger had believed so entrenched have been toppled. The world is waiting to see whether the democratically elected bodies that have arisen to replace them will significantly differ in their foreign policy towards the European Union. Yet despite the recent uprisings at least two factors will remain the same: the new Arab governments are as reticent to engage with Israel as the old, and they are likely to continue to resist foreign influence in the shaping of their political institutions. Despite the advent of new democracies it is possible that the UfM may encounter similar resistance from Arab actors as in the past.

The article has little bearing on Morocco. The country is not mentioned and the impact of the UfM on Moroccan policies is not explored. A case can be made that the King, who has taken significant steps to empower his nation's parliamentary system since the writing of this article, is not justifiably lumped into the same category as highlighted dictators Ben Ali and Colonel Qaddafi. Ultimately the article is not recommended as reading for MAC at large.

---

**The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean Relations**

Federica Bicchi

Mediterranean Politics, 16:1, March 2011


**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This article examines the formation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), launched in July 2008, and its impacts on relationships within the region. The article argues that the formation of the UfM presents a substantial change in the pattern of Euro-Mediterranean relations away from the previous Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The UfM came about because of "the efforts of a minority of countries cajoling a majority into accepting a new initiative". The creation of the UfM was primarily due to the insistence of France, occasionally supported by Spain and Italy. This plan received the acquiescence of Germany and other northern and eastern European countries after changing some provisions to limit the number of changes in shifting between the EMP and UfM. Israel and Turkey have been less supportive of the UfM because of fears that its acceptance would dilute their special relationship with the EU.

The UfM does impose changes on the institutional structure left by the EMP. UfM marks a shift "away from the region-building strategy of the EU," which the EMP supported. The Arab-Israeli conflict also had a greater impact on the formation of the UfM than the EMP, often influencing the speed and substance of the negotiations surrounding the UfM.

**RECOMMENDATION**

This article has very little to do with Morocco, instead focusing on internal EU negotiations and the impact that regional issues had on these internal negotiations. There is nothing in the article that would warrant putting it on the MAC site or spreading it among the staff.

---

**Writing as Resistance: Berber Literature and the challenges surrounding the Emergence of a Berber Literary Field in Morocco**

Stephanie Poussel


**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This article examines the creation of a contemporary Berber/Amazigh literature and language, which are politically synonymous, and the attempts by the Moroccan state to deal with this emerging field. This article attempts to show that Moroccan state policies have driven Berber writers to attempt to affirm "Moroccanness" exclusive of "Arabness."
Initially the Moroccan state viewed Berbers as people with "a marginal identity in need of rehabilitation" into the Arab culture of Morocco. The state thus attempted to Arabize education and the public space, thereby eliminating all three major Amazigh dialects. This stance changed in 1994 when King Hassan II allowed broadcasting in the Berber language on national radio. The states acceptance of the Amazigh language(s) has only increased since then with its incorporation into the public school system and the founding, in 2001, of the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM).

IRCAM has sought to standardize the Amazigh language, partly in order to introduce it into the school curriculum, and to reverse the long-standing association of "Berber" with "opposition." Activists claim that IRCAM serves to divide the literary field into those that worked for the state and those, declared by the article to be the majority, who radically opposed the "takeover" of Berber identity by the State. IRCAM has attempted to impose a uniform alphabet for the writing of Amazigh called Tifinagh. As it stands, Amazigh can be written in Arabic script, which identifies the author with the Arabo-Muslim regime, or Latin script, which identifies the author as modern, but has negative colonial associations. The creation of a Tifinagh script divorced from any oral tradition has been condemned by many who see it as "a State strategy to fence off the Berber language and confine it to an 'unreadable' alphabet for the rest of the world." The standardization of the language has been met with calls for a "return to local" by many activists. Amazigh writers see this standardization as an attempt at modernization, while activists fear it will create a division between the literary/educated class and the masses, much as Modern Standard Arabic and its many local variations have caused throughout much of the Arab world. The article concludes by stating that contemporary Amazigh literature “has been evolving in parallel with the Berber identity and political movement,” which has linked this literary field with the ethnic and political demands of Berbers.

RECOMMENDATION
This article deals with literary and cultural development, much of it historical, which is of little relevance to MAC. The discussion of the efforts of the State to incorporate Berber language and identity, specifically in public schooling and broadcasting, is interesting, but is brief with no analysis. The author also fails to really examine if/how Berber writers have "affirm[ed] an alternative definition of Moroccanness" and in many instances seems to contradict this assertion. There is little in this article that would be helpful either for dissemination or distribution purposes.

Youth Perceptions in Morocco: Political Parties in the wake of Legislative Elections: Findings from Qualitative Research in Morocco Conducted in March and April 2012
The National Democratic Institute, July 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report, drawing upon 18 focus group discussions with 160 Moroccans aged 18 to 25 years, "examines attitudes of young Moroccan citizens towards the current situation in their country, major political actors, and recent and upcoming elections." Drawing on participants of both genders and from across the social spectrum in various areas of the country, the report finds surprisingly consistent attitudes on the topics discussed. The research was conducted between March and April 2012, four months after legislative elections were held.

General Mood
Many young Moroccans are positive about the current political direction of the country. "Constitutional reforms, elections perceived as more transparent, and the victory of the PJD are mentioned by most focus groups participants as positive indicators." This notwithstanding, some participants express doubt that elections may spur significant change, with some positing that the victory of the PJD was engineered by the regime to calm the streets. Nevertheless, a significant number of participants believe the new government can succeed, and that patience is required - the PJD must be given time to achieve its goals.

Of particular interest to the young respondents was the matter of unemployment. One urban woman declared that unemployment is, "a ghost threatening every graduate." Another commented on the prevalence of nepotism. "If you go to the United States or France and look for a job, they check and ask about the things you can do; but in Morocco, they ask, 'who sent you here,' if you understand what I mean."

Perspectives on Elections
The overwhelming majority of focus group participants characterized the recent legislative elections as a step forward. The fact that a historic opposition party won the largest number of seats in the Parliament and formed the first government following a constitutional revision is seen as a significant and positive development. Most believe that the elections were conducted in a fair and transparent manner. Yet despite this view, most participants confessed a lack of knowledge about how elections are conducted and the role of elected officials in office. "Bad knowledge about [MP] roles," said one rural woman, "We haven't even studied that in school. We studied the history of, say, Britain and France, but never Morocco." Although most focus group participants acknowledge that they themselves did not vote in the November election, they suggest that they have greater intention to vote in upcoming communal elections.

Attitudes Toward Political Parties
Despite the positive characterization of elections, most participants characterized the general performance of political parties as extremely unsatisfactory. "[Political parties] are always seeking self-interest," said one respondent. "They promise people lots of things but never act when they win." This belief is prevalent, despite the fact that participants generally have a very superficial knowledge of party ideologies or platforms. They know and appreciate that most parties have vowed to tackle government corruption, and there is some perception that efforts have been made in this regard. The exceptions to this rule are the PJD and Istiqlal - both parties are universally recognized and can be described by participants in some detail.

Focus group participants link their intention to vote in upcoming elections "to the degree of responsiveness they feel from political parties in listening to and acting on the needs of citizens."
Perceptions of the New Government

Participants generally hold a positive attitude towards the new government and "associate it with a sense of transparency and urgency." The PJD is perceived to be a credible party buoyed by its Islamic credentials and legitimate in its efforts to combat corruption. A lack of women in government is disheartening to some. “One thing I don’t like is that while Morocco has been struggling for women’s rights, the party chose only one lady for the new government, which is not fair.”

Participants expressed hopes that the opposition would be productive and work with the new government, rather than just criticize it. There is division over the February 20th movement. Many desire February 20th to remain a force applying pressure from outside the government, and many desire it to be a political party. Others question why the movement is still active now that a constitutional referendum has passed. “Thanks to the movement, lots of things have changed,” said one urban woman. "I think the movement precipitated the reform of the constitution. But I don't understand why the movement still demonstrates and protests given that lots of reforms are done.”

RECOMMENDATION

This report reveals a relatively positive perception of the PJD - at the time of the focus test. In March and April of 2012 the party, burnished by its Islamic credentials and its promises to reform the government, combat corruption, and reduce unemployment, was still broadly perceived as representing the people and genuinely attempting to resolve the country’s crises. Yet the data is somewhat out of date. In the intervening six months, the PJD’s credibility has suffered - perhaps unavoidably - as corruption and economic difficulties in the country persist.

The value of a focus group is the depth of an explanation it provides on public opinion rather than the statistical data generated by a public opinion poll. While the general favorability of the PJD has faded somewhat since this poll was taken, the information about the issues motivating Moroccan youth still remain pertinent. In this case, the youth express frustration with continuing corruption and unemployment. The PJD, and any other party seeking to hold office, must make a credible and meaningful attempt to combat these problems.

The document is somewhat dated but provides valuable insight into the perspectives of Moroccan youth. As it was effective in bringing about the constitutional reforms of 2011, this demographic is likely to continue to be a meaningful player in future politics. For this reason, the report is recommended reading.

(Back to top)
'Change Within Continuity': The Equity and Reconciliation Commission and Political Reform in Morocco

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines the Instance Equite et Reconciliation (IER) in Morocco. The article argues that the IER, formed by royal decree, represents "an attempt by the palace to co-opt a critical public discourse on past abuses into a state-managed forum". The opposition was willing to go along with this cooption because they felt that it would increase the
opportunities for democratization. This divergence in objectives greatly impacts the chances for implementation of the commission’s recommendations, but the commission has responded to the demands of the majority of the victims and reflects the social and cultural values of Moroccan society.

The IER was established by King Mohammed VI in January 2004 and was the first Truth Commission to be held in Arab-Islamic country. The IER was formed to investigate four decades of “forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and torture from Moroccan independence in 1956 to 1999.” The regime presented the IER as proof to the international community that Morocco was enlightened on human rights and was committed to democratic reform. Controversially, the IER was limited by a stipulation that no individual perpetrators were to be implicated in its work. The IER was unique amongst Truth Commissions for several reasons. The IER did not occur following a regime change, but instead from an “unbroken, powerful regime.” All other Truth Commissions had been preceded by regime change up until this point. The IER was also the first explicit Truth Commission to be held by an Arab/Islamic state.

The article argues that the IER was undertaken due to palace strategies for managing discontent, which “gave rise both to the abuses that necessitated the IER and a gradual reform process” in the 1990’s “that eventually enabled a commission.” The Moroccan King inherited from the French colonial authority a powerful modern state as well as a set of repressive and undemocratic emergency laws. Once the state faced discontent and riots, the “prerequisites for widespread abuse were already available.” King Hassan II launched a repressive campaign from the 1950s until the 1970s, when he began a process of limited political inclusion. This process picked up in the 1990s as King Hassan began permitting consultation and reform in areas that didn’t impact royal prerogatives. During the 1990s, there was increased Western criticism of human rights and democratization, which set the stage for the formation of the IER once King Mohammed VI took over from his father in 1999.

The IER enabled King Mohammed VI to position himself as a reformer, which he solidified by removing hard-line figures from the old regime, such as Interior Minister Driss Basri. The IER was a subject of much debate between regime hardliners, who saw it as showing weakness, and softliners, largely made up of King Mohammed VI’s appointees who argued that targeted reforms could strengthen the monarchy. The King ultimately went with the softliners, perceiving the IER “as a means to disarm public criticism and strengthen his image as a modern, compassionate monarch.”

The IER also served to co-opt many local groups that had previously been in opposition to the monarchy. Many opposition groups/individuals, such as Driss Benzekri, a human rights activist, believed that even though the IER was somewhat gutted and had flaws, it could also “have a positive impact through its ability to propose institutional reforms” and therefore decided to support the commission. The IER was seen as the “best opportunity since independence to push democratic reform”.

The decision not to allow the naming of guilty individuals in the IER was made for several reasons: other examples of similar commissions, like South Africa's, had succeeded without apportioning guilt, the opposition was skeptical of the judicial system in Morocco, and there was often a lack of evidence to get convictions even if the judicial system were used. Many commissioners felt that it was more important to establish institutional responsibility, for future institutional reform, instead of focusing on criminal sanctions. This focus on social justice and fair treatment, over retribution and punishment, is a cultural and social norm.
within Islamic societies that encouraged opposition groups to support the lack of prosecution for guilty parties.

The article nevertheless concludes that the ultimate impacts of the IER have been limited. Individual reparations were completed quickly and completely, but reforms to the judiciary, state security sector, and political system have not been implemented. This mixed bag of results is due to the monarchy’s control of implementation of the IER recommendations and the desire of the palace to secure the monarch’s power and societal position. The “majority of the IER recommendations related to institution reform would...involve introducing substantial limits on royal prerogatives” and are therefore blocked. The war on terror has shielded Morocco from outside pressure as both Europe and the US “prioritize concerns for security...and [the] stability of western-friendly regimes in the Middle East and North Africa over concerns for human rights.” The Casablanca suicide bombings of 2003 also dampened some of the internal pressures for reform. The palace uses this freedom of maneuver, in the context of the war on terror, to apply state repression broadly and not limit it to terrorist suspects.

The regional implications of the IER are not yet clear. Immediately after the IER report was published, Morocco sent the commissioners to numerous regional and international conferences, but they were met with limited interest, especially from other Middle Eastern countries. Regional implications are probably limited and the ultimate significance for the IER will depend on the reform process within Morocco itself, largely driven by a King who has “yet [to] demonstrate that [he] is ready to abandon [his] monopoly on power.”

RECOMMENDATION

This piece focuses on Morocco and the IER; however, it is not especially flattering towards the King or the progress that Morocco has made on human rights or democracy. The article does refer to steady reform and liberalization of the country and regime and also points out the King Mohammed VI is very different from his father. The fact that the IER is the first Truth Commission to be launched by the regime which committed the abuses is certainly a bragging point for Morocco. The article criticizes the King for cynical motives and a desire to hold onto power. This article can be used for brief quotes to show marked improvement in the areas of human rights over time as well as some flattering regional comparisons, but the overall impression is rather negative towards the Moroccan monarchy.

Emerging Order in the Middle East
Sinan Ulgen, Nathan J. Brown, Marina Ottaway, and Paul Salem
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/middle_east_order1.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines the recent rise of Islamist movements and the decline of secular groups in the Middle East. The article looks at some of the underlying causes and broad impacts this rise has had, and gives recommendations for the appropriate Western response. While primarily focused on Egypt and Tunisia, the article examines these changes with a broad regional focus.
Islamic political movements have risen throughout the region on a wave of popular discontent. Islamist movements were the best placed to take advantage of this discontent because they had an “extensive social presence and organizational capacities.” These Islamist movements arose in an oppositional role, challenging the old secular elite. Morocco is posited as a unique case where the monarchy remains firmly in control, but was “forced” to allow the PJD “to form a new government and thus to some extent challenge the old elite.”

Islamists, the article claims, are the major winners of the limited democratic changes in the region. They have successfully managed this transition and have begun to build up “structures and comprehensive programs addressing a host of political, economic, and public policy issues” and begun adapting themselves to a democratic system. Even in countries, like Morocco, where the old regime is still in place, the PJD has “accepted limited constitutional reform and taken a leading role in the cabinet.” The PJD, like other Islamist groups, has also been insistent on “joining the ruling elite” and becoming politically engaged, which is a break from much of the rhetoric of Salafi groups when they were in opposition. Islamist groups throughout the region have begun to “embrace democratic mechanisms and politics more generally” and they “have ceased to regard themselves as opposition movements and increasingly see themselves as actual or potential governing parties.”

Governance, and public notoriety both in the domestic and international scenes, has also pushed these groups to “become more cautious with their rhetoric” to reassure international actors that they can work together, primarily in the economic sphere. Islamic groups do want Western economic help and support, and groups have expressed a willingness to participate in international economic fora. For example, the PJD has already “demonstrated [its] readiness to participate in international platforms of economic dialogue such as the World Economic Forum.” That said, there is little that outside actors can do to shape the development of Islamist movements. These groups are not “looking for ideological guidance” and the group solidarity is strong so they are unlikely to fracture due to western “flirtations.”

In addition, Islamist movements are primarily domestically focused, which severely limits the West’s ability to influence them. In the areas of security sector reform and economics, where instability has adversely impacted economic performance, these movements “show a real interest in learning from the experience of other countries.” Demands for acceptance of a “broad ideological agenda” endorsing secularism, for “commitments to core values such as women’s rights,” or for “cooperation with a full Western security agenda” are all unlikely to succeed. More limited goals, such as maintenance of existing treaty obligations and a general commitment to a peaceful settlement of international disputes, however, might be effective. Western pressure will be most effective if it is “uniform;” the West must begin to “build bridges to entire societies” instead of a small number of elite political actors.

The West must nevertheless be concerned about the rise of these movements for two reasons. First, there are questions about the ultimate goals of these parties and how they will react to holding power. There are dangers that the Arab-Israeli conflict could heat up again and that Islamists could undermine/rollback gains in women’s rights. Second, the West should concern itself with the deep divisions between the Islamists and the secular/modernist forces, which were the traditional allies of the West and are now being marginalized. The Arab Spring and the rise of Islamist groups have increased regional instability and created “new risks from terrorist networks.” These factors have also had dramatic repercussions for every actor in the region, sinking the popularity of states like China, Russia, and Iran while providing a new starting point for others like Egypt.
The article concludes that the West should attempt short-term oriented policies in order to help Arab governments, which are faced with short-term pressures of job creation and fiscal constraints. In order to do this the West can increase financial assistance, provide technical experts on debt management, and help to establish secure and predictable regulatory frameworks for public-private partnerships. The most important consideration for the West, however, is to remain consistent in including Islamists in any discussion of bilateral or multilateral issues. The West must acknowledge that democratic transitions are "long-term complicated processes that do not follow straight-forward trajectories" and act accordingly by supporting a long-term transition to democracy to help countries overcome short-term difficulties.

RECOMMENDATION

This article is helpful for understanding the larger issues of Islamist movements and how their rise during the Arab Spring has impacted the region. There is little specifically on Morocco as the article focused instead on Tunisia and Egypt, which experienced mass protests and regime change. This article does remain broad enough to inform on Morocco and the PJD, but is not specific enough to be distributed widely within MAC. The small bits there are on Morocco are rather anti-monarchy making is seem that King Mohammed VI and Mubarak are on the same level. I would not recommend this article for the MAC site.

Le Maroc et le printemps arabe dans un monde en plein changement  
(Morocco and the Arab Spring in a Changing World)

Bernabé López García
EUROMESCO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article analyzes political developments in Morocco within the context of the Arab Spring. The author argues that the one unifying factor at the heart of demonstrations – whether in Cairo or Casablanca – was the presence of the youth with shared objectives: more rights, more social justice, more transparency, more control of the political system. This was the situation in Morocco, but there, the government reacted much differently. The author argues that Morocco responded to the protestors’ demands the quickest, the smartest, and the most flexibly in the region. However, this does not mean that Morocco should be praised for its reaction, as Western governments and Moroccan political parties jumped to do in the aftermath of the March 9th speech. Although this speech did address many of the demands of the protest movement, including the separation of powers, increased powers for the Prime Minister and Parliament, and independence for the judiciary, among others, the King clearly led the process of constitutional reform, despite the appearance of a consultative process through the Constitutional Commission.

In detailing developments after the March 9th speech, the author makes similar pronouncements. He argues that the new Constitution “incontestably brings significant improvements over the previous one.” Notable changes include the supremacy of international law over Moroccan law, the institutionalization of equality between men and women, and the increased responsible of the head of government and the Parliament.
However, for the moment, these are merely statements of intention, as considerable efforts are required to concretize these changes as was the case with the reform of the family code, which clashes with the views of conservative judges and many of society. In addition, despite some obvious improvements, the author argues that the makeup of the political system remains intact: the King reigns and governs, directs the council of ministers, controls religious discourse, and presides over the superior council of the judiciary, thus not granting significantly more power to the people. The author likewise disagrees with the official results of the constitutional referendum – although the voter participation rate was 73%, the government failed to note that the participation rate was only 45% of people of voting age.

He applies the same logic to the victory of the PJD in the November 2011 elections – claiming that the PJD received only 5% of the vote when calculating voter participation of eligible, rather than registered, voters. Nevertheless, the PJD victory was at least symbolically important as the group doubled its share of the votes from previous parliamentary elections. It has a difficult path ahead as it seeks to implement the Constitution and develop a working relationship with the King, who will be consulted on all major decisions. The author views the King’s appointment of five royal advisors (Menouni, Azziman, El Himma, Zenagui, and Fasshi Fihri) as evidence that there will be a battle for power between the Palace and the Parliament, but also notes that Benkirane’s strong personality and the PJD’s relative power within the Cabinet (12 out of 31 ministers) indicate some balance of power. Regardless, it is obvious that the PJD will have to work hard to implement reforms and work to improve the economy in order to meet the demands of the protestors. While they have been isolated, many of their core grievances remain and they will likely reappear if the promises of the Constitution are not realized.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Despite some words of praise for Morocco’s response to the Arab Spring, the author is largely critical of both the process and the outcome, arguing that the political system in Morocco remains relatively intact in spite of the reform of the Constitution and that both the “yes” on the Constitutional referendum and the PJD victory were not indicative of widespread support. It is important to acknowledge that these kinds of arguments are being made, in Europe and the US alike, but I would not recommend this article for further review.
The article argues that, following the Arab Spring protests in Morocco, the King quickly “tried to pre-empt and co-opt the protestors” by promising change and constitutional revisions. The promises of reform quieted the protests, but the King failed to follow through on the promised changes. Mohammad VI appointed a committee of experts to draft the constitution, which was “headed by a constitutional law professor with a history ofcondoning autocracy.” The King also set up a consultative body, which was deemed illegitimate by many protest groups who refused to participate. Once submissions to the consultative body were made “there was no follow up or debate” and the constitutional draft was only shown to the group only one day before the King presented the constitution in a televised speech during which he announced the date for the Constitutional referendum to take place two weeks later.

The referendum was similarly stacked against the protestors by the King. Muhammad VI quoted a passage of the Qur’an “[enjoining] the public to follow his ‘way’” and the Ministry of Religious Affairs “instructed imams to urge a ‘yes’ vote during Friday sermons.” The mainstream parties all supported the Constitution, with the PJD saying that the Constitution contained enough safeguards for democracy. Protestors against the new Constitution staged demonstrations that were met with pro-monarchy crowds, which protestors claimed were “organized and paid by the Ministry of Interior.” Voting was also widely seen as fraudulent.

The author notes that the text of the new Constitution “addresses all key demands of the protestors,” but “the changes made are less than meets the eye.” The events of the 2011 elections show that the Constitution shows that Morocco “has a long way to go towards a real parliamentary monarchy.” The 45% turnout for voting in the parliamentary elections, while 8% higher than previous elections, shows the “cynicism, indifference, and apathy” of Moroccans who felt that “it would not really matter whether they voted or not.” Benkirane, leader of the PJD party that won the most seats in the election, formed his coalition with the caveat that the only party definitely excluded from talks was the royalist PAM. On December 7, the King appointed Fouad Ali El Himma, founder of the PAM, as one of his advisors, which served to end Benkirane’s hopes that he would have direct contact with the King. The formation of the new government “followed the pattern of previous such formations in Morocco with the palace having a strong hand” in the choice of ministers. The changes of the new Constitution can thus be seen as purely cosmetic changes while the monarchical system remained firmly in place.

The article argues that Morocco’s handling of the Western Sahara conflict has followed a similar trend of seeking to do the bare minimum without offering fundamental change. For example, Morocco has accepted UN proposals for resolving the conflict “in principle,” but with the intention of interpreting them to secure Moroccan interests. Morocco relocated thousands of people into Western Sahara in order to create facts on the ground and to skew voting lists to be used in a referendum to determine the status of Western Sahara, in Morocco’s favor. Morocco also attempted to influence MINURSO to accept this population as legitimate residents of Western Sahara while proceeding to “inject resources into [Western Sahara], by building up its cities, developing its infrastructure, and by providing financial aid and other incentives to thousands of Moroccans to move [into Western Sahara].” Internationally, Morocco attempted to influence the Security Council, specifically France, so that “decisions would benefit the Moroccan position.”

During all this time the primary goal of Morocco was to deadlock and “delay the process” while expecting friendly nations to step in to support Morocco’s interests. Once MINURSO had settled on the voting lists, Morocco appealed all rejected voters as a stalling tactic. King Hassan II was willing to consider alternative solutions to the “zero-sum game of the [UN]
Settlement Plan,” but the Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri, “convinced the King to remain with the Settlement Plan.” Upon ascending the throne, Mohammad VI was willing to consider new plans, but “it was a case of too little too late.” Autonomy plans, put forward by each of the actors, were rejected by the Polisario, Morocco, or both. James Baker, Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, put forward an autonomy plan which Morocco stalled on and “employ[ed] all means in its disposal...to get Baker to change the proposal” until finally rejecting it in 2004. Morocco’s stalling and negative reactions to several proposals led the UN to attempt to salvage something of MINURSO’s efforts by passing Resolution 1541, which “weakened the [Security] Council’s support of the Peace Plan” and led Baker to resign. These two events were hailed as “a triumph of Moroccan diplomacy” by the Foreign Minister.

The Moroccan autonomy plan was announced in 2007, but the Security Council was “not quite prepared to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.” Instead the Security Council passed Resolution 1754, which set the stage for formal and informal meetings between the conflicting parties where “nothing resembling negotiations” happened in either the formal or informal setting. Instead, Resolution 1754 “set the path for irresolution for the conflict,” which served Morocco’s short-term interests in preventing any non-Moroccan solution to the conflict. In furtherance of this, Morocco has also expanded its lobbying efforts in the US Congress and news media where “individuals without real grasp of the conflict present simplistic views on how the conflict could be resolved using solely the Moroccan proposal,” which shows Morocco’s continued “strategy of short-sighted inflexibility.”

In conclusion, the article states that the new Constitution has failed to change the Moroccan political system in any meaningful way. The Constitution’s impact “depends on the way it is implemented,” as “the text has potential.” Realizing this potential requires the Parliament to adopt legislation and provide the maximum space for “political forces,” which Parliament is unlikely to be able to accomplish. Those in power in Morocco still believe that “cosmetic changes and repression will bring the desired results” obviating the need for real reforms. Similarly, “Morocco never had a long-term strategy for resolving the Western Sahara conflict, other than to insist on its sovereignty over the Territory,” and has actively avoided referendums which Morocco would have won had it “followed a well-thought strategy of winning over the local Saharan population.” Given Morocco’s history, it is now impossible to trust that Morocco will negotiate fairly or stand by its promises in the Western Sahara, dooming its own autonomy plan. As a study on autonomy arrangements in non-democracies by Khakke shows “autonomy can only truly exists within a democratic system,” which is a conclusion that Moroccan authorities continue to ignore. Moroccan supporters must stop “blindly supporting [Morocco’s] every position” and instead must demand more “in terms of its internal politics” and “in its handling of the Western Sahara conflict.”

**RECOMMENDATION**

This article is very critical about both Morocco’s recent constitutional reforms as well as Morocco’s handling of the Western Sahara issue. While the tone of the article is very negative, many of the facts cited and the history presented show Morocco in a favorable light. Morocco is mentioned specifically as pouring money into infrastructure and development of Western Sahara and there are quotes from opposition members praising the constitutional reforms. Even the article admits that much of the impetus for reform has been left to the Parliament and that the text of the Constitution provides an opening for meaningful change to occur. This article shows even those negatively disposed towards Morocco admit that Morocco has its bright spots. The article really fails to prove its thesis and fails to make a connection between the Western Sahara conflict and the democratic
reforms. The two topics seem very much divided in the paper; it isn’t until the conclusion that the Khakke study, which apparently shows a link, is even mentioned and even that is briefly and poorly explained. The discussion of Western Sahara ends in 2009, well before the protests even occurred. The connection between the two issues, the crux of the paper, is very vague and anomalous. While the tone is very negative, this article provides a source for favorable quotes and facts that come from a source biased against Morocco and can be useful in that regard.

(Back to top)

**The Rise of Islamist Actors: Formulating a Strategy for Sustained Engagement**

Quinn Mecham
Project on Middle East Democracy Policy Brief, April 27, 2012

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Recent electoral victories among Islamist political parties as well as the emergence of new Islamist actors across the Middle East and North Africa necessitate a new strategy for American engagement in the region. In the past, US policymakers prioritized their relationships with singular actors in authoritarian regimes, taking little stock of Arab countries’ domestic politics. These regimes opposed US engagement with Islamist parties—many of whom comprise the groups rising to power today—and American diplomats chose to prioritize their existing relationships with regime leaders. As a result, the US has found itself ill-prepared to understand the rise of these now victorious political parties in the context of a new political dynamism. US policymakers must abandon the old model and reach out to new actors based on the degree of their political relevance, rather than their perceived alignment with US positions. Meaningful engagement with Islamist groups provides the opportunity to support pluralism, strengthen evolving political institutions, and positively impact political processes in Muslim countries.

Some Islamist groups like Somalia’s al-Shabaab or transnational groups like al-Qaeda use political violence to achieve their ends, but the last decade has witnessed an explosion of Islamist political parties which reject violence and have competed in elections in over 20 countries worldwide. The success of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), for example, has highlighted the political opportunities that exist for moderate Islamist parties which focus on more universal political values rather than strict implementation of Sharia. Increased political openness throughout the Muslim world has encouraged Islamist groups to blend religious and cultural authenticity with pragmatic political strategies.

US policy toward non-violent Islamist movements and political parties has been inconsistent both across countries and between groups within countries. This has left the US vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy and political discrimination against Islamists. Most frequently, American diplomats rejected engagement with these groups primarily to avoid upsetting existing relationships with autocratic allies. Another motivation underlying this reluctance, however, is American policymakers’ fear that their engagement with Islamists could be perceived as an endorsement of their ideology—an ideology that may differ from US preferences in social or cultural norms, or in support for violence. With the ouster of several long-standing US allies as a result of the Arab uprisings, emerging governments could prove less friendly to a number of US interests, including human rights, liberal democratic values,
long-standing economic relationships, and the security of Israel. This new “Islamist challenge” requires a meaningful shift in American policy toward consistent engagement on a wide range of political concerns with some traditionally marginalized, but non-violent Islamist groups.

This shift toward engagement was codified in Secretary Clinton’s address to the National Democratic Institute in late 2011—she articulated a belief that Islamist politics can be compatible with democracy and affirmed support for a full democratic transition in Egypt, even if it leads to a government led by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This shift in US rhetoric has also been met with regular high-level meetings between American policymakers and officials from Islamist parties throughout the region. This is a practical step in the right direction, but it fails to fully recognize the new opportunities that engagement with a broad range of Islamist actors—even those with anti-Western views—can provide to the US. Just as the US misunderstands many Islamist groups, Islamists often misunderstand US interests and behavior. As these Islamist parties begin to formulate foreign policy in their respective countries, their misconceptions about the US could have negative implications for longstanding bilateral relationships. For that reason, consistent engagement on a wide range of issues provides an opportunity to clarify American values and priorities that Islamist groups often fail to sufficiently grasp.

Policy Recommendations:

1. Recognize the similarities between Islamist groups and other political groups, including the way they respond to the political incentives of their systems.
2. Proactively engage with a wide range of Islamist organizations, particularly those that have committed themselves to competing in electoral processes.
3. Distinguish the appropriate level of political engagement based on the political relevance of the Islamic group, not on the basis of its religious ideology.
4. Support political pluralism and equal treatment, without distinction for religion or gender.
5. Promote an independent media and freedom of speech.
6. Work to strengthen legal systems that provide equal access regardless of religious ideology.
7. Publicly reinforce US support for democracy and good governance where Islamist parties operate.
8. Work together with Islamist groups to support freedom of association.

RECOMMENDATION

POMED’s analysis and recommendations represent a prevalent narrative in the policy community: US engagement in the Middle East and North Africa must evolve to accommodate a rapidly growing and diversifying body of political actors and must shift from military to economic assistance. The notion that American diplomatic engagement in the region requires reexamination and redesign is a relatively non-contentious issue, but American policymakers disagree on how exactly to proceed. POMED argues that the US should focus efforts on specific actors and groups based purely on their political relevance, while others insist that US engagement should target groups based on their alignment with American policy positions. Morocco’s PJD represents the convergence of these two camps—it is the most powerful, politically relevant party in the country, and it’s moderate Islamic ideology and democratic trajectory coincides with American policy positions. This article is useful in that it highlights the advantageous position of the PJD for engagement with the US; that being said, the article does not directly discuss the PJD.
Silent Complicity: The International Community and Algeria’s Democratic Façade
John P. Entelis
Project on Middle East Democracy, Policy Brief, June 28, 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although Algeria suffers from many of the same problems that led to uprisings in other parts of North Africa, the country has not experienced significant political change in the past year. In this article, John Entelis analyzes Algerian politics over the past year to explain this “exception,” condemns the international community’s failure to engage Algeria to spur political reform, and provides recommendations for renewed US engagement with Algeria.

The conditions that created mass discontent elsewhere in North Africa are present in Algeria, including prevalent youth unemployment, limits on political expression, and widespread corruption. In spite of this, Algeria has not witnessed significant political upheaval in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. To be sure, protests are a regular feature of Algerian political life and have been long before the Arab uprisings started in late 2010, but they have not yet escalated to demands for regime change. According to Entelis, this is largely because Algeria remains afflicted by the legacy of its civil war in the 1990s, when election results were upset by a military coup; this legacy, combined with oil-generated wealth, has inhibited uprisings similar to those in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. In the past year, the anti-regime activity nevertheless intensified, forcing the government to respond, which it did so by lifting the 19-year-old emergency laws, increasing food subsidies, and promising parliamentary elections.

The government sought to portray the latter as genuinely democratic and politically legitimate—a model of democratic participation on par with the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia. They allowed international election monitors and pushed a voter mobilization campaign, stressing voting as a national duty. Yet, in the run-up to the election, two counter narratives also existed, according to Entelis. The first projected the illegitimacy of the election based on low voter turnout of 25-30%, figures based on declining participation rates over the last few elections and widespread political malaise. The second narrative focused on the expected victory of Islamist parties should the elections be free and fair; Islamist-oriented parties developed strong campaigns to get out the vote. When the elections took place in May 2012, both of these narratives proved false. Voter turnout was suspiciously high at 43% and Islamist parties won only 47 seats in the 462-member national assembly, leading many to believe that the vote was seriously fraudulent. As Entelis notes, rather than a step towards democracy, the May 2012 elections were yet another example of political maneuvering from the top, “a smoke and mirrors strategy intended to give the appearance of authentic contestation while preserving the status quo.”

The regime pointed to the election results as proof of its legitimacy and was aided by influential members of the international community’s in pushing this narrative. Both the US and the EU praised the elections despite widespread reports of fraud. According to Entelis, this is because the US relationship with Algeria is narrowly focused on security cooperation and oil; the US is the largest purchases or Algerian oil. This policy has come at the expense of...
of democracy and human rights, leading many Algerians to view the US as complicit in the political status quo.

Entelis argues that this policy is a mistake and concludes his paper with several policy recommendations for the US:

- **If an opportunity arises, publicly acknowledge the allegations of fraud in the recent parliamentary elections and insist that, as similar events in neighboring countries have proven, manipulating elections in order to preserve an authoritarian political order can have disastrous consequences.**
- **Establish a bilateral economic assistance package to Algeria, which includes democracy and governance assistance.**
- **Encourage the Algerian regime to take seriously the need to resolve the Western Sahara conflict with its Moroccan neighbor; failure to do so will both sustain terrorist activity in the region and forestall the transition to a genuine democracy in both countries.** In making this recommendation, Entelis argues that Algeria is complicit in the conflict through its financial support of the Polisario despite its claims of neutrality. Its primary objective in its support is to limit Morocco’s power in North Africa. Entelis underscores that Algeria must be held accountable for arming and training Polisario fighters and that it can help deescalate the conflict by removing support for the guerilla movement. Entelis also makes reference to language in the FY2013 foreign appropriations bills and advocates including both in a final draft in order to improve human rights in Morocco and force Algeria to take a more accommodating role in the Western Sahara conflict in order to advance regional stability.
- **Encourage the Algerian government to explore opportunities for strengthening ties and expanding trade with neighboring countries in North Africa.**

**RECOMMENDATION**

The article is important in highlighting Algeria’s veiled attempts at political reform – something that is not as widely discussed as it should be by DC-based think tanks and other experts. It is also important in calling out the United States for its contradictory policies in the Maghreb region – calling for democratic reform on human rights issues in most of the other countries in the region, while remaining silent on Algeria and going so far as praising it. Entelis’ argument that this is largely due to the economic and security relationship between the US-Algeria is widely acknowledged, but bears repeating. The article also makes several points that help MAC’s messaging on politics in the Maghreb and on the Western Sahara. His recommendation on the Western Sahara is particularly poignant, as it supports much of what MAC has been trying to do over the past few years: force the US to call out Algeria for its support of the Polisario and play a more mediating role in the conflict. Although Entelis recommends that US military aid to Morocco be conditioned, because he also mentions the importance of the House language, this report should be disseminated to our target audiences (and has in fact already been posted on the MOTM website).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Oliver Schlumberger challenges the viability of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) to serve as a normative power with regards to its influence on Arab state members. A primary purpose of the UfM, after it replaced the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 2008, was to encourage democratization and a closer relationship with Israel. By being a “norm entrepreneur,” it was supposed that Europe could encourage “respect for human rights, the rule of law, and pluralistic, inclusive, transparent and accountable modes of political decision making.” It fails in these objectives, says Schlumberger, because the structure of the UfM and the actors participating in the institutions all empower, rather than challenge, authoritarian regimes.

Arab regimes have been resistant to pan-Mediterranean economic and political institutions, for two reasons:
(a) Deteriorated Arab–Israeli relations and an unwillingness, on the Arab side, to enter into what might become a creeping normalization of relations with Israel; and
(b) Fears about a renewal of what in the past was sometimes perceived as European paternalism.

Cooperation between the Arab members of the EMP and Israel deteriorated at periods of peak Arab-Israeli tensions, such as the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the 2008 bombing of the Gaza strip. Arab leaders also pushed against EU dominance of the initiative. As Schwarzer (2009) put it: “No equal partnership has been established between the northern and southern states. The Mediterranean Union is still seen in the southern region primarily as an EU project, if not as a project of French political interests.”

Because of Arab leaders’ resistance to an institution that they perceived as a challenge to their authority, they were able to insist in changes to the new UfM that broadened their powers and provided checks to European influence. As a result, through actors, institutions, and policies pursued, the UfM has empowered rather than curtailed the authoritarian leaders of the Arab member states.

This resulted from the constituent makeup of the organization. Rather than representing societies within the member nations, “the UfM’s institutions almost exclusively represent their respective governments, or rather: heads of state in the majority of Arab cases where these do not form part of the respective governments.” This stands in stark contrast to pre-UfM organizations such as the EMP, which favored cooperation at the societal and cultural levels.

Institutionally, actors in the UfM were given greater “ownership” of projects and programs in comparison to the EMP. Effectively this gives the Arab regimes veto power over programs that would support civil society and generate competitors or instability within their respective nations. Given that level of control, “the UfM cannot become a vehicle for any sort of meaningful political reform. By contrast, institutional reform has created an instrument for Arab regimes that makes it yet easier to avoid any reform of domestic autocratic governance.”

European actors in the EU have also curtailed their political objectives. “Emphasis,” says Schlumberger, “is now placed on joint projects as opposed to larger-scale and more macro-level programmes.” Mutual interests in technical co-operation seem to deliberately gain in importance compared to political areas of dissent between north and south.

Accounting for these factors, Schlumberger provides two possible trajectories for the EU –
Arab relationship as a result of the UfM. The first, the ‘Schuman–Sarkozy Scenario’, predicts that admittedly modest foundational links will over time result in deeper integration among UfM parties. The logic of this argument states that after a long period of low-level functional co-operation the UfM may eventually grow and come to “convince Arab rulers to cede power in favour of their hitherto disenfranchised populations. Normalization of relations with Israel and democratization, then, will not come about tomorrow, but they can and will come about.”

The alternative, which Schlumberger prefers and dubs the “Realist Scenario” is more grim in its assessment of the UfM’s chances to bring about change. Schlumberger reasons that “even a power that might consider itself ‘normative’ by nature will eventually not run the risk of devising (let alone implementing) policies that contradict its own material interests and preferred policy outcomes in international relations. It will therefore prefer pragmatism and self interest over a normative vision, even if that latter was grounded in a functional logic.”

Given this limitation, EU leaders have given up on the spread of democratic reforms beyond rhetorical challenges directed at their own populations. The EU, says Schlumberger, has “largely given up on previously established larger and normatively based foreign policy goals in its relations with the Arab world.”

RECOMMENDATION

Significant events have come to pass in the Mediterranean Arab states since the writing of this article. Several of the authoritarian regimes that Schlumberger had believed so entrenched have been toppled. The world is waiting to see whether the democratically elected bodies that have arisen to replace them will significantly differ in their foreign policy towards the European Union. Yet despite the recent uprisings at least two factors will remain the same: the new Arab governments are as reticent to engage with Israel as the old, and they are likely to continue to resist foreign influence in the shaping of their political institutions. Despite the advent of new democracies it is possible that the UfM may encounter similar resistance from Arab actors as in the past.

The article has little bearing on Morocco. The country is not mentioned and the impact of the UfM on Moroccan policies is not explored. A case can be made that the King, who has taken significant steps to empower his nation’s parliamentary system since the writing of this article, is not justifiably lumped into the same category as highlighted dictators Ben Ali and Colonel Qaddafi. Ultimately the article is not recommended as reading for MAC at large.
formation of the UfM presents a substantial change in the pattern of Euro-Mediterranean relations away from the previous Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The UfM came about because of “the efforts of a minority of countries cajoling a majority into accepting a new initiative”. The creation of the UfM was primarily due to the insistence of France, occasionally supported by Spain and Italy. This plan received the acquiescence of Germany and other northern and eastern European countries after changing some provisions to limit the number of changes in shifting between the EMP and UfM. Israel and Turkey have been less supportive of the UfM because of fears that its acceptance would dilute their special relationship with the EU.

The UfM does impose changes on the institutional structure left by the EMP. UfM marks a shift “away from the region-building strategy of the EU,” which the EMP supported. The Arab-Israeli conflict also had a greater impact on the formation of the UfM than the EMP, often influencing the speed and substance of the negotiations surrounding the UfM.

RECOMMENDATION

This article has very little to do with Morocco, instead focusing on internal EU negotiations and the impact that regional issues had on these internal negotiations. There is nothing in the article that would warrant putting it on the MAC site or spreading it among the staff.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines the creation of a contemporary Berber/Amazigh literature and language, which are politically synonymous, and the attempts by the Moroccan state to deal with this emerging field. This article attempts to show that Moroccan state policies have driven Berber writers to attempt to affirm “Moroccanness” exclusive of “Arabness.”

Initially the Moroccan state viewed Berbers as people with “a marginal identity in need of rehabilitation” into the Arab culture of Morocco. The state thus attempted to Arabize education and the public space, thereby eliminating all three major Amazigh dialects. This stance changed in 1994 when King Hassan II allowed broadcasting in the Berber language on national radio. The states acceptance of the Amazigh language(s) has only increased since then with its incorporation into the public school system and the founding, in 2001, of the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM).

IRCAM has sought to standardize the Amazigh language, partly in order to introduce it into the school curriculum, and to reverse the long-standing association of “Berber” with “opposition.” Activists claim that IRCAM serves to divide the literary field into those that worked for the state and those, declared by the article to be the majority, who radically opposed the “‘takeover’ of Berber identity by the State.” IRCAM has attempted to impose a uniform alphabet for the writing of Amazigh called Tifinagh. As it stands, Amazigh can be written in Arabic script, which identifies the author with the Arabo-Muslim regime, or Latin script, which identifies the author as modern, but has negative colonial associations. The
creation of a Tifinagh script divorced from any oral tradition has been condemned by many who see it as “a State strategy to fence off the Berber language and confine it to an ‘unreadable’ alphabet for the rest of the world.” The standardization of the language has been met with calls for a “return to local” by many activists. Amazigh writers see this standardization as an attempt at modernization, while activists fear it will create a division between the literary/educated class and the masses, much as Modern Standard Arabic and its many local variations have caused throughout much of the Arab world. The article concludes by stating that contemporary Amazigh literature “has been evolving in parallel with the Berber identity and political movement,” which has linked this literary field with the ethnic and political demands of Berbers.

**RECOMMENDATION**

This article deals with literary and cultural development, much of it historical, which is of little relevance to MAC. The discussion of the efforts of the State to incorporate Berber language and identity, specifically in public schooling and broadcasting, is interesting, but is brief with no analysis. The author also fails to really examine if/how Berber writers have “affirm[ed] an alternative definition of Moroccanness” and in many instances seems to contradict this assertion. There is little in this article that would be helpful either for dissemination or distribution purposes.

---

**Youth Perceptions in Morocco: Political Parties in the wake of Legislative Elections: Findings from Qualitative Research in Morocco Conducted in March and April 2012**

The National Democratic Institute, July 2012


**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This report, drawing upon 18 focus group discussions with 160 Moroccans aged 18 to 25 years, “examines attitudes of young Moroccan citizens towards the current situation in their country, major political actors, and recent and upcoming elections.” Drawing on participants of both genders and from across the social spectrum in various areas of the country, the report finds surprisingly consistent attitudes on the topics discussed. The research was conducted between March and April 2012, four months after legislative elections were held.

**General Mood**

Many young Moroccans are positive about the current political direction of the country. “Constitutional reforms, elections perceived as more transparent, and the victory of the PJD are mentioned by most focus groups participants as positive indicators.” This notwithstanding, some participants express doubt that elections may spur significant change, with some positing that the victory of the PJD was engineered by the regime to calm the streets. Nevertheless, a significant number of participants believe the new government can succeed, and that patience is required - the PJD must be given time to achieve its goals.

Of particular interest to the young respondents was the matter of unemployment. One urban woman declared that unemployment is, “a ghost threatening every graduate.”
Another commented on the prevalence of nepotism. “If you go to the United States or France and look for a job, they check and ask about the things you can do; but in Morocco, they ask, ‘who sent you here,’ if you understand what I mean.”

**Perspectives on Elections**

The overwhelming majority of focus group participants characterized the recent legislative elections as a step forward. The fact that a historic opposition party won the largest number of seats in the Parliament and formed the first government following a constitutional revision is seen as a significant and positive development. Most believe that the elections were conducted in a fair and transparent manner. Yet despite this view, most participants confessed a lack of knowledge about how elections are conducted and the role of elected officials in office. “Bad knowledge about [MP] roles,” said one rural woman, “We haven’t even studied that in school. We studied the history of, say, Britain and France, but never Morocco.” Although most focus group participants acknowledge that they themselves did not vote in the November election, they suggest that they have greater intention to vote in upcoming communal elections.

**Attitudes Toward Political Parties**

Despite the positive characterization of elections, most participants characterized the general performance of political parties as extremely unsatisfactory. “[Political parties] are always seeking self-interest,” said one respondent. “They promise people lots of things but never act when they win.” This belief is prevalent, despite the fact that participants generally have a very superficial knowledge of party ideologies or platforms. They know and appreciate that most parties have vowed to tackle government corruption, and there is some perception that efforts have been made in this regard. The exceptions to this rule are the PJD and Istiqlal - both parties are universally recognized and can be described by participants in some detail.

Focus group participants link their intention to vote in upcoming elections “to the degree of responsiveness they feel from political parties in listening to and acting on the needs of citizens.”

**Perceptions of the New Government**

Participants generally hold a positive attitude towards the new government and “associate it with a sense of transparency and urgency.” The PJD is perceived to be a credible party buoyed by its Islamic credentials and legitimate in its efforts to combat corruption. A lack of women in government is disheartening to some. “One thing I don’t like is that while Morocco has been struggling for women’s rights, the party chose only one lady for the new government, which is not fair.”

Participants expressed hopes that the opposition would be productive and work with the new government, rather than just criticize it. There is division over the February 20th movement. Many desire February 20th to remain a force applying pressure from outside the government, and many desire it to be a political party. Others question why the movement is still active now that a constitutional referendum has passed. “Thanks to the movement, lots of things have changed,” said one urban woman. “I think the movement precipitated the reform of the constitution. But I don’t understand why the movement still demonstrates and protests given that lots of reforms are done.”

**RECOMMENDATION**
This report reveals a relatively positive perception of the PJD - at the time of the focus test. In March and April of 2012 the party, burnished by its Islamic credentials and its promises to reform the government, combat corruption, and reduce unemployment, was still broadly perceived as representing the people and genuinely attempting to resolve the country’s crises. Yet the data is somewhat out of date. In the intervening six months, the PJD’s credibility has suffered - perhaps unavoidably - as corruption and economic difficulties in the country persist.

The value of a focus group is the depth of an explanation it provides on public opinion rather than the statistical data generated by a public opinion poll. While the general favorability of the PJD has faded somewhat since this poll was taken, the information about the issues motivating Moroccan youth still remain pertinent. In this case, the youth express frustration with continuing corruption and unemployment. The PJD, and any other party seeking to hold office, must make a credible and meaningful attempt to combat these problems.

The document is somewhat dated but provides valuable insight into the perspectives of Moroccan youth. As it was effective in bringing about the constitutional reforms of 2011, this demographic is likely to continue to be a meaningful player in future politics. For this reason, the report is recommended reading.

See below and attached.


Morocco: A staunch and stable ally in North Africa

By Edward M. Gabriel and Michael Ussery, former ambassadors to Morocco

The murder of U.S. Ambassador John Christopher Stevens and three other Americans in Libya, and the violence at our Cairo embassy, are sad and dreadful demonstrations that now more than ever, the United States needs reliable friends in the Middle East and North Africa.

Challenges to critically important U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa have steadily mounted since 9/11, and have increased even further in the wake of popular revolts throughout the region—culminating in last week’s horrific developments. How to face those challenges with now less-certain alliances in the Arab World has become a serious concern for American policy-makers and others, in and out of government, who worry about future developments in the region. The United States needs reliable partners who share the same vision, values and goals for its future.

One of the oldest and most reliable American partners in the Middle East-North Africa region has been the Kingdom of Morocco. That relationship was strengthened late last week when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched a new Strategic Dialogue with Morocco, which she praised as “a leader and a model” in the region. This new strategic relationship will not only consolidate and elevate an already long history of close cooperation with Morocco; more importantly it will also help establish a new anchor for U.S. efforts to ensure that the vision both nations share for the future of the region can prevail against those who would undermine it through extremist violence and intolerant world views.

The Morocco-U.S. Strategic Dialogue will focus on key areas where Morocco’s experience and example can help
America address changes and challenges in the Arab and Moslem worlds, as well as throughout the Mediterranean and in Central and West Africa, where Morocco has long-established relationships.

Though many believed the U.S.-Morocco relationship and its relevance to U.S. foreign policy interests was less important once the Cold War ended, Morocco’s importance to the U.S. has instead increased steadily over the past ten years as challenges have mounted from hostile groups, adversarial governments, and rapid change. Throughout this period, while others in the region slipped ever deeper into the contradictions in their societies that ultimately resulted in the revolts of the Arab Spring, Morocco pushed ahead with its own ambitious reform agenda that directly addressed past human rights abuses, the status and role of women in society, the need to focus attention and resources on the most disadvantaged, insistence on religious tolerance, the need to open up political space to civil society and other non-state actors, and conducted a series of the only truly free and fair local and national elections in the Arab World.

It was this ambitious and largely successful reform agenda that resulted in the increasingly close relations between Morocco and the U.S. and led, ultimately, to the new strategic partnership launched in Washington. What makes this all the more remarkable was that Morocco’s reform agenda was self-driven and not the result of any external pressure. Rather, it was the product of enlightened leadership from the Moroccan monarchy working closely with civil society and others who understood that such changes were not only necessary, but would strengthen Morocco’s fortunes in a changing world.

As former U.S. Ambassadors to Morocco, we are pleased to see the US take this important step to elevate its relations with Morocco to the level of strategic cooperation. This step is the culmination of more than a decade of close cooperation between our two countries, under the leadership of King Mohammed VI and three American presidents. Already Morocco has established itself as a major non-NATO Ally, the beneficiary of a Free Trade Agreement, and a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact with the United States.

Establishing a Strategic Dialogue at this time not only makes good sense as we face common problems in the region with a common purpose, but it also sends a strong signal to the region that the United States is a willing partner with those in the Middle East and North Africa who are prepared to share a vision of a better future for the region, and who are also capable of demonstrating their own commitment to that vision through the kind of steady and progressive policies Morocco has pursued with significant success these last dozen years.

King Mohammed VI has been working hard for more than a decade to promote democratic reform, economic development, and greater regional cooperation. Changes initiated by the King, most recently in the 2011 Constitution, advance political reforms, guarantee religious freedom, protect women’s rights, promote human rights, and serve as an example for other countries. Continued efforts to promote economic development and create jobs likewise offer a model for economic growth in a region where it is sorely needed.

Morocco has demonstrated, through the partnership between King Mohammed VI and the United States, that it is ready and capable of building a strong mutual response to the forces of uncertainty in the region.

*Gabriel, former U.S. ambassador to Morocco under President Bill Clinton, advises the Kingdom of Morocco. Ussery, is the former U.S. ambassador to Morocco under President George H.W. Bush.*
Morocco: A staunch and stable ally in North Africa

By Edward M. Gabriel and Michael Ussery, former ambassadors to Morocco

The murder of U.S. Ambassador John Christopher Stevens and three other Americans in Libya, and the violence at our Cairo embassy, are sad and dreadful demonstrations that now more than ever, the United States needs reliable friends in the Middle East and North Africa.

Challenges to critically important U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa have steadily mounted since 9/11, and have increased even further in the wake of popular revolts throughout the region—culminating in last week’s horrific developments. How to face those challenges with now less-certain alliances in the Arab World has become a serious concern for American policy-makers and others, in and out of government, who worry about future developments in the region. The United States needs reliable partners who share the same vision, values and goals for its future.

One of the oldest and most reliable American partners in the Middle East-North Africa region has been the Kingdom of Morocco. That relationship was strengthened late last week when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched a new Strategic Dialogue with Morocco, which she praised as “a leader and a model” in the region. This new strategic relationship will not only consolidate and elevate an already long history of close cooperation with Morocco; more importantly it will also help establish a new anchor for U.S. efforts to ensure that the vision both nations share for the future of the region can prevail against those who would undermine it through extremist violence and intolerant world views.

The Morocco-U.S. Strategic Dialogue will focus on key areas where Morocco’s experience and example can help America address changes and challenges in the Arab and Moslem worlds, as well as throughout the Mediterranean and in Central and West Africa, where Morocco has long-established relationships.

Though many believed the U.S.-Morocco relationship and its relevance to U.S. foreign policy interests was less important once the Cold War ended, Morocco’s importance to the U.S. has instead increased steadily over the past ten years as challenges have mounted from hostile groups, adversarial governments, and rapid change. Throughout this period, while others in the region slipped ever deeper into the contradictions in their societies that ultimately resulted in the revolts of the Arab Spring, Morocco pushed ahead with its own ambitious reform agenda that directly addressed past human rights abuses, the status and role of women in society, the need to focus attention and resources on the most disadvantaged, insistence on religious tolerance, the need to open up political space to civil society and other non-state actors, and conducted a series of the only truly free and fair local and national elections in the Arab World.

It was this ambitious and largely successful reform agenda that resulted in the increasingly close relations between Morocco and the U.S. and led, ultimately, to the new strategic partnership launched in Washington. What makes this all the more remarkable was that Morocco’s reform agenda was self-driven and not the result of any external pressure. Rather, it was the product of enlightened leadership from the Moroccan monarchy working closely with civil society and others who understood that such changes were not only necessary, but would strengthen Morocco’s fortunes in a changing world.
As former U.S. Ambassadors to Morocco, we are pleased to see the US take this important step to elevate its relations with Morocco to the level of strategic cooperation. This step is the culmination of more than a decade of close cooperation between our two countries, under the leadership of King Mohammed VI and three American presidents. Already Morocco has established itself as a major non-NATO Ally, the beneficiary of a Free Trade Agreement, and a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact with the United States.

Establishing a Strategic Dialogue at this time not only makes good sense as we face common problems in the region with a common purpose, but it also sends a strong signal to the region that the United States is a willing partner with those in the Middle East and North Africa who are prepared to share a vision of a better future for the region, and who are also capable of demonstrating their own commitment to that vision through the kind of steady and progressive policies Morocco has pursued with significant success these last dozen years.

King Mohammed VI has been working hard for more than a decade to promote democratic reform, economic development, and greater regional cooperation. Changes initiated by the King, most recently in the 2011 Constitution, advance political reforms, guarantee religious freedom, protect women's rights, promote human rights, and serve as an example for other countries. Continued efforts to promote economic development and create jobs likewise offer a model for economic growth in a region where it is sorely needed.

Morocco has demonstrated, through the partnership between King Mohammed VI and the United States, that it is ready and capable of building a strong mutual response to the forces of uncertainty in the region.

*Gabriel, former U.S. ambassador to Morocco under President Bill Clinton, advises the Kingdom of Morocco. Ussery, is the former U.S. ambassador to Morocco under President George H.W. Bush.*
Clearly, events in Libya, Egypt and elsewhere across the Middle East and North Africa these past weeks demonstrate the necessity of the US being able to forge reliable partnerships with nations in the region who share a common view of the challenges and vision for the future. The creation, earlier this month, of a Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue makes it clear that Morocco is that kind of viable strategic partner, and provides a new opportunity for our two nations to advance a progressive agenda for the region as threats to our common interests are increasingly evident.

The inauguration of a Strategic Dialogue between the U.S. and Morocco elevates and formalizes a longstanding relationship with a friend that shares our interests and values, recognizing more than a decade of leadership on reform under King Mohammed VI, and the increasingly close, cooperative relationship with Morocco under three US presidents.

Since King Mohammed VI ascended the throne in 1999 with a determination to expedite reform and development, Morocco has made significant advances in protecting human rights, especially the equal rights of women, building an independent judicial system, promoting religious tolerance, accelerating human development initiatives for the country’s most disadvantaged, and boosting open trade and investment.

This strategic dialogue is not just another diplomatic gabfest; it is a carefully considered step by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to strengthen an anchor relationship in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It provides an opportunity for the two countries to work together through regular, high-level meetings to give serious consideration to real issues of concern and to formulate policies and solutions that support US global interests, as well as Morocco’s objectives, in the areas of politics, security, economy, culture and education.

Morocco is the first North African country--and one of only two dozen in the world--to have such a
partnership with the US. Adding Morocco to that limited group—which includes Israel, Russia, South Africa, and India—signals America's growing commitment to Morocco as an increasingly important partner in achieving our mutual ambition to create a more democratic, prosperous, and secure MENA region.

At the same time, it is a demonstration of US support for Morocco's success in advancing democratic reform at home and its commitment to partner with the US in defense of our shared values. This is a model for how we should engage our friends in that part of the world on the basis of mutual respect and common interest. It should also serve as an incentive to other countries in the region who seek a closer relationship with the United States.

Success stories like Morocco's are needed in the region, and the convening of this strategic process builds on steps already taken between the US and Morocco. Morocco is one of only 20 countries that have free trade agreements with the US. It has formed an exceptional strategic partnership on military and security issues as it participates regularly in NATO and bilateral US military exercises and training and cooperates fully in our efforts to combat terrorist activity. It is one of only 24 countries with a current Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact -- which is awarded on the basis of a country's commitment to democratic reform and economic openness. Morocco is also designated a major non-NATO ally, one of only 16 countries with this exceptional status.

While Morocco continues to work to bring democratic reforms to full fruition, America's support and the privileged status it offers Morocco have encouraged and expedited the very positive outcomes we are witnessing there. As "Arab Spring" turbulence and increasing terrorist activity continue in the MENA region, the US can count on Morocco as a pillar of stability and as a reliable and staunch ally.

This is the capstone to a relationship that began more than two centuries ago with the birth of our nation.

When attacks by Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean threatened our young nation's ability to export its goods to Europe, America turned to the then-Sultan of Morocco, King Mohammed III, for assistance. This new relationship was subsequently codified in the 1787 US-Morocco Treaty of Friendship and Peace, America's longest standing treaty relationship which remains in force today.

In December 1789, President George Washington sent a letter thanking the Sultan for Morocco's help, writing "our soil is bountiful, and our people industrious, and we have reason to flatter ourselves that we shall gradually become useful to our friends."

The United States has now taken yet another major step to reinforce the promise George Washington made 223 years ago by affirming our commitment to an enduring partnership where the US and Morocco will continue to stand together in the 21st century as close friends and reliable allies, something that seems so very appropriate given that Morocco was the first country in the world to recognize the independence of the United States of America in 1777.

Robert M. Holley is Senior Policy Advisor for the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP).
SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

Moroccan American Center for Policy (Washington, DC)

OPINION


BY ROBERT M. HOLLEY, 24 SEPTEMBER 2012

Clearly, events in Libya, Egypt and elsewhere across the Middle East and North Africa these past weeks demonstrate the necessity of the US being able to forge reliable partnerships with nations in the region who share a common view of the challenges and vision for the future. The creation, earlier this month, of a Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue makes it clear that Morocco is that kind of viable strategic partner, and provides a new opportunity for our two nations to advance a progressive agenda for the region as threats to our common interests are increasingly evident.

The inauguration of a Strategic Dialogue between the U.S. and Morocco elevates and formalizes a longstanding relationship with a friend that shares our interests and values, recognizing more than a decade of leadership on reform under King Mohammed VI, and the increasingly close, cooperative relationship with Morocco under three US presidents.

Since King Mohammed VI ascended the throne in 1999 with a determination to expedite reform and development, Morocco has made significant advances in protecting human rights, especially the equal rights of women, building an independent judicial system, promoting religious tolerance, accelerating human development initiatives for the country's most disadvantaged, and boosting open trade and investment.

This strategic dialogue is not just another diplomatic gabfest; it is a carefully considered step by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to strengthen an anchor relationship in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It provides an opportunity for the two countries to work together through regular, high-level meetings to give serious consideration to real issues of concern and to formulate policies and solutions that support US global interests, as well as Morocco's objectives, in the areas of politics, security, economy, culture and education.

Morocco is the first North African country--and one of only two dozen in the world--to have such a partnership with the US. Adding Morocco to that limited group--which includes Israel, Russia, South Africa, and India--signals America's growing commitment to Morocco as an increasingly important partner in achieving our mutual ambition to create a more democratic, prosperous, and secure MENA region.

At the same time, it is a demonstration of US support for Morocco's success in advancing democratic reform at home and its commitment to partner with the US in defense of our shared values. This is a model for how we should engage our friends in that part of the world on the basis of mutual respect and common interest. It should also serve as an incentive to other countries in the region who seek a closer relationship with the United States.

Success stories like Morocco's are needed in the region, and the convening of this strategic process builds on steps already taken between the US and Morocco. Morocco is one of only 20 countries that have free trade agreements with the US. It has formed an exceptional strategic partnership on military and security issues as it participates regularly in NATO and bilateral US military exercises and training and cooperates fully in our efforts to combat terrorist activity. It is one of only 24 countries with a current Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact -- which is awarded on the basis of a country's commitment to democratic reform and economic openness. Morocco is also designated a major non-NATO ally, one of only 16 countries with this exceptional status.

While Morocco continues to work to bring democratic reforms to full fruition, America's support and the privileged status it offers Morocco have encouraged and expedited the very positive outcomes we are witnessing there. As "Arab Spring" turbulence and increasing terrorist activity continue in the MENA region, the US can count on Morocco as a pillar of stability and as a reliable and staunch ally.
This is the capstone to a relationship that began more than two centuries ago with the birth of our nation. When attacks by Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean threatened our young nation's ability to export its goods to Europe, America turned to the then-Sultan of Morocco, King Mohammed III, for assistance. This new relationship was subsequently codified in the 1787 US-Morocco Treaty of Friendship and Peace, America's longest standing treaty relationship which remains in force today.

In December 1789, President George Washington sent a letter thanking the Sultan for Morocco's help, writing "our soil is bountiful, and our people industrious, and we have reason to flatter ourselves that we shall gradually become useful to our friends."

The United States has now taken yet another major step to reinforce the promise George Washington made 223 years ago by affirming our commitment to an enduring partnership where the US and Morocco will continue to stand together in the 21st century as close friends and reliable allies, something that seems so very appropriate given that Morocco was the first country in the world to recognize the independence of the United States of America in 1777. - Robert M. Holley is Senior Policy Advisor for the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP).
Excellent article by Totten, who we are making arrangement with Abdel for a visit to Morocco. Notice the he mentions a visit to Morocco in his article. Ed

[Article Link]

What a Real Alliance Looks Like - Michael J. Totten

President Barack Obama came under criticism recently for describing Egypt as neither an ally nor an enemy of the United States and then backtracking days later. Most Americans who follow the Middle East and North Africa know perfectly well that Egypt’s relationship with the United States is no longer friendly. After what happened over there during the last couple of weeks, even many Americans who hardly pay any attention at all have figured it out. But it’s not diplomatic for the White House or the State Department to say it out loud, so the president walked it back.

Compare and contrast Washington’s poisoned relationship with Cairo to the one at the opposite end of North Africa. The United States just upgraded its relationship with Morocco to the level of what’s called a Strategic Dialogue, bringing the two almost as close as possible without bringing Morocco into NATO. Americans have fewer than two dozen alliances like this in the world.

The timing could hardly be better. Since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, North Africa and the Middle East have gone through an extraordinary period of tumultuous change, some of it good, but much of it bad. The U.S. needs friends it can count on over there and hardly has any other than Israel. Pro-American Arab governments — not that there are many of those — likewise need an alliance with the United States they can count on.

That part of the world also needs a stable rock somewhere—not the stultifying stability provided by the House of al-Saud in Arabia, and certainly not the tyrannical sort that Moammar Qaddafi managed for a few decades in Libya. No, what the Middle East and North Africa need right now is progressive stability, the kind that slowly advances human and political development without triggering the kinds of violent reactions and shocks we’re seeing in so many places right now. Morocco is one of the few countries that’s pulling it off.

Unlike “frenemy” states like Egypt and Pakistan, Morocco is a genuine friend of the United States and always has been. Washington and Rabat share the same strategic interests in the region and, just as importantly, the same outlook and vision.

I recently spoke with Youssef Amrani, Morocco's minister delegate for foreign affairs.
"We’ve decided to upgrade our relationship,” he said. “We have the same values. We have economic and cultural ties. The United States recognizes the commitment of Morocco to human rights and the rule of law. With all the changes in the region, we need to send the message that an Arab country can work with the United States on the basis of shared values.”

Our strong anti-communist alliance during the Cold War transitioned smoothly into a strong anti-terrorist alliance in the 21st century. Long before the terror war started in earnest, however, Morocco stood strong against Nasserism, Baathism, and the other various noxious secular “isms” that have proven such spectacular failures everywhere they’ve been tried.

Arab Nationalism, radical Islam, and anti-Americanism exist in Morocco, of course, but they find less purchase than in most other places. The ideas make less sense there. Morocco is a pluralistic blend of Arab and Berber and has been culturally influenced by southern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa throughout its entire history. The United States has never been hostile toward Morocco and Morocco has never been hostile toward the United States. Only a small percentage of Americans know that Morocco was the first country in the world to recognize our independence from Britain, but everyone in Morocco knows and is proud of it.

Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak was sort of an ally of the United States, but he wasn’t a real one. He was part of America’s security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Washington propped him up with assistance, but he did nothing—to liberalize or modernize Egypt and prepare it for a future of peaceful relations with itself, its neighbors, or with the rest of the world. Every day his state-run media cranked out as much anti-American and anti-Semitic invective as Nazi Germany, and it did so for decades. He threw liberals as well as Islamists in prison. His military regime ruthlessly repressed anything and everything that even smelled like civil society. Revolutionary Egypt was not even remotely primed for tolerant liberal democracy. “We’ve had 7,000 years of civilization,” an activist told me in Tahrir Square last year, “and 7,000 years of oppression.”

By contrast, civil society is flourishing in Morocco. The state doesn’t have a paranoid view of non-governmental organizations. It doesn’t think they’re part of a sinister foreign conspiracy like the Egyptian government did when Mubarak was running the place and like it still does today. Morocco has long had a pluralistic view of outsiders, the kind that only exists in a few isolated pockets elsewhere in the Arab world like Beirut and Tunis.

Jews live in Morocco as a protected minority. The only other Arab country where that’s true is Tunisia. King Mohammad VI had been campaigning to educate the Muslim world about the horrors of the Holocaust and to put an end to Holocaust denial once and for all. It’s outrageous that he has to stand up and say the Holocaust happened and that it was bad, but that’s where we are. His government has opted out of the Arab-Israeli conflict and would, in all likelihood, sign a peace treaty with Israel tomorrow if that wouldn’t cause such a geopolitical headache for itself in the region.

While Morocco is not a democracy and Mohammad VI wasn’t elected, the country does have democratic institutions and its people are slowly developing democratic habits of mind. The king’s father, Hassan II, began liberalizing Morocco decades ago, and Mohammad VI stepped on the accelerator as soon as he came to power. He did it before widespread disgruntlement threatened to bring down the government, which is the best time to do it, not only because it’s the right thing to do on general principle, but because it’s the only way governments can maintain legitimacy over the long term. Reforms aren’t likely to placate hundreds of thousands of furious demonstrators, but genuine reforms will likely prevent hundreds of thousands of furious demonstrators from taking to the streets in the first place.

So while much of the region is boiling with turmoil, Morocco is placid and calm.
“Democratic transition and the building of institutions take time,” said Amrani from the foreign ministry. “You can’t change the world in one day. Countries that have had no institutions and no civil society are going to have problems. Democracy can’t be imposed all at once. It’s a culture. It’s something you have to do every day.”

Edward Gabriel and Michael Ussery, two former U.S. ambassadors to Morocco, put it this way on The Hill’s Congress blog[^1]: “Morocco pushed ahead with its own ambitious reform agenda that directly addressed past human rights abuses, the status and role of women in society, the need to focus attention and resources on the most disadvantaged, insistence on religious tolerance, the need to open up political space to civil society and other non-state actors, and conducted a series of the only truly free and fair local and national elections in the Arab World.”

With revolution, war, sectarian bloodshed, and renascent repression roiling so much of the region, Morocco’s gradual political liberalization looks like a better model than ever. And with two hundred years of history behind it, the American-Moroccan alliance is likely to last.

[^1]: [The Hill’s Congress blog](https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog)
The information contained in this report is from a generally reliable source, although it has not been corroborated by third party sources.

(1) According to a leading member of a Sahrawi NGO in Algiers, Polisario's activity over the coming months will focus on one central goal: having defence of the human rights of Sahrawis living under Moroccan administration included in MINURSO's mandate. This objective, which Polisario's leaders have been pushing for several months (Mohamed Abdelaziz has already written to the UN Secretary General on the subject), has been given an additional boost by the visit to the Sahara by UN Special Rapporteur on torture Juan Mendez and the Robert Kennedy Center's recent mission to the Sahara and the Tindouf camps. The impasse that the negotiation process has reached and the difficulties caused by the Moroccan veto against the Secretary General's Special Envoy Christoper Ross have together broken down the reticence of certain members of the Polisario leadership such as Bechir Mustapha Sayed with regard to the tactic of focussing all the movement's efforts on the human rights campaign alone. While agreeing that the human rights question should not be neglected, Bechir Mustapha Sayed had been arguing in favour of a policy of regionalising the Sahrawi question that would have meant pushing to put the Sahara conflict on the agenda of inter-Maghreb relations. This option was ruled out, however, because it stands in opposition to Algerian policy, which is predicated on keeping the Sahara question separate from Algeria's bilateral relations with other Maghreb countries, in particular Morocco – Algiers' line being that the conflict is between Polisario and Morocco, not between Morocco and Algeria.

(2) On Sept. 22, SADR President and Polisario General Secretary Mohamed Abdelaziz reshuffled personnel at the President's office and SADR/Polisario representations abroad. According to an Algiers-based Sahrawi journalist, two appointments are particularly significant. The first is the removal of Mouloud Saïd from the position of Polisario representative in the United States, a position he has held for 30 years, and his appointment as Minister-Delegate for Asia. According to the source, this is a sign that Mohamed Abdelaziz intends to appoint one of his close associates to head the mission in the United States – the name should be announced before the end of the month. The second is the appointment of Malainin Sadiq as Minister-Advisor to the Presidency. The source describes Sadiq as a "pure product of the Algerian DRS", having served as coordinator with the security services in Algiers for years before being made an ambassador and, now, special advisor to Mohamed Abdelaziz with ministerial rank. In his new capacity, Sadiq will be in charge of security and coordination with the Algerian security forces, and was chosen for this sensitive role because of his longstanding closeness to Mohamed Abdelaziz, says the source. At least one figure within the Polisario hierarchy will be feeling let down after this reshuffle, the source adds: Mohamed Yeslem Baissat, who remains Polisario's representative for Europe but without the formal rank of ambassador, whereas he had been hoping for a ministerial position.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two Circles</td>
<td>Bombardier to open unit in Morocco Oct 1, 2012</td>
<td>A Bombardier Aerospace facility will be opened in a free trade zone that is offering a five-year financial incentive, including no taxes. Several international aviation companies have established manufacturing units in Morocco. The volume of exports of this sector has increased to $1 billion in 2011.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco: subsidy will not affect bread Sept 29, 2012</td>
<td>Najib Boulif, minister in charge of general affairs and public governance said a 15 percent cut in Morocco's subsidies on soft wheat imports in the last quarter of the year will not boost bread prices. High food prices were seen as a factor in violence which engulfed North African neighbours Tunisia, Libya and Egypt last year, and Morocco has also witnessed violence following bread price hikes in the past.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco selects Saudi-led group for major solar plant Oct 1, 2012</td>
<td>A group led by Saudi International Company for Water and Power has won a $1-billion contract to build a 160-megawatt concentrated solar power plant in the south of Morocco. Morocco hopes to be a key exporter of clean energy to Europe.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco planning agency revises down Q2 GDP growth Oct 1, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco’s GDP grew 2.3% in the second quarter, not 2.6% as had been estimated. It is a sign that the government’s 3.4 percent growth goal for 2012 may be tough to meet. Morocco has been hit by drought and the economic slowdown in the European Union, its main trading partner.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Algeria dismantles AQIM recruiting network Sept 30, 2012</td>
<td>Algerian security services broke up a suspected AQIM cell that trained young fighters to join Islamist militias in Libya.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Algeria, US discuss Sahel security Sept 30, 2012</td>
<td>Algerian Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel and the head of US Africa Command met in Algiers on September 29th to examine “the situation in the Sahel, especially the Mali crisis and the prospects for its resolution.”</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Moroccan health sector under</td>
<td>The health sector needs to be reformed. It lacks equipment, human resources, training and</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Newly chosen Istiqlal leader and Fez Mayor Hamid Chabat is seeking a cabinet shakeup. The new secretary-general said a cabinet reshuffle will be a good thing, especially if it brings women into the government. The performance of Istiqlal ministers has been mediocre up to now, and yet they need to answer to party campaigners and engage more with the electorate, Chabat added.</td>
<td>Oct 2, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>In addition to its obvious function of resolving disputes, Justice Minister Mustapha Ramid said that the judiciary is a locomotive for growth and economic prosperity because it encourages investment and guarantees the rights of individuals.</td>
<td>Oct 4, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telegraph UK</strong></td>
<td>This opinion piece suggests that British aid goes to places that don’t need it as much as others. It cites Morocco’s 120 million British pounds in annual aid from the EU as an example of egregious giving.</td>
<td>Sept 30, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Africa</strong></td>
<td>HM King Mohammed VI presented a speech to the UN in which he asked Syrian officials to end violence and embrace democratic reforms. Morocco continues to show regional solidarity by providing medical services to Syrian refugees in Jordan.</td>
<td>Sept 28, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Africa</strong></td>
<td>HM King Mohammed VI said that Morocco supports the UN stance of resolving disputes by peaceful means, stressing that achieving international peace and security remains the core mission of the United Nations.</td>
<td>Sept 28, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Africa</strong></td>
<td>Arabic Network for Human Rights Information criticized the failed security solutions of using excessive violence against demonstrators. They stated that it “is the only method that the Moroccan authorities recognize to address the peaceful demonstration in occupied Western Sahara.”</td>
<td>Oct. 1, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Launch of 'Touiza' Operation in Meknes-Tafilalet Region - Royal Willingness to Put 2012-13 Crop Year Under Sign of Solidarity Affirmed</strong></td>
<td>King Mohammed VI launched the &quot;Touiza&quot; operation in the Meknes-Tafilalet region, marking the beginning of 2012-2013 crop year. The operation aims at improving the socio-economic conditions of farmers, creating jobs for young people, and developing sustainable agriculture.</td>
<td>Oct. 1, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Court Orders Prince Moulay Hicham, Khairat Reconciliation</strong></td>
<td>A court has ended an inquiry into a complaint by Prince Moulay Hicham against Socialist Union of Popular Forces leading member Abdelhadi Khairat. The court gave the parties two weeks to reconcile.</td>
<td>Oct 3, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td><strong>Crisis strengthen Spain-Morocco ties</strong></td>
<td>The economic crises rocking Spain and Morocco may favor stronger ties between the neighboring kingdoms despite historical differences. Two Spanish firms were named to participate in construction of the five major solar plants. Morocco is seeking easing of visa restrictions.</td>
<td>Oct. 2, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Muslim News</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Using Salafis as pawns</strong></td>
<td>The Moroccan government has realized that they can use the influence of Salafi leaders to protect themselves from popular protest. Allying with the Salafis worked well when youth-led protests occurred last year, but afterwards “the regime once more became hostile to its one-time allies.”</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrik News</td>
<td><strong>Morocco and Spain strengthening their relations</strong></td>
<td>The Spanish Prime Minister was in Morocco for meetings with HM Mohammed VI and other government officials to discuss improving relations between the two countries. Eight bilateral agreements were signed.</td>
<td>Oct 4, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN.com Blogs</td>
<td><strong>Morocco navy escorts abortion vessel out of port, group says</strong></td>
<td>A ship of women’s activists, seeking to help women receive abortions, was escorted out of the Moroccan port of Smir after the government initially blocked the harbor and prevented residents from accessing the vessel. Abortion is illegal in Morocco.</td>
<td>Oct 4, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Star</td>
<td><strong>Palace and Islamists wrestle in Morocco</strong></td>
<td>Prime Minister Benkirane and the Islamists of the PJD have been engaged in several disagreements with HM Mohammed VI over the divisions of power expressed in Morocco’s new constitution. PJD sympathizers believe HM has overstepped his authority in many instances, such as control of television, radio, and calling meetings with ministers without Benkirane’s knowledge.</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Online</td>
<td>JetBlue and Royal Air Maroc Partner to Bring More Access to Africa</td>
<td>Jet Blue and Royal Air Maroc have agreed to integrate networks to facilitate travel between North Africa and the Americas.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Arabiya</td>
<td>Morocco, Spain to strengthen economic cooperation</td>
<td>Spain has overtaken France as Morocco’s “top economic partner.” Morocco has suffered a drop in economic growth over the last year and “is looking to diversify its markets and doing all it can to attract foreign investments in a difficult climate.”</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The View from Fez</td>
<td>Spanish Government Support for Morocco on Sahara Issue Welcomed</td>
<td>The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to &quot;the southern territories&quot; instead of &quot;Western Sahara.&quot; Spain appears to be backing Morocco’s stance on the issue. The minister will face internal opposition from the Popular Party that considers Morocco an &quot;enemy.&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Peru and Morocco intending to increase trade flow</td>
<td>The Peruvian government is investigating the possibility of a bilateral trade agreement with Morocco, in the belief that the two markets will complement each other.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project on Middle East Democracy</td>
<td>Algeria Calls for Limits on Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>During his address to the U.N. General Assembly, Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci called for further control over free speech, a seeming response to the anti-Islam film &quot;Innocence of Muslims.&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project on Middle East Democracy</td>
<td>Western Sahara Autonomy Discussed, Violence Condemned</td>
<td>King Mohammed VI reiterated his position on creating an semi-autonomous Western Sahara, which was rejected by the Algerian- backed Polisario. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon summarized a report on Western Sahara at the U.N. which noted “on the core issues of the future status of Western Sahara and the means by which the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara was to occur, no progress was registered.”</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
<td>Party Politics for Morocco’s Salafis?</td>
<td>Moroccan Salafis are not interested in party politics, but the events of last year have caused a shift in attitude. Many Salafi-jihadist leaders were granted royal pardons and released from jail. With the Islamists’ rise to political prominence through the PJD, Salafis and other Islamists openly expressed their hopes that the PJD would resolve the issue of “political imprisonment,” and limit their systematic arrest. Their hopes rose when Mustapha al-Ramid, who once represented a number of Salafi-jihadist defendants, was named Morocco’s Minister of Justice.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The Daily Beast | Morocco Cracks Down on Democracy Rappers  
| The Jakarta Post | RI can make Morocco a gateway to Europe  
| Oct 5, 2012 | Morocco and Indonesia have enjoyed good relations for several decades, and now they are evaluating the potential for a trade agreement. In addition to Morocco’s strategic mineral reserves, Indonesia believes it will serve as an entryway into the European market. |

Deborah Klodowski  
Intern, Moroccan American Center  
(202) 587-0855 ext 108
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td>Judges in Morocco Lead Sit-In Calling for Autonomous Judiciary</td>
<td>1000 judges organized a sit-in protest outside the Supreme Court in Rabat, demanding a truly independent judiciary in addition to better working conditions and compensation. There are complaints that ministers interfere in judicial matters.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sahara Press Service</strong></td>
<td>U.S. Department of State criticizes Morocco’s human rights violations in Western Sahara</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of State has sent a report to Congress criticizing Morocco’s human rights violations in Western Sahara. Concerns “includ[e] limitation[s] on the freedom of expression and assembly, the use of arbitrary detention and physical and verbal abuse against detainees during arrest and imprisonment.” The report states that Moroccan citizens must exercise self-censorship over Western Sahara in order to avoid punishment under Moroccan laws.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Africa</strong></td>
<td>Morocco: Polisario Condemns Aggressive Acts Against Saharawi Workers Southern France</td>
<td>Saharawi workers were subjected to “aggressive and racist” acts by Moroccans in the southern French city of Medoc. The attacks, which necessitated the intervention of the Gendarmerie, were allegedly “fueled and fed” by Moroccan intelligence.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Africa</strong></td>
<td>Morocco: UN Fourth Committee - Entities Reaffirm Support to Process of Decolonization in Western Sahara</td>
<td>Chile’s Ambassador to the UN Mr. Octavio Errazuriz reaffirmed support for the process of decolonization in Western Sahara and the right of the Saharawi people to self-determination and independence. Permanent Representative of Nicaragua, Ambassador of Costa Rica, and Ambassador of Peru agreed with his position. Representatives from Europe, Africa, and the United States are expected to give testimonies about the situation in Western Sahara.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurasia Review</strong></td>
<td>Morocco: Skirmishes Flare In Tangier</td>
<td>One person was killed and several others injured when police responded to a protest over a court eviction ruling in the city of Tangier.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Plaza</td>
<td>Morocco predicts decline in citrus prediction</td>
<td>Morocco is Africa's third largest citrus exporter, after South Africa and Egypt. This year is expected to see a 25% drop in production leading to an increase in price on these commodities in December.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Morocco's 'liquid gold' liberates Berbers</td>
<td>Argan oil is opening opportunities for Berber women in Morocco. The oil is mainly made by Berber women in Agadir. Zoubida Charrouf, who helped found some of the first all-women cooperatives producing the oil, said &quot;I am very happy, economically, [because] the price is increasing; socially, because the women can get outside the house and learn; and environmentally, because we can plant these trees.&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporters</td>
<td>Hazards mount for freedom of information in Morocco</td>
<td>Reporters Without Borders is concerned about the increasing violations of freedom of the press in Morocco. They cite the cases of Omar Brouksy, who has been harassed because he wrote &quot;an unprofessional dispatch about the partial legislative election in Tangiers&quot;; and Ali Lmrabet who is being harassed for criticizing certain political leaders that directly or indirectly affect the King.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda appoints new Sahara emir</td>
<td>AQIM’s Shura council named Al Vourghan brigade chief Jemal Oukacha, alias Yahya Abou El Hammam, as its new Sahara emir. The news came one month after former Sahara emir Nabil Makloufi was killed in a car crash. El Hammam was sentenced to death in absentia by a Biskra court in a 2006 terror case. France also accuses him of killing Michel Germeneau, a French national who was kidnapped and killed by AQIM.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Concert for Tolerance thrills Moroccans</td>
<td>200,000 people were present for a concert in Agadir that promoted concepts of cross-cultural tolerance and respect. Performers came from Morocco, Algeria, and France.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco issues moratorium on international adoptions</td>
<td>Moroccan Justice Minister Mustafa Ramid has issued a moratorium on international adoptions of Moroccan children. Ramid justified his decision with concerns that children adopted abroad will not be brought up to respect their culture, tradition, and religion.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Sit-in calls for re-opening Morocco-Algeria border</td>
<td>Moroccan and Algerian activists staged a symbolic sit-in October 7 seeking to reopen the Algerian-Moroccan border. Activists say that opening the border will allow families to visit and communicate with each other and will bring economic opportunities; creating jobs and opening markets.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Nulls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Spain, Morocco sign co-operation deals</td>
<td>Spain and Morocco signed eight co-operation agreements during a top-level Spanish visit. The accords focused on security topics but also on &quot;simplifying visa procedures, cooperation in tourism, sports, education, and transportation.&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco holds global conference on employment</td>
<td>Moroccan Employment Minister Abdelwahed Souhail highlighted Morocco’s progress in shrinking its unemployment rate over the last 10 years. Looking ahead, he said that Morocco must focus on preemptive training and responsiveness to labour demands as well as ensuring jobs for degree holders.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>UN chief appoints special envoy for Sahel crisis</td>
<td>Ban Ki-moon appointed former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi as his new special envoy on the Sahel crisis. Prodi will coordinate UN efforts to develop and implement an integrated regional strategy for the Sahel. He will also conduct wide-ranging consultations throughout the region.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>New programme for female Moroccan entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Morocco has initiated a program called &quot;Infitah for Her&quot; which encourages small businesses to use information technology. Female-owned small businesses constitute the base of the economy in Morocco. &quot;Infitah for Her&quot;’s goal is to ensure the livelihood of these small women-owned businesses by giving them support.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>Morocco admits to police abuse, tarnishing model response to Arab Spring</td>
<td>The Justice Minister’s admission that torture occurs serves to undermine Morocco’s position as a model of reform and shows that in Morocco, especially in the prison system, “there is little evidence of change.”</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco News Board</td>
<td>Morocco: Islamists Failing as an Alternative</td>
<td>Morocco’s Islamists claim to be reformers but “[i]t's been almost a year now and no effective political or economic agenda has been implemented.” Moroccans are losing patience with the PJD. The Arab Spring, which brought Islamists to power instead of democrats, will not stand for Sharia to be implemented as the Islamists really desire.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco delays $1 bln sovereign bond sale: minister</td>
<td>Morocco has delayed its maiden dollar bond sale to the end of November, pending market stability. There is speculation that King Mohammed VI will soon make a rare official tour of the Gulf Arab region from where Rabat hopes to raise a substantial share of the issue.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Star</td>
<td>Democracy in Morocco advancing slowly but surely: PM</td>
<td>PM Benkirane said in an interview with France 24 that democracy in Morocco is slowly advancing. The Arab Spring set fire to regimes and “ours was scalded.” Morocco’s success “was because...we had a new constitution, we had elections, and a party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 9, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>once harassed and marginalised” was voted to power. He rejected the idea that there was any conflict between his party and the palace.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco is trying to become the world’s leading solar power state, with a 7,400-acre pilot project in the Sahara Desert it hopes will lead to vast carbon-free solar energy plants that could supply much of Europe’s electricity needs.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 10, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Polisario addressed the UN Fourth Committee saying that Morocco has been ignoring the UN Security Council and the ICJ in the invasion and occupation of Western Sahara. Morocco is also forcing MINURSO to “live without credibility and without authority.” The Polisario reaffirmed its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict through the UN.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara Echo</td>
<td></td>
<td>S&amp;P revised Morocco’s outlook downward to negative because of Europe’s financial crisis, a high deficit, and lagging reforms. Morocco’s rating remains at BBB- credit, which hovers just above junk bond status, but the negative outlook makes a downgrade possible. A downgrade could make it harder for Morocco to borrow money and find international investment.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 11, 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco’s King Mohammed VI is to make a rare official tour of Gulf Arab countries later this year as his cash-strapped government seeks alternatives to its crisis-hit European trade partners. Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Khaled al-Jarallah told Reuters the monarch would discuss investment and bilateral relations.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The View From Fez</td>
<td></td>
<td>The EU crisis and air carrier issues have hurt tourism in Morocco. Property investment, however, seems to be on the rise. Despite lower prices now, there is still a property bubble in Morocco. Marrakesh and Fez have the worst overpriced properties.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This information is from public and non-public sources, and has not been corroborated by third parties

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT #118
October 17, 2012

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- The new government headed by Abdelmalek Sellal will have its hands full fending off socio-economic challenges in the year and a half left before the presidential election.
- Current expenditure having been pumped up by last year's public sector pay rises, capital expenditure has been reined in for the first time in years in the 2013 budget. Even so, the government may be unable to balance the budget if oil prices weaken even moderately.
- An explosion in international grain prices is set to test the regime's strategy of 'buying' social peace to the limits.
- There are signs of a crackdown on potential 'troublemakers', in particular human rights activists and independent trade union organisers.
- Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul has established a new party, TAJ, with what seems to be the tacit complicity of the authorities.
- There is speculation that Ghoul is being groomed as a possible successor for Bouteflika in 2014, or at least as a vice president if and when the constitution is amended.

Foreign Relations

- Algiers has spent much of September and early October battling a French-backed diplomatic push in favour of military intervention in northern Mali.
- Although it has every reason to distrust the jihadist quasi-state that has emerged in northern Mali, Algiers fears the political and geopolitical consequences of military intervention and distrusts Paris' motives.
- The gap between the French and the Algerians has lessened somewhat since UNSC Res. 2017, which calls for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement in northern Mali before the use of force can be authorised as a last resort, was passed with American backing.
- But with little chance of negotiations succeeding, tensions between Paris and Algiers are likely to re-emerge before François Hollande's visit to Algiers, tentatively scheduled for early December.

Security

- With levels of violence lower than average nationwide and particularly low in Kabylia, the question of whether the jihadist organisation's capability in its historic heartland has been lastingly degraded remains open.
- On the other hand, there has been an upsurge in incidents on Algeria's southern borders, including one operation in which a number of SA-7 man-portable air defence systems, smuggled out of Libya, were reportedly seized by the security forces.
- As international discussions continue as to the possibility of a military intervention against the jihadist entity in northern Mali, Gendarmerie commanders from all the wilayas bordering on Mali and Libya have been summoned by their national command to a meeting in Tamanrasset to review border security.
Political Trends

Appointed just over a month ago, the Sellal government was convened on September 17 for the first full council of ministers meeting chaired by President Bouteflika in seven months. The new government now has a programme of sorts, coupled with a draft budget for 2013 that will soon be put to the vote in parliament. Although its programme includes no lofty ambitions for political transformation, the Sellal government will nonetheless have its hands full fending off socio-economic challenges in the coming period – all the more so given that the crucial presidential election is now just a year and a half away.

The official communiqué issued after the council of ministers meeting, which outlines the government's priorities, makes no mention of the promised reform of the constitution, or more generally of the programme of political and institutional reforms launched in April 2011. These, it would seem, are the exclusive prerogative of the Presidency. Prime Minister Sellal and his team, according to the text of the communiqué, are to concentrate on “four main areas”:

- continued improvement of governance such as to strengthen the rule of law, carry through a root and branch rehabilitation of public services and promote national cohesion;
- the consolidation of the economic and financial sphere with a view in particular to strengthening the visibility of the national development process, improving the investment environment, notably as far as land is concerned, continuing the modernization of the financial system and increasing the efficiency of government intervention in the economy;
- the development of socio-economic infrastructures, and in particular implementing scheduled house-building programmes for which all necessary resources will be mobilised, and the expansion of infrastructure networks;
- the promotion of human development through the continued implementation of the reform of the education and training sector, the fight against unemployment, developing government assistance for the less well-off, better support for young people and establishing an efficient cultural policy.

In our last report, we suggested that the replacement of Ouyahia with Sellal might augur a shift in economic strategy, away from the “economic nationalism” championed by Ouyahia and towards more investor-friendly policies. The reference to “improving the investment environment” in the government communiqué comes as partial confirmation of that, but it would seem that Sellal has been told to tread carefully on this front: presenting his plan of action to parliament on September 25, the new Prime Minister insisted that Algeria “would never become a neoliberal country, but will establish the necessary conditions to encourage direct and indirect investment”; furthermore, the rule requiring a minimum Algerian stake of 51% in all ventures established by foreign firms in Algeria, imposed by his predecessor, is to remain unchanged. This cautious, middle-of-the-road approach is very much in evidence in the government's new bill to amend the Hydrocarbons Law[1]: on the one hand, the conditions pertaining to IOCs' exploration and production activities are to be eased, the methodology for determining the tax rate on oil revenues is to be based on a project's profitability instead of sales, and there are new tax incentives to encourage activities related to unconventional hydrocarbons, small deposits, deposits in under-explored areas, and fields with complex geology and/or lacking infrastructure; while on the other, Sonatrach's monopoly over pipeline transportation of oil and petroleum products is restored and partnership with Sonatrach in the downstream sector becomes obligatory.

The 2013 draft budget is also a cautious piece of legislation. Current expenditure having been pumped up by the public sector pay rises that were rolled out last year in a panic reaction to the wave of revolt sweeping through the Arab world, capital expenditure has had to be reined in for the first time in years; taxes, meanwhile, go up. Even so, it is by no means guaranteed that the government will be able to balance the books at the end of the year. For 2013, as for the past several years, revenue has been calculated on the basis of a reference price for
crude oil of $37/barrel, and as in previous years, on paper this results in a deficit budget. $37 is of course way below actual international oil prices, and the government has for years now been able not only to wipe out the programmed deficit each year but to run a substantial surplus. By the middle of this year, however, the central bank calculated that an oil price of at least $112/barrel was needed in order to balance the 2012 budget. The 2013 budget requires broadly similar oil price levels in order to break even, and any lasting decline in oil prices in the coming year could therefore have a dramatic effect on Algeria’s fiscal balance, perhaps forcing the government to draw for the first time on the Revenue Regulation Fund established in 2000. Sustained low oil prices might compel the government to review its spending commitments under its five-year infrastructure development plan – putting the regime’s strategy of buying social peace at risk. On top of this, as a major importer of agricultural products Algeria is highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global food prices. Drought in the US cereals belt is currently fuelling an explosion in the price of wheat (the main staple in Algeria, in the form of bread and couscous), corn (an essential ingredient of feed for chickens, the main source of meat for ordinary Algerians) and soya (also an input for animal feed, as well as a source of cooking oil). The government's commitment, also made under the pressure of the Arab Spring, to controlling prices for basic foodstuffs means that its subsidies bill will be rising dramatically. Over the medium term, the Algerian government may therefore have to choose between making further cuts to capital expenditure to compensate for runaway spending on consumer subsidies, or cutting subsidies on food and running the risk of bread riots.

It is against this background that the authorities have begun to crack down on potential agitators, in particular human rights activists and independent trade union organisers, who have been increasingly subject to harassment, arrest and prosecution of late. With the clock now ticking on the countdown to the 2014 presidential election, the regime will be all the more inclined to try and keep a lid on social protests.

It cannot be entirely ruled out that President Bouteflika – who has been written off as dead or dying more often than can be remembered but who bounced back once again in apparently combative form at the September 17 council of ministers meeting – might yet stand for a fourth term of office, notwithstanding his earlier hints that the time has come for his generation to stand aside. But a new element has emerged recently in the preparations for 2014 with the creation of Amar Ghoul's Algerian Hope Rally, more commonly known by its Arabic acronym, TAJ (meaning 'crown'). Ghoul, who has been Public Works Minister for ten years, broke with the moderate islamiest MSP this year in order to hold onto his ministerial position and proceeded to establish TAJ, which was joined by around 40 members of parliament, freshly elected on the MSP ticket or under the colours of Moussa Touati's Algerian National Front (FNA). In late September, when TAJ held its founding congress, it became clear that the new party enjoys surprisingly abundant financial resources and the tacit complicity, if not outright support, of the authorities. Ghoul has proclaimed that his party, inspired by the example of the FLN during the liberation war, intends to “mobilize the living forces of the country, irrespective of ideological divisions: islamiest, nationalists and democrats come together under its banner to inspire hope and build a united, promising and pioneering Algeria” - a discourse which might have come straight from the regime's copybook. The episode is reminiscent of the creation back in 1997 of the RND, which three months after it was established went on to win the parliamentary elections. This suspiciously premature success, together with the physiognomy of its General Secretary Ahmed Ouyahia, led Algiers wits to dub the RND “the baby that was born with a moustache”. The latest joke, alluding to Amar Ghoul's islamisiest background, casts TAJ as “the baby born with a beard”. There is now speculation that Ghoul himself is being groomed as a possible successor for Bouteflika in 2014, or at least as a vice president if and when the Presidency finally gets around to amending the constitution. It is worth noting in this respect that Ghoul, although not particularly charismatic, offers the distinct advantage, from
the point of view of the regime's power brokers and in particular DRS chief Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène, of being eminently controllable: deeply involved in corruption in his time as Minister of Public Works, notably in connection with the East-West motorway project, Ghoul has to date never been charged, and rarely even accused publicly, giving those in the know – in other words, the DRS – a potentially powerful hold over him.

Foreign Relations

Algiers, as we observed in our last report, is faced with a quandary in the festering crisis in northern Mali, where a trio of jihadist groups (AQMI, the closely related MUJAO, and the Malian Tuareg Ansar Dine) have taken power in the wake of February's revolt led by the ostensibly secular Tuareg-separatist MNLA. While it is clearly uneasy about the emergence of a jihadist quasi-state on its southern border, Algiers is leery of sending its own armed forces to attempt to quash it and is at the same time very reluctant to see other forces – especially extra-regional and a fortiori French forces – take on the job.

Algiers objects to military intervention on several levels. Operationally, the Algerian military foresees only disaster. As a high-ranking Algerian army officer quoted by French daily Le Figaro (Oct. 1) puts it:

3,000 men, thrown into a theatre of more than 8,000 square kilometres, would be insignificant. What's more, the invisible, elusive enemy will conduct a war of attrition that it will win for sure, pitted against a military force such as the one ECOWAS is suggesting – a force that is not acquainted with the terrain of the Sahara, either. Finally, armed groups will be able to draw on the support of the local population, the Tuaregs, for whom an African army amounts to a foreign occupation force.

Politically, Algiers fears the destabilising effect of a military intervention, especially (but not only) if it were to commit troops of its own. Rachid Tlemcani, professor of international politics and regional security at the University of Algiers, sets it out in stark terms:

Stability is a fundamental issue for Algeria's leaders. Between now and 2014 (when the next presidential election is due) they want unity and social peace at any price... [Algeria fears] that military intervention could awaken regional, religious or ethnic extremism, and risks opening a Pandora's box. An explosion in the south would destabilise the north all the way to Morocco. That would be unavoidable. The principle of the inviolability of borders would be challenged, with the risk of implosion as happened in Somalia.

And on the geopolitical level, the involvement of forces from outside the region in any such adventure gives Algiers nightmares. As we have observed on several occasions over the past year and a half, the NATO intervention in Libya, inspired largely by the French, shocked and dismayed the Algerian regime, which saw the whole episode at best as a dangerous precedent in terms of overriding national sovereignty in the name of the 'right to protect' and at worst as proof of the neo-colonial ambitions in North Africa of France and its allies. Since then, there has been a tendency on the part of leading Algerian politicians – including notably President Bouteflika himself and, more recently, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal – to pepper their speeches with references to sinister "foreign hands" seeking to stir up strife in Algeria and generally to prepare the way for outside intervention in the country's destiny. A person close to the Presidency quoted by Le Figaro explains that what is feared is:

the return of the old spectre of territorial amputation, as proposed by de Gaulle in 1961. Since the partition of Sudan, our new position as the largest country in Africa makes us extremely fragile – all the more so since, on our southern border, the Tuaregs broke with Bamako and declared their independence.

Such fears have been expressed with great clarity in an article in Algerian French-language daily El Watan (Oct. 10):

The fact is that Paris does not care much about the chronic instability in Tunisia, where the Salafists are now able to
strut around as if they owned the place. And even less [about the situation] in Libya, where the political crisis is in full swing and where insecurity is rife. For France can barely conceal its geopolitical intentions in the Sahel. Its uranium in Niger has ended up radiating throughout the crisis in Mali, which is as complicated as that of Syria. Spoiling for a fight, under the banner of the UN, France has gone as far as to risk alienating neighboring countries, such as Algeria and Mauritania, which will inevitably suffer the blowback from any military intervention. That is why Algiers and Nouakchott are busy too, drumming up support for efforts to avoid a "French solution". Faced with the prospect of a quagmire in Mali, there are two distinct camps: the war front led by France and the rejectionist front led by Algeria.

And indeed, in September and much of the first half of October, there were very clearly two camps in competition: on the one hand the French, lobbying for support for a UN Security Council resolution authorising the ECOWAS to use force against the jihadist entity in northern Mali; and on the other hand the Algerians, lobbying equally actively for a political solution through dialogue and negotiation. To this end, Algeria's Minister-Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel undertook a tour of Sahel capitals in early October, accompanied amongst others by Maj-Gen. Rachid 'Attafi' Lallali, head of the Direction du Renseignement Extérieur (foreign intelligence department) at the DRS. This served to confirm and consolidate the support of the governments of Mauritania and Niger for Algiers' approach; the government of Mali, which had earlier formally requested a UN resolution authorising the use of force, remained clearly aligned with France. Meanwhile, representatives of Ansar Dine were quietly invited to Algiers for exploratory talks, in the hope of finding at least one negotiating partner. This in turn developed into a further point of disagreement between Algiers and Paris: with the French rejecting negotiations with terrorists outright and considering Ansar Dine to be of a piece with AQMI and MUJAO in this respect, Algeria began to argue that a distinction could be made between Ansar Dine, as an indigenous Malian Tuareg organisation, and the other two groups, made up of committed jihadists from all over north-west Africa.

By the time French Interior Minister Manuel Valls arrived in Algiers for a two-day visit on Oct. 13, however, Algerian government officials had become much more placatory. This was perhaps in part because Washington, after some humming and hawing, had thrown its weight behind the French-sponsored UNSC Resolution 2071 on northern Mali (approved unanimously by the Security Council on Oct. 12). But it appears also to have been in part the result of the lobbying process of the proceeding weeks. In its attempts to win over the Malian government, Algiers had been compelled to adopt a strong and unambiguous stance in favour of Mali's territorial integrity, which it now considers “non-negotiable” (by contrast, it will be recalled, there were widespread suspicions at the beginning of the year that the Algerian authorities were backing the Tuareg rebellion). Under pressure, the MNLA announced that it was no longer insisting unconditionally on independence for the Azawad (northern Mali), leading in turn to splits in the organisation; in parallel, Algiers appears to be trying to provoke a split in Ansar Dine, between out-and-out jihadists and members of the Ifoghas clan who have joined its ranks largely out of tribal loyalty to Ibrahim Ag Ghaly but have no interest in transnational terrorism. At the same time, Resolution 2071 invites the Malian government, those rebel groups that have “cut off all ties to terrorist organisations” and representatives of the local population to “engage, as soon as possible, in a credible negotiation process in order to seek a sustainable political solution, mindful of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali”, and leaves 45 days for this before the Security Council shall "respond to the request of the Transitional authorities of Mali regarding an international military force assisting the Malian Armed Forces in recovering the occupied regions in the north of Mali".

This formulation leaves room for Paris and Algiers to express consensus that, while there can be no negotiations with terrorists, drug-traffickers and secessionists, talks are an essential first step. But Resolution 2071 also seems to leave plenty of room for the divergences between France and Algeria to re-emerge later down the line. As
things stand now, it seems unlikely that Ansar Dine will really break with AQMI and MUJAO, while the divided MNLA's real strength on the ground is a matter of conjecture, leaving very little prospect for meaningful negotiations towards a “sustainable political solution”. Consequently, there seems to be every likelihood that, when the allotted 45 days run out, the UNSC will be called upon to make good on its implied promise to authorise the use of force. And while Resolution 2071 does make a show of putting the Malian army and ECOWAS forces at the centre of a hypothetical military intervention, there can be little doubt that any operation in northern Mali would require French support (in logistics, transport, probably air power and electronic intelligence) and could also entail direct participation of French special forces (notably in attempting to retrieve French hostages held by AQMI/MUJAO). All of which suggests that by late November – with President Hollande's tentatively planned visit to Algiers just days off – tensions between France and Algeria could be on the rise again.

Security

Levels of jihadist activity and related security incidents were somewhat below average in September: only 13 jihadist operations were recorded (down from 15 the previous month and 19 the month before that), out of a total incident count of 23. AQMI's traditional heartland Kabylia has been particularly quiet: only one terrorism-related incident was reported in the Kabyle wilayas for the whole month between Aug. 13 and Sept. 13, and although AQMI activity resumed in Kabylia after that date it remained at a surprisingly low level, with only 8 operations reported for September and the first week of October. Algerian newspapers reported that security forces in the town of Tizi Ouzou, the largest city in Kabylia, were put on “maximum alert” on October 5 after intelligence services received “credible information” of a suicide car bomb “ready to go” in the town, but there does not appear to have been any follow-through. The question of whether AQMI's capability in its historic heartland has been lastingly degraded, raised in our last report, remains open.

In ALGIERS, meanwhile, the situation was entirely quiet apart from one incident on Sept. 13 when the authorities destroyed a “suspect package” in the Baïnem forest on the western edges of the capital. A local resident spotted the object and alerted the authorities who cordoned off the area and brought in the bomb squad. The object was destroyed in a controlled explosion and its fragments taken to the lab for inspection. It is not clear, though, whether it was actually a bomb.

While the oil- and gas-producing regions of the SOUTH were on the whole quiet, activity and clashes with smugglers on the borders resumed after a four-month hiatus (see previous report). Only two armed clashes on the borders were reported from May 23 to September 12, and seven since, including two firefight with smugglers/jihadists around the town of Bordj Baji Mokhtar on the border with Mali, one incident with “jihadists coming in from Libya” near the town of Deb Deb in Illizi, a clash with smugglers south of Djanet on the border with Libya, and a clash “near the border with Niger”. On Oct. 6 special forces units “on the border with Mali” captured “four MUJAO jihadists” — three originally from Niger and one Algerian — “using advanced sensing devices brought in from Russia”. The jihadists were trying to sneak their way in among a group of refugees fleeing instability in northern Mali, but they were discovered. They were found to be carrying individual weapons and “an explosive belt”. The next day (Oct. 7) an army force clashed with a group of jihadists of the Belmokhtar group that were trying to cross into Algerian near Tinzaouatin on the Malian border. The army “destroyed an offroader and killed four jihadist”. Further, L’Expression reported on October 9 that the recent dismantling of a “terror support” network in the east of the country has allowed the authorities to seize “SAM-7 missiles” smuggled in from Libya”. The newspaper gave no further details, but this “revelation” came a couple of weeks after the commander of a powerful Libyan militia told the Washington Post (Sept. 24) that looters had stolen “a large number” of shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles (MANPADS) from the militia’s base in Benghazi when protesters who called for dismantling the country’s militias overran the compound. It is worth recalling here that the Algerian press has frequently talked of MANPADS seized by the authorities on the borders or
smuggled into the country, but on the ground there is no firm evidence that AQMI in Algeria itself has such weapons.

Across the border in northern Mali, AQMI’s “emir of the Sahara region”, Nabil Makhloufi (aka, Abou Alqama, an Algerian national) was killed “in a car accident” north of Gao on September 8, according to reports on Mauritanian news sites, later confirmed by AQMI itself. On October 4 ANI, a Mauritanian news agency, said Jemal Oukacha, alias Yahya Abou El Hammam, a close aid to AQMI Emir Abdelmalik Droukdel, was named the group’s emir for the Sahara region. Abou El Hammam, an Algerian national, is one of the most prominent Al-Qaeda leaders in northern Mali, and was earlier this year appointed “governor of Timbuktu” by the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance which currently controls northern Mali.

The news of Abou Alqama’s death set the Algerian press to speculating about clashes between the various factions in northern Mali. On Sept. 28 El-Khabar claimed that members of Belmokhtar’s group clashed with MUJAO fighters, leaving eight of Belmokhtar’s men dead and Belmokhtar himself “seriously wounded”, supposedly because of disagreements between Belmokhtar and MUJAO over how to handle the Algerian diplomats held hostage by the latter. Belmokhtar’s followers denied the news in a call to a Mauritanian news agency on Sept. 30, but the Algerian newspaper insisted its original story is true. However, reports that Belmokhtar has been killed or wounded have been legion over the years, and must always be treated with considerable caution.

Meanwhile, as Paris, Bamako, ECOWAS and the United Nations continue to debate the possibility of a military intervention against the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance in northern Mali, the chief-of-staff of the Algerian Gendarmerie, Maj-Gen. Ahmed Bousteila, has convened a meeting of Gendarmerie commanders from all the wilayas bordering on Mali and Libya (Adrar, Bechar, Illizi, Ouargla, Tamanrasset and Tindouf). Held in the town of Tamanrasset on Oct. 16, the meeting appears to be mainly concerned with reviewing and optimising border patrols, the Gendarmerie's border guard units being in the front line in the fight against arms smuggling and other contraband, as well as infiltration/exfiltration of elements linked to AQMI or allied armed groups.

END

[1] As it stands, the Hydrocarbons Law is already a strange hybrid: first conceived by then Energy Minister Chakib Khelil as a very liberal piece of legislation, offering international oil companies hitherto unparalleled access to Algeria's upstream and midstream oil and gas sectors, it was to a large extent vitiated by amendments imposing a minimum 51% stake for Sonatrach in all upstream ventures and slapping a hefty 'windfall tax' on IOCs' production when global oil prices exceed $30/barrel (which of course they have ever since).

[2] The example of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has influenced Bouteflika in the past, may conceivably have an impact on the President's personal outlook.

[3] The approximate size of the multilateral force that has been proposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to reconquer northern Mali.

[4] In his Sept. 25 speech presenting his government's programme to parliament, Sellal proclaimed that "a strong internal front will protect Algeria against malevolent hands that seek to attack the country's stability and unity of the Algerian people."


[6] There was also an incident on Sept. 5, when police manning a checkpoint at the entry to the Béjaïa port opened fire at car that tried to force its way into the port. But it is not clear whether this was the work of jihadists or in anyway connected to terrorism.

Dear All,

Attached please find the ER on the Carne Ross Event a few weeks ago at Georgetown. Let us know if you have any questions.

Thanks,
MAMS Event Report
Date: October 11, 2012

1. Title: From Both Sides Now: Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat
   Hosted by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University

   Participants:
   **Carne Ross**: Founder and Director, Independent Diplomat
   **Paula Newburg**: Moderator: Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University

2. Overview

   Carne Ross spoke about his professional background and how he came to be the director of Independent Diplomat. He discussed his philosophy about what he refers to as the "diplomatic deficit" and how small actors can gain power and influence.

3. Summary

   Paula Newberg introduced Mr. Ross as someone who tries to change the international system. She said he works with small states, failing states, new states, and not-quite states. His work makes one wonder what the international system will look like in the future.

   Carne Ross started by talking about his professional background. He worked in the UK diplomatic corps until he resigned in 2003 over the Iraq war. He worked on the US-UK bilateral relationship, Iraq (including detailed work on Iraq's weapons), Afghanistan, and the UN Mission in Kosovo, among other issues. His work as a senior diplomat for the UK gave him perspectives on the diplomatic process. He said, “[t]he people we were making decisions about were not present [in the room], not consulted, and not involved.” As an example of this, he described how Kosovo was not permitted to have diplomatic representation at the United Nations and the Contact Group (US, UK, France, Italy, Russia and Germany) was the only body that dealt explicitly with the Kosovo question.

   Ross spent some time describing what he calls the "diplomatic deficit,” which is the difference in diplomatic power and influence between large and small countries. He would like to "close the gap between institutions and people being affected by decisions.” Ross’ Independent Diplomat organization advises several countries and groups, such as Kosovo, Croatia, Moldova, South Sudan, and the Polisario Front, which is “the representative of the people of Western Sahara, which is to this day occupied illegally by Morocco.” He described the Polisario Front as “one of the most marginalized groups in the world”, despite the fact that it “has a legitimate case in representative terms and legal terms”.

   Ross discussed the disadvantages of working with small countries or groups, including lack of access, lack of information, and lack of institutional knowledge. Once one is in charge of setting the agenda and the language of what is being discussed, that brings more influence to an actor. Ross says, “It’s fun to have the Polisario propose language to the United Nations Security Council,” in that the Polisario gain influence by the act of suggesting language to be discussed in an international body.
Conversely, there are ways to "confer advantages" on small states. The first step is to focus on achieving a singular objective; for example, South Sudan focused on independence. Smaller actors normally operate in small, tight teams of people. Ross says with small teams one can inject a high degree of professionalism and effectiveness and there is less bureaucracy. His final point on strategy for small actors was that it can send a message simply and clearly, over and over. He invoked Israel, Cuba, and Singapore as examples of small, but tenacious delegations with strong, clear, and consistent messages and methods.

Ross turned his remarks to what diplomats do at Independent Diplomat. By definition, their clients are marginalized and frustrated, operating in what they perceive to be a hopeless situation. The method at Independent Diplomat, when approached by a potential client, is to research and analyze the specific situation- identify the key players (diplomats, UN officials, etc.) and to set meetings with these people where he can “ask sensible, polite questions over coffee.” As a UK diplomat he was “trained to tell people what I want; now I ask questions.” The second and final step is to build an integrated strategy with political, legal, and public diplomacy components. In Kosovo, he knew they did not have a strong legal argument, so he hammered the political strategies. He stopped people on his team from issuing legal arguments because they would have undermined the political ones.

He closed saying that he is happy to be doing diplomatic work the way he wants to. He enjoys the fact that it is pure policy work and he does not have to engage any bureaucracy—he works directly with country leaders and “develops intimacy with them.” He feels a rush from helping “very able people” express themselves diplomatically and achieve results for their home country, and admits he feels an “emotional connection” with clients. Laughingly, he said “Maybe I was bullied in school, plus I’m the youngest in my family—I like to work for the underdog.”

4. Q&A

Q: (Moderator) What work are you doing in regard to climate change?
A: (Carne Ross) Our work is all client-driven; one of our clients is the Marshall Islands, which will disappear in 50 years if we don’t do something about climate change. We are trying to inject urgency into the discussion. We are doing some work within a small island association in multilateral negotiations.

Q: (Basil Vsalky, student at Georgetown School of Foreign Service) Are you concerned about losing your UK citizenship? Sometimes you work against UK national interests.
A: (Carne Ross) No, the UK is pretty tolerant. I did receive some nasty letters after I resigned, but now things are okay. I would never take on a client like Hezbollah, Hamas, or Gaddhafi. Independent Diplomat is aligned with right thinking countries, and we do have ethical criteria. Something strange is in regards to South Sudan, the independence movement supported by America, while the US is awful on Western Sahara even though it is exactly the same case of self-determination. I did have a very nice meeting this morning at the State Department about Western Sahara. Our enemies are Morocco and Serbia, those are the only places we have no access.

Q: (Sam Ferhesla, student at Georgetown School of Foreign Service) I have an ethical question; do you ever reject clients?
A: (Carne Ross) Yes, we have dropped or refused clients. If they neglect human rights and democracy, we have the right to terminate the contract. We make sure our clients are decent people by speaking to ordinary people in the area. That's what I did in Somaliland.
Another lesson I had from my time in the diplomatic corps was that as a high level diplomat surrounded by 25 armed guards, you don’t get a full picture of the situation, and we never had a full picture in many places, like Afghanistan, for example.

Q: How are you financed during the period you are investigating potential clients, and throughout the process?
A: (Carne Ross) We are a non-profit, so we have philanthropic funding, as well as support from some governments, like the Swiss. Fees are calibrated by ability to pay.

Q: (Emily Ferguson, student at Georgetown School of Foreign Service): What is your level of involvement with states once your project is completed?
A: (Carne Ross) None. We take our clients very, very seriously, but once a project is over, it’s over.

Q: (Zach Homus, student at Georgetown School of Foreign Service): How can we make the UN a more effective body?
A: (Carne Ross) I was on the ground in Kosovo and I can tell you that 90 percent of UNMIK was useless, and in some cases actually made things worse by getting into car accidents with the locals and things like that. UN incompetence is deep seated. It is an international disgrace, and it’s pathetic to have an international organization like that in the 21st century. It is trapped by old-fashioned politics. Certain countries are terrible, mean bullies there: India is obstructive and unpleasant, as well as Pakistan; Cuba is unpleasant. The UN Secretary-General needs to be a stronger leader with a “back me or sack me” attitude. I can’t stand the god worship of the Secretary-General.

Q: (David Galbraith, Fellow, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy) Does Independent Diplomat take non-territorial clients, like those in Bahrain, who are religiously marginalized?
A: (Carne Ross) We are talking to people in Bahrain, but we can only help in a situation where a diplomatic dialogue already exists.

Q: (Mark Lagon, Faculty, Georgetown University): Is it possible the UN could do some of what you do, in terms of coaching and helping delegations? And how do you classify yourself/ Independent Diplomat in the international system?
A: (Carne Ross) I’d classify us as a hybrid. I don’t like the cultural connotation of NGOs.

Q: Can someone do your job without being a former diplomat?
A: (Carne Ross) Clients want to know how the large powers operate, and that’s what they pay for. We need employees who know how the machine works.

Q: You set out to change the rules of the game. How’s that going six years later?
A: (Carne Ross): We are changing the way people think of diplomacy. Serious governments support us. We have made great strides. For example, South Sudan speaking to the UN Security Council before independence; that was us. I think diplomacy is becoming more eclectic, and that nation-states’ powers are declining. Democracies are being co-opted by special interests.

We are going to get Western Sahara independence. How do you get independence? Make other countries recognize you. Western Sahara has every case in international law, and yet it is not a state.

Q: (Deborah Klodowski, Intern, MAC) (Privately asked question, did not identify myself) You say Western Sahara will be independent, but you admit the US does not support that.
We can also see that the relationship between the US and Morocco is getting stronger all the time, with the Strategic Dialogue that was just signed. How do you plan to get an independent Western Sahara?

A: (Carne Ross) Well, I don’t agree that the relationship between the US and Morocco is getting stronger all the time. Political situations are fluid and can be changed. Nobody except Morocco supports the occupation of Western Sahara. The rights of Sahrawis are unquestionable.

5. Observation

This event was attended by about 30 people, all students and faculty from Georgetown. Carne Ross, while certainly a person of interest, is not someone who will ever be on Morocco’s side. He would like to create a negative image of Morocco. It would be interesting to know how Mr. Ross reconciles his “ethical criteria” with what has happened to Sahrawis under Polisaro control.
Dear Team,

Below please find the September 2012 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

September 2012 Events Bulletin

September 11
The Middle East and the Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace

September 14
Morocco's Perspective on the Newly Launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue

The Middle East and the Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace

Date: 11 September 2012

1. Title: The Middle East and the Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace
   Hosted by the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University
   Participants:
   Azizah al-Hibri: Founder and President, KARAMAH
   Dr. Muqtedar Khan: Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware
   Laith Kubba: Senior Director, Middle East and North Africa, The National Endowment for Democracy
   Dr. Peter Mandaville: Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University
   Joseph Montville: Moderator: Director, Program on Healing Historical Memory, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

2. Overview

This panel discussed the Arab Spring and assessed the prospects for peaceful elections and the emergence of stable democracies in the Middle East. The speakers reflected on the relevance of the role of Islamic religious values and the influence of foreign policy as democratic movements in the Middle East negotiate their futures.
3. Summary

Joseph Montville began with a brief mention of Islam and how there are religious values within Islam that support democratic transitions and traditions. The issue is that within Islam there is a fringe that feels that democracy and Islam are incompatible.

Muqtedar Khan focused on the language that is used when discussing democracy and democratic transitions. Khan pointed out that Islam can justify any type of governmental system—the key is to pick and choose within Islam. When creating a political philosophy around democracy, the focus should be on the needs of the community. If the community buys into the philosophy built up around democracy then monarchical forms of government become less likely and won't take root. He discussed two forms of political changes going on within the Arab world today. The first type was political change with regime change like that taking place in Egypt and Tunisia. The second was political change without regime change such as that occurring in Morocco and Jordan. He highlighted that Morocco has been very successful in this regard and has made real and important political changes to the system.

The ultimate outcome of these changes in the Arab world is unclear, but Khan underscored that the language used in the transition was very important and gave some hopeful signs. The term often used in political discourse is “democratic state.” The strength of this term is that its meaning is nebulous. Islamists use the term to get support from secularists and liberals while liberals can advocate for a liberal state without using the term ‘liberal’ with its negative connotations in the Arab world. The idea of a “democratic state” has created “common ground” for all political groups to come together.

Khan next discussed how political transformation in the Arab world were unique – in the Arab world “citizens” worked to create the state, whereas traditionally in the West it has been the state which confers citizenship. Citizenship for all is assumed, creating a situation where the state can be pushed to confer equality based on a universal citizenship. In the Islamic environment today this is more difficult since equality can’t be discussed as easily through an Islamic lens - gender and religious equality being thorny subjects.

In terms of the future, Khan mentioned that Islamists are being pulled in two directions by the Arab Spring. Islamist groups want to move towards the political center by accepting democracy within an Islamic tradition. This supports their international legitimacy. Islamists, however, gain domestic legitimacy from their Islamic credentials, which are being challenged for the first time by more conservative groups; pressure from the Salafists, which is pulling Islamist groups to the right. Khan believes that this is a worrying trend which might retard democratic transitions in many of these countries.

Azizah al-Hibri said that democracy must "seep into the political consciousness" of the public before there is any chance that a democratic government will survive. She mentioned that Morocco is a unique case in North Africa because there was no revolution in Morocco. Democratic change is best served by occurring gradually, as in Morocco. That said, she warned that top-down impositions of democracy will result in a reversion to the old autocratic systems. Education of the masses is the only way to ensure proper, gradual change in line with Islamic jurisprudence.

Al-Hibri also touched briefly on women in the Arab world. In most post-Arab Spring countries there are increasing constraints placed on women's rights. Many secularists are pushing for full equality for women by replacing existing Koranic law with more western-style law. Al-Hibri argued This is a poor idea; instead laws must be placed within Koranic terms. There are many historical precedents in Islam and the Ottoman Empire which could support gender equality. The early signs for permanent change within the region are not encouraging. Tunisia and Egypt are going backwards, only Libya is a positive exception where women changed the election law.

Laith Kubba re-examined the Islamic frame through which the West views the Arab Spring. He questioned whether or not Islam was the defining feature of the Middle East, arguing that Muslim communities face the same problems as other developing communities. Developing communities have to deal with the tensions between modernizing and the challenges modernizing poses to their traditional structures. The key difference in the Middle East is that Islam is a “more powerful presence” and has left a strong imprint on the region. Kubba argued that the various traditions and interpretations that have been applied to Islam over the fourteen centuries are more important than current trends in Islam for understanding the region today. Fitting these traditions and interpretations into modernity is the real challenge that many Arab states face. The core values of Islam have been disconnected from the actual practices within the region as evidenced by horrible human rights abuses and destruction of mosques in the name of Islam.
Kubba focused on two areas to determine the extent to which modernity or reactionary figures are dominant in each country. The first area is philosophical, looking for the emergence of thinkers who are examining the intersections between politics and the core values of Islam and the relation between the people and Islamic forces. This is important and where it is occurring there is a strong probability that democracy will last. The other area is the political culture which is patriarchal and fosters dependency. Civil society is too weak to encourage the development of a modern non-patriarchal state. Civil society among the youth is more promising than traditional areas. Youth are more open to modernization and technology and show real promise. The current trajectory, however, is not hopeful.

Peter Mandaville examined the implications of US foreign policy towards the Islamist rise saying that the US has taken a “non-stance” towards Islamist groups within the region. He pointed at two issues which must be kept in mind by policymakers. One is that these Islamist movements are having widespread internal debates about, for example, the practical implications of introducing sharia law and how exactly to implement sharia. This internal debate of the Islamist parties has been “interrupted by politics.” The second issue is the “increased pluralization of the Islamic space.” Islam is increasingly debated by society and in the political space in these countries; today there are a wide variety of groups which claim to be Islamist. The term has lost some of its utility by becoming so widespread.

Despite his characterization of the US’ “non-stance,” Mandaville underscored that US policy is no longer anti-Islamist, as in the early 1990’s when the mantra of “one man, one vote, one time” was deemed US policy. The US has now routinized its contact with Islamist parties in countries like Morocco and Egypt. US policy was always planning on talking to these rising Islamist parties. The question for the US was what tone the US should take in its policies towards these new groups. The US pursues relationships with countries, not parties, and this view was extended to the Islamist parties rising after the Arab Spring. Mandaville was careful to point out that the US has little influence over the outcome of the Arab Spring. The most important thing for the US is to not appear hypocritical by pushing a human rights agenda on the Islamist parties when, for so long, the US was willing to overlook abuses by friendly regimes. Instead, the US should focus on promoting equality in the Arab world; Islam promotes minority “rights” to a great extent but, this is often an excuse to separate groups from the mainstream.

4. Q&A

Q: (Don Rogers, Catholic Relief Services) The media was very important in the Arab Spring. Could you explain how the media could be useful in spreading the values that you’ve discussed?
A: (al-Hibri) In Egypt there are private and government channels for media. Since the revolution, private channels opened up and you saw a lot of horrible patriarchal talk. It’s important to remember that a free media is not always a great thing. Official media in the past was also bad, encouraging Copt-Muslim violence for example, but there is hope for the future.

(Khan) It’s important to remember that social media outlets were vital to the success of the revolutions. This is pretty much the limit of its effectiveness. Media tends to reflect the sentiment of the masses and this is not always positive. Media often has its own “political baggage.” The media can signal when change is occurring, but it can’t shape it.

(Kubba) The youth is far more globalized than ever before, thanks to the media. The government is not able to condition this new generation.

(Mandaville) The media is unlikely to improve things. Salafists have used the media to increase their constituency, as an example. The plus is that the media provides activists a potential path to provide civic education, which is at the root of what they want for Egypt.

Q: (Don Barns, Banshee University of China): What is the role of NGOs in the transitions and moving forward?
A: (Kubba) The economies of these countries will need the help of NGOs to improve. The Nobel laureate from Yemen got her first leg up from NGOs. She has become the symbol for the uprisings in Yemen. This is only one example, every country has similar stories.

(al-Hibri) The important thing is that NGO’s act as partners, not as teachers. There is a role for NGOs if they act correctly, not coming as “liberators,” but as equal partners.

(Khan) I want to mention that the US supports NGOs selectively. There are many NGOs, Salafist NGOs for example, which the US doesn’t support. This has created a two-tiered system of those that receive western funds and those purely local ones that don’t. There are some negative consequences to putting a western-tinge on NGOs - they lose credibility. A better way would be blind funding, so long as a project is good, it gets international aid.

(Mandaville): NGOs have the ability to influence the debate on secular/liberal issues while the political parties are still engaged in the internal debate I mentioned. The issue is how to support them without tainting them with association with the West.
5. Observation

This event was attended by 40-50 people who were a mixture of interns, professors, students, and a few journalists. The discussion was a good overview of the role of Islam in Arab Spring. Morocco was only mentioned as an aside, but they were favorable asides discussing Morocco’s uniqueness and the favorable way Morocco has handled the Arab Spring. Dr. Muqtedar Khan was mentioned as someone who has done field work in Morocco and the brief mention he made of Morocco was favorable. He might be a person of interest for MAC. Al-Hibri’s views on gradual change being preferable to rapid change also put Morocco in a favorable light and she might also be a person of interest. Qualifyingly, however, she never mentioned Morocco and her views on Morocco’s record on human rights aren’t clear from this discussion.

Morocco’s Perspective on the Newly Launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue

Date: 14 September 2012

1. Title: Morocco’s Perspective on the Newly Launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue
   Hosted by the German Marshall Fund

   Participants
   Youssef Amrani: Minister Delegate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Morocco
   Moderator: Enders Wimbush: Senior Director, German Marshall Fund of the United States

2. Overview

Minister Delegate Youssef Amrani discussed Morocco’s perspectives on the newly launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue. He highlighted Morocco’s importance to the region and the close relationship between Morocco and the US. He also discussed Morocco’s goals in the region and the future prospects for Morocco and the Strategic Dialogue.

3. Summary

Enders Wimbush opened by highlighting the importance of the Strategic Dialogue to the US and Morocco. This is in stark contrast to the chaos in Libya and the region. Morocco’s relationship with the US is “vital, deep, and robust” and the two nations have close and important ties. He stressed that Morocco was a “formidable” Atlantic actor with an expanding role in the region.

Minister Delegate Amrani began his talk with two messages about Morocco. The first was that Morocco has worked hard domestically to get the Strategic Dialogue. The King has provided leadership that has brought democratic openness and values to the country. Morocco’s position on the UN Security Council and the Strategic Dialogue are reflections of the real progress and ambitions of Morocco. The second message was that Morocco is ambitious and wants to expand connections with the US, expand its role in the Security Council and the UN, and make more progress in areas such as job creation. The unique free economy and political openness of Morocco has put the country in a better position than other Arab countries, but there is always room for growth.

Morocco’s new constitution has created a “New Morocco,” which is inclusive of women and minorities. The constitution itself was the product of “long-consultation” with society and all Moroccan political parties. There is a new “culture of listening” in Morocco that has made these domestic advances possible – Amrani noted that the Moroccan government listens to society and responds. Demonstrations in Casablanca, over an anti-Islamist film, were completely peaceful unlike protests in other Arab countries. This is representative of the “maturity” of Morocco and highlights the positive domestic situation that allowed for the Strategic Dialogue to take place.

The Minister said that the Strategic Dialogue is only the latest advance in the long-standing ties between the US and Morocco. Morocco is a major non-NATO ally of the US and there is an FTA between the two countries. The Strategic Dialogue is yet another tool which will increase the partnership between the two, expanding on long-standing historical roots. The Strategic Dialogue has many concrete benefits for Morocco, as it will include economic
proposals, energy policy, and efforts to advance cooperation between the US and Morocco in Geneva over human rights and non-proliferation.

The goals which Morocco hopes to advance via the Strategic Dialogue are primarily security focused. Mali, Libya, and the Western Sahara present great challenges and are high priorities for Morocco. On the Western Sahara issue, US policy is in line with Morocco’s desire for a “political solution” and both are committed to working with the UN to achieve a comprehensive solution to the conflict. Regional economic ties, including free trade agreements, would help promote security and would create jobs for Morocco.

At the UN, Morocco has been an “important and moderate” actor working closely with the US for Arab-Israeli peace and over the Syrian crisis. Morocco can act as a bridge or link between the Security Council and the Arab world. Europe is an important partner for Morocco and the Kingdom’s main trading partner. Morocco is “a member without being a member” of the EU, participating in many EU institutions and maintaining strong dialogues with the EU countries.

4. Q&A

Q: (Enders Wimbush, German Marshall Fund) Where is the region going and what should US policy be?
A: In regards to Syria, any resolution by the UN has been blocked by the Security Council. There is no way forward since China and Russia block every effort. There is no future for Assad in Syria and Syria must be a democratic nation. Of course, sovereignty must be respected and the country cannot be broken up in smaller units. There are worries over extremism and the growth of al-Qaeda and other salafists groups. The Arab League is important in finding a solution and Morocco can be the link between the Arab world and the Security Council. Prospects are gloomy, but we will continue to work on China and Russia in the UN.

Q: Morocco has a “culture of compromise” unique to the region, will this be used as a model for the region?
A: I don't want to say that we're a model, but we certainly have a contribution to make to the region. The problem is that much of the leadership of other countries has been taken over by Islamists, some are moderate and some are not. The parties in the region have failed to modernize, like Morocco’s have done, and the countries remain stuck. The FLN in Algeria is an example of a party stuck in the past. On the other hand, Morocco has a new culture, a modern one that respects minorities.

Q: (Alexis Arieff, Congressional Research Service) Could you clarify Morocco’s position on the Arab Maghreb Union?
A: For the AMU to work, there needs to be open frontiers. Morocco doesn’t want to push Algeria on this issue, but without open borders the AMU won’t work. The Maghreb is an opportunity for investment and countries can’t have “frozen postures” if they want to take advantage of the situation. We need some confidence building measures between Morocco and Algeria, which are the key players in the AMU. The area needs the 3D’s to really succeed: diplomacy, development, and defense.

Q: (Enders Wimbush, German Marshall Fund): How does the EU crisis impact the Strategic Dialogue and how can the Strategic Dialogue help to manage the crisis?
A: The crisis highlights the investment opportunities in Morocco. Now is the time for the EU to invest in the Maghreb region and in Morocco.

Q: Morocco has an interest in investment; can the country be a link to the Gulf and investment in that region?
A: Yes, most certainly yes. Morocco has close ties to the Gulf - the GCC asked Morocco to join although Morocco decided to just keep a strategic partnership. Morocco has worked with Gulf countries on tourism and investment. Morocco pursues investment from Gulf countries as well as from Europe. Morocco has become a hub for car exports to the region, especially Egypt. Morocco can continue to act as a bridge for investment into the region.

Q: (Jean AbiNader, Moroccan American Center): How can Morocco help with the security situation in Africa?
A: There are two sides to security, one is political and the other economic. There must be a balanced engagement with both in order for there to be security. In Mali, for example, security measures alone aren’t sufficient. The same thing applies with immigration issues between Spain and Morocco. The economic issues underlying the instability must be addressed.

Q: (Enders Wimbush, German Marshall Fund): Where does the Strategic Dialogue go from this point?
A: The Strategic Dialogue must continue to move forward on energy, security, and development. The US and Morocco partnership is based on shared values and this must continue.
Q: What is the greatest accomplishment in Morocco’s foreign policy?
A: The two issues that have bedeviled Morocco for the past 35 years are the Sahara conflict and Algeria. In the international community, Morocco seeks respect and has been active and moderate in international affairs. Morocco was the first to help the US in the Arab-Israeli peace process and has worked with Israel for a permanent solution.

Q: (Alexis Arieff, Congressional Research Service): What are the concrete outcomes Morocco wants in the Strategic Dialogue?
A: There are many things that Morocco is pursing in the Strategic Dialogue. Morocco and the US will work closely together on regional democracy, security, and women’s rights. Morocco and the US jointly work in Geneva on human rights issues. We work together on seeking a resolution to the Sahara issue, on Maghreb dialogue, and in the South Indian Ocean. We are also working to ensure that both parties benefit from the FTA, pursue food security, and energy development. Morocco and the US will work to integrate civil society and businesses into the Strategic Dialogue because the Dialogue is not just a government to government connection. Morocco looks forward to the business forum set for 2012 as well as to increased educational and cultural ties between the US and Morocco. Morocco would like to prioritize development, but these are all issues important to Morocco.

Q: Morocco’s diplomats are good at “selling Morocco” compared to all other Arab countries, what’s the edge?
A: Morocco always listens to the outside world. Morocco is both an Atlantic country and a Mediterranean country. We are very diverse and have respect for others. When the Jews were thrown out of Spain, they found shelter in Morocco, and this attitude continues today.

5. Observation

This event was attended by 20-30 people, mostly embassy staff and journalists. This event provided an excellent overview of Morocco’s views about the Strategic Dialogue with the US. This event was excellent source of quotation material that is extremely favorable to Morocco. The close US-Moroccan relationship, Morocco’s regional importance, and the strides that Morocco has made in areas such as human rights, women’s rights, political openness, and respect for minority rights were all highlighted during the talk.
The Middle East and the Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace

Date: 11 September 2012

1. Title: The Middle East and the Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace
Hosted by the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University

Participants:
Azizah al-Hibri: Founder and President, KARAMAH
Dr. Muqtredar Khan: Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware
Laith Kubbah: Senior Director, Middle East and North Africa, The National Endowment for Democracy
Dr. Peter Mandaville: Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University
Joseph Montville: Moderator: Director, Program on Healing Historical Memory, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

2. Overview

This panel discussed the Arab Spring and assessed the prospects for peaceful elections and the emergence of stable democracies in the Middle East. The speakers reflected on the relevance of the role of Islamic religious values and the influence of foreign policy as democratic movements in the Middle East negotiate their futures.

3. Summary

Joseph Montville began with a brief mention of Islam and how there are religious values within Islam that support democratic transitions and traditions. The issue is that within Islam there is a fringe that feels that democracy and Islam are incompatible.

Muqtredar Khan focused on the language that is used when discussing democracy and democratic transitions. Khan pointed out that Islam can justify any type of governmental system—the key is to pick and choose within Islam. When creating a political philosophy around democracy, the focus should be on the needs of the community. If the community
buys into the philosophy built up around democracy then monarchical forms of government become less likely and won’t take root. He discussed two forms of political changes going on within the Arab world today. The first type was political change with regime change like that taking place in Egypt and Tunisia. The second was political change without regime change such as that occurring in Morocco and Jordan. He highlighted that Morocco has been very successful in this regard and has made real and important political changes to the system.

The ultimate outcome of these changes in the Arab world is unclear, but Khan underscored that the language used in the transition was very important and gave some hopeful signs. The term often used in political discourse is “democratic state.” The strength of this term is that its meaning is nebulous. Islamists use the term to get support from secularists and liberals while liberals can advocate for a liberal state without using the term ‘liberal’ with its negative connotations in the Arab world. The idea of a “democratic state” has created “common ground” for all political groups to come together.

Khan next discussed how political transformation in the Arab world were unique – in the Arab world “citizens” worked to create the state, whereas traditionally in the West it has been the state which confers citizenship. Citizenship for all is assumed, creating a situation where the state can be pushed to confer equality based on a universal citizenship. In the Islamic environment today this is more difficult since equality can’t be discussed as easily through an Islamic lens - gender and religious equality being thorny subjects.

In terms of the future, Khan mentioned that Islamists are being pulled in two directions by the Arab Spring. Islamist groups want to move towards the political center by accepting democracy within an Islamic tradition. This supports their international legitimacy. Islamists, however, gain domestic legitimacy from their Islamic credentials, which are being challenged for the first time by more conservative groups; pressure from the Salafists, which is pulling Islamist groups to the right. Khan believes that this is a worrying trend which might retard democratic transitions in many of these countries.

Azizah al-Hibri said that democracy must “seep into the political consciousness” of the public before there is any chance that a democratic government will survive. She mentioned that Morocco is a unique case in North Africa because there was no revolution in Morocco. Democratic change is best served by occurring gradually, as in Morocco. That said, she warned that top-down impositions of democracy will result in a reversion to the old autocratic systems. Education of the masses is the only way to ensure proper, gradual change in line with Islamic jurisprudence.

Al-Hibri also touched briefly on women in the Arab world. In most post-Arab Spring countries there are increasing constraints placed on women’s rights. Many secularists are pushing for full equality for women by replacing existing Koranic law with more western-style law. Al-Hibri argued This is a poor idea; instead laws must be placed within Koranic terms. There are many historical precedents in Islam and the Ottoman Empire which could support gender equality. The early signs for permanent change within the region are not encouraging. Tunisia and Egypt are going backwards, only Libya is a positive exception where women changed the election law.

Laith Kubba re-examined the Islamic frame through which the West views the Arab Spring. He questioned whether or not Islam was the defining feature of the Middle East, arguing that Muslim communities face the same problems as other developing communities. Developing communities have to deal with the tensions between modernizing and the challenges modernizing poses to their traditional structures. The key difference in the Middle East is that Islam is a “more powerful presence” and has left a strong imprint on the region.
Kubba argued that the various traditions and interpretations that have been applied to Islam over the fourteen centuries are more important than current trends in Islam for understanding the region today. Fitting these traditions and interpretations into modernity is the real challenge that many Arab states face. The core values of Islam have been disconnected from the actual practices within the region as evidenced by horrible human rights abuses and destruction of mosques in the name of Islam.

Kubba focused on two areas to determine the extent to which modernity or reactionary figures are dominant in each country. The first area is philosophical, looking for the emergence of thinkers who are examining the intersections between politics and the core values of Islam and the relation between the people and Islamic forces. This is important and where it is occurring there is a strong probability that democracy will last. The other area is the political culture which is patriarchal and fosters dependency. Civil society is too weak to encourage the development of a modern non-patriarchal state. Civil society among the youth is more promising than traditional areas. Youth are more open to modernization and technology and show real promise. The current trajectory, however, is not hopeful.

Peter Mandaville examined the implications of US foreign policy towards the Islamist rise saying that the US has taken a “non-stance” towards Islamist groups within the region. He pointed at two issues which must be kept in mind by policymakers. One is that these Islamist movements are having widespread internal debates about, for example, the practical implications of introducing sharia law and how exactly to implement sharia. This internal debate of the Islamist parties has been “interrupted by politics.” The second issue is the “increased pluralization of the Islamic space.” Islam is increasingly debated by society and in the political space in these countries; today there are a wide variety of groups which claim to be Islamist. The term has lost some of its utility by becoming so widespread.

Despite his characterization of the US’ “non-stance,” Mandaville underscored that US policy is no longer anti-Islamist, as in the early 1990’s when the mantra of “one man, one vote, one time” was deemed US policy. The US has now routinized its contact with Islamist parties in countries like Morocco and Egypt. US policy was always planning on talking to these rising Islamist parties. The question for the US was what tone the US should take in its policies towards these new groups. The US pursues relationships with countries, not parties, and this view was extended to the Islamist parties rising after the Arab Spring. Mandaville was careful to point out that the US has little influence over the outcome of the Arab Spring. The most important thing for the US is to not appear hypocritical by pushing a human rights agenda on the Islamist parties when, for so long, the US was willing to overlook abuses by friendly regimes. Instead, the US should focus on promoting equality in the Arab world; Islam promotes minority “rights” to a great extent but, this is often an excuse to separate groups from the mainstream.

4. Q&A

Q: (Don Rogers, Catholic Relief Services) The media was very important in the Arab Spring. Could you explain how the media could be useful in spreading the values that you’ve discussed?
A: (al-Hibri) In Egypt there are private and government channels for media. Since the revolution, private channels opened up and you saw a lot of horrible patriarchal talk. It’s important to remember that a free media is not always a great thing. Official media in the past was also bad, encouraging Copt-Muslim violence for example, but there is hope for the future.

(Khan) It’s important to remember that social media outlets were vital to the success of the revolutions. This is pretty much the limit of its effectiveness. Media tends to reflect the
sentiment of the masses and this is not always positive. Media often has its own "political baggage." The media can signal when change is occurring, but it can’t shape it. (Kubba) The youth is far more globalized than ever before, thanks to the media. The government is not able to condition this new generation. (Mandaville) The media is unlikely to improve things. Salafists have used the media to increase their constituency, as an example. The plus is that the media provides activists a potential path to provide civic education, which is at the root of what they want for Egypt.

Q: (Don Barns, Banshee University of China): What is the role of NGOs in the transitions and moving forward?
A: (Kubba) The economies of these countries will need the help of NGOs to improve. The Nobel laureate from Yemen got her first leg up from NGOs. She has become the symbol for the uprisings in Yemen. This is only one example, every country has similar stories. (al-Hibri) The important thing is that NGO’s act as partners, not as teachers. There is a role for NGOs if they act correctly, not coming as "liberators," but as equal partners. (Khan) I want to mention that the US supports NGOs selectively. There are many NGOs, Salafist NGOs for example, which the US doesn’t support. This has created a two-tiered system of those that receive western funds and those purely local ones that don’t. There are some negative consequences to putting a western-tinge on NGOs - they lose credibility. A better way would be blind funding, so long as a project is good, it gets international aid. (Mandaville): NGOs have the ability to influence the debate on secular/liberal issues while the political parties are still engaged in the internal debate I mentioned. The issue is how to support them without tainting them with association with the West.

5. Observation

This event was attended by 40-50 people who were a mixture of interns, professors, students, and a few journalists. The discussion was a good overview of the role of Islam in Arab Spring. Morocco was only mentioned as an aside, but they were favorable asides discussing Morocco’s uniqueness and the favorable way Morocco has handled the Arab Spring. Dr. Muqtedar Khan was mentioned as someone who has done field work in Morocco and the brief mention he made of Morocco was favorable. He might be a person of interest for MAC. Al-Hibri’s views on gradual change being preferable to rapid change also put Morocco in a favorable light and she might also be a person of interest. Qualifyingly, however, she never mentioned Morocco and her views on Morocco’s record on human rights aren’t clear from this discussion.

Morocco’s Perspective on the Newly Launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue

Date: 14 September 2012

1. Title: Morocco’s Perspective on the Newly Launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue
   Hosted by the German Marshall Fund

Participants
Youssef Amrani: Minister Delegate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Morocco
Moderator: Enders Wimbush: Senior Director, German Marshall Fund of the United States

2. Overview

Minister Delegate Youssef Amrani discussed Morocco’s perspectives on the newly launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue. He highlighted Morocco’s importance to the region and the close relationship between Morocco and the US. He also discussed Morocco’s goals in the region and the future prospects for Morocco and the Strategic Dialogue.

3. Summary

Enders Wimbush opened by highlighting the importance of the Strategic Dialogue to the US and Morocco. This is in stark contrast to the chaos in Libya and the region. Morocco’s relationship with the US is “vital, deep, and robust” and the two nations have close and important ties. He stressed that Morocco was a “formidable” Atlantic actor with an expanding role in the region.

Minister Delegate Amrani began his talk with two messages about Morocco. The first was that Morocco has worked hard domestically to get the Strategic Dialogue. The King has provided leadership that has brought democratic openness and values to the country. Morocco’s position on the UN Security Council and the Strategic Dialogue are reflections of the real progress and ambitions of Morocco. The second message was that Morocco is ambitious and wants to expand connections with the US, expand its role in the Security Council and the UN, and make more progress in in areas such as job creation. The unique free economy and political openness of Morocco has put the country in a better position than other Arab countries, but there is always room for growth.

Morocco’s new constitution has created a “New Morocco,” which is inclusive of women and minorities. The constitution itself was the product of “long-consultation” with society and all Moroccan political parties. There is a new “culture of listening” in Morocco that has made these domestic advances possible – Amrani noted that the Moroccan government listens to society and responds. Demonstrations in Casablanca, over an anti-Islamist film, were completely peaceful unlike protests in other Arab countries. This is representative of the “maturity” of Morocco and highlights the positive domestic situation that allowed for the Strategic Dialogue to take place.

The Minister said that the Strategic Dialogue is only the latest advance in the long-standing ties between the US and Morocco. Morocco is a major non-NATO ally of the US and there is an FTA between the two countries. The Strategic Dialogue is yet another tool which will increase the partnership between the two, expanding on long-standing historical roots. The Strategic Dialogue has many concrete benefits for Morocco, as it will include economic proposals, energy policy, and efforts to advance cooperation between the US and Morocco in Geneva over human rights and non-proliferation.

The goals which Morocco hopes to advance via the Strategic Dialogue are primarily security focused. Mali, Libya, and the Western Sahara present great challenges and are high priorities for Morocco. On the Western Sahara issue, US policy is in line with Morocco’s desire for a “political solution” and both are committed to working with the UN to achieve a comprehensive solution to the conflict. Regional economic ties, including free trade agreements, would help promote security and would create jobs for Morocco.
At the UN, Morocco has been an "important and moderate" actor working closely with the US for Arab-Israeli peace and over the Syrian crisis. Morocco can act as a bridge or link between the Security Council and the Arab world. Europe is an important partner for Morocco and the Kingdom’s main trading partner. Morocco is “a member without being a member” of the EU, participating in many EU institutions and maintaining strong dialogues with the EU countries.

4. Q&A

Q: (Enders Wimbush, German Marshall Fund) Where is the region going and what should US policy be?
A: In regards to Syria, any resolution by the UN has been blocked by the Security Council. There is no way forward since China and Russia block every effort. There is no future for Assad in Syria and Syria must be a democratic nation. Of course, sovereignty must be respected and the country cannot be broken up in smaller units. There are worries over extremism and the growth of al-Qaeda and other salafists groups. The Arab League is important in finding a solution and Morocco can be the link between the Arab world and the Security Council. Prospects are gloomy, but we will continue to work on China and Russia in the UN.

Q: Morocco has a “culture of compromise” unique to the region, will this be used as a model for the region?
A: I don’t want to say that we’re a model, but we certainly have a contribution to make to the region. The problem is that much of the leadership of other countries has been taken over by Islamists, some are moderate and some are not. The parties in the region have failed to modernize, like Morocco’s have done, and the countries remain stuck. The FLN in Algeria is an example of a party stuck in the past. On the other hand, Morocco has a new culture, a modern one that respects minorities.

Q: (Alexis Arieff, Congressional Research Service) Could you clarify Morocco’s position on the Arab Maghreb Union?
A: For the AMU to work, there needs to be open frontiers. Morocco doesn’t want to push Algeria on this issue, but without open borders the AMU won’t work. The Maghreb is an opportunity for investment and countries can’t have “frozen postures” if they want to take advantage of the situation. We need some confidence building measures between Morocco and Algeria, which are the key players in the AMU. The area needs the 3D’s to really succeed: diplomacy, development, and defense.

Q: (Enders Wimbush, German Marshall Fund): How does the EU crisis impact the Strategic Dialogue and how can the Strategic Dialogue help to manage the crisis?
A: The crisis highlights the investment opportunities in Morocco. Now is the time for the EU to invest in the Maghreb region and in Morocco.

Q: Morocco has an interest in investment; can the country be a link to the Gulf and investment in that region?
A: Yes, most certainly yes. Morocco has close ties to the Gulf - the GCC asked Morocco to join although Morocco decided to just keep a strategic partnership. Morocco has worked with Gulf countries on tourism and investment. Morocco pursues investment from Gulf countries as well as from Europe. Morocco has become a hub for car exports to the region, especially Egypt. Morocco can continue to act as a bridge for investment into the region.

Q: (Jean AbiNader, Moroccan American Center): How can Morocco help with the security situation in Africa?
A: There are two sides to security, one is political and the other economic. There must be a balanced engagement with both in order for there to be security. In Mali, for example, security measures alone aren’t sufficient. The same thing applies with immigration issues between Spain and Morocco. The economic issues underlying the instability must be addressed.

Q: (Enders Wimbush, German Marshall Fund): Where does the Strategic Dialogue go from this point?
A: The Strategic Dialogue must continue to move forward on energy, security, and development. The US and Morocco partnership is based on shared values and this must continue.

Q: What is the greatest accomplishment in Morocco’s foreign policy?
A: The two issues that have bedeviled Morocco for the past 35 years are the Sahara conflict and Algeria. In the international community, Morocco seeks respect and has been active and moderate in international affairs. Morocco was the first to help the US in the Arab-Israeli peace process and has worked with Israel for a permanent solution.

Q: (Alexis Arieff, Congressional Research Service): What are the concrete outcomes Morocco wants in the Strategic Dialogue?
A: There are many things that Morocco is pursing in the Strategic Dialogue. Morocco and the US will work closely together on regional democracy, security, and women’s rights. Morocco and the US jointly work in Geneva on human rights issues. We work together on seeking a resolution to the Sahara issue, on Maghreb dialogue, and in the South Indian Ocean. We are also working to ensure that both parties benefit from the FTA, pursue food security, and energy development. Morocco and the US will work to integrate civil society and businesses into the Strategic Dialogue because the Dialogue is not just a government to government connection. Morocco looks forward to the business forum set for 2012 as well as to increased educational and cultural ties between the US and Morocco. Morocco would like to prioritize development, but these are all issues important to Morocco.

Q: Morocco’s diplomats are good at “selling Morocco” compared to all other Arab countries, what’s the edge?
A: Morocco always listens to the outside world. Morocco is both an Atlantic country and a Mediterranean country. We are very diverse and have respect for others. When the Jews were thrown out of Spain, they found shelter in Morocco, and this attitude continues today.

5. Observation

This event was attended by 20-30 people, mostly embassy staff and journalists. This event provided an excellent overview of Morocco’s views about the Strategic Dialogue with the US. This event was excellent source of quotation material that is extremely favorable to Morocco. The close US-Moroccan relationship, Morocco’s regional importance, and the strides that Morocco has made in areas such as human rights, women’s rights, political openness, and respect for minority rights were all highlighted during the talk.

(Back to top)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reuters Africa</td>
<td>Morocco inflation rises to 1.2 pct in Sept from 1 pct in Aug Oct. 21, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco’s consumer price inflation increased to an annual 1.2 percent in September from 1 percent in August, the High Planning Authority said.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco expects first Gulf aid payouts in early 2013 Oct. 22, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco expects to receive early next year the first part of $2.5 billion in aid promised by wealthy Gulf Arab states. The aid helps to cement ties between Arab monarchies at a time of political turmoil. Foreign aid is important to Morocco which is “heavily exposed” to the pitfalls of the EU.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBCNews</td>
<td>Morocco denies destruction by Salafi Muslims of pagan rock carving Oct. 21, 2012</td>
<td>Reports of the destruction of a rock engraving in Morocco are false. The communication minister took the media to prove that they were undamaged. Morocco has generally followed a tolerant form of Sunni Islam, although there were fears of rising Salafism post-9/11. The government arrested hundreds, especially following the 2003 Casablanca bombings.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>Salafists destroy ancient carvings in Morocco Oct. 18, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco’s government has denied that ancient carvings have been destroyed. The Amazigh League for Human Rights says that Salafis destroyed ancient carvings. This is “the latest in a string of incidents in which radicals have destroyed historic and religious sites under</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Peninsula</td>
<td><strong>Moroccan FM: 'Qatar-Morocco ties are historical!'</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 20, 2012</td>
<td>Othmani has praised Qatar’s standing by “Arab populations” from the beginning of the Arab Spring. He also stressed that Morocco-Qatar ties are strong “at all levels.” Talks between the two states are expected to focus on GCC developmental support for Morocco. He pointed to Morocco’s exposing of Israeli “violations” saying that Morocco and Qatar share similar views on the Palestinian conflict and on other regional crises such as Syria.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Restore AFP Reporter's Accreditation - New Move Against International Media Two Years After Al Jazeera Banned</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 22, 2012</td>
<td>Moroccan authorities should restore the accreditation of AFP journalist Omar Brouksy and stop retaliating against foreign media for what they report. 2 years ago, Morocco shut down the Morocco bureau of Al Jazeera television in response to its coverage of the disputed territory of Western Sahara. The UNHRC has said that limited accreditation can only be applied in a “non-discriminatory manner.”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Africa: 18 Educators From Africa, Middle East for Microsoft PLF</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 23, 2012</td>
<td>For enhancing student success through innovative use of technology in the classroom, Microsoft announced that 18 educators from Nigeria, Ghana, Jordan, Mauritius, Oman, Pakistan, Lebanon, Qatar, Turkey, South Africa, Egypt, UAE, Lesotho, Saudi Arabia, Uganda and Morocco will represent the Middle East and Africa in the Partners in Learning Global forum which will take place in Prague later this year.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: All</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>President of Republic and</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sahrawi Men and Women Are Workers for Independence, Says President of Republic</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 22, 2012</td>
<td>Secretary General of Polisario Front Mohamed Abdelaziz has praised the role of the Saharawi workers in the national struggle, emphasizing &quot;all Sahrawi men and women are workers for independence,&quot; in a speech at the 7th Congress of Saharawi Workers Union.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco: UN Special Rapporteur On Torture Asserts Morocco Uses Excessive Torture Against Saharawi Civilians</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 24, 2012</td>
<td>UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendez, told the UN Security Council that Morocco uses excessive torture against human rights defenders and political prisoners in Western Sahara. &quot;Whenever there is a sense that national security is involved, there is a tendency to use torture in interrogation. Difficult to say how pervasive or how systematic it is, but it happens frequently enough that the government of Morocco should not ignore the practice,&quot; he said. Torture occurred in both Western Sahara and in Morocco.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco’s Governing Council Approves Budget</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 22, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco’s governing council has adopted the 2013 budget. Following the meeting, Morocco’s Communications Minister and government spokesman Mustapha El Khalfi revealed that the 2013 budget predicts growth next year of 4.5%, and for a reduction of the public deficit to 4.8% of GDP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moroccan courts hit by strikes</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 22, 2012</td>
<td>Moroccan court clerks staged a three-day strike last week to protest work-related grievances and push for reform. The clerks are members of the Democratic Justice Syndicate. This follows a sit-in by judicial officers on October 5 in Rabat.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Morocco has “irrevocably” docked salaries of striking clerks. In the absence of prospects for dialogue, the strike movement among court officials could grow over the coming days.

**Magharebia**

**Magharebia** activists push for death penalty ban

Oct. 23, 2012

Oct. 18-20, Rabat hosted the first regional conference seeking to eliminate the death penalty from the MENA region. Morocco was praised as being “qualified, more than any other country in the region, to [ban the death penalty] since it has stopped the implementation of death penalties for two decades” said the mayor of Rabat.

**Magharebia**

Rabat forum explores new security threats

Oct. 24, 2012

A Rabat forum on security concluded that Southern Atlantic states need to work closer together to fight terrorism. Particular focus was placed on combating illicit drug trafficking and “polycriminal” threats.

**Magharebia**

Moroccan king tours Gulf countries

Oct. 25, 2012

The King’s Gulf trip focused on economic cooperation and development with the GCC. The GCC promised Morocco $5 billion over a period of 5 years. The focus for the funds will be on development and investment particularly in agriculture.

**Magharebia**

US Secretary of State to visit Algeria

Oct. 25, 2012

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Algeria on October 30th, the US State Department said on October 24th. Clinton will meet Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to discuss issues of bilateral and regional concern. The visit comes after the first session of the Algerian-US Strategic Dialogue held on October 19th in Washington.

**Christian Science**

Spain loses title as

Many Moroccan migrants are leaving Spain due to
| **Monitor** | **Moroccans' land of opportunity** | poor economic conditions. Moroccan workers in Spain have an unemployment rate of 50%. Many northern areas of Morocco rely on migration to Spain for remittances. This decline is symptomatic of broader EU woes which have negatively impacted the Moroccan economy and Morocco may have trouble handling this influx of people. |
| Oct. 22, 2012 |

| **The Daily Star** | **European prisoners in Morocco 'on hunger strike'** | European prisoners in Morocco, some of whom are also Moroccan, have begun a hunger strike to protest poor conditions. Most complain of "physical abuse" and said they were denied fair trials. Morocco has denied that a hunger strike is occurring and denied that there was any poor treatment. The UN special envoy on torture has said that inhumane treatment of prisoners in Morocco is "very frequent." |
| Oct. 22, 2012 |

| **MENAFN** | **King of Morocco Mohammed VI Visits Kuwait** | This extremely flattering editorial refers to King Mohammed as the “King of Hearts,” lauds the economic progress and green reforms Morocco has made and extols its bright future. |
| Oct. 24, 2012 |

| **BusinessWeek** | **Locust Plague May Spread to North Africa as Swarms Form in Chad** | “Locusts will probably spread to North Africa in coming weeks as swarms form in Chad and are about to gather in Mali and Niger after summer rains,” the United Nations’ Food & Agriculture Organization said. The FAO has alerted Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Mauritania to prepare for the arrival of desert locust swarms. |
| Oct. 23, 2012 |

<p>| <strong>Gulf Daily News</strong> | <strong>GFH's Morocco project is under modification</strong> | Bahrain-based Islamic investment bank Gulf Finance House (GFH) has announced that its development project in |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 23, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco, the Royal Ranches Marrakech (RRM), is undergoing critical modifications to adapt to the changing market conditions in Marrakech. The project will now shift from luxury large scale villas to small- medium apartments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 25, 2012</td>
<td>Students in Morocco feel neglected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batswana students studying in Morocco have expressed dissatisfaction with the education system and the insufficient allowances given to them. They complain that the French instruction is poor and that course guidelines are ignored. There are also complaints about racism and failures to look after their social welfare. The students say their experience in Morocco has been bad. They want to return home to be offered better learning conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog Name</td>
<td>Update Title/Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Rains add to worries of Moroccans in shantytowns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco reacts to terror arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Compensation Fund strains Morocco budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco launches job training projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Prophet</td>
<td>Morocco is Building a Mega “Green City” Named After King Mohammed VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Prophet</td>
<td>Spain Ditches Morocco’s Desertec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Africa</strong></td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Polisario Denounces Expulsion of International Observers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solar Project Meeting</strong></td>
<td>North Africa’s energy market. Spain is a key partner in the Desertec project.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FYI, attached is a listing of all new members of the House Freshmen, that will come into office with the new Congress in January. Ed
Biographies of House Freshmen

November 14, 2012

Government Relations
BLANK & ROMER
Roadmap

Biographies of House Freshmen: Republicans

Biographies of House Freshmen: Democrats

(In Alphabetical Order by Last Name)
Freshmen Republicans

Andy Barr
R-Ky. (06)

Born: July 24, 1973
Family: Married, Carol Barr; one daughter
Religion: Episcopalian
Education: University of Virginia, B.A., 1996; University of Kentucky, J.D., 2001
Elected Office: None
On the issues: Yet to be determined

Kerry Bentivolio
R-Mich. (11)

Born: Oct 6, 1951
Family: Married, Karen Bentivolio; two children
Religion: Christian
Education: St. Mary’s College, B.A., 1979; Marygrove College, M.Ed
Career: Car designer; homebuilder; teacher; farmer
Military Service: Army; Michigan Army National Guard
Elected Office: None
On the issues: Conservative hard lines on spending, tax cuts, and abortion
Freshmen Republicans

Jim Bridenstine
R-Okla. (01)

Born: June 15, 1975
Family: Married, Michelle Ivory Bridenstine; three children
Religion: Baptist
Education: Rice University, B.A., 1998; Cornell University, M.B.A., 2009
Career: Director, Tulsa Air and Space Museum, 2008-10; defense consultant, Wyle Laboratories, 2007-08; Deputy mayor, Tulsa, 1998-2003
On the Issues: Expected conservative; backed by tea party

Susan W. Brooks
R-Ind. (05)

Born: Aug. 25, 1960
Family: Married, David M. Brooks; two children
Religion: Catholic
Education: Miami University in Ohio, B.A., 1982; Indiana University, J.D., 1985
On the Issues: Channels understated conservatism akin to Governor Mitch Daniels, previous experience working to prosecute crime such as homicides, human trafficking, and drugs, as well as consolidating the counterterrorism apparatus of the Southern District of Indiana


Case 2:16-cr-00365   Document 212-4   Filed 06/02/19   Page 746 of 1649
**Chris Collins**

**R-N.Y. (27)**

**Born:** May 20, 1950

**Family:** Married, Mary Sue Collins; three children

**Religion:** Catholic

**Education:** North Carolina State University, B.S., 1972; University of Alabama (Birmingham), M.B.A., 1975

**Career:** Entrepreneur, 1998-2007; general manager, CEO, Nuttall Gear Corp., 1983-97; Westinghouse Electric, 1972-83

**Military Service:** Air Force Reserve, 1994-2005

**Elected Office:** Erie County Executive, 2007-11

**On the Issues:** Promised to bring business acumen to D.C.; known as “the fix-it guy,” helping to turn around Erie County’s budget problems and infrastructure while serving as executive; wants to install budget efficiency at the federal level; opposes Obama’s tax increase proposals

---

**Doug Collins**

**R-Ga. (09)**

**Born:** Aug. 16, 1966

**Family:** Married, Lisa Collins; three children

**Religion:** Baptist

**Education:** North Georgia College & State University, B.S., 1988; New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, M.Div., 1996; John Marshall Law School, J.D., 2008

**Career:** Practicing attorney, 2008-present; pastor, Chicopee Baptist Church, 1994-2005

**Military Service:** Chaplain, Air Force Reserve, 2002-present; Pastoral: Baptist Church, 1994-2005

**Elected Office:** Georgia House, 2006-present

**On the Issues:** Deeply conservative; campaign drew on legislative experience crafting budgets and anti-Obama sentiment
Freshmen Republicans

Paul Cook
R-Calif. (08)

Born: March 3, 1943
Family: Married, Jeanne Cook; two children
Religion: Catholic
Education: Southern Connecticut State University, B.S., 1966; California State University-San Bernardino, M.A., 1979; J.D., 2002
Career: Professor, University of California-Riverside, 2002-present; assistant professor, Copper Mountain College, 1998-2002; executive director, Yucca Valley Chamber of Commerce, 1993-94
Military Service: Marine Corps, 1966-92
Elected Office: California Assembly, 2006-12; Yucca Valley Town Council, 1998-2004
On the Issues: Campaigned on promises not to raise taxes and as an advocate for veteran and military families; while on state assembly, worked on issues related to retirement homes, child custody, higher education, and veteran services; pushed legislation to protect children from sexual predators

Tom Cotton
R-Ark. (04)

Born: May 13, 1977
Family: Single
Religion: Christian
Education: Harvard University, B.A., 1999; J.D., 2002
Military: Army, 2004-09
Elected Office: None
On the Issues: Campaigned on promises not to raise taxes and as an advocate for veteran and military families; while on state assembly, worked on issues related to retirement homes, child custody, higher education, and veteran services; pushed legislation to protect children from sexual predators
Freshmen Republicans

Kevin Cramer
R-N.D. (At Large)
Born: Jan. 21, 1961
Family: Married, Kris Cramer; five children
Religion: Evangelical Christian
Education: Concordia College (Minn.), B.A., 1983; University of Mary, M.S., 2003
Career: Director, Harold Schafer Leadership Foundation, 2001-03; director, North Dakota tourism, 1993-97; North Dakota Republican Party, 1990-93
Elected Office: North Dakota Public Service Commission, 2003-present
On the issues: Traditionally Republican; supports across-the-board spending cuts and a freeze in federal spending to 2008 levels to fix deficit; calls for repeal of Obama's health care act and an evaluation of Dodd-Frank; deeply-held social conservative values, inspired by Ronald Reagan; guided an energy boom in North Dakota's economy

Steve Daines
R-Mont. (At Large)
Born: August 20, 1962
Family: Married, Cindy Daines; four children
Religion: Presbyterian
Education: Montana State University, B.S., 1984
Career: Vice President, Clair Daniels Construction, 1997-2000; General Manager/Vice President RightNow Technologies; operations manager, Procter & Gamble, 1984-1997
Elected Office: None
On the issues: Traditionally Republican; supports across-the-board spending cuts and a freeze in federal spending at 2008 levels to fix deficit; calls for repeal of Obama's health care act and an evaluation of Dodd-Frank; economically conservative values, inspired by Ronald Reagan; guided an energy boom in Montana; calls for repeal of Obama's health care act and an evaluation of Dodd-Frank; proposes a market-based, all-inclusive approach to new energy sources.
Freshmen Republicans

Rodney Davis
R-Ill. (13)

Born: Jan. 5, 1970
Family: Married, Shannon Davis; three children
Religion: Catholic
Education: Millikin University, B.A., 1992

On the issues: Emphasized interest in small businesses; emphasized his work on the board of education for his local church while campaigning; calls for a repeal of Obama's health care act and a cut in government spending; supports deficit reduction while maintaining pension benefits for lawmakers; favored the repeal of Obama's health care act and a cut in government spending, excepting Pell Grants.

Ron DeSantis
R-Fla. (06)

Born: Sept. 14, 1974
Family: Married, Casey Black DeSantis
Religion: Catholic
Education: Yale University, B.A., 2001; Harvard University, J.D., 2004
Career: Practicing attorney, 2004-present
Military Service: Navy, 2004-present

On the issues: Emphasized interest in small businesses; emphasized his work on the board of education for his local church while campaigning; calls for a repeal of Obama's health care act and a cut in government spending; supports deficit reduction while maintaining pension benefits for lawmakers; favored the repeal of Obama's health care act and a cut in government spending, excepting Pell Grants.
Freshmen Republicans

George Holding
R-N.C. (13)
Born: April 17, 1968
Family: Married, Lucy Herriott; four children
Religion: Baptist
Education: Wake Forest University, B.A., 1990; J.D., 1996
Elected Office: None
On the Issues:
Campagna focused on core family values and responsible conservative values;
Reagan-inspired views inspired by

Richard Hudson
R-N.C. (08)
Born: Nov. 4, 1971
Family: Married, Renee Hudson
Religion: Christian
Education: University of North Carolina-Charlotte, B.A., 1996
Elected Office: None
On the Issues:
Emphasized experience on Capitol Hill working behind-the-scenes cultivating connections; promised to work to fully fund retraining programs for laid-off textile workers; promised to work to fully fund retraining programs for laid-off textile workers; promised to work to fully fund retraining programs for laid-off textile workers;
Freshmen Republicans

David Joyce  
R-Ohio (14)  
Born: March 17, 1957  
Family: Married, Kelly Joyce; three children  
Religion: Catholic  
Education: University of Dayton, B.S., 1979; J.D., 1982  
Career: Public defender, Geauga County, Ohio, 1983-84; public defender, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1985-88; public defender, Cleveland, Ohio, 1988-98  
Elected Office: Prosecutor, Geauga County, 1988-present; California Senate, 2010-present; California Assembly, 2002-08  
On the issues: Views more conservative than predecessor Rep. Steve LaTourette's but not as conservative as many GOP newcomers. Believes federal government central for infrastructure; not entirely opposed to raising revenue to curtail deficit; opposes abortion except in cases of rape, incest, and the life of the woman; thinks pro-choice stances undermine pro-life stance.

Doug LaMalfa  
R-Calif. (01)  
Born: July 2, 1960  
Family: Married, Jill LaMalfa; four children  
Religion: Christian  
Education: California Polytechnic State University, B.S., 1982  
Career: Owner, rice farm, 1982-present  
Elected Office: California Senate, 2010-present; California Assembly, 2002-08  
Freshmen Republicans

Thomas Massie
R-Ky. (04)

Born: Jan. 13, 1971
Family: Married, Rhonda Massie; four children
Religion: Christian
Education: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, B.S., 1993; M.S., 1996
Elected Office: Judge-executive, Lewis County, 2010-12

On the issues: Self-described “conservative with conviction and common sense”; campaigned on his business background and budget-cutting experience as a county official; has attracted the support of tea party activists

Mark Meadows
R-N.C. (11)

Born: July 28, 1959
Family: Married, Debbie Meadows; two children
Religion: Christian
Education: University of South Florida, B.S., 1983
Career: Real estate developer, 1990-present; president, owner, sandwich shop, 1986-1990; director, customer relations
Elected Office: None

On the issues: Longtime Republican activist; ran ads emphasizing his opposition to many of President Obama’s policies in his run for current House seat

Freshmen Republicans

Luke Messer
R-Ind. (06)

Born: Feb. 27, 1969
Family: Married, Jennifer Messer; three children
Religion: Presbyterian
Education: Wabash College, B.A., 1991; Vanderbilt University, J.D., 1994
Elected Office: Indiana House, 2003-06

On the issues: Values hard work and self-sufficiency; aligned with policies of departing Rep. Mike Pence; in state House, focused on education, mostly aimed at curtailing high school dropouts;

Markwayne Mullin
R-Okla. (02)

Born: July 26, 1977
Family: Married, Christie Mullin; three children
Religion: Christian
Education: Oklahoma State University Institute of Technology, A.D., 2010; Missouri Valley College, attended, 1996
Career: Owner, Mullin Plumbing, 1996-present
Elected Office: None

On the issues: Opposes overregulation and Obama's policies, such as Dodd-Frank and the stimulus package.
Freshmen Republicans

Scott Perry
R-Pa. (04)

Born: May 27, 1962

Family: Married, Chrissy Perry; two children

Religion: Christian


Career: Co-owner, Hydrotech Mechanical Services, 1993-present; dock worker, Dauphin Distribution, 1981-82


On the issues: More conservative than predecessor, retiring Rep. Todd Platts; supports a leaner federal government; gun rights; and traditional marriage; opposes Obama’s health care reform

Elected Office: Pennsylvania House, 2006-present

Robert Pittenger
R-N.C. (09)

Born: Aug. 15, 1948

Family: Married, Suzanne Bahakel Pittenger; four children

Religion: Christian

Education: University of Texas, B.A., 1970

Career: Owner, Robert Pittenger Co., 1989-pres; assistant to the president, Campus Crusade for Christ

On the issues: Conservative values, deeply concerned about nation’s budget deficit, opposes Obama’s health care reform

Elected Office: North Carolina Senate, 2002-08

Case 2:16-cr-00365   Document 212-4   Filed 06/02/19   Page 755 of 1649
Freshmen Republicans

Tom Rice
R-S.C. (07)

Born: Aug. 4, 1957

Religion: Episcopalian
Family: Married, Wrenzie Rice; three children

Education:
University of South Carolina, B.A., 1975; M.A., 1979; J.D., 1982

Career:
Practicing attorney, 1984-present; staff accountant, Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, 1982-84

Elected Office: Horry County Council, 2010-present

On the issues:
Focus on business and conservative values; endorsed by Gov. Nikki Haley; defines self as fiscal conservative; wants to address political polarization in Congress; opposes abortion; supported by tea party; wants to bring jobs back from overseas by creating a more business-friendly domestic environment with less regulations; campaign focused on job creation, increasing military spending; protecting gun owners' rights; and simplifying immigration laws; opposes abortion; supported by predecessor Rep. Connie Mack, his father Sen. Connie Mack, and Sen. Marco Rubio.

By tea party: wants to address political polarization in Congress; military spending; protecting gun owners' rights; and simplifying immigration laws; opposes abortion; supported by predecessor Rep. Connie Mack, his father Sen. Connie Mack, and Sen. Marco Rubio.
On the issues: Admires Reagan's traditional conservative values; opposes the widening budget deficit and roll back regulation of financial markets; believes "Obama's stimulus bill" is the wrong answer; opposes health care reform; supports tax cuts.


Career: Assistant attorney general; senior policy analyst, Medicare/Medicaid; White House budget advisor, 2002-04; assistant director, Office of Management and Budget, 2007-10; senior advisor, National Economic Council, 2011-12

Elected Office: None

Religion: Roman Catholic

Family: Married; four children: Kelly, 1989; Brittany, 1991; John, 1993; Greg, 1995

Born: April 25, 1962

Keith Rothfus

Freshmen Republicans

Elected Office: U.S. House, 114th Congress; Pennsylvania, 13th District; Pennsylvania Senate, 1990-94


Education: Lehigh University, B.S., 1982; Pennsylvania State University, J.D., 1985

Religion: Presbyterian

Family: Married; four children: Matthew, 1986; Nathaniel, 1988; Alexander, 1990; Zachary, 1992

Born: May 7, 1962

Matt Salmon


Education: Arizona State University, B.A., 1981; Brigham Young University, M.P.A. 1986

Religion: Mormon


Born: Jan. 21, 1958

R-Pa. (12)

R-Ariz. (05)
Freshmen Republicans

Chris Stewart
R-Utah. (02)
Born: July 15, 1960
Family: Married, Evie Stewart; six children
Religion: Mormon
Education: Utah State University, B.A., 1984
Career: Owner, Shipley Group, 2000-present
Elected Office: None
On the issues: Very conservative; agenda includes deficit spending, smaller government, and a balanced budget. Favors a 25% top marginal income-tax rate; his list of federal spending programs that can be cut includes stimulus spending, energy development, and transportation programs.

Steve Stockman
R-Tex. (36)
Born: Nov. 14, 1956
Family: Married, Patti Stockman
Religion: Baptist
Education: University of Houston, B.S., 1990
Career: Director, campus leadership program, Leadership Institute, 2005-07; accountant, 1990-94
On the issues: Very conservative; agenda includes demand for a balanced budget, smaller government, and lower taxes; emphasized need to curb illegal immigration; cosponsored the Defense of Marriage Act and a bill to give states power to prosecute illegal immigrants. Favoring a balanced budget. Favors a 25% top marginal income-tax rate; his list of federal spending programs that can be cut includes stimulus spending, energy development, and transportation programs.
Freshmen Republicans

David Valadao
R-Calif. (21)
Born: April 14, 1977
Family: Married, Terra Valadao; three children
Religion: Catholic
Education: College of the Sequoias, attended 1996-98
Career: Partner, Valadao Dairy, 1992-present
Elected Office: California Assembly, 2010-present
On the issues: Interested in dairy farming and agricultural issues; sponsored legislation that called for eliminating millions of dollars in state funding to subsidize production of corn-based ethanol; supported bill that placed restrictions on people with criminal convictions who care for the elderly or disabled

Ann Wagner
R-Mo. (02)
Born: Sept. 13, 1962
Family: Married, Raymond Wagner; three children
Religion: Catholic
Education: University of Missouri, B.S., 1984
Elected Office: None
On the issues: Yet to be determined
Freshmen Republicans

Jackie Walorski  
R-Ind. (02)  
Born: Aug. 17, 1963  
Family: Married, Dean Swihart  
Religion: Christian  
Education: Taylor University, B.A., 1985  
Elected Office: Indiana House, 2004-10  
On the issues: Believes in a very limited role of government; co-sponsored Indiana’s voter-identification law; priorities are to push for full repeal of the Affordable Care Act and for deficit reduction; said she wants to try to work across the aisle.

Randy Weber
R-Tex. (14)
Born: July 2, 1953
Family: Married, Brenda Weber; three children
Religion: Christian
Education: University of Houston-Clear Lake, B.S., 1977
Career: Owner: Weber’s Air and Heat, 1981-present
Elected Office: Texas House of Representatives, 2007-present; Pearland City Council, 1990-96
On the issues: Inspired by Reagan’s message of limited government; has worked on issues ranging from veteran’s affairs to domestic human trafficking.
Freshmen Republicans

Brad Wenstrup
R-Oh. (02)

Born: June 17, 1958
Family: Married, Monica Klein Wenstrup
Religion: Catholic
Education: University of Cincinnati, B.A., 1980; Wenstrup College of Podiatric Medicine, B.S., D.P.M., 1985
Career: Physician, Wellington College of Podiatric Medicine, 1985-present; private practice, 1986-99
Military Service: Army Reserve, 1998-2011; combat surgeon, Iraq, 2005-06
Religion: Episcopalian
Career: Owner, Brad Wenstrup Foundation, 1982-present; President, Wenstrup Consulting, 1982-present
Family: Married, Monica Klein Wenstrup

Roger Williams
R-Tex. (25)

Born: Sept 13, 1949
Family: Married, Patty Williams; two children
Religion: Christian
Education: Texas Christian University, B.S., 1971
Career: Owner, Roger Williams Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, 1971-present; Texas secretary of state, 2005-07; baseball coach, Texas Christian University, 1974-76; Atlanta Braves farm team, 1999-00
Religion: Christian
Education: Texas Christian University, B.S., 1971
Career: Owner, Roger Williams Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, 1971-present; Texas secretary of state, 2005-07; baseball coach, Texas Christian University, 1974-76; Atlanta Braves farm team, 1999-00
Family: Married, Party Williams; two children

On the issues:
Decided to become involved in politics because he disliked that people in Washington who had never served were making military decisions, and people who had never seen a patient or dealt with Medicare or Medicaid or insurance companies were making health care plans.

On the issues:
Decided to become involved in politics because he disliked that people in Washington who had never served were making military decisions, and people who had never seen a patient or dealt with Medicare or Medicaid or insurance companies were making health care plans.

Listen to your generals, and understand the 10th Amendment.
Ted Yoho
R-Fla. (03)

Born: April 13, 1955

Family: Married, Carolyn Yoho; three children

Religion: Catholic

Education: University of Florida, B.S., 1979; D.V.M., 1983

Career: Veterinarian, 1983-present

Elected Office: None

On the Issues: Embraced his tea party backing; railed against “career politicians” and “the mess” in Washington; wants to repeal the Affordable Care Act; opposes raising taxes, but won’t sign a no-tax pledge in case certain events leave no other alternatives

Freshmen Republicans
Roadmap

Biographies of House Freshmen: Democrats (In Alphabetical Order, by Last Name)

Biographies of House Freshmen: Republicans (In Alphabetical Order, by Last Name)
Joyce Beatty
D-Ohio (03)

Born: March 12, 1950
Family: Married, Otto Beatty, Jr.; two stepchildren
Religion: Baptist
Education: Central State University, B.A., 1977; Wright State University, M.S., 1979
Career: Senior vice president, Ohio State University, 2008-present; president, Joyce Beatty & Associates, 1992-2008
Elected Office: President, Montgomery County Department of Community Human Services, 1993-92

On the issues: Proponent of labor unions; made education central to campaign; advocates for women's healthcare and employment

Freshmen Democrats

Joyce Beatty
D-Ohio (03)

Julia Brownley
D-Calif. (26)

Born: Aug. 28, 1952
Family: Divorced; two children
Religion: Episcopalian
Education: Mount Vernon College, B.A., 1975; American University, M.B.A., 1979
Career: Product manager, Steelcase; 1981-84; sales manager, Pitney Bowes; 1984-92; sales manager, Burroughs
Elected Office: California Assembly, 2006-present; member, Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District, 1994-present

On the issues: Campaign focused on improving educational opportunities to fix poor economy; advocated greater investment in California's public schools; worked on legislation to prevent human trafficking; improved foster-care systems, increase green awareness; tried to pass a state version of the Disclose Act to improve campaign finance transparency

D-Calf. (26)
On the issues: Known for laboring to reform state’s gang prevention and intervention programs, including passing the Schiff-Cárdenas Crime Prevention Act, active in creating opportunities for minority-owned businesses to compete for city’s bond underwriting work, promoting policies fighting human trafficking and animal mistreatment.

On City Council, focused on economic development, funding and clarifying the East Moline Downtown Revitalization Committee; backed by labor unions in campaign; advocate of women’s health issues.


Religion: Catholic

Family: Married, Gerry Bustos; two children

Born: Oct. 17, 1961

Family: Married, Norma Cárdenas; four children

Born: March 31, 1963

Religion: Christian

Education: University of California-Santa Barbara, B.A., 1986


On City Council, focused on economic development, funding and clarifying the East Moline Downtown Revitalization Committee; backed by labor unions in campaign; advocate of women’s health issues.

On the issues: Known for laboring to reform state’s gang prevention and intervention programs, including passing the Schiff-Cárdenas Crime Prevention Act, active in creating opportunities for minority-owned businesses to compete for city’s bond underwriting work, promoting policies fighting human trafficking and animal mistreatment.


Religion: Catholic

Family: Married, Gerry Bustos; two children

Born: Oct. 17, 1961

Family: Married, Norma Cárdenas; four children

Born: March 31, 1963

Religion: Christian

Education: University of California-Santa Barbara, B.A., 1986


the American dream, restoring education funding even during budget cuts; very pro-Obama

Matt Cartwright
D-Pa. (17)

On the issues: Passionate about civil rights, pro-affirmative action; has focused on education as a component of

Elected Office: Texas House of Representatives, 2002-12

Career: Practicing attorney, 2000-present

Education: Stanford University, B.A., 1996; Harvard University, J.D., 2000

Religion: Catholic

Family: Single

Born: Sep. 16, 1974

Joaquín Castro
D-Texas (20)

On the issues: Passionate about civil rights, pro-affirmative action; has focused on education as a component of

Elected Office: None

Career: Practicing attorney, 1986-2012

Education: Hamilton College, B.A., 1983; University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1986

Religion: Catholic

Family: Married, Marion Munley Cartwright; two children

Born: Oct. 17, 1961

Freshmen Democrats
new economic-stimulus spending, as well as Obama’s plan to let Bush’s tax cuts for the wealthy expire.

**John Delaney**

D-Md. (06)

- Born: April 16, 1963
- Family: Married, April McClain-Delaney; four children
- Religion: Catholic
- Education: Columbia University, B.A., 1985; Georgetown University, M.B.A., 1990
- Career: Founder, CEO, CapitalSource, 2000-10; founder, CEO, Healthcare Financial Partners, 2008-09; vice president, director, state Department of Revenue, 2010-12; consultant, Global Partnerships, 2008-09; vice president, Microsoft, 2004-07; president, CEO, Nimble Technology.
- Elected Office: None

**Suzan DelBene**

D-Wash. (01)

- Born: Feb. 17, 1963
- Family: Married, Kurt DelBene; two children
- Religion: Episcopalian
- Career: Director, state Department of Revenue, 2010-12; consultant, Global Partnerships, 2008-09; vice president, director, state Department of Revenue, 2010-12; consultant, Global Partnerships, 2008-09; vice president, Microsoft, 2004-07; president, CEO, Nimble Technology.
- Elected Office: None

On the issues:

- Campaigned as a social liberal, championing same-sex marriage and women’s issues; aligns himself with centrist-leaning, business-minded Democrats like Bill Clinton, who is a friend, as well as Sen. Mark Warner, on fiscal issues.
- Touts business background; wants to use policy to create opportunities for families; supports new economic-stimulus spending, as well as Obama’s plan to let Bush’s tax cuts for the wealthy expire.

**Freshmen Democrats**

Updated: Nov. 4, 2012

Tammy Duckworth  
D-Ill. (08)  
Born: March 12, 1968  
Family: Married, Bryan Bowlsbey  
Religion: Deist  
Education: University of Hawaii, B.A., 1989; George Washington University, M.A., 1992  
Career: Assistant secretary, U.S. Veterans Affairs Department; director, Illinois Veterans Affairs Department; manager, Rotary International, 2003-04  
On the Issues: Emphasized her military service and experience in veterans’ affairs  

Bill Enyart  
D-Ill. (12)  
Born: Sept. 22, 1949  
Family: Married, Annette Eckert; two children  
Religion: United Church of Christ  
Education: University of Illinois; Southern Illinois University (Edwardsville), B.A., 1974; Southern Illinois University (Carbondale), J.D., 1979; U.S. Army War College, M.S.S., 2000  
Career: Adjutant general, Illinois National Guard, 2007-12; practicing attorney, 1979-2007; president and COO, Doc’s Distributing  
On the Issues: Emphasized the necessity of job creation in downtrodden 12th district; criticized opponent for refusing to release tax returns; tied to Obama’s campaign  

Freshmen Democrats
Elizabeth Esty
D-Conn. (05)

Born: Aug. 25, 1959
Family: Married, Dan Esty; three children
Religion: Congregationalist
Education: Harvard University, B.A., 1976; Harvard University, Ph.D., 1983
Elected Office: Connecticut House, 2008-10; Cheshire Town Council, 2005-08

On the issues:
Pushed to reinvigorate manufacturing in her ailing factory-dominated district by working for infrastructure improvements, creating internships to train future manufacturers, and creating better access to credit for small businesses; defended women's reproductive rights as attorney; on Cheshire Town Council, worked on providing tax relief for senior citizens and reducing town’s debt as state representative; voted to abolish the death penalty.

Bill Foster
D-Ill. (11)

Born: Oct. 7, 1955
Family: Married, Aesook Byon; two children
Religion: No affiliation
Education: University of Wisconsin, B.A., 1976; Harvard University, Ph.D., 1983
Elected Office: U.S. House, 2008-10

On the issues:
On House Financial Services Committee, supported financial market bailouts; restored $62.5M in funding for Fermilab; voted for Obama’s stimulus act and health care reform; on Cheshire Town Council, 2005-08; Cheshire Town Council, 2005-08; Professor, American University, 1991-92; Practicing attorney, 1986-1990

Freshmen Democrats
Lois Frankel  
D-Fla. (22)  
Born: May 16, 1948  
Family: Divorced; one child  
Religion: Jewish  
Education: Boston University, B.A., 1970; Georgetown University, J.D., 1973  
Career: Practicing attorney, 1978-2003; assistant public defender, West Palm Beach, 1974-78  
Elected Office: Mayor, West Palm Beach, 2003-11; president, Healthy Hawaii Coalition, 2000-present  
On the issues: Opposes Rep. Paul Ryan’s budget plan; pro-choice; also opposed to privatizing Medicare; as state minority leader, wrote Florida’s first AIDS law, ensuring confidentiality in testing  

Tulsi Gabbard  
D-Hawaii (02)  
Born: April 12, 1981  
Family: Divorced  
Religion: Hindu  
Education: Hawaii Pacific University, B.S., 2009  
Career: Founder, Kanu Productions, 2011-present; cofounder, Healthy Hawaii Coalition, 2000-present  
Military Service: Army National Guard, 2003-present; Iraq, 2003-04  
Elected Office: Honolulu City Council, 2010-present; Hawaii House, 2002-04  
Legislative aide, Sen. Daniel Akaka, 2006-07  
On the issues: Pro-gay marriage; focuses on energy and environmental issues, running on a platform for investing in alternative energy as a way of diversifying Hawaii’s tourism-dependent economy; as state minority leader, wrote Florida’s first AIDS law, ensuring confidentiality in testing  

Freshmen Democrats
Freshmen Democrats

Pete Gallego
D-Tex. (23)

Born: Dec. 2, 1961
Family: Married, Maria Elena Ramon; one child
Religion: Catholic
Education: Sul Ross State University, B.A., 1982; University of Texas, J.D., 1985
Elected Office: None

On the Issues: Promotes Cuban-American rights; believes energy is the most important sector in America; against gay marriage and voting in favor of parental-consent laws for minors seeking abortions; Catholic views; opposes parental consent laws with the League of Conservation Voters; backs

Joe Garcia
D-Fla. (26)

Born: Oct. 12, 1963
Family: Divorced; one child
Religion: Catholic
Education: University of Miami, B.A., 1987; J.D., 1991
Elected Office: None

On the Issues: Promises to remain tied to district; backed by League of Conservation Voters; sides with Catholic views; promotes Cuban-American rights; believes energy is the most important sector in America.
Alan Grayson
D-Fla. (09)
Born: March 13, 1958
Family: Married, Lolita Grayson; five children
Religion: Jewish
On the issues: Progressive liberal views; touted experience fighting corrupt defense contractors, called for ending tax breaks for the wealthy and establishing a lower estate-tax rate

Denny Heck
D-Wash. (10)
Born: July 29, 1952
Family: Married, Paula Heck; two children
Religion: Lutheran
Education: Evergreen State College, B.A., 1973
Career: Cofounder, board member, Intrepid Learning Solutions, 1999-present; president, co-founder and CEO, TWV, 1993-present; chief of staff, Gov. Booth Gardner, 1989-93
On the issues: Strong background in education support, helping to write the Washington Basic Education Act in 1988; joins with Rep. Ron Paul of Texas to pass the “Audit the Fed” bill; promised to protect entitlements

Federal Reserve critic—joined with Rep. Ron Paul of Texas to pass the “Audit the Fed” bill; promised to protect entitlements
Steven Horsford
D-Nev. (04)
Born: April 29, 1973
Family: Married, Sonya Horsford; three children
Religion: Baptist
Education: University of Nevada-Reno, attended, 1992-97, 2009
Career: CEO, Culinary Training Academy, 2001-present
Elected Office: Nevada Senate, 2004-present

On the Issues:
- Emphasized experience in aiding Nevada’s largest industry, hospitality
- Attacked opponent for “hard line on immigration”

Jared Huffman
D-Calif. (02)
Born: Feb. 18, 1964
Family: Married, Susan Huffman; two children
Religion: No religious affiliation
Education: University of California-Santa Barbara, B.A., 1986; Boston College, J.D., 1990
Elected Office: California Assembly, 2006-present
Board member, Marin Municipal Water District, 1990-94

On the Issues:
- As attorney, worked on antitrust litigation and made a name for self in Title IX cases pursuing gender equity
- On state Assembly, blocked efforts by Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to construct death-row complex at San Quentin

Freshmen Democrats

Case 2:16-cr-00365   Document 212-4   Filed 06/02/19   Page 773 of 1649
Freshmen Democrats

Hakeem Jeffries
D-N.Y. (08)
Born: Aug. 4, 1970
Family: Married, Kennisandra Jeffries; two children
Religion: Baptist
Education: Binghamton University, B.A., 1992; Georgetown University, M.P.P., 1994; New York University, J.D., 2003; Harvard University, B.S., 2003; assistant district attorney, Cape & Islands, 2009-2011; Peace Corps, 2004-06
Elected Office: New York Assembly, 2006-present
On the issues: Continue Kennedy political legacy; made "fairness" central to campaign; emphasized need to level economic playing field and create equal opportunity for education and jobs; pro-choice; independent redistricting authority; elimination of the NYPD's "stop-and-frisk" database; as well as introduced legislation to establish an affordable housing database and passed a bill forcing the

Joe Kennedy
D-Mass. (04)
Born: Oct. 4, 1980
Family: Single
Religion: Catholic
Education: Stanford University, B.S., 2003; Harvard University, J.D., 2009
Career: Assistant district attorney, Middlesex County, 2011-12; assistant district attorney, Cape & Islands, 2009-2003; Peace Corps, 2004-06
Elected Office: None
On the issues: Continue Kennedy political legacy; made "fairness" central to campaign; emphasized need to level economic playing field and create equal opportunity for education and jobs; pro-choice; independent redistricting authority; elimination of the NYPD's "stop-and-frisk" database; as well as introduced legislation to establish an affordable housing database and passed a bill forcing the
Freshmen Democrats

Daniel Kildee
D-Mich. (05)

Born: August 11, 1958
Family: Married; Jennifer Kildee; three children
Religion: Catholic
Career: President and CEO, Center for Community Progress, 2009-present; youth specialist, Whaley Children’s Center, 1976-1985

On the issue: Will follow in footsteps of mentor and predecessor Rep. Norm Dicks; strong background in urban planning; seen as radical on board of Education; fought for ban on corporal punishment; expressed desire to sit on committees that deal with urban policy, such as the Financial Services Committee and the Transportation Committee.

Derek Kilmer
D-Wash. (06)

Born: Jan. 1, 1974
Family: Married; Jennifer Kilmer; two children
Religion: Methodist
Education: Princeton University, B.A., 1996; Oxford University, Ph.D., 2003

On the issue: Follow in footsteps of mentor and predecessor Rep. Norm Dicks; strong background in economic development and continued interests in using skills to foster growth; promoted job creation legislation; continued interest in using skills to foster growth; promoted job creation legislation.
Ann Kirkpatrick
D-Ariz. (01)
Born: March 14, 1950
Family: Married, Roger Curley; four children.
Religion: Catholic
Education: University of Arizona, B.A., 1972; Georgetown University, J.D., 1978
Elected Office: None
On the issues: Promotes Native American rights and welfare, having previously worked to provide tribes with money to build communication infrastructure; in tenure in House, supported Obama’s agenda, voting for stimulus and health care reform.

Ann Kuster
D-N.H. (02)
Born: Sept. 5, 1956
Family: Married, Brad Kuster; two children.
Religion: Episcopalian
Education: Dartmouth College, B.A., 1978; Georgetown University, J.D., 1984
On the issues: Calls for a return to Clinton-era tax rate; supports Obama’s health care reform.
On the issues: Stresses bipartisan background; in career, focused on issues of the aging and health
Elected Office: Commissioner, Bernallillo County, 2010-present
Agency on Aging, 1991-2004
Secretary, New Mexico Aging & Long-Term Services, Department; 2004-Present, New Mexico State
Career: Co-owner, Delta Consulting Group, 2008-Present; Secretary, New Mexico Department of Health,
Education: University of New Mexico, B.A., 1981; J.D., 1987
Religion: Catholic
Family: Widowed; two children
Born: Oct. 24, 1959

On the issues: Stresses bipartisan background; in career, focused on issues of the aging and health
Elected Office: California Senate, 2004-present; Assembly, 2002-2004; Long Beach City Council, 1992-98
Career: Professor, California State University (Long Beach), 1996-98
Education: Hobart College, B.A., 1967; Ohio State University, M.S., 1965; Ph.D., 1971
Religion: Jewish
Family: Married, Deborah Lowenthal; two children
Born: March 8, 1941

On the issues: Stresses bipartisan background; in career, focused on issues of the aging and health
Elected Office: Commissioner, Bernallillo County, 2010-present
Agency on Aging, 1991-2004
Secretary, New Mexico Aging & Long-Term Services, Department; 2004-Present, New Mexico State
Career: Co-owner, Delta Consulting Group, 2008-Present; Secretary, New Mexico Department of Health,
Education: University of New Mexico, B.A., 1981; J.D., 1987
Religion: Catholic
Family: Widowed; two children
Born: Oct. 24, 1959

On the issues: Stresses bipartisan background; in career, focused on issues of the aging and health
Elected Office: Commissioner, Bernallillo County, 2010-present
Agency on Aging, 1991-2004
Secretary, New Mexico Aging & Long-Term Services, Department; 2004-Present, New Mexico State
Career: Co-owner, Delta Consulting Group, 2008-Present; Secretary, New Mexico Department of Health,
Education: University of New Mexico, B.A., 1981; J.D., 1987
Religion: Catholic
Family: Widowed; two children
Born: Oct. 24, 1959
On the issues: Strong opponent of Iraq War; fought to include billions of dollars for school construction in the Democrats' economic stimulus bill during his term in the House of Representatives from 2008-10.


Prudential Capital Management; 2006-08; campaign coordinator; 1997-2000; press aide;

Brown University, B.A.; 1990; Columbia University, M.S.; 1991; Harvard University, M.P.; 1995

Religion: Catholic

Family: Married, Abby Davidson Maffei

Born: July 4, 1968

Dan Maffei

D-N.Y. (24)

Freshmen Democrats

Sean Patrick Maloney

D-N.Y. (18)

On the issues: Self-described "Bill Clinton Democrat" aligns himself with centrist Democratic politics;

Elected Office: None

COO, Kiodex. 2000-03; special assistant/deputy assistant White House, 1997-2000


Education: University of Virginia, B.A., 1988; J.D., 1992

Religion: Catholic

Family: Partner, Randy Fiske

Born: July 30, 1966

Updated: Nov 14, 2012

National Journal Membership
Grace Meng  
**D-N.Y. (06)**

**Born:** Oct. 1, 1975  
**Family:** Husband, Wayne Kye; two children  
**Religion:** Christian  
**Education:** University of Michigan, B.A., 1997; Yeshiva University, J.D., 2002  
**Career:** Practicing attorney, 2003-present  
**Elected Office:** New York Assembly, 2009-present; California Senate, 2006-12

**On the issues:**
- Prioritizes bolstering Queens’ transportation infrastructure and expanding the borough’s potential for tourism.  
- Calls for higher income taxes for the rich.  
- Promises to hire more police officers and firefighters to improve public safety.  
- Supports anti-discrimination efforts and senior citizens’ issues.

Gloria Negrete McLeod  
**D-Cali. (35)**

**Born:** Sep. 6, 1941  
**Family:** Married, Gilbert McLeod; 10 children  
**Religion:** Catholic  
**Education:** Chaffey College, A.A., 1975  
**Career:** Instructional aide, Chaffey College, 1986-95  
**Elected Office:** California Assembly, 2000-06; California Senate, 2006-12

**On the issues:**
- Supports gun control.  
- Accused opponent Rep. Joe Barton of not doing enough to help veterans.  
- Supports gun control.  
- Accused opponent Rep. Joe Barton of not doing enough to help veterans.  
- Supports gun control.

**Freshmen Democrats**

Freshmen Democrats

Rick Nolan
D-Minn. (08)
Born: Dec. 17, 1943
Family: Married, Mary Nolan; four children
Religion: Catholic
Education: University of Minnesota, B.A., 1966
On the issues: Liberal voting record; previously battled large-farm favoritism by the federal government, pushed legislation proposing education programs, equipment loans, and tax-code changes for small farmers; record of job creation and international diplomacy; inspired to run for Congress by lack of local jobs, will push for small-business tax breaks and infrastructure investment.

Beto O'Rourke
D-Texas (06)
Born: Sept. 26, 1972
Family: Married, Amy Sanders; three children
Religion: Catholic
Education: Columbia University, B.A., 1995
Career: Owner, Stanton Street Technology Group, 1999-present
Elected Office: El Paso City Council, 2005-11
On the issues: Promotes economic development, trying to reverse trend of youth moving from El Paso; won City Council, worked to save primary form of public transportation from near meltdown; accused primary opponent Rep. Silvestre Reyes of not doing enough on the Veterans Affairs Committee and failing to on the issues: Promotes economic development, trying to reverse trend of youth moving from El Paso; won City Council, worked to save primary form of public transportation from near meltdown; accused primary opponent Rep. Silvestre Reyes of not doing enough on the Veterans Affairs Committee and failing to
Donald Payne, Jr.  
D-N.J. (10)  
Born: Dec. 17, 1958  
Family: Married, Bea Payne; three children  
Religion: Baptist  
Education: Kean College, attended  
Career: District leader, Newark's South Ward, 1992-present  
Elected Office: Newark Municipal Council, 2006-present; freeholder-at-large, Essex County, 2006-present  
On the issues: Cites job creation as chief priority  
Gay rights: Interested in health care and extending insurance coverage; in state assembly, voted for business tax  

Mark Pocan  
D-Wis. (02)  
Born: Aug. 14, 1964  
Family: Married, Phillip Frank  
Religion: No affiliation  
Education: University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.A., 1986  
Career: Owner, Budget Signs & Specialties, 1988-present; public relations specialist, Wisconsin Realtors Association; owner, Budget Signs & Specialties, 1988-present; public relations specialist, Wisconsin Realtors Association  
Elected Office: Wisconsin Assembly, 1998-2012; Dane County Board of Supervisors, 1991-96  
On the issues: Progressive liberal values similar to predecessor, Rep. Tammy Baldwin; openly gay and promotes gay rights; interested in health care and extending insurance coverage; in state assembly, voted for business tax
Freshmen Democrats

Raul Ruiz
D-Calif. (36)
Born: Aug. 25, 1972
Family: Single
Religion: Seventh-Day Adventist
Education: University of California-Los Angeles, B.S., 1994; M.D., 2001; M.P.H. 2007
On the Issues: Aims for greater bipartisanship; focuses on business, science, and healthcare

Brad Schneider
D-Ill. (10)
Born: Aug. 20, 1961
Family: Married, Julie Dann; two children
Religion: Jewish
Education: Northwestern University, B.S., 1983; M.B.A. 1988
On the Issues: Aims for greater bipartisanship; touts pro-business stance, arguing that government needs to help companies by investing in education and upgrading infrastructure; strongly supports Israel and advocates for peace in the Middle East
Freshmen Democrats

Carol Shea-Porter
D-N.H. (01)

Born: Dec. 2, 1952
Family: Married, Gene Porter; two children
Religion: Catholic
Career: Social worker; community college instructor
On the issues: Known for liberal politics, balanced by willingness to work with Republicans to pass legislation on human trafficking and other issues; active on gay rights issues.

Elected Office: Arizona Senate, 2011-12; Arizona House, 2005-11
Worker, 1995-2002
Career: Instructor, Center for Progressive Leadership; 2006-present; practicing attorney, 2005-present; political consultant; 2005-2006
Education: Brigham Young University, B.A., 1997; Arizona State University, M.A., 1999; J.D., 2004; Ph.D., 2012
Religion: No affiliation
Family: Single
Born: July 12, 1976

Kyrsten Sinema
D-Ariz. (09)

Born: July 12, 1976
Family: Single
Religion: No affiliation
Education: Brigham Young University, B.A., 1995; Arizona State University, M.A., 1999; J.D., 2004; Ph.D., 2012
Career: Instructor, Center for Progressive Leadership, 2006-present; practicing attorney, 2005-present; social worker, 1995-2002
On the issues: Known for liberal politics, balanced by willingness to work with Republicans to pass legislation on human trafficking and other issues; active on gay rights issues.

Elected Office: Arizona Senate, 2011-12; Arizona House, 2005-11
Worker, 1995-2002
Career: Instructor, Center for Progressive Leadership; 2006-present; practicing attorney, 2005-present; political consultant; 2005-2006
Education: Brigham Young University, B.A., 1997; Arizona State University, M.A., 1999; J.D., 2004; Ph.D., 2012
Religion: No affiliation
Family: Single
Born: July 12, 1976

Case 2:16-cr-00365 Document 212-4 Filed 06/02/19 Page 783 of 1649
Freshmen Democrats

Eric Swalwell
D-Calif. (15)
Born: Nov. 16, 1980
Family: Single
Religion: Christian
Education: University of Maryland, B.A., 2003; J.D., 2006
Career: Deputy district attorney, Alameda County, 2000-present
Elected Office: Deputy district attorney, Alameda County, 2000-present

On the issues: Self-described solid Democrat, but reached out to Republicans and Independents by saying he would at least listen as their congressman; made the case that it was time for a change when running against 40-year tenured Dem incumbent Pete Stark.

Mark Takano
D-Calif. (41)
Born: Dec. 10, 1960
Family: Single
Religion: Methodist
Education: Harvard University, B.A., 1983; University of California-Riverside, teaching credential, 1987; M.F.A., 2010
Career: Teacher, Rialto Unified School District, 1988-present; substitute teacher, Boston, 1984-85
Elected Office: Board of Trustees, Riverside Community College District, 1999-present

On the issues: Ran as a populist, attacking lobbyists and powerful oil and insurance companies; stressed job creation, job training, and education reform; hopes victory will be breakthrough for LGBT rights.
Dina Titus
D-Nev. (01)

Born: May 23, 1950
Family: Married, Tom Wright
Religion: Greek Orthodox
Education: College of William and Mary, B.A., 1973; Florida State University, M.A., 1977; Harvard University, J.D., 1991
Career: Professor, University of Nevada-Las Vegas, 1977-2011; professor, North Texas State University, 1975-76
Elected Office: California Senate, 2010-present; San Diego City Council, 1993-96
On the issues: Advocate for people with disabilities

Juan Vargas
D-Calif. (51)

Born: March 7, 1961
Family: Married, Adrienne Vargas; two children
Religion: Catholic
Education: University of San Diego, B.A., 1983; Fordham University, M.A., 1987; Harvard University, J.D., 1991
Career: Vice president, external affairs, Safeco Insurance, 2006-08; vice president, corporate legal, Liberty Mutual Group, 2008-2010
Elected Office: California Senate, 2010-present; California Assembly, 2000-06; San Diego City Council, 1993-2000
On the issues: Took pro-union stances and advocated government support for children and the elderly; sponsored bill mandating the reporting of child abuse by athletics coaches in California

Freshmen Democrats
On the issues: Has at times backed GOP office-seekers, but aligned himself with the Democratic agenda.

Electorate: None

Career: Practicing attorney, 1988-2012
Education: Georgetown University, B.A., 1985; University of Texas, J.D., 1987
Religion: Catholic
Family: Married, Rose Vela
Born: Feb. 13, 1963

On the issues: Worked to bring a grocery store to a poor section of Fort Worth, worked to secure transportation funding for the district's roads; spent much of his time in the Texas House dealing with banking and pension issues; served on an environment-regulations committee; interested in joining the Financial Services and Armed Services committees and the Congressional Black Caucus.

Electorate: Texas House, 2004-present
Education: Texas Wesleyan University, B.S., 1995
Religion: Baptist
Family: Married, Tonya Vela; one child
Born: Jan. 3, 1971

Updated Nov. 4, 2012

Freshmen Democrats
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Rains add to worries of Moroccans in shantytowns Nov. 11, 2012</td>
<td>Recent rain in Morocco is a boon to farmers but devastating to the urban poor, making life in shantytowns and dilapidated buildings even more unpleasant and difficult. Travel is more difficult and there is always the danger of the shanty falling down on the heads of residents. The rainy season also draws attention to the “aging worn-out structures” in Rabat and Casablanca. Morocco’s 2004 initiative to eliminate shantytowns, costing $25 billion dirhams, is 70% complete.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco reacts to terror arrests Nov. 12, 2012</td>
<td>Public opinion in Morocco is split over several large-scale terror arrests. The past month has seen a significant spike in reported apprehensions. While most applaud the efforts of the security services, others are sceptical and want precise and transparent information about these arrests to be released. Others are concerned that Morocco might have more terror cells hiding within the country.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Compensation Fund strains Morocco budget Nov. 13, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco's Compensation Fund is weighing heavily on the state budget, with officials warning reforms as an urgent necessity. The government has set a target of holding Compensation Fund expenditures to a sustainable level and seeks to target the poorest members of the population by giving them direct conditional money transfers.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco launches job training projects Nov. 15, 2012</td>
<td>New training centers aim to improve the employability of young Moroccans. King Mohammed VI opened one such facility in Marrakech. The site will offer vocational instruction in the building trades and public works sector. Another new center will focus on training for the handicraft industry.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green Prophet</strong></td>
<td>Morocco is Building a Mega “Green City” Named After King Mohammed VI Nov. 12, 2012</td>
<td>Mohammed VI Green City, a future “eco” development is being built just outside of Benguerir. Exactly what will make the Mohammed VI Green City so green has yet to be established, though plans are underway to develop a 4km, 80 hectare corridor between this new development and Benguerir that will be planted with 50,000 trees. The project sounds much like another so-called “eco-city” in the Middle East, namely Masdar City.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green Prophet</strong></td>
<td>Spain Ditches Morocco’s Desertec Solar Project</td>
<td>Morocco’s ambitious Desertec solar energy project received a setback after Spain failed to show for the official signing of the agreement that aims to transform North Africa’s energy market. Spain is a key partner in</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Polisario Denounces Expulsion of International Observers =</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>Nov. 13, 2012</td>
<td>the Desertec project.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dear Team,

Below please find the October 2012 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

October 2012 Events Bulletin

October 2

Women after the Arab Awakening

October 11
FYI: While in no way wishing to vouch for its accuracy, we thought you might be interested in the following item:

A number of the “countries calling for military intervention in northern Mali” have officially asked Morocco to participate in operations, given the long experience of Moroccan forces in desert war.

Sources told Assabah (27/11) that Moroccan participation would allow the country’s intelligence services “to have a foothold” in this area “long dominated by Algeria, which keeps nourishing the terrorist movements there”.

The sources added that Morocco’s participation should not exceed 300 special forces soldiers, as the jihadists, some of which come from Polisario camps, are digging in for a long war.
وقالت نفس المصادر أن مشاركة القوات المغربية لن تتجاوز 300 عنصر، من نخبة عناصر القوات المسلحة، مدربين على القتال في حروب الصحراء، وهو الأمر الذي يطلبه التحالف العسكري للتدخل في شمال مالي، بالنظر إلى أن حركات الجهاد تتوقع "حرب رمال" قد تطول مدةها في منطقة أصبحت تحمل اسم "ساحلتان". يتم فيها تجنيد مقاتلين مقابل تعويضات تصل إلى ثلاثة آلاف أورو للمجند الواحد، بعضهم قدم من مخيمات بوليساريو، وسبق له أن عمل في جبهات عسكرية بتدوف.
The information contained in this report are from open and reliable closed sources, but has not been corroborated by third parties.

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
November 30, 2012

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- The municipal and provincial elections have passed off amid the usual indifference.
- Interior Minister Ould Kablia has indicated that the process of constitutional reform should begin soon with the appointment of a commission in charge of drafting amendments.
- At least three figures previously identified as possible successors to Bouteflika – former Prime Ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul – seem for various reasons to be out of the running for the 2014 presidential election.
- Ali Benflis, Bouteflika's unlucky challenger in 2004, may now be emerging as a serious contender, possibly enjoying the support of DRS chief Tewfik.
- On the other hand, the regime’s need for stability and continuity may mean that President Bouteflika will run for a fourth term of office after all.

Foreign Relations

- Despite the ECOWAS resolution approving military action, there will be no quick solution to the crisis in northern Mali. At least six months' preparation are thought to be necessary for an military intervention, once it has been okayed by the UNSC in mid-December.
- Algiers has been restating its opposition to military “adventures” in northern Mali, and has been engaging the Ansar Dine and MNLA rebel groups in dialogue, with at least superficial success.
- As French President François Hollande's visit to Algeria draws near, differences between Algiers and Paris on the way forward in northern Mali are thus increasingly open.
- Algiers will not be reassured by an apparent warming of relations between France and Morocco, amid unconfirmed reports that Paris has sought the participation of Moroccan special forces in any military operation to reconquer northern Mali.

Security

- Jihadist activity has continued to decline, dropping to particularly low levels in November.
- Although there was one minor incident in Algiers, the bulk of jihadist activity has been recorded in AQMI's heartland in Kabylia.
- There have been sporadic incidents, mostly involving suspected gun-runners on Algeria's southern borders, notably with Libya.
- Towards the end of November, security forces rounded up over 60 suspected sympathisers of MUJAO in the Wilaya of Tamanrasset.
On Nov. 29, Algerians went to the polls for the second time this year, this time to elect municipal and provincial councils. As is now usual, the election was greeted with indifference and cynicism by large swathes of the population – with the added disincentives, this time round, of torrential rain in many areas and, in the Béjaïa region, two moderately sized earthquakes. Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia nonetheless announced a turnout of 44.26% - very slightly higher than the turnout in the last local elections in 2007, and very close (many would say suspiciously close) to the forecast Ould Kablia himself had made two days previously. As usual, according to the official results, the FLN came out on top, with the RND not very far behind. Also as usual, there have been claims of fraud and ballot rigging by officials, which have been dismissed by the Interior Ministry.

True to form if not to reality, official news agency APS proclaimed the local elections “another step forward in strengthening democracy”. Those interested in the path the Algerian state is really taking, however, will have been looking to other, more meaningful events on the political calendar. On the one hand, there is the process of constitutional reform – as promised in President Bouteflika's famous televised address of April 2011, in the midst of the first wave of the “Arab spring”. Ould Kablia announced on Nov. 21 that the ball is to be set rolling in the coming weeks with the appointment of a commission to draft proposed amendments to the constitution; the commission's recommendations will be discussed by the government, perhaps in the second quarter of 2013 according to Ould Kablia, before being submitted for approval either by parliament or by referendum. And on the other hand, there is the presidential election – now less than a year and a half away.

Over the past few months, we have watched the fortunes of a number of possible contenders for the presidency unfold – or, perhaps, unwind. FLN leader Abdelaziz Belkhadem's ambitions, it will be recalled, were an open secret, but his chances have been badly damaged by the open revolt against his leadership which has been festering within his party for months now. At the same time, RND leader Ahmed Ouyahia, long thought to have been DRS chief Mohamed Tewfik Médiène's favoured candidate to succeed Bouteflika, seems to have been pushed into the background, especially since he was replaced as Prime Minister at the beginning of September. More recently, there had been some speculation that Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul, who this autumn set up his new party, the TAJ, apparently with the connivance of the authorities, was perhaps being groomed as a docile successor to Bouteflika – the skeletons in his closet from the corruption-ridden episode of the East-West motorway project making him all the easier for the DRS to control[1]. In mid-November, however, French-language daily Algérie News began to bring those skeletons out into the public eye, printing revelations of bribe-taking in connection with the East-West motorway project, implicating not only Ghoul, but also Belkhadem and Industry Minister Cherif Rahmani. The daily claimed to be in possession of "confidential files" and hinted that more revelations were to come, which suggests that it may have been fed the compromising information by the DRS, or elements within it, in a deliberate move to puncture any presidential ambitions Ghoul may have been harbouring. A former DRS officer and one-time presidential advisor says that Ghoul is now "toast" and Belkhadem marginalised, and confirms that the waning of Ouyahia's star followed a serious falling-out between him and Tewfik.

The same former DRS officer went on to claim that Tewfik is now grooming Ali Benflis, Bouteflika's unlucky
challenger in the 2004 presidential election, to succeed him in the 2014 poll, describing Benflis as the "dominant figure" now within the FLN[2]. Interestingly, some days after the source made this claim in a private conversation, leading Arabic-language daily *Al-Khabar* (27/11/12) published an account of a meeting Ali Benflis had purportedly convened at his family home with a number of leading members of the FLN to announce his intention of running for president in 2014, now that he had received "assurances" that Bouteflika would not be standing for a fourth term of office due to ill-health. Benflis is reported to have phoned *Al-Khabar* with a denial the same day, but the former FLN Secretary General is nonetheless clearly a man to watch over the coming months.

As it happens, same issue of *Al-Khabar* carried, on the page opposite the article on Ali Benflis' alleged presidential bid, a full-page advertisement paid for by millionaire member of parliament for Annaba Bahaeddine Tliba[3], beseeching President Bouteflika to run for a fourth term of office in 2014. While it is conceivable that this is no more than a personal initiative of Tliba's, it is worth remembering that pseudo-spontaneous appeals for an ostensibly reluctant head of state to reconsider his supposed plans for retirement have long been a set-piece of pre-electoral periods in autocratic republics across the Arab world. And while Bouteflika did seem to be signalling his readiness to bow out when he gave his now famous “*tab djenanena*”[4] speech in Setif in May of this year, there has been mounting speculation that he may not be ready to give up the presidency yet after all. Indeed, the same ex-DRS source cited above suggests that until recently, Bouteflika was in two minds about running again in 2014, though his family had been urging him to do so, but may now be inclined to stay on for a fourth term of office because of developments in Mali and the South: in the turmoil that is afflicting the region and threatening Algeria itself, Bouteflika would, it is argued, be a symbol of the stability and continuity of the Algerian state.

**Foreign Relations**

If the situation in Mali and the Sahel is impinging on the calculations made at the top of the Algerian state with regard to the 2014 presidential election, it is because it is becoming increasingly clear that the crisis set in motion by the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali in the first months of 2012 will not be short-lived. On the contrary, despite the best efforts of various concerned parties – the Malian government, ECOWAS, France, the United Nations – to set deadlines and timetables for 'solving' the north Mali crisis, the real time scale for any kind of meaningful action keeps stretching further and further into the future. In accordance with UNSC Resolution 2071, passed in mid-October, ECOWAS duly convened on Nov. 11 to approve military intervention by its member states' armed forces, with the support of Western powers, and France is now pushing hard for a new UNSC resolution approving this, to be voted on it is hoped in mid-December. France and other EU states, including Germany and it is thought Great Britain, are already involved in discussions of the practicalities of military intervention with ECOWAS governments. But in contrast to the bold prognoses made by French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in the early autumn, according to which a military intervention was then only “a matter of weeks” away, there is a growing realisation that it will take at least six months to equip and prepare the ECOWAS force and plan its mission properly; at the UN and in military-to-military discussions, the United States appears to be urging greater caution and an even longer time scale, on the grounds that the 3,500 men
promised by ECOWAS will simply not be sufficient to take on the job. Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, reporting to the Security Council at the end of November, has expressed the view that, while military action may ultimately be necessary against the “most extremist” elements in northern Mali, any such intervention requires far more preparation if a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe is to be averted, and that in the meantime “political dialogue” must be given pride of place.

Tactically speaking, this is to the advantage of Algiers, which, while vacillating somewhat on the rights and wrongs of the principle of military intervention against the hard core AQMI and MUJAO in northern Mali, has consistently foregrounded dialogue with those rebel groups that can be engaged as the best way forward – an approach which enables the Algerians, and in particular the DRS\[5\], to leverage their extensive knowledge of and contacts in northern Mali. And indeed the Algerian authorities have lost no time in initiating talks with both the Tuareg separatist MNLA and the Islamist Ansar Dine, both in Algiers and in Ouagadougou (under the auspices of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, ECOWAS’ designated mediator). Superficially at least, this approach seems to have borne fruit remarkably quickly. MNLA spokesmen have made concessions on the group’s central demand of independence, claiming that a form of autonomy within a federation may be acceptable, and have engaged the hardcore Islamist MUJAO in battle in the Gao region as of mid-November. Spokesmen for Ansar Dine, meanwhile, have claimed\[6\] that the organisation has “broken with terrorism” and enjoys “very good relations” with the MNLA, and renounced the goal of conquering the whole of Mali to establish sharia law across the entire country; furthermore, the group has on at least one occasion intercepted cigarette smugglers in the Malian desert who are believed to have been raising funds on behalf of AQMI and/or MUJAO. Gratifyingly for the Algerian authorities, Cheikh Awisa, one of Ansar Dine’s political and military leaders, has recently stated that the organisation insists that any “decisive solution” must be “found and signed in Algiers.”

In this context, as forecast in our last report, the differences between the French and Algerian positions are again becoming increasingly visible, even as French President François Hollande’s visit to Algiers approaches. Questioned by reporters in Paris on Nov. 20, Hollande continued to foreground the military solution and categorically ruled out any talks with “groups linked with terrorism” (which, by French definitions, ought to encompass Ansar Dine); speaking at the same time on Algerian radio, Algerian Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia laid out a diametrically opposite position, insisting that “trying to reconstitute Mali’s territorial unity by force would be an adventure that will never succeed.”

Hollande is due to visit Algiers in mid-December, around the time the Security Council meets to approve the ECOWAS intervention plan. This in itself does not bode well for efforts to build a new entente between France and Algeria – all the more so given that the slight advantage Algiers may have felt it had acquired vis à vis Morocco, France’s traditional partner in the Maghreb, appears to be evaporating. After six months of silence on the question following the election of the new centre-left government, Paris has reaffirmed its support for the Moroccan autonomy plan in for Western Sahara, while Rabat has finally appointed a new ambassador to Paris in the person of Chakib Benmoussa (former Interior Minister and one-time chief negotiator at the Manhasset talks), putting an end to rumours of a “silent crisis” in Franco-Moroccan relations. A visit to Rabat by Prime
Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault accompanied by several members of his government has been scheduled for December 12-13, just before Hollande's trip to Algiers, as if to reassure the Moroccans of the continuity of their 'special relationship' with Paris. And in the meantime, rumours have begun to crop up in the Moroccan press to the effect that the contribution of Moroccan special forces has been solicited for the forthcoming northern Mali operation (according to one version, by Hollande himself, during the summit of French-speaking nations in Kinshasa in October, with the offer of debt forgiveness as an incentive). While these reports remain for the time being unconfirmed, they can scarcely be reassuring for Algiers, for whom recognising that Morocco has a legitimate interest in the Sahara-Sahel region would in effect amount to recognising Rabat's claim to Western Sahara.

Security

The level of jihadist activity continued to decline in October, and slumped heavily in November. Only three AQMI operations were reported in November, down from ten in October and 13 in September, making it the quietest month Algeria has seen in several years in terms of jihadist activity. The reason for the abrupt fall in AQMI activity in November is most likely the inclement weather that hit northern Algeria in the middle of the month, but the clear downward trend we have observed over the past few months still holds. AQMI operations remain small-scale – roadside bombs and isolated shootings – and mostly concentrated in Kabylia: eight out of ten in October and all three of the attacks in November took place in the Kabyle wilayas to the east of Algiers. The level of army activity, meanwhile, has remained steady throughout the period from August to November, at around 10 operations per month, although the municipal and provincial elections on Nov. 29 did see a special mobilisation of the security forces (notably the police, with 76,000 men detailed to protecting the 27,000 polling stations across the country).

In ALGIERS the security forces on November 9 detained “two armed men, suspected of being terrorists” at a checkpoint between Zeralda and Ben Aknoun, to the west of the capital. The two men reportedly “tried to resist” and “an ambulance was called to the location” though “no shots were heard,” said El-Khabar (10/11).

The oil producing areas of the south were largely quiet, as were the southern borders, which saw no incidents after the three reported early October (see previous report). The Algerian press has persistently been reporting heightened security along the country’s southern borders, especially with Mali, with Al-Khabar (05/11) indicating that the Algerian army “has begun deploying a 50km-long electrified fence along the borders with Mali around the town of Bordj Baji Mokhtar” to block access for “terrorists and smugglers” (although this would still leave about 1,100km of unguarded border between Algeria and Mali). On Nov. 4, according to Al-Khabar (04/11) security forces “arrested a terrorist from Niger carrying a suicide belt near the Libyan border, Daraj sector, inside Algerian territory”. The man admitted he was a member of MUJAO and was planning a suicide attack against Algerian security targets in the southern wilayas. The Algerian press later reported that as many as 61 people (29 Malians, 18 Algerians and 14 people from other countries including Nigeria and Burkina Faso) were arrested in Tamanrasset on Nov. 23-24 on suspicion of contacts with terrorist groups in Mali, notably MUJAO; only four were reportedly charged with supporting terrorism, however.
The Libyan border, meanwhile, saw some incidents. The security forces around October 21 intercepted a Libyan armed group that had crossed into Algerian territory near In Amenas (wilaya of Illizi). The group, believed to be composed of a Libyan rebel commander and his armed escort, is thought to have been in Algeria to meet with weapons smugglers in the desert and close a deal. The Algerian security forces tracked the commander and arrested him some 200km south of Debdeb. On October 31 the army intercepted six smugglers near the Libyan border in the Djanet area (also in the wilaya of Illizi) and seized two offroaders and a quantity of weapons and ammunition believed to have been on the way to deliver to jihadists in northern Mali. On Oct. 28 Al-Khabar published a somewhat confused account of uncertain credibility of an AQMI emir arrested near the Libyan border while trying to racketeer a shepherd and who told the security forces during interrogation about stocks MANPADS smuggled from Libya and hidden somewhere on Algerian territory.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] See AMSR #118
[2] Benflis served as Prime Minister for three years during Bouteflika's first term, becoming General Secretary of the FLN in 2003. Having fallen out with Bouteflika he stood as the FLN candidate in the 2004 presidential election, and for a time appeared well set to beat him with the Army's tacit approval, but appears to have been robbed of his victory by a last minute deal between Bouteflika and Tewfik, which led to the lasting political marginalisation of the Army chiefs and, in its wake, a coup against him within the FLN – led by Abdelaziz Belkhadem.
[3] Tliba, who also owns Annaba football club, was elected to parliament in May on the Front National Démocratique ticket, after which he promptly defected to the FLN, becoming deputy chairman of the FLN parliamentary caucus.
[4] “Our orchard has ripened”, i.e. the younger generation is ready to take over from the generation that fought in the war of independence. See AMSR#114.
[5] A former DRS officer points out, however, that DRS chief Tewfik is unsettled by the fact that the West's main interlocutor with Algeria on the situation in northern Mali is not him but Chief of Staff Maj-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd-Saleh.
[6] Ansar Dine may not have actually broken with AQMI and MUJAO on the ground in northern Mali itself, however. Ansar Dine's core objective appears to be less the establishment of sharia law than establishing and perpetuating Iyad Ag Ghaly's dominance over the Tuareg Iforas clan and the Kidal region, and it is increasingly clear that it is quite flexible – not to say opportunistic – in pursuing that goal.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 04, 2012 8:47 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com

FYI. Minister Amrani in the WP

Morocco on the Move posted: "Washington Post, by Jennifer Rubin, Right Turn (Washington, DC, Dec. 3, 2012) -- The United States is short on allies and effective means of influencing events in the Middle East. Syria is still a bloodbath. Libya is threatened by jihadists. Egypt has taken a turn toward dictatorship. Mali is a non-functioning state in which jihadist separatists control much of the country. The "peace process" (for good reason) is going nowhere.

To break up the monotony of bad news, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is no doubt delighted to be hosting Morocco's Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani who is in Washington D.C to prepare for Clinton's upcoming trip to Morocco. Morocco will be chairing the United Nations Security Council in December when all of these issues are likely to be swirling and will be hosting a critical international gathering on Syria."
I spoke with Amrani by phone this morning. If the United States is happy to have pro-American friends in the region, Morocco is obviously delighted to have an elevated relationship, dubbed a "strategic partnership" that launched this fall. Amrani told me: "We have a longstanding relationship. Today we want to upgrade relations and deepen our dialogue. Tomorrow we will have a business conference called by Secretary Clinton." As part of this and future discussion, Amrani told me, "We would like to include new players -- civil society [leaders], business leaders. We want a unique relationship . . . a mode of cooperation, consultation and understanding. We think we can be a model."

Certainly the region could use a model of gradual evolution toward gender equality, rule of law, human rights and democracy, which in Morocco has been accelerated under King Mohammed VI. And the Obama administration could use some advice and assistance on a range of issues including Syria, Libya and Egypt.

**Clinton will visit with the king** on December 11 in a meeting expected to touch on Syria, the Palestinians and Mali where jihadists now control the northern part of the country ("It is a situation that is deteriorating," Amrani said.) Morocco supports a "double track" approach in Mali that includes both political negotiations and "military pressure" on the terror groups. On this one, Amrani said, "Africans will take the lead."

When I ask him about fears that Libya may be headed in the same direction -- a weak central government overrun by jihadists. He took the long view. "Transitions in the region -- in Tunis, Libya, Egypt -- will be long, complicated and will take time." In Libya as in other countries, Amrani cautioned, there are "no institutions, no civil societies, no political parties." In perhaps the most memorable comment in our conversation he said simply, "Democracy is culture."
That sentiment indisputable. Critics of the Obama administration point to the lack of staying power, the failure to work over the long haul on civil society building and inconsistency in opposing autocracy that hinder U.S. influence in the region. Morocco in the past has been hesitant to step forward as a model for the region but with its newly intensified relationship with the United States and the deteriorating situation throughout the region, Morocco is becoming less reticent. Amrani explained, "We can share our modest experience. We need to have success stories . . . otherwise extremists will take the lead."

On December 12, Clinton will attend the Friends of Syria meeting hosted by Morocco. Approximately 100 international delegations are expected to attend along with representatives of the Syrian opposition. Amrani deflected a question about whether there is room for optimism that Bashar al-Assad will soon be gone. He insisted, "The future of Syria should be democracy or there is no future. . . . There is no other choice." He didn't offer a view on whether the Syrian opposition has what it needs to prevail, but said, "We have to support the opposition politically and financially. Through the [United Nations] Security Council and other organizations, we need to put pressure on the regime." He added, "We should not forget the human dimension." In addition to some 38,000 dead Syrians, Turkey and other countries now feel pressure from refugees fleeing the violence.

Throughout the interview Amrani reiterated that the United States and Morocco would discuss the peace process and should try to get the parties "back on track." From the view of many in the United States this seems Pollyannish, especially in light of the Palestinian Authority's decision to bypass bilateral negotiations and go to the United Nations General Assembly for recognition. Amrani showed his diplomatic skill: "We know that in some countries and the [United] States, some were opposed [to the unilateral declaration]. But we feel a vote could be an opportunity to bring the parties back together." He affirmed that the goal should be "two independent states, living side by side with secure frontiers." While many in the United States see this as a fruitless exercise, Morocco remains convinced that "it is important to give a positive signal," as Amrani described it.

It is with a measure of frustration that Amrani expressed the plight of moderate Arab countries. "We are fed up with conflict, with crisis. We need peace. Peace can be achieved through political will."

It is, of course, the $64,000 question whether there is the will for peace in the Palestinian Authority, which has repeatedly walked away from the bargaining table and has abrogated the Oslo Accords in going to the United Nations. That said, even the appearance of progress is better than nothing, one supposes.

Meanwhile, if nothing else, the trip to Morocco should impress upon Clinton that the "Arab Spring" is not a one season episode, but a multi-year and probably multi-decade process in which the United States will have to find ways to maximize its leverage, promote reform, aid in the development of civil institutions and find new allies that can fill the breach while others (such as Egypt) may be in turmoil. For a president that too often has seemed annoyed with national security intrusions into his domestic agenda and has sought to minimize the U.S. role on the world stage, this is an inconvenient reality. Nevertheless, President Obama, Clinton and Clinton's successor would do well to develop an actual policy for the Middle East that consists of more than simply lurching from one crisis to another. If that realization is driven home on the Morocco trip, then it will be a worthwhile visit for both countries.
Unsubscribe or change your email settings at Manage Subscriptions.

Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser:
http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/2012/12/03/maybe-morocco-can-help-jennifer-rubin-the-washington-post/

Thanks for flying with WordPress.com
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 04, 2012 8:47 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com

FYI. Minister Amrani in the WP

Morocco on the Move posted: " Washington Post, by Jennifer Rubin, Right Turn (Washington, DC, Dec. 3, 2012) -- The United States is short on allies and effective means of influencing events in the Middle East. Syria is still a bloodbath. Libya is threatened by jihadists. Egypt"

Respond to this post by replying above this line

New post on Morocco On The Move

“Maybe Morocco can help” – Jennifer Rubin, The Washington Post
by Morocco on the Move

Washington Post, by Jennifer Rubin, Right Turn (Washington, DC, Dec. 3, 2012) -- The United States is short on allies and effective means of influencing events in the Middle East. Syria is still a bloodbath. Libya is threatened by jihadists. Egypt has taken a turn toward dictatorship. Mali is a non-functioning state in which jihadist separatists control much of the country. The "peace process" (for good reason) is going nowhere.
To break up the monotony of bad news, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is no doubt delighted to be hosting Morocco's Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani who is in Washington D.C to prepare for Clinton's upcoming trip to Morocco. Morocco will be chairing the United Nations Security Council in December when all of these issues are likely to be swirling and will be hosting a critical international gathering on Syria.

I spoke with Amrani by phone this morning. If the United States is happy to have pro-American friends in the region, Morocco is obviously delighted to have an elevated relationship, dubbed a "strategic partnership" that launched this fall. Amrani told me: "We have a longstanding relationship. Today we want to upgrade relations and deepen our dialogue. Tomorrow we will have a business conference called by Secretary Clinton." As part of this and future discussion, Amrani told me, "We would like to include new players -- civil society [leaders], business leaders. We want a unique relationship . . . a mode of cooperation, consultation and understanding. We think we can be a model."

Certainly the region could use a model of gradual evolution toward gender equality, rule of law, human rights and democracy, which in Morocco has been accelerated under King Mohammed VI. And the Obama administration could use some advice and assistance on a range of issues including Syria, Libya and Egypt.
Clinton will visit with the king on December 11 in a meeting expected to touch on Syria, the Palestinians and Mali where jihadists now control the northern part of the country ("It is a situation that is deteriorating," Amrani said.) Morocco supports a "double track" approach in Mali that includes both political negotiations and "military pressure" on the terror groups. On this one, Armani said, "Africans will take the lead."

When I ask him about fears that Libya may be headed in the same direction -- a weak central government overrun by jihadists. He took the long view. "Transitions in the region -- in Tunis, Libya, Egypt -- will be long, complicated and will take time." In Libya as in other countries, Amrani cautioned, there are "no institutions, no civil societies, no political parties." In perhaps the most memorable comment in our conversation he said simply, "Democracy is culture."

That sentiment indisputable. Critics of the Obama administration point to the lack of staying power, the failure to work over the long haul on civil society building and inconsistency in opposing autocracy that hinder U.S. influence in the region. Morocco in the past has been hesitant to step forward as a model for the region but with its newly intensified relationship with the United States and the deteriorating situation throughout the region, Morocco is becoming less reticent. Amrani explained, "We can share our modest experience. We need to have success stories . . . otherwise extremists will take the lead."

On December 12, Clinton will attend the Friends of Syria meeting hosted by Morocco. Approximately 100 international delegations are expected to attend along with representatives of the Syrian opposition. Amrani deflected a question about whether there is room for optimism that Bashar al-Assad will soon be gone. He insisted, "The future of Syria should be democracy or there is no future. . . . There is no other choice." He didn't offer a view on whether the Syrian opposition has what it needs to prevail, but said, "We have to support the opposition politically and financially. Through the [United Nations] Security Council and other organizations, we need to put pressure on the regime." He added, "We should not forget the human dimension." In addition to some 38,000 dead Syrians, Turkey and other countries now feel pressure from refugees fleeing the violence.

Throughout the interview Amrani reiterated that the United States and Morocco would discuss the peace process and should try to get the parties "back on track." From the view of many in the United States this seems Pollyannish, especially in light of the Palestinian Authority's decision to bypass bilateral negotiations and go to the United Nations General Assembly for recognition. Amrani showed his diplomatic skill: "We know that in some countries and the [United] States, some were opposed [to the unilateral declaration]. But we feel a vote could be an opportunity to bring the parties back together." He affirmed that the goal should be "two independent states, living side by side with secure frontiers." While many in the United States see this as a fruitless exercise, Morocco remains convinced that "it is important to give a positive signal," as Amrani described it.

It is with a measure of frustration that Amrani expressed the plight of moderate Arab countries. "We are fed up with conflict, with crisis. We need peace. Peace can be achieved through political will."
It is, of course, the $64,000 question whether there is the will for peace in the Palestinian Authority, which has repeatedly walked away from the bargaining table and has abrogated the Oslo Accords in going to the United Nations. That said, even the appearance of progress is better than nothing, one supposes.

Meanwhile, if nothing else, the trip to Morocco should impress upon Clinton that the "Arab Spring" is not a one season episode, but a multi-year and probably multi-decade process in which the United States will have to find ways to maximize its leverage, promote reform, aid in the development of civil institutions and find new allies that can fill the breach while others (such as Egypt) may be in turmoil. For a president that too often has seemed annoyed with national security intrusions into his domestic agenda and has sought to minimize the U.S. role on the world stage, this is an inconvenient reality. Nevertheless, President Obama, Clinton and Clinton's successor would do well to develop an actual policy for the Middle East that consists of more than simply lurching from one crisis to another. If that realization is driven home on the Morocco trip, then it will be a worthwhile visit for both countries.

Morocco on the Move | December 3, 2012 at 4:04 pm | Tags: featured | Categories: Elections and Reform, General, Politics, Security | URL: http://wp.me/p1Gm1x-1YW

Comment | See all comments

Unsubscribe or change your email settings at Manage Subscriptions.

Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser:
http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/2012/12/03/maybe-morocco-can-help-jennifer-rubin-the-washington-post/

Thanks for flying with WordPress.com
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 04, 2012 1:06 PM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: FW: [New post] King Mohammed VI, Clinton to meet on Strategic Partnership – Morocco urges political will to build peace in region

FYI, Minister Amrani’s event at the Atlantic Council.

New post on Morocco On The Move

King Mohammed VI, Clinton to meet on Strategic Partnership – Morocco urges political will to build peace in region
by Morocco on the Move

HM King Mohammed VI and Secretary of State Clinton will meet on Dec. 11 in Morocco to discuss security challenges in Mali & Syria, Middle East peace process, and Morocco-US Strategic Partnership

**Morocco Deputy Foreign Minister Amrani meets in DC with US officials, Atlantic Council on Mali, Syria**

Washington, DC (Dec. 4) — Morocco Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani met with US officials today in Washington to prepare for strategic talks in Morocco on December 11 between His Majesty King Mohammed VI and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. King Mohammed VI and Secretary Clinton will discuss concrete steps Morocco and the US can take in their strategic partnership to address crises in Mali and Syria, advance the Middle East peace process and regional humanitarian concerns, and deepen US-Morocco bilateral ties.
At an Atlantic Council forum, Mr. Amrani said Morocco and the US are working together closely on a number of specific initiatives resulting from the formal Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue agreed to in September, including a US-Moroccan Business Development Conference that convened in Washington for the first time today.

In December, Morocco assumes the rotating Presidency of the UN Security Council, where it is working with the US and allies on the deteriorating situations in Mali and Syria. On December 12, Morocco is hosting the next international “Friends of Syria” meeting in Marrakech, which Secretary Clinton is expected to attend.

“We know what has to be done to build peace,” said Mr. Amrani. “We need to show the political will to do it.”

He said “the interconnection between drug-trafficking and al-Qaeda-linked extremists” in the Sahel and Central Africa “poses a great threat to the international community. If we don’t fight it, it will create instability and failed states across the region. What happened in Mali can happen in other countries.” Amrani said “African nations must take the lead,” pointing to the current two-track approach of dialogue and military pressure.

Mr. Amrani said that economic development and job creation are crucial parts of a multi-prong strategy to “build peace and prosperity and curb the rise of violent extremism in the region.” So too are political freedoms and democratic reforms. But he added, “democracy is a culture and expression of political will. Countries without a history of civil society need transition time to build it, which can be complicated, long, and difficult.”

Amrani said that Morocco, which began its reforms more than a decade ago under the leadership of King Mohammed VI, can play an important role as a regional leader with its strong civil society, tradition of tolerance and consensus-building, and respect for individual rights.
Unsubscribe or change your email settings at Manage Subscriptions.

Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser:

Thanks for flying with WordPress.com
Here's the FOX News story, which is excellent once you get past the advertisement up front. The last few minutes showcase Morocco's reforms and stability under HM King Morocco VI and the reporter loves Morocco. We like to see that occasionally from the press.

http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/2012/12/04/fox-news-highlights-marrakech-summit-on-syria-moroccos-remarkable-reforms/
The next chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, which will now include both the ME and North Africa as its combined mandate, will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a great friend of Morocco. This is very good news for Morocco. You will recall that previously Morocco fell under the mandate of Africa. Now it is combined with the ME. Ed
Team -- Here's last night's NPR story on audio interviewing Minister Amrani, which now has a transcript. The story is generally about Mali and puts Morocco in key position as the Minister responds to key questions of the reporter. As posted at MOTM, at link below and attached:

http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/2012/12/04/morocco-warns-of-growing-terrorist-threat-in-mali-npr-all-things-considered/
MOROCCO WARNS OF GROWING TERRORIST THREAT IN MALI – NPR ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

**Click here to listen to NPR story**
(See full Transcript below)

National Public Radio, All Things Considered, by Michele Kelemen (Washington, DC, Dec. 4, 2012) — The U.N. Security Council is expected to take action soon to approve an African military intervention force for Mali. Morocco is nervous about the al-Qaida affiliate based in Northern Mali, a group that is now training and supporting extremists across the continent. That’s a fear the head of U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham, is also raising. But both he and officials in Morocco say there needs to be a two-tracked approach — a military intervention to root out al-Qaida and a big diplomatic push to reunite Mali. A coup led to a power vacuum with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb now controlling the north.

Morocco’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Youssef Amrani, speaks at Atlantic Council forum on Dec. 3

NPR’s Michele Kelemen interviewed Morocco’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Youssef Amrani, on Monday following his remarks at a forum hosted by the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. She also spoke with the Atlantic Council’s Ansari Africa Center Director J. Peter Pham, who welcomed Mr. Amrani to the forum along with the Atlantic Council’s Fred Kempe.

Amrani is in Washington meeting with US officials to prepare for strategic talks in Morocco on December 11 between His Majesty King Mohammed VI and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. King Mohammed VI and Secretary Clinton will discuss substantive steps Morocco and the US can take in their strategic partnership to address crises in Mali and Syria, advance the Middle East peace process and regional humanitarian concerns, and deepen US-Morocco bilateral ties.

Transcript of Program (from NPR)

AUDIE CORNISH, HOST: From NPR News, this is ALL THINGS CONSIDERED. I’m Audie Cornish.

MELISSA BLOCK, HOST: And I’m Melissa Block. The African nation of Mali is one of the many pressing topics facing the U.N. Security Council this month. After a coup in Mali back in March, an al-Qaida affiliate seized control of the northern part of the country, and the terrorist threat there is growing. As NPR’s Michele Kelemen reports, U.S. officials aren’t the only ones raising alarms.

MICHELE KELMEN, BYLINE: A top Moroccan official was making the rounds in Washington this week, warning of a growing extremist threat in Africa from the Gulf of Guinea to the Gulf of Yemen. Speaking in between meetings, the minister delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Youssef Amrani says the international community needs to do something and fast about northern Mali, which has become a safe haven for al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.
YOUSSEF AMRANI: It’s urgent because if we don’t find appropriate solutions, the situation will get worse. This will reinforce the extremist movement who are working today for the instability for the whole region.

KELEMEN: Morocco is the current president of the U.N. Security Council, and Amrani says his country will make sure that the council passes a resolution to authorize an African intervention force for Mali.

AMRANI: We need people who knows the region and the country. And Africans have taken the lead. That’s good.

KELEMEN: But the Africans have offered just 3,000 troops to battle extremists in a region the size of Texas. And that’s just not enough, says J. Peter Pham of the Atlantic Council, who points out that even the U.N. secretary general isn’t ready to put U.N. funds behind that African plan.

J. PETER PHAM: It’s like a child who keeps turning in the same piece of homework over and over trying to wear the teacher down into accepting it. I don’t think that’s a helpful strategy. I think the Security Council really has to take the leadership role here.

KELEMEN: Pham says it will take several more months to get a force trained, funded, and ready to intervene. The top U.S. military commander for Africa, General Carter Ham, was asked at George Washington University this week whether that’s too late.

GENERAL CARTER HAM: As each day goes by, al-Qaida and other organizations are strengthening their hold in northern Mali.

KELEMEN: Ham says there’s evidence that extremists from other countries, including Nigeria, have gone to northern Mali for training. And the AFRICOM commander says al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is one of the best-funded and well-armed al-Qaida affiliates these days. But he cautions against premature military action, saying the real challenge is countering al-Qaida’s ideology.

HAM: The military is a – an essential but non-decisive component of countering that ideology. It will be more successful when there’s good governance, when there’s economic development, when there’s medical care, when there’s hope and opportunity for people so that they foresee a better future and are not susceptible to a more extremist ideology which presently seems to be gaining traction.

KELEMEN: On Mali, diplomats are trying to help reunite the country. The Moroccan foreign ministry official, Amrani, says the goal is to reach out to indigenous Tuareg rebels in the north to peel them away from al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb.

AMRANI: If they agree to play the game, if I may say so, that will be a good opportunity to help the Malians to reinforce their national cohesion.

KELEMEN: But for negotiations to succeed there also needs to be a legitimate government in Mali. And that hasn’t been the case since a coup earlier this year, says Pham of the Atlantic Council.

PHAM: One of the reasons for the Tuareg uprising in northern Mali was previous peace deals were broken. If the Tuaregs had grievances about broken deals with legitimate governments, why would they ever sign a deal with a government that’s not supported?

KELEMEN: That’s one more problem for the countries in the region and the international community to help solve to try to prevent al-Qaida from digging themselves in. Michele Kelemen, NPR News, Washington.
Commenting on Christopher Ross's briefing of the Security Council on November 28, a member of Polisario’s National Secretariat (said) it contained only two positive points as far as Polisario is concerned. The first is that it recognises, albeit implicitly, the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination; the second is that it admits that direct and indirect talks have reached a dead end. What is missing is the obvious: the human rights violations committed by the Moroccan authorities in the “occupied territories”. Ross has sketched out a way of restarting talks that is, from Polisario’s point of view, erroneous and inappropriate, insofar as he is arguing that re-launching the talks depends on improved relations between Algeria and Morocco, as do any subsequent chances of success. In other words, Ross is saying that only Morocco and Algeria can, by improving their bilateral relations, implement a solution to the Sahara conflict within the framework of these relations. That is Morocco’s position, says the National Secretariat member. Rabat has always held that the Sahara question is an artificial conflict created by Algeria to settle scores with Morocco. Now, if talks are at a dead end and the UN is incapable of forcing Morocco to organise a self-determination referendum, the situation becomes untenable and an explosion might become inevitable. Contrary to what some people might think, the tensions in the Sahel region are not an obstacle against reverting to armed struggle and might even be a facilitating factor, argues the National Secretariat leader, adding that if there were to be a resumption of armed struggle, neither Polisario nor anyone else could prohibit or prevent a link-up between armed action in the Sahara and the armed action already going on in the Sahel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Spanish PM Urges Government to Support Western Sahara's Membership At UN</strong> Dec. 1, 2012</td>
<td>The Spanish Deputy from the Compromis-Equo coalition, Mr. Joan Baldoví, has called on the Government of his country to support Western Sahara UN membership. In a statement published Friday by Europa Press News Agency, Mr. Baldoví said &quot;we want the UN to adopt a decision similar to that taken on Thursday with regard to the state of Palestine&quot;, considering that &quot;a way in the recognition of Saharawi state at the UN level.&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: EU-Morocco Agriculture Agreement Does Not Include Western Sahara Territories, Confirms Dutch Minister</strong> Dec. 1, 2012</td>
<td>&quot;The agricultural agreement... is legitimate only at the level of Moroccan territory, &quot; Foreign Minister of the Netherlands Uri Rosenthal stated. “This statement coincides with the convictions of other countries outside the European Union, such as Norway and the United States of America, on the grounds that Western Sahara is not part of Morocco.”</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: HM the King Congratulates Mahmoud Abbas On UN GA Vote in Favor of Palestine Status On UN</strong></td>
<td>HM King Mohammed VI sent a congratulatory message to the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, on the vote by the UN General Assembly in favor of granting Palestine the status of non-member observer state. The Sovereign expressed to Mr Abbas and to the Palestinian people his warm congratulations, voicing satisfaction with this international recognition &quot;which is the culmination of your tremendous efforts and...&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: There Is No Solution to Western Sahara Conflict Out of Referendum, Confirms Khatri Addouh</td>
<td>&quot;It is out of question to design a solution (to the Saharawi conflict) apart from those relating to the holding of a free, fair and transparent referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi people,&quot; said Mr. Khatri Addouh, Speaker for the Saharawi National Council and Head of the Saharawi negotiating delegation with Morocco. He said in this context that &quot;the Moroccan autonomy project could not achieve success,&quot; because, he said, &quot;it is in total contradiction with UN decisions and resolutions on Western Sahara.&quot; &quot;Moroccan autonomy proposal has convinced, ultimately, no country in the world,&quot; he said.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Conference in Swedish Parliament On Looting Natural Resources of Western Sahara</td>
<td>A conference held in the Swedish Parliament focused on the looting of Western Sahara's natural resources and illegal exploitation of these resources by Moroccan occupation, according to the Polisario Representation in Sweden. The conference was attended by politicians and representatives of several Swedish parties. Conference participants urged the EU to exclude all producers that exported from the occupied Western Sahara from any trade agreement with Morocco.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The African Bulletin</td>
<td>Morocco to assume rotating Security Council presidency for December</td>
<td>Mohammed Loulichki, the permanent representative of Morocco to the United Nations, will take over the rotating security council presidency. Some observers believe the Moroccan presidency will expedite discussion of two current SC issues; Syria and the Sahel.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Online</td>
<td>Morocco turns Marchica</td>
<td>The King launched the construction of hotels and a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington Post</strong></td>
<td>Maybe Morocco can help</td>
<td>Jennifer Rubin writes about her phone interview with Minister Amrani, during which they discussed the strategic partnership, Morocco’s advancements in terms of gender equality, rule of law, human rights and democracy, and prospects for cooperation.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reuters</strong></td>
<td>Portugal’s Galp buys operatorship in Moroccan bloc</td>
<td>Portuguese oil company Galp Energia has agreed to buy a 50 percent stake in Morocco's shallow-water Tarfaya offshore bloc from Australia's Tangiers. The first well is to be drilled by mid-2014 in the Trident prospect of the Tarfaya area. Galp said Trident is estimated to contain 450 million barrels of recoverable reserves.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reuters</strong></td>
<td>MIDEAST DEBT- Morocco under pressure to plug budget gap, avert more protests</td>
<td>There are daily protests about wasteful government spending, some of which focus on the spending habits of the royal family. The article claims that “[t]hough King Mohammed's royal expenditure is higher than those of European monarchies, it amounts to less than 1 percent of Morocco’s budget....in the face of simmering unrest the government is hurriedly trying to find cash to avoid having to roll back subsidies, which account for 15 percent of total public spending”.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Des Mau à Dire</strong></td>
<td>Malgré les critiques soulevées par l’usage disproportionné de la force : Benkirane défend les violences policières</td>
<td>Benkirane believes that the use of police violence during demonstrations prevents protesters from being arrested and embarrassing their families. According to Mounir Bensalah, a member of the National Council OMDH: &quot;Our international partners will surely be</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 3, 2012</td>
<td>Despite the criticisms raised by the disproportionate use of force: Benkirane defends police violence against demonstrators</td>
<td>shocked by these words because they call into question the willingness of the Kingdom to establish the rule of law and respect human rights”. This article was translated from French to English</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 3, 2013</td>
<td>Ibn Kafka's obiter dicta</td>
<td>It may seem surprising in a country that is considered Muslim, and where most citizens self-identify as religious, that elections are invalidated due to the inclusion of a minaret in the background of campaign materials. Article 118 of the Moroccan constitution prohibits such actions. The goal is to prevent the manipulation of religious sentiments of voters. This article was translated from French to English</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 3, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco's Democratic League for Women's Rights organized a sit-in in Rabat to demand the criminalization of all forms of sexual harassment. Protesters called for laws to protect the dignity of girls and women.</td>
<td>Morocco's Democratic League for Women's Rights organized a sit-in in Rabat to demand the criminalization of all forms of sexual harassment. Protesters called for laws to protect the dignity of girls and women.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 5, 2012</td>
<td>Algeria, the United States and Colombia have made the greatest progress over the past decade in reducing the impact of terrorism. &quot;Algeria has experienced a steady decline in terrorist operations from 2002 to 2011,&quot; the Institute for Economics and Peace said.</td>
<td>Algeria, the United States and Colombia have made the greatest progress over the past decade in reducing the impact of terrorism. &quot;Algeria has experienced a steady decline in terrorist operations from 2002 to 2011,&quot; the Institute for Economics and Peace said.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 6, 2012</td>
<td>The rector of Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), Ahmed Boukousa, said that the granting of official status to Amazigh by the constitution was a historic delay.</td>
<td>The rector of Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), Ahmed Boukousa, said that the granting of official status to Amazigh by the constitution was a historic delay.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
milestone and that the government must now take the necessary steps to implement this decision. Tamazight is not yet being taught at all primary schools and certain difficulties have been encountered, such as a shortage of specialist teachers. The Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Lahcen Daoudi, who is himself an Amazigh, says that running language holiday camps would be a more convenient way of helping children to master the language than teaching it.

<p>| Magharebia | Morocco terror cell suspects appear in court | A Sale court arraigned 27 alleged members of a terror recruitment cell reports MAP. Individuals were seized in Casablanca, Laayoune, Nador, Guercif and Kelaat Sraghna and are accused of sending more than 20 young Moroccans to join al-Qaeda and the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad (MUJAO) in northern Mali. One of the suspects is a Malian national. | 0 |
| Magharebia | Benkirane answers rights complaints | Benkirane responded to criticisms about civil rights in Morocco by saying the fact that there are so many protests is a testament to the rights Moroccans enjoy. | 0 |
| African Manager | EU, Morocco, Tunisia discuss free trade agreement | The European Union (EU) will open talks with Morocco and Tunisia to conclude a free trade agreement with the two North African countries in order to &quot;improve market access, investment climate and support economic reforms in these countries while taking into account the specifics of each of them&quot;. The EU will also do preparatory work with Egypt to achieve a free trade agreement there. | 0 |
| Eurasia Review | Morocco: Political Reform And Economic | The author emphasizes Morocco’s social and economic progress while | 0 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth, Hand In Hand – OpEd</td>
<td>Dec. 4, 2012</td>
<td>drawing a favorable comparison against other North African countries. He defends the monarchy, asserting that “the monarchy possesses a special measure of legitimacy owing to its descent from the Prophet Muhammad”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blogma Aggregator</td>
<td>Xenophobia in FIFM against Moroccan journalists</td>
<td>Moroccan journalists were allegedly beaten by French security guards at the International Film Festival in Marrakech. Festival policy appears to be somewhat xenophobic, with Moroccans being barred from certain hotels and restaurants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuwire Investor</td>
<td>Rentals, Home Prices Improving in Morocco</td>
<td>Residential property prices rose by 1% in 2012 based on the real estate price indexes constructed by Bank Al-Maghrib and the National Land Registry Office. The housing market was weakened by local and global crises in 2007 and 2008, and in Marrakesh it had dropped by 40 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Blog</td>
<td>Peine de mort: &quot;le Maroc doit voter le moratoire&quot;</td>
<td>This article is an interview between Menara and Abderrahim Jamai, coordinator of the Moroccan Coalition for the Abolition of the death penalty. Jamai states that “It is unfortunate that Morocco has once again refused to vote (in the UN to support a moratorium)“. Morocco has not used the death penalty in years, yet there are 111 death row prisoners in Moroccan jails, four of whom were imprisoned in 2012. “Voting on the moratorium would be a symbolic gesture of Morocco moving forward” Jamai said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox News</td>
<td>Morocco honorary consul in Syria reportedly</td>
<td>The official Moroccan news agency says the North African country’s honorary consul in Aleppo, Syria, has</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Killed in Aleppo

Dec. 5, 2012

The MAP agency reported that Mohamed Alae Eddinne was killed after armed men in a taxi attacked him. The report said Eddinne, a Syrian national, was born in 1961 and had been the honorary consul of Morocco since 2001. Such posts are largely ceremonial.

### Morocco poised to shift phosphate markets

Dec. 5, 2012

The Moroccan government has been aggressively pursing bilateral and multilateral negotiations with European, Middle Eastern and North American governments to secure market access for its mineral and agricultural products. It is currently the world’s largest exporter of phosphate rock ore and phosphate production, and is expected to increase its outputs. Negotiations have been made with Canada for a free trade agreement between the two nations. However, regional instability remains a concern to many companies and governments.

### Clinton Announces Visit to Morocco, Tunisia, and UAE

Dec. 5, 2012

POMED reports, “Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's plans to travel to Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates later this month. Clinton will lead a U.S. delegation at the Friends of the Syrian People meeting in Marrakesh on December 12, where she is expected designate a Syrian rebel group with reported ties to al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization in the hopes of decreasing the influence of extremists with the Syrian opposition. After Morocco, Clinton will then travel to Tunisia to co-host the 9th Forum for the Future Ministerial with the Tunisian government on December 13, and will finish her trip by attending a global counterterrorism forum in the United Arab Emirates on December 14.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Article Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Relevant Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POMED</td>
<td>Western Sahara May Seek U.N. Observer Status</td>
<td>According to an article translated by Al-Monitor, president of the Sahara National Council and head of the Polisario Front’s negotiating team Khatri Eddouh “did not rule out that the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic may request U.N. recognition as an observer state as Palestine did”. Eddouh said Palestine’s successful bid is “a moral and psychological victory for the Sahrawi people”.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 24</td>
<td>Little hope in Morocco shanty town, despite promises</td>
<td>Around 10,000 people living in the Saab Al-Kaid shanty town outside Sale have lost hope in governmental promises of improving their living situation. Nearly one in six Moroccan citizens is without &quot;decent&quot; accommodation, Housing Minister Mohamed Nabil Benabdallah admitted at a recent press conference.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>Investors pile in on Morocco’s $1.5bn issue [updated]</td>
<td>The Financial Times writes that, “the specter of political risk hasn’t deterred investors from piling in on Morocco’s maiden dollar-denominated bond. The North African country, which is under pressure to plug budget gap and contain the kind of protests that have brought down regimes in other parts of the Middle East, raised $1.5bn in a dual-tranche offering on Wednesday.”</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco News Board</td>
<td>Spain’s EU Residency For Real-Estate Investment Plan Worries Morocco</td>
<td>Spanish secretary of state for commerce, Jaime Garcia-Legaz, announced last month that the government was contemplating granting temporary residency cards to foreigners who buy homes valued over 160,000 euros. He was primarily targeting the Chinese and Russian investors to revive Spain’s housing market. However, it is Moroccans who have truly taken interest due to the difficulty of getting a visa to enter the EU.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappler</td>
<td>Pinays in</td>
<td>Young women from the</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 6, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco cry rape, abuse</td>
<td>Philippines working as housemaids in Morocco described being exploited, physically abused and raped by their employers in the North African kingdom.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 7, 2012</td>
<td>Naharnet Morocco NGOs Launch Campaign to Free Jailed Activists</td>
<td>Moroccan human rights groups have announced the launch of a national campaign to free more than 70 &quot;political prisoners,&quot; particularly jailed members of the &quot;February 20&quot; protest movement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 7, 2012</td>
<td>The National Morocco cashes in on its investment grade</td>
<td>Morocco retained its investment-grade status, unlike Tunisia who S&amp;P demoted as “junk” in May, and Egypt, which has been downgraded four times to a “B”, since the Arab Spring started at the end of 2010.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title/ Date</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe Hot for Algerian Shale Gas Dec. 3, 2012</td>
<td>The Sahara Desert is a potential cure for the European Union’s gas problems, and all eyes are on Algeria’s 321 trillion cubic feet of recoverable shale gas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland and Catalonia bellwethers for Western Sahara? Dec. 3, 2012</td>
<td>This piece suggests that other regional independence movements could set a precedent for Western Sahara independence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Istiqlal distance encore une fois M. Laenser Dec. 3, 2012</td>
<td>The Istiqlal party requests a definitive timetable of forthcoming legislative deadlines from its partner, PJD. Abdallah Bakkali, MP and editor of the party’s newspaper, compares the attitude of the current Minister of the Interior to that of former minister Driss Basri, notorious for announcing last minute meetings at his convenience.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chabat Warns against ‘Social Explosion’ in Morocco Dec. 3, 2012</td>
<td>Hamid Chabat, Secretary General of the Istiqlal party, criticized Benkirane’s intention to raise water and electricity prices, and says Morocco needs “concrete solutions to put an end to further strikes”.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco Ranks First Country in Arab World in English Proficiency Dec. 4, 2012</td>
<td>According to the latest report of the EF English Proficiency Index conducted by the Swiss-based Education First, Morocco ranks as the first country in the Arab world in terms of English proficiency. At the global level, it ranks 35th.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco ranks Low in the Environmental Performance</td>
<td>According to the Environmental Performance Index, issued by Yale University, Morocco ranks 105th position among 132 countries. The study gauges 22 criteria including the level of pollution in the air, the availability of water resources, biodiversity, forest exploitation and the impact of climate change. Moroccan policy makers are urged to protect biodiversity where Morocco ranks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
117th position and the quality of potable water where it ranks 116th. Morocco’s environmental record is more positive in agriculture where it ranks 19th position and climate change where it ranks 47th.

The president of ECOWAS has urged the UNSC to adopt a resolution to allow a military intervention in northern Mali in the first part of 2013.

According to the Index of Perception of Corruption, published by Transparency International, Morocco is “very corrupt”.

Malian Minister of Territorial Administration and Local Government, Sinko Kolibaly Moussa said Wednesday in Dakar that his country depends on Morocco’s support to face the current crisis in the north of the country. “Since the start of the sad events in Northern Mali, we have appreciated Morocco’s presence to our side through its support to our country, including the shipping of humanitarian aid to the affected Malian population,” Moussa told MAP following a meeting with Interior Minister, Mohamed Laenser on the sidelines of the 6th Africities Summit held in Dakar.

Despite the eurozone crisis, tourism has increased by one percent in Morocco, according to the l’Observatoire du Tourisme (ODT).

The government is examining the possibility of increasing electricity taxes, according to the Minister of Energy, Fouad Douiri. These tariffs have not changed since 2006.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>éventuelle hausse des tarifs est prévue</td>
<td>Electricity: Expected increase in tariffs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Desertec is a German energy concept which involves the construction of solar panels throughout the Middle East and North Africa, including Morocco. The goal is to produce enough electricity for all of North Africa and some of Europe.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
See attached
PRELIMINARY RESULTS REPORT

Minister Youssef Amrani visit to US to prepare for HM King Mohammed VI/Secretary of State Clinton Meeting in Morocco on December 11

Communications/Press Coverage

Moroccan American Center for Policy
December 6, 2012
PRELIMINARY RESULTS REPORT
Minister Youssef Amrani visit to US to prepare for HM King Mohammed VI/Secretary of State Clinton Meeting in Morocco on December 11
Communications/Press Coverage

Objectives
The key communications goals for this trip were twofold: 1) to generate press coverage of Minister Amrani in the US and generate publicity for the December 11 strategic discussions between HM King Mohammed VI and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Morocco, and 2) to provide background briefings and drive interest amongst media that will report and write next week about Secretary Clinton’s trip to Morocco to meet with HM the King and also participate in the December 12 “Friends of Syria” meeting in Marrakech.

A key challenge, again, was getting the attention of US press, which has traditionally shown little interest in covering strategic discussions, dialogues, or partnerships with other nations that don’t appear to have a direct link to breaking news or issues followed closely by the US public. MAC conducted broad outreach to US print and broadcast media, prepared press briefing materials, coordinated a think tank forum, and communicated aggressively through online and social media channels. Importantly, MAC leveraged and linked external messaging on Minister Amrani’s visit and the upcoming December 11 meeting in Morocco with breaking news about the ongoing crises in Mali, and Syria, as well as the Middle East Peace process.

Results
As a result, Morocco and Minister Amrani generated significant visibility in mainstream US press for his December 3-4 visit and for the upcoming meeting between HM the King and Secretary Clinton. CNN International and FOX News.com broadcast live interviews with Minister Amrani that publicized the upcoming meeting between King Mohammed VI and Secretary Clinton and positioned Morocco as a leader with regard to the upcoming “Friends of Syria” summit in Marrakech. FOX News.com, one of the largest news sites in the US with several million daily viewers, devoted the second part of its interview to a recitation of HM King Mohammed VI’s visionary reforms that helped keep Morocco a relative oasis of stability through the turmoil of the Arab Spring. The FOX News correspondent went so far as to express how much he personally likes Morocco - even highly recommending it as a place for viewers to visit. Such advocacy is not standard practice among US news journalists. The Washington Post published a very positive commentary on Morocco by influential columnist Jennifer Rubin, who is one of the most widely-read conservative commentators in Washington.

National Public Radio’s most popular program ‘All Things Considered’ — which airs on more than 950 radio stations in virtually every market across the US — broadcast a story to millions of US listeners that featured Minister Amrani with the Commander of AFRICOM General Carter Ham and respected Africa security expert J. Peter Pham expressing their shared concern about the growing danger from the extremist takeover of northern Mali, which is a threat to North Africa, the US, and the international community.

Minister Amrani was also able to brief a number of other journalists – Christiane Amanpour from CNN, as well as journalists from the Associated Press, TIME magazine, BBC, The Washington Times, The Washington Post editorial board, and Voice of America – which will help shape their news coverage of Secretary Clinton’s travels to Morocco next week for both her meeting with HM the King and the “Friends of Syria” meeting. These pre-briefings are very important and critical to positively influencing stories that will be written next week during Secretary Clinton’s visit.

While the numbers are very preliminary, this news coverage and two MAC press releases resulted in hundreds of positive stories and postings at news media sites, and generated more than 30 million impressions in English-speaking media, raising awareness among the US press, public, and policymakers of the deepening strategic partnership between Morocco and the US.
PRELIMINARY MEDIA COVERAGE RESULTS
For December 3-4 Visit to Washington, DC by
H.E. Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs Youssef Amrani

**CNN Live Interview**
* Live interview CNN International with Minister Amrani on upcoming Clinton trip to meet HM the King and “Friends of Syria” (Audience: A daily, global broadcast show with more than a million daily viewers)

**CNN Interviews Youssef Amrani on Clinton’s upcoming Morocco trip, “Friends of Syria” summit**

CNN International (Dec. 4, 2012) — CNN International today interviewed Morocco’s Delegate Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Youssef Amrani, about upcoming Dec. 11-12 trip […]

**CNN with Christiane Amanpour**
* Background interview conducted with Christiane Amanpour. Will inform any coverage of Clinton’s trip to Morocco, Friends of Syria, and Mali. Amanpour is the Chief International Correspondent for CNN and host of CNN International’s nightly interview program Amanpour. She’s also a Global Affairs Anchor of ABC News.

**Background interview with CNN Reporter Christiane Amanpour**

**FOX NEWS Live Interview**
* Live interview on FOX News with Minister Amrani on upcoming Clinton trip to meet HM the King and “Friends of Syria” (Audience: One of the largest news sites in America with several million daily viewers)

**FOX News Interviews Youssef Amrani, highlights Marrakech summit on Syria and Morocco’s remarkable record of reform**


**NPR ‘All Things Considered’**

* Taped interview with Minister Amrani for broadcast on National Public Radio’s ‘All Things Considered’ (Audience: One of the most popular daily programs for elite policy makers and several million listeners across the US)

---

**Morocco Warns Of Growing Terrorist Threat In Mali – NPR ‘All Things Considered’ Interviews Y. Amrani**

National Public Radio, All Things Considered, by Michele Kelemen (Washington, DC, Dec. 4, 2012) — The U.N. Security Council is expected to take action soon to approve an African military intervention force for Mali. Morocco is nervous about the al-Qaida affiliate based in Northern [...]

---

**AP Associated Press**

* Background interview conducted with AP reporter to shape upcoming coverage next week on trip with Clinton to Morocco. Lee plans to meet with Amrani again while in Marrakesh. AP stories will have largest total US audience of all coverage of trip.

---

**MAC Press Release**

* Sent to PR Newswire, reporters, posted at 241 US news media websites, including Reuters, Wall Street Journal Market Watch, Boston Globe, Yahoo News and many more

---

**Washington Times reporter**

* Interview with Washington Times reporter Shaun Waterman. Expected to result in coverage leading up to Clinton trip to Morocco. Influential conservative readership in US capital.

---
**Washington Post Commentary**

* Interview with Minister Amrani and columnist Jennifer Rubin posted at Washington Post online “Right Turn” forum (Audience: The Washington policy community and over 2 million viewers daily)

**“Maybe Morocco can help” – Jennifer Rubin talks with Youssef Amrani / The Washington Post**

Washington Post, by J. Rubin, Right Turn (Washington, DC, Dec. 3, 2012) — The US is short on allies and effective means of influencing events in the Middle East. Syria is still a bloodbath. Libya is threatened by jihadists. Egypt has taken a turn toward dictatorship. [...]

**Atlantic Council Forum**

* Two dozen experts and policymakers joined Minister Amrani at a think tank forum hosted by the influential Atlantic Council think tank. Attended by reporters from NPR, VOA.

**H.E. Youssef Amrani at the Atlantic Council**

The Michael S. Ansari Africa Center hosted a discussion today with H.E. Youssef Amrani, minister-delegate for foreign affairs and cooperation of the Kingdom of Morocco. The minister-delegate is in Washington in advance of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s travel to Morocco next week for the “Friends of Syria” meeting in Marrakesh as well as strategic discussions with His Majesty King Mohammed VI [...]

**VOA Voice of America**

* Taped interview with Minister Amrani following Atlantic Council forum with VOA host Carol Castiel will air next week for Clinton trip to Morocco, to VOA audience of millions worldwide.

**Interview with VOA host Carol Castiel for radio program to air during Clinton trip to Morocco**

**BBC**

* Background interview with Kim Ghattas, BBC, for report that will air next week around time of Clinton trip to Morocco, to BBC audience of millions worldwide.

**Background interview with BBC reporter Kim Ghattas for coverage to air next week during Clinton trip to Morocco**
**TIME Magazine**

* Background interview with Jay Newton-Small, TIME, the largest news weekly in America, for a story that will be published next week around time of Clinton trip to Morocco, to TIME audience of several millions in US & worldwide

**Washington Post editorial board**

* Briefing with Washington Post editorial writer Jackson Diehl. Will inform any editorials on Clinton’s trip to Morocco, Friends of Syria, and Mali. Readership is several million and the Washington Post is the among most respected publication in the US capital.

**MOTM Blog Post**

* Posted advisory at MoroccoOnTheMove. Picked up and published from MOTM by AllAfrica.com. Helped spread word about Strategic Dialogue business conference

**United States to Host US-Moroccan Business Development Conference**

US State Department, Notice to the Press (Washington, DC, Dec. 2, 2012) — On December 4, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Jose W. Fernandez and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones, in cooperation with the Bureau of Energy Resources, will convene a business development conference [...]

**MAC Press Advisory**

* Sent to PR Newswire, reporters, posted at 252 US news media websites including Reuters, Wall Street Journal Market Watch, Boston Globe, Yahoo News and many more

**King Mohammed VI, Secretary Clinton to Meet in Morocco on Mali, Syria, and Strategic Partnership**

*Morocco Deputy Foreign Minister Amrani in DC Dec. 3 for preparations*

MACP (Washington, DC, Nov. 29) — Morocco’s Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani will be in Washington, DC on December 3 to prepare for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s upcoming strategic discussions in Morocco with His Majesty King Mohammed VI. King Mohammed VI and [...]

---

Dec 6, 2012

---

---

---
Delegate-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Youssef Amrani

Washington, DC Media and Think Tank Visit Schedule
December 3-4, 2012

Monday, December 3

9:30 AM – 10:00 AM
Media Interview via Phone with Jen Rubin, The Washington Post
Contact: 703-476-2422; Naomi Decter (MAC Media Consultant) 202-321-3654

12:00 PM – 12:45 PM
Media Interview with Al-Jazeera

1:00 PM
Editorial Board Interview led by Jackson Diehl, The Washington Post
Location: 1150 15th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005
Attendees: Minister Amrani
Contact: TBD; Naomi Decter (MAC Media Consultant) 202-321-3654

2:00 PM
Media Interview with Jay Newton-Small, TIME
Location: 1130 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., 9th Floor, Washington, DC 20036
Attendees: Minister Amrani
Contact: Ms. Newton-Small (Reporter) 202-861-4069; Naomi Decter (MAC Media Consultant) 202-321-3654

3:00 PM
Background Media Interview with Kim Ghattas, BBC
Location: MAC Offices, 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 411, Washington, DC 20005
Attendees: Minister Amrani
Contact: 202-247-0368; Naomi Decter (MAC Media Consultant) 202-321-3654

4:00 PM – 5:15 PM
Think Tank Event – The Atlantic Council
Location: The Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, 888 16th Street, 8th Floor Conference Room,
Washington, DC 20005
Attendees: Minister Amrani, Ambassador Bouhlal, Ambassador Gabriel
Contact/Host: Dr. J. Peter Pham, 202-778-4952

5:15 PM
Media Interview with Michele Keleman, National Public Radio (NPR)
Location: The Michael S. Ansari Africa Center
Attendees: Minister Amrani
5:30 PM
Media Interview with Carol Castiel, Voice of America
Location: The Michael S. Ansari Africa Center
Attendees: Minister Amrani
Contact: 202-382-7438 (Office)/202-841-9925 (Mobile); Naomi Decter (MAC Media Consultant) 202-321-3654

Tuesday, December 4

6:10 AM
Media Interview with Max Foster, CNN International
Location: CNN Washington Studio, 820 1st Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20002
Attendees: Minister Amrani
Contact: +44 771 281 3663; Naomi Decter (MAC Media Consultant) 202-321-3654
Note: Upon arrival, just tell the host that you are there for “World One”

Media Interview via phone with Christiane Amanpour

11:00 AM
Media Interview via Phone with Matt Lee, Associated Press
Contact: 409-777-9000, Passcode 365614#

11:20 AM
Media Interview via Phone with Shaun Waterman, The Washington Times
Contact: 732-832-7512, Passcode: 5467#

11:45 AM – 12:10 PM
Media Interview with Jonathan Hunt, FoxNews.com LIVE
Location: 400 N Capitol St NW Suite 550
Attendees: Minister Amrani
Contact: Naomi Decter (MAC Media Consultant) 202-321-3654
CNN International LIVE

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Interview with:
Morocco’s Delegate Minister for Foreign Affairs & Cooperation, Youssef Amrani

FRIENDS OF SYRIA – Delegates to discuss political transition, aid for refugees, and security

CNN (Anchor from CNN Hong Kong): US Sec. of State Hillary Clinton is to discuss Syria’s future next week at an international meeting. A smooth political transition, aid to refugees, and the future stability of the region will be on the agenda at the “Friends of Syria” meeting in Morocco. We want to cross over to Morocco’s Delegate Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. He joins us now from Washington. Thank you very much for being with us.

CNN: What do you hope to accomplish with this meeting with the Secretary of State?

Amrani: First of all, we waited for a long time before convening this meeting. Today we think the conditions are gathered. There is a coalition of the Syrian opposition. And I think we need to build on this moment and to move forward. We need to support the Syrian civil society towards a democratic transition. This is I think the major outcome of the visit of Mrs. Clinton to Morocco. She will also have within the Strategic Dialogue with King Mohammed VI, to discuss not only the Syrian issue, but other issues with are today in the agenda of the Security Council that Morocco is chairing this month.

CNN: When we look at specifically Syria, you said “moving forward” and you said “support.” What specifically are you talking about when you say moving forward especially at time when it seems as though things are not moving forward in Syria. What are you talking about when you say support? Are you talking about material support? Financial support? Military support for the opposition?

Amrani: I think we should give all the necessary support to Syria, to the Syrian opposition in order to lead the democratic transition in Syria. Because the future of Syria should be democratic. There is no
other choice. And we need to help them stop the violence. We should continue pressure within the Security Council on Bashar Assad and to be able to allow the Syrian people to decide over its future, respect its sovereignty, its independence, and the democratic values that we share together. Today we have no more choice than to support the Syrian people and we cannot stand any conflict in the region.

**CNN:** How optimistic are you of a smooth political transition, of a smooth political future for Syria post-Assad?

**Amrani:** I think it is up to the Syrian people to decide. I think that today they have shown the will to move forward towards national reconciliation, joining and associating all the civil society and political parties in the shaping up and making up of the future of Syria. It should be democratic and we should now support it internationally. Don’t forget also the human dimension of this conflict. It’s important because today there are a lot of refugees in the neighboring countries – in Turkey and in Jordan – and the need to help these people in order to live in decent conditions.

**CNN:** Alright, Morocco Delegate Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Youssef Amrani. Thank you very much for your time.

**Amrani:** Thank you very much. You’re welcome.
Interview with:

Morocco’s Delegate Minister for Foreign Affairs & Cooperation, Youssef Amrani

FOX News correspondent Jonathan Hunt today interviewed Youssef Amrani, Morocco’s Deputy Foreign Minister, about reports that Syria may be considering using chemical weapons and next week’s milestone international conference in Marrakech, Morocco for the “Friends of Syria” group of nations.

After discussing Syria, Hunt and Amrani turn their focus to Morocco and note how its decade of reforms under King Mohammed VI has made Morocco a model for stability and progress in the region, and a leader on critical international issues.
The U.N. Security Council is expected to take action soon to approve an African military intervention force for Mali. Morocco is nervous about the al-Qaida affiliate based in Northern Mali, a group that is now training and supporting extremists across the continent. That's a fear the head of U.S. Africa Command is also raising. But both he and officials in Morocco say there needs to be a two-tracked approach — a military intervention to root out al-Qaida and a big diplomatic push to reunite Mali. A coup led to a power vacuum with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb now controlling the north.

TRANSCRIPT:

AUDIE CORNISH, HOST:

From NPR News, this is ALL THINGS CONSIDERED. I'm Audie Cornish.

MELISSA BLOCK, HOST:

And I'm Melissa Block.

The African nation of Mali is one of the many pressing topics facing the U.N. Security Council this month. After a coup in Mali back in March, an al-Qaida affiliate seized control of the northern part of the country, and the terrorist threat there is growing. As NPR's Michele Kelemen reports, U.S. officials aren't the only ones raising alarms.

MICHELE KELEMEN, BYLINE: A top Moroccan official was making the rounds in Washington this week, warning of a growing extremist threat in Africa from the Gulf of Guinea to the Gulf of Yemen. Speaking in between meetings, the minister delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Youssef Amrani says the
international community needs to do something and fast about northern Mali, which has become a safe haven for al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

YOUSSEF AMRANI: It's urgent because if we don't find appropriate solutions, the situation will get worse. This will reinforce the extremist movement who are working today for the instability for the whole region.

KELEMEN: Morocco is the current president of the U.N. Security Council, and Amrani says his country will make sure that the council passes a resolution to authorize an African intervention force for Mali.

AMRANI: We need people who knows the region and the country. And Africans have taken the lead. That's good.

KELEMEN: But the Africans have offered just 3,000 troops to battle extremists in a region the size of Texas. And that's just not enough, says J. Peter Pham of the Atlantic Council, who points out that even the U.N. secretary general isn't ready to put U.N. funds behind that African plan.

J. PETER PHAM: It's like a child who keeps turning in the same piece of homework over and over and over trying to wear the teacher down into accepting it. I don't think that's a helpful strategy. I think the Security Council really has to take the leadership role here.

KELEMEN: Pham says it will take several more months to get a force trained, funded, and ready to intervene. The top U.S. military commander for Africa, General Carter Ham, was asked at George Washington University this week whether that's too late.

GENERAL CARTER HAM: As each day goes by, al-Qaida and other organizations are strengthening their hold in northern Mali.

KELEMEN: Ham says there's evidence that extremists from other countries, including Nigeria, have gone to northern Mali for training. And the AFRICOM commander says al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is one of the best-funded and well-armed al-Qaida affiliates these days. But he cautions against premature military action, saying the real challenge is countering al-Qaida's ideology.

HAM: The military is a - an essential but non-decisive component of countering that ideology. It will be more successful when there's good governance, when there's economic development, when there's medical care, when there's hope and opportunity for people so that they foresee a better future and are not susceptible to a more extremist ideology which presently seems to be gaining traction.

KELEMEN: On Mali, diplomats are trying to help reunite the country. The Moroccan foreign ministry official, Amrani, says the goal is to reach out to indigenous Tuareg rebels in the north to peel them away from al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

AMRANI: If they agree to play the game, if I may say so, that will be a good opportunity to help the Malians to reinforce their national cohesion.

KELEMEN: But for negotiations to succeed there also needs to be a legitimate government in Mali. And that hasn't been the case since a coup earlier this year, says Pham of the Atlantic Council.
PHAM: One of the reasons for the Tuareg uprising in northern Mali was previous peace deals were broken. If the Tuaregs had grievances about broken deals with legitimate governments, why would they ever sign a deal with a government that's not supported?

KELEMEN: That's one more problem for the countries in the region and the international community to help solve to try to prevent al-Qaida from digging themselves in. Michele Kelemen, NPR News, Washington.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

King Mohammed VI, Sec. Clinton to meet on Strategic Partnership, Morocco urges ‘political will to build peace, curb extremism in region’

Morocco Deputy Foreign Minister Amrani meets with US officials, Atlantic Council on Mali, Syria

Washington, DC (Dec. 4) — Morocco Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani met with US officials today in Washington to prepare for strategic talks in Morocco on December 11 between His Majesty King Mohammed VI and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. King Mohammed VI and Secretary Clinton will discuss concrete steps Morocco and the US can take in their strategic partnership to address crises in Mali and Syria, advance the Middle East peace process and regional humanitarian concerns, and deepen US-Morocco bilateral ties.

At an Atlantic Council forum, Mr. Amrani said Morocco and the US are working together closely on a number of specific initiatives resulting from the formal Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue agreed to in September, including a US-Moroccan Business Development Conference that convened in Washington for the first time today.

In December, Morocco assumes the rotating Presidency of the UN Security Council, where it is working with the US and allies on the deteriorating situations in Mali and Syria. On December 12, Morocco is hosting the next international “Friends of Syria” meeting in Marrakech, which Secretary Clinton is expected to attend.

“We know what has to be done to build peace,” said Mr. Amrani. “We need to show the political will to do it.”

He said “the interconnection between drug-trafficking and al-Qaeda-linked extremists” in the Sahel and Central Africa “poses a great threat to the international community. If we don’t fight it, it will create instability and failed states across the region. What happened in Mali can happen in other countries.” Amrani said “African nations must take the lead,” pointing to the current two-track approach of dialogue and military pressure.

Mr. Amrani said that economic development and job creation are crucial parts of a multi-prong strategy to “build peace and prosperity and curb the rise of violent extremism in the region.” So too are political freedoms and democratic reforms. But he added, “democracy is a culture and expression of political will. Countries without a history of civil society need transition time to build it, which can be complicated, long, and difficult.”

Amrani said that Morocco, which began its reforms more than a decade ago under the leadership of King Mohammed VI, can play an important role as a regional leader with its strong civil society, tradition of tolerance and consensus-building, and respect for individual rights.

For more on Morocco and the region, visit http://www.moroccoonthemove.com/. Also follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

###

The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) is a non-profit organization whose principal mission is to inform opinion makers, government officials, and interested publics in the United States about political and social developments in Morocco and the role being played by the Kingdom of Morocco in broader strategic developments in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. For more, please visit www.moroccoonthemove.com

This material is distributed by the Moroccan American Center for Policy on behalf of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
The United States is short on allies and effective means of influencing events in the Middle East. Syria is still a bloodbath. Libya is threatened by jihadists. Egypt has taken a turn toward dictatorship. Mali is a non-functioning state in which jihadist separatists control much of the country. The "peace process" (for good reason) is going nowhere.

To break up the monotony of bad news, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is no doubt delighted to be hosting Morocco's Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani who is in Washington D.C to prepare for Clinton's upcoming trip to Morocco. Morocco will be chairing the United Nations Security Council in December when all of these issues are likely to be swirling and will be hosting a critical international gathering on Syria.

I spoke with Amrani by phone this morning. If the United States is happy to have pro-American friends in the region, Morocco is obviously delighted to have an elevated relationship, dubbed a "strategic partnership" that launched this fall. Amrani told me: "We have a longstanding relationship. Today we want to upgrade relations and deepen our dialogue. Tomorrow we will have a business conference called by Secretary Clinton." As part of this and future discussion, Amrani told me, "We would like to include new players -- civil society [leaders], business leaders. We want a unique relationship . . . a mode of cooperation, consultation and understanding. We think we can be a model."

Certainly the region could use a model of gradual evolution toward gender equality, rule of law, human rights and democracy, which in Morocco has been accelerated under King Mohammed VI. And the Obama administration could use some advice and assistance on a range of issues including Syria, Libya and Egypt.

Clinton will visit with the king on December 11 in a meeting expected to touch on Syria, the Palestinians and Mali where jihadists now control the northern part of the country ("It is a situation that is deteriorating," Amrani said.) Morocco supports a "double track" approach in Mali that includes both political negotiations and "military pressure" on the terror groups. On this one, Armani said, "Africans will take the lead."

When I ask him about fears that Libya may be headed in the same direction -- a weak central government overrun by jihadists. He took the long view. "Transitions in the region -- in Tunis, Libya, Egypt -- will be long, complicated and will take time." In Libya as in other countries, Amrani cautioned, there are "no institutions,
no civil societies, no political parties." In perhaps the most memorable comment in our conversation he said simply, "Democracy is culture."

That sentiment indisputable. Critics of the Obama administration point to the lack of staying power, the failure to work over the long haul on civil society building and inconsistency in opposing autocracy that hinder U.S. influence in the region. Morocco in the past has been hesitant to step forward as a model for the region but with its newly intensified relationship with the United States and the deteriorating situation throughout the region, Morocco is becoming less reticent. Amrani explained, "We can share our modest experience. We need to have success stories . . . otherwise extremists will take the lead."

On December 12, Clinton will attend the Friends of Syria meeting hosted by Morocco. Approximately 100 international delegations are expected to attend along with representatives of the Syrian opposition. Amrani deflected a question about whether there is room for optimism that Bashar al-Assad will soon be gone. He insisted, "The future of Syria should be democracy or there is no future. . . . There is no other choice." He didn't offer a view on whether the Syrian opposition has what it needs to prevail, but said, "We have to support the opposition politically and financially. Through the [United Nations] Security Council and other organizations, we need to put pressure on the regime." He added, "We should not forget the human dimension." In addition to some 38,000 dead Syrians, Turkey and other countries now feel pressure from refugees fleeing the violence.

Throughout the interview Amrani reiterated that the United States and Morocco would discuss the peace process and should try to get the parties "back on track." From the view of many in the United States this seems Pollyannish, especially in light of the Palestinian Authority's decision to bypass bilateral negotiations and go to the United Nations General Assembly for recognition. Amrani showed his diplomatic skill: "We know that in some countries and the [United] States, some were opposed [to the unilateral declaration]. But we feel a vote could be an opportunity to bring the parties back together." He affirmed that the goal should be "two independent states, living side by side with secure frontiers." While many in the United States see this as a fruitless exercise, Morocco remains convinced that "it is important to give a positive signal," as Amrani described it.

It is with a measure of frustration that Amrani expressed the plight of moderate Arab countries. "We are fed up with conflict, with crisis. We need peace. Peace can be achieved through political will."

It is, of course, the $64,000 question whether there is the will for peace in the Palestinian Authority, which has repeatedly walked away from the bargaining table and has abrogated the Oslo Accords in going to the United Nations. That said, even the appearance of progress is better than nothing, one supposes.

Meanwhile, if nothing else, the trip to Morocco should impress upon Clinton that the "Arab Spring" is not a one season episode, but a multi-year and probably multi-decade process in which the United States will have to find ways to maximize its leverage, promote reform, aid in the development of civil institutions and find new allies that can fill the breach while others (such as Egypt) may be in turmoil. For a president that too often has seemed annoyed with national security intrusions into his domestic agenda and has sought to minimize the U.S. role on the world stage, this is an inconvenient reality. Nevertheless, President Obama, Clinton and Clinton's successor would do well to develop an actual policy for the Middle East that consists of more than simply lurching from one crisis to another. If that realization is driven home on the Morocco trip, then it will be a worthwhile visit for both countries.
Monday, December 03, 2012

Discussion with Moroccan Minister-Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

The Michael S. Ansari Africa Center hosted a discussion today with H.E. Youssef Amrani, minister-delegate for foreign affairs and cooperation of the Kingdom of Morocco. The minister-delegate is in Washington in advance of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s travel to Morocco next week for the “Friends of Syria” meeting in Marrakesh as well as strategic discussions with His Majesty King Mohammed VI on the various current crises in North Africa, West Africa, and the Middle East.

Ambassador Amrani spoke about the recently-launched US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue as well as on regional issues, including the precarious security situation in the Sahel following the takeover of northern Mali by extremist groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the need for greater economic integration in the Maghreb.

Council President Fred Kempe welcomed participants to and chaired the event, while Ansari Center Director J. Peter Pham moderated the discussion, which included US government officials, representatives of nongovernmental organizations, leading academic and think tank Africa experts, and members of the business community.
MICHAEL S. ANSARI AFRICA CENTER

Discussion with H.E. Youssef Amrani, Minister-Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Morocco

December 3, 2012 • 4:00 p.m. – 5:15 p.m.
Atlantic Council • Washington, DC

H.E. Youssef Amrani
Minister-Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Kingdom of Morocco

Rudolph Atallah
Senior Fellow, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center
Atlantic Council

Mamadou Beye
Manager, International Government Affairs
Chevron Corporation

H.E. Rachad Bouhlal
Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the US
Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco

Bronwyn Bruton
Deputy Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center
Atlantic Council

Gretchen Blrkle
Deputy Director, Middle East and North Africa
International Republican Institute

Caitlin Dearing
Senior Vice President of Research Projects, and Programs
Moroccan American Center

Michele Dunne
Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
Atlantic Council

Melvin Foote
President and CEO
Constituency for Africa

Edward Gabriel
Former US Ambassador to Morocco

Audra Grant
Political Scientist
Rand Corporation

Hanane Zelouani Idrissi
Assistant Program Officer, Middle East & North Africa Program
National Endowment for Democracy

Frederick Kempe**
President and CEO
Atlantic Council

Mohsin Khan
Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
Atlantic Council

Karim Mansouri
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kingdom of Morocco

Sean McFate
Vice President, TD International, LLC
Adjunct Professor, Adjunct Researcher,
National Defense University

Anne Moisan
Professor, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
National Defense University

Alexei Monsarrat
Director, Global Business and Economics Program
Atlantic Council

Garth Neuffer
Director of Media
Moroccan American Center

J. Peter Pham
Executive Director
Moroccan American Center

Morgan Roach
Research Associate, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
The Heritage Foundation

Lawrence Veile
Professor, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
National Defense University

William E. Ward
Former Commander
US Africa Command

Mary Carlin Yates**
Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa
The White House

* Atlantic Council Member
** Atlantic Council Board Director
*** International Advisory Board Member
Sunday, December 2, 2012

United States to Host US-Moroccan Business Development Conference


The Moroccan delegation will be led by Minister of Industry, Trade and New Technologies Abdelkader Aamara, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Aziz Akhannouch, and Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Youssef Amrani.

Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides will provide opening remarks. The conference will take place at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. Attendees will discuss ways to increase bilateral trade and enhance business development in sectors such as aerospace, agriculture, automotive, and renewable energy and infrastructure.
The **U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement**, implemented in 2006, is one of the United States’ most comprehensive free trade agreements; it eliminated tariffs on 95 percent of traded goods. The FTA has bolstered trade and investment between our two countries, resulting in two-way trade valued at $3.79 billion in 2011.

Currently, there are more than 120 American businesses operating in Morocco, which have invested $2.2 billion and have created more than 100,000 direct and indirect jobs. However, in order to achieve the FTA’s full potential, the United States is providing $1.5 million in assistance designed to attract foreign investors to Morocco, to foster local economic development, and strengthen the legal and regulatory framework.

**Secretary of State Clinton** has set a goal of increasing trade from Morocco to the United States, and the Morocco Business Development Conference aims to do just that by raising awareness among U.S. businesses of opportunities to trade with, and invest in Morocco.

The Opening Plenary of the U.S.-Morocco Business Development Conference will take place on Tuesday, December 4, in the Department of State’s Loy Henderson Auditorium from 9:00 a.m. to 9:45 a.m. This session is open to credentialed members of the media.

*********

Pre-set time for cameras: 8:10 a.m. from the 23rd Street entrance

Final access time for journalists and still photographers: 8:45 a.m. from the 23rd Street entrance.

Media representatives may attend this event upon presentation of one of the following: (1) A U.S. Government-issued identification card (Department of State, White House, Congress, Department of Defense, or Foreign Press Center), (2) a media-issued photo identification card, or (3) a letter from their employer on letterhead verifying their employment as a journalist, accompanied by an official photo identification card (driver’s license, passport).

For more information, please see the Bilateral Fact Sheet at: [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm)

PRESS CONTACT: Kerry Humphrey: 202-647-0677 | EPPDMedia@state.gov
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  Thursday, November 29, 2012

King Mohammed VI, Sec. Clinton to Meet in Morocco on Mali, Syria Crises, Strategic Partnership

Morocco Deputy Foreign Minister Amrani in Washington week of Dec. 3 for preparations

Washington, DC (Nov. 29) — Morocco’s Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani will be in Washington, DC on December 3 to prepare for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s upcoming strategic discussions in Morocco with His Majesty King Mohammed VI. Secretary Clinton and King Mohammed VI will meet on December 11 in Morocco to discuss specific steps Morocco and the US can take within their strategic partnership to overcome security challenges in Mali and Syria, address the Middle East peace process and regional humanitarian concerns, and deepen the US-Morocco bilateral relationship.

Morocco has become an increasingly important strategic partner for the US since King Mohammed VI began, more than a decade ago, to advance democratic reforms in a progressive manner, successfully avoiding the chaos and uncertainties that have troubled much of the region over the past two years.

In addition, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and a bilateral partner in the new Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue, Morocco and King Mohammed VI have recently played an increasingly important role on the international stage, helping the US and its allies to address the pressing crisis in Syria and now Mali.

On December 12, Secretary Clinton will join the fourth “Friends of Syria” meeting, which Morocco is hosting in Marrakech. More than 100 delegations are expected to attend. The goal is to reach agreement on a common strategy for ensuring a political transition, mobilizing aid for refugees caught in the humanitarian crisis, and addressing regional security implications. Morocco has worked closely with the US to advance a common and progressive position among Arab nations on the crisis.

** To set up an interview with Mr. Youssef Amrani, Morocco’s Minister Delegate of Foreign Affairs, please contact: Garth Neuffer at 202.470.2055, gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com.

For more on Morocco and the region, visit http://www.moroccoonthemove.com/. Also follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

###

The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) is a non-profit organization whose principal mission is to inform opinion makers, government officials, and interested publics in the United States about political and social developments in Morocco and the role being played by the Kingdom of Morocco in broader strategic developments in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. For more, please visit www.moroccoonthemove.com

This material is distributed by the Moroccan American Center for Policy on behalf of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
Susan Rice withdraws from consideration for secretary of state

U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice has withdrawn her name for consideration for secretary of state, the White House has announced.

"While I deeply regret the unfair and misleading attacks on Susan Rice in recent weeks, her decision demonstrates the strength of her character, and an admirable commitment to rise above the politics of the moment to put our national interests first," President Obama said in a statement.

Read more at:
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Friday, December 14, 2012 11:45 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: Washington Post: "Rice Pulls Out of Running" and other appointment rumors

Please note in this article about Susan Rice resigning, there are references to John Kerry being the likely candidate now, as well as hints on other possible security positions. Ed


The Washington Post

Friday, December 14, 2012

Rice Pulls Out of Running

Kerry in line to be Secretary

Charges over Libya proved too distracting

By Karen DeYoung and Anne Gearan

U.N. Ambassador Susan E. Rice withdrew her name Thursday as President Obama’s leading candidate for secretary of state, saying the administration could not afford a “lengthy, disruptive and costly” confirmation fight over statements she made about the extremist attack in Libya that killed four Americans.

Rice called Obama on Thursday morning, before sending him a letter officially withdrawing from consideration. Rice said in an interview that she had concluded early this week that what she and Obama considered “unfair and misleading” charges against her over the Sept. 11 attack in Benghazi, Libya, would impede the president’s second-term agenda. “This was my decision,” Rice said. When asked if Obama had tried to dissuade her, she said that he “understood that this was the right decision, and that I made it for the right reasons.”

Her withdrawal leaves Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) with no apparent rivals to take over from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. A senior administration official said that “something strange would have to happen” for Kerry not to be the choice.

The official also said that former senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) has emerged as a “solid” candidate to run the Pentagon, although a final decision has not been made. For the CIA, the official said, Obama is deciding between Acting Director Michael J. Morell and deputy national security adviser John O. Brennan, who has yet to tell the president whether he would accept the job.

As Obama assembles his second-term national security team, formal announcements are due as early as next week. National security adviser Thomas E. Donilon will remain in his job, according to officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal White House deliberations.

Rice said in the interview that “after a long, grueling battle, in all likelihood, I would be confirmed.” The assessment was
shared by White House officials and by senior Democratic congressional aides who said they were confident that a majority of senators would have voted for her. “But I really came to believe this would not be weeks, but potentially months, and incredibly distracting and disruptive,” Rice said. The first few months of any president’s second term, she said, are “your high-water mark of influence.”

“If my nomination meant that the odds of getting comprehensive immigration reform passed or any other major priority were substantially reduced, I couldn’t live with myself,” she said. Rice’s withdrawal was a retreat by Obama, who had repeatedly voiced support for her. In a statement issued by the White House, Obama described her as “an extraordinarily capable, patriotic, and passionate public servant.”

But her removal from the scene is unlikely to quell the controversy that led to it: the extremist attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Libya that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.

Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) have focused on what they called Rice’s intentionally misleading description, in television interviews five days after the attack, of an anti-American demonstration that turned violent. The administration later revised that assessment, using what it said was updated intelligence information, to blame organized extremists.

Rice’s withdrawal, Graham said in a statement, “will not end questions about what happened in Benghazi.” Clinton is scheduled to appear before House and Senate committees next week to discuss an independent State Department review of possible security lapses that is nearing completion.

Rice and Obama made clear that she will continue at the United Nations. But administration officials said Obama left open a door when he spoke of her “limitless capability to serve our country now and in the years to come.”

In the weeks before the Nov. 6 presidential election, as Republican criticism of Rice crystallized, the White House initially portrayed the fight over her as nakedly partisan. Congressional Republicans were unfairly attacking the ambassador simply because she represented the White House, administration spokesmen said. GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney also criticized the White House over the attack and suggested there had been a cover-up.

But the controversy over Rice’s portrayal of the attack did not evaporate after Obama won, and some congressional Democrats became worried about the cost of a nomination battle that probably would make negotiations over taxes and spending more difficult. The White House insisted that Rice’s television appearances had been closely coordinated with the intelligence community, and senior intelligence officials came forth with background statements supporting her.

Obama did not disguise his anger in defending Rice at a news conference after the election. “If Senator McCain and Senator Graham and others want to go after somebody, they should go after me,” he said. “I’m happy to have that discussion with them. But for them to go after the U.N. ambassador who had nothing to do with Benghazi, and was simply making a presentation based on intelligence that she had received, and besmirch her reputation is outrageous.”

But White House attempts to mollify critics and round up support by sending Rice to Capitol Hill for two days of meetings last month backfired when moderates such as Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) declined to endorse her.

Collins’s criticism was a red flag for the administration. Along with new Republican charges this week that Rice had mishandled diplomatic tasks when she served as the Bill Clinton administration’s chief diplomat on Africa, Rice and the White House began to believe that the cause was not worth the price.

The Africa charges, a senior Obama official said, “indicated that they were going to keep going — once they ran out of one issue, they would manufacture another.” By last Sunday, Rice said in the interview, “I started very seriously thinking that the costs really outweighed the benefits. That no number of facts or rationality or reason was going to
deter those who were determined to make this a political issue.” In its schedule, the White House said Obama will meet with Rice in the Oval Office on Friday.

Throughout the controversy, Kerry has said little about Rice. On Thursday, he called her “an extraordinarily capable and dedicated public servant.” “As someone who has weathered my share of political attacks and understands on a personal level just how difficult politics can be,” he said, “I’ve felt for her throughout these last difficult weeks, but I also know that she will continue to serve with great passion and distinction.”

Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) said Rice could have been confirmed by the Senate but for the actions of certain Republicans. “The politically motivated attacks on her character from some of my Republican colleagues were shameful,” he said in a statement Thursday.

Rice, 48, was an early Obama backer among Democratic national security experts who had worked in the Clinton White House, where she served on the National Security Council staff. During the 2008 campaign, Hillary Clinton’s team considered Rice’s support for Obama a defection.

After Obama won, he gave Rice the U.N. job, a plum among policy wonks but a post that is not well known nationally. There, she quickly became a White House insider with strong connections among Obama’s close circle of policy advisers. Rice has worked alongside Hillary Clinton without any public hint of discord, although the two were never close.

In a statement issued by the State Department, Clinton called Rice an “indispensable partner” and said they had worked together on difficult issues such as Iran, North Korea, Libya and South Sudan. “Susan has worked tirelessly to advance our nation’s interests and values,” Clinton said. “I am confident that she will continue to represent the United States with strength and skill.” Rice said she does not think the secretary of state battle will undermine her effectiveness at the United Nations. “They know, because they’ve seen it firsthand, that I have the full confidence of the president,” she said.

Scott Wilson and Ed O’Keefe contributed to this report
Rice Pulls Out of Running
Kerry in line to be Secretary
Charges over Libya proved too distracting

By Karen DeYoung and Anne Gearan

U.N. Ambassador Susan E. Rice withdrew her name Thursday as President Obama’s leading candidate for secretary of state, saying the administration could not afford a “lengthy, disruptive and costly” confirmation fight over statements she made about the extremist attack in Libya that killed four Americans.

Rice called Obama on Thursday morning, before sending him a letter officially withdrawing from consideration. Rice said in an interview that she had concluded early this week that what she and Obama considered “unfair and misleading” charges against her over the Sept. 11 attack in Benghazi, Libya, would impede the president’s second-term agenda. “This was my decision,” Rice said. When asked if Obama had tried to dissuade her, she said that he “understood that this was the right decision, and that I made it for the right reasons.”

Her withdrawal leaves Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) with no apparent rivals to take over from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. A senior administration official said that “something strange would have to happen” for Kerry not to be the choice.

The official also said that former senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) has emerged as a “solid” candidate to run the Pentagon, although a final decision has not been made. For the CIA, the official said, Obama is deciding between Acting Director Michael J. Morell and deputy national security adviser John O. Brennan, who has yet to tell the president whether he would accept the job.

As Obama assembles his second-term national security team, formal announcements are due as early as next week. National security adviser Thomas E. Donilon will remain in his job, according to officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal White House deliberations.

Rice said in the interview that “after a long, grueling battle, in all likelihood, I would be confirmed.” The assessment was shared by White House officials and by senior Democratic congressional aides who said they were confident that a majority of senators would have voted for her. “But I really came to believe this would not be weeks, but potentially months, and incredibly distracting and disruptive,” Rice said. The first few months of any president’s second term, she said, are “your high-water mark of influence.”

“If my nomination meant that the odds of getting comprehensive immigration reform passed or any other major priority were substantially reduced, I couldn’t live with myself,” she said. Rice’s withdrawal was a retreat by Obama, who had repeatedly voiced support for her. In a statement issued by the White House, Obama described her as “an extraoridinary capable, patriotic, and passionate public servant.”

But her removal from the scene is unlikely to quell the controversy that led to it: the extremist attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Libya that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.

Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) have focused on what they called Rice’s intentionally misleading description, in television interviews five days after the attack, of an anti-American demonstration that turned violent. The administration later revised that assessment, using what it said was updated intelligence information, to blame organized extremists.
Rice’s withdrawal, Graham said in a statement, “will not end questions about what happened in Benghazi.” Clinton is scheduled to appear before House and Senate committees next week to discuss an independent State Department review of possible security lapses that is nearing completion.

Rice and Obama made clear that she will continue at the United Nations. But administration officials said Obama left open a door when he spoke of her “limitless capability to serve our country now and in the years to come.”

In the weeks before the Nov. 6 presidential election, as Republican criticism of Rice crystallized, the White House initially portrayed the fight over her as nakedly partisan. Congressional Republicans were unfairly attacking the ambassador simply because she represented the White House, administration spokesmen said. GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney also criticized the White House over the attack and suggested there had been a cover-up.

But the controversy over Rice’s portrayal of the attack did not evaporate after Obama won, and some congressional Democrats became worried about the cost of a nomination battle that probably would make negotiations over taxes and spending more difficult. The White House insisted that Rice’s television appearances had been closely coordinated with the intelligence community, and senior intelligence officials came forth with background statements supporting her.

Obama did not disguise his anger in defending Rice at a news conference after the election. “If Senator McCain and Senator Graham and others want to go after somebody, they should go after me,” he said. “I’m happy to have that discussion with them. But for them to go after the U.N. ambassador who had nothing to do with Benghazi, and was simply making a presentation based on intelligence that she had received, and besmirch her reputation is outrageous.”

But White House attempts to mollify critics and round up support by sending Rice to Capitol Hill for two days of meetings last month backfired when moderates such as Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) declined to endorse her.

Collins’s criticism was a red flag for the administration. Along with new Republican charges this week that Rice had mishandled diplomatic tasks when she served as the Bill Clinton administration’s chief diplomat on Africa, Rice and the White House began to believe that the cause was not worth the price.

The Africa charges, a senior Obama official said, “indicated that they were going to keep going — once they ran out of one issue, they would manufacture another.” By last Sunday, Rice said in the interview, “I started very seriously thinking that the costs really outweighed the benefits. That no number of facts or rationality or reason was going to deter those who were determined to make this a political issue.” In its schedule, the White House said Obama will meet with Rice in the Oval Office on Friday.

Throughout the controversy, Kerry has said little about Rice. On Thursday, he called her “an extraordinarily capable and dedicated public servant.” “As someone who has weathered my share of political attacks and understands on a personal level just how difficult politics can be,” he said, “I’ve felt for her throughout these last difficult weeks, but I also know that she will continue to serve with great passion and distinction.”

Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) said Rice could have been confirmed by the Senate but for the actions of certain Republicans. “The politically motivated attacks on her character from some of my Republican colleagues were shameful,” he said in a statement Thursday.

Rice, 48, was an early Obama backer among Democratic national security experts who had worked in the Clinton White House, where she served on the National Security Council staff. During the 2008 campaign, Hillary Clinton’s team considered Rice’s support for Obama a defection.

After Obama won, he gave Rice the U.N. job, a plum among policy wonks but a post that is not well known nationally. There, she quickly became a White House insider with strong connections among Obama’s close circle of policy advisers. Rice has worked alongside Hillary Clinton without any public hint of discord, although the two were never close.

In a statement issued by the State Department, Clinton called Rice an “indispensable partner” and said they had worked together on difficult issues such as Iran, North Korea, Libya and South Sudan. “Susan has worked tirelessly to advance our nation’s interests and values,” Clinton said. “I am confident that she will continue to represent the United States with strength and skill.” Rice said she does not think the secretary of state battle will undermine her effectiveness at the United Nations. “They know, because they’ve seen it firsthand, that I have the full confidence of the president,” she said.

Scott Wilson and Ed O’Keefe contributed to this report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benkirane</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sacrifices the well-being of Moroccans to balance the state’s budget&lt;br&gt;Dec. 9, 2012</td>
<td>This article criticizes Benkirane’s intention to end government subsidies on fuel and basic goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moroccans Fear That Flickers of Democracy Are Fading</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dec. 10, 2012</td>
<td>“More and more Moroccans are questioning [Benkirane’s] ability to [strengthen the middle class] and are wondering whether Morocco’s version of the Arab Spring brought anything more than cosmetic changes to this impoverished country, which has been one of America’s most stable and staunch allies in a region marked by turmoil.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion et Déclaration universelle des droits de l’Homme</strong>&lt;br&gt;Religion and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights&lt;br&gt;Dec. 10, 2012</td>
<td>In an article published by the newspaper &quot;Akhbar Al Yaoum&quot; Abdelilah Hami Eddine, a member of PJD, defends the central thesis that &quot;secularism&quot; is not &quot;a prerequisite to building democracy.&quot; Translated from French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mali : Le Maroc ne sait pas ce qu’il veut</strong>&lt;br&gt;Mali: Morocco doesn’t know what it wants&lt;br&gt;Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco is incapable, despite its temporary presidency of the UNSC, of taking a clear position on Mali. Supporter of an African military intervention without being a member of the African Union, Morocco is not involved in the crucial discussions about Mali. Translated from French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saisie de plus de 700 kg de drogue sur la route entre Meknès et El Hajeb</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td>According to Meknes Customs officials, 701 kg of drugs were seized in two cars near Loudaya on the National Road No. 13. The drugs consisted of 547 kg of cannabis resin, 153 kg tobacco leaves and 1.1 kg of chira. The cars used were a Ford Mondeo and a Partner, and both drivers fled the scene. The market value of the drugs seized is estimated to be 711,000 dhs. Translated from French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seizure of over 700kg of drugs on the road between Meknes and El Hajeb</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria's vision for Mali’s future relies on the preservation of the territorial integrity, preservation of national unity, promoting a peaceful solution, and fighting against terrorism and transnational organized crime. Algeria believes that the Malian army must be strengthened and consolidated to play its necessary role in safeguarding these principles. Finally, Algeria has provided a significant amount of logistic support as well as securing institutions and facilities in Bamako and donating $10 million.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“L’Algérie veut voir les frères maliens régler leurs problèmes”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Algeria wants to see its Malian brothers fix their problems”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two former presidents of the Meknes Chamber of Commerce under arrest</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two former presidents and an official of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services of Meknes have been accused of embezzlement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O Maghreb: Where Art Thou in US Foreign Policy?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Given the current political climate, US foreign policy needs to address the political challenges facing the Maghreb region, in the context of a vibrant “freedom agenda” that would promote meaningful reforms. The new U.S. administration needs to further press for good governance, rule of law and accountability in order to increase the scope of individual and group liberties. The relevance of the region to US foreign policy is intrinsically linked to a successful resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, which continues to stand as an albatross for regional cooperation. “</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benkirane: La lutte contre la corruption est prioritaire</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption has been a long standing issue, particularly within audit institutions. PM Benkiraine says great steps have been taken since the implementation of the new Constitution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kuwait, Morocco discuss further industrial cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kuwait Industries Union (KIU) discussed ways of boosting economic cooperation between the two countries, especially industrial opportunities available in Morocco. Banani, Moroccan Ambassador to Kuwait, added that Morocco is keen to provide several advantages for investment, including tax exemptions and flexible laws. He emphasized Morocco's stability within the region, a major attraction for foreign investment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source/Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 12, 2012</td>
<td>&quot;The economic and material interests of France impede reaching an agreement on the question of Western Sahara, and [it leaves] the Saharawi people unable to access their independence,&quot; said the delegate from the Greater Chantereine-Marne Area council (Seine-et-Marne). According to Mr. Kabeya Nkashama, political commentator, the industrialized countries and France &quot;want to safeguard their own interests in Morocco trampling human values of freedom, emancipation and the right of peoples to self-determination.&quot; He stressed, in this regard, &quot;the hypocrisy&quot; of France consisting of &quot;preaching freedom and human rights&quot;, while in the case of Western Sahara, it &quot;does not apply [those values] on the ground&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 13, 2012</td>
<td>In an article about the custom of sipping tea while conducting business, NPR referred to Western Sahara as Moroccan territory. They had posted the following retraction when DK revisited the piece on Dec. 14. &quot;An earlier version of this blog post identified Western Sahara as a territory of Morocco. In fact, the territory has been under dispute since 1976. The United Nations designates Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 13, 2012</td>
<td>Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane said Thursday the kingdom would not tolerate the media implicating the king in political party rivalry, in reference to the withdrawal of an AFP journalist's accreditation. The government decided to suspend Omar Brouksy’s press accreditation on October 4, in response to a story he wrote that referred to the participation in a Tangiers by-election of candidates “close to the royal palace.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 13, 2012</td>
<td>In an interview with the Spanish journal Sahara Libre, member of the National Secretariat of the Polisario Front and coordinator with MINURSO Mhamed Jadad said France prevents the U.N. Security Council from exercising MINURSO’s mandate for the supervision and protection of human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Translated from French</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 13, 2012</td>
<td>Maroc : Le PJD veut mettre fin au Mariage des -16 ans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 13, 2012</td>
<td>Huge crowds gather for funeral of Morocco Islamist leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 14, 2012</td>
<td>Beating bribery: International Anticorruption Day in Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 14, 2012</td>
<td>Chambre des représentants, le conseil constitutionnel annule l’élection de 12 membres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 14, 2012</td>
<td>Maroc : La pauvreté est la véritable cause de la déforestation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog Name</td>
<td>Update Tile/Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR.com</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>Agreements Seen as Boost to Trade Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Tunisia: Nation, Morocco Receive EU Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blogma Aggregator</td>
<td>Le textile tunisien fait mieux que le textile marocain!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Voice of Russia</td>
<td>Clinton Delays Visit to Morocco due to stomach virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahoo News</td>
<td>Morocco opposition says monarchy still calls the shots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
family's rule. "People are now convinced the steps taken in Morocco are more or less superficial, which is exactly how the regime responded to pressure in the past," Arsalane told Reuters. "It's become clear that it is the monarchy in control."

| Daily Markets | Lear Corporation Announces Agreement To Construct Automotive Wiring Facility In Morocco | Lear Corporation announced its new automotive wiring plant is scheduled to open in 2013 in Morocco's Amer Saflia area and create approximately 700 jobs, expected to increase significantly over upcoming years based on the projected growth in Lear's Electrical Power Management Systems business. | 0 |
| Platts | New Frontiers: the buzz about oil in Morocco | This article provides an in depth look at which oil companies are operating in Morocco and where. | 0 |
| Business Day Live | Hacker defends Morocco from SA villainy | Three South African government websites were hacked last weekend by a lone activist who was apparently angered at South Africa’s support for the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic in Western Sahara. | 1 |
| OMCT.org | Morocco: OMCT begins mission to Morocco to assess anti-torture progress | Today a delegation of experts of the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) is beginning its mission to Morocco. The objective of the mission is to assess the level of implementation of the UN Committee Against Torture’s conclusion and recommendation issued one year ago. | 0 |
| Magharebia | Moroccans protest gender violence | Hundreds of people formed a human chain in Rabat on Saturday Dec. 8 to denounce all forms of violence against women, AFP reported. "We are here to denounce physical, verbal and moral | 0 |
violence, as well as the harassment of women," a demonstrator said. The protest was organized by "Spring of Dignity", a coalition of 22 groups focused on the defense of women's rights. "Morocco's laws should be adapted to the international conventions that Morocco has ratified, particularly those dealing with the rights of women," one organizer said.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magharebia</th>
<th>Morocco chairs UN talks on Mali</th>
<th>Morocco will chair a UN Security Council meeting on the crisis in Mali and the Sahel region, MAP reported. Moroccan Foreign Minister Saadeddine El Othmani will head the talks, which will also be attended by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, UN Sahel envoy Romano Prodi and UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres.</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>'Friends of Syria' set for Marrakech</td>
<td>The &quot;Friends of Syria&quot; group will meet in Morocco on Wednesday, AFP reports. Arab and Western states will consider two key issues concerning the 21-month Syria conflict: the political transition in the event of President Bashar al-Assad's exit, and the mobilization of humanitarian aid as winter sets in. More than 100 delegations are expected to attend the Marrakech event. Wednesday's meeting will reportedly address ways of supporting the National Coalition.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>French PM to visit Morocco</td>
<td>French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault will arrive in Morocco on Wednesday, Maghreb Emergent reports. During his 2-day visit, Ayrault is expected to sign several cooperation agreements with his Moroccan counterpart Abdelilah Benkirane. The French PM will also attend a meeting of Moroccan and French businessmen and co-chair the launch of the Casablanca tram.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>'5+5 Defence' meeting opens in Rabat</td>
<td>The 8th meeting of the &quot;5+5 Defence&quot; initiative opens on Monday (Dec 10) in Rabat, APS reports. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, along with European partners Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal, will sign a joint declaration on defense and security cooperation. Founded in 2004, the &quot;5+5&quot; initiative includes regular dialogue and military drills by the armed forces of member states.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco, Algeria bloggers want open border</td>
<td>Moroccan and Algerian bloggers are calling for their shared border to be reopened. They argue that the two nations have been linked for centuries by blood, marriage, proximity, mutual interests, literature and music. The border has been closed for nearly 18 years.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco jails customs officers</td>
<td>More than 40 customs officials and police are facing prosecution for fraud and &quot;harassment&quot;. Of the forty, seven former officers were sentenced to one year in prison on Tuesday December 11th by a Tetouan court.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco leads Sahel security drive</td>
<td>Morocco is using its United Nations Security Council presidency to rally international attention to the Mali conflict, terrorism, transnational crime and other threats to Sahel security.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait News Agency</td>
<td>US goal is offer additional support at Morocco meeting of Friends of Syria</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton &quot;will want to hear from [the Syrian Opposition Council], both in her own meeting and in the broader meeting, about how they see things going forward, both in terms of their own internal organization, about their connectivity with Syrians inside Syria, about their transitional planning, about the needs that they see for external support, how they would have us best direct the non-lethal support and humanitarian support that we are providing,&quot; State Sept. spokesperson</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>Syrian Rebels Seek More Global Support at Morocco Meeting</td>
<td>The Syrian Opposition Coalition has been steadily gaining support, and they will make their case to more than 100 delegations on Dec. 13 in Marrakesh.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice Of America</td>
<td>Nations Supporting Syrian Opposition to Meet in Morocco</td>
<td>There is mounting concern that Islamic extremists are becoming a significant force among armed opposition groups within Syria. Morocco’s Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani told VOA's Press Conference that the longer the violence continues in Syria, the more Islamic extremists will benefit. Nations at the Friends of Syria meeting will discuss regional security implications of the conflict and efforts to mobilize aid for refugees caught in the humanitarian crisis.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Star Online</td>
<td>Clinton cancels Morocco trip due to illness</td>
<td>US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has canceled a planned trip to Morocco due to a stomach virus, her office said Monday. Philippe Reines, a Clinton aide, said that Deputy Secretary of State William Burns would travel in her place to Marrakesh for a meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People. At the talks, the United States may recognize the new Syrian National Coalition as the sole representative of the Syrian people, as the group struggles to present itself as a legitimate alternative to President Bashar al-Assad's regime.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Nation</td>
<td>Morocco King Mohammed urges security council's Syria action</td>
<td>King Mohammed VI, has urged the United Nations Security Council to urgently adopt a unified resolution in support of transfer of power in Syria. The King emphasizes his country's support for the Syrian people's demands for freedom, democracy and dignity.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Jazeera</td>
<td>'Friends of Syria' recognise opposition</td>
<td>Dec. 12, 2012</td>
<td>The world's major powers have given full political recognition to the Syrian National Coalition, an opposition bloc, as the fourth conference for the &quot;Friends of the Syrian People&quot; opens in Morocco. More than a hundred government delegates, including from the US, France, Britain and the Gulf countries, have gathered in the Moroccan city of Marrakesh to unveil measures to support the newly formed Syrian group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Monitor</td>
<td>How Dangerous Are Morocco's Salafists?</td>
<td>Dec. 12, 2012</td>
<td>In Tangier on Nov. 27, 2012, a &quot;bearded&quot; demonstration turned into an open confrontation between the police and one hundred Salafists. The Salafists demanded the release of one of their own who allegedly tried to kill a policeman and is thought to be one of 24 suspected terrorists specializing in sending jihadists to northern Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco police arrest protester who impersonated king</td>
<td>Dec. 13, 2012</td>
<td>A Moroccan anti-government protester who dressed up as King Mohammed has been arrested and accused of possessing drugs, the man's lawyer and human rights activists said on Thursday. Idris Boutarada, a member of the 'February 20' movement that led Arab Spring protests in Morocco last year, was detained by police after taking part in an anti-government protest near parliament in Rabat two days earlier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia Review</td>
<td>France Favors A Strong Win-Win Partnership With Morocco – OpEd</td>
<td>Dec. 14, 2012</td>
<td>This piece discusses the recent visit of high-level French ministers to Morocco and the strengthening of ties between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


November/December 2012 Events Bulletin

November 15
Politics and Power in Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring - A conversation with Michael Willis

November 29
Prospects for Maghreb Economic Integration

December 5
Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North

Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis

Date: 15 November 2012

1. Title: Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis
   Hosted by Project on Middle East Political Science at the Elliott School of International Affairs

   Participants:
   Michael Willis: University Research Lecturer and King Mohammed VI Fellow in Moroccan and Mediterranean Studies, University of Oxford

2. Overview

   Professor Willis discussed his new book, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring.

3. Summary

   Professor Willis began by discussing why he wanted to write a book. He noted that the Maghreb is not a focal area for many scholars, not even for those you study the MENA region. It thus does not receive a lot of attention. This is also because the region does not have conflicts on the scale of the Mashreq countries, although Willis noted that the Maghreb certainly has conflicts of importance, most notably the conflict over the Western Sahara. Willis
characterized the Western Sahara as one of the longest unresolved conflicts that, “no one outside of the corridors of the UN has ever heard of, let alone addressed its causes and effects.” Willis also noted that he wanted to write a book about the Maghreb as a region, because when the area has been covered, it has been at the individual country level, rather than at the region level. Given the absence of a book on the politics and history of the region, Willis set out to write a broad and comparative study of the region as a whole, thus integrating texts on individual countries.

Through his research (and prior to the Arab Spring), Professor Willis drew two primary conclusions about the region as a whole: it has had continuity in its political system and continuity in its forms of political power – although there are different faces, the structures have remained largely the same. With regard to the former, Morocco has maintained a monarchy, Tunisia has historically had an all-powerful President back by a political party, and Algeria has had a civilian president and a strong military, with the intelligence services serving as kingmaker. With regard to the second conclusion, in Morocco, the real wielders of power are not the elected officials and a shadow government operates to some extent, while the real decisions being taken by people outside of the government. In Algeria, unelected officials likewise hold the real power. In the 1990s, there was some political opening in Morocco and Algeria and the establishment of political processes that mimicked liberal democracy, but there was no real change. In Tunisia, the political structures remained the same from Bourguiba to Ben Ali.

The events of the Arab Spring, particularly in Tunisia, forced Willis to reevaluate his initial conclusions and question whether the countries of the Maghreb are really as similar and continuous as originally thought. Certainly, for Morocco and Algeria, whether or not these conclusions have changed after the Arab Spring is still unclear. Willis noted that Algeria and Morocco felt the impact of the Arab Spring, but the revolutions seemed to go east rather than west. In Algeria, several factors mitigated a revolution, including the previous history of revolt that reduced the appetite for radical political change, oil wealth that allowed the government to buy off protestors, and the pluralistic leadership structure, which meant that there was no single, dominant leader for the population to revolt against. In addition, Algerian protests tended to be at the local, socio-economic level. Such protests serve to relieve some pressure on the system. In Morocco, the creation of the February 20th movement was a clear reaction to the Arab Spring, but its momentum was halted to some degree by constitutional reform and early elections. Willis noted that Moroccan opinion is divided as to whether the palace sees this current situation as the end of the Arab Spring or that something else – perhaps a period of ongoing reform. He questioned whether the current strategy of governing with the PJD was the same as that during the period of alternance, when the Palace brought the socialists into government to neutralize them. In any event, Willis argued that Morocco has long claimed to be the most liberal in the region and that is now uncomfortable with the possibility of losing that claim to Tunisia. Whether or not that will inspire further reform is unclear, though Willis believes there has been a change in atmosphere – at least on the street. There is a new appetite for change and it appears that the population is not prepared to accept the failings of the state as before – this may be the biggest fallout of the Arab Spring in Morocco. Turning to Tunisia, Willis said that if it does succeed, it will stand apart from its autocratic neighbors and encourage change across the Maghreb.

In conclusion, Willis noted that the Arab Spring has certainly led to one important shift in the Maghreb, even if the continuity from independence to present has been interrupted by the change in Tunisia. Before, Algeria was revolutionary, Tunisia was reformist, and Morocco was conservative. Now, Tunisia is revolutionary Morocco is reformist, and Algeria is conservative.

4. Q & A

Q: Does the book address the Western Sahara?
A: It is not possible to understand Morocco’s foreign policy without understanding the Western Sahara. The issue is vital to the survival of the Moroccan regime and to some extent the Algerian region. As of yet, I can’t see a resolution between the Polisario, Algeria, and Morocco, unless there is some breakthrough in convincing them to reassess what they all perceive as their vital strategic interests.

Q: What is the role of external actors in the Maghreb?
A: France has failed in the region. The US and Britain are starting to get involved and they need to. The countries of the region will still have to deal with France, but because of France’s colonial history and its support of past dictators, its influence has waned. For example, more and more people are expressing themselves in Arabic, rather than French.

Q: Is there a future for the Arab Maghreb Union?
A: We are seeing a revival right now, particularly by Tunisia. There is certainly a compelling economic case for it, but the problem is the Western Sahara. Morocco lost interest in the AMU when it became clear it wasn’t going to resolve the Western Sahara. Now, most of the interest is coming from Libya and Tunisia. However, I am not optimistic
Q: What is your assessment of the new Moroccan Constitution and whether it meets the aspirations of the Moroccan people for a better system?

A: What was voted on was not what was proposed in March, and what was implemented was not what was voted on. It has been watered down in the process. There are some importance advances, but it isn’t enough. As they say in Morocco, chouia, chouia.

5. Observation

Approximately 30 people attended the book discussion, primarily students and those interested in Maghreb affairs. Professor Willis was an engaging speaker and offered some interesting insights on politics in the Maghreb. While much of what he said was not entirely new, his focus on and passion for the Maghreb is apparent and he is clearly an expert on the region. His promotion of the importance of the Maghreb region for US and UK strategic interests makes him a useful ally for MAC. Furthermore, his title at Oxford University would indicate that he collaborates closely with Morocco. Despite some of his skepticism about reforms in Morocco, he clearly loves the country and has spent much time there. If possible, it might be worth cultivating a relationship with him to see if he would be able to serve as a third party expert.

(Back to top)

---

Prospects for Maghreb Economic Integration

Date: 29 November 2012

1. Title: Prospects for Maghreb Economic Integration
   Hosted by the Atlantic Council

   Speakers:
   - Gary Hufbauer: Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics
   - Jonathan Walters: Director for Regional Strategy and Programs in the Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank
   - John Entelis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle East Studies Program, Fordham University
   - Mohsin Khan: Moderator: Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

   Roundtable Participants:
   - Abdulwahab AlKebsi: Center for International Private Enterprise
   - Ghazi Ben Ahmed: Club de Tunis
   - Caitlin Dearing: Moroccan American Center
   - Michele Dunne: Atlantic Council
   - Mohammed El Qorchi: International Monetary Fund
   - Clément Gillet: Institute for International Finance
   - Danya Greenfield: Atlantic Council
   - Eric Knecht: Atlantic Council
   - Haim Malka: Center for Strategic and International Studies
   - Amine Mati: International Monetary Fund
   - Stephen McInerney: Project on Middle East Democracy
   - Karim Mezran: Atlantic Council
   - Svetlana Milbert: Atlantic Council
   - Mustapha Rouis: World Bank
   - Amor Tahiri: International Monetary Fund
   - Mona Yacoubian: Stimson Center
   - I. William Zartman: School of Advanced International Studies

2. Overview

The aftermath of the Arab Spring has created a new political environment in the Middle East and North Africa. Not only have internal politics changed, but relations between the countries of the region have also changed. There
likewise appears to have been a shift in thinking about economic integration in the region. In light of these developments, this discussion addressed whether in the aftermath of the Arab Spring it is time once again to examine economic integration in the Maghreb. A recent major study by the World Bank on trade and infrastructure in the Maghreb provided an entry point for discussion on the issue.

3. Summary

Mohsin Khan defined the parameters of the discussion, asking the speakers to provide their assessment on whether or not it is a good time to have another look at economic integration, both from an economic perspective and a political perspective. He noted that both elements are an essential point of view because despite convincing evidence of the economic benefits of such integration, political realities have stalled the process.

Gary Hufbauer provided an overview of the current economic status in the region and made the economic case for further integration. He noted that the primary economic goal of the Maghreb countries is sustained 6%+ GDP growth in order to employ young people and converge towards EU per capita income, but that all of the Maghreb countries have fallen far short of this goal. Morocco’s projected growth rate for 2013 is 4.5%, Algeria’s 2.5%, and Tunisia’s 1.8%, and their per capita incomes are one-tenth of what they are in Europe. Hufbauer questioned why the Maghreb countries were doing so poorly despite trade agreements, macroeconomic stability, and reasonable inward foreign direct investment in trade.

According to Hufbauer, there are both internal and external reasons. Externally, trade agreements have failed to deliver additional trade and investment, both within the region and internationally. The Agadir and PAFTA agreements have had a week effect in promoting regional trade, and the EU-Med and US-Morocco agreements haven’t done much. Internally, the countries suffer from a multitude of problems. First, they have failed to fully implement important fiscal and economic reforms, despite some progress. As Hufbauer put it, “the Maghreb is not a poster region for the Washington consensus, but neither is it completely off track. Second, the countries suffer from low rankings in competitiveness, enabling trade, doing business, and corruption. Third, the education systems are oriented towards government service, not business. Despite similar spending as a percentage of GDP to the US and France, the education systems are just not delivering, as they focus on literature, law, and religion, rather than technical training, science, and business. In sum, Hufbauer stressed that the second and third reasons were the primary problems, noting that social infrastructure surrounding business and government, including monopolies, soft cartels, barriers to entry, and corruption costs, is a huge growth killer, as is an achronistic education system. Given this rather challenging economic environment, Maghreb economic integration makes sense, as it will allow economic diversification and improve changes for growth.

Jonathan Walters provided context about trade in the Maghreb and discussed the findings of two recent reports on the Maghreb – one from the World Bank on Trade Facilitation and Infrastructure in the Maghreb, the other a study the World Bank did for the Deauville partnership on trade and foreign direct investment in the region. In terms of context, Walters argued that the current economic drivers in the region are jobs, jobs, jobs, noting that the countries of the region will not be able to achieve the kind of growth required for jobs without integration. However, Walters views integration in a much broader context. In order to achieve sustainable growth, the countries must not only integrate regionally, but also with Europe. He noted that trade as a percentage of GDP within the Maghreb is only 2%, compared with 10% in West Africa and 15% in Central America. Trade costs within the Maghreb are also twice as expensive as trade between Maghreb countries in Europe, indicating that infrastructure and trade barriers are serious impediments to intra-Maghrebi trade.

Turning to the reports, Walters noted that the first study found that in the Maghreb, markets are fragmented, there are no economies of scale, trade costs are high, and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is ineffective. Non-tariff barriers are likewise high due to border closures and arbitrary regulations. The region nevertheless have some assets – a common technical heritage, free trade agreements (although they are yet to be realized), and some tariff reductions. The study also found that if there was integration, complementarities would start to emerge. Walters noted that global supply chains start because of sub-regional supply chains and that if the Maghreb could integrate to start such chains at the sub-regional level, the economic potential would be huge. Economic reform and integration is thus essential to promote regional growth.

The second study addressed economic challenges in the Maghreb in light of the Arab Spring, concluding that an economic awakening to accompany the political awakening and economic integration to promote jobs were essential. It noted that there was some skepticism in the region about liberal economic policies because of the abuse of those policies in crony capitalist societies like Egypt and Tunisia under Mubarak and Ben Ali respectively. The challenge is for these countries is to thus overcome that skepticism and also bridge the gap between the political focus on the
short-term and the economic focus on the long-term. The study also concluded that the European Union needs to be an external anchor for economic integration in the Maghreb by establishing a common vision for the region and confidence building measures between the Maghreb countries.

John Entelis addressed whether or not the political environment is better for economic integration in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Regarding the political feasibility going forward, Entelis noted that the principle obstacle in the past has indeed been largely political, but even more so that it was individual; the AMU didn’t work because it was composed of a diverse set of political leaders and systems, and conflicting personalities that never came close to agreeing on or meeting the goals of the organization. Now, political conditions have changed enormously, even in Morocco and Algeria. There has been a transformation in Libya and Tunisia, and Morocco and Algeria are responding to challenges. A new political consciousness about the need for accountability, democracy, and transparency is beginning to develop. As a result, Entelis argued that we should start to see a convergence of economic diversity and political changes. He stressed, however, that political changes would set the tone for economic changes.

Despite the change in the political environment in the Maghreb, Entelis was only mildly optimistic about the political prospects for Maghreb economic integration – even though politics is changing, serious political obstacles remain that will not, at least for the moment, be solved by new governments. For example, the border closure between Morocco and Algeria is a political decision that seems unlikely to change after the Arab Spring. The same applies to the decision taken by Algeria to have more flights to Paris than Morocco. Entelis stated that, “he can’t explain it, just like he can’t explain Algeria’s refusal to changes its stance on the Western Sahara.”

What, therefore, are the prospects for integration in the future? Entelis argued that complementarity of political systems is a requirement for sustained economic development and integration. This will require institutional changes, including elections, political party development, and institutional building, as well as renewed trust in political institutions. The region has experience as long period of social distrust of political institutions that cannot be overcome quickly. This shift toward political socialization, the willingness to trust leaders through accountability and to accept transfers of power will take time. The region is currently seeing the early signs of changes in political culture, as noted in the start of a renewed political consciousness. A true shift will also require the establishment of the rule of law in the business sense. In closing, Entelis argued that if the fundamental characteristics of politics change and the characteristics that flow out of that, including transparency, accountability, improved education, and improved civil society, then there may be better prospects for Maghreb economic integration.

4. Q & A/Discussion

C: (Ahmed) Maghreb economic integration is a core focus of the work of the Club de Tunis, which is a new think tank that aims to help policymakers and the private sector form economic development strategies. We believe that the government does not have to dictate private investment and that much can be done in spite of political obstacles between governments. Right now we are working to set up a North Africa private sector network. We can use external support for these initiatives – there is a critical role for the US in driving increased regional economic cooperation, but there will also have to be a push from above. We may not have complete integration, but bilateral trade is a start and there is bilateral trade happening between the Maghreb countries that is not being captured by statistics. Going forward, the private sector will have to convince governments that this is in their interest.

C: (Tahiri) The main answers to the questions raised by this forum are yes and yes – yes for economic reasons and yes for political reasons. Economic integration is not a choice, but a necessity for the Maghreb countries, and political changes, albeit ongoing, will push this reality forward. The main reason why economic integration has not progressed well is because of politics, primarily the absence of political will and the absence of a perceived benefit from increased integration for all countries. We have to change this mindset and convince people that this is not a zero-sum game. The private sector will play a key role in this, as they can help convince countries that they will benefit from this. However, international institutions also need to change their approach – no more studies need to be done to show the importance of integration. Rather, the IMF and the World Bank, among others need to be candid about the challenges and be willing to tackle political issues rather than just ignore them.

C: (Entelis) The new situation offers hope because Maghrebis want integration and if they are empowered, through democracy, they may push for it, particularly as political systems are increasingly responding to the demands of the people.

Q: (Zartman) Economic integration isn't just going to happen. Is the US ready to push for it?

Q: (Yacoubian) Is there not a chance for economic drivers to push this rather than waiting on political changes?
Q: (Malka) Do these bureaucracies have the capacity to implement the reforms require for integration?

C: (El Qorchi) Has the international community done enough to push the benefits of regional economic integration? It has to demonstrate that there is a benefit. The private sector tries this approach through Chambers of Commerce, etc., but it did not work. Civil society is trying, but there is an obstacle in centralized power. The push has to come from international institutions doing these studies. They have to be willing to take a political stance.

C: (Dunne) The rationale for this is obvious and well-worn. The question is whether the attitude has changed. Is there a possibility for a shock from the inside rather than the outside? Tunisia and Libya are already engaging economically. Could they not start a revived Arab Maghreb Union without the other countries and then, if successful, Morocco and Algeria would be convinced to join?

C: (Rouis) Is the timing right? Internally, there is certainly a changing political landscape. Externally, there has also been shock to the Maghreb countries with the crisis in Europe. They have to integrate now in order to address both the demands of the population and the external economic crisis. The Maghreb also doesn’t have to move as a whole – if Algeria isn’t budging, then the rest of the Maghreb countries should move ahead without it.

C: (Entelis) There is a practical and an ideological reason for the Algerian people to want integration – not just for goods, but for tourism and services. Oil is only benefitting the state. In terms of circumventing the state to jumpstart progress, this doesn’t need to be done in Tunisia and Libya. If you do such a thing in Morocco or Algeria, you either go to jail or are co-opted into cooperating with the state (crony capitalism). So what is really needed in these countries is transparency to allow ordinary people to have opportunities.

C: (Walters) The discussion about regional integration is a bit of a time warp in the Maghreb. The debate is about regional trade instead of global trade, rather than regional trade and integration and/as a means for global trade and integration.

C: (Hufbauer) Political liberalization will unfortunately reinforce the current problem in the Maghreb that economic solutions come in more government jobs, which is not really the solution. Likewise, the informal sector is not the answer, the formal sector is. Another problem is a lot of old-style economic thinking in these countries. Economists cannot convince them of the benefits, they can’t even convince the US to push for integration. It’s possible that you could convince Algeria to become a champion of integration for reasons of power politics and Maghreb political domination.

5. Observation

The roundtable discussion was attended by prominent Maghreb experts from the most important economic institutions and political think tanks in DC – it was thus the right group of participants for a discussion on the future of Maghreb economic integration. Despite some degree of optimism about the prospects for regional integration the Maghreb, the majority of the discussants concluded that there would be little movement on the AMU or other regional integration initiatives in the near future, even though it makes sense both politically and economically in the current Maghreb landscape. Revolutionary changes in Libya and Tunisia, as well as evolutionary changes in Morocco, have indeed altered the political environment in the Maghreb, but not enough so to fundamentally alter intra-Maghrebi relations and increased cooperation. Another challenge is that societies have not been transformed merely by regime change. Many of the elements necessary for citizen empowerment in both economics and politics are not yet present, and despite some political changes, both crony capitalism and the economic policy of alleviating discontent with more government jobs still prevails. Until transparency and accountability become the norm in the Maghreb, it is unlikely that there will be much regional integration, however convincing the argument is for it from an economic standpoint.

The challenge for Morocco is to demonstrate that it has the political will to overcome the truculence of Algeria in promoting regional integration. Morocco is responding quite effectively to bilateral openings with Tunisia and Libya, but has yet to define a broad and proactive strategy with regard to economic integration. Giving the private sector more support and leeway to pursue stronger trade ties, and by leveraging the FTA rules of cumulation, Morocco may develop a comparative edge to offset Algeria’s energy assets.
Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North

Date: 5 December 2012

1. Title: Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North
   Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs

   Participants:
   Panel One
   **Ambassador Johnnie Carson**: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State
   **Earl Gast**: Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID
   **Amanda Dory**: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, Department of Defense
   Panel Two
   **Dr. Christopher Formunyoh**: Regional Director for Central and West Africa, National Democratic Institute
   **Corinne Dufka**: Senior Researcher Africa Division, Human Rights Watch
   **Nii Akuetteh**: Independent Policy Researcher
   Senators
   **Senator Chris Coons**: Committee Chairman (D-DE)
   **Senator Johnny Isakson**: Ranking Member (R-GA)

2. Overview

The Senate hearing addressed the future of the crisis in Mali as a result of the Touareg rebellion in March 2012, the subsequent coup in Bamako, and the takeover of large swaths of the northern part of the country by al-Qaeda affiliated groups. In framing the hearing, Senator Chris Coons said there are three separate, but overlapping crises occurring at the same time - security, political, and humanitarian. The testimony presented at this hearing was meant to inform the subcommittee on the situation in Mali and to present options on how best to move forward.

3. Summary

Panel One

Senator Coons opened the hearing with a brief description of the situation on the ground. He expressed the opinion that there should be an intervention by a multilateral, regionally-led military force. Though the US had previously provided various types of aid and support to Mali, most aid has been frozen since the Touareg uprising and subsequent conflict; only emergency health care and food assistance remain. The first panel presented US government views of the crisis.

Johnnie Carson identified four main goals to achieve a sustainable solution in Mali. First, legitimacy must be restored to the central government. This is the most important step because it precedes the opening of negotiations with the Touaregs in the north to address historical grievances and find common ground. Third, there must be significant emphasis placed on countering al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); and fourth, there must be a response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Carson argues these issues should be addressed simultaneously. In terms of military intervention, he believes it should be an ‘African-led, Malian-led’ group. He claims that the threat of military action has gotten some results; groups who had previously voiced intentions to establish an extremist-backed state have backed off that goal. In terms of what the US can and is doing, Carson noted that the US has been involved in various capacities: sending military planners to ECOWAS, working with its regional partners through the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and pledging $445 million for emergency humanitarian aid.

Earl Gast spoke about the humanitarian elements of the crisis and USAID’s response. He noted that 4.6 million Malians are affected by the unfolding food crisis. In terms of responding to that need, in the disputed northern territories aid workers negotiate access on a case by case basis to deliver essential life-saving assistance. To support the aim of establishing a legitimate central government in Bamako, USAID would like to engage in electoral stabilization programs such as educating voters, strengthening political parties, and overseeing elections. Gast says they plan to support national reconciliation and they are examining the feasibility and appropriateness of post-conflict programs.

Amanda Dory addressed the security concerns. The Department of Defense is focused on countering AQIM and affiliates, and they are doing everything possible to enable ECOWAS to degrade AQIM. She corroborated what
Senator Coons said about cutting off most US assistance to Mali, including military to military capacity building programs. In terms of destabilizing factors, she laments the continued involvement of Captain Sanogo, who was a leading figure in the Touareg separatist movement and who continues to influence policy. Dory said the conflict threatens US interests in the region, primarily because the terrorists frequently kidnap Westerners for ransom. She stressed this despite the fact that AQIM has not called for striking targets inside the US, it has expressed a desire to hit Europe. She believes the strategic concept for military intervention is sound, and she anticipates more planning. She confirmed that the US plans to contribute logistical support, training, and equipment, but not boots on the ground in Mali.

Panel Two

The second panel was comprised of non-governmental political analysts.

Christopher Formunyoh distributed a paper at the hearing, so he only spoke briefly. He focused his comments mainly on potential problems of governmental legitimacy.

Corinne Dufka gave a very disturbing account of human rights abuses taking place in northern Mali. She explained that she has conducted interviews on the ground and has daily phone contact with people reporting human rights abuses. She described instances of beatings, executions, stoning, amputations, stabbings, gang rapes, and pillaging at the hands of AQIM and its affiliates. In terms of the organized military force, there appears to be little command and control. Dufka indentified four ways the United States can help improve the situation:

1. Widening criticism of the military;
2. Conducting an American-led investigation of human rights abuses and ensuring that no amnesty for criminals in included agreements;
3. Supporting civil society and discouraging hate speech; and,

Nii Akuetteh added that the US should be aware of a fifth dimension to the Mali problem, in addition to the already addressed issues of political and electoral legitimacy, separatism, ethnic tensions and terrorism; contagion. People in the region are concerned the conflict in Mali could spread beyond its borders. He hopes there will be elections, negotiations between the north and the south, and “an intervention maybe,” but he was adamant that preference not be shown to the Touaregs for fear of reinforcing or rewarding their behavior. He closed his comments by saying there needs to be an emphasis placed on a return to civilian leadership.

4. Q & A

Panel One

Q: (Coons) It seems to me that sequencing is very important here, because we have a lot of interrelated, complex problems, considering the historical grievances, security objectives, and political/electoral objectives. What’s the correct sequence?
A: (Carson) All of the objectives you mentioned need to be approached simultaneously and in parallel. However, we shouldn’t hold some objectives hostage if we can’t move forward on another. The bottom line is we must have a central government that can make good on promises made to the Touaregs.

Q: (Coons) There have been four Northern rebellions. How can we increase Northern participation in the general election and decision-making process?
A: (Carson) It would be difficult, but it’s possible. Only 10% of Mali’s population is in the northern part of the country. I realize it’s important to include those 800,000-1,000,000 people, but half have left due to the conflict. We could hold elections in refugee camps administered by UNHCR.

Q: (Isakson) It seems to be AQIM’s modus operandi to attack and kidnap. Was AQIM involved in what happened in Benghazi?
A: (Dory) We are investigating the extent of AQIM’s involvement in that incident, but haven’t reached a conclusion yet. I would prefer to discuss that further in a closed session.

Q: (Isakson) Can West Africans really take on AQIM themselves?
A: (Dory) I believe they can. All it requires is the will, the equipment, and the intent.
Q: (Isakson) What was the cause of the coup?
A: (Carson) There were a series of military defeats in northern Mali at the hands of the Touregs. The government’s forces were underequipped, so the government didn’t fulfill their obligation to arm and train them adequately. There was also a growing discontent in the south due to widespread corruption. So to answer your question, it was really about poor governance and poor delivery of services.

Q: (Isakson) So Africa’s oldest problem, corruption, is alive and well in Mali?
A: (Carson) The ex-president wasn’t doing a good job.

Q: (Chris Coons) Under what timeline could Mali have an effective military force?
A: (Dory) Feasibility is a key component of planning. In general, you don’t engage until risk is low enough and we’ve had time for force generation.
(Gast) In the best of times, Mali is in crisis. What’s important is to establish a connection between the government and the people. Historically, we’ve developed partnerships in tandem with the government to establish some regularity and legitimacy, but that moves too slowly in this case.

Q: (Coons) How can we wait a year to intervene?
A: (Dory) At DoD we have a sense of moving as fast as circumstances will allow.

Q: (Isakson) What us Captain Sanogo capable of?
A: (Dory) He is a field grade officer. He cannot remake institutions.

Panel 2

Q: (Coons) What is the most important thing for the United States government to do in this situation?
A: (Akuetteh) The US should promote legitimate elections, create regional strategy for combating terrorism, and work to promote a culture that is rooted in democracy and social justice in order to remove grievances.
(Dufka) The rule of law institutions are very weak and need to be repaired. Encouraging dialogue amongst all Malians and working to address the culture of impunity are also important measures that need to be taken.
(Formanyoh) Elections do not make democracies. They need to build sustainable partnerships.

5. Observations

This hearing was sparsely attended by members of Congress, but heavily attended by an audience of about 100 professionals and students in the international affairs community. Though the hearing was informative about US perspectives on the crisis in Mali, none of the panelists provided any additional news or insight into what the best process was for addressing the crisis.

(Back to top)
Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis

Date: 15 November 2012

1. Title: Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis

   Hosted by Project on Middle East Political Science at the Elliott School of International Affairs

   Participants:
   Michael Willis: University Research Lecturer and King Mohammed VI Fellow in Moroccan and Mediterranean Studies, University of Oxford

2. Overview

   Professor Willis discussed his new book, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring.

3. Summary

   Professor Willis began by discussing why he wanted to write a book. He noted that the Maghreb is not a focal area for many scholars, not even for those you study the MENA region. It thus does not receive a lot of attention. This is also because the region does not have conflicts on the scale of the Mashreq countries, although Willis noted that the Maghreb certainly has conflicts of importance, most notably the conflict over the Western Sahara. Willis characterized the Western Sahara as one of the longest unresolved conflicts that, “no one outside of the corridors of the UN has ever heard of, let alone addressed its causes and effects.” Willis also noted that he wanted to write a book about the Maghreb as a region, because when the area has been covered, it has been at the individual country level, rather
than at the region level. Given the absence of a book on the politics and history of the region, Willis set out to write a broad and comparative study of the region as a whole, thus integrating texts on individual countries.

Through his research (and prior to the Arab Spring), Professor Willis drew two primary conclusions about the region as a whole: it has had continuity in its political system and continuity in its forms of political power – although there are different faces, the structures have remained largely the same. With regard to the former, Morocco has maintained a monarchy, Tunisia has historically had an all-powerful President back by a political party, and Algeria has had a civilian president and a strong military, with the intelligence services serving as kingmaker. With regard to the second conclusion, in Morocco, the real wielders of power are not the elected officials and a shadow government operates to some extent, while the real decisions being taken by people outside of the government. In Algeria, unelected officials likewise hold the real power. In the 1990s, there was some political opening in Morocco and Algeria and the establishment of political processes that mimicked liberal democracy, but there was no real change. In Tunisia, the political structures remained the same from Bourguiba to Ben Ali.

The events of the Arab Spring, particularly in Tunisia, forced Willis to reevaluate his initial conclusions and question whether the countries of the Maghreb are really as similar and continuous as originally thought. Certainly, for Morocco and Algeria, whether or not these conclusions have changed after the Arab Spring is still unclear. Willis noted that Algeria and Morocco felt the impact of the Arab Spring, but the revolutions seemed to go east rather than west. In Algeria, several factors mitigated a revolution, including the previous history of revolt that reduced the appetite for radical political change, oil wealth that allowed the government to buy off protestors, and the pluralistic leadership structure, which meant that there was no single, dominant leader for the population to revolt against. In addition, Algerian protests tended to be at the local, socio-economic level. Such protests serve to relieve some pressure on the system. In Morocco, the creation of the February 20th movement was a clear reaction to the Arab Spring, but its momentum was halted to some degree by constitutional reform and early elections. Willis noted that Moroccan opinion is divided as to whether the palace sees this current situation as the end of the Arab Spring or that start of something else – perhaps a period of ongoing reform. He questioned whether the current strategy of governing with the PJD was the same as that during the period of alternance, when the Palace brought the socialists into government to neutralize them. In any event, Willis argued that Morocco has long claimed to be the most liberal in the region and that is now uncomfortable with the possibility of losing that claim to Tunisia. Whether or not that will inspire further reform is unclear, though Willis believes there has been a change in atmosphere – at least on the street. There is a new appetite for change and it appears that the population is not prepared to accept the failings of the state as before – this may be the biggest fallout of the Arab Spring in Morocco. Turning to Tunisia, Willis said that if it does succeed, it will stand apart from its autocratic neighbors and encourage change across the Maghreb.

In conclusion, Willis noted that the Arab Spring has certainly led to one important shift in the Maghreb, even if the continuity from independence to present has been interrupted by the change in Tunisia. Before, Algeria was revolutionary, Tunisia was reformist, and Morocco was conservative. Now, Tunisia is revolutionary Morocco is reformist, and Algeria is conservative.

4. Q & A

Q: Does the book address the Western Sahara?
A: It is not possible to understand Morocco’s foreign policy without understanding the Western Sahara. The issue is vital to the survival of the Moroccan regime and to some extent the Algerian region. As of yet, I can’t see a resolution between the Polisario, Algeria, and Morocco, unless there is some breakthrough in convincing them to reassess what they all perceive as their vital strategic interests.

Q: What is the role of external actors in the Maghreb?
A: France has failed in the region. The US and Britain are starting to get involved and they need to. The countries of the region will still have to deal with France, but because of France’s colonial history and its support of past dictators, its influence has waned. For example, more and more people are expressing themselves in Arabic, rather than French.

Q: Is there a future for the Arab Maghreb Union?
A: We are seeing a revival right now, particularly by Tunisia. There is certainly a compelling economic case for it, but the problem is the Western Sahara. Morocco lost interest in the AMU when it became clear it wasn’t going to resolve the Western Sahara. Now, most of the interest is coming from Libya and Tunisia. However, I am not optimistic because of the Algeria-Morocco divide.

Q: What is your assessment of the new Moroccan Constitution and whether it meets the aspirations of the Moroccan people for a better system?
A: What was voted on was not what was proposed in March, and what was implemented was not what was voted on. It has been watered down in the process. There are some importance advances, but it isn’t enough. As they say in Morocco, chouia, chouia.

5. Observation

Approximately 30 people attended the book discussion, primarily students and those interested in Maghreb affairs. Professor Willis was an engaging speaker and offered some interesting insights on politics in the Maghreb. While much of what he said was not entirely new, his focus on and passion for the Maghreb is apparent and he is clearly an expert on the region. His promotion of the importance of the Maghreb region for US and UK strategic interests makes him a useful ally for MAC. Furthermore, his title at Oxford University would indicate that he collaborates closely with Morocco. Despite some of his skepticism about reforms in Morocco, he clearly loves the country and has spent much time there. If possible, it might be worth cultivating a relationship with him to see if he would be able to serve as a third party expert.

(Back to top)

Prospects for Maghreb Economic Integration

Date: 29 November 2012

1. Title: Prospects for Maghreb Economic Integration
   Hosted by the Atlantic Council

   Speakers:
   **Gary Hufbauer**: Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Jonathan Walters: Director for Regional Strategy and Programs in the Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank
John Entelis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle East Studies Program, Fordham University
Mohsin Khan: Moderator: Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

Roundtable Participants:
Abdulwahab AlKebsi: Center for International Private Enterprise
Ghazi Ben Ahmed: Club de Tunis
Caitlin Dearing: Moroccan American Center
Michele Dunne: Atlantic Council
Mohammed El Qorchi: International Monetary Fund
Clément Gillet: Institute for International Finance
Danya Greenfield: Atlantic Council
Eric Knecht: Atlantic Council
Haim Malka: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Amine Mati: International Monetary Fund
Stephen McInerney: Project on Middle East Democracy
Karim Mezran: Atlantic Council
Svetlana Milbert: Atlantic Council
Mustapha Rouis: World Bank
Amor Tahiri: International Monetary Fund
Mona Yacoubian: Stimson Center
I. William Zartman: School of Advanced International Studies

2. Overview

The aftermath of the Arab Spring has created a new political environment in the Middle East and North Africa. Not only have internal politics changed, but relations between the countries of the region have also changed. There likewise appears to have been a shift in thinking about economic integration in the region. In light of these developments, this discussion addressed whether in the aftermath of the Arab Spring it is time once again to examine economic integration in the Maghreb. A recent major study by the World Bank on trade and infrastructure in the Maghreb provided an entry point for discussion on the issue.

3. Summary

Mohsin Khan defined the parameters of the discussion, asking the speakers to provide their assessment on whether or not it is a good time to have another look at economic integration, both from an economic perspective and a political perspective. He noted that both elements are an essential point of view because despite convincing evidence of the economic benefits of such integration, political realities have stalled the process.

Gary Hufbauer provided an overview of the current economic status in the region and made the economic case for further integration. He noted that the primary economic goal of the Maghreb countries is sustained 6%+ GDP growth in order to employ young people and converge towards EU per capita income, but that all of the Maghreb countries have fallen far short of this goal. Morocco’s projected growth rate for 2013 is 4.5%, Algeria’s 2.5%, and Tunisia’s 1.8%, and their per capita incomes are one-tenth of what they are in Europe. Hufbauer questioned why the Maghreb countries were doing so poorly despite trade agreements, macroeconomic stability, and reasonable inward foreign direct investment in trade.
According to Hufbauer, there are both internal and external reasons. Externally, trade agreements have failed to deliver additional trade and investment, both within the region and internationally. The Agadir and PAFTA agreements have had a weak effect in promoting regional trade, and the EU-Med and US-Morocco agreements haven’t done much. Internally, the countries suffer from a multitude of problems. First, they have failed to fully implement important fiscal and economic reforms, despite some progress. As Hufbauer put it, “the Maghreb is not a poster region for the Washington consensus, but neither is it completely off track. Second, the countries suffer from low rankings in competitiveness, enabling trade, doing business, and corruption. Third, the education systems are oriented towards government service, not business. Despite similar spending as a percentage of GDP to the US and France, the education systems are just not delivering, as they focus on literature, law, and religion, rather than technical training, science, and business. In sum, Hufbauer stressed that the second and third reasons were the primary problems, noting that social infrastructure surrounding business and government, including monopolies, soft cartels, barriers to entry, and corruption costs, is a huge growth killer, as is anachronistic education system. Given this rather challenging economic environment, Maghreb economic integration makes sense, as it will allow economic diversification and improve chances for growth.

Jonathan Walters provided context about trade in the Maghreb and discussed the findings of two recent reports on the Maghreb – one from the World Bank on Trade Facilitation and Infrastructure in the Maghreb, the other a study the World Bank did for the Deauville partnership on trade and foreign direct investment in the region. In terms of context, Walters argued that the current economic drivers in the region are jobs, jobs, jobs, noting that the countries of the region will not be able to achieve the kind of growth required for jobs without integration. However, Walters views integration in a much broader context. In order to achieve sustainable growth, the countries must not only integrate regionally, but also with Europe. He noted that trade as a percentage of GDP within the Maghreb is only 2%, compared with 10% in West Africa and 15% in Central America. Trade costs within the Maghreb are also twice as expensive as trade between Maghreb countries in Europe, indicating that infrastructure and trade barriers are serious impediments to intra-Maghrebi trade.

Turning to the reports, Walters noted that the first study found that in the Maghreb, markets are fragmented, there are no economies of scale, trade costs are high, and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is ineffective. Non-tariff barriers are likewise high due to border closures and arbitrary regulations. The region nevertheless have some assets – a common technical heritage, free trade agreements (although they are yet to be realized), and some tariff reductions. The study also found that if there was integration, complementarities would start to emerge. Walters noted that global supply chains start because of sub-regional supply chains and that if the Maghreb could integrate to start such chains at the sub-regional level, the economic potential would be huge. Economic reform and integration is thus essential to promote regional growth.

The second study addressed economic challenges in the Maghreb in light of the Arab Spring, concluding that an economic awakening to accompany the political awakening and economic integration to promote jobs were essential. It noted that there was some skepticism in the region about liberal economic policies because of the abuse of those policies in crony capitalist societies like Egypt and Tunisia under Mubarak and Ben Ali respectively. The challenge is for these countries is to thus overcome that skepticism and also bridge the gap between the political focus on the short-term and the economic focus on the long-term. The study also concluded that the European Union needs to be an external anchor for economic
integration in the Maghreb by establishing a common vision for the region and confidence building measures between the Maghreb countries.

John Entelis addressed whether or not the political environment is better for economic integration in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Regarding the political feasibility going forward, Entelis noted that the principle obstacle in the past has indeed been largely political, but even more so that it was individual; the AMU didn’t work because it was composed of a diverse set of political leaders and systems, and conflicting personalities that never came close to agreeing on or meeting the goals of the organization. Now, political conditions have changed enormously, even in Morocco and Algeria. There has been a transformation in Libya and Tunisia, and Morocco and Algeria are responding to challenges. A new political consciousness about the need for accountability, democracy, and transparency is beginning to develop. As a result, Entelis argued that we should start to see a convergence of economic diversity and political changes. He stressed, however, that political changes would set the tone for economic changes.

Despite the change in the political environment in the Maghreb, Entelis was only mildly optimistic about the political prospects for Maghreb economic integration – even though politics is changing, serious political obstacles remain that will not, at least for the moment, be solved by new governments. For example, the border closure between Morocco and Algeria is a political decision that seems unlikely to change after the Arab Spring. The same applies to the decision taken by Algeria to have more flights to Paris than Morocco. Entelis stated that, “he can’t explain it, just like he can’t explain Algeria’s refusal to changes its stance on the Western Sahara.”

What, therefore, are the prospects for integration in the future? Entelis argued that complementarity of political systems is a requirement for sustained economic development and integration. This will require institutional changes, including elections, political party development, and institutional building, as well as renewed trust in political institutions. The region has experience as long period of social distrust of political institutions that cannot be overcome quickly. This shift toward political socialization, the willingness to trust leaders through accountability and to accept transfers of power will take time. The region is currently seeing the early signs of changes in political culture, as noted in the start of a renewed political consciousness. A true shift will also require the establishment of the rule of law in the business sense. In closing, Entelis argued that if the fundamental characteristics of politics change and the characteristics that flow out of that, including transparency, accountability, improved education, and improved civil society, then there may be better prospects for Maghreb economic integration.

4. Q & A/Discussion

C: (Ahmed) Maghreb economic integration is a core focus of the work of the Club de Tunis, which is a new think tank that aims to help policymakers and the private sector form economic development strategies. We believe that the government does not have to dictate private investment and that much can be done in spite of political obstacles between governments. Right now we are working to set up a North Africa private sector network. We can use external support for these initiatives – there is a critical role for the US in driving increased regional economic cooperation, but there will also have to be a push from above. We may not have complete integration, but bilateral trade is a start and there is bilateral trade happening between the Maghreb countries that is not being captured by statistics. Going forward, the private sector will have to convince governments that this is in their interest.
C: (Tahiri) The main answers to the questions raised by this forum are yes and yes – yes for economic reasons and yes for political reasons. Economic integration is not a choice, but a necessity for the Maghreb countries, and political changes, albeit ongoing, will push this reality forward. The main reason why economic integration has not progressed well is because of politics, primarily the absence of political will and the absence of a perceived benefit from increased integration for all countries. We have to change this mindset and convince people that this is not a zero-sum game. The private sector will play a key role in this, as they can help convince countries that they will benefit from this. However, international institutions also need to change their approach – no more studies need to be done to show the importance of integration. Rather, the IMF and the World Bank, among others need to be candid about the challenges and be willing to tackle political issues rather than just ignore them.

C: (Entelis) The new situation offers hope because Maghrebis want integration and if they are empowered, through democracy, they may push for it, particularly as political systems are increasingly responding to the demands of the people.

Q: (Zartman) Economic integration isn’t just going to happen. Is the US ready to push for it?

Q: (Yacoubian) Is there not a chance for economic drivers to push this rather than waiting on political changes?

Q: (Malka) Do these bureaucracies have the capacity to implement the reforms require for integration?

C: (El Qorchi) Has the international community done enough to push the benefits of regional economic integration? It has to demonstrate that there is a benefit. The private sector tries this approach through Chambers of Commerce, etc., but it did not work. Civil society is trying, but there is an obstacle in centralized power. The push has to come from international institutions doing these studies. They have to be willing to take a political stance.

C: (Dunne) The rationale for this is obvious and well-worn. The question is whether the attitude has changed. Is there a possibility for a shock from the inside rather than the outside? Tunisia and Libya are already engaging economically. Could they not start a revived Arab Maghreb Union without the other countries and then, if successful, Morocco and Algeria would be convinced to join?

C: (Rouis) Is the timing right? Internally, there is certainly a changing political landscape.Externally, there has also been shock to the Maghreb countries with the crisis in Europe. They have to integrate now in order to address both the demands of the population and the external economic crisis. The Maghreb also doesn’t have to move as a whole – if Algeria isn’t budging, then the rest of the Maghreb countries should move ahead without it.

C: (Entelis) There is a practical and an ideological reason for the Algerian people to want integration – not just for goods, but for tourism and services. Oil is only benefitting the state. In terms of circumventing the state to jumpstart progress, this doesn’t need to be done in Tunisia and Libya. If you do such a thing in Morocco or Algeria, you either go to jail or are co-opted into cooperating with the state (crony capitalism). So what is really needed in these countries is transparency to allow ordinary people to have opportunities.
C: (Walters) The discussion about regional integration is a bit of a time warp in the Maghreb. The debate is about regional trade instead of global trade, rather than regional trade and integration and/as a means for global trade and integration.

C: (Hufbauer) Political liberalization will unfortunately reinforce the current problem in the Maghreb that economic solutions come in more government jobs, which is not really the solution. Likewise, the informal sector is not the answer, the formal sector is. Another problem is a lot of old-style economic thinking in these countries. Economists cannot convince them of the benefits, they can't even convince the US to push for integration. It’s possible that you could convince Algeria to become a champion of integration for reasons of power politics and Maghreb political domination.

5. Observation

The roundtable discussion was attended by prominent Maghreb experts from the most important economic institutions and political think tanks in DC – it was thus the right group of participants for a discussion on the future of Maghreb economic integration. Despite some degree of optimism about the prospects for regional integration the Maghreb, the majority of the discussants concluded that there would be little movement on the AMU or other regional integration initiatives in the near future, even though it makes sense both politically and economically in the current Maghreb landscape. Revolutionary changes in Libya and Tunisia, as well as evolutionary changes in Morocco, have indeed altered the political environment in the Maghreb, but not enough so to fundamentally alter intra-Maghrebi relations and increased cooperation. Another challenge is that societies have not been transformed merely by regime change. Many of the elements necessary for citizen empowerment in both economics and politics are not yet present, and despite some political changes, both crony capitalism and the economic policy of alleviating discontent with more government jobs still prevails. Until transparency and accountability become the norm in the Maghreb, it is unlikely that there will be much regional integration, however convincing the argument is for it from an economic standpoint.

The challenge for Morocco is to demonstrate that it has the political will to overcome the truculence of Algeria in promoting regional integration. Morocco is responding quite effectively to bilateral openings with Tunisia and Libya, but has yet to define a broad and proactive strategy with regard to economic integration. Giving the private sector more support and leeway to pursue stronger trade ties, and by leveraging the FTA rules of cumulation, Morocco may develop a comparative edge to offset Algeria’s energy assets.

(Back to top)

Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North

Date: 5 December 2012

1. Title: Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North

   Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs

   Participants:
   Panel One
The Senate hearing addressed the future of the crisis in Mali as a result of the Touareg rebellion in March 2012, the subsequent coup in Bamako, and the takeover of large swaths of the northern part of the country by al-Qaeda affiliated groups. In framing the hearing, Senator Chris Coons said there are three separate, but overlapping crises occurring at the same time - security, political, and humanitarian. The testimony presented at this hearing was meant to inform the subcommittee on the situation in Mali and to present options on how best to move forward.

3. Summary

Senator Coons opened the hearing with a brief description of the situation on the ground. He expressed the opinion that there should be an intervention by a multilateral, regionally-led military force. Though the US had previously provided various types of aid and support to Mali, most aid has been frozen since the Touareg uprising and subsequent conflict; only emergency health care and food assistance remain. The first panel presented US government views of the crisis.

Johnnie Carson identified four main goals to achieve a sustainable solution in Mali. First, legitimacy must be restored to the central government. This is the most important step because it precedes the opening of negotiations with the Touaregs in the north to address historical grievances and find common ground. Third, there must be significant emphasis placed on countering al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); and fourth, there must be a response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Carson argues these issues should be addressed simultaneously. In terms of military intervention, he believes it should be an ‘African-led, Malian-led’ group. He claims that the threat of military action has gotten some results; groups who had previously voiced intentions to establish a extremist-backed state have backed off that goal. In terms of what the US can and is doing, Carson noted that the US has been involved in various capacities: sending military planners to ECOWAS, working with its regional partners through the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and pledging $445 million for emergency humanitarian aid.

Earl Gast spoke about the humanitarian elements of the crisis and USAID’s response. He noted that 4.6 million Malians are affected by the unfolding food crisis. In terms of responding to that need, in the disputed northern territories aid workers negotiate access on a case by case basis to deliver essential life-saving assistance. To support the aim of establishing a legitimate central government in Bamako, USAID would like to engage in
electoral stabilization programs such as educating voters, strengthening political parties, and overseeing elections. Gast says they plan to support national reconciliation and they are examining the feasibility and appropriateness of post-conflict programs.

Amanda Dory addressed the security concerns. The Department of Defense is focused on countering AQIM and affiliates, and they are doing everything possible to enable ECOWAS to degrade AQIM. She corroborated what Senator Coons said about cutting off most US assistance to Mali, including military to military capacity building programs. In terms of destabilizing factors, she laments the continued involvement of Captain Sanogo, who was a leading figure in the Touareg separatist movement and who continues to influence policy. Dory said the conflict threatens US interests in the region, primarily because the terrorists frequently kidnap Westerners for ransom. She stressed this despite the fact that AQIM has not called for striking targets inside the US, it has expressed a desire to hit Europe. She believes the strategic concept for military intervention is sound, and she anticipates more planning. She confirmed that the US plans to contribute logistical support, training, and equipment, but not boots on the ground in Mali.

Panel Two

The second panel was comprised of non-governmental political analysts.

Christopher Formunyoh distributed a paper at the hearing, so he only spoke briefly. He focused his comments mainly on potential problems of governmental legitimacy.

Corinne Dufka gave a very disturbing account of human rights abuses taking place in northern Mali. She explained that she has conducted interviews on the ground and has daily phone contact with people reporting human rights abuses. She described instances of beatings, executions, stoning, amputations, stabbings, gang rapes, and pillaging at the hands of AQIM and its affiliates. In terms of the organized military force, there appears to be little command and control. Dufka identified four ways the United States can help improve the situation:

1) Widening criticism of the military;
2) Conducting an American-led investigation of human rights abuses and ensuring that no amnesty for criminals in included agreements;
3) Supporting civil society and discouraging hate speech; and,
4) Encouraging a strong human rights component in a future intervention.

Nii Akuetteh added that the US should be aware of a fifth dimension to the Mali problem, in addition to the already addressed issues of political and electoral legitimacy, separatism, ethnic tensions and terrorism; contagion. People in the region are concerned the conflict in Mali could spread beyond its borders. He hopes there will be elections, negotiations between the north and the south, and “an intervention maybe,” but he was adamant that preference not be shown to the Touaregs for fear of reinforcing or rewarding their behavior. He closed his comments by saying there needs to be an emphasis placed on a return to civilian leadership.

4. Q & A

Panel One
Q: (Coons) It seems to me that sequencing is very important here, because we have a lot of interrelated, complex problems, considering the historical grievances, security objectives, and political/electoral objectives. What’s the correct sequence?
A: (Carson) All of the objectives you mentioned need to be approached simultaneously and in parallel. However, we shouldn’t hold some objectives hostage if we can’t move forward on another. The bottom line is we must have a central government that can make good on promises made to the Touaregs.

Q: (Coons) There have been four Northern rebellions. How can we increase Northern participation in the general election and decision-making process?
A: (Carson) It would be difficult, but it’s possible. Only 10% of Mali’s population is in the northern part of the country. I realize it’s important to include those 800,000-1,000,000 people, but half have left due to the conflict. We could hold elections in refugee camps administered by UNHCR.

Q: (Isakson) It seems to be AQIM’s modus operandi to attack and kidnap. Was AQIM involved in what happened in Benghazi?
A: (Dory) We are investigating the extent of AQIM’s involvement in that incident, but haven’t reached a conclusion yet. I would prefer to discuss that further in a closed session.

Q: (Isakson) Can West Africans really take on AQIM themselves?
A: (Dory) I believe they can. All it requires is the will, the equipment, and the intent.

Q: (Isakson) What was the cause of the coup?
A: (Carson) There were a series of military defeats in northern Mali at the hands of the Touaregs. The government’s forces were underequipped, so the government didn’t fulfill their obligation to arm and train them adequately. There was also a growing discontent in the south due to widespread corruption. So to answer your question, it was really about poor governance and poor delivery of services.

Q: (Isakson) So Africa’s oldest problem, corruption, is alive and well in Mali?
A: (Carson) The ex-president wasn’t doing a good job.

Q: (Chris Coons) Under what timeline could Mali have an effective military force?
A: (Dory) Feasibility is a key component of planning. In general, you don’t engage until risk is low enough and we’ve had time for force generation. (Gast) In the best of times, Mali is in crisis. What’s important is to establish a connection between the government and the people. Historically, we’ve developed partnerships in tandem with the government to establish some regularity and legitimacy, but that moves too slowly in this case.

Q: (Coons) How can we wait a year to intervene?
A: (Dory) At DoD we have a sense of moving as fast as circumstances will allow.

Q: (Isakson) What us Captain Sanogo capable of?
A: (Dory) He is a field grade officer. He cannot remake institutions.

Panel 2

Q: (Coons) What is the most important thing for the United States government to do in this situation?
A: (Akuetteh) The US should promote legitimate elections, create regional strategy for combating terrorism, and work to promote a culture that is rooted in democracy and social justice in order to remove grievances.

(Dufka) The rule of law institutions are very weak and need to be repaired. Encouraging dialogue amongst all Malians and working to address the culture of impunity are also important measures that need to be taken.

(Formanyoh) Elections do not make democracies. They need to build sustainable partnerships.

5. Observations

This hearing was sparsely attended by members of Congress, but heavily attended by an audience of about 100 professionals and students in the international affairs community. Though the hearing was informative about US perspectives on the crisis in Mali, none of the panelists provided any additional news or insight into what the best process was for addressing the crisis.

(Back to top)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title/ Date</strong></th>
<th><strong>Summary</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Le Conseil de l’Europe cherche à être mieux compris par le Parlement marocain</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dec. 17, 2012</td>
<td>Members of the Moroccan parliament took part in a Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) conference, which aims to establish institutional cooperation with the parliaments of neighboring non-EU member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maroc: Le Maroc aggrave son endettement extérieur</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dec. 17, 2012</td>
<td>In this piece, the Minister of Economics and Finance examines why Morocco has been forced to take on more debt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maroc : Les USFPistes ont-ils fait le bon choix avec Driss Lachgar ?</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dec. 17, 2012</td>
<td>The political party USFP has chosen a new leader, Driss Laghar, elected with 848 Congressional votes. His opponent, Ahmed Zaydi, won 650 votes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Une mouche Marocaine attaque la Russie</strong>&lt;br&gt;A Moroccan fly</td>
<td>53 tons of Moroccan clementines have been put into quarantine in the commercial port of St. Petersburg by Russian authorities because they detected Mediterranean fruit flies in the shipment. The federal veterinary and plant surveillance service has recommended freezing the clementines to prevent the spread of the flies to Russia’s agricultural fields, which would result in a “catastrophe of the highest order”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 17, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Bouira : Salah Gasmi dit Mohamed Abou Salah, n° 2 d'Aqmi arrêté</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 17, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Hollande s'adressera au monde arabe depuis le Maroc</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18, 2012</td>
<td><strong>IMF urges Morocco to remove fuel subsidies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 19, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Un député français demande au président Hollande de faire évoluer &quot;considérablement&quot; la question sahraouie</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Le Maroc tenu de fournir des preuves que le Sahara occidental bénéficie de l'accord de pêche</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Morocco is required to provide evidence that the fisheries agreement with the EU benefits the Western Sahara (Alistair Burt) Dec. 19, 2012

The House of Representatives has accelerated its rate of production by adopting 20 bills on Tuesday, including approving texts of international conventions relating to various themes. Legislation includes Bill No. 83.12 supplementing Law No. 37.80 on hospitals, Bill No. 58.12 on the establishment of the National Agricultural Advisory and Bill No. 39.12 on organic production of agricultural products and aquatic, as adopted by the House of Counselors. Other texts relate to the approval of certain international conventions, including agreements between the Kingdom and The Gambia, Liberia and Turkey, and legislation approving the Arab convention related various topics, including the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and the fight against crimes related to information technology and communication (ICT). The President of the House of Representatives welcomed the approval of these bills, stating that "in adopting these texts, Morocco strengthens its role on the international stage."

Last week the French Institute of Public Opinion, a professional polling group, released a study that showed French people "prefer" Morocco to Algeria. Now communities in both countries are saying the French entity is trying to cause more problems between the North African countries (a subheading in the article says "Divide and conquer").

The EU presented a series of propositions to support political and economic integration of North Africa on December 19. The recommendations focus on the creation of a common market for renewable energies.

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the Western Sahara issue in which it supports the negotiation process "to arrive at a solution that allows the determination of the people of Western Sahara" while praising the efforts by the Personal Envoy for Western
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>résolution</strong> appuyant l'autodétermination du peuple sahraoui</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution pressing for Saharawi self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sahara, Christopher Ross.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Title/ Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>Abdessalam Yassine, leader of Morocco’s largest opposition movement, dies at 84, says group</td>
<td>Thousands of people came to pay their respects to “the charismatic religious leader of Morocco’s largest opposition movement and longtime opponent of two Moroccan kings”.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mamfakinch | L’aventur de l’économie marocaine sera démocratique ou ne sera pas | This opinion piece discusses the distribution of wealth in Morocco and is highly critical of elites, who, according to the piece, “are exempt and live in total impunity.”  
Translated from French | 3        |          |
<p>| Al Bawaba  | From micro to macro: Morocco to use mini-loan scheme to boost employment | The Moroccan government plans to use microcredits to create two million permanent jobs over the next ten years instead of the one million currently forecasted. Lending by microcredit associations has been exempt from value-added tax (VAT) since 2006, but the policy was due to end on December 31st, 2012. To help the microfinance sector expand and encourage entrepreneurs to | 0        |          |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: The African Peace and Security Council Rejects Nation's Participation in a Session Devoted to Situation in Mali</td>
<td>Morocco’s participation in a high-level AU meeting on Mali was denied due to “[Morocco’s] occupation of parts of the SADR”, as well as the fact that “several observers have noted reports of the involvement of Moroccan intelligence services with terrorist groups in northern Mali.”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Local Regime Policy Based On Lust for Sahrawi Resources, Says PM</td>
<td>The [Saharawi] Prime Minister Mr. Abdelkader Taleb Omar declared that the occupation of Saharawi territories by Morocco is not motivated by &quot;historical and political rights&quot;, [but] rather by &quot;an expansionist policy based on the lust for the Sahrawi resources.&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>EU boosts Morocco health, education</td>
<td>The European Union Delegation in Rabat wrapped up a field visit to Settat and Marrakech. The purpose of the regional trip was to see whether EU-funded literacy, hospital care and education programs were working. A total of 86 million euros were allocated for health programs between 2009-2013. The financial aid granted by the EU to tackle illiteracy amounted to 27 million euros over five years.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Algeria arrests AQIM ‘number two’</td>
<td>AQIM suffered another major blow in Algeria on Sunday (December</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong> African leaders call for Mali intervention</td>
<td>The AU and ECOWAS called for deploying an African force &quot;without delay&quot; to expel armed Islamist groups that control northern Mali. ECOWAS' chiefs of staffs said that their plan for military intervention against the terrorist groups in northern Mali has been completed in spite of the UN's reserved position on the Africans' proposed plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong> Moroccans spend hours online, new survey finds</td>
<td>A new survey released Monday (December 17th) in Casablanca found that 57.4% of young Moroccans spend more than four hours per day on the internet, MAP reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong> IMF urges Morocco to reduce unemployment</td>
<td>Morocco must focus on reducing youth unemployment, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said Monday (December 17th) after talks with the Moroccan government over the two-year IMF credit line. &quot;Morocco has made substantial progress in strengthening growth and reducing poverty over the past decade. But despite such progress, much remains to be done to reduce unemployment, in particular among the youth,&quot; the IMF said.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18, 2012</td>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong> Sahel insecurity poses global threat, study finds</td>
<td>Mali-based terrorists are now a greater threat to European security than al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, a recent report claims.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 19, 2012</td>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Moroccan, Algerian activists partner for open border campaign</td>
<td>Moroccan civil society organizations are working with campaigners across the border to play the “civil society diplomacy card” and apply pressure, hoping that they will push decision-makers into lifting the barriers that separate the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 19, 2012</td>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco jails M20F activists</td>
<td>Eight members of Morocco's February 20 Movement received prison sentences of 3-6 months for participation in an unauthorized demonstration, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) announced on Tuesday (December 18th) The activists were arrested September 29th during a protest in Sidi Ifni, near Agadir. &quot;They were simply demanding the right to work,&quot; AMDH regional representative Abdallah Idrissi told AFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 19, 2012</td>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco tackles youth employment</td>
<td>MP Omar Hjira said the government must find innovative solutions to get young graduates into work in a range of sectors. Hjira argued that young people had no confidence in the competitive recruitment system, which has long been tainted by favoritism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 17, 2012</td>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco Jan-Nov trade deficit rises 11.8 pct</td>
<td>Morocco's trade deficit rose 11.8 percent in January-November from a year earlier, the foreign exchange regulator said on Monday, putting more pressure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on the country's foreign currency reserves. The trade shortfall widened to 183.1 billion dirhams ($21.5 billion) from 163 billion dirhams in the same period last year. Tourism receipts fell 2.3 percent because of lower business from the euro zone, the main source of foreign visitors. Remittances from the 3 million Moroccans living abroad dropped 4 percent.

**Reuters**

Morocco inflation eases to 1.6 pct in November
Dec. 20, 2012

Morocco's consumer price inflation eased to an annual 1.6 percent in November from 1.8 percent in October, the High Planning Authority said on Thursday.

**KHL**

EIB invests in Morocco infrastructure
Dec. 18, 2012

The European Investment Bank (EIB) has committed two loans totaling € 420 million (US$ 553 million) to Morocco to support transport and energy infrastructure projects.

**CPI Financial**

Morocco’s banking sector 'resilient', says IMF
Dec. 18, 2012

“The banking sector has proven resilient to the global crisis and remains sound overall. We support Bank Al-Maghrib’s efforts to continue to strengthen banking regulation and supervision, including through gradual adherence to Basel III standards,” said International Monetary Fund (IMF) team leader Jean-François Dauphin following discussions in Morocco.

**Bernama**

IMF Says Morocco's Healthy Policies Behind Its Robust

"The solidity of Morocco's economic fundamentals and the healthy policies put in place have contributed to getting robust
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro-Economic Results</td>
<td>macro-economic results,&quot; Dauphin told a press conference here</td>
<td>Dec. 18, 2012</td>
<td>Monday following a visit by IMF officials to the north African kingdom. He noted that this performance also helped Morocco obtain an IMF precautionary liquidity line of credit of US$6.2 billion last June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara Echo</td>
<td>Incitec Pivot must stop theft of Western Sahara phosphate</td>
<td>Dec. 18, 2012</td>
<td>Incitec Pivot has announced no plans to phase out their imports of phosphate from Western Sahara, sold by the Moroccan company OCP, which has no legal title over Western Sahara phosphates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres blog</td>
<td>Morocco: voices from Gourougou</td>
<td>Dec. 19, 2012</td>
<td>This blog entry reports the hardship of sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco. The author writes, &quot;Stuck in Morocco, unable to move on or to return to their own countries, the migrants suffer constant harassment by Moroccan security forces and the Guardia Civil (the Spanish police force). Caught trying to scale the fence to Melilla, they face violence and possible expulsion to the Algerian border.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Plaza</td>
<td>&quot;Spain and Morocco will work together to obtain good prices&quot;</td>
<td>Dec. 19, 2012</td>
<td>The Minister of Agriculture, Food and Environment, Miguel Arias Cañete, stated on Friday that &quot;only with dialogue can we build the future&quot; and defended the importance of having a meeting to analyze the situation of the markets, the evolution of prices and the adherence to quotas and import prices. The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ShanghaiDaily.com</td>
<td>German Development Bank to fund Morocco's wind farm project</td>
<td>Dec. 19, 2012</td>
<td>The German Development Bank has provided a loan of 62 million U.S. dollars to Morocco for a wind farm project, an official statement said Wednesday. The statement said the loan aimed to diversify the North African country's energy resources and promote renewable energy possibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPI.com</td>
<td>Morocco eyed for oil and gas reserves</td>
<td>Dec. 20, 2012</td>
<td>Gulfsands Petroleum announced it acquired Cabre Maroc Ltd., a subsidiary of British independent Caithness Petroleum, in a deal valued at around $19 million. Gulfsands said the company has &quot;an extensive portfolio&quot; of around 5,100 square miles of &quot;highly prospective oil and gas&quot; acres in northern Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab News</td>
<td>$ 745 m tramway drives Morocco to new heights</td>
<td>Dec. 20, 2012</td>
<td>The $ 745 million tramway was opened by King Mohammed VI in the presence of &quot;hundreds of thousands of joyful residents&quot;. The project enhances the city’s landscapes and ambience as well as reducing traffic jams and air and sound pollution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citoyen Hmida</td>
<td>Sommes-nous fait pour la democratie?</td>
<td></td>
<td>The author writes, &quot;In the past few days we’ve experienced two major political events which answer that question with a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;It is a categorical no&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Moroccans) made for democracy?</td>
<td>Dec. 20, 2012</td>
<td>resounding ‘NO! We aren’t ready or even made for democracy!’&quot;</td>
<td>Translated from French</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attached are three documents that provide a quick look into Senator Kerry’s background and how this may affect his thinking on the ME and Morocco. It is a very quick compilation of existing documents and not intended to be a final report to you. It is rather a temporary document until a complete analysis is completed of Kerry and the new Obama Administration. The attachments include:

- A background summary on Senator Kerry and the new Obama Administration, and some of his views on the ME, Morocco, the JFK Foundation and Hillary Clinton.
- Meeting notes of a meeting with Senator Kerry’s staff and Jordan Paul, dated May 27, 2008
- Meeting notes of a meeting with Senator Kerry’s staff with Ed Gabriel and Jordan Paul, dated May 30, 2007

A final and more complete document should be submitted to you by January 11th, depending on the appointment process to name all national security and foreign policy members in the new administration. Thank you, Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com
Date: May 30, 2007

Submitted by: Jordan Paul

Place: RSOB

Member of Congress: Sen. Kerry

Names of Participants: Frank Lowenstein (Foreign Policy Advisor for Sen. Kerry), Amb. Mekouar, Ed Gabriel, Jordan Paul

Synopsis of remarks, including Q&A:

Frank Lowenstein began the meeting by saying that this was his first meeting on the subject. The Ambassador then said he would start at the beginning. The Ambassador took about 15 minutes to outline the history of the region from before Spanish Colonization through Baker II. Ed then reviewed how the Clinton Administration and subsequently the George W. Bush Administration had pushed Morocco to offer the autonomy proposal as a compromise to end the 30-year problem. Ed further explained how Congressional support was critical to solving this issue and showed Frank a copy of the 173 signature letter. Ed also previewed the VIP letter to be released on June 6, 2007. Frank was impressed with both letters and said that this sounded like a fairly cut-and-dried issue.

Ed said that the most recent terrorist attacks in North Africa, attributed to the rise of AQM, made it an even better issue for Sen. Kerry. Frank then asked what Senator Kerry could do to help to bring the issue to a satisfactory resolution. Ed replied that we were looking for letter of support from the Foreign Relations committee. Then, Ed mentioned that we had briefed other members of the Committee, including Lugar, Biden, Coleman, and Cardin. He said that we had received general support, but that we also had some detractors that Frank should know about.

Ed explained that Kennedy, Leahy, Feingold, and Inhofe were generally against us on this issue – though Feingold appeared to be more pragmatic. Frank said that he was glad that we mentioned this. He then asked us why the three Democrats didn’t see this issue our way (he wasn’t concerned about Sen. Inhofe). Ed said that it varied from member to member but that human rights and the issue of self-determination were the primary reasons. Ed went on to explain Morocco’s serious efforts to curb human rights abuses were the best in the Arab world but that abuses,
unfortunately, still continued. Ed mentioned that he genuinely saw the glass as half full and that he would bet on Morocco to follow through on their serious reforms. Ed mentioned the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Ambassador then defended Morocco’s human rights record and blamed the recent events on the Polisario intentionally inciting the Moroccan security forces.

Frank said that he was very glad that we had brought this to our attention. He mentioned that he would discuss the possibility of a letter and that he thought it was something that Sen. Kerry would be willing to do.

Responses/Observations:

From Ed, "Meeting with Frank Lowenstein of Kerry staff was productive."
From Jordan Paul: it was a very long and productive meeting. Frank now has the full picture of Western Sahara as the issue relates to Congress.

Follow-up Actions: Keep Frank informed of latest developments and press him on the letter from the Senate.
Obama Foreign Policy Overview

Regardless of who will occupy the top diplomatic posts in the second Obama Administration, it is likely that most current policies will continue unless events overseas demand a readjustment. The Obama Doctrine of collaboration, negotiation, and multilateralism will continue in a second Administration. As analysts point out, presidents do not simply change their entire agenda or their personalities once they have been re-elected. Aaron David Miller, in an article in Foreign Policy, referred to the belief that presidents would suddenly adopt an entirely new approach to international relations as “The Second-Term Illusion.”

When talking about the potential next term, Administration foreign policy officials mention the so-called “pivot” toward the Pacific. The Obama Administration has already sought to strengthen economic and military relations with Burma, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand. Obama has also announced the stationing of Marines in Australia. Emerging and seriously conflictual problems related to competing claims to territorial waters in the South China Sea are likely to require senior policy attention early on in the next Administration. Additionally, there has been a renewed focus in recent months on developments in Europe, where the continuing financial crisis is beginning to require the kind of attention that the Obama Administration has only marginally addressed until recently.

In terms of foreign policy initiatives that require Congressional approval, Obama will quickly come to the realization that term limits are cruel to second term presidents. His best opportunities will come in 2013 and, even then, the likely GOP-controlled House and gridlocked Senate will prove to be formidable obstacles. The middle of 2014, upcoming Congressional elections, and the beginning of the 2016 presidential campaign will weaken him even more on Capitol Hill. Given the polarized environment, the likelihood of a closely divided Congress, and a probably narrow margin of victory for Obama should he win, it is highly unlikely that Obama would make any huge shifts in his foreign policy philosophy in his second term.

Key Personnel in a Second Obama Administration

Frequently, there is a substantial turnover in important senior positions in a second Administration as officials use the opportunity to transition back to (or into) the private sector where they can turn their recent government experience into advantages for themselves and their new private sector role. Even if this brings no wholesale change in policy directions or guiding philosophy, new officials inevitably attempt to put their own stamp, style, and preferences into play, and that sometimes results in significant changes, even on some key issues.

Secretary of State

Secretary Clinton will retire on or before January 20th. President Obama has nominated Sen. John Kerry to be the next secretary of state.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-MA) appears to be the first choice of Secretary Clinton, which would help explain why she has sent him on so many diplomatic missions around the world. Although his appointment would create a Democratic vacancy in the Senate, Democrats feel they would be able to hold on to that seat. Kerry has been neutral towards Morocco as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, he is the product of the more liberal wing of the Democratic Party foreign policy community that has historically been critical of Morocco on issues like human rights. As the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry will certainly be aware of the RFK center and Kerry Kennedy. He was also a close associate of Senator Ted Kennedy and often deferred to the “Kennedy” policy opinions.
**Biography**

John Kerry was born on December 11, 1943 at Fitzsimons Army Hospital in Aurora, Colorado. Not long after Kerry was born, his family returned home to Massachusetts, where his parents, Richard and Rosemary, taught him the values of service and responsibility and the blessings of his Catholic faith, lessons he carries with him to this day.

As he was graduating from Yale University, John Kerry volunteered to serve in the United States Navy, because, as he later said, "it was the right thing to do." Lt. Kerry served two tours of duty in Vietnam. On his second tour, he volunteered to serve on a Swift Boat in the river deltas, one of the most dangerous assignments of the war. He was decorated with a Silver Star, a Bronze Star with Combat V, and three Purple Hearts.

When he came home to the United States, John Kerry spoke out against a policy he felt gave politicians political cover while soldiers bore the real burden. He also began a lifelong fight for his fellow veterans – joining with other vets to found the Vietnam Veterans of America to fight for veterans’ benefits, for extension of the G.I. Bill for Higher Education, and for treatment of PTSD.

Later, John Kerry accepted another tour of duty - to serve in America's communities. After graduating from Boston College Law School in 1976, he went to work as a top prosecutor in Middlesex County, Massachusetts. He took on organized crime, fought for victims' rights and created programs for rape counseling.

John Kerry was elected Lieutenant Governor in 1982. Two years later, he was elected to the United States Senate and he has won reelection four-times since. He is now serving his fifth term.

John Kerry entered the Senate with a reputation as a man of conviction. He helped provide health insurance for millions of low-income children. He has fought to improve public education, protect our natural environment, and strengthen our economy.

From his ground-breaking work on the Iran-Contra scandal to his leadership on global AIDS, John Kerry has distinguished himself as one of our nation's most respected voices on national security and international affairs. As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, he worked to learn the truth about American soldiers missing in Vietnam and to normalize relations with that country. As the ranking Democrat on the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, he is a leading expert on that region, including North Korea. He worked on a bipartisan basis to craft the American response to September 11th and has been a leading voice on American policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, the Middle East peace process and Israel's security.

In 2002, John Kerry announced that he would be a candidate for president of the United States -- and he went on to mount a come from behind campaign that won the Democratic nomination, and was nearly elected President in a close contest against a wartime president. (NOTE: Ambassador Gabriel was on Senator Kerry’s Presidential Election Committee and served as a surrogate for both Senator and Mrs. Kerry to the Arab American community, and escorted Mrs. Kerry to a number of political functions.)

Kerry returned to the Senate, where today he continues fighting for what motivated him to enter public life in the first place: love of country. He is the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the very committee he testified before in 1971 as a veteran pushing for an end to the Vietnam War. Under Kerry’s leadership, the committee is addressing the key foreign policy and national security issues facing the United States including Afghanistan and Pakistan, nuclear nonproliferation, and global climate change.
Today, Senator Kerry is the tenth most senior Senator and the second longest serving Senator in his seat. He also holds senior positions on the Finance, Commerce, and Small Business Committees.

**Relationship with Hillary Clinton**

"Kerry, who is rumored to be Clinton's choice to follow her to the State Department, is widely respected on the international stage and currently chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee”

Rumors have it that if Hillary had to choose between Rice and U.S. Sen. John Kerry, who is head of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, she would prefer Kerry.

“Hillary is not close to Rice, who is tough — but is not the friendliest person,” said a top White House source. “And Hillary’s brief comment recently that Rice had done ‘a great job’ was considered underwhelming and tepid,” the source added.

**Issues**

Kerry is a strong supporter of abortion rights. During the Bush years, he refused to support the appointment of a Supreme Court justice who would overturn Roe v. Wade while the court was 5-4.

**Middle East:**
Kerry is one of the most pro-Israel senators. A Kerry nomination for Secretary of State would be a nomination for strengthening the U.S.-Israel partnership.

Like virtually every person in Washington, John Kerry feels that the Iranian nuclear program is a menace to regional stability. However, he is opposed to 'saber rattling' and represents the standard Beltway consensus on Iran: Voted against designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization, siding with Democrats who dubbed it needlessly antagonistic. He helped unanimously pass severe sanctions on Iran, the same ones described by Vice President Joe Biden as the toughest in history.

As quoted in the New York Times, “Some close to the administration have even called this emerging American relationship with the Brotherhood a first step toward a pattern that could take shape with the Islamist parties’ coming to power around the region in the aftermath of the uprisings of the Arab Spring. Islamists have taken important roles in Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt in less than a year. “You’re certainly going to have to figure out how to deal with democratic governments that don’t espouse every policy or value you have,” said Senator John Kerry, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and recently joined with the ambassador to Egypt, Anne W. Patterson, for a meeting with top leaders of the Brotherhood’s political party.”

In a speech at Johns Hopkins SAIS in 2007 he said: “NATO should reach out to Muslim partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue—countries like Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.”

During a 2011 speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he identified Morocco as one of the countries that has responded to the imperative for immediate reform, praising King Mohammed VI’s decision to conduct a popular referendum on proposed constitutional amendments. [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/senator-john-kerry-on-u.s.-policy-toward-middle-east/1fd](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/senator-john-kerry-on-u.s.-policy-toward-middle-east/1fd)

**Kennedy Connection**
In 1962, Senator Kerry was a volunteer for Ted Kennedy's first Senatorial campaign. The summer after his graduation from St. Paul's, he dated Janet Jennings Auchincloss, First Lady Jacqueline
Kennedy's half-sister. Auchincloss invited Kerry to visit her family's estate, Hammersmith Farm, in Rhode Island, where Kerry met President John F. Kennedy for the first time. According to Kerry, when he told the president he was about to enter Yale University, Kennedy grimaced, because he had gone to rival Harvard University. Kerry later recalled, "He smiled at me, laughed and said: 'Oh, don't worry about it. You know I'm a Yale man too now. '" According to Kerry "The President uttered that famous comment about how he had the best of two worlds now: a Harvard education and Yale degree", in reference to the honorary degree he had received from Yale a few months earlier.

Kerry appeared at RFK event on LGBT rights in Uganda
In November of 2011, John Kerry presented Ugandan LGBTI Rights Activist Frank Mugisha with the 2011 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award in the Kennedy Caucus Room. In his remarks, Kerry praised Mugisha for his fight for gay, lesbian, transgender and bisexual rights. He also praised the Kennedy Center for its unwavering fight against discrimination and injustice.

He also Authored article w/ Kerry Kennedy (and others) for Politico: Protection for women a top foreign policy priority. The article reported that a bipartisan coalition, led by Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.), Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), Susan Collins (R-Maine) and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) in the Senate and Congressmen Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) and Ted Poe (R-Texas) in the House, had introduced the International Violence Against Women Act (IVAWA). Introduction of this bill supports the efforts of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to rightly put women at the very center of a broad global security agenda that factors in the great challenges of our decade and invests in the world’s peacemakers.

John Kerry was very close with Ted Kennedy during his time in the Senate until Kennedy’s death.
What Will Secretary of State John Kerry's Foreign Policy Look Like?
Molly Redden
December 17, 2012 | 1:15 pm

After the GOP embarrassed Susan Rice out of the running, ABC News reported on Saturday that Obama will nominate Sen. John Kerry to succeed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. Kerry, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, brings with him a long record on foreign policy—and a little dirty laundry. Below is a collection of his statements and stances on recent foreign policy crises.

Syria
Before Syria’s Bashar al-Assad began killing thousands of civilians, Sen. Kerry counted himself among the foreign policy minds hoping that Assad would prove a reformer. To that end, he and Assad had multiple discussions that left Kerry feeling optimistic. In April 2010, he called Syria “an essential player in bringing peace and stability to the region.” In March 2011, he said, “President Assad has been very generous with me in terms of the discussions we have had. ... So my judgment is that Syria will move; Syria will change, as it embraces a legitimate relationship with the United States and the West.” Kerry urged moderation at the start of the Syrian war; however, he has since called for discussing safe zones and arming the Syrian opposition.

Libya
In 2011, Kerry was one of the leading voices urging a no-fly zone over Libya while White House officials were still skeptical. Speaking to the Foreign Relations Committee, he said, “The international community cannot simply watch from the sidelines as this quest for democracy is met with raw violence. ... The Security Council should act now, in my judgment, to heed the Arab League’s call.” He also called for nations to turn over billions in frozen Libyan assets to the rebels fighting to oust Quaddafi.

Environment
Kerry, long an advocate for the U.S. to lead on climate change prevention, has compared the threat posed by poor international effort to confront climate change to that of war. In an August speech on the Senate floor, he said, “We all know what’s happening with respect to Iran, and nuclear weapons and the possibility even of a war. ... This issue actually is of as significant a level of importance, because it affects life itself on the planet. Because it affects ecosystems on which the oceans and the land depend.” As National Journal’s Coral Davenport points out, “He was the only U.S. senator to attend key UN climate-change negotiations in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007, and Poznan, Poland, in 2008.”

China
Earlier this year, Kerry led a crusade to shame China over its theft of American companies’ trade secrets and intellectual property. The victims of this practice included a Massachusetts wind-energy corporation that lost the
majority of its business when a Chinese firm stole its most prized technology. Kerry explained, “It’s a very clear and, in our judgment, egregious, palpable demonstration of the practice that we are deeply concerned about, but it’s not the only one. There are so many things: cyberattacks, access-to-market issues, espionage, theft. These are major points of discussion between us and China.”

Afghanistan

Kerry outlined his thoughts on the end of the war in Afghanistan in a May 2011 hearing: “Despite the tremendous skill and sacrifice of our troops, there is no purely military victory to be had in Afghanistan. What we face is a political resolution. ... Our reintegration efforts have had limited impact so far. Reconciliation is more promising in the long run, but it will not be fast and it won’t be a silver bullet. ... Still, some Taliban appear willing to negotiate, so the United States must send a strong and consistent message that we support a political solution led by the Afghans.” Shortly afterwards, he called for the president to speed up the troop drawdown.

Benghazi

In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Kerry sent a private inquiry to the State Department seeking information about the circumstances of the attacks. But he loudly objected to GOP politicization of the issue: “My view is that the people of the United States understand that when there is a tragedy that involves the loss of life in an embassy ... you bond together as a country, and you don’t make it a political football. I don’t remember a political football when 3,000 people died about 40 miles away from here and you had 9/11. ... The president called it an act of terror immediately. Everyone understands what happened. There's no secret here.”
PolicyMic

John Kerry Secretary of State Nomination What it Means for America

President Obama has decided to nominate Massachusetts Senator and 2004 presidential candidate John Kerry to be Hillary Clinton's successor as Secretary of State, and will make the announcement next week — according to an anonymous Democrat who spoke with CNN on Saturday.

The revelation follows the withdrawal of U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice from the nomination process. Rice was criticized for statements she made following the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi, Libya, as well as for her "aggressive personality."

Kerry is considered one of the strongest remaining choices for the position, "noted for the experience, gravitas and relationship-building" which he brings to the role. Notably, he recently traveled to Pakistan following the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, and has traveled the globe on behalf of the United States to bolster the Obama administration's relationship with key foreign leaders.

The only thing we can say with 100% certainty is that Kerry is not using his potential Secretary of State nomination to build up his resume for president.

So just where is John Kerry on the issues, and what role will he play in an Obama administration?

1. Climate Change: Secretary Kerry would likely make climate change a primary focus of the next four years in international relations. He has already made a reputation as one of the Senate's biggest climate hawks, and supports comprehensive international action to reverse global warming. Much of the chatter around his nomination reflects a debate on his commitment to elevating climate change as a foreign policy priority for this and subsequent administrations. E&E Daily claims Kerry will make this the "banner issue" of his term:

   — Kerry would push China to join the U.S. in taking a long-term leadership role on Climate Change.
   — Believes climate change is "biggest long term threat" to security.
   — Reportedly one of the most knowledgeable senators on the science and diplomacy of climate change.
   — Prioritized action on the Law of the Sea treaty that addresses melting polar ice caps.
   — In 2007, wrote This Moment on Earth: Today's New Environmentalists and Their Vision for the Future with his wife, Theresa.

Should we expect a major reversal of the U.S.' longstanding opposition to signing major climate change and CO2 reduction treaties? Unclear. While Kerry is personally committed to the issue, whether or not American policy
undergoes major changes will depend on what amount of time and effort the Obama administration is willing to sink into talks. That is *doubtful*.

2. *War on Drugs*: Kerry is slightly more liberal than other members of the Obama team on marijuana legalization, but leans conservative on other drugs. With Rahm Emanuel gone and Hillary Clinton planning on leaving the administration, Kerry may be a good choice to help the president transition to a more relaxed stance on the recent Colorado/Washington marijuana legalization laws, but do not expect him to be an opponent of the Drug War in general:

— Kerry *admits* to smoking marijuana in the past (come on, he's from Massachusetts).
— Mild *support* for removing criminal penalties on the possession or use of small amounts of weed, as well as similarly tepid support for medical marijuana. No particular courage on this issue.
— In favor of barring convicted drug dealers, but not users, from receiving federal loans for education.
— In 2004, *tapped* anti-drug "zealot" Rand Beers to serve as a security advisor, who supported defoliating the Colombian-Ecuador border and then accused farmers affected by the spraying of having relationships with Colombia’s FARC.

Kerry as Secretary of State would likely support aggressive overseas action to fight drug trafficking, as well as efforts to shore up Central and Latin American countries' legal systems in pursuit of more effective anti-drug operations. However, there will be no real change to the status quo.

3. *Women's Rights*: Kerry is a lifetime social moderate who usually plays to his liberal Massachusetts base on those issues. However, like everything Kerry, he is far from the Senate's most fiery advocate of women's rights, instead taking a safer centre-left position:

— Kerry is a strong supporter of abortion rights. During the Bush years, refused to support the appointment of a Supreme Court justice who would overturn Roe v. Wade while the court was 5-4.
— Catholic who believes life begins at conception, but will not legislate faith.
— Either does not *believe* in a right to terminate "post-viability" pregnancies, or *voted* for Tom Daschle's Comprehensive Abortion Ban Act of 1997 as a political move.
— Strong supporter of equal pay for women.

What does this mean for the State Department? Kerry would continue Secretary Clinton's *assertive programs* to assist women internationally. While Secretary Clinton has continually *emphasized* women’s' rights in relation to
the Arab Spring and establishment of new democracies in the Middle East, Secretary Kerry's record indicates he will likely make this less of a focus of his diplomatic mission.

4. **Economy / Fiscal Cliff:** Far from his portrayal in the 2004 campaign, Kerry is no socialist but a rather milquetoast welfare-state liberal. Kerry has supported most major Obama administration policies, including the stimulus and Obamacare, and is a relative moderate who plays to Beltway centrists on this issue, supporting the bipartisan Bowles-Simpson deficit reduction plan (despite its **fuzzy math**). Again, we see no signs of Kerry leaving safe territory:

— In 2004, Kerry supported raising the minimum wage to $7 (it’s now $7.25). This was such a weak and overdue increase that it enjoyed broad political support: in 2006, President Bush endorsed the increase.
— Voted yes on an additional $825 billion for Obama’s economic recovery package.
— As a member of the Congressional super-committee on the deficit, accused Americans for Tax Reform's Grover Norquist of acting as a *de facto* 13th member and thus partially responsible for derailing negotiations.
— Supports the Bowles-Simpson deficit reduction package.
— Blamed Republicans for failing to reach a deal during 2011’s debt ceiling negotiations, claiming that Democrats were willing to put serious entitlement reform on the agenda.
— Strong opponent of offshore tax loopholes, and supports efforts to close them by any means possible.

Under Kerry, the U.S. would continue to liaise with organizations such as the International Monetary Fund to assure "confidence" in the U.S.' long-term fiscal stability. A deficit-reduction package signed by a bipartisan committee will doubtless be bragged about to the rest of the world as a model for ending the international financial crisis. He will likely help coordinate efforts to work with international agencies in ending overseas tax loopholes, as well as emphasize that we are getting our fiscal house in order. Kerry will be an excellent pointman in highlighting America's continued financial stability and restoring our international image as a good place to do business. Secretary Kerry will blame continued instability or the inability to finalize a deal on knuckle-dragging Congressional Republicans, minimizing damage to the Obama administration’s reputation abroad.

5. **Israel:** Kerry is one of the most pro-Israel senators. A Kerry nomination for Secretary of State would be a nomination for strengthening the U.S.-Israel partnership. The Senator supports a two-state peace deal, but only if Israel's interests are taken into account foremost:

— After the 2010 raid on a Palestinian aid flotilla, stated that he did not believe Israel was becoming a strategic burden to the United States. Israel "has every right in the world to make certain weapons are not being smuggled in," said Kerry.
— **Signed** a 1999 resolution expressing opposition to the formation of a Palestinian state. However, in 2009 urged Israel to do more to support a Palestinian state.
— Emphasizes continually a perceived lack of credible Arab or Palestinian bargaining partners.
— Embarrassingly, in 2010 said that Syria's Bashar al-Assad could be a force for change in the conflict. al-Assad is now best known for readying chemical weapons to deploy against a massive insurrection in his country.

Obama selecting Kerry is a clear indication that the U.S.-Israel partnership will continue, and that major concessions to Palestinians are not on the agenda, regardless of the U.N.'s recent recognition of a theoretical Palestinian state.

6. Iran: Like virtually every person in Washington, John Kerry feels that the Iranian nuclear program is a menace to regional stability. However, he is opposed to 'saber rattling' and represents the standard Beltway consensus on Iran:

— Voted against designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization, siding with Democrats who dubbed it needlessly antagonistic.
— Helped unanimously pass severe sanctions on Iran, the same ones described by Vice President Joe Biden as the toughest in history.
— Stated in April that he thinks Iranian leaders will act rationally on the discussion of nuclear issues.
— Thinks we can work harder to solidify "common interests" with Iran, including eliminating the Taliban and fighting drug trafficking.
— Says military action on Iran is a last resort after diplomatic possibilities have been exhausted.

7. China: Kerry has a nuanced view of U.S.-Chinese relations, and seems focused on continuing the Obama administration's first-term policy of emphasizing broad commonalities for cooperation and a stable long-term trade relationship.

— Voted in favor of normalizing trade relations with China, but voted against an amendment tying this request to Congressional oversight of human rights issues in that country.
— Does not support transferring clean energy technology to China.
— Said, "I don't think that we're here to rupture [the Chinese-American] relationship. I think we're here to send a message to the Chinese about the urgent need to repair it," speaking in favor of a bill to add new duties on imports from countries with undervalued currencies which infuriated Chinese officials.
— However, says we need to counter China's rise not by fighting, but competing with our own economic resurgence: "... economics is not war. We can both come out well ahead of where we are now."

Kerry will continue to engage U.S.-Chinese relations as a cooperative, rather than purely competitive effort
Congressional Meeting Notes

Date: May 27, 2008

Submitted by: Jordan Paul

Member of Congress: Sen. Kerry

Names of Participants: Frank Lowenstein (Sr. Foreign Policy Advisor), Jordan Paul

Subject of Meeting: Western Sahara Negotiations Update, Senate Letter

Synopsis of remarks, including Q&A:

Jordan gave Frank the update on the negotiations and the one year extension of the MINURSO mandate. They discussed Peter Van Walsum's call for realistic negotiations based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and the U.S. endorsement of this position. Jordan explained how this was the moment to push to process towards a conclusion and discussed a possible Senate letter.

Frank asked a series of questions about the Western Sahara:

1) Is the Western Sahara Moroccan?
2) How important is it to U.S.-Morocco Relations?
3) What about a referendum?
4) What about International Law?

Jordan explained that the land was always Moroccan, except for the period of Spanish colonialism. Jordan explained that several Moroccan dynasties traced their roots back to the Western Sahara. On the issue of importance, Jordan said that it was, far and away, the most important issue in Morocco. It affects the stability of the country and remains the most important international issue for Morocco.

Jordan retold the story about how and why the referendum failed and why the international community, especially the U.S., supported the idea of autonomy. Jordan characterized a return to referendum as a return to a failed idea that would only maintain the status quo and prolong the suffering of those living in the camps. Jordan also discussed the role of international law and how the autonomy plan meets every definition of self-determination and responds to the UN Security Council calls for proposals from the parties to facilitate a negotiated political solution.

Jordan segued back into why now is the best time for a Senate letter and described our efforts in the Senate over the past few weeks (Lugar, Biden, Kerry, Coleman, et al). Frank said that the committee generally worked by consensus and that we should keep him in the loop as we move forward. Frank’s last line was that he supported moving the process forward.

Responses/Observations:
The meeting with Kerry's staffer Frank Lowenstein was productive but he did not commit to supporting a Senate letter. He seems to support the Moroccan position, but he is friends with Gare Smith (head lobbyist at Foley Hoag for Algeria). Frank’s father-in-law is also a partner at Foley-Hoag.

My feeling is that Frank’s head is probably with Morocco but he would rather sit on the sidelines and remain neutral.

**Follow-up Actions:** Keep Frank informed of any significant development concerning a potential Senate letter.

**Favorable to Morocco: See Notes**
According to one of its members, Polisario's National Secretariat will be meeting over a period of several days as of January 5 to draw up a programme of activities for the Saharawi national liberation movement for 2013. The National Secretariat will in particular be looking at what initiatives might be taken to counter Morocco's manoeuvres in its present capacity as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. According to the National Secretariat member, Polisario's top leadership – in fact a semi-formal committee made up of five top officials, namely General Secretary Mohamed Abdelaziz, SADR Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, SADR Defence Minister Lamine Bouhali, SADR Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Oumar and Speaker of the Saharawi National Council Khatri Adouh – is convinced that the cause of Saharan independence will over the coming year face diplomatic problems and attempts by Morocco to weaken the UN's intervention, including via MINURSO. The determining factor, however, will be the struggle of the Saharawis of the interior, concludes the National Secretariat member.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>M20F rallies in Rabat</strong> Dec. 24, 2012</td>
<td>Morocco’s February 20 Movement (M20F) rallied in Rabat on Sunday (December 23rd). “We are here to demand the liberation of Driss Bouterrada and the release of all the political prisoners,” Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) chief Khadija Ryadi told AFP. While Bouterrada was arrested December 10th on drug trafficking charges, Ryadi claims that he is being prosecuted for his links to the M20F group.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>Morocco dismantles AQIM cell</strong> Dec. 26, 2012</td>
<td>Moroccan judicial police broke up an al-Qaeda cell in Fez, MAP reported on Tuesday (December 25th). The aim of the six-member cell was to &quot;enrol and recruit young Moroccans who have embraced jihadist ideas, in order to send them to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) camps&quot;, AFP quoted the interior ministry as saying in a statement.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>Maghreb countries to launch joint university</strong> Dec. 27, 2012</td>
<td>A “new pan-Maghreb university and science academy will soon be established” said Libyan Education Minister Mohamed al-Faitouri Soualem on Wednesday (December 26th) in Rabat. Education ministers from Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia discussed ways to harmonize basic education methods and facilitate student and teacher mobility in the Maghreb.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>Marrakech opens cybercrime lab</strong> Dec. 28, 2012</td>
<td>Moroccan police forces opened their latest laboratory to fight cybercrime in Marrakech, MAP reported on Thursday (December 27th). Facilities with anti-cybercrime labs are already open in Rabat, Casablanca and Fes. The new Marrakech establishment will also cover the regions of Agadir, Laayoune and Safi.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>Moroccan police arrest 30 protestors</strong> Dec. 30, 2012</td>
<td>Demonstrators protesting against rising prices of water and electricity clashed with police in Marrakech. Thirty people were arrested for organizing an unauthorized demonstration,&quot; the ministry statement said, adding that these people committed &quot;acts of violence and vandalism&quot; and threw stones at law enforcement officers and citizens.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>USFP to challenge Morocco</strong></td>
<td>The new first secretary of Morocco's Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) wants to take on the conservative movement by creating a left-wing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Conservatives
Dec. 30, 2012

Alliance. Since his election as head of the USFP on December 16th, Driss Lachguer has repeatedly told the media of his party's intention to form an alliance to counter the rise of "conservative and backward trend".

### Magharebia
#### Moroccan police accused of assaulting MP
Jan. 2, 2013

Controversy rocked Morocco when law enforcement officers allegedly beat up Abdessamad El Idrissi, an MP of the PJD, while breaking up a demonstration staged by unemployed graduates in Rabat last week. The young MP intervened during Thursday's protest to ask police officers to release a young unemployed graduate who had been assaulted and arrested by law enforcement officers.

### Magharebia
#### Morocco counters extremism with culture
Jan. 3, 2013

According to Culture Minister Amine Sbihi "Extremists should be tackled not only directly by the authorities, but also by instilling the country's values in young people. This will protect them against the extremist thinking that is spread everywhere, in particular by certain satellite channels". For 2013, Morocco has allocated 571 million dirhams (52 million euros) for the culture ministry, including 217 million dirhams solely for investment purposes. A new community-based strategy includes the opening of fifteen new arts centers, three conservatories, two theaters, and 15 new culture centers to be run in partnership with local authorities.

### Magharebia
#### Moroccan MP arrested for corruption
Jan. 6, 2013

A Moroccan MP in the Chamber of Counselors was arrested on corruption charges last week in Kenitra after being caught red-handed taking a bribe of 200,000 dirhams.

### Magharebia
#### Morocco literacy project reaches milestone
Jan. 8, 2013

More than 6 million Moroccans have benefited from literacy programs over the last decade, according to figures unveiled last month. "Some 735,000 people benefited from literacy programmes from 2011 to 2012. This is a record for the past ten years," Illiteracy Eradication Directorate (DLCA) head El Habib Nadir said at a Marrakech press conference on December 16th. Morocco won an honorable mention at the 2012 UNESCO Confucius Prize for its efforts, especially projects aimed at helping women become more independent through literacy.

### Magharebia
#### Young Moroccans discuss 2013 wish list
Jan. 11, 2013

Young people say they desire a more effective and transparent government to solve the crisis of unemployed graduates in 2013. Politics and corruption must be cleaned up, and there should be an expansion of resources for young people to develop their artistic and athletic talents, Magharebia heard from several young Moroccans.

### Carnegie Endowment for International
#### Morocco's Engagement with the Sahel

This piece discusses the possibility of resuscitating the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. The author writes that only Morocco has the "the spur, stature, and stability to lead it."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Community</th>
<th>U.S. oil company latest to move on Morocco</th>
<th>Jan. 3, 2013</th>
<th>U.S. company Plains Exploration and Production said it aims to start drilling in a highly promising area off the coast of Morocco. The company said it plans to drill at least two wells in the area by 2014.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax News</td>
<td>Morocco's Parliament Backs 2013 Finance Bill</td>
<td>Jan. 3, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco’s 2013 finance bill levies higher “solidarity” taxes on top earners and on companies earning large profits to benefit the poor. Revenues from the solidarity taxes are to flow to a support fund for “social cohesion.” The 2013 finance bill provides for a projected economic growth rate of 4.5 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FreshPlaza</td>
<td>Morocco: Citrus export down 22%</td>
<td>Jan. 3, 2013</td>
<td>The Moroccan citrus export is a lot lower than expected this season, mainly due to the cold weather during the blooming period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Lakome          | Sahara : Al Jazeera puts Rabat to the test | Jan. 3, 2013 | On Jan. 3, Al Jazeera published an article heavily criticizing Morocco’s Western Sahara policy only weeks after receiving permission to reopen in Rabat. Written by Tom Stevenson in Laayoune, the article describes the Saharan conflict emphasizing rights for the Sahrawi victims. The article draws parallels to the Israeli - Palestinian conflict stating that “Both involve the departure of former colonial powers, the arrival of external forces, the supposed repression of the local population and to maintain the status quo of the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN.”  
*Translated from French to English* |
<p>| TIME            | Is Marrakech’s Westernized Female Mayor a Real Figure for Change? | Jan. 4, 2013 | This piece is about the 37 year old female mayor of Marrakech. Many observers believe the fact that Ms. Mansouri has been elected demonstrates how progressive the country has become; others believe she is merely a puppet controlled by male advisers. |
| Reuters         | Morocco says may launch subsidies reform in June | Jan. 5, 2013 | In a step supported by the International Monetary Fund, the government now aims to repair its finances by reducing subsidies and shifting the focus of spending to the poorest Moroccans. |
| Reuters         | Morocco to | | Morocco plans structural reform of its state pension |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Arabiya</td>
<td>Islamist ally wants more woman ministers in Morocco</td>
<td>The head of Morocco’s Istiqlal (Independence) party, the main ally of the ruling Islamists, has asked for a cabinet reshuffle, saying 20 percent of ministers should be women, media reports said on Friday. “The reshuffle is an opportunity to inject new blood... and increase the representation of women to 20 percent,” Hamid Chabat said in an official request to the head of the government which was published in local media. The current government led by the head of the Justice and Development Party, Abdelilah Benkirane, has only one female minister in the 31-member cabinet, in charge of family affairs.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Jazeera</td>
<td>Inside disputed Western Sahara</td>
<td>Sahrawis complain of abuses and say the international community has ignored their plight under Moroccan rule. MINURSO has limited jurisdiction and is insufficiently staffed. In April, Amnesty International reported that: &quot;Sahrawis advocating self-determination for the people of Western Sahara remained subject to restrictions on their freedoms of expression, association and assembly, and leading activists continued to face prosecution.&quot;</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News24</td>
<td>Morocco rapper gets &quot;integrity&quot; prize</td>
<td>Transparency Morocco awarded jailed Moroccan rapper Mouad Belghouat (known as “Al-Haqed”) its “Integrity Prize” for his efforts towards creating an &quot;integrated and transparent society.&quot; He is considered a public face of the February 20 Movement.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa Post</td>
<td>Morocco Elected Chair of Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee</td>
<td>Morocco has been elected chair of both the UNSC’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, which supports member states’ legal and institutional abilities to combat terrorism, and a Working Group tasked with examining practical measures to be taken against groups and individuals involved in terrorism. In the coming year, the UNSC will focus on counter-terrorism and peacekeeping missions. The article concludes with a brief biography of Mohammed Loulichki, Morocco’s permanent representative to the UN.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Online</td>
<td>Morocco’s Justice and Charity 'ready to form party'</td>
<td>A top member Morocco’s banned Justice and Charity Party has declared that the party is willing to submit a request to formally become a political party. However, as a result of Justice and Charity’s refusal to accept the King as the commander of the faithful, he does not believe that any such request will be accepted.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Online</td>
<td>Morocco reduces jail terms for 5</td>
<td>Five members of the &quot;February 20&quot; protest movement saw their sentences reduced on Wednesday to six months. Human Rights Watch had condemned the...</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2013</td>
<td>'February 20' activists</td>
<td>The original trial process, citing claims by the defendants that they were tortured into signing false confessions, while the UN special rapporteur on torture last year criticized Morocco's harsh treatment of protesters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 8, 2013</td>
<td>I'Humanite.fr</td>
<td>This piece is very critical of the state of human rights in the Western Sahara and refers to the king as “the executioner of the Saharawi people.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2013</td>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>This piece is very critical of the state of human rights in the Western Sahara and refers to the king as “the executioner of the Saharawi people.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco: French NGO</td>
<td>Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic's Friends Association (AARASD) called on French President François Hollande to &quot;pay attention&quot; to the situation of 23 political prisoners in the Moroccan jail of Sale, and whose trial is to be held on February 1. Regine Villemont, president of the AARASD, called on Hollande to exert pressure in favor of the Saharawis at meetings during his upcoming official visit to Morocco.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 11, 2013</td>
<td>A new role for Morocco in North Africa?</td>
<td>This article explains why leading the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) would be highly profitable to Morocco. In addition to setting the agenda for regional security talks, it could exercise heretofore untapped soft power potential.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 11, 2013</td>
<td>HM the King Pardons 413 Convicts On Independence Manifesto Day</td>
<td>HM King Mohammed VI pardoned 413 convicts on the occasion of the Manifesto Independence Day, celebrated on 11 January, the Justice and Liberties Ministry said in a statement. 299 criminals had their prison sentences or imprisonment reduced. One inmate's life sentence was commuted to a limited prison term. Imprisonment sentences were pardoned and fines imposed for 10 others. Three convicts were granted pardons over their prison sentences and fines, while 60 had their fines annulled.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update Name/ Date</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **La réforme de la caisse de compensation est-ce un remède indispensable à la hausse des dépenses publiques?**  
Reform of entitlements is an critical remedy for public debt?  
Jan. 8, 2013 | According to Najib Boulif, Minister in charge of general affairs and governance, reform of entitlements is ready and will be implemented in the coming months. It will reduce public expenditure by 24 billion dirhams, thereby reducing public debt and encouraging investment. The government plans to maintain assistance only to the lowest income group, defined as earning 1000 dirhams or less per month. |
| **Maroc : Le Club des magistrats s'oppose au ministère de l'Intérieur sur le contrôle des élections**  
Morocco: The Moroccan Magistrates’ Club clashes with the Ministry of the Interior over the control of elections  
Jan. 8, 2013 | The Moroccan Magistrates’ Club, an organization of Moroccan judges devoted to the separation of executive power from the judiciary, has made demands for the control of elections to be shifted from the Ministry of the Interior to an independent judiciary, in order to combat perceived corruption in the governmental control of elections. The demand is unlikely to be met, but serves the purpose of reopening the debate on the necessity of an independent body overseeing elections. |
| **Clôture à Tanger de la 3ème réunion des chambres de commerce et d'industrie arabo-africaines**  
A closure to Tangier’s 3rd reunion of the Arab- African | This two day meeting aimed to establish an investment and trade partnership between African and Arab countries, as well as identifying obstacles and constraints to the development of economic cooperation. Participants examined various ways to promote Arab-African investment, increase the volume of trade between parties and focus on the promotion and strengthening of relations between the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. They also called for the disbanding of trade barriers. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chambers of Commerce and Industry</th>
<th>Jan. 9, 2013</th>
<th>Tanger se confirme en tant que deuxième pôle économique du Maroc</th>
<th>Jan. 9, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The triangle between Tangier, Tanger Med port and Tetouan has become the economic showcase of Morocco with a series of industrial areas served by a highway, ultra modern port, railroad and in a couple of years by TGV. Once constructed, it will make Tangier the first city in Africa to have a TGV.</td>
<td>Tanger is confirmed as the second economic center of Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Au Maroc, un institut va former des « leaders de communauté » catholiques et protestants | Jan. 10, 2013 | Al Mowafaqa (“Agreement”) Institute has been established in Rabat, Morocco. This project is the product of a partnership between academic Institute Al Mowafaqa, the Catholic Institute of Paris and the Faculty of Protestant Theology of Strasbourg. | |
| In Morocco, an institute is being established for Catholic and Protestant “community leaders” | | |

| Le port de pêche de Laâyoune paralysé | Jan. 10, 2013 | A strike by 3,000 fishermen has caused the port of Laayoune to come to a standstill. Their demands include more access to prime fishing areas, reduction of hiring restrictions, and requesting tax exempt status on their haul. They would also like to be allowed legally to catch more octopus. | |
| Fishing port of Laayoune paralyzed | | |

<p>| Un eurodéputé appelle le Danemark à reconnaître la RASD | Jan. 10, 2013 | Danish MP Soren Sondergaard called on Denmark to recognize Western Sahara as an independent state, according to a press release he made public on Tuesday. | |
| A European deputy calls on Denmark to recognize the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Maghreb:</strong> Ouverture d'une banque d'investissement commune cette année</td>
<td>The Arab Maghreb Union is preparing the establishment of a joint bank. With a starting capital of $ 100 million, the bank will have its headquarters in Tunis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Manifestation pacifique contre l'occupation marocaine à la ville occupée de Boujdour</strong></td>
<td>On Wednesday a protest occurred in the Western Sahara city of Boujdour which called for the immediate end of Moroccan rule in Western Sahara. The protesters carried SADR flags and chanted slogans for Sahrawi self-determination. According to this article, the protest was brutally dispersed by Moroccan forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Maroc : Le PJD rejette une proposition de loi criminalisant tout rapport sexuel avec les mineures</strong></td>
<td>The PJD has rejected a proposed amendment to article 475 of the penal code which would criminalize all sexual relations with minors, in order to counteract the article that states that alleged rapists may avoid jail time if they marry their alleged victims. This amendment had been proposed in response to the highly publicized suicide of Amina Filali last spring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Des avions militaires et soldats étrangers dépêchés dans le centre du Mali.</strong></td>
<td>Military aircraft carrying weapons and foreign troops arrived Thursday in Sévaré (central Mali), where the army has an operational command post. No indication, however, had been obtained immediately on the number and origin of these aircraft, weapons and foreign soldiers, one witnesses who mentioned the presence of whites among the soldiers. &quot;I saw a C-160 land with arms and men. Certain men had white skin,&quot; said the worker airport Sévaré (650 km north of Bamako).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dispatched to central Mali
Jan. 11, 2013
On January 5, Polisario's National Secretariat – the movement's central committee – convened for its half-yearly meeting at the Shahid El Hafedh camp in Tindouf to assess the events of 2012 and outline plans for the first six months of 2013. Attention was focused on the upcoming 40th anniversaries of the founding of the Polisario Front (May 10) and of the beginning of its armed struggle for the independence of Western Sahara (May 20).

Speaking to us shortly before the National Secretariat meeting, one of its members initially struck an upbeat note, arguing that the double anniversary would provide the opportunity for countless initiatives to raise the profile of and generally re-galvanise the struggle for Saharawi independence. 2013, the National Secretariat member claimed, will be “the year of the Western Sahara” – only to lapse, almost immediately, into a rather more pessimistic tone: with Morocco currently serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Polisario's top leadership fears that the cause of Saharawi independence will have trouble making any headway at the UN, where Moroccan manoeuvring may even affect MINURSO and its mission.

Morocco has, of course, been on the UN Security Council for a year already, even holding the rotating presidency in December 2012, and it is by no means clear that this has in and of itself made a qualitative difference to the international community’s handling of the Western Sahara issue. After all, despite the fact that the Moroccan authorities very publicly withdrew their confidence in him last spring, Christopher Ross remains Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s Personal Envoy, suggesting that Rabat's supposedly privileged position does not even give it any added leverage over personnel, never mind policy.

However, Morocco’s position at the UN has of late arguably been strengthened to some degree by the election of its Permanent Representative Mohamed Loulichki to chair the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee throughout 2013. If nothing else, this will throw further fuel onto Polisario's smouldering anxiety about being equated with the islamist armed groups operating out of northern Mali and generally being smeared with the brush of terrorism. Such fears have been voiced on a number of occasions by Polisario officials and activists, and according to a Saharawi journalist who spoke to us in early November the issue was raised explicitly by Polisario's intelligence chief Brahim Ahmed Mahmoud in his meeting with Christopher Ross when
the latter visited the Tindouf camps in the autumn. Mahmoud is reported to have presented the UN envoy with “proof” that the Moroccan security services have been trying to discredit Polisario by seeding smuggling and terrorist networks in the Sahel with young Saharawis whom they allegedly control by means of blackmail. With Moroccan and other media periodically bringing up the *canard* of hordes of Saharawi fighters in the ranks of AQMI (an echo of the much repeated claim that Polisario units were fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi regime in the Libyan conflict of 2011), Polisario spokespeople have been peddling the counter-claim that the AQMI spin-off MUJAO is manipulated by, and may even have been created by, the Moroccan security services[1] – a rumour that is well on the way to becoming received wisdom in the Algerian media[2].

At the same time, Polisario's leadership has reason to fear that it may be increasingly marginalised in the coming period due to the approach adopted by Christopher Ross. Reporting to the UN Security Council on November 28, Ross said that he did not believe that convening another round of informal talks (i.e. the continuation of the so-called Manhasset process) would advance the search for a solution to the Western Sahara question, stating his intention of focussing instead on additional consultations with "key international stakeholders"[3], to be followed at some unspecified date by a round of shuttle diplomacy with the parties and neighbouring states[4], the ultimate aim of which would be to bring the two parties, Morocco and Polisario, back to the table for formal negotiations (as opposed to "informal contacts", à la Manhasset).

In essence, Ross appears to be arguing that progress depends on improved relations between Algeria and Morocco. Ironically, in light of his earlier blackballing by Rabat, this is very close to Morocco’s long-held position that the Sahara question is an “artificial” conflict created by Algeria that must ultimately be solved by direct negotiations between Rabat and Algiers – and it has been decried as such by the above-quoted Polisario National Secretariat member[5]. Even as Ross seeks to internationalise the Western Sahara question, Polisario – which had the added disappointment of hearing the spokesman of France's new Socialist government re-state Paris' support for the Moroccan autonomy plan during Ross' visit to the French capital in November – appears to be expecting less and less of the international community. Increasingly, Polisario sources talk of the need for action in the Moroccan-administered territories to keep the cause alive: while the National Secretariat member argues that the “determining factor” in the coming period will be the struggle of the “Saharawis of the interior”, a Polisario cadre attending a meeting of members of the Saharawi community in Europe held in the Paris suburb of les Mureaux on Dec. 29-30, 2012 told us plainly that the Saharawis “will just have to rely on their own strength”, adding that “an intifada is the only way to force the Moroccans to organise a referendum”. 2013 will be “the year of the uprising of the Saharawis living under Moroccan occupation,” proclaimed the same activist.

A senior civil servant at the Algerian Presidency, for his part, concurs that the Western Sahara conflict is likely to be shunted even more firmly into the sidelines in the coming period – but far from advocating a new intifada in the Moroccan-controlled territories to counter this suggests that Polisario and the SADR ought to seek to strengthen their ties with the peoples of the region, “and especially Mauritania”. Speaking to us at the beginning of January, the source argued that Morocco's two year term on the UN Security Council did not give it any particular advantage in the Western Sahara dispute, and was indeed surprisingly positive about Rabat's position
at the UN: far from being a problem, Morocco’s Security Council membership is, from Algiers' point of view, “a good thing”, he argued, pointing out that Algeria's permanent representative actually voted for the Moroccans when non-permanent members were being selected in October 2011.

Above all, the Algerian senior servant stressed, Algiers has no intention of provoking a crisis in its relations with Morocco, or of letting any such crisis develop in any way, shape or form. On the contrary, the source goes as far as to argue that from Algeria's point of view it is time for “normalisation” with Morocco – because of the gathering storm just over Algeria's southern borders in northern Mali.

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel  
President and CEO  
The Gabriel Company, LLC  
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411  
Washington DC, 20005  
Phone: +1 202.887.1113  
Fax: +1 202.887.1115  
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com  
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] In July 2012, SADR Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek gave an interview to Italian geopolitical review Limes, reproduced by the official Algérie Presse Service (21/07/12), in which he stated à propos of MUJAO: “There is no doubt that Moroccan occupation of our territories is a destabilising factor. You can’t take it out of my head that Moroccan intelligence services are behind that strange group that formed specifically to kidnap the aid workers. Moroccan intelligence has been trying to destabilise the region since 2005 to reduce humanitarian aid and thus pressure Polisario into accepting political concessions.”

[2] For one recent example, see the editorial in French daily El Watan of 23/12/12, in which MUJAO is described as “an association of criminals created by the Moroccan intelligence services, whose only mission it to try to destabilise Algeria.”

[3] This is likely to mean, essentially, Spain and France, and perhaps the United States. As part of his tour prior to reporting back to the Security Council in November, Ross chose to visit Madrid and, in their capacity as permanent members of the UN Security Council, the UK, France, the US and Russia.


[5] The source was speaking to us privately in early December. Publicly, Polisario’s National Secretariat has been careful to restate its confidence in Christopher Ross, describing his tour of the region as a “positive step” in a statement issued after its meeting in early January.
Ali El Gazi, former DGST (Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire) commissioner, wrote a public letter to PM Benkirane about the existence of a detention center in Temara, a facility which the political class notoriously denies despite the insistence of international NGOs. With the implementation of the new constitution (which emphasizes good governance) Abdelilah urges PM Benkirane to address human rights violations that occur within the “secret” prison walls.

At the regional council of the National Gathering of Independents (French acronym RNI), RNI president Salaheddine Mezour stated that the city’s local government was “exhausted” and suffered from an absence of a participative approach. In his words, “We must develop a new vision for expanding the responsibilities of the local collective and giving citizens an opportunity to participate in its management, via decentralization.” He suggested taking inspiration from the French model of local government in formulating a new unit system for local government in Moroccan cities.

The Safi court of appeals has sentenced a man to 5 years in prison for having raped 45 women whom he lured to an isolated place under the guise of interviewing cooks for an event he was planning. Upon being arrested, the man reportedly admitted his crimes and showed no remorse, stating that he did it as revenge against his wife, who had left him. Many in the region are angry that he was given such a light sentence.
Parti de l'Istiqlal: Les membres du comité central désignés

Istiqlal party: Members of the central committee designated

Jan. 13, 2013

The Istiqlal Party had its second official meeting last Friday and Saturday. During the meeting, the party adopted the contents of a note addressed to the members of the majority coalition. Also, Taoufik Hjira was named president of the National Council, and several members of the central committee were appointed as well. Finally, PI Secretary-General Hamid Chabat delivered a message criticizing the government for the insufficiency of the economic measures it has taken in the past year.

Le Maroc pourrait quitter le MSCI

Morocco could leave MSCI

Jan. 14, 2013

Given the volatility of the Moroccan stock market in the wake of the global financial crisis, Morocco could be removed from the MSCI Emerging Market index. This could have serious consequences for the Moroccan economy, as it could cause a drop in foreign investments in Morocco.

Halima Assali, future patronne du Mouvement Populaire?

Halima Assali, future head of Mouvement Populaire?

Jan. 14, 2013

Halima Assali, who is known as a peacemaker in the Mouvement Populaire party, is likely to be named the new head of the party. Other candidates for this position include Mohamed Ouzzine, Minister of Youth and Sports and Assali’s protege.

Chabat cloue au pilori ses détracteurs

Chabat hold his critics accountable

Jan. 14, 2013

Secretary General of the Istiqlal Party, Hamid Chabat, insisted that his authority over the party is incontestable and that his status will not be challenged. Furthermore, he appointed former Minister of Housing Taoufik Hjira, one of his main supporters, as president of the National Council. Mr. Chabat had unexpectedly strong support during the national council session.

Benabdellah à la majorité: « Assez! »

“Enough!” exclaims Benabdellah to the majority

Jan. 16, 2013

PPS Secretary-General Nabil Benabellah believes that the majority of the government is missing two vital qualities: maturity and serenity. He further explains that current climate is full of “artsy scandals” rather than focusing on the sole mission of the government which is representing the “supreme interest of the country”. Lastly, he calls for more cohesion within the government stating that “it is unacceptable to put one foot in one area and the other in a different area“.

Le parlement USFP est désormais sur pied

Voting for the 300 members to the Administrative Commission took place on Saturday (Jan. 12) in a calm and transparent manner. The president of the IXth Congress of the USFP announced the final outcome on Monday (Jan.14). Women play an important role in the new Administrative Commission as they could potentially gain one third of the total seats.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 16, 2013</td>
<td>The USFP Parliament is put in motion</td>
<td>PM Benkirane met with health ministers from the Arab Maghreb Union in an effort to promote common health policy across the region. The Libyan health minister said, &quot;[p]roblems in this sector are generally the same in all Maghreb countries, it’s a situation that requires a concerted effort from all countries in the region to find an appropriate solution.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 17, 2013</td>
<td>Benkirane s'entretient avec les ministres maghrébins de la Santé</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Istiqlal party, Hamid Chabat, has recently threatened to withdraw his party from the coalition government, so PJD is looking for other potential allies. While the l'Union Constitutionel (Constitutional Union) party has said it will support whatever the majority party is, Rassemblement Nationale des Independents (National Assembly of Independents) is on record refusing to participate in a PJD-ruled government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 17, 2013</td>
<td>Menouni reçoit des représentants des mouvements Fatah et Hamas</td>
<td>Advisor of HM King Mohammed VI, Abdellatif Menouni, received representatives from Fatah and Hamas on Wednesday Jan. 16 in Rabat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 17, 2013</td>
<td>Maroc Telecom : 10 milliards prévu pour la modernisation de son infrastructure</td>
<td>Maroc Telecom plans to invest over 10 billion dirhams to modernize its infrastructure through a signed agreement with the government. Morocco Telecom intends to meet &quot;the growing needs of mobile technology and broadband Internet&quot;. In order to meet the market demand almost all existing equipment will need to be replaced. This project is expected to create around 500 jobs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2013 11:26 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: FW: Blog Monitoring January Week 2

FYI

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Response?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia Review</td>
<td><strong>Morocco’s Nizar Baraka Selected As Best Finance Minister In Middle East – OpEd</strong> Jan. 11, 2013</td>
<td>Moroccan finance minister Nizar Baraka has been selected as best finance minister in the Middle East by <em>Banker</em> magazine. Bankers and economic experts were “impressed by the fact that the Moroccan Ministry of Finance presents performance indicators for better implementation of government programs, noting that the restructuring reforms to stimulate growth, investment and boost businesses still ongoing in Morocco.”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>Algeria denies any Morocco border dispute</strong> Jan. 11, 2013</td>
<td>Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci said Tuesday (January 8th) that his country had “no problem with Morocco”, stating that the two countries could open up talks in the future on the issue of maritime borders, noting that Algeria would work on expanding the recent agreement with Tunisia on maritime borders to include other countries, including Libya, Morocco, Spain and Italy. While he did not mention opening the land border between the two countries, he did state that it is not in dispute.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td><strong>Morocco launches youth volunteer initiative</strong> Jan. 13,</td>
<td>Morocco has launched an initiative to train youth in “volunteering and civic education.” The initiative is intended to establish the tradition of civil service and social cohesion in the younger</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Title</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 14, 2013</td>
<td>Rabat hosts transitional justice forum</td>
<td>An international conference on the progress and the prospects of transitional justice opened Monday (January 14th) in Rabat. Representatives from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Centre for Transitional Justice, and the EU are expected to attend the two-day event.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 14, 2013</td>
<td>Human development key to Maghreb progress</td>
<td>Government officials from Tunis, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania expressed their desire for greater cooperation on human development, with priority given to younger generations. All agree that more should be done to improve the scientific and cultural level of Maghreb human resources in order to speed up development.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 15, 2013</td>
<td>Maghreb bankers back financial integration</td>
<td>The economic leg of the Arab Maghreb Union is moving forward following a meeting last week in Nouakchott. Representatives of the IMF, the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank, along with central bank governors and financial experts from Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, discussed ideas at the 5th Arab Maghreb Union congress on economic integration.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Jan. 16, 2013 | Moroccan rape victim speaks after suicide attempt                           | A young Moroccan house maid whose dramatic suicide attempt has revived concerns about violence towards women and child workers spoke to representatives from the National Institution for Solidarity with Women in Distress on Tuesday (January 15th), AFP reported. The 19-year-old woman jumped from the fourth floor of an
apartment building in Casablanca. A young man was killed while catching her as she fell. The incident was filmed by a neighbor and posted on the Internet.

### Magharebia

**Morocco, EU enhance political dialogue**

Jan. 17, 2013

The seventh session for enhanced political dialogue between Morocco and the European Union opened Wednesday (January 16th) in Rabat, MAP reported. The meeting will reportedly focus on developments in Africa and the Middle East.

### The View from Fez

**Morocco introduces new bank note**

Jan. 13, 2013

Morocco has issued a new banknote of MAD 25 ($ 2.94). Chadwick Wasilenkoff, President and Chief Executive Officer of Fortress Paper, commented: "I would like to congratulate the Bank al Maghrib on the launch of their new 25 Dirham banknote and being the first in the world to produce and launch these high security Durasafe banknotes." The back of the note carries a print vignette commemorating 25 years of banknote printing at the Moroccan State Printing Works.

**High Atlas Rescue Mission**

Jan. 14, 2013

Moroccans have rallied to support villagers in the High Atlas Mountains, who are struggling to survive in the face of cold winter temperatures. Several tons of food and hundreds of mattresses and blankets were distributed this weekend to inhabitants of remote mountain villages.

**Jetairfly Teases With Promises of New Flights to Morocco**

Jan. 14, 2013

Belgian airline, Jetairfly, has announced that it will be adding new flights to Moroccan destinations - at least for the summer season - but has not disclosed the intended routes.

**Ryanair bases in Morocco confirmed**

Ryanair is creating its first non-European bases in Fez and Marrakech, the company confirms. Arrangements will begin in April.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Article Details</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jadaliyya</td>
<td>Penser le changement de l'éducation au Maroc : Interview de Nabil Belkabir, membre de l'UECSE</td>
<td>This article is an interview with a member of the Union of Students for Changing the Educational System (UECSE), a newly formed group of students protesting the Moroccan educational system. According to Belkabir, the Moroccan educational system is &quot;rotten&quot;, and is imperiled as the country continues to move towards privatization of education. He particularly criticizes Arabization policies as a failure of the educational system. According to him, the goal of the movement is to organize students and formulate and implement ideas for overhauling the educational system. <em>Translated from French to English</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadaliyya</td>
<td>A New Revolt in Morocco?: An Interview with Mohammed El Marouani</td>
<td>Mohamed El Marouani is the author of Abdessalam Yassine's funeral oration, who died on 13 December 2012. Sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for &quot;conspiring against state security,&quot; El Marouani was released during the wake of the February 20 Movement. He is the founder of the Al Umma, which he hopes to transform into a political party.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prensa Latina</td>
<td>Military Alert in Morocco Facing Events in Mali</td>
<td>The Moroccan security forces are on high alert amid fears that the actions of Islamic groups in Northern Mali, now attacked by French soldiers, might extend to Moroccan territory.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>Morocco prepares to grasp nettle of subsidy reform</td>
<td>Morocco's government is preparing to launch its biggest economic policy change in years: reform of the system of food and energy subsidies which it uses to keep down the living costs of millions of people. The reforms are needed to prevent heavy government borrowing from destabilizing</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abdesslam El Bouraini, the president of the National Order of Religious Notaries argues: “The median age for marriage increases more and more, while women can’t find husbands. So why don’t we modify the polygamy law to allow men to marry several women?”

SMEs, entrepreneurship and other youth employment strategies will enhance economic development in Morocco, a government body says.

Morocco is preparing a tender for the second phase of the Quarzazate solar plant after awarding the contract for the 160 megawatt first phase late last year. The new tender will call for a further 300MW worth of solar power capacity. Initial bids will be solicited next month, and the tender will be floated soon after.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Arabiya</td>
<td>Morocco’s only female minister says wearing hijab made her a media target</td>
<td>Morocco’s only female minister claimed that the media has targeted her because she dons the Islamic headscarf, commonly known as the hijab. Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development, Bassima Hakkouei, said since taking office in January 3, 2012, the media attempted to mar her credibility by reporting false news and information about her, such as that her husband has a second wife.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Occidental</td>
<td>The Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State El-Aaiun, Western Sahara</td>
<td>On Tuesday, January 15, 2013, the second day of the international meeting on transitional justice organized by the National Council for Human Rights, Moroccan security forces prevented eighteen Saharawi human rights activists from entering the conference room at the Royal Academy. The Saharawi activists could participate on the first day of the meeting without an invitation. However, “it was during the second day that the Saharawi activists could speak and report the reality of extreme poverty in which their own people are living under the Moroccan occupation and clarify that transitional justice is still far from being in place in Western Sahara” states the author.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Light &amp; Power</td>
<td>Masdar and Morocco inks agreement</td>
<td>Masdar (Abu Dhabi’s renewable energy company) announced the signing of a framework agreement with the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment of the Kingdom of Morocco that will enable them to have thorough cooperation in the field of renewable energy.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Editor Charged With Defamation in Morocco</td>
<td>Youssef Jajili, editor-in-chief of the investigative weekly Alaan Magazine, was charged with defamation on Monday in Ain Al-Saba court in Casablanca in connection with a June 22 article about Abdelkader Amara, minister of manufacture and trade in the current Islamic government, news reports said.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Sahel Upheaval Worries Morocco</td>
<td>This article addresses concern felt by Moroccan government officials, Moroccan officials of non-governmental organizations, and Moroccan citizens regarding instability of the Sahel region. Wide-ranging problems include recruitment of young Moroccans to terrorist networks, problems with</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article Title</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 23, 2013</td>
<td>intelligence sharing, and problems relating to regional integration.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 25, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco Looks to Revive Tourism Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 22, 2013</td>
<td>How 3 Women Entrepreneurs are Creating Opportunities in Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 18, 2013</td>
<td>North Africa: Morocco Terror Risk Spikes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 20, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco dismantles terror recruitment cell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 23, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco to host security meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Morocco is hoping 2013 will be a year of economic recovery for the tourism sector but experts are cautioning the rebound will not be as easy as once thought. "Tourism in Morocco is crucial to the country's economy, as it represents about 7.1% of the gross domestic product," financial analyst Moussa El Mouritani explained. The analyst told Magharebia that reviving the sector this year would be difficult: "The European market represents over 50% of the tourism in Morocco; however that market is still unstable and the economy is having a hard time getting back to its normal pace and normal progression."

This article is about three women entrepreneurs in the MENA region, one of whom is Moroccan. The Moroccan project focuses on rehabilitating educational facilities in depressed areas.

This article discussed efforts by AQIM and MUJWA to recruit Moroccans for jihadist projects in the region.

The Moroccan judicial police and the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance have broken up a terrorist recruitment cell, the fifth such since last fall. The terror cell, which had ties to Al Qaeda, had recruited more than 40 Moroccans since April 2012. The Moroccan government is concerned that this is representative of a “proliferation of terrorist networks.”

More than a year after the election of Morocco's new Chamber of Representatives under the new constitution, views on its performance remain mixed. Areas of concern are absenteeism, favoritism, and obstructionism.

The interior ministers of Morocco, Spain, France and Portugal will meet in Rabat on Friday to discuss regional security. Police training, intelligence sharing and the Mali crisis will reportedly top the agenda of the Morocco talks.

Arif Hassan, a parliamentarian who has been accused of rape, has been acquitted despite the fact that a positive DNA match links him to the...
### Deputy accused of rape

**Jan. 20, 2013**

Civil society organizations have launched a petition against this decision as well as creating a Facebook group inviting Hassan to resign from Parliament.

*Translated from French into English*

### MarketWatch

**Chevron Signs Agreement for Exploration Areas Offshore Morocco: Acreage expands Chevron's footprint offshore Africa**

**Jan. 22, 2013**

Chevron Corporation announced that its subsidiary, Chevron Morocco Exploration Ltd, signed petroleum agreements with Morocco's Office National Des Hydrocarbures Et Des Mines for three offshore areas. "We look forward to participating in exploration activities in Morocco, which provides Chevron an opportunity to advance our growth strategy in frontier basins," said George Kirkland, vice chairman, Chevron Corporation. Once awarded, Chevron will acquire seismic data and conduct studies in deepwater areas known as Cap Rhir Deep, Cap Cantin Deep and Cap Walidia Deep located between 60 and 120 miles (100 to 200 kilometers) west and northwest of Agadir, Morocco. The areas encompass approximately 11,300 square miles (29,200 square kilometers) with average water depths ranging from between 330 feet to 14,700 feet (100 meters to 4500 meters).

### The View from Fez

**Morocco May Scrap Disputed Rape Law: Justice Ministry**

**Jan. 22, 2013**

The only female minister, Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development, Bassima Hakkaoui, has been vocal in her call to change the law. "A rapist belongs to jail and not elsewhere," she said. The justice ministry supported a proposal by the parliament to alter article 475 of the penal code, under which the rape of a minor is punishable by several years in prison unless the victim and their aggressor wed. The modification has yet to be formally approved by both houses. The ministry said it was prepared to go even further and suggest harsher punishments for rapists of minors, including up to 30 years in prison rather than the current standard punishment of five years.

### The View from Fez

**Morocco's Tourism Sector - Is 2013 A Recovery Year?**

**Jan. 25, 2013**

The blogger writes, "The economic downturn in Europe and instability in Mali and Algeria are all contributing to the tourism sector's slow recovery in Morocco. While there are some promising developments such as the Ryanair decision to use Marrakech and Fez as bases for their aircraft, there is still a touch of gloom in the tourist industry. Tourism experts say that concentrating on airline services and introducing medical tourism may be the key to a brighter future."

### Reuters

**Morocco GDP growth slows to 2.8 percent in Q4**

**Jan. 23, 2013**

Morocco's economic growth slowed to a “real, seasonally adjusted” 2.8 percent year-on-year in the last quarter of 2012, from 2.9 percent in the third quarter, the country's planning agency said. The economy was hit by a 9.2 percent drop in agricultural production during the past quarter due to drought. However, GDP growth is expected to pick up to about 4.5 percent in the first quarter of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huffington Post</td>
<td>Morocco To Change Law That Allowed Rapists To Avoid Punishment By Marrying Their Victims</td>
<td>Jan. 23, 2013</td>
<td>Nearly a year after Morocco was shocked by the suicide of a 16-year-old girl who was forced to marry her alleged rapist, the government has announced plans to change the penal code to outlaw the traditional practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Scotland</td>
<td>Cairn to drill off coast of Morocco</td>
<td>Jan. 23, 2013</td>
<td>Edinburgh-based Cairn Energy says it will start exploratory drilling off the coast of Morocco this year despite the recent attack on an oil and gas facility in nearby Algeria where six British workers are thought to have died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora Saharaoui</td>
<td>Rassemblement samedi à Paris pour exiger la libération des prisonniers politiques sahraouis</td>
<td>Jan. 23, 2013</td>
<td>A rally will be held in front of the Trocadero in Paris in early February prior to a military court trial of 24 Saharawi political prisoners in Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>In remote Western Sahara, prized phosphate drives controversial investments</td>
<td>Jan. 24, 2013</td>
<td>This article is an overview of the debate about Western Saharan resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuroMoney Magazine</td>
<td>Mena Q4 results: Gulf becomes safer; Morocco and Tunisia resist heightened global risks</td>
<td>Jan. 25, 2013</td>
<td>This article assesses changes in (economic and security related) risk in the MENA region. It concludes that though the Gulf states are safer than the rest of the MENA region, “Tunisia and Morocco, now similarly ranked in 73rd and 74th places respectively, are still less risky than parts of western and eastern Europe, despite the upheavals caused by the Arab Spring and other problems that have caused the ratings agencies to question their creditworthiness.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FYI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Government decides to reduce visits of foreigners to refugee camps and liberated territories due to situation in Mali</td>
<td>The Government of the Saharawi Arab Republic has decided to reduce visits of foreigners to the Saharawi refugee camps and liberated territories “given to the war situation in Mali and its possible negative impact on security and stability in the region,” said Wednesday a press release issued by the Ministry of Cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 23, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdelilah Benkirane: une popularité intacte une année après</td>
<td>It would make sense if Benkirane’s popularity had declined as a result of the economic doldrums gripping Morocco, but public opinion of the prime minister has not suffered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 23, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le &quot;chantage&quot; de Chabat sur Benkirane</td>
<td>Officials within the PJD accuse Hamid Chabat of &quot;blackmail&quot; as well as exerting political pressure to assure his position as mayor of Fez. A member of the PJD also noted that Chabat is putting pressure for the nomination of Ahmed Toufiq Hejira as the new chairman of the House of Councillors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 24, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui veut faire avorter l’expérience de la finance islamique au Maroc ?</td>
<td>Several Islamic banks accuse Moroccan lobbyists of derailing these banks in order to allow conventional banks to keep the monopoly of the credit market in Morocco. Benkirane’s government does not want Islamic banks to be able to work on international norms and has thus implemented certain conditions which make it impossible for these banks to establish themselves. Bank officials believe that &quot;Morocco is missing an historic opportunity to attract capital that is fleeing from the Arab Spring countries, notably Tunisia and Egypt.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 24, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Update Title/ Date** | **Summary**
--- | ---
**Maroc : Le père d’un étudiant décédé des suites d'une agression policière, veut une intervention royale** | After a third year student at the University of Fes died following a “violent” altercation with police, his father, a prominent imam in the region, has demanded that the king intervene to see that “justice will be done.”
Jan. 28, 2013

**Deux ans après le Printemps arabe, l'intégration économique du Maghreb est indispensable** (Par Nizar Baraka, ministre de l'économie et des finances du Royaume du Maroc) | Minister Baraka wrote this piece explaining the underlying issues surrounding the current economic situation and explained how the region can move forward together. He emphasized the importance of stability to attract investment and alleviate the burden on the indigenous populations. He expressed a positive attitude about a “Transmaghreb Growth Pact” which “transcends both individual agendas and neighborhood rivalries” in the hope of creating a common vision and a unifying project: shared prosperity for all and the creation of a trusted economic organization in the “South of the Mediterranean” region.
Jan. 28, 2013

**Pas d’immunité pour les ministres !** | In Article 94 of the new Constitution, members of the government are criminally responsible before the Kingdom’s court for crimes committed during their tenure.
Jan. 28, 2013

**Benkirane à Davos :** | During the Davos summit, Benkirane accused Western countries of undermining the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;l'Occident refuse la démocratie qui porte les islamistes au pouvoir&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benkirane to Davos: “The West refuses democracy that brings Islamists to power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 28, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Le Maroc réduit l’ouverture de sa frontière avec la Mauritanie à quelques heures par jour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco reduces the opening of its border with Mauritania to a few hours per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 28, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;Il est temps que l’UA joue un rôle capital pour la décolonisation de la dernière colonie en Afrique “ (Président Mohamed Abdelaziz)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;It is time that the AU plays a leading role in decolonizing the last colony in Africa” (President Mohamed Abdelaziz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 28, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benkirane au Forum économique de Davos : « Le Maroc est un pays stable »</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benkirane on the world economic forum in Davos: &quot;Morocco is a stable country&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 28, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sahara Occidental : le Conseil des ministres de l’UA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The AU’s council of ministers has unanimously adopted a resolution to conduct a referendum in Western Sahara. They “unanimously adopted a decision by which it requested the Commission of the African Union to take ‘all measures’ to organize a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 29, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 29, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 31, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Investigation. Africans, but not too much...

Jan. 31, 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Respond?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco street vendors to gain rights</td>
<td>Jan. 25, 2013</td>
<td>Trade Minister Abdelkader Amara announced a plan to legalize and regulate long-ignored street vendors. A new organizational framework will be created to enable traders to work legally at specific times in specific areas. The program, which will be tested in Kenitra, will also include training and awareness-raising efforts raised at traders.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>France, Portugal join Moroccan-Spanish police initiative</td>
<td>Jan. 27, 2013</td>
<td>France and Portugal will become part of the Moroccan-Spanish police collaboration, which was established last year. The interior ministers of Morocco, Spain, France and Portugal met in Rabat to discuss regional security. Police training, intelligence sharing and the Mali crisis topped the agenda of the talks.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Global experts tackle Sahel security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Over 150 diplomats, officials and analysts from 67 countries</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jan. 28, 2013  convened in Marrakech on January 25th-26th to explore solutions to Sahel instability. There is an urgent need to prevent the threat of terrorism from spreading across the region, concluded participants in the fourth Marrakech Security Forum, held by the African Federation for Strategic Studies (FAES) and the Moroccan Center for Strategic Studies (CMES).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Moroccan officials discuss security situation</td>
<td>Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane faced tough questions from members of Parliament this week regarding the country's security situation. Parliamentarians warned about the danger of the rise of crime especially in light of the events in Sahel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Monitor</td>
<td>Morocco’s Banned Islamist Party Gets New Leader</td>
<td>Mohamed Abadi has assumed the position at the head of the banned Justice and Charity Association political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Bawaba</td>
<td>Housing shortage in Morocco</td>
<td>The Moroccan government is taking steps to solve the housing problem by building 100,000 units and investing $400 million into the construction and housing industries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
117,000 more units will be built annually. Moroccan social housing projects have attracted high interest from foreign and national investors.

**Marketwire**

*Chaininformation Announces Partnership to Launch Franchise Software in Morocco*

Jan. 28, 2012

Chaininformation, a leading provider of software for retail, franchise and chain businesses, today announced it has entered an agreement with BeOne Consulting, a consulting and training corporation based in Morocco. Launching in Morocco also means that the CCM franchise software suite has been completely translated to French, allowing rapid implementation with French speaking franchise- and retail-chains.

**ArabianBusiness.com**

*Abu Dhabi's TAQA seals $1.4bn Morocco finance deal*

Jan. 29, 2013

Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA), sealed a US$1.4bn deal for financing the expansion of its power plant in Morocco. The financing is the largest in over a decade for an international project in Morocco with Japanese and Korean export credit agencies participating for the first time in Moroccan project finances.

**Afrique Jet**

*MISMA: Morocco pledges 5 Million*

Morocco has pledged five
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Plaza</td>
<td>Cold wave affects tomato development in Morocco</td>
<td>Jan. 29, 2013</td>
<td>The low temperatures registered two weeks ago in Agadir, Morocco, have had an impact on the shipments to European markets. Perpignan (FR) port operators were the first to notice the lower supply volumes, as these fell by over 15%, although now that temperatures are warmer, production is also back to the usual levels. The drop in temperatures was not extreme, but they went as low as 3-4 degrees Celsius (37-39F); temperatures at which tomatoes stop their development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Daily Online</td>
<td>Morocco donates 4 min USD to Syrian refugees</td>
<td>Jan. 30, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco has donated 4 million dollars to help alleviate the suffering of Syrian refugees, official media reported Wednesday. This additional contribution made 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Tribune</strong></td>
<td><em>Westerners warned on travel to Morocco amid terror attacks in region</em></td>
<td>Jan. 31, 2013</td>
<td>The British Foreign Office modified its official country profile on Morocco to say there is a general threat from terrorism and that foreigners could be subject to hostility and possible abduction, anticipated retribution from France's military action in Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POMED</strong></td>
<td><em>Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index 2013</em></td>
<td>Jan. 31, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco has been ranked 136/179 in global standings according to Reporters Without Borders 2013 assessment of freedom of the press. It is toward the lower end of MENA region rankings, with Syria holding the region’s worst rating of 176 and Kuwait the region’s best at 77. The United States was ranked 32nd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Africa Report</strong></td>
<td><em>Morocco capitalised on its democratic transition - Nizar Baraka</em></td>
<td>Jan. 31, 2013</td>
<td>Rabat is looking to Gulf financing and multilateral financiers to help it roll out infrastructure building programs and develop and support a network of small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Baraka explained that Morocco is approaching international capital markets to lift pressure on domestic debt markets and avoid squeezing small companies and the private sector.

**Human Rights Watch**  
**Morocco/Western Sahara: Repression Belies Reform Pledges**  
Jan. 31, 2013

According to HRW’s World Report 2013 Report, “Even as government ministers talked of reform, the courts imprisoned dissidents during 2012 under repressive laws curtailing free speech, and after unfair trials. The police used excessive force against demonstrators, abused the rights of migrants, and advocates of self-determination for Western Sahara faced continuing repression.”

**News 24**  
**Morocco: Protests as 24 Sahrawis tried**  
Feb. 1, 2013

Rival protests were held on Friday Feb. 1 outside a military tribunal in the Moroccan capital where 24 Sahrawis accused of killing members of the security forces in the Western Sahara in 2010 are being tried.
FYI – Nice mention today in Jennifer Rubin’s open letter to Secretary of State Kerry.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/02/05/an-open-letter-to-secretary-of-state-john-kerry/

The Washington Post

February 5, 2013

An open letter to Secretary of State John Kerry

By Jennifer Rubin

Dear Secretary of State Kerry:

Those in favor of a robust U.S. presence in the world are dismayed, to put it mildly, about the president’s choice for secretary of defense. Although foreign policy hawks have had their differences with you in the past, to be blunt, you are the best hope for maintaining the United States as that indispensable nation and the world’s only superpower. Because many errors were not made on your watch, you have the unique opportunity to clean the slate, put mistakes behind you and chart a more responsible and successful foreign policy.

Others may scoff, but Republicans are rooting for you to succeed and to do so in ways that further US interests around the globe.

For starters, you can repair the U.S.-Israel relationship. A good place to start would be by denouncing a truly vile study by the Council of Religious Institutions in the Holy Land, funded by a grant for the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, that equates Palestinian and Israeli textbooks. As this report explains: [T]he study finds that, while neither Israel nor the Palestinians are guilty of “dehumanizing and demonizing characterizations of the other,” each side presents “the other as a violent enemy bent on destroying or dominating the self-community ...” One example of the latter is that Israeli textbooks depict Palestinians “negatively” by linking them to the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. (How this particular piece of history could be portrayed otherwise without rewriting it is beyond me.) It is no wonder, then, that the Israeli Education Ministry decided not to cooperate in the study at its outset and now denounces its outcome.

In addition it would be wise to focus on the Palestinian Authority’s “unity government” with Hamas, making clear that
the partnership cannot continue and/or it must explicitly accept the Quartet principles for any progress to be made on the “peace process.” Speaking of which it would be productive for you to meet with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and to reemphasize the importance of progress on the ground and improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians.

Moving to North Africa, it is obvious the first term appointees messed up, ignored threats and let the area descend into chaos. You should make every effort to reverse that error. Building on the new strategic relationship with Morocco, aiding the French in Mali and providing ample assistance to Libya to build its security apparatus and civil society are essential. Why not, like the Marshall Plan for Europe, the Kerry Plan for North Africa?

Next is Russia. I see you have already dumped “reset” and for that you deserve praise. However, it would be helpful for you to continue to raise the cases of imprisoned dissidents, meet with democracy advocates and limit trade and economic partnerships with Russia so long as the dictatorship of Vladimir Putin persists.

Now we come to Syria, which is a sore subject with you, I know. But you can help repair your legacy (which includes all that unseemly ingratiating of Bashar al-Assad) for pushing for more involvement in aid and support for the rebels and urging the administration to set up humanitarian safe zones. Hillary Clinton has a Syria debacle on her record; you can have an end to a bloody civil war and a successful post-war Syria.

And then there is Iran. You were left, I know, with a sanctions policy that is not having the intended effect. The Iranian nuclear program is moving swiftly ahead. There is no way you want the first line of your bio to read: “As secretary of state, Kerry allowed Iran to get the nuclear bomb.” It is essential to remain firm on our bargaining position on abandoning nuclear enrichment (in fact why are we allowing enrichment up to 20 percent?) and to communicate seriously about a military option.

In some sense your past views and actions make your firm stances even more credible and important to a second term course correction. Coming from you, toughness on Iran, Russia and Syria will certainly get the world’s attention.

Best of luck, Mr. Secretary. You will need it.
An open letter to Secretary of State John Kerry

By Jennifer Rubin

Secretary of State John Kerry
(Melinda Mara/The Washington Post)

Dear Secretary of State Kerry:

Those in favor of a robust U.S. presence in the world are dismayed, to put it mildly, about the president’s choice for secretary of defense. Although foreign policy hawks have had their differences with you in the past, to be blunt, you are the best hope for maintaining the United States as that indispensable nation and the world’s only superpower. Because many errors were not made on your watch, you have the unique opportunity to clean the slate, put mistakes behind you and chart a more responsible and successful foreign policy.

Others may scoff, but Republicans are rooting for you to succeed and to do so in ways that further US interests around the globe.

For starters, you can repair the U.S.-Israel relationship. A good place to start would be by denouncing a truly vile study by the Council of Religious Institutions in the Holy Land, funded by a grant for the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, that equates Palestinian and Israeli textbooks. As this report explains: [T]he study finds that, while neither Israel nor the Palestinians are guilty of “dehumanizing and demonizing characterizations of the other,” each side presents “the other as a violent enemy bent on destroying or dominating the self-community ...” One example of the latter is that Israeli textbooks depict Palestinians “negatively” by linking them to the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. (How this particular piece of history could be portrayed otherwise without rewriting it is beyond me.) It is no wonder, then, that the Israeli Education Ministry decided not to cooperate in the study at its outset and now denounces its outcome.

In addition it would be wise to focus on the Palestinian Authority’s “unity government” with Hamas, making clear that the partnership cannot continue and/or it must explicitly accept the Quartet principles for any progress to be made on the “peace process.” Speaking of which it would be productive for you to meet with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and to reemphasize the importance of progress on the ground and improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians.

Moving to North Africa, it is obvious the first term appointees messed up, ignored threats and let the area descend into chaos. You should make every effort to reverse that error. Building on the new strategic relationship with Morocco, aiding the French in Mali and providing ample assistance to Libya to build its security apparatus and civil society are essential. Why not, like the Marshall Plan for Europe, the Kerry Plan for North Africa?

Next is Russia. I see you have already dumped “reset” and for that you deserve praise. However, it would be helpful for you to continue to raise the cases of imprisoned dissidents, meet with democracy advocates and limit trade and economic partnerships with Russia so long as the dictatorship of Vladimir Putin persists.

Now we come to Syria, which is a sore subject with you, I know. But you can help repair your legacy (which includes all that unseemly ingratiating of Bashar al-Assad) for pushing for more involvement in aid and support for the rebels and urging the administration to set up humanitarian safe zones. Hillary Clinton has a Syria debacle on her record; you can have an end to a bloody civil war and a successful post-war Syria.

And then there is Iran. You were left, I know, with a sanctions policy that is not having the intended effect. The Iranian nuclear program is moving swiftly ahead. There is no way you want the first line of your bio to read: “As secretary of state, Kerry allowed Iran to get the nuclear bomb.” It is essential to remain firm on our bargaining position on abandoning nuclear enrichment (in fact why are we allowing enrichment up to 20 percent?) and to communicate seriously about a military option.

In some sense your past views and actions make your firm stances even more credible and important to a second term course correction. Coming from you, toughness on Iran, Russia and Syria will certainly get the world’s attention.

Best of luck, Mr. Secretary. You will need it.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments?</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td>Morocco military trial of Sahrawi civilians flawed from the outset, Feb. 1, 2013</td>
<td>The trial of 24 Sahrawi civilians before a military court in Morocco is flawed from the outset, Amnesty International said today, as it called for the defendants to be tried in a civilian court and for an investigation into their torture allegations.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Arabiya</td>
<td>Gulf states hand Morocco first chunk of $2.5 bln aid package, Feb. 2, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco has received the first part of a $2.5 billion aid package promised by wealthy Gulf Arab states, a Moroccan official said on Friday. The pledge is designed to cement ties between Arab monarchies in the wake of regional uprisings.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahoo! Finance</td>
<td>Morocco's ruling Islamists target risky reforms, Feb. 3, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco’s ruling Islamists are pushing ahead with critical reforms of government subsidy programs and pension programs. The current economy is characterized by “sharp inflation and deteriorating public finances”, according to this Yahoo News report.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: SADR Government ‘Ready’ to Cooperate With AU to Conduct Self-Determination Referendum in Western Sahara, Feb. 3, 2013</td>
<td>The Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, welcomed the decision to designate the African Union Commission to take all measures for the holding of a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. In a press conference at the SADR embassy in Algiers, Mr. Ould Salek described the decision as the &quot;historic and important event&quot;, noting that such decision is an indication to the commitment by the United Nations and African Union to conduct a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: President of Republic Calls On AU Commissioner to Stop Moroccan Decision to Bring the Gdeim Izik</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Polisario Front, Mohamed Abdelaziz, has called on Chairperson of the African Union to intervene against the decision to bring 24 Saharawi political prisoners before a Moroccan military tribunal.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco broadens youth services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Africa</strong></td>
<td>West Africa: HM The King - Morocco Warned the International Community, Years Ago, of the Perils Looming Over the Sahel and Sahara Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco adjourns Gdaim Izik trial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Jailed Moroccan rapper launches hunger strike</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco: HM The King - We All Have to Support Current Efforts to Achieve Palestinian Reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### All Africa

**West Africa: HM The King - Morocco Warned the International Community, Years Ago, of the Perils Looming Over the Sahel and Sahara Region**

Feb. 7, 2013

In a speech to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, King Mohammed VI said Morocco had warned of instability in the Sahel.

### Magharebia

**Morocco broadens youth services**

Feb. 3, 2013

Young Moroccans will soon get easier access to a number of services, from employment to transportation, healthcare and cultural opportunities. A new special "youth card" is part of a global approach aimed at the advancement of young people through a number of initiatives, Youth and Sports Minister Mohamed Ouzzine told Parliament on January 14th. "This gives young people what they've been asking for. It sends out a strong signal that we're thinking about young people who are looking for practical measures which will have a positive effect on their everyday lives," the minister said.

**Morocco adjourns Gdaim Izik trial**

Feb. 3, 2013

The military trial of 24 Sahrawis accused of killing members of the Moroccan security forces in Western Sahara opened on Friday (February 1st) and was adjourned until February 8th, AFP reported.

**Jailed Moroccan rapper launches hunger strike**

Feb. 5, 2013

On Feb. 4 Mouad Belghouat, a 24 year old rapper and member of Morocco's youth activist group M20F, began a hunger strike in Oukacha prison, where he was sentenced to serve a one year term. Belghouat, known as "El-Haqed", was jailed last May in connection with the posting of a YouTube video set to his song "Kilab al-Dawla" (Dogs of the State). He has denied any connection to the video.

**Morocco: HM The King - We All Have to Support Current Efforts to Achieve Palestinian Reconciliation**

Feb. 6, 2013

Commending the UN General Assembly's decision to grant Palestine non-member observer State status, HM the King recalled, in the speech read out by head of the government, Abélah Benkirane, that this is an "achievement we owe to His Excellency President Mahmoud Abbas's unrelenting efforts and to the Palestinian people's brave struggle to set up their independent, unified and fully viable state, on the basis of the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco: Local Vocational Training Falls Short, Report Says</td>
<td>A new report from Morocco's audit court criticized the kingdom's job training programs for failing to find work for graduates. Morocco’s Office for Vocational Training and Work Promotion (OFPPT) oversees such programs, but now faces questions from the audit court for failing to keep track of how students are doing on the job market post-graduation.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco: Nation to Upgrade Infrastructure</td>
<td>Morocco signed a 2.5 billion dirham (223 million euro) loan deal with the Islamic Development Bank, MAP reported on Wednesday (February 6th). The funds will be used for the construction of the 170 MW M'dez El Menzel hydro power plant. The loan will also help fund drinking water supplies in eight provinces and upgrade rural road networks.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Cast</td>
<td>Tangiers Petroleum reveals oil potential at Trident prospect in Morocco</td>
<td>Tangiers Petroleum on Monday said seismic data confirmed its Trident prospect in offshore Morocco contained an estimated 750m barrels of recoverable oil.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>IMF gives thumbs up to Morocco's economic strategy</td>
<td>IMF completed the first assessment of Morocco's economic program under a two-year precautionary credit line, indicating the country had met all the performance criteria of its $6.2 billion loan. Nemat Shafik, the IMF's deputy managing director, said the Moroccan authorities' economic strategy was &quot;built appropriately on fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and prudent monetary and financial policies.&quot; The IMF urged the government to move forward with reforms of its subsidy and pension system.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>AP Interview: Morocco Islamists Warn of Unrest</td>
<td>In an interview with the Associated Press, Fathallah Arsalane, political leader of Al Adl wal Ihsan, or the Justice and Charity movement, warned that Morocco is at serious risk of a popular revolt if the state doesn't recognize the demands of the Arab Spring and implement real democratic reforms. &quot;Things have regressed to the point before the Arab Spring and today there is a risk of serious popular revolt outside of any political structure,&quot; he said at his home in Rabat. &quot;We can't predict when the social situation will explode but what is certain is that all the ingredients already exist.&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamazgha</td>
<td>Violence policière à Agadir</td>
<td>Moroccan police violently broke apart a pro-Amazigh rally in Agadir. Dozens of people were allegedly arrested and Amazigh flags were confiscated. The article describes the situation in Agadir as “unprecedented repression.”</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zawya</td>
<td>Spectrami expands its wings and sets up a new base in Morocco</td>
<td>Spectrami, the leading value added distributor in the MENA region, today announced the opening of its new office in Morocco as part of its expansion strategy in the region. The new office is based in Casablanca and will serve the fast growing market for technology products and solutions in North Africa.</td>
<td>Feb. 6, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNBC</td>
<td>Why Morocco Holds Mixed Fortunes for Investors</td>
<td>Slim Feriani, CEO at Advance Emerging Capital, asserts that “the jury is still out as to whether Morocco can remain fully insulated from what's going on in neighboring countries and more recently Mali, which has increased the political and social risk of all of North Africa”. For 2013, the IMF projects stronger economic growth of 5.5 percent, higher than any other country in the MENA region, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia.</td>
<td>Feb. 6, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait News Agency</td>
<td>Morocco strongly condemns assassination of Belaid</td>
<td>Morocco strongly condemned the assassination of Tunisian opposition politician and leader of the Unified Democratic Nationalist party, Chokri Belaid, branding the deadly attack on the politician as a &quot;terrorist and dangerous&quot; act. Morocco renewed its rejection of violence and political assassination from any source and affirmed its solidarity with the bereaved and the people of Tunisia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in Morocco said in a statement, issued late on Wednesday.</td>
<td>Feb. 7, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Power Monthly</td>
<td>GDF goes ahead with 300MW Morocco project</td>
<td>French energy giant Gaz De France Suez and Moroccan conglomerate Nareva Holding have broken ground on their jointly owned 300MW project at Tarfaya, on the country's southern Atlantic coast.</td>
<td>Feb. 8, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg Free Press</td>
<td>Bombardier makes way for CSeries; shifts some production to Morocco</td>
<td>Bombardier Aerospace is making room for production of the CSeries airliner by beginning to transfer component work on its regional jets to a temporary plant in Morocco. Bombardier employment in Morocco is expected to reach about 100 by year-end and ramp up to 850 in eight years.</td>
<td>Feb. 8, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan News Board</td>
<td>U.S.- Morocco Joint Military Exercises Expand</td>
<td>Exercise “African Lion”, traditionally an annual training exercise between the US and Morocco, will include 14 partner nations from Europe and Africa.</td>
<td>Feb. 8, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2013 9:54 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: FW: Twitter Monitoring February Week 1

FYI

Subject: Twitter Monitoring February Week 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Update Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Le Roi Mohammed VI serait le 1er chef d'Etat maghrébin à visiter la Tunisie révolutionnaire</strong></td>
<td>King Mohammed VI will be the first North African leader to visit Tunisia since the Jasmine Revolution. The interim president of Tunisia, Mohamed Moncef Marzouki, has family in Morocco. They are expected to discuss further development of the Arab Maghreb Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feb. 5, 2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Le Qatar conditionnerait son aide financière au Maroc par son achat de Maroc Telecom</strong></td>
<td>The kingdom of Qatar is conditioning financial aid to Morocco on the basis of being allowed to purchase a majority share of Maroc Telecom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feb. 5, 2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanger : Les ouvrières de Zara et Mango payées 11,7</strong></td>
<td>Moroccan workers who create clothes for global fashion powerhouses Zara and Mango make slightly less than 12 dirhams an hour, according to a study conducted by Isidor Boix, secretary of a Spanish syndicate of labor rights and practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feb. 5, 2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>dirhams de l'heure</strong></td>
<td>Tangiers: Factory workers at Zara and Mango paid 11.7 dirhams per hour. Feb. 5, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maroc : Le crédit du FMI maintenu en échange de la réforme de la caisse de compensation</strong></td>
<td>Though Morocco has met the IMF loan requirements, the body insists that Morocco needs to focus on reforming the compensation fund and the pension system. While the reform of the public pension system has not been announced specifically, Abdelilah Benkirane has admitted: “Our pension system is in danger. Nobody wants our country to suffer the same fate as Greece.” Feb. 5, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amrani continue l'opération de séduction des britanniques...</strong></td>
<td>Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Youssef Amrani was in talks Wednesday in Rabat with the president of the Moroccan-British Parliamentary Friendship Group, Ian Liddell-Grainger. The two discussed opportunities for growth in Moroccan-British economic cooperation and the security situation in the Sahel. Feb. 6, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manifestation à Tanger contre la projection d'un film sur les juifs</strong></td>
<td>On Tuesday nearly 200 people, largely young Islamists, protested against the screening of a film about Jews in the National Film Festival. The film, titled &quot;Tinghir-Jérusalem, les échos du Mellah&quot; and directed by French-Moroccan director Kamal Hachkar, is about Jews from the small Amazigh town of Tinghir and their immigration to Israel in the 1950's and '60's. The protesters chanted, “No to normalization with Israel! No to Zionism!” Hachkar responded that the film was in no way pro-Zionist. The Minister of Communication, Mustapha Khalfi, took no position on the film.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 6, 2013</td>
<td>A new report released by the Open Society Justice Initiative has fingered Morocco as being one of the 54 countries who cooperated with the CIA in its “enhanced interrogation” program. According to the report, Morocco gave the US access to prison facilities and handed over prisoners that the US suspected of having links to Al-Qaeda. The report further alleges that several detainees were tortured in Moroccan facilities during the length of the enhanced interrogation program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 6, 2013</td>
<td>Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tieman Coulibaly, confirmed the growing presence of Polisario fighters in northern Mali: “there were only 500 jihadis, nowadays, they are between 5,500 and 7,000 men”. Mr. Coulibaly thanked Morocco for being the first country to send humanitarian aid as well as providing diplomatic and military cooperation. He stresses that &quot;Morocco has always supported and continues to support the Mali and its territorial integrity. We rely heavily on the support and cooperation with Morocco to overcome the terrorist threat&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 6, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco has received 580 million euros in aid from the EU between 2011-2013, making it the number one recipient of European aid. The aid money is meant to help economic and social development, environmental protection initiatives, and institutional support (specifically regarding human rights and the justice system).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Sunday, February 17, 2013 11:17 AM
To: Rachad Bouhlal <rachad.bouhlal@gmail.com>
Subject: I am home. can you call me when its convenient for you please

THanks Ed

Sent from my iPad
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Update Title/ Date</strong></th>
<th><strong>Summary</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pourquoi Vivendi veut vendre Maroc Telecom?</strong>&lt;br&gt;Feb. 11, 2013</td>
<td>The article explores possible motives for selling the controlling share of Maroc Telecom. Vivendi expects the Moroccan market to become saturated and would like to sell its share while it is still profitable. Apparently, French President Francois Hollande has requested the sale be postponed until after the conclusion of French military deployment in Mali, so France can maintain the controlling share of Vivendi subsidiaries in Mali and other African countries. Akhbar Al Yaoum has reported that the Elysee Palace is opposed to a potential sale to Qatari telecom giant Qtel, due to intelligence reports indicating Qatar has formed ties to armed militants in Northern Mali, and in light of Qatar's refusal to participate in French air raids in Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Le nouveau regard de l'UE sur le Printemps arabe</strong>&lt;br&gt;Feb. 11, 2013</td>
<td>In light of the Arab Spring unrest, the EU has proposed a new strategy in its relations with its neighbors south of the Mediterranean. The commission has proposed a &quot;partnership for democracy and a shared prosperity with the south of the Mediterranean.&quot; This signifies the EU's dedication to supporting the nascent democratization efforts in the region, both politically and financially.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maroc : Pas de retrait de l'Istiqlal du gouvernement Benkirane</strong>&lt;br&gt;Feb. 11, 2013</td>
<td>Hamid Chabat, leader of the Istiqlal party, has definitively ruled out the possibility of leaving the government, despite repeatedly butting heads with his PJD counterpart, Abdelillah Benkirane. The latest eruption between Istiqlal and PJD is due to disagreement over proposed legislation to reform entitlements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>La stabilité du Maroc, une exception en Afrique du Nord (presse)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Feb. 11, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco is seen as an &quot;island of stability&quot; in North Africa, given its relatively low level of unrest during the Arab Spring. This stability has entices foreign companies to invest in Morocco, and the IMF has predicted that the country could see a GDP growth of 5.5% this year, though some sources say that this is too optimistic. The country is rapidly improving its competitiveness in international markets, but it still has to deal with a debt crisis and high youth unemployment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Stability, an exception in North Africa (press)

**Feb. 11, 2013**

If the state were to remove the compensation fund and liberalize the price of raw materials, the cost of electricity will double while gas will more than triple. Experts believe, however, that the reform of the compensation fund is a targeted campaign led by the PJD to gain more support from the poorer rural areas of the country. Reforming the compensation fund should allow the government to gradually grant direct subsidies gradually to 3.5 million poor people. It may, however, increase poverty affecting millions of Moroccans.

### Le réforme de la Caisse de compensation, manoeuvre électorale du PJD ?

Reforming the compensation fund, an electoral maneuver of the PJD?

**Feb. 12, 2013**

26 Sahrawi organizations have released a statement saying ""We, the signatories are against Total's presence in Western Sahara. We urge the company to stop all research and leave immediately." Total has signed an agreement with the Moroccan government for a 100,926,70 km² block of land, calling it the Anzarane Offshore.

### 26 organisations sahraouies demandent à Total de quitter leur pays

26 Sahrawi organizations demand Total to leave their country

**Feb. 12, 2013**

The Ministry of Health announced on Sunday that twelve cases of influenza A (H1N1) were reported amongst fishermen in Dakhla, with one death. A medical team was deployed to the fishing boat docking in the port of Dakhla to assess the situation and make the recommended therapeutic and prophylactic measures. As a precautionary measure, the Ministry of Health has activated its alert system.

### Numbers of tourists visiting Ouarzazate in November 2012 increased by 42% compared with figures collected in November 2011.

**Ouarzazate : Les arrivées touristiques en hausse de 42% en novembre**

Numbers of tourists visiting Ouarzazate in November 2012 increased by 42% compared with figures collected in November 2011.
The development of port infrastructure in Morocco is troubling to Algeria, which could soon depend entirely on Moroccan ports. Algeria’s 14 ports date back to colonial times and cannot accommodate large haul vessels. Additionally, the transport and processing of shipments costs 40% more in Algeria than in Morocco, according to an Algerian shipping expert.
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

February 8, 2013

**Executive Summary**

**Political Trends**

- Although there have been suggestions that DRS commander Tewfik may no longer be as pivotal a player as he once was, the DRS is understood to have been put in command of operations at the In Amenas siege and to have responsibility for channelling critical information to President Bouteflika.

- The press has been strongly supportive of the army’s intervention at In Amenas, but has implicitly questioned the possible shortcomings of the DRS in preventing the terrorist take-over of the gas facility, which may be damaging for Tewfik.

- Rumours that Bouteflika was in Geneva for medical treatment during the In Amenas crisis appear to be untrue. The President is reported to be in good health and the main arbiter in the forthcoming presidential contest.

- Although the possibility of Bouteflika himself running for a 4th term of office has still not been ruled out, PM Abdelmalek Sellal is now being mentioned as a possible successor.

**Foreign Relations**

- The In Amenas attack was launched in retaliation for Algeria’s assistance to the French war effort in northern Mali, which includes efforts to cut off AQMI’s access to fuel as well as authorising French air force overflights.

- The In Amenas attack and the earlier Islamist offensive in Mali initially put the Algerian regime on the back foot, stoking its fears of losing all control over the Sahara, exposing its collaboration with France and putting its relations with countries whose nationals were among the hostages under strain.

- Algiers appears however to be bouncing back, earning respect for its tough response, securing a security cooperation agreement with the UK and pressing for transfers of sensitive military and security technology.

**Security**

- The In Amenas crisis dominated reporting of security news in January, possibly crowding out other incidents.

- In Amenas was the first ever direct attack on oil and gas production facilities in Algeria since the outbreak of violence in 1992.

- The opportunistic attempt by AQMI and its allies to build an ‘Islamic emirate’ in northern Mali brought them into direct conflict with France, transforming AQMI’s strategic orientation and recasting Mokhtar Belmokhtar as the new face of the global jihad.

- The attacks of AQMI’s Saharan branch on Algerian interests are subsidiary to its struggle with France, but it remains to be seen whether or not the national leadership in the north of the country will adopt this orientation.
Political Trends

The surprise attack on the Sonatrach-BP-Statoil gas facility at In Amenas in the southern Algerian province of Illizi on January 16 is a unique and unprecedented event: not only does it represent the first direct attack on hydrocarbons production facilities in Algeria since the islamist insurgency broke out 21 years ago, it is without doubt the worst terrorist incident at an oil or gas installation anywhere in the world in the history of the industry. With Minister of Communication Mohand Oussaid Belaid now casting it as “Algeria's 9/11”, it is worth considering how the In Amenas siege might affect relations and the balance of power between the key members of the country's leadership – President Bouteflika, intelligence chief Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène and the heads of the army – all the more so in light of earlier claims that Tewfik had been unsettled to see Western powers dealing primarily with CoS Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd-Saleh rather than him when discussing how to handle crisis in northern Mali,[1] to which of course the In Amenas attack is linked.

The public blame game following the In Amenas attack has naturally been more muted than it might have been in a fully functioning democracy, with the result that indicators as to how the incident is affecting relations at the top are partial, fragmentary, and to some extent contradictory. On the one hand, while local and international news media (and the Algerian Defence Ministry's own website) have tended to highlight the role of the army's special forces in putting an end to the In Amenas hostage crisis,[2], a source close to the commanders of the DRS intelligence and security service tells us that President Bouteflika from the outset entrusted control over operations to the DRS, which kept the President informed throughout. This would seem to imply that, behind the scenes, Tewfik has the upper hand over the military chiefs, while at the same time holding onto an important card in his relationship with Bouteflika insofar as he is entrusted with the task of channelling critical information to the President.

On the other hand, the Algerian press has in general been very supportive of the army's role, with most media strongly defending both the refusal to negotiate with the armed group that had seized control of the site and the uncompromising military assault that put an end to the siege, and to the extent that there has been any questioning in the Algerian media, it has tended largely to focus on how the attack could have happened in the first place – the unspoken charge being that In Amenas could only have occurred because of a catastrophic intelligence failure. In this vein, leading Arabic-language daily Al-Khabar (Jan. 21) claims that President Bouteflika had ordered an investigation into how AQMI was able to take over the In Amenas facility. This of course lays the blame implicitly at the door of the DRS. Meanwhile, a source at the Presidency has been hinting that Tewfik is no longer the pivotal figure he once was. If this is so, it may be the result of a longer-term decline in power rather than a direct consequence of the In Amenas episode, but insinuations about his services' lack of efficacy in defending the country's vital infrastructures against terrorist attack will do nothing to enhance Tewfik's standing.

At the same time, there has been open criticism, especially in the Algerian French-language and online media, of Bouteflika's role, or rather his absence, during and after the In Amenas crisis. Having received Malian Prime Minister Diango Cissoko on Jan. 14, two days before AQMI's attack on the In Amenas facility, Bouteflika disappeared from public view for a full fortnight, reappearing on Jan. 28 to welcome the Spanish Defence
Minister. Bouteflika’s failure to address the nation at the height or in the immediate aftermath of the crisis was seen as a sign of “contempt” for the people by some press commentators, while others suggested that the President had not been seen or heard because he was in Geneva for medical treatment. This latter explanation – a recurrent rumour – appears to be untrue: a senior civil servant at the Presidency tells us that Bouteflika is “in good health” and had not of late been noticeably absent from the El Mouradia presidential palace. Indeed, however much criticism might be piled upon him beyond the walls of El Mouradia, within the inner workings of the Algerian political system Bouteflika still seems to be in control.

Above all, the President appears to have the upper hand with regard to the upcoming presidential contest – more so, it would seem, than intelligence chief Tewfik, who had previously been held to be the king-maker. One source at the Presidency suggests, almost off-handedly, that the current most likely candidate to take over from Bouteflika in 2014 is Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal – a long-standing and reliable supporter of Bouteflika who is also understood to be close to Tewfik, but who has not hitherto been thought of as having either the ambition or the stature to become President. At the same time, however, the option of Bouteflika himself standing for a fourth successive term of office has still not been definitively ruled out, and it seems unlikely that any firm decision will be possible at least until the dust has settled from In Amenas, and possibly not before there is clearer visibility with regard to the implications for Algeria of the broader conflict in northern Mali.

Foreign Relations

If nothing else, the attack by the 'Masked Men Brigade' of AQMI's Saharan branch on the Tiguentourine gas facility at In Amenas on Jan. 16, planned as much as two months in advance according to the group's chief Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is indicative of the organisation’s acute sense of strategy.

The In Amenas raid must be seen in the context of the ongoing struggle south of the border between AQMI and its allies on the one hand and the French military and what remains of the Malian state on the other. The French intervention was triggered by the surprise offensive on Jan. 10 by the armed Islamist groups in northern Mali against the town of Konna, just south of the unofficial demarcation line between the territory they conquered in early 2012 and the territory still under the control of the central government; Paris has argued that the attack on Konna was a prelude to a swoop on Bamako that would have opened the way to the establishment of an Islamist emirate in the whole of Mali. However, the jihadist groups that had managed with a force of a few thousand men to hold the north of the country for almost a year would have had great difficulty establishing firm control over Bamako (population 2 million) and Mali's other cities, which are largely hostile to them, and it seems likely that AQMI and its allies were aware of this and never had the conquest of Bamako as their real objective. Rather, their surprise southwards push to Konna seems to have been designed to provoke precisely the reaction that it got: the open intervention of the French military. By drawing in the French – rather than obediently waiting for Paris, working through the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, put together a West African proxy force – the jihadists would have been
seeking to recast their fight as a confrontation between the defenders of Islam and an invading 'infidel', Western, imperialist army. Neither should the rapid success of the French army's Operation Serval be taken as a sign that AQMI and its allies were taken by surprise, or even that they have been vanquished; rather, in virtually all areas, the jihadist groups appear to have carried out an orderly tactical retreat, deliberately avoiding engaging the advancing French and Malian forces and minimising their losses. Having learned the lessons of Iraq and in particular Afghanistan, their subsequent strategy is likely to be to launch an insurgency, using hit-and-run guerilla tactics, once the occupying force is in place.[7]

The In Amenas operation was an extension of this strategy insofar as it seems to have been intended, like the offensive against Konna, to clarify matters: in striking at an element of Algeria's critical infrastructure, AQMI would have anticipated a very tough response from the Algerian security forces; by targeting a plant that is jointly operated by European oil companies, with large numbers of expat workers present on site – rather than an easier target such as, for example, the network of oil and gas pipelines that criss-cross the Algerian Sahara – it ensured that Algiers would be clearly seen as colluding with “the West”. Plans for the operation were, by Belmokhtar's own account, first hatched some two months in advance – i.e. in the wake of UN Security Council Resolution 2071 calling on member states, regional and international organisations to provide support for efforts to combat AQMI and its allies in northern Mali. For those plans to have been carried through when they were, AQMI would have to have been convinced that Algeria was – contrary to the Algerian government's official position – providing support in one form or another for the French military campaign, since to have launched such an attack on Algeria while it was observing strict neutrality would clearly have been counterproductive. Beyond granting the French air force overflight rights, one key way in which Algeria can discreetly provide assistance to the French war effort in northern Mali is to crack down more effectively on the smuggling of the fuel which is essential to the jihadists' mobility and which mostly comes from Algeria, and it would seem that a commitment to do just that was made at the meeting of the Algerian, Tunisian and Libyan prime ministers in Ghadames, Libya on Jan. 12. Indeed, a senior civil servant at the Algerian Presidency has confirmed to us that Algeria had resolved a few days before the Ghadames border security summit to establish full control over the so-called 'Salvador triangle' – an area straddling the borders of Algeria, Libya and Niger that has long been a crucial passageway for smugglers of all types, and which had taken on special importance for AQMI and its allies in the Sahara for channelling weapons from Libya and, no doubt, fuel from Algeria; the same source indicated that Algiers considers the In Amenas raid to be a form of retaliation for such moves.

Initially, AQMI's offensives – against Konna in Mali, and against the gas facility at In Amenas – put Algiers on the back foot. The fact that it was Ansar Dine – the Tuareg islamist faction with which Algiers had brokered negotiations in the hope of breaking the jihadist front and obviating or at least minimising any armed intervention – that led the attack on Konna came as a shock to Algiers, compromising its entire strategy for dealing with the Mali crisis. Speaking to us a fortnight later, an advisor at the Presidency spoke of the Algerian leadership's alarm that it is losing all vestige of the control it used to have over events across its southern borders, which is increasingly tinted with concern that this may steadily develop into a loss of control over Algeria's own desert south. As the French military intervention got under way, the announcement by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius that air raids on jihadist strongholds in northern Mali had been made possible
by Algiers' decision to grant the French Air Force the right to overfly its territory came as a considerable embarrassment to Bouteflika and the regime as a whole, who were lambasted by critics at home for collaborating with the armed forces of the former colonial power. Finally, the siege of In Amenas and the uncompromising military assault to dislodge the armed islamists and retake the facility before they could blow it up momentarily exposed Algeria's relations with the governments of those countries with significant numbers of nationals on the site – in particular the United Kingdom and Japan – to severe strain.

Any tension with Western countries has dissipated remarkably quickly, however. UK Prime Minister David Cameron jetted in to Algiers on Jan. 30 – the first ever visit to Algeria by a British head of government – with his National Security Advisor Sir Kim Darroch and MI6 chief Sir John Sawers in tow, and proceeded, according to an advisor at the Presidency, to bend over backwards to persuade his hosts to forget his initial “over-reaction” to the Algerian military intervention at In Amenas, blaming it on a lack of information. By the end of the British PM's visit, agreement had been reached on a “strategic security partnership” between the two countries, built around consultations between senior military, security and intelligence advisers co-chaired by Darroch and his Algerian counterpart Kamal Rezzag-Bara. For his part, France's President François Hollande – who had carefully avoided criticising the Algerian response to In Amenas in the heat of the moment – went still further, strenuously defending the Algerian government's fight against terrorism in remarks to the European Parliament on Feb. 5; this has been greeted with immense satisfaction by Algerian media close to the government, which has contrasted Hollande's supportive stance to the disdainful, hands-off attitude shown by his Socialist predecessors towards the Algerian regime at the height of the troubles in the 1990s. Cameron, Hollande and other Western leaders have explicitly recognised the importance of Algeria to any solution to the security problems of the Sahara-Sahel region.

Meanwhile Algiers, although it has been shown to be collaborating to some degree with the West against the jihadists in northern Mali, has stuck to its line of no foreign troops on Algerian soil and no Algerian troops on foreign soil (as restated by PM Sellal during the annual African Union summit in Addis Ababa towards the end of January), and even finds itself in a position to try to extract some positive advantage from the situation, both politically and practically. On the political level, “senior officials” quoted by the New York Times, for example, have been quick to put out the kind of message Algiers wishes to be heard in Washington: that the In Amenas incident is directly connected to last September's attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, and that such damage to Western interests is the direct consequence of the Arab Spring uprisings with which Washington and other Western capitals have expressed sympathy. And in practical terms, the Algerian regime now seems to be attempting to transform the respect, however grudging, that it has won for its uncompromising stance towards the attackers of In Amenas into agreements on arms and security technology transfers: the army is reported to be pressing ahead with plans to acquire American or French-made mine resistant ambush protected-all terrain vehicles, while Bouteflika is believed to have discussed with David Cameron the possible use of satellites in securing Algeria's borders and to have received a pledge from the British PM that he would support security plans for border with Mali which include the acquisition by Algiers of American-made UAVs – although it is not clear whether Cameron will go all the way and lobby for Algiers to be allowed to buy the MQ-9
Reaper killer drones on which it seems to have its heart set.

Security

Falling in the middle of the month and spreading out over several days, the In Amenas siege naturally dominated reporting of security news in January, possibly to the extent of crowding out reporting of other incidents: only seven jihadist attacks and 12 incidents all told were reported in the Algerian media for the entire month (and none at all in the week of Jan. 20-27)[13]. On the other hand, the shock of In Amenas seems to have loosened at least some tongues, with one ex-military source, now in private security in southern Algeria, letting slip that armed clashes on the border with Mali are far more frequent, and damaging, than officially admitted (to the point, the source claimed, that the Algerian military is in urgent need of new field hospitals); this seems to confirm our earlier suspicion (see AMSR #117) that the abrupt decline to close to zero in reports of incidents on the Algeria-Mali border as of June last year was to be attributed to a news blackout rather than an actual decline in the number of incidents.

An unprecedented event in the history of political violence in Algeria, the In Amenas crisis received unprecedented coverage in the international media. To recap the most salient points: early in the morning of Jan. 16, a group of heavily armed jihadists who had crossed the Libyan border around 80km away in three 4WD vehicles, stormed a gas production facility jointly operated by Sonatrach, BP and Statoil at Tinguetourine, located in the desert 40km east of the small town of In Amenas in the wilaya of Illizi. The jihadists overran the facility with relative ease and held hostage 800 workers, including more than 100 expatriates of various nationalities. The hostage takers belonged to AQMI's Katibat al-Mulathamine (Brigade of Masked Men), headed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar[14], and based in northern Mali. In a statement to independent Mauritanian news agency ANI, Katibat al-Mulathamine said the operation was launched “after it became clear that Algeria is taking part in the war against the Muslim people of Azawad, opening its airspace [to French jet fighters] and closing its borders to complete the blockade against them”. According to Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, no more than five of the attackers were Algerian nationals; 11 of them were Tunisians and the rest came from eight other countries, including two Canadian nationals. The Algerian Special Forces rapidly surrounded the facility, and on Jan. 17 launched an assault with helicopter support to retake the living quarters, followed on Jan. 19 by a second assault aimed at retaking the production plant. In all, one Algerian hostage and 39 foreign hostages of various nationalities are reported to have been killed. PM Sellal put the total number of attackers at 32, of whom 29 were killed and three captured, although there have been suggestions that the group was up to 40 strong, some of whom managed to escape.

The In Amenas attack was the first ever direct attack on oil and gas production facilities in Algeria since the outbreak of violence in 1992. Although a number of expatriates working in the oil and gas industry were assassinated in the 1990s[15] and bombings of pipelines in the north of the country – mainly if not exclusively domestic oil and gas pipelines supplying refineries and power stations, as opposed to export pipelines – were commonplace, in the early years of the islamist insurgency it was the deliberate policy of both the AIS and the GIA, the two main armed groups at that time, not to attack the oil and gas production facilities in the deep
south. This was as much a practical question (the Sahara was for a time one of the main routes for gun-running to the armed groups in the north of the country, and it was considered wiser to avoid attracting more attention than was absolutely necessary from the security forces) as a matter of principal (especially in the period up to late 1995, when an islamist victory still seemed a plausible outcome, it was argued that Algeria’s oil and gas was the rightful property of the people and that the industry should be safeguarded so that the coming Islamic state would be able to take it over intact). As the GIA began to fall apart in the mid-90s, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who hails from the southern wilaya of Ghardaia, briefly emerged as the organisation's regional commander or emir for the deep south, before being squeezed out by the GIA's northern leadership as of the summer of 1997 – because of his reluctance to adopt their tactic of mass killings, according to statements he made to a local source who managed to meet and interview him in May 1998. By that time, Belmokhtar had come to specialise mainly in cigarette smuggling and the theft of vehicles from oil companies and government agencies, observing informal rules of engagement that had more to do with Bedouin razzias, or raids, than with the modus operandi of the armed groups in the north. This remained the case even after Belmokhtar joined forces with the Hassan Hattab's GSPC (the split-off from the GIA which was soon to emerge as Algeria's main jihadist group) in 1999, with Belmokhtar keeping a large measure of autonomy and whenever avoiding bloodshed as an unwelcome diversion from the serious business of smuggling. By the mid-2000s, he and his group had for the most part relocated across Algeria's southern borders, and seemed to have established a relatively peaceful modus vivendi with the Algerian security forces.

In 2006, the GSPC's national leadership swore allegiance to Osama Ben Laden and rebranded itself as Al-Qaid in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), adopting Al-Qaida's language of confrontation with the “Jews and Crusaders” in a global jihad as well as its tactic of suicide bombings. However, locked in a life-or-death struggle with the Algerian regime, the organisation's conversion to Al-Qaida's strategy of concentrating on the “far enemy” (i.e. the United States and other Western countries that support both Israel and the oppressive regimes in the Arab and Muslim world) rather than the “near enemy” (i.e. the local regimes themselves) was only partial at best. In mid-2007, AQMI carried out an internal reorganisation which saw the emergence of new leaders (Yahia Djouadi, Abdelhamid Abou Zeid) for the Saharan brigades who appeared to be more in tune with the leadership in the north than Belmokhtar had ever been, and it was after this reorganisation that AQMI units based in northern Mali adopted the tactic of kidnapping European and North American expats, aid workers, diplomats and tourists. Disconnected from the armed struggle against the Algerian regime in Algeria itself, the AQMI's kidnapping gangs in the Sahara thus in a sense began to engage the “far enemy” - although in many cases the political demands and ultimatums put to Western governments for the release of their nationals have in effect been little more than window dressing for the payment of hefty ransoms. It was ostensibly the southern leaders' concentration on kidnapping (and other illegal money-making activities such as drug smuggling) at the expense of active participation in the jihad against the “near enemy” that led some of the group's members to break away and set up MUJAO in mid-2011.

What has really “Al-Qaidised” AQMI's Saharan branch – and transformed Mokhtar Belmokhtar into the new face of global jihad – is a sequence of events that, initially at least, were not of its own making at all. The uprising against the Qaddafi regime in Libya in February 2011 and the ensuing war opened up a vast new treasure trove.
of weaponry; the opening of the prisons in Libya and Tunisia, and later political developments in those countries, led to the establishment of like-minded groups keen to build ties with AQMI; and, crucially, the return of thousands of trained and armed Tuareg fighters from Libya to northern Mali made possible a new Tuareg rebellion in early 2012 that seized hold of the northern half of the country extremely quickly, pushing the Malian state to the brink of collapse. This provided AQMI with the opportunity, which together with MUJAO and the newly created Ansar Dine it seized with alacrity, to hijack the Tuareg revolt and establish an embryonic state in northern Mali. Although reports of volunteers flooding to the infant ‘Islamic emirate’ from across North West Africa appear to be exaggerated, the success of AQMI's daring coup does appear to have attracted a certain number of fighters from Libya, Tunisia and possibly elsewhere, and some acolytes from even further afield (the improvised Sharia court in Gao, for example, is reported to have been staffed by Pakistani judges). Above all, setting up a breakaway state in northern Mali also brought AQMI into direct conflict with a Western power, France.

The raid on In Amenas, as we have argued above[17], must be seen as a function of that conflict – as must the future attacks Belmokhtar has promised in retaliation for the Algerian military's assault against his men at the gas plant. In terms of jihadist strategy, this situation is in fact a mirror image of the GIA and the GSPC years: the GIA and the GSPC, insofar as they attacked France and French interests (i.e. the “far enemy”) at all, did so to punish and dissuade perceived support for the Algerian state, the “near” - and main - enemy; in 2013, it is France that has become the main enemy for AQMI's Saharan brigades, and Belmokhtar's men have lashed out as never before against Algeria, the near enemy, because of its support for the French war effort. It remains to be seen what role AQMI's central leadership in the north of Algeria will play in this battle – but a video message issued by the organisation’s national emir Abdelmalek Droudkel in early December condemning French manoeuvring in Mali suggests that it may be inclined to march in step with its southern comrades-in-arms.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] See AMSR #119
[2] The Guardian (Jan. 25) did, however, point out that the assault was commanded by Gen. Bachir Tartag (appointed head of the DRS's Directorate of Internal Security in December 2011), whom it presented as Tewfik's “deputy”.
[3]
This rumour was also picked up by *The Guardian*, which claimed in the article quoted above that "the 75-year-old president was absent throughout the crisis, undergoing medical treatment in Geneva. Mediene and the army, say well-placed sources, kept him out of the picture because they were angry that his agreement to let French planes fly over Algeria to attack Islamist rebels in Mali was leaked from Paris."

The President does on occasion stay away from the Presidential palace, according to the source, “but never for more than 24 hours at a stretch”.

Responsibility for the operation was claimed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, head of Katiba El Moulathimine (the Masked Men Brigade), on behalf of Katiba El Mouakione Bi Damaa (the 'Brigade of those who Sign in Blood'), which appears to have been a specially established sub-group. Despite some suggestions in the international media that Belmokhtar somehow 'broke' with AQMI at the end of 2012 because of rivalry with Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, the organisation's principal 'emir' in northern Mali, there is no indication that this is actually the case, and Belmokhtar explicitly spoke in the name of AQMI in the video message claiming responsibility.

It could by no means have been ruled out, on the other hand, that what remained of the Malian state might have collapsed under the impact of the islamist offensive, ushering in a period of anarchy in which no faction could claim control of the entire country.

The first signs of this are already being seen, with a number of roadside bombs and, on Feb. 8, a suicide bomb attack against a Malian army unit in Gao.

Seemingly in response to this, French weekly magazine *Jeune Afrique* (Jan. 21) published an article – illustrated with what purported to be a photograph of the presentation of the 'real' route to Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian at France's Air Operations Command – claiming that the French Air Force's Rafales actually flew a far more circuitous route via Morocco and Mauritania; some Algerian media subsequently claimed that, while Bouteflika may have given permission for the overflights, it was not in the end used by the French. This version – which has all the hallmarks of a spin doctors' damage limitation exercise – has not been officially confirmed by any of the governments involved.

Hollande told the European Parliament: “We shall need Algeria in this part of the world … in fighting terrorism, … in encouraging a policy of development, … and for the political dialogue, including with the Tuareg.”

'Some Algeria Attackers Are Placed At Benghazi', New York Times, 22/01/13

Several of the fighters who took part in the raid on In Amenas were, according to the unnamed senior Algerian official quoted by the NYT, Egyptians who had also taken part in the Bengazi attack.

“This is the result of the Arab Spring,” said the official said, who spoke on condition of anonymity because investigations into the hostage crisis were still under way. “I hope the Americans are conscious of this.”

Nonetheless, armed activity in the north of the country is likely to have seen a real dip due to heavy snow in Kabylia and other mountainous areas of northern Algeria where AQMI's forces are mainly concentrated. Only two AQMI operations and six incidents all told were reported in the Kabyle wilayas throughout the month.

Also known as Belaouer in Algerian Arabic or Le Borgne in French (i.e. the One-Eyed Man), or by the nom de guerre Khaled Abou El Abbas.

A British engineer was shot dead at the Bethioua petrochemicals plant and gas port in NW Algeria in Dec. 1993, and five foreign technicians employed by Bechtel were killed in Ghardâa in May 1995.

Under which the seizure of booty is licit but bloodshed is avoided wherever possible since this enables the opposite party to claim a blood "debt" and can lead to interminable blood feuds.

See above, Foreign Relations.
Very important and interesting piece by Peter Pham. Thanks Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel  
President and CEO  
The Gabriel Company, LLC  
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411  
Washington DC, 20005  
Phone: +1 202.887.1113  
Fax: +1 202.887.1115  
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com  
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

From: Dr. J. Peter Pham [mailto:drjppham@aol.com]  
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 11:00 AM  
To: undisclosed-recipients  

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

I co-authored a just-published study examining Morocco’s relationship with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), in the evolving context of one of the world’s most intractable feuds, the dispute over the Western Sahara.

The study, *Morocco and the African Union: Prospects for Re-engagement and Progress on the Western Sahara*, was published by the Johannesburg, South Africa-based Brenthurst Foundation as part of its Discussion Papers series on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the first pan-African organization, and co-authored with the Foundation’s director, Greg Mills, and its deputy director, Terence McNamee.

Founded in 2004 by the Oppenheimer family to promote constructive dialogue on issues affecting economic growth and development across Africa, the Brenthurst Foundation has as its mandate to encourage key decision makers and experts to share experiences and insights at private meetings and seminars; deliver relevant, practical *policy advice* to governments; and generate new thinking and *thought-leadership* to address Africa's development challenges.

The study argues that specter of transnational conflict in Africa’s Sahel region – punctuated by France’s intervention in Mali – has cast a fresh light on the stalemate over the Western Sahara. Moreover, my co-authors and I contend that if the African Union is to engage meaningfully on this issue, it must engage Morocco, the separatist Polisario Front, and, perhaps most consequentially, the Polisario’s main backer, Algeria, with new ideas and realistic avenues to break the impasse. Morocco’s continuing absence from the AU over the organization’s recognition of the Polisario’s “Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic” not only threatens to create a permanent rupture in the regional body but also limits the catalytic role in Africa’s economic growth that Morocco, given its relative sophistication and depth of integration with Europe and the Mediterranean and Atlantic basins, is especially well positioned to play.

I have taken the liberty of attaching a copy of the paper for your consideration.

Best regards, /s/ JPP
Morocco and the African Union

Prospects for Re-engagement and Progress on the Western Sahara

Terence McNamee,
Greg Mills and
J Peter Pham

Strengthening Africa’s economic performance
Morocco and the African Union

Prospects for Re-engagement and Progress on the Western Sahara

Contents

Introduction .............................................. 4
Background ............................................ 6
OAU to AU ............................................... 6
Re-engaging Africa ................................... 9
Irreconcilable Differences? ......................... 11
Africa’s new security landscape ..................... 15
Economic integration ................................. 16
New Directions for Morocco and the AU? ............ 20
Endnotes ............................................... 24

About the Authors

Terence McNamee is the Deputy Director, and Greg Mills is the Director of the Brenthurst Foundation. J Peter Pham is Director of the Africa Centre at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC, and Editor-in-chief of the Journal of the Middle East and Africa.

Published in February 2013 by:
The Brenthurst Foundation
E Oppenheimer & Son (Pty) Ltd
PO Box 61631, Johannesburg 2000, South Africa
Tel +27–(0)11 274–2096 · Fax +27–(0)11 274–2097
www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org

All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored, or transmitted without the prior permission of the publisher. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged.

Layout and design by Sheaf Publishing, Benoni.
Executive Summary

On the 50th anniversary of the founding of the first pan-African organisation, this Paper examines Morocco’s relationship with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), in the evolving context of one of the world’s most intractable feuds, the dispute over the Western Sahara. Morocco formally withdrew from the OAU in 1984 over the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a full member of the organisation. SADR claims sovereignty over the whole Western Sahara territory, which Morocco claims as its own. In the nearly 30 years since, Morocco has refused to rejoin the OAU/AU – and remains the only African country that is not a member – unless the membership of SADR, which is only partially recognised internationally, is withdrawn or frozen. This dispute has impaired Morocco’s relations with, to varying extents, all African countries and creates serious divisions within the AU.

The spectre of transnational conflict in Africa’s Sahel region – punctuated by France’s intervention in Mali – has cast a fresh light on the stalemate over the Western Sahara, which has been a pawn in regional power plays for decades. Many analysts have warned that rising instability in the region is a threat to the uneasy peace that has prevailed since the UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991. Conversely, this Paper argues that for all the uncertainty and potential flashpoints the Arab Spring and the crisis in the Sahel have laid bare for the countries of the region, this period of transition – as with major political shifts elsewhere in recent history – may provide a window of opportunity to break the deadlock over the Western Sahara and thus smooth Morocco’s re-entry into the AU.

In particular, the need for new forms of economic and security cooperation should fuel a new push for a diplomatic settlement, even if positions over the Western Sahara’s status appear as entrenched as ever.

Within Morocco, further internal reform would reinforce the seriousness of its 2007 autonomy proposal for the Western Sahara and help address a number of questions about its viability. For all Morocco’s investment in the territory and concerted efforts to bring a Sahrawi elite into the establishment, there is no avoiding the existence of strong nationalist sentiment or the continuing perception on the ground of an occupation. That does not make independence any more of a panacea for the myriad local and regional issues at stake – as AU statements routinely suggest – but it does illustrate that Morocco may need to rethink some of the core arrangements in the autonomy proposal to counter the powerful lure of self-determination.

For its part, the AU has buried its head in the Saharan sands for far too long. If it is to engage meaningfully on this issue, it must engage Morocco, SADR and, perhaps most consequentially, SADR’s main backer, Algeria, with new ideas and realistic avenues to break the impasse. Morocco’s continuing absence from the AU not only threatens to create a permanent rupture in the organisation but also limits the catalytic role in Africa’s economic growth that Morocco, given its relative sophistication and depth of integration with Europe and the Mediterranean and Atlantic basins, is especially well positioned to play.
Introduction

The spectre of transnational conflict in Africa’s Sahel region has cast a fresh light on one of the world’s most intractable feuds, the dispute over the Western Sahara. In November 2012, the United Nations Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, warned that the crisis had lasted ‘far too long’ and called any acceptance of the status quo a ‘serious miscalculation’. He went on to urge the Kingdom of Morocco and the government-in-exile of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) to ‘move swiftly into serious negotiations’ over the Western Sahara – a territory both claim as their own – and implored the key external actors (notably the United States, France and Algeria) to pressure the two sides to do so. In a region increasingly exposed to multiple, inter-locking security threats – from extremist Islamists, secessionists, displaced persons, drug traffickers and mercenaries, to say nothing of deteriorating civil–military relations – a potentially catalytic conflict such as the one in the Western Sahara ‘cannot be allowed’, according to Ross, ‘to stand still.’

The Arab Spring and the related ‘fall-out’ underline the potential consequences of inaction over the Western Sahara, which has been a pawn in regional power plays for decades. Many analysts have warned that rising instability in the region is a threat to the uneasy peace that has prevailed since the UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991. Even so, the temptation to let this enduring dispute remain frozen is strong. The Western Sahara is one of several intractable ‘intra’-state issues that has defied the international community’s efforts to facilitate its ‘solution’ for decades. A long-time observer of the struggle has called it a ‘chronic illness’. In this respect it is not dissimilar to the conflict in Cyprus or even the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, although it elicits nowhere near the global interest that those two struggles provoke. Notwithstanding their diverse origins and different triggers for violence, at the heart of these intractable conflicts lay sharply contrasting interpretations of key historical events, which shape the opposing communities’ identities as well as their sense of justice and what is rightfully theirs.

In a year which began with a surprise intervention by France in Mali and a mass hostage-taking of Westerners by Islamist terrorists in neighbouring Algeria, North Africa and the Sahel region are sure to be high on the agenda of Western diplomats and the African Union. Paradoxically, this could diminish the effort to find new mechanisms for the Western Sahara, if it is seen as too risky to launch a diplomatic push when political dynamics in the neighbourhood are so fluid. Despite Ross’s warning, the dispute may indeed be destined to ‘stand still’ for some time yet.

We can only speak of Africa when Morocco is included; and of the African Union when it is excluded

– A senior AU official

At the heart of these intractable conflicts lay sharply contrasting interpretations of key historical events, which shape the opposing communities’ identities as well as their sense of justice and what is rightfully theirs.

There are compelling reasons why all parties to the conflict should no longer regard this as a viable alternative. In human welfare terms, the Sahrawi people have most to lose by maintenance of the status quo. As many as a hundred thousand Sahrawis live in wretched conditions in refugee camps in southern Algeria; some have been there since the 1970s. Of the remainder of the (est.) 400 000 people of the historically nomadic Sahrawi tribes who live in Western Sahara (some are dispersed in neighbouring countries), they face harsh living conditions and are, according to international human rights groups, subject to violations on a regular basis by Moroccan security forces. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) have tried to
exploit such conditions to convince young Sahrawi to join the movement, which is seeking to establish fundamentalist regimes based on Islamic Law (or Sharia) and expel ‘foreign’ influences from the region. Although over the years they have had limited success due, at least in part, to their conflicting aims (AQIM is anti-nationalist), AQIM has shown an increasing pragmatism in its use of ‘outside help’ and the fluid situation appears to be evolving in a negative direction. In Mali, AQIM-linked militias and the Touaregs temporarily joined forces in early 2012 to rout government forces in the north of the country, before turning on each other a few months later. In the absence of meaningful progress on the Western Sahara dispute – whatever the outcome – it is hard to imagine how the Sahrawis’ plight might improve, with all the related dangers that portends for the region. In an ominous indication of what might well be ahead, French intelligence sources confirm some 300 Sahrawi youth may have been recruited to militant training camps in northern Mali in late 2012.

Since the 1970s, part of the challenge in ‘reimagining’ the Western Sahara issue has been the failure of leaders on all sides to promote a reasoned debate on the issue with their publics. Equally hard to envisage is how Morocco might re-join the AU unless there is an end to the stalemate over the Western Sahara. The Kingdom left its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in 1984 over the admission of SADR. This self-exclusion is not just symbolic. It has real and profound consequences for both Morocco and the organisation. The ‘distance’ created by the Kingdom’s absence from the AU – Morocco is the only African country not to be included as a member – could become permanent, as an increasingly dynamic Moroccan state pursues deeper integration in the wider Atlantic area and reinforces its strong European links. This would not be in the AU’s – or Africa’s – interest. The evolving crisis in Mali is a potent example of how divisions over the Western Sahara impede potentially vital political and security cooperation on the continent, in this case between regional powerhouses, Algeria and Morocco, both of whom have considerable experience in combating extremism, as well as strong historical and cultural links with the Touareg groups – considered part of the wider Berber diaspora – who are central to any management of the crisis. In economic terms, too, the AU will be less effective in realising its laudable aims and tackling some of the emergent challenges facing the continent, so long as Morocco remains outside the organisation and the Western Sahara issue continues to blight relations between its members.

On the 50th anniversary of the founding of the continent’s first pan-African organisation, the OAU, this Paper assesses the current scope for Morocco’s reintegration with the AU, mindful that positions on both sides of the Western Sahara dispute are deeply entrenched. The merits of the competing claims on the Western Sahara will not be addressed in any detail. Nor is there a focus on the internal concerns and politics of the Sahrawi leadership, though it goes without saying that they are central to any viable agreement. There are a number of excellent studies examining the complex legal, cultural and historical issues which have scuppered all previous attempts to resolve the Western Sahara crisis, but in general the literature and commentary on the subject inclines towards highly partisan analyses, if not plain propaganda. Since the 1970s, part of the challenge in ‘reimagining’ the Western Sahara issue has been the failure of leaders on all sides to promote a reasoned debate on the issue with their publics. Instead they have defaulted into a Manichean discourse; among their own, those who challenge their official line are typically seen as quislings, outside the sacred national project.

The specific point of departure in this Paper is Morocco’s relationship with Africa and the AU in the evolving context of what is commonly referred to as the ‘Western Sahara question’. Lack of meaningful progress on this question has come at significant cost, especially to Africa. Should it continue there is a danger of permanent damage to the pan-African organisation. The Paper argues, however, that for all
Background

On 26 February 1976, the colonial power, Spain, officially withdrew from what was then called the Spanish Sahara – a vast, sparsely populated territory with about 1 100 kilometres of Atlantic coastline, with seemingly few resources apart from fishing grounds and phosphate mines. The following day the Polisario Front9 – a liberation group founded in May 1973 in Mauritania by students from the Spanish Sahara studying in Morocco – proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a government-in-exile. Backed, armed and harboured by Algeria, the Polisario Front initiated a guerrilla war against Morocco and Mauritania, which inherited part of the Spanish Sahara territory.10

Since then Morocco – which gained its independence from France in 1956 – has engaged in a costly struggle with the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, first on the battlefield, then in international capitals and the halls of the United Nations. In general, the international community has been equivocal in the face of each side's competing claims, encouraging dialogue and emphasising the need for a peaceful resolution. While Morocco has lobbied for international acceptance of its claim to the territory, Algeria and Libya (under Gaddafi) have actively sought recognition for SADR, a process which has seen several reversals with formal recognition extended and withdrawn by foreign governments over the past two decades.

A UN Peace plan was accepted by all parties in 1988 and subsequently a Settlement Plan was endorsed by the Security Council in June 199011 and the following year the UN brokered cease-fire was implemented on 6 September 1991.12 The Settlement Plan effectively gave Morocco most of the territory (including the entire Atlantic coastline) whilst SADR ‘administered’ the remaining (largely uninhabited) eastern part which bordered Mauritania and Algeria from its base in camps around Tindouf in the southwestern part of Algeria. The two areas were separated by a berm – a land-mined embankment in the desert stretching more than 2 000 kms, built by the Moroccan army in the 1980s. The Plan comprised a transitional period, the repatriation of refugees, the exchange of prisoners of war and the setting up of an international peace-keeping force referred to as ‘MINURSO’13 to monitor the cease-fire and the planning and the organisation of a referendum. However, the identification of eligible voters for the self-determination referendum became a permanent stumbling block – both parties rejected alternating referendum proposals in which their putative voters were at a numerical disadvantage.14 During his time as the UN Secretary General’s envoy to the Western Sahara from 1997–2004, former US Secretary of State, James Baker, put forward a series of proposals to break the deadlock over the terms of the referendum, but none succeeded.15

OAU to AU

The seminal moment in African–Moroccan relations came in February 1982 when at the 69th Council of Ministers conference of the OAU, the Western Sahara was admitted into its membership. In response, Morocco immediately suspended its participation in the OAU. Then, two years later, in
November 1984, Morocco officially withdrew from the organisation.

There is nothing that is not disputed about this episode. Nearly all aspects of this chapter are contentious and subject to sharply contrasting interpretations by both governments and scholars. The overwhelming view within Morocco is that the decision was borne of back room deals and the strong-arming of many small and diplomatically-weak African countries by others, especially Morocco’s neighbours Algeria and Libya. Special opprobrium is reserved for the then OAU Secretary General, Edem Kodjo. Strong evidence suggests that he exceeded his mandate in determining the legal basis of Western Sahara’s admission, in particular by allowing – without prior consultation with the then OAU chairman, Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi, or the newly-established Implementation Committee on the territory’s future – a self-proclaimed republic to take a seat as a member before a referendum on its status organised and supervised by the organisation was held. Chaos followed Kodjo’s decision and 19 states walked out in protest at the Secretary General’s unilateral move. The affair plunged the OAU into an unprecedented predicament that threatened the very existence of the organisation.

That the historical controversies are unlikely to ever be resolved is evident in the contrasting reflections on the episode by two of the major protagonists, Kodjo and Olusegun Obasanjo, the former President of Nigeria and one of two surviving members of the OAU’s ad hoc committee of African leaders (‘Wisemen’) established in 1978 to seek a solution to the Western Sahara question compatible with the right of self-determination. Following his spell as OAU Secretary General, Kodjo, who later served twice as Prime Minister of Togo, has been equivocal, at best, about the Western Sahara’s claim to statehood. He has suggested that SADR no longer possesses the conditions that had motivated its endorsement at the OAU and attempted to shift the blame for the imbroglio onto sitting African heads of state at the time. Conversely, Obasanjo remains convinced that the decision to admit the Western Sahara in 1982 was correct and its claim to full independence should be facilitated through the mechanisms of the AU.

The AU’s predecessor, the OAU, was founded in the wake of decolonisation and based on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. The main impetus behind its establishment was to consolidate newly-independent African states, prevent the balkanisation of the continent and, critically, gain independence for a number of new nations.

Morocco was a major force in the OAU’s establishment, through ‘The Casablanca Group’ – an organisation of ‘progressive’ states which included Algeria, Egypt, Ghana and Morocco – which merged with its rival, the Monrovia Group, and eventually led to the creation of the OAU in 1963. More broadly, Morocco perceived itself as a major contributor to African solidarity and ardent supporter of various liberation movements across the continent. Consequently, when Morocco withdrew from the OAU it was very much as a deeply disillusioned state, which believed that the OAU had acted perversely against its own founding charter, which stipulated that the territoriality of states was a sine qua non condition for their membership. This was all the more so because the Polisario was never recognised by the OAU as an African liberation movement and the SADR was not a sovereign, independent state with control over its territories. In 1963 Morocco was one of two countries (the other was Somalia) that had made strong reservations and abstained from voting in favour of the sanctity of frontiers at the formation of the OAU, pointing out that their territorial integrity was not yet achieved. This goes some way to explaining its different interpretation of ‘decolonisation’ in the context of Spain’s withdrawal from the Spanish Sahara.

Nevertheless, from the Moroccan perspective the damage was done. In response Morocco closed its embassies in several African countries and concentrated more heavily on greater Euro–Mediterranean integration, its membership of the Arab league, and...
establishing free trade agreements with European countries and the United States. In 1987, Morocco even applied to join the then European Economic Community. This was arguably a more symbolic than quixotic gesture: Morocco knew from its advance diplomacy that it stood no chance of admission, as much due to its poor human rights record and lack of democracy as geography. Nonetheless, Morocco’s reigning monarch, King Hassan II, persevered with the application, a clear signal to sub-Saharan Africa that Morocco’s future lay elsewhere.\(^21\)

The OAU, meanwhile, was faltering badly. It was derided internationally as ‘the Dictators Club’. Corruption, poverty and authoritarianism were pervasive amongst its members, many of whom became entwined in proxy conflicts fought on behalf of the Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Although civil wars abounded, the OAU stood on the sidelines and did not intervene; it was rendered impotent, as much by its own now-anachronistic charter as by the failings of its leaders.

By the end of the 1990s a number of key African leaders, notably Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi – eager to create a new platform for his grandiose political aims – were pushing for a radical rethink of the OAU. The result was the AU, formed in 2002. This new organisation was recast from the vestiges of the OAU into a new continental body that was committed to increase Africa’s development, combat poverty and corruption, and, critically, end Africa’s many conflicts, if necessary through intervention.

The AU was broadly modelled on the European Union, with a number of comprehensive frameworks and governing institutions covering its main areas of concern: The Assembly, comprised of heads of state; The Executive Council and the all-important Commission, which does the lion’s share of the policy implementation; The Peace and Security Council (PSC), the body which was established to intervene in African conflicts to protect the security of the continent; the Pan African Parliament; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC); the Court of Justice; and other entities, such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). There are also far reaching plans to set up more integrated financial institutions, and by 2023 an African Economic Community with a single currency.

The scale of ambitions for the AU is vast, but the organisation is a direct reflection of Africa itself – it is struggling to reform its governing structures and progress towards its laudable aims has in some areas been painfully slow, if not non-existent. With huge financial and organisational barriers, the AU has a mountain to climb before it can claim to be ‘fit for purpose’. The burdens and expectations on the AU – perhaps most especially in its formidably challenging peacekeeping missions – are enormous. And there have been some very significant failures, notably its inability to devise an effective response to the Zimbabwean crisis of the 2000s.\(^22\)

Several experts have rightly observed, however, that regional and continental bodies in Europe, Asia and Latin America also took many years to establish themselves and grow into their charters.\(^23\) In 2012 the organisation moved into its striking new headquarters (funded and built by the Chinese as ‘a gift to Africa’) in Addis Ababa and elected an impressive new Chairperson of the Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, one of South Africa’s most respected government ministers. Ultimately, however, the AU’s success will hinge on the realisation of one of its founding principles, that Africa’s conflicts must be resolved before the continent can achieve prosperity. On that score, there are new grounds for optimism. Its most ambitious mission is the AU peacekeeping
force in Somalia, a battle-hardened army of nearly 18,000 uniformed personnel. Security experts argue that this mission has been more effective in restoring a measure of stability to the country’s chaotic, war-torn capital than any other foreign force, including the American mission in the 1990s.

The one conflict which creates the most strain within the institution itself is the Western Sahara. By its own admission, however, the AU Commission “has more or less buried its head in the sand.” The body has done little more than continually reiterate its support of the on-going efforts by the UN to find a solution to the conflict consistent with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The only statements made by successive Commission Chairpersons “start and stop with the assertion that Morocco is an important part of Africa and has an important contribution to make to the development of the continent, and with an expression of hope that a solution will be found so that Morocco can “re-join the African family.”

The question is whether Morocco can do that outside the AU.

**Re-engaging Africa**

Following Morocco’s exit from the OAU in the 1980s, its bilateral relations narrowed in scope and became confined to specific areas, such as oil imports from Nigeria and humanitarian aid. Its diplomatic approach was characterised by Abdallah Saaf, Minister of Education from 1998 to 2002, as ‘Royal Air Maroc [the national airline] diplomacy – almost totally symbolic. It means that we only have relationships with countries that our airline serves. Southern African countries are ignored and our representation in South Africa is more symbolic than effective.’

Since 2000, however, Morocco has made a determined effort to re-engage with Africa (especially French speaking African countries) on several fronts. The Kingdom re-opened several diplomatic representations, both resident and non-resident; and it reinforced its presence in several African-related forums, such as the Franco–African summits and the first Euro–Africa summit in 2000. During the latter’s proceedings, Morocco’s King Muhammad VI (who succeeded his father King Hassan II in 1999) announced a debt forgiveness plan for Africa’s least-developed countries, and the eradication of the custom duties to be levied on the products imported from these states. In the field of education, a grant programme for African students was launched; today over 7,000 grants to African students from 35 countries are awarded annually for study at Moroccan universities. He also made numerous official visits to African countries, which have resulted in the conclusion of 17 bilateral trade agreements.

In November 2010, the then Moroccan minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, Taib Fassi Fihri, proposed the creation of an Alliance for development in Africa as a framework to coordinate bilateral, regional and international initiatives related to the African continent. Morocco also launched in 2009 the ministerial conference of Atlantic African countries (African states on the Atlantic Ocean coast) and established a permanent secretariat in Morocco. The second ministerial conference, which took place in Morocco on 15 November 2010, adopted an action plan for cooperation and coordination in the fields of politics, security, economics and the environment. In parallel, with support from the European Commission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA), Morocco has organised an even more ambitious series of international forums, which met in 2009 and 2012 in Shkirat, outside Rabat, with the goal of creating a broader ‘Atlantic Community’ linking the African states on the ocean’s littoral with their European and American counterparts.

Of the 252 international accords Morocco signed in 2010, 96 were with African countries in the field of telecommunications, water management, electricity, fisheries, air-transport and banking. The majority of
these accords were related to projects involving private Moroccan businessmen though it includes some public bodies operating in African markets or investing directly in African companies.\textsuperscript{31} In the 1990s, Moroccan trade with sub-Saharan Africa amounted to an average of $300 million annually, barely 2 per cent of Morocco’s foreign exchange. Between 1998 and 2008, however, the volume improved dramatically, averaging $529 million annually and reaching $1 billion in 2008. Nevertheless, it is still ‘far below its potential’, a Ministry of Finances report concluded in 2007. Between 1998 and 2008, for example, sales of agricultural products on the African market never exceeded 0.3 per cent of Morocco’s agricultural exports and 0.05 per cent of Africa’s total imports of the same. Likewise, less than 0.7 per cent of Moroccan textile exports go to African countries, an amount equivalent to barely 0.35 per cent of their textile imports, while just 2.5 per cent of Morocco’s chemical products are exported to Africa, equivalent to 0.3 per cent of the total amount imported by the rest of the continent.\textsuperscript{32}

Morocco’s political re-engagement with Africa under King Mohammed VI is doubtless borne of numerous practical and strategic considerations. The underlying message to Africa, however, is that Morocco is a country of serious political and economic clout, integral to the continent’s development and prepared to play a leading role in its future – but perhaps not unconditionally. Morocco would not budge on its position on re-taking its seat at the AU: it would not re-join unless the membership of ‘SADR’ was frozen. After 1984, Morocco expended a huge amount of diplomatic and financial muscle on trying to get SADR out of the OAU. Although to no avail, for years the subject was deemed too sensitive to be discussed at the annual OAU summits. Moreover, since the organisation had acted decidedly in favour of the Western Sahara by admitting them as a full member, the OAU’s potential role in acting as a neutral negotiator between Morocco and SADR to end the conflict was fatally undermined.

On 15 September 2004, just over two years since the AU was founded, Moroccan officials were left reeling after the ‘shock’ recognition of SADR by South Africa. Hitherto, Moroccan officials believed strongly that they had turned the tide of African opinion on the Western Sahara question and were winning the diplomatic argument. South Africa’s ‘principled position’ on SADR – ‘delayed’ for 10 years

![Figure 1: Imports and exports to sub-Saharan Africa](image-url)
despite clear commitments made by Nelson Mandela as apartheid fell – was ‘based on its rejection of colonialism in all its forms and the support for achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.’\textsuperscript{33} The principles which underpinned this stance included:

1. The centrality of the AU and UN in the resolution of the conflict; and
2. The sanctity of inherited colonial borders in Africa and the right of peoples of former colonial territories to self-determination and independence as contained in the Constitutive Act of the AU.

Morocco swiftly withdrew its ambassador to Pretoria and condemned South Africa’s ‘partial, stunning and ill-timed’ decision, noting in its official response ‘the pioneer support it has continuously provided to the legitimate struggle of the South African people for its dignity and freedom,’ referring to the ANC’s struggle against apartheid.\textsuperscript{34} Yet formal recognition by such a significant African player – South Africa constitutes 25 per cent of the AU’s economy – only served to redouble Morocco’s effort to re-invigorate its African linkages and relationships.

Additional impetus was given by the impending secession of South Sudan, which achieved independent statehood and full international recognition in July 2011. Morocco feared that the South Sudan ‘precedent’ might soften key international opinion against SADR’s case for formal sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory. The emergence of Africa’s newest state, however, cut both ways. While supporters of the Polisario argued that it strengthened the case for the creation of an independent Western Sahara, the fact that it shattered the precedent that African states conform to colonial borders also undermined one of the principal pillars of claim for a separate Saharan entity based on the boundaries of the Spanish protectorate.

Eighteen months on from the independence of South Sudan, there is no evidence that its experience has made independence more likely for other would-be states in Africa, including Somaliland, which aside from its demonstrated commitment to democratic rule can also legitimately claim – at least more than any other sub-state entity – to fulfil the Montevideo criteria for statehood (a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to defend and represent itself), as well as near universal popular support for independence.\textsuperscript{35} South Sudan’s troubled beginnings – economic warfare with the North, the emergence of Kashmir-like scenarios on its northern border, renewed internecine conflicts inside the country – may have only cemented international opinion against any further ‘balkanisation’ of Africa.

At the time of writing, Morocco is accorded a special status within the AU and benefits from some of the services and institutional arrangements available to all AU states, such as the African Development Bank. In recent years Morocco has worked with the AU Commission in various international partnerships between the AU and different regions and countries, and has even sent representatives for meetings held at the AU in Addis Ababa – this would have been unheard of in the mid 2000s. Outside the halls of the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2012, Morocco’s Foreign Minister Saad-Eddine El Othmani was engaged in intensive diplomatic activities. Some have taken it as a sign that Morocco may feel the tide of opinion at the AU is turning in its favour.\textsuperscript{36}
Irreconcilable Differences?

Morocco’s renewed political and economic engagement, with Africa aside, the fundamental position on re-joining the AU remains more or less exactly the same: if SADR occupies a seat as a member state, Morocco will stay out of the AU. In 2007 Morocco unveiled a plan offering broad autonomy to the Western Sahara covering executive, legislative and judicial matters whilst Rabat would retain defence, foreign affairs and the currency, as well as the religious prerogatives of the king. Officially called the Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region in 2007, it has received considerable international endorsement. Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions renewing MINURSO’s mandate have described it as ‘serious’ and ‘credible’ and the French, Spanish and US governments expressing support for it. In the words of then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, ‘Morocco’s autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible – a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity’.

For senior SADR officials, the autonomy plan was a non-starter; they remained singularly focused on achieving full statehood. Autonomy was only relevant insofar as it could be one of the options that the Sahrawi people could choose in the promised UN-organised referendum on the Western Sahara’s future, so long as outright independence was also on the ballot. The African countries that support SADR, such as South Africa, generally concurred that this was a clear case of self-determination.

There is a lack of unanimity on this issue, both internationally and among member states of the AU, however. As of 2012, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has been recognized by 85 states, although 32 states have ‘frozen’ or ‘withdrawn’ recognition for a number of reasons. A total of 40 states currently maintain diplomatic relations with SADR, though Sahrawi embassies exist in only 18 states. Within Africa, 38 states have recognised SADR though more than a dozen have ‘de-recognised’ it. Kenya, for example, suspended its decision to recognize SADR in 2006, apparently so it could act as a mediating party. But under the AU Charter, just like the UN Charter, there is no provision for de-recognition. In technical and legal terms, therefore, it is immaterial how many African countries derecognise SADR. According to a senior AU official, the political position of the AU with regard to Morocco’s membership boils down to the following: The Constitutive Act of the AU gives a window to Morocco to come back – but it must do so without any conditions. Effectively, then, this ‘position’ means ‘acceptance of the Western Sahara as a separate country’. Not only is this currently – and doubtless for the foreseeable future – unacceptable to Morocco but it is difficult to imagine any Moroccan government even considering it as an option.

Within Morocco, the struggle to preserve sovereignty over this disputed territory has been viewed as something of a sacred obligation. Within Morocco, the struggle to preserve sovereignty over this disputed territory has been viewed as something of a sacred obligation, by the King of Morocco as much as ordinary citizens. For all King Muhammed VI’s genuine popularity and importance to national identity – which has helped keep the Arab Spring largely at bay in Morocco – it is widely argued that the existence of the monarchy in its present form is dependent on the outcome in Western Sahara, since it has become its principal rallying cry. So sensitive is the issue within Morocco that criticism of its security forces’ response to unrest in Sahrawi refugee camps in November 2010 prompted
hundreds of thousands to take to the streets of the country’s largest city, Casablanca, in protest. (The criticism was levelled by an opposition political party in Spain.) Internationally, Morocco’s main supporters fear that its ‘loss’ of the Western Sahara would severely weaken one of the main bulwarks for moderation and stability in the region.

In talks on the Western Sahara’s future, the autonomy proposal remains the anchoring framework for Morocco and its international backers. The proposal is brief, with less than two dozen substantive clauses, and borrows heavily from experiences elsewhere, particularly European models. There are a host of unanswered questions – the exact borders of the autonomous region, the division of resources, police and army presence, flag, even what the region would be called – but Morocco believes they needn’t preclude the plan from serving, at a minimum, as an entry point for negotiations. Other commentators have raised questions about the efficacy of the plan given that the proposed autonomous entity would, in its legal and institutional make-up, be fully democratic while the ‘parent state’ would continue to function as a monarchy where the King effectively controls the key levers of the state. Whether a democratic, self-governing Western Sahara could be embedded within a less-free but infinitely more powerful Morocco is an open question.

For SADR, its own position is complicated by the lack of intellectual and legal consensus on the concept of self-determination. International law provides few pointers in deciding on independence movements, in Africa as elsewhere, where the principles of ‘self-determination’ and ‘territorial integrity’ collide, with no clear track to reconcile the two. At the founding of the OAU in 1963, for instance, the former Portuguese protectorate of Cabinda was ranked by the organisation as the 39th state still to be decolonised and Angola as the 35th. The enclave of Cabinda had a separate history and legal status as a Portuguese colony and was for much of its history (although not all) governed separately from Angola. In this and other respects it was similar to the Spanish Sahara. Yet since the Alvor Agreement granting Angola independence was signed in 1975, and Cabinda – which refused to sign the agreement – was forcibly subsumed into Angola proper as a province by MPLA (and Cuban) troops, the OAU and its successor the AU have effectively accepted the Angolan fait accompli without so much as a murmur. That Cabindans saw its incorporation into Angola then (and now) as a clear violation of their right to self-determination has never garnered much interest beyond its borders.

The right to unilaterally establish a new state based on the principle of self-determination outside the colonial context is not recognised in international law. Morocco has steadfastly argued that SADR’s claim falls ‘outside’, whereas its supporters assert that it is a clear case of decolonisation. Yet the wisdom of applying an understanding of self-determination framed exclusively by decolonisation and ‘all-or-nothing’ propositions is problematic, according to some legal experts. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been much greater emphasis placed on the idea of self-determination as less an automatic right to statehood than a right to democratic governance. To complicate matters further, often there is no shared vision of what constitutes ‘self-determination’ between locals and their putative representatives who sit at the AU table or regional fora. Some African ‘leaders’ patently do not control the territories they purport to represent: not so much ungoverned spaces as spaces governed by the ungoverned.

Any discussion of self-determination for SADR must also reflect on the role of Algeria, which still refuses to allow a census of the Sahrawi population in its camps. Morocco’s supporters charge that Polisario is not only backed and funded by Algeria but in fact has no sovereign decision-making power; its leaders take direct orders from Algiers, which is less committed to the Sahrawi people than it is to ‘whatever may unsettle Morocco’. To be sure, Algeria has used the Western Sahara as a pawn in its fight for regional supremacy and a means to consolidate domestic
Figure 2: World SADR status

Countries that currently recognise SADR
Countries that have derecognised SADR
Countries that do not recognise SADR
support in a country still struggling with the consequences of its brutal, murky civil war and the myriad sources of potential instability within its borders. But so, to a more limited extent, has Morocco. The legacy of mistrust between the two countries has kept their shared border closed since 1994 and fuelled a dangerous arms race. In May 2012, the Moroccans declared the UN Envoy, Christopher Ross, biased in favour of Algeria.

On the face of it, therefore, the positions are irreconcilable. On 11 to 13 March 2012, a ninth round of UN-backed informal talks on the Western Sahara was held in New York. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s summary of the meeting conveyed more or less the same gloomy message as the previous rounds:

The parties discussed and disagreed sharply on the purpose of the negotiating process. Morocco argued that the process was meant to negotiate the details of its autonomy proposal in preparation for a referendum of confirmation. Frente Polisario countered that it was meant to open the door to all possibilities in preparation for a referendum with multiple options. Each side continued to reject the other’s proposal as the basis for negotiation.

Against these entrenched divisions, the past may not be a helpful guide for new ideas to break the stalemate. Where alternatives may emerge is in a consideration of Africa’s evolving security and economic landscapes, particularly Morocco’s changing role.

Africa’s new security landscape

From Africa’s Mediterranean coast to the southern Sahel there are grave concerns that no country will be immune from the rising tide of insecurity. The main threats – terrorism, insurgency and transnational organised crime – are spilling over the region’s porous borders. No one quite foresaw how the Arab Spring would exacerbate and complicate these challenges. Just how unpredictable the future trajectory of these threats could be was underlined by France’s surprise intervention in Mali. That a number of extremists from the Boko Haram Islamist movement in Nigeria are reported to have aided rebels in the north of the country is testament to the potential spread of the crisis. There is a potential upside in all this, however: an increasingly fragile and uncertain environment could set the stage for new forms of political and security cooperation. For Morocco, it could also soften some of the intractable divisions – in particular with Algeria and the AU – over the Western Sahara.

Africa – and particularly the AU – must lead in defining its own changing security landscape and devise an effective, comprehensive and coherent approach. Piecemeal efforts by one country alone will achieve little. In North Africa and the Sahel, there is an urgent requirement to strengthen logistical coordination and intelligence cooperation among all affected countries and pool resources and materiel for joint security operations. The success of any multilateral response would be undermined by Morocco’s exclusion, given its political, military and economic clout, as well as its direct experience of terrorism. As recently as April 2011 Morocco itself fell victim to AQIM-linked terrorists, who attacked the country’s number one tourist destination, Marrakech. By joining the AU, Morocco – which boasts military and intelligence services as advanced as any in the wider region – would also join the Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region (CEMOC), which has taken a leading role in coordinating anti-terrorist operations.

Benjamin Nickels argued recently that AU member states could also benefit from Morocco’s relations and strong political and economic interests with the European Union, and its membership in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (which also includes Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritania), to strengthen military cooperation with these major entities. This cooperation may include intelligence...
support, and permission to land military forces in the Sahara, where terrorist groups and criminal gangs carry out their criminal activities.51

Given the limited resources and technical capabilities of most African states, foreign assistance will play an important part in tackling the interlocking security challenges affecting the Sahel region. Nevertheless, recent events have highlighted the need for regional powers with in-depth knowledge of a highly complex and fluid security terrain to lead the response. France’s intervention in Mali to halt the advance of Islamist militias on the capital, Bamako, has been met with broad approval in the region – but ultimately France’s actions will be judged on its long-term effectiveness in promoting stability, which is far from certain.52 For its part, the United States is beginning to question the effectiveness of its costly pan-Sahelian counter terrorism initiative, launched in 2002 to train the region’s armed forces in countering violent Islamists. In three of the four states which received US assistance – Mauritania, Niger and Mali – the army has seized power. In the fourth, Chad, the army came close in 2006.53 ‘The tendency in the west’, argue some experts in the region, ‘to look at Islamic extremism as a global threat and a global phenomenon, at the expense of local dynamics, has led to a string of policy failures’.54

Morocco’s contribution to an African-led solution or approach to the crisis would be greatly enhanced by a rapprochement between the Kingdom and Algeria – which has a de facto veto over Morocco’s involvement – something which both publics would enthusiastically welcome. Both administrations are under pressure to deliver wider political reform whilst avoiding Arab-Spring-type uprisings. That Morocco’s new foreign minister made Algiers his first foreign trip in January 2012 may reflect their shared anxiety over the pace of reform as well as the rise of extremist parties within their midst,55 but it might also hint at the possibility of normalisation in their relations. One should not underestimate the reservoir of mutual suspicion that still exists, however. Algeria’s President Bouteflika was the country’s foreign minister when the Polisario was established in the 1970s (Morocco’s current King was just ten years old) and his regime comprises a cadre of war-hardened officials not easily given to compromise, not least with their bitter rival next door.56

**Economic integration**

Morocco’s fight with Algeria over the Western Sahara impedes regional economic integration at least as much as security cooperation. This lack of integration has blocked potentially enormous opportunities for development in the areas of infrastructure, transport and energy, which could have a transformative impact on poverty, job creation and food security across a broad swath of the continent.

Morocco is a member of the moribund Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Arguably the worst performing regional economic community (REC) in Africa, the AMU comprises Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. It was founded in 1989 on high hopes of future economic and even political unity, rooted in their shared Arab/Berber culture and language, Muslim religion and experience of French colonialism. The AMU has not convened a meeting since 1994, however. Again, the principal (though not only) source of division has been the Western Sahara question. The consequences for intra-regional trade have been palpable: current estimates put it between 1.2 to 2 per cent, one of the lowest levels recorded for regional trade in the world.57 If the AMU had instead realised its goal of a fully-fledged free trade area, it would nearly double the level of commercial relations within the Maghreb region, according to one recent study,58 and significantly raise overall GDP.
North and west Africa: A region in turmoil

Case 2:16-cr-00365 Document 212-4 Filed 06/02/19 Page 991 of 1649

MOROCCO AND THE AFRICAN UNION
The Arab Spring, and perhaps especially the removal of the polarising figures of Gaddafi and Tunisian leader Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, appears to have breathed new life into the AMU, with Tunisia leading the effort to revive the union. The hope is that some long-delayed projects, particularly the Trans-Maghreb Highway, which could have a catalytic impact on development across the region, might finally be realised. Greater energy trade could also have a huge multiplier effect. The potential for complementarity between oil-rich Algeria, which exports almost nothing to other Maghreb countries, and Morocco, with its sophisticated banking, manufacturing and resources (mainly phosphates) sector, is vast.

Of course, potential is one thing, reality another. In the past all North African states have played their part in the region’s pernicious balance of power game, often using the Western Sahara as a political football, despite all the fine-sounding words about Maghreb unity. Attempts to influence Libya’s Transitional National Council to fall behind Morocco’s claim on the Western Sahara or recognise SADR is a case in point. Nevertheless, long-time observers of Maghreb politics believe the Arab Spring together with the emergence of a new generation of economic elites in Algeria, seemingly keen to forge a détente with Morocco, could rescue the AMU.

Morocco is also at the forefront of African integration beyond the borders of the Maghreb. The Kingdom has sought to assume leadership of CEN-SAD – the Community of Sahara–Sahel States. The least known of Africa’s RECS, CEN-SAD ballooned to 28 members under Gaddafi’s largesse, covering a vast area of the continent. But it lacked a viable raison d’être and appeared doomed to oblivion after the death of the Libyan leader in 2011. CEN-SAD was given a lifeline when members lobbied Morocco to take command of the organisation, which includes major continental powers Kenya and Nigeria. For the Kingdom it represents, according to Nickels, a unique opportunity to project its influence in a grouping that draws ‘Africa’s Arab and Muslim North into the continent’s south.’ This would allow Morocco to engage more fully in a region where it has deepening security concerns and wishes to broaden its economic links – and without worrying about an Algerian ‘veto’. Algeria is the only Muslim country in Africa that has refused to join the organisation. In joining, Algeria believes it would be tantamount to recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, which borders the Sahel (Algeria does not consider Morocco a Sahelian country).

The potential for Morocco to serve as one of the continent’s key hubs for integration and commerce is clear. The inter-continental Tanger Med port and the expansion of Casablanca airport are only two of several existing projects which demonstrate what might be possible, if linked to other countries’ investments in road and rail infrastructure. As a member of the AU, Morocco would also be well positioned to serve as a channel for internal aid to African infrastructure projects, with Moroccan firms serving as the implementation agents in sectors such as agriculture, health and water.

Morocco’s rapid development over the past 15 years puts it among very few African countries that can genuinely claim to be an economic model for the rest of the continent. The President of the Congo Republic and former AU Chairperson, Denis Sassou Nguesso, said as much in early 2012, in a speech advocating deeper economic ties in Africa: ‘The Moroccan model should be taken into account for the free trade area project in Africa’. He reportedly added that Morocco should return to the AU though provided no recipe for its re-admission.

In less than a decade, Morocco went from an economic straggler to one of the top five recipients of foreign investment in Africa.
of foreign investment in Africa. Once best known as a "louche" retreat for European travellers, Morocco is today home to some of the most ambitious manufacturing, infrastructure and tourism schemes in Africa. Through a solid programme of macroeconomic reforms and economic diversification Morocco has been able to raise gross national income per person five-fold from US$550 in the 1970s to US$2,850 in 2010. The average life expectancy increased from 55 years to 73 in 2009. Over the past ten years, poverty rates have declined by more than 40 per cent. A few decades ago, less than 15 per cent of Moroccans had access to water; today only about 10 per cent do not. The former managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) described Morocco as a 'pillar of development in the region' and an example of progressive reform for Arab and African countries alike.

In some areas, Morocco still faces enormous socio-economic challenges, especially in education and literacy. And for all the progress on the processes of democratisation and the consolidation of the rule of law, the implementation of the reforms announced by the King in 2011 have been, at best, sluggish. Nevertheless, Morocco's political and economic progress in recent years led to its selection as the first country in the region to be granted 'advanced status' by the European Union, which makes it a pioneer in the European Neighbourhood Policy. The agreement constitutes a 'roadmap' which widens the sphere of EU–Morocco bilateral relations. Morocco is already the foremost beneficiary in the region of European funds allocated to Neighbourhood Policy countries (€654 million for 2007–2010).

Morocco’s main economic, financial and social relations are with Europe and as such it has cultivated a high degree of dependency on its northern neighbours. At the same time, Morocco does not have a seat at the European table. So as Europe reshapes itself, Morocco will effectively remain prisoner to that situation, with little or no power to affect outcomes that bear heavily on its economic and political priorities. ‘We have to follow what is happening in Europe and we have little control over how our relations evolve with the rest of the continent’, according to former minister Abdalla Saaf. And in spite of the historical legacy of our past with Europe (mainly France and Spain), we are considered as a country that belongs to its margin. We are seen like Ukraine and Moldova for instance.” His comments were made before the 2008 global financial crisis and the years of austerity which have ensued. Today, the current crisis in the euro zone has ‘raised new questions about the future of the EU and the degree of European openness to societies on its periphery’. Beyond Europe, Morocco retains considerable influence in the Muslim world – as a founding member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and a member of the League of Arab States. This is particularly true of the Gulf states, as more summits of the two bodies have taken place in Morocco than any other Arab or Muslim country (the frequent visits of Saudi Arabia's king and the United Arab Emirates' leader is a case in point).

Returning to Africa, even without being a member of the AU, Morocco has in the last decade served as president of the Africa Group in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and president of the Group 77. Going forward, in theory there is nothing preventing Morocco from remaining outside the AU ad infinitum whilst retaining its current informal links both through various missions and in Addis Ababa. The scale of its ambition in Africa in the political and economic spheres is clear. How engaged Morocco will be in the future is by no means certain, however. Until the impasse over the Western Sahara question is broken Morocco’s full contribution to Africa will never be realised. As for the AU, Morocco...
remains keen to resume its membership but there may come a point when it decides to turn its back on the AU permanently, a move that could have far-reaching consequences for the organisation.

New Directions for Morocco and the AU?

This analysis of Morocco's troubled relationship with Africa in the context of the Western Sahara question has focused mainly on high politics and relations between leaders and governments. The views of ordinary Moroccans on the issues discussed above tell a different, perhaps even more revealing story.

Africa is not part of the worldview or consciousness of most Moroccans. Speak to any young professional or student in Morocco today and there can be no doubt that for the vast majority their compass still points in only two directions – north towards Europe and west towards North America. Notwithstanding the commercial links established in (especially West) Africa by top Moroccan businesses, African countries are places which have become ‘other’: rarely visited or experienced by Moroccans, and for the most part neglected. For decades ‘Africa’ has been what transits through their country in the form of migrants, seeking a better life in Europe via the continent’s closest crossing point on Morocco’s coast. Since Morocco’s economy took off in the 2000s, ‘Africa’ has started to stay in the country in increasing numbers, as migrants from poorer sub-Saharan countries secure construction work and other manual jobs that Moroccans generally avoid.69 Beyond this, Africa appears to hold little interest. Several years ago the respected Centre for Cross Cultural Learning in Morocco’s capital, Rabat, attempted to develop a programme for learning English in Ghana, geared to Moroccan students as an alternative to more expensive destinations for language instruction such as the US and UK. The project never got off the ground because no students (or parents) expressed any interest whatsoever in learning English in an African country. ‘We realised then’, remarked the head of the Centre, the level of ‘misconceptions concerning Africa, particularly English Speaking Africa which is little known in Morocco.’70

This blinkered perspective is not restricted to Africa. The comparative dearth of Moroccans working or even travelling in places like India or China speaks to the hegemony of Western culture among the country’s elite and youth, which is perhaps surprising in a country that boasts such a rich melange of Islamic, Berber, Maghrebi, Arab and Jewish traditions. The neglect of Africa is all the more pronounced for the fact that the continent is home to Morocco.

For years the issue of the Western Sahara was taboo in Morocco, something that was never spoken about in terms other than the official narrative – i.e., the Western Sahara is an ineluctable part of Morocco and always has been, end of story. More recently the taboo has lessened somewhat, with Moroccan media less constrained in its reporting of the on-going negotiations and even contentious issues such as the Sahawri refugee camps in Tindouf.
speaks of Africa when Morocco is included; and of the AU when it is excluded.

At present, there could be no bitterer pill for Morocco to swallow than a resumption of its place at the African table while SADR still occupied a seat. For Rabat this would be tantamount to an acceptance of the AU position. This is not technically the case, according to a senior legal expert at the AU, however. Morocco could take up AU membership without _de facto_ recognition of the SADR, not least since a large number of African countries do not recognise (or have derecognised) the entity diplomatically. And the AU Charter does not allow for the exclusion of states once they have become members: it has no power of de-recognition or expulsion (although there is nothing that prevents the revision of the Constitutive Act either by consensus or, ‘failing which, by a two-third majority’ of the AU Assembly to provide for such a possibility – an outcome that Morocco is likelier to achieve within the AU, rather than outside of it).72

The AU has been at pains to remind Morocco it left the OAU, an organisation which no longer exists. In taking up membership of the AU, Morocco would be joining a more effective continental organisation of far greater promise than its much maligned predecessor. If Morocco becomes a member of the AU, it will be ‘speaking as part of Africa on African issues – you are part of the software and hardware of Africa – and you can access African markets which are moving to integration.’

Conversely, should the UN-sponsored talks on the Western Sahara finally result in a political settlement, it will be deeply embarrassing for the AU to have a member state that exists in name only. Over time, the AU’s partial position towards the Western Sahara conflict will almost certainly erode its credibility as a continental body. One could go further still and assert that the fundamental principles and objectives of the AU – uphold African unity and deepen continental integration – are threatened by Morocco’s continuing absence. The current security crisis in the region, together with other emergent dynamics which should promote much greater cooperation and integration, have created a significant opportunity to bring Morocco back into the African family, though it may prove short-lived.

The dispute over the Western Sahara was once inextricably linked to the Cold War; riven by ideological differences and evincing many of the attributes of a classic East–West proxy war. Today the conflict is deeply enmeshed in the politics of the Maghreb and the wider region, in particular the struggle for dominance between Algeria and Morocco. This is not to say that self-determination and sovereignty are not central to understanding the dispute and any viable resolution, but rather that future developments on the Western Sahara will be measured more by political decisions made in Rabat and Algiers than these core principles. A staunch supporter of Western Sahara’s right to statehood, Olusegun Obasanjo, has nevertheless also acknowledged that no movement on this issue is possible without a renewed diplomatic dialogue between the two rivals. In the former

---

In taking up membership of the AU, Morocco would be joining a more effective continental organisation of far greater promise than its much maligned predecessor.

---

The current security crisis in the region, together with other emergent dynamics, have created a significant opportunity to bring Morocco back into the African family, though it may prove short-lived.

---

Since a large number of African countries do not recognise (or have derecognised) the entity diplomatically. And the AU Charter does not allow for the exclusion of states once they have become members: it has no power of de-recognition or expulsion (although there is nothing that prevents the revision of the Constitutive Act either by consensus or, ‘failing which, by a two-third majority’ of the AU Assembly to provide for such a possibility – an outcome that Morocco is likelier to achieve within the AU, rather than outside of it).72

The AU has been at pains to remind Morocco it left the OAU, an organisation which no longer exists. In taking up membership of the AU, Morocco would be joining a more effective continental organisation of far greater promise than its much maligned predecessor. If Morocco becomes a member of the AU, it will be ‘speaking as part of Africa on African issues – you are part of the software and hardware of Africa – and you can access African markets which are moving to integration.’

Conversely, should the UN-sponsored talks on the Western Sahara finally result in a political settlement, it will be deeply embarrassing for the AU to have a member state that exists in name only. Over time, the AU’s partial position towards the Western Sahara conflict will almost certainly erode its credibility as a continental body. One could go further still and assert that the fundamental principles and objectives of the AU – uphold African unity and deepen continental integration – are threatened by Morocco’s continuing absence. The current security crisis in the region, together with other emergent dynamics which should promote much greater cooperation and integration, have created a significant opportunity to bring Morocco back into the African family, though it may prove short-lived.

The dispute over the Western Sahara was once inextricably linked to the Cold War; riven by ideological differences and evincing many of the attributes of a classic East–West proxy war. Today the conflict is deeply enmeshed in the politics of the Maghreb and the wider region, in particular the struggle for dominance between Algeria and Morocco. This is not to say that self-determination and sovereignty are not central to understanding the dispute and any viable resolution, but rather that future developments on the Western Sahara will be measured more by political decisions made in Rabat and Algiers than these core principles. A staunch supporter of Western Sahara’s right to statehood, Olusegun Obasanjo, has nevertheless also acknowledged that no movement on this issue is possible without a renewed diplomatic dialogue between the two rivals. In the former
has been, for instance, no progress on the timing and terms of a popular referendum. Moreover, there are a number of mechanisms and concepts in the conflict resolution ‘ toolkit’ – such as associate statehood, shared sovereignty, free association and so on – that have not yet been adequately considered by either camp. The 2007 autonomy proposal currently put forward by Morocco as the sole basis of its approach to negotiations has not proved acceptable to SADR, though arguably too little has been done to rethink some of its core arrangements.

Decentralisation would provide a vehicle to satisfy the cultural, political and economic aspirations of hitherto voiceless communities and tribes

Considerable attention has turned to the roadmap for regionalisation announced by the King in November 2008 and emboldened two years later with the creation of the Advisory Committee on Regionalisation (CCR). The stated objective of the CCR is to insert autonomy for Western Sahara into a larger framework of regionalism in Morocco, broadly based on the Spanish model. In theory, this would give far greater scope for Morocco’s long-neglected regions to run their own affairs and eventually result in the establishment of local governments. Decentralisation would provide a vehicle to satisfy the cultural, political and economic aspirations of hitherto voiceless communities and tribes, which could become a template for the wider region.

To be sure, the Western Sahara question cannot be tackled in isolation from dynamics which affect all countries in the region: ‘by resolving Western Sahara, you don’t really resolve the wider problem; the region is infinitely more complex than that’. The Sahara Desert represents an area bigger than the United States, yet it does not make up a state but part of one. Any political settlement on the Western Sahara is likely to have ramifications for other countries in the region – such as Mauritania, Algeria and Libya – which have within their borders the potential for other Saharan states. It is worth recalling that the forefathers of the Polisario, after all, wanted to liberate the entire Sahara region not just the present-day territory of the Western Sahara. When weighing up the viability of any strategy, for the Western Sahara as much as other existing or simmering conflicts, the region’s history speaks to the acute importance of identity. The region comprises some of the poorest populations in the world but also some of the strongest identities, most of which are not confined to one state. In attempting to forge a common will of living together, the colonial legacy does not necessarily point to the most effective means to promote stability, prosperity and safeguard peoples’ identities.

Thinking in ‘regionalisation’ terms may be sensible in theory for all states in the region, but diplomatically for Morocco a heavy emphasis on regionalisation may have the opposite effect as negotiations over the Western Sahara. The symbolism of the date of the King’s announcement of the regionalism proposal in 2008 – the 33rd anniversary of the Green March, when hundreds of thousands of Moroccans crossed into the Western Sahara to assert its sovereignty over the territory – was not lost on anyone. However sincere the proposal, in diplomatic terms it is likely to widen the gap because it negates any claims of distinctiveness on the part of SADR; in effect the Western Sahara becomes one of several equally distinct claims within one Moroccan nation.

The region comprises some of the poorest populations in the world but also some of the strongest identities, most of which are not confined to one state

At present Morocco is a highly centralised state, which is one of the reasons many analysts have argued that the autonomy proposal would prove unworkable. At the same time, the instincts of Morocco’s relatively young King are reformist. Morocco is not a democracy but its process of democratisation is more advanced than any country in the region. The Western Sahara will be an important litmus test. Progressive minds are under no illusions about the
strength of the nationalist sentiment in Western Sahara. For all Morocco’s investment in the territory and concerted efforts to bring a Sahrawi elite into the establishment, there is no avoiding the continuing perception on the ground of an occupation, complete with endless checkpoints, mistreatment by security forces and the like. That does not make independence any more of a panacea, but it does illustrate that Morocco has much work to do to counter the almost irresistible lure of self-determination.

Further internal reform would reinforce the seriousness of the autonomy proposal and help address the problematic question of hybridity (democracy inside monarchical-based rule). One of the leading Moroccan analysts of the plan, Abdelhamid El Ouali, suggests that it confirms ‘the irreversibility of the process of democratisation which the country is experiencing, as autonomy has its own requisites, the most significant being the effective implementation of democracy on both national and local scale. Territorial autonomy is so associated and interwoven with democracy that the former is unimaginable without the latter.’ Although Morocco’s fiercest critics regard the proposal as nothing more than a ruse to avoid a referendum, within the Kingdom there is a deep conviction in the ‘autonomy’ concept as the most promising and viable means to address the Western Sahara question. Over the past 30 years, Rabat’s diplomacy has been underpinned by the belief that the liberation struggle will turn out to be a ‘blip in the longue durée’, an idea that will eventually burn itself out, just as many self-determination movements have, over time, been compelled to scale back their once-steadfast ambitions for statehood. The autonomy plan suggests that Rabat is genuinely committed to altering the status quo, but the proof may well rest in its acceptance of some previously unthinkable compromises.

A number of constructive ideas have been put forward by legal experts and political analysts that might, conceivably, soften opposition to the autonomy plan amongst SADR officials and their supporters. Some specific proposals, such as the removal (in a final agreement) of language expressly forbidding secession, would doubtless meet with fierce resistance in Morocco. Yet the act of recognising a ‘moral right to secede’ could, in itself, give a measure of dignity to the Sahwari people that helps to build confidence in the negotiating process, even where there is unlikely to ever be consensus on the precise conditions under which both sides would allow for the ‘right’ to be exercised. Moreover, international experience has shown that autonomous arrangements are never likely to be perceived as concrete, fixed for all time, because the minority in multi-national states will always reserve the right to challenge them if they believe their core interests are at stake. The ‘permanent’ solution to secessionism is, in fact, a chimera. The recent push for a vote on independence in the Catalan region of Spain – the model for Morocco’s regionalisation strategy – emphasises the point. In reality, perhaps the best governments seeking to manage deep political and cultural cleavages within their midst can hope for is a modus vivendi, a second best solution.

The good news is that evidence from around the world suggests that Morocco’s process of democratisation and declared commitment to human rights, if realised, bodes well for a peaceful and viable agreement on the Western Sahara. The new constitution adopted in July 2011 outlines a more democratic future for Morocco, as well as a new emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel is explicitly highlighted, and it follows only the Maghreb and the umma (and precedes the Mediterranean world) in the document’s listing of Morocco’s regional priorities. The bad news is that Moroccan–African relations may have hit a high-water mark; in the absence of real progress on Morocco’s re-integration into the AU, we may not witness any further deepening of African–Moroccan relations but rather some significant reversals, especially in the political sphere. The AU is seeking to strengthen its internal cohesion in the face of serious and potentially divisive continental challenges. Some of the most troubling threats were laid
bare at the AU Summit in 2012, which was dominated by political and security crises – instability and the rise of ‘Jihadism’ in parts of West Africa and the Sahel, renewed violence in the DRC and the ongoing crisis between Sudan and South Sudan. And this was before France intervened in Mali.

The AU has buried its head in the Saharan sands for far too long. If it is to engage meaningfully on this issue, it must engage Morocco, SADR and, perhaps most consequentially, Algeria with new ideas and realistic avenues to break the impasse. It may suit AU leaders personally to avoid the highly contentious argument that there ought to be a different classification for a member if their final international status is still pending, but such evasion could eventually have serious consequences for the organisation, especially if more countries de-recognise the Western Sahara.

A Moroccan reversal would have some echoes in the current situation with Turkey and the European Union. For decades Turkey craved EU membership but was kept outside the Union for various political and cultural reasons. Today, many would argue that newly-confident and economically powerful Turkey needs Europe, whose reputation has taken a beating due to political infighting and financial crises, a lot less than Europe needs Turkey – though it remains to be seen how strong the pull of membership still is in Ankara. ‘The clock is winding down’, according to one expert, ‘you could push Morocco so far away that it never comes back.’

The political instability and insecurity sweeping across a growing expanse of Africa highlight the importance of not just regional efforts but indeed a trans-regional strategy to counter the proliferation of armed groups and tackle the key, inter-locking drivers of conflict. Morocco has a vital role to play, but its contribution will be circumscribed so long as the Western Sahara issue infects relations within the key body which should be leading the fight – the AU.

This analysis was complemented by several interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012 with officials in Morocco, Addis Ababa (African Union) and South Africa, many of whom spoke on condition of anonymity.

Endnotes

2 When the Gaddafi regime in Libya collapsed in October 2011 due to an Arab Spring uprising, up to 5 000 Touareg from Mali, who had been recruited into Libya’s armed forces and were fighting on behalf of the dictator, returned to Mali. ‘Resentful and well-armed’, the Touaregs’ successful operations against Mali’s military led to the ongoing political and security crises affecting the country. See, for instance, http://www.opendemocracy.net/george-joff%C3%A9/chaos-in-sahel.
3 Interview with Professor Mohammed Benhammou, Moroccan Centre for Strategic Studies, Rabat, 29 November 2012.
7 For a discussion of Touareg groups’ aims, see http://www.andymorganwrites.com/what-do-the-touareg-want/?fb_action_id=1015219959477195&fb_action_types=og.likes&fb_source=aggregation&fb_aggregation_id=24695925417366.
8 See, for instance, Jacob Mundy and Stephen Zunes, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict, Resolution, 2010); Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman (eds.), The International Dimension of the Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); Ali Bahajoub, Western Sahara Conflict: Historical, Regional and International Dimensions (London: North–South Books, 2010); Toby Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara:
MOROCCO AND THE AFRICAN UNION


From the Spanish abbreviation of Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro ('Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el-Hamra and Río de Oro').

Mauritania withdrew from the fight in 1979 and recognised SADR's sovereignty, although Moroccan forces quickly moved into the areas it vacated.


Throughout the 1990s Moroccan actions, in particular, served to bog the voter identification process down through a series of appeals based on a much wider interpretation of 'eligibility' than SADR's, as described pointedly by Jeremy Harding, 'Behind the Sandwall', *London Review of Books* (Vol. 28, No. 4, 2006).


At the instigation of Morocco's King Hassan, an Implementation Committee, mandated by the OAU assembly to work out the modalities of a cease-fire and referendum, was established in 1981. It held its second ordinary session in Nairobi, on 8–9 February 1982, which was preceded by a meeting of the Foreign Ministers which drew up details of the referendum and the cease-fire. OAU Doc.AHG/IMPC/WS/Dec.2, (II), Rev.2., 8–9 February 1982.


18 The other surviving member is Mali's former president Moussa Traoré. Aside from then Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Traoré, the ad hoc committee comprised the heads of state of Guinea, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Sudan.


20 Interview with Olusegun Obasanjo, 12 February 2013.

21 Morocco also has a free trade agreement with the United States, in effect since 2006. Bilateral trade in goods between the two countries is valued in excess of $2 billion per year.


23 Ibid.


25 Correspondence with senior AU official, 7 December 2010.


27 Correspondence with senior AU official, 7 December 2010.


29 Communication with Ali Bahaijoub, 6 June 2011.

30 See http://www.itca.hcp.ma/.

31 Statement to parliament in Rabat on 4 November 2011 by Morocco’s minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, Taib Fassi Fihri.

32 Kingdom of Morocco: Ministry of Finance and Economy (Royaume du Maroc: Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances), Study and Financial Planning Department (Direction des Études et des Prévisions Financières), Point sur les relations du Maroc avec les pays de l’Afrique Subsaharienne, Mai 2010, 7 (brief on Morocco’s relations with sub-Saharan states).

parliamentary-question-dirco-saharawi-sudan-ivory-coast-asean-etc&catid=53:People&Itemid=117.

34 See http://www.afrol.com/articles/13961.


37 French Brigadier General Jean Maurin reiterated France’s support for the autonomy plan in his address to the Marrakech Security Forum, the largest annual security forum held in Africa, 25 January 2013.


39 Correspondence with senior AU official, 8 December 2010.

40 Ibid. It is unclear how ‘official’ – or, more importantly, how prescriptive – this position is. A 2005 AU Commission report by then Deputy Chair Patrick Mazimhaka effectively concluded that the independence of Somaliland would not necessarily be problematic for the AU. ‘Objectively viewed,’ the 2005 report states, ‘the case should not be linked to the notion of “opening a Pandora’s box”’. Yet the status of Somaliland has not changed despite this ‘position’.


42 Ibid.

43 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

44 Spector, Op cit., p. 112.


46 Interview with a senior Moroccan government official, Rabat, 29 November 2012.


49 Benjamin P. Nickels. ‘Morocco’s Engagement with the Sahel Community’, 3 January 2013, see http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/03/morocco-s-engagement-with-sahel-community/ez1k.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.


54 Ibid.


58 Ibid, p. 87.


60 Nickels, Op cit.

61 Lesser et al., Op cit., p. 39.


64 Statement by IMF managing director Dominque Strauss-Kahn following a report on the Article IV consultation with Morocco compiled in July 2008.

65 Failings in education and literacy are the main factors behind Morocco's relatively poor ranking on the UN Human Development Index (117 out of 172 countries in the 2010 survey).

66 Communication with Ali Bahaijoub, 6 June 2011.


68 Lesser et al., Op cit., p. 15.

69 See http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/10/03/121091.html.

70 Interview with Abdelhayy Moudden, 30 November 2012, Rabat.

71 Ibid.
72 Correspondence with senior AU official, 15 November 2010.
73 Interview with Obasanjo, Op cit.
74 Spector, Op cit.
76 Interview with former advisor to King Mohammed VI of Morocco, 28 November 2012, Rabat.
78 Interview with former advisor to King Mohammed VI of Morocco, Op cit.
79 One prominent example being Morocco’s ambassador to Spain, who is a Saharwi. Another is the appointment of Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz’s own father – a retired Moroccan army non-commissioned officer – to the Royal Consultative Council on Saharan Affairs.
80 Interview with former senior Moroccan UN official, 30 November 2012, Rabat.
81 Khakee, Op cit.
82 Interview with Mustapha Machrafi, 28 November 2012, Rabat.
83 Harding, Op cit.
86 Interview with Machrafi, Op cit.
The following information is from a generally reliable source but it has not been corroborated by other sources.

According to a member of Polisario’s National Secretariat, the Front is split between two points of view concerning negotiations with Morocco. The most recent meetings of the National Secretariat, which were supposed to be devoted to preparations for Polisario’s 40th anniversary celebrations in three months, saw divergent opinions emerge. Some insisted that everything had to be done to demonstrate that the stalemate is Morocco’s responsibility. Those who argued for this position underlined that the suspension of family visits between Tindouf and Laayoune late January feeds into this strategy of putting Morocco on the defensive. The visits were suspended by Polisario in protest at the Moroccan police’s security measures against families coming from Tindouf. Mohamed Abdelaziz, the secretary general of Polisario, is one of those in favour of this line. The other point of view, upheld by a minority of participants, was that everything should be done to push for a quick resumption of UN-sponsored talks with Morocco. This faction argued that there is no other realistic way forward in this difficult regional context. Ahmed Salem Ould Salek, Polisario’s foreign minister – who two years ago used to insist that negotiations “serve no useful purpose” - was among those arguing in favour of the latter option.

A member of a Sahrawi NGO based in Algiers said the heavy jail sentences (25-30 years) recently handed down by Moroccan military courts on 24 Sahrawi activists were greeted with relief by Polisario leaders. Mohamed Abdelaziz described them before a closed-door meeting as a “godsend” and ordered that a file be prepared presenting the trials as an “exemplary case of Moroccan colonial practices in the Sahara”. For Mohamed Abdelaziz this was not a trial of youths who had attacked policemen in November 2010, but of young activists struggling for the freedom of their country. These trials will be given a prominent place at Polisario’s 40th anniversary celebration, the Polisario general secretary added.
This is something I believe Morocco could partner with the US on. Ed
Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan meets with French President Francois Hollande to discuss security issues

[Essam Mohamed]

Magharebia, by Essam Mohamed (Tripoli, Libya, Feb. 25, 2013) – Libya wants to secure its borders, build a national army and set up a police force. Now the country's leaders are looking for outside help to make it happen.

Italy, France, the United States, Britain, and India have put forth proposals to help Libya secure its borders and maintain order, Prime Minister Ali Zidan said on Thursday (February 21st). Libya and Turkey were already co-operating in terms of training, defence and security equipment.

"We're committed to reaching the best," the premier said.

With its 3,000 kilometres of land borders, Libya is determined to thwart traffickers and terrorists from taking advantage of the country's terrain.

Libya will be working with other countries to co-ordinate ways to secure its southern borders, as agreed upon during the February 16th Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) summit, Zidan said.

"We have discussed... border security with the French President," Prime Minister Zidan told reporters after meeting with Francois Hollande in Paris on February 13th.

Meanwhile, the Friends of Libya met in Paris on February 12th and pledged security support to the country's nascent democratic government.

"Much has already been achieved but issues remain," French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said in his opening address to the gathering.
International partners should send "experts to train Libyan security forces and police, and help to rebuild the army, navy and air force", he added.

The partners confirmed their full support for the interim government in its determination to implement a plan to enhance national security, boost justice and rule of law, and build a democratic, prosperous and stable state.

Libya's Foreign Minister Mohammed Abdel Aziz told the Paris event that Libya did not need troops, but training.

"What we're asking of our international partners is to help us with training and rehabilitation, and the transfer of advanced technology to protect our long borders and shores," he said.

The Friends of Libya welcomed the EU decision to send a civil mission from the European Common Security and Defence Policy by June 2013 to help manage the border.

"Controlling the border will spare Libya a lot of problems, especially arms smuggling and the smuggling of Africans to Europe, which Kadhafi was using to pressure Europe," journalist Miftah Belaid said.

"We're suffering from these border-related problems, especially from the entry of drugs… The assistance from the West to is a step to help build the new, free Libya," civil servant Kamela Ali said.
An Algerian merchant named Karim Yahi arrived in Casablanca for a trade fair in January, upon which time he was detained by Moroccan police with no apparent grounds for arrest and was held in the Maârif police station for four days. Then, upon releasing him from jail, Moroccan authorities refused to return his passport for two months, forcing him to live with acquaintances in Casablanca. The Algerian Consulate in Casablanca is reportedly still following the case.

Khalid Alioua, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research and former director of Crédit Immobilier Hôtelier (CIH), was allowed to leave jail on Monday for four days to attend the interment of his mother. He is being prosecuted for embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds and abuse of power during his tenure as head of CIH. King Mohammed VI gave Alioua his personal condolences for his mother’s death.

In a recent media release, Hamid Chabat, Secretary General of the Istiqlal Party, stated that his party’s alliance with the Islamists [PJD] was only "temporary, not strategic" and that it would end in 2016. These statements enraged the Deputy of PJD, Abdelaziz Aftati, who believes that these kind of statements are a provocation and that "those who want to confront the PJD must do so here and now, not later."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>L’École Hassania en péril</strong></td>
<td>March 5, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>La Fondation de l’éducation pour l’emploi (EFE-Maroc) fait son bilan</strong></td>
<td>March 5, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohammédia : 3 personnes arrêtées en flagrant délit pour escroquerie dans une affaire d’immigration clandestine</strong></td>
<td>March 5, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Six mineurs sahraouis enlevés et torturés à El Aaiun occupée par les autorités marocaines</strong></td>
<td>March 5, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan authorities</td>
<td>Minister of Communication Mustapha Khalfi has drafted a new press law that would expand the regime’s discretion in prosecuting journalists and restrict freedom of the press. The new draft law would ban the publishing of words, images, or films deemed immoral. It bans material that contains “pornographic” content that would incite “debauchery, adultery, or crime.” Publishing such material would be punishable by a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 dirhams. Furthermore, publishing material deemed to be offensive to any members of the royal family would be punishable by 3 to 5 years in prison and a fine of 10,000 to 100,000 dirhams. Under this law, the police would have absolute discretion to seize any materials they consider to be in violation of these restrictions. The article describes the law as giving the police a &quot;blank check&quot; to punish those who publish materials that they deem to be morally offensive or offensive to the person of the King or the royal family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 7, 2013</td>
<td>March 7, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projet de code de la presse. La morale, une &quot;ligne rouge&quot; supplémentaire?</th>
<th>Draft law on the press. Morality, another &quot;red line&quot;?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morocco: Bullying a vehicle body-builder, the magistrate is suspended from duty</th>
<th>After two huge protests in Midelt (5,000-7,000 attend the first protest and 10,000 attended the second, in support of Himmi Moulay Hicham, a young mechanic forced to kiss the feet of Said Fareh, prosecutor the court of first instance in Midelt); Fareh has been suspended of all judicial duties. As a judge, Said Fareh enjoyed judicial immunity, “yet with the direct intervention of the Minister he has lost his immunity and will thus be judged like any other citizen” says Mourad Chqondi, vice-president of the AMDH.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 7, 2013</td>
<td>March 7, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sebta : Une association dénonce des discriminations contre les travailleuses marocaines</th>
<th>On International Women’s Day, the Association for the Dignity of Women and Children protested discrimination against Moroccan women working in Ceuta. According to the Association, Moroccan women in Ceuta are often recruited into jobs with little stability and with a high potential for abuse, such as domestic work and the service industry, and are often forced into “degrading and precarious” work situations. They receive very little compensation, and have little to no access to education or health care.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 8, 2013</td>
<td>March 8, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| L'Université George Washington | George Washington University received on Thursday Sahrawi Human Rights official Aminatou Haidar, who was visiting Washington DC and New York to plead the cause of Western Sahara and denounce violations of human rights against Sahrawis in Morocco. In a panel discussion |
George Washington University receives the Sahrawi militant Aminatou Haidar

March 8, 2013

presented to students, teachers and representatives of U.S. organizations of human rights, Ms. Haidar explained the brutal and bloody repression led by Morocco, through arbitrary arrests, beatings, incommunicado detention, torture, rape, extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, burying Sahrawis alive and the ejection from helicopters. Accompanying her testimony she showed video recordings depicting scenes of repression by Moroccan forces shot secretly in the occupied Saharawi territories. In addition to this conference in Washington, Ms. Haidar has also participated in a meeting held last Tuesday at the UN Headquarters by the Robert F. Kennedy for justice and human rights.

Pour la première fois, la CDG sous la loupe de la Cour des comptes

For the first time, the CDG is under the magnifying glass of the Court of Accounts

March 8, 2013

The CDG, Morocco’s state fund, is being audited for the first time in a process that is being undertaken with the utmost discretion. The fund had previously been criticized for its opacity, and numerous financial institutions affiliated with it experienced serious financial mismanagement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Update Title/ Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Response?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Arabiya</strong></td>
<td><strong>Morocco, EU begin talks on free-trade accord</strong> March 1, 2013</td>
<td>EU Commission head Jose Manuel Barroso met with PM Abdelilah Benkirane on Friday to discuss the terms of a Morocco-EU free trade agreement. According to Barroso, such a deal “will give each better access to the other’s markets and improve the business climate in a way that will make it more predictable and stable.”</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Morocco, Spain discuss security partnership</strong> March 1, 2013</td>
<td>Moroccan Interior Minister-Delegate Cherki Drais and Spanish State Secretary for Security Francisco Martinez Vazquez met on Tuesday (February 26th) in Rabat to discuss bilateral cooperation. Both sides discussed the various aspects of security cooperation, specifically in regards to organised trans-border crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. They also agreed to make the passage through checkpoints smoother.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activists debate Morocco right to rally</strong> March 6, 2013</td>
<td>Moroccan human rights activists met in Rabat on Saturday (March 2nd) to discuss the people’s right to demonstrate despite the sometimes forceful response from authorities. Mohamed Nouhi, Chairman of the Moroccan Centre for Human Rights believes that such revisions will “be in line with international human rights mechanisms ratified by Morocco”.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong></td>
<td><strong>UpM project to assist Morocco women entrepreneurs</strong> March 6, 2013</td>
<td>The Union for the Mediterranean (UpM) announced that it will launch a project aimed at helping young, female entrepreneurs in Morocco. The project is set to be launched in April.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sahara Press Service</strong></td>
<td><strong>Morocco takes “great risk” by condemning 24 Sahrawi activists (AARASD)</strong> March 2, 2013</td>
<td>Regine Villemont, president of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic’s Friends Association in France (AARASD), stated on Saturday that Morocco took a great risk by sentencing the 24 Sahrawis involved in the 2010 Gdem Izik riots. In her opinion, this trial demonstrates that Morocco does not abide by international democratic and human rights conventions, and these convictions could well spark a second crisis like Gdeim Izik. Furthermore, Abba Heisan, Secretary General of the Saharawi Jurists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Eurasia Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union,</strong> stated that Moroccan security forces have been subjecting the 24 jailed Sahrawis to torture.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Council on Human Rights (CNDH) adopted 4 thematic reports at its Fourth Ordinary Session. The first of these reports concerns the contributions of the CNDH to the Constitutional Court. The second report lays out the Council’s proposals relating to the “exception of unconstitutionality” clause, which would allow a party in a lawsuit raise concerns of the constitutionality of the law in question. The third report concerns military court reform, and recommends that civilians not be tried in military courts, and the fourth report concerns the separation of power and independence of the judiciary. A representative of the King stated that he welcomed the approach and contents of the report, and is dedicated to continually foster the values of democracy in Morocco.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### View From Fez

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moroccan News Brief #89: Morocco aims to be among top 20 tourist destinations in the world</th>
<th>March 3, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysts at the Oxford Business Group (OBG) recently released a report that Morocco is well positioned to “claim itself among the top 20 tourist destinations in the world”. The report states that the Kingdom &quot;continues its efforts to achieve this goal despite the difficulties related to the impact of instability in the region and the current crisis in the Eurozone.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), Philippe de Fontaine Vive, applauded Morocco’s record and exceptional cooperation in 2012. Morocco, he said, is the first recipient of this action and this new “unprecedented” commitment of nearly one billion euros of financing in 2012. It also shows “the strong commitment &quot;of the EIB-FEMIP to support the transition to a new form of innovative and more inclusive growth in Morocco.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Moroccan Zorro - Unmasked</td>
<td>March 4, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounir Agueznay, the young man who has been nicknamed &quot;the sniper of Targuist&quot; has spent the last six years recording the actions of corrupt policemen. His first video revealed drivers handing money to the police. The video went viral in both the Arabic and Western media, yet his identity was not discovered. At the time, the local police tried hard to discover his identity but the community protected him. The authorities in Targuist strongly suspected Agueznay, but after failing to catch him they turned on his family. &quot;To get their revenge, they arrested my brother Radouane last October and accused him of drug dealing. He was sentenced to one year in prison,&quot; Agueznay said.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moroccan Tourism Off</th>
<th>March 4, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan tourism has expanded in the first weeks of 2013, with a 3% increase in the month of January as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Morocco seeks energy salvation in sunshine, wind

**Arabian Business**

March 6, 2013

Morocco, one of the world’s most energy-poor countries, intends to make up its energy deficit with new projects in solar and wind power. Morocco currently imports 95% of its energy needs, and last year energy comprised over a quarter of the country’s total imports. Morocco hopes to cut 2.5 million tons of oil from its imports with these new projects.

### Morocco bars four MEPs

**European Voice**

March 6, 2013

Four members of the European Parliament were barred from entering Western Sahara. They had planned on entering Western Sahara on a fact-finding mission on the state of human rights in the territory. The group of MEPs was comprised of several political parties, and one of them, far-left Spanish MEP Willy Meyer, had been barred from entering the territory in the past. This was not an official delegation from the European Parliament, and while they had informed the EU’s president and foreign policy chief of their intention to visit Western Sahara, they had not informed European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso, who on Friday launched trade talks with Morocco.

### The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) will continue to support the implementation of the Agadir agreement; which was signed in Rabat, Morocco on 25 February 2004, between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

**Daily News Egypt**

March 4, 2013

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) will continue to support the implementation of the Agadir agreement; which was signed in Rabat, Morocco on 25 February 2004, between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The Agadir agreement aims at establishing a free trade area between the four countries. It is a crucial step towards the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. It includes liberalising trade for industrial products, agricultural and processed agricultural products, and trade in services.

### Morocco’s Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Youssef Amrani visited NATO headquarters for the first time on Tuesday 5 March 2013. He met with Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and the two discussed Moroccan-NATO relations and Morocco’s role in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

**NATO News**

March 5, 2013

Morocco’s Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Youssef Amrani visited NATO headquarters for the first time on Tuesday 5 March 2013. He met with Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and the two discussed Moroccan-NATO relations and Morocco’s role in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Since it joined the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994, Morocco has played an active role in missions such as the anti-terrorism mission in the Mediterranean, the SFOR mission in Bosnia, and the KFOR mission in Kosovo.
solar and wind energy programs, and eventually export some of the energy produced through these programs to European countries. There are, however, some concerns about the projects, including the potential environmental impact and difficulties in finding funding.

| Bernama | International Narcotics Control Board Highlights Morocco's Role In Drgs War | The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has released a report highlighting Morocco’s role in fighting drug trafficking. It notes that the Moroccan government has undertaken a number of measures against drug trafficking, including tightening border and coastal control, training border police in using new detection technologies, strategies to prevent the use of light aircraft in drug trafficking, and improved cooperation with international law enforcement agencies such as INTERPOL. The report also specifically praises the Moroccan government for its strategies in decreasing the production and use of cannabis in the country. | 0 |

| Mail & Guardian | Morocco's Parliament Pledges to Change Rape Law | The Moroccan Parliament and judiciary have already stated that they support overturning the controversial Article 475. This article also outlines a movement on the part of some left-leaning parties in Parliament to officially ban all child marriage, citing language in the 2011 constitution. While the 2004 Family Law reforms state that the minimum age of marriage is 18, many judges overlook that, and it’s estimated that as many as 10% of Moroccan girls are married as minors. | 1 |

| Afrique Jet | Morocco, Libya agree to strengthen economic ties | Moroccan Minister of Industry, Trade and new technologies, Abdelkader Amar, and his Libyan counterpart, Suleiman Ali Latif al-Faytouri discussed ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the industrial field through the establishment of companies and increasing mutual visits. | 0 |
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Sunday, March 10, 2013 11:41 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: situation report on Algeria

The source of this information is very reliable and provides solid analysis based on a recent visit there. This information has not been corroborated by third parties.

Politics
First, on politics, the sense in Algiers is that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and his advisors are going to shortly orchestrate a constitutional reform that will change the presidential term limit from its current maximum of three five-year terms to two seven-year terms. In addition, the constitutional reform will introduce a vice presidency, something that has been batted about for four or five years, largely by Bouteflika himself who whinges about Algeria’s parliamentary system leaving him less than a full president, but not entirely oblivious to the fact that his own health is likely to soon leave him a dead president. Any Algerian president does have legitimate grievances with Algeria’s half parliamentary/half presidential system. But the real driver to the amendments is to figure out how to transition to a post-Bouteflika era with as few disruptions as possible. The amendments would effectively extend Bouteflika’s presidency by two years. Bouteflika would no longer be in the final year of his third term, but fifth year of his second term. This approach seems to be the best compromise for the moment: it postpones potential destabilizing elections currently slated for 2014 in which there do not appear to be any credible candidates; it avoids the uncomfortable and unmanageable situation that Bouteflika does indeed win a fourth five-year term in 2014, but dies midway; and assuming that the vice president is in effect Algeria’s first post-Bouteflika president, it resolves the succession issue.

The problem with this approach is that it simply kicks the can down the road. It is easy to imagine that the four-month debate over who was to become prime minister after the 2012 legislative elections will look like a petty squabble compared to the fight over who should be vice president. The fight for prime minister was intense because there were suspicions that whoever won was effectively being tapped to replace Bouteflika, but these were ultimately untrue. Were the position of vice president to be created, it will in fact be the case and the debate over who will be vice president will be proportionally more intense than that for prime minister. But perhaps kicking the can down the road is just what Algeria needs – nature will takes its course in the next several years and key decision-makers will no longer be with us, potentially freeing up the field for more workable solutions.

Security
On the security front, while the internet and Paris and Washington were buzzing about the possible deaths of AQIM leaders Abdelhamid Abou Zeid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Algiers was much more sanguine and no one paid it much mind. Obviously, it would be good if both Abou Zeid and Belmokhtar were dead – they deserve it – but in Algeria that seemed to be beside the point. Algeria has cut off the heads of many a snake only to see them grow back and the snakes’ venom evolve. Algiers is convinced that even if we have seen the end of AQIM in the Sahara, we have not seen the end of jihadi terrorists. The real point is who comes after Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid, what will happen to AQIM, how long the French intend to remain in Mali, and consequently how long there will be northerly pressure on Algeria’s southern border.

The reluctance to dwell on Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid’s fate was also in no small part likely due to the fact that the French and Chadians may have managed to accomplish in six weeks what Algeria had been unable to do in six years. When I was speaking with an official about Abou Zeid and Belmokhtar, I asked about Droukdel – after all, he’s only 40 miles from Algiers, so how can he still be alive? The official replied, “If there were no mice, what would cats do?”

Regarding oil sector security, the consensus in Algiers appears to be that the attack at the In Amenas gas facility in January was a one-off, both because of the attack’s objectives and because of the facility’s unique constellation of characteristics. Whether the immediate Algerian response did indeed serve as a deterrent for future attacks is an open question, but it does appear that the Algerian military response has been meaningful. There is a question about who and what those resources are – are they upper echelon troops or are they the dregs; are they competent and capable or just warm bodies with guns?
This raises another question that I intend to look into over the next several weeks. The relationship between the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) and Sonatrach has always been well understood. Likewise, the relationship between the MEM and the Prime Minister’s Office and the Presidency was closely watched. This was because the problems that the energy sector faced over the last decade were regulatory ones and the solutions to them were negotiated among the different political decision makers. In Amenas, however, introduced a new level of problems for the energy sector, namely, security. As a consequence, it’s important now to understand the relationship between the MEM and the Interior Ministry which is responsible for the Gendarmerie, as well as the relationship between the MEM and the Army Chief of Staff and the Defense Ministry.

Oil and Gas
Speaking specifically about the oil and gas sector, Minister of Energy and Mines Youcef Yousfi is in Houston promoting Algeria best he can and trying to salvage an upcoming bid round that has been undermined by the In Amenas attack. The bid round was intended to showcase new fiscal terms enshrined in the January 2013 hydrocarbons reform law, but oil companies are not enticed by new incentives, and it’s not just because of concerns about another In Amenas. In fact, In Amenas seems to have given IOCs a pretext for something that they were already looking for. IOCs think that the new terms are not attractive enough and they think that if they sit the next bid round out and make it fail, then they will be able to push the terms down even further. Sonatrach desperately needs new exploration activity and faced with another failed round, it would likely capitulate. In short, the IOCs have Sonatrach over the barrel and are showing no mercy.

Sonatrach itself is reeling from its own internal problems, including the indeterminate status of its CEO Abdelhamid Zerguine and the corruption scandal that is being called Sonatrach Deux. Following rumors that Yousfi had fired Zerguine last month, Zerguine is still in his position, as he himself said, “for the moment.” The perception in Algiers is that Zerguine is indeed out of a job, and only remains in his office because the media beat Yousfi to the punch. Not wanting to appear to have lost control of the situation, Yousfi kept Zerguine in office, but he’ll remain there only so long as it takes to find another replacement. The immediate consequence of this is that Zerguine is going about his work, but in a desultory manner. His vice presidents have picked up on this and are doing likewise.

Sonatrach Deux appears to be at once more interesting and more mundane than Sonatrach Un. If the first Sonatrach scandal in 2010 that resulted in the entire energy sector leadership being sacked was driven by a settling of scores between clans in the ruling elite, the current Sonatrach scandal does not have that same political component and seems to be genuinely aimed at reducing levels of corruption in the sector. On the one hand, Sonatrach Deux is not as salacious and intrigue-laden as the 2010 scandal. On the other hand, it is potentially more interesting because it raises real questions about how far the government is willing to go to pursue corruption, about how business was done at Sonatrach in the past and how it will be done in the future. Likewise, while many observers in Algeria dismissed Sonatrach Un as a political affair, as something internal to power struggles in the depths of political leadership, Sonatrach Deux is starting to take on a populist tone, which could compel political leadership to more sincerely pursue it. To be continued.

For the moment, Algiers is in a strange state – calm on the surface, but churning beneath. Outwardly, people and politicians are going about their business as usual, even if a little more distractedly, but there’s a sense that the next shoe is about to drop. That sense is not entirely one of foreboding, but also one of anticipation – perhaps this is the break-out that Algeria has been waiting for, that this is the moment that Algeria will begin to realize its full potential.

Walking with an official on a rainy night under Martyrs’ Monument (a monument, the official wryly pointed out, that had been built by SNC-Lavalin, a potential target of the current corruption investigations) we were talking about Algerian nationalism. “Algerians love their country and they’re proud of it, but they’re frustrated with the current situation. Algeria could be so much more.”

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
For your information please see below. This information is from a generally reliable source although it has not been corroborated by third parties. Thank you, Ed

Begin message: Regarding French supermajor Total's contract with ONHYM for the Anzarane block off the coast of Western Sahara, which is currently up for renewal, pro-Saharawi groups in France are looking at ways of bringing pressure to bear to prevent this, including possibly taking the case to the European Court of Justice (along similar lines to legal challenges last year to the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Morocco). A member of the Polisario leadership confirms that the SADR intends to “take the matter to the the European Court of Justice, and to the UN. The aim is not just to get Total’s contract for exploration off the Western Sahara coast cancelled, but restate the SADR's claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara.” END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com
**From:** Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 17, 2013 2:53 PM  
**To:** ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com  
**Subject:** FW: Twitter Monitoring March Week 2

**FYI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Update Title/ Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sebbar trace les grands traits des rapports thématiques du CNDH</td>
<td>Four thematic reports were written by the CNDH for the forum on &quot;Evaluation of the contribution of the NHRC Justice Reform in Morocco&quot; which were then submitted to the King. A recommendation from one of the reports is to amend the Code of Military Justice so that more civilians are tried before military courts. In terms of the Constitutional Court, recommendations focused on the right of litigants before the Court, the public nature of the sessions especially in terms of appeals, and to improve the representation of women. The latest report on the Higher Judicial Council recommends that the Board is responsible for overseeing all stages of the election of its members, as well as internal promotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samira Sitail compare Benkirane à Kadhafi</td>
<td>Samira Sitail, deputy director of the public television channel 2M, angered Benkirane by comparing him to Muammar Gaddafi and Fidel Castro. Samira Sitail, which prides herself of her close connections to the palace and the royal adviser Fouad Ali El Himma, is accused of using the public broadcaster funding towards a political agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deux projets sociaux pour les enfants et les jeunes souffrant d'addictions</td>
<td>Two social projects were launched today (March 12) by King Mohammed VI. They are intended to support young people with addictive behaviors and improve conditions of hospitalized children admitted to the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire (CHU) Hassan II. The first project will be built in Doukkarate. It will include a center for social support, risk reduction, and a medical center. The cost is estimated to be 5 million dirhams, funded equally by the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity and the Ministry of Interior. The second project, will be a space of socio-educational support and training for children who have been hospitalized for a long time, allowing them to better withstand their disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 2013</td>
<td>Two men were sentenced to 10 and 5 months in prison, respectively, for fraud and theft of electricity. They were arrested in early February in connection to an investigation undertaken by the Royal Gendarmerie after protests in the slum of Sidi Taibi in which residents called for their homes to be connected to water and electricity. A local Labor Party official was sentenced to 10 months in prison and a 500dh fine for fraud, and a local electrician was sentenced to 5 months in prison and a 500dh fine for theft of electricity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 2013</td>
<td>Over the past ten years, Amazigh-language periodicals have been disappearing, to the point that there is only one Amazigh newspaper left (&quot;Le Monde Amazigh&quot;). All of the Amazigh language periodicals failed due to financial concerns, and now &quot;Le Monde Amazigh&quot; also appears to be in financial trouble. According to the article, one of the main factors behind the financial issues that caused so many periodicals to fail was a lack of professionalism on the part of newspaper distributors and a lack of companies willing to purchase ad space in the newspapers; in essence, latent racism against the Amazigh appears to be putting the Amazigh press in danger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14, 2013</td>
<td>A participatory radio called &quot;E-joussour&quot; headquartered in Casablanca is scheduled to launch today (March 14) at the Cultural Fabric of Veterans Abattoirs. The inauguration will be an opportunity for the team to present its project and disseminate its first program on the &quot;Role of community radio stations in the promotion of women's rights&quot; in connection to the International Women's Day which was celebrated on March 8th. This initiative is funded in part by the European Union, and supported by the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters, International Media Support and Community Media Solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14, 2013</td>
<td>The local refinery, Samir, has stopped producing fuel because the state and Moroccan oil distributors insist on importing diesel from abroad, even if Samir can cover almost all of the local...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Menace de paralyser l'économie marocaine

A war of oil threatens to paralyze the Moroccan economy

**March 14, 2013**

Samir argues that there have been no shortages. In fact, the refinery has delivered 58,000 tons of fuel, which is more than the average 35,000 tons.

### L'AMDI veut se greffer aux ambassades

AMDI wants to add itself to embassies

**March 15, 2013**

The Moroccan Agency for Investment Development (AMDI) wants to increase its visibility with Morocco’s largest international investment partners by basing itself in their foreign missions. Currently, cooperation between AMDI and the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs is under discussion.

### Le PJD fait cavalier seul avec son plan législatif

The PJD rides solo with its legislative plan

**March 15, 2013**

Regarding the government’s legislative, it seems that the PJD is trying to force their own agenda at the expense of the majority and of the opposition with which it still refuses to discuss critical issues that affect the future of Morocco. "The legislative plan that has been developed in the context of a unilateral agenda without consultation is an attempt to deprive Parliament of its right to legislate," stated Lachgar Driss, first Secretary of the USFP. Moreover, since Chabat, leader of the Istiqlal, called for a new charter and a majority of the cabinet reshuffling, there has been a blatant discrepancy between the two main components of the majority fueling an already existing tension.

### Prevenir les violences sexuelles faites aux enfants

Preventing sexual violence against children

**March 15, 2013**

The Association for A Better Future for Our Children is organizing training sessions this week in Rabat for a program designed to prevent the sexual abuse of minors. The training program will teach program officials and educators how to handle potential abuse situations, parents on how to speak with their children on this topic and spot the signs of abuse, and children how to avoid potentially abusive situations. The Association intends to broadcast this program throughout the Middle East and Africa with the help of NGO partners in France and several African countries.
The following information is compiled from public and private sources. Its accuracy has not be verified.

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
March 15, 2013

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- Taking advantage of the attention that has been focussed on the south of the country in the wake of the In Amenas attack, trade unionists and the unemployed in Algeria’s southern wilayas have launched one of the broadest and most militant protest movements over socio-economic issues that the country has seen in years, prompting PM Sellal to issue dire warnings about “criminal gangs” seeking to split southern Algeria away from the north.
- At the same time, a number of corruption scandals involving figures formerly close to President Bouteflika, which had been thought to be closed cases, have returned with a vengeance.
- There are signs that the military – encouraged by the centre-stage role it has been given by the war in Mali and its repercussions in Algeria but irked by Bouteflika’s decision to grant the French over-flight rights and by disputes over commissions on defence procurement – is re-emerging as a political player. The resurgence of the corruption scandals may be a factor of this.
- In place of the old duumvirate made up of Bouteflika and DRS chief Tewfik, a more complex, three-way game, involving Bouteflika, Tewfik and the military, may be emerging in the run-up to the 2014 presidential election.

Foreign Relations

- With the French military battling AQMI and its allies very close to Algeria’s southern borders, a French general has praised Algiers as “our best ally in Mali”.
- President Bouteflika has nonetheless been happy to let the Russian Foreign Minister condemn, in the name of both their countries, outside intervention “in Mali and Syria”.
- Algiers’ efforts to acquire US-made armed drones have been predictably unsuccessful. The question of collaboration with the American drone capability in the Sahara remains open.

Security

- In a rare report of jihadist activity in the capital, one Algerian daily has claimed that the security forces apprehended a would-be suicide bomber in an Algiers suburb towards the end of February.
- Overall, however, AQMI in northern Algeria appears to be on the back foot at present and not well equipped to launch attacks in solidarity with its comrades in northern Mali.
- With the armed forces and the Energy Ministry still discussing how best to secure oil and gas facilities in the south of the country, a vehicle belonging to an Italian company was hijacked and stolen near Hassi Messaoud in early February.
- There have been suggestions that foreign oil companies will be prohibited from using private security firms to defend their installations in southern Algeria, with the army taking over this role.
- Sporadic reporting of mostly minor incidents on the southern and eastern borders continues, but may not be a full reflection of the real situation.
- Reports that one of AQMI’s main leaders in the Sahara, Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, has been killed are judged credible by French official sources.
Political Trends

Lambasted in the press for failing to address the nation during or immediately after the In Amenas siege in January, President Bouteflika finally addressed the subject in a message to mark Algeria's annual “martyr's day” (commemorating those who died in the war of liberation) on Feb. 18. In his statement – which was published by the official media rather than being delivered as a speech – Bouteflika lauded the commitment that inspired our brave soldiers in the great battle of In Amenas against the forces of evil and destruction [which] is the epitome of the legacy inherited from our martyrs [of the liberation war]. The heroes of this battle proved by their efficiency, precision, professionalism and triumph that they are the undisputed and indisputable successors of our brave martyrs and that the National People’s Army is truly a worthy successor to the National Liberation Army and the standard-bearer of victory and triumph in every battle engaged by the nation to protect its security, stability and sovereignty.

In a clear allusion to the upheavals that have shaken the region since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Bouteflika went on to call for “vigilance” and a reaffirmation of Algerian “love for the homeland and nationalism” in the face of the deplorable events and developments occurring here and there and all around us in more than one Arab country, [which] irrespective of their outer aspects, demonstrate the seriousness of what is happening behind the scenes.

A week later, another presidential statement – again, not delivered as a speech, but this time sent as a message to UGTA leader Abdelmadjid Sidi-Said on the occasion of the double anniversary of the founding of Algeria's official trade union and the nationalisation of the oil and gas sector – was published in the official media. The President renewed his praise for the role played the army and other security forces at In Amenas, before neatly seguing into other issues of the day:

Our security is jeopardized by the situation in Mali on our southern border and the sporadic outbreaks of terrorism that we are constantly fighting. What happened recently in Amenas is an instructive illustration, in that it highlighted the cruelty of the terrorist groups, but also the know-how of our army and our security services, who put an end to this attack against one of the most important facilities in our country. I want to take this opportunity to pay a special tribute to the officers, soldiers and members of the security services and of the civil defence force, whose intervention earned our admiration and that of international public opinion. I bow also to the memory of the Algerian and foreign workers who lost their lives in this cowardly attack and I express our admiration and gratitude to those among them who, by their cool-headedness and courageousness, made it possible to save the installations and production facilities. In this connection, I cannot ignore the scandals that have recently been uncovered by the press concerning the management of Sonatrach. Such news can only inspire indignation and disapproval, but I have faith in our criminal justice system's ability to unravel this tangled web, identify those responsible and mete out with thoroughness and firmness the punishments provided for under our legislation.

Their hackneyed phraseology notwithstanding, both presidential messages are in fact replete with signals not only to the population at large but also to other players in the Algerian power structure. This urgent political semaphore comes amid two political squalls that have blown up, seemingly independently of one another, over the past month: an upsurge in agitation across the vast southern wilayas where Algeria's oil and gas resources are located on the one hand, and the surprise return to prominence in the Algerian media (and to a degree also internationally) of a number of high-level corruption scandals that had seemed to have been swept definitively
under the carpet after being partially dealt with during Bouteflika’s second and third terms of office. It remains to be seen whether these squalls will blow over, or whether they augur heavier storms to come.

Since the presidential election of 2004, in which a last-minute deal with DRS chief Lt-Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène enabled him to outmanoeuvre the army chiefs, it had been largely plain sailing for President Bouteflika. With the once powerful heads of the army marginalised as political players, Bouteflika and Tewfik in effect ruled as a duumvirate, proving to be masters at the game of manipulating, dividing, co-opting and suborning the political parties and able for the most part simply to ignore the many spontaneous and localised outbreaks of social unrest that flared regularly in towns and villages across the country without ever finding a political voice or, still less, coming together into a single, united movement. To be sure, the regime was rattled for a time by the protests and rioting over soaring food prices that broke out in late 2010, coinciding with the Tunisian revolution, and the following months of upheavals across the Arab world, prompting Bouteflika's April 2011 promise of extensive political and constitutional reform, but it soon became apparent that the fires of the Arab Spring had not taken in Algeria, and the regime returned largely to business as usual (the constitutional reform process has limped on, but with less and less enthusiasm from all concerned: Prime Minister Sellal, confirming earlier this month that the draft reform would be submitted first to parliament and then to a referendum, was unable to say whether this would be during the spring or autumn session of parliament and dropped not the slightest hint as to what it might actually contain).

Beneath the surface this otherwise tediously flat sea, however, hidden currents seem to have begun to move of late. Amid prolonged uncertainty as to whether or not Bouteflika intends to stand for a fourth term of office in 2014, one potential successor after another (former Prime Ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Ali Benflis, Transport Minister Amar Ghoul, the present PM Abdelmalek Sellal) has bobbed up to the surface only to sink again for the most part almost without trace – suggesting a state of indecision or deadlock behind the scenes. In our last report, we quoted a source at the Presidency as hinting that Tewfik (who is thought to have earlier backed first Ouyahia and then Benflis as possible regime candidates in 2014) might no longer be the pivotal figure he once was. This came on the heels of suggestions from a former DRS officer that Tewfik had been unsettled by the fact that the West's main interlocutor with Algeria on the situation in northern Mali is not him but Chief of Staff Maj-Gen. Ahmed Gaid-Saleh.

Since then, there have been further suggestions – from private sources (notably an astute Algerian businessman close to sections of the military) and from the special envoy of Paris-based daily Le Monde – that the army has begun to re-emerge as a political player. The catalyst has been the French intervention against AQMI and its allies in northern Mali, which has thrust the Algerian military centre-stage – not only as the preferred interlocutor of the Western powers but also as the guardian of Algeria’s borders and, as seen at In Amenas, vital infrastructures. The Algerian businessman notes that, since France launched its 'Operation Serval' in northern Mali, members of the rising generation of officers in the Algerian military have begun to hold informal gatherings to discuss the situation (and no doubt other matters) – a practice that had ceased several years ago. A mid-ranking Spanish defence official, meanwhile, claims that the French intervention in Mali provoked a direct confrontation between President Bouteflika and the army: although the military chiefs were extremely reluctant
to grant the French over-flight rights (insisting that permission to overfly Algerian territory be limited to logistical support aircraft rather than fighter aircraft, and that it be granted on a case-by-case basis) they were in the end overruled by the President who promptly granted the French what they wanted.

At the same time, the sudden rush of media and government attention for conditions in southern Algeria following the In Amenas siege seems to have acted as a stimulus to the socio-economic agitation across the southern wilayas. Protest movements by the unemployed and others are of course nothing new in southern cities such as Ouargla and Laghouat. But the In Amenas attack, by drawing attention to the social and political context in which it took place (due notably to reports that the attackers had been able to recruit a number of disaffected locals as informants or accomplices), has provided southern Algerians with an opportunity to air their grievances. The opportunity has been seized with enthusiasm: unemployed workers attempted to march to the oil hub of Hassi Messaoud to make their voice heard on the February 24 anniversary of the nationalisation of the oil and gas sector (only to be beaten back by police and gendarmes), workers in the education sector in all the southern wilayas launched a three-day strike as of February 25 over pay and working conditions and called on other sectors to follow their lead, and the National Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Unemployed (CNDDC) called for an all-south demonstration in Ouargla on March 14 (at least 10,000 attended the protest, which this time was allowed to pass of peacefully). Marking the anniversary of nationalisation with a visit to In Amenas on Feb. 24, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and his ministers were taken to task by speaker after speaker at a meeting with notables and representatives of the local population over the social and economic marginalisation of the south; Sellal's remarks, in which he gave voice to the regime's fears of a “criminal gang[1]” of wreckers seeking to split the south away from the rest of Algeria, seem to have served only to further fuel the indignation of the protesters[2]. The government has since responded with a reshuffle of provincial governors that has brought new heads to six out of ten southern wilayas (including, for the first time, the appointment of a local man as Wali of Illizi), a programme to encourage small businesses, job creation and local recruitment in the south, and pledges to establish Sonatrach and Algérie Télécom training academies in various southern towns to develop local talent. It remains to be seen whether this will be sufficient to quell a movement which for the time being seems to be growing in confidence.

The attention to the south, and the protest movement there, appear also to have encouraged another former Prime Minister, Ahmed Benbitour, who hails from the southern wilaya of Ghardaia, to declare his intention of standing for President in 2014. Benbitour was the first prime minister appointed by Bouteflika after he came to power in 1999 but served for less than a year before falling out with the head of state over economic policy; somewhat later, at a time of tension between the President and the military chiefs, he seems briefly to have been considered by some within the army as a potential alternative to Bouteflika in the 2004 presidential election. Whether or not Benbitour is being actively encouraged this time round by elements within the establishment, he has latched on to the other political hot potato of the moment, namely the corruption scandals surrounding the Bouteflika presidency – a theme which was extensively used by Bouteflika's opponents within the power structure in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, when compromising details were drip-fed to the press by insiders over a period of months.
Since the second week of February, when Milan prosecutors announced that they had put ENI head Paolo Scaroni under investigation in a probe into alleged bribes paid to win contracts in Algeria for ENI subsidiary Saipem SpA, the Algerian independent media has been publishing a seemingly endless stream of articles on corruption at Sonatrach, further fuelled by later reports in the Canadian and Italian press that Swiss magistrates are investigating possible corrupt practices on the part of Canada’s SNC-Lavalin in Algeria. While the initial trigger may have been provided by these external probes, there are signs that the media chatter has been deliberately kept going by elements within the establishment: new tidbits relating to middlemen involved in corruption at Sonatrach appear to have been leaked to reliable journalists (notably Salima Tlemçani of El Watan, who has close ties to the military), those who do not have anything new to add have been free to indulge in speculation, and other, unrelated cases have been dragged back into the open – including lurid claims that then Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni was seen leaving national police chief Col. Ali Tounsi’s office with a mysterious bundle of documents under his arm immediately after the latter was shot dead at his desk by a colleague in 2010). Time and again, the central figures in these scandals are individuals who are or were close associates of Bouteflika’s: Zerhouni, former Foreign Minister Mohamed Bedjaoui, and above all former Energy Minister Chakib Khelil (who according to certain press reports jetted briefly back to Algiers from his self-imposed exile in the midst of all this to consult with the President’s brother, Said Bouteflika, and seek assurances that he would be protected from prosecution). Furthermore, it has transpired that the Algerian courts themselves opened a second investigation into corruption at Sonatrach last October\(^3\) that in part covers the same ground as the Milanese investigation into Saipem, and that a decision was taken in January of this year to allow both the defence and the prosecution in the long-buried El Khalifa Bank case\(^4\) to have their appeals heard in a court of cassation, as of April 2. It would seem therefore that there is an internal, Algerian dynamic going on here, and there are grounds for thinking that it may be driven by parties within the establishment with an axe to grind with the President and his erstwhile 'clan'. In this respect, it is worth noting that the Spanish defence official quoted above also alluded to a conflict between the Algerian top brass and Said Bouteflika, who is said to have cornered all the commissions generated by a contract signed with Germany for the supply of frigates to the navy, leaving the military out.

Thus the signs seem to point to the emergence of a new, three-way game at the top, between Bouteflika, Tewfik and the generals, in place of the rather uneventful two-man game run by Bouteflika and Tewfik alone over the past eight years. This would seem to be the context of Bouteflika’s repeated hat-tipping to the army and the DRS in his recent messages, his warning about the continued risk of Arab Spring contagion, and his statement of “confidence in the ability of the criminal justice system” to deal appropriately with the resurgent corruption scandals. It is unclear at this stage how this game will play out, but it is certainly worth monitoring as Algeria enters the run-up to the spring 2014 presidential poll.

**Foreign Relations**

As France’s Operation Serval in northern Mali continues to unfold, fighting is increasingly concentrated in the Adrar des Ifoghas uplands north of Kidal to which AQMI and its allies had fallen back after their tactical retreat
from the main towns in the early days of the French intervention. Consequently, French troops have taken
control of the remote town of Tessalit, just 70 km from Algeria's southern border, and are conducting
operations in a mountain range that actually extends northwards into Algerian territory – uncomfortably close,
from the Algerian point of view. With the jihadist groups under pressure from French air strikes and ground
offensives by Chadian forces, this puts Algeria, and its armed forces in particular, in role of gatekeeper. It is in
this context that French army general Henri Poncet (an Africa specialist who coincidentally was born in Oran)
was quoted by French news magazine *Marianne* at the end of February as lauding in no uncertain terms
Algeria's "courageous” support for the French war effort. “At a time when the joint European defence effort is
conspicuous by its absence, Algeria has turned out to be our best ally in our intervention in Mali,” opined the
general, going on to argue that the time has come for Algeria and France “to march ahead together – History
has just given us the opportunity to do so, by designating a common enemy.”

Algiers' position is not without ambiguity, however. After receiving Sergei Lavrov on Feb. 11, for example,
President Bouteflika made no comments to the press himself, leaving the talking to the Russian Foreign Minister
– who naturally seized the opportunity to restate Russia's traditional opposition to outside (and especially
Western) intervention in the affairs of sovereign states and to emphasise the harmony of views between Algiers
and Moscow on the need for negotiated, “political and diplomatic” solutions to conflicts in countries “such as
Mali and Syria”. In Mali, grumbled Lavrov, the French now found themselves fighting “the same people they
armed in Libya”. Even though in reality Algeria, by force of circumstance, now has little choice but to collaborate
with the French against AQMI and its allies, there can be little doubt that Algiers shares the view that what is
now happening in Mali is in large part the consequence of former French President Sarkozy's adventurism in
Libya.

The upheavals in Mali and Libya having creating immense problems for Algeria on its southern and eastern
borders, the Algerian leadership has, as we indicated in our last report, expressed interest in acquiring
advanced, US-made killer drones (specifically the MQ-9 Reaper) with which to patrol these vast and almost
uncontrollable frontiers. However, it would appear that such efforts – be they directly with the US authorities or
via the British – have led nowhere (perhaps unsurprisingly given the sensitive nature of the technology which
has not even been made available as yet to the United States' closest Arab allies in the Gulf). In the wake of this
failure, the Algerian media has claimed that the first prototype Algerian-made drone, which has apparently been
in development since President Bouteflika launched the idea during a visit to Ouargla in 2010, will be ready “by
the end of this year”. There is no indication however that the future Algerian drone will be armed, and even if a
prototype does fly before the end of 2013, mass production and deployment would still be a long way off,
leaving the Algerian military dependent on other means for patrolling the vast desert badlands – and perhaps
tempted to envisage closer cooperation with the US military's newly established drone capability in
neighbouring Niger.

**Security**

Political violence in February was markedly one-sided. The security forces kept up a steady rate of ambushes
targeting small groups of jihadists in Kabylia and to a lesser extent other parts of the country, while AQMI remained for the most part passive. Overall, the jihadist group took the initiative in only around a third of the 22 incidents recorded in February[6].

One significant exception to AQMI’s pattern of passivity came early in the month, when a group of “several jihadists” attacked a military camp near Boudoukhan in the wilaya of Khenchela, in the east of the country, on February 5. The group, dressed in military uniforms, commandeered a vehicle used to supply the camp and tried to use it as a “Trojan horse” to infiltrate the facility, provoking a three-hour battle in which at least one jihadist was killed and an unspecified number of soldiers wounded. The army immediately launched a major search and destroy mission in the area to track the group, using helicopter gunships and even jet fighters according to press accounts, and the following day freed a hostage (believed to be the driver of the hijacked vehicle) the attackers had taken with them in their flight. Initial press reports claimed that there had been as many as 50 attackers, “most of them Tunisians and Libyans”[7]; the Algerian Defence Ministry officially denied this in a statement on Feb. 8, saying there no more than “eight criminals” involved.

There was also an unusual report of an attempted suicide-bombing in the capital, Algiers, which has not seen any incidents of political violence for a number of years. According to Arabic-language daily Echorouk (Feb. 28), the security forces, expecting terrorist acts against French interests in the capital following France’s military intervention in Mali, tightened their surveillance of jihadist activity and towards the end of February discovered a plot to suicide-bomb a “civil security centre” in the Bab el-Oued district; when apprehended in a mosque the would-be bomber “was already wearing his suicide belt”, but the security forces “managed to immobilise him” before he could detonate it, claimed the daily.

Although this story should be viewed with some caution (Echorouk, which has a tendency to sensationalism and cannot be considered an entirely reliable news source, was the only newspaper to carry it), the reference to the potential threat to French interests in connection with the war in Mali does nonetheless raise the serious question of whether and how AQMI in northern Algeria will take part in the “revenge” operations promised by Mokhtar Belmokhtar following the bloody denouement of the In Amenas siege, and more broadly in supporting its comrades-in-arms who are battling French and allied African forces in the Malian Sahara. Documents allegedly found in Timbuktu after it was taken back from the jihadists in late January[8] indicate that ties between AQMI’s two branches — the Kabylia-based arm which comprises the central leadership and the Saharan branch in northern Mali — are closer than seemed to be the case, with AQMI’s national emir Abdelmalek Droukdel (a.k.a. Abou Mosab Abdelwadoud) effectively laying down the line for the southern branch. And yet, two months after the beginning of France’s Operation Serval in northern Mali, AQMI in northern Algeria has largely kept quiet, or even reduced its activity. This may be due to pressure from the security forces, pre-emptively stepping up their harassment of jihadists in the north of Algeria with constant search and destroy missions and ambushes of isolated jihadists, and/or the effects of harsh winter weather on AQMI's depleted forces. However, AQMI theoretically still has the option of suicide bombings, which are more difficult to prevent by means of classic military operations, and it cannot be entirely ruled out that the French war in Mali might provide the context for a suicide strike against French interests or symbols of the Algerian state and military in northern Algeria.
In the oil producing regions of the South, there was one minor incident on February 2, when a group of armed men “believed to be bandits” hijacked a 4WD vehicle belonging to an Italian company “working in the oil industry”. The assailants beat up the occupants of the car — none of them expats — and held them hostage for some time before letting them go and making away with the car. The fact that armed men on pick-up trucks could still roam the areas around Hassi Messaoud suggests that security of Algeria’s oil and gas sites was still not optimal more than a fortnight after the In Amenas incident. There have since been reports that the security forces have beefed up their presence beyond the perimeters of oil and gas facilities and suggestions that foreign oil companies will no longer be allowed to employ local private security firms for facilities protection, in which role they are supposedly to be permanently replaced by the army. On Feb. 20, Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi, speaking at a forum organised by government-owned daily Echadb, indicated that the Ministry of Energy and Mining was still in discussions with the DRS and the army concerning the oil and gas industry's security needs.

Two incidents were reported on the borders with Libya. On February 16 the security forces detected an off-roader that was trying to cross into Algeria from Libya near In Amenas, wilaya of Illizi, and launched an operation to intercept it. Two “terrorists”, one Libyan and one Egyptian, and a third unidentified individual were killed in the operation. Echorouk (17/2) said these jihadists are believed to have fled from Mali to Libya with the beginning of the French intervention there. For its part, El-Khabar (28/2) reported that security forces had on Feb. 26 arrested four men in an off-roader as they tried to cross into Algeria from Libya near Djanet, also in the wilaya of Illizi. The vehicle bore no registration plates and the men, dressed in military uniforms, carried two machine guns. They claimed to have lost their way while on a hunting trip.

Algeria’s Southern Border saw three incidents early February but no further clashes have been reported since Feb. 16. On February 1 security forces intercepted an armed group travelling in three off-roaders as they tried to cross into Algeria from Niger near In Guezzam, in the south of the wilaya of Tamanrasset. Helicopter gunships were used in the operation. Two “terrorists” were killed and ammunition and a number of weapons and satellite phones recovered. On Feb. 8 the Algerian army “eliminated” two jihadists who were trying to cross the border with Niger in the south of the wilaya of Tamanrasset to “deliver a shipment” of weapons. They were found to be carrying machine guns and communications gear. On Feb. 11 El-Khabar said that security forces on February 9 intercepted three individuals smuggling weapons from Mali in the area between Tin Zaouatin and Bordj Baji Mokhtar. They were carrying machine guns and ammunition and “admitted working for MUJAO”. And on February 15, security forces, acting on intelligence, tracked and intercepted a jihadist group near Bordj Baji Mokhtar in the south of the wilaya of Adrar, on the border with Mali. After a “three-hour chase” the security forces killed four of the jihadists, believed to belong to Ansar Dine, and forced three others to flee into Mali. Five machine guns were recovered.

In northern Mali, meanwhile, French and Chadian forces continue to battle jihadists in the Adrar des Ifoghas uplands, which run right up to the Algerian border where they merge into the foothills of the Hoggar. In late February it was reported that Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, emir of AQMI’s Katiba Tarek Ibn Ziad and one of the organisation’s top three commanders in Mali, was killed in a French air raid on or around February 25. A week later, Chadian sources claimed that their forces had killed Mokhtar Belmokhtar, commander of AQMI’s Masked
Men Brigade which carried out the In Amenas raid. French official sources say news of Abou Zeid’s death appears to be credible, pointing to posts on jihadist forums that admit he was “martyred”, but are more sceptical of reports of Belmokhtar’s death.

Meanwhile French military commanders say their forces fighting in the Adrar des Ifoghas have discovered “terrorism infrastructure on an industrial scale” in the area and weapons in very large quantities, including armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and other heavy weapons, but no MANPADS. According to a usually well-informed French journalist and defence analyst, French forces “have found no surface-air missiles in working condition” in the arsenal the jihadists left behind, and there have as yet been no reports of such weapons being used against French aviation in the conflict.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] Cherdima, a particularly derogatory word in Algerian colloquial Arabic – which the Prime Minister’s spokesmen have since tried to deny he ever used.

[2] Significantly, banners reading “national unity is a red line [not to be crossed]” were raised at the Ouargla demonstration on March 14.

[3] Now being referred to as the 'Sonatrach II case'. The first investigation into corruption at Sonatrach, which led to the conviction of the company's CEO Mohamed Méziane and most of its top management, was launched in 2010.

[4] Founded by Abdelmoumen Rafik Khalifa in 1998, El Khalifa Bank, one of the first private banks in Algeria, enjoyed a meteoric rise during Bouteflika's first term of office thanks in part to its management of the accounts of several large, government-related institutional clients, before abruptly hitting a wall and going into liquidation. Having fled to London, Abdelmoumen Khalifa was tried in absentia in 2007 along with over 100 other defendants and sentenced to life imprisonment for corruption, abuse of trust, forgery and criminal association. Widespread suspicions that he had been 'covered' for years by the regime and that members of Bouteflika's entourage had profited directly or indirectly from embezzlement at his bank were swept under the carpet.

[5] Seven incidents reported in AQMI's Kabyle heartland in February; one in Algiers; five in the eastern wilayas of Batna, Tebessa and Khenchela; two in the western wilaya of Chlef; five in the south, mostly on the borders.

[6] So far in March five incidents all told, including two AQMI operations, have been registered.

[7] Following the Algerian authorities' assertion that as many as 11 of the In Amenas attackers were Tunisians, and in light of the ongoing instability in Libya and Tunisia, rumours of Libyan and Tunisian nationals being involved in attacks in Algeria are likely to be a recurrent theme in Algerian media reporting over the coming period. It is not yet possible to state with any certainty, however, that Tunisian and Libyan fighters are present in any significant numbers in AQMI's ranks in northern Algeria.

[8] Radio France International and French daily Libération (25/02/13) give an account of a document entitled 'Roadmap relating to Islamic jihad in Azawad', signed by Abdelmalek Droukdel and dated 20 July 2012, which summarises internal discussions about the way forward for AQMI in building an Islamic state northern Mali, managing its relations with Ansar Dine and the MNLA. A fortnight earlier, Britain's Daily Telegraph (13/02/13) published what it claims were partial minutes of a meeting of AQMI's leadership, held under the command of Droukdel on 18 March
2012, covering similar themes.

With a war on the other side of the southern border which has already leaked into Algeria through its eastern border, there is clearly a big effort by the Algerian authorities to keep the borders, especially in the south, closed and keep infiltrators out. The relative lack of reporting since Feb. 16 does not necessarily mean a lack of incidents, since information appears to be controlled and some activity is likely not to be reported in the press.

The Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa, a group which split off from AQMI's southern units in mid-2011 but continues to work closely with its parent organisation.
FYI, a report from our sources:

According to a former Mauritanian government minister, a number of Saharawis have indeed been taking part in the war in Mali. The Mauritanian intelligence services have established a list of around fifty names. But although these fighters may hail from Western Sahara, they are not members of the Polisario Front or its affiliated organisations; they are residents of Mauritania, and some of them were born in that country, and entered Mali from Mauritania rather than travelling through Algerian territory.
Dear Team,
Below please find the January/February 2013 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

Visit us at: http://www.moroccoonthemove.com
Follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove

January/February Events Bulletin

January 29
Global Authoritarians and the Arab Spring: New Challenges for U.S. Diplomacy

January 30
Moving Beyond Rhetoric: How Should President Obama Change U.S. Policy in the Middle East?

February 6
Crisis in Mali and North Africa: Regional Dynamics and International Priorities

February 6
Priorities for Stabilizing Mali

February 11
Elections and Politics in North Africa

February 14
Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response

February 27
International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism
Global Authoritarians and the Arab Spring: New Challenges for U.S. Diplomacy

Date: January 29, 2013

1. Title: Global Authoritarians and the Arab Spring; New Challenges for U.S. Diplomacy
   Hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

   Participants:
   Daniel Brumberg: Senior Adviser, Center for Conflict Management, United States Institute of Peace
   Steven Heydmann: Senior Advisor, Middle East Initiatives, United States Institute of Peace
   Tamara Cofman Wittes: Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institute
   Haleh Esfandiari: Moderator: Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center

2. Overview

   Daniel Brumberg and Steven Heydmann discussed their recently published paper “Global Authoritarianism and the Arab Spring: New Challenges for U.S. Diplomacy”, which analyses powerful authoritarian regimes and their influence in the MENA region. Tamara Wittes provided commentary on the paper.

3. Summary

   Steven Heydmann discussed the theoretical background of the paper. Since the Arab Spring, the United States has been navigating an extremely volatile policy environment. While the landscape of the region is far from stable, some trends are beginning to emerge that will pose serious challenges for US diplomacy. Among them is the role that leading authoritarian states have assumed, notably Russia, China, and Iran, as critical actors in regional and international diplomacy. Heydmann, this “loose, flexible, and informal” grouping of countries has five main goals: 1) Challenging the West, particularly in international organizations; 2) Creating economic ties among themselves via trade agreements, weapons sales, and direct investment; 3) Creating ties with emerging regional democracies, who are often sympathetic to critiques of the US role in the international system; 4) Establishing authoritarian forms of government as a viable alternative to democracy; and 5) Breaking Western dominance of globalization. These countries vehemently defend state sovereignty, reject the imposition of international normative human rights mechanisms, and argue that the US is no longer the global hegemon. Heydmann emphasized that these authoritarian actors have immense interests in the Middle East and are able to capitalize on anti-US sentiment found across the region, which has a negative aggregate impact that makes US diplomacy very difficult.

   Daniel Brumberg explained that he and Heydmann wanted to start the conversation about global authoritarianism and its impacts. He is particularly interested in the way these regimes band together to block pathways to global governance in international organizations, thus “thwarting the will of the global community” to implement Responsibility to Protect and similar programs. Russia and China routinely blunt the efforts of the UNSC, and Brazil and South Africa, sought-after emerging democracies, use abstentions to provide political cover to authoritarian regimes in such settings. At a recent meeting of Non-Aligned States, Mohammed Morsi spoke of redefining the global economic and political order in a more equitable way, mimicking traditional authoritarian regimes.

   Tamara Wittes noted the region is undergoing a change of immense strategic importance. Her primary comment on the paper was about whether or not the balance of democracy and authoritarianism matters. The nature of globalizing authoritarianism is to strengthen collective opposition to global norms of human rights in the face of global consensus and growing global democratization in every region and in every culture. However, there is a complex mix of interests and opportunities due to globalization that these regimes seek to exploit. The United States must transform its diplomacy to adapt. Wittes admitted that the US must manage a difficult legacy in the Middle East, and she seemed dubious that it could overcome it in this fluid landscape with “smart power”.

   Heydmann responded that the balance of democracy and authoritarianism matters. The authoritarians contextualize their claims with arguments about the international order. Authoritarians present entirely different options from the West in managing crises and in general; they present the possibility of being equal to the West. Now emerging states have the option of being something different.. However, even though history gives the United States an advantage, acquiescence is not a given. Brumberg agreed that the Chinese have been explicit in offering an
alternative model.

4. Q&A

Q: (Esfandiari) Regarding vote counts in the UN, Iran did not get the votes it was counting on to stop sanctions. Also, the only countries willing to trade with Iran are India and China.
A: (Heydmann) Relationships are ad-hoc between authoritarian regimes, and they depend on sufficient shared interests between states, which is the problem in “too casual” arrangements like these.

Q: (Professor, University of Wisconsin) This all seems reminiscent of the Group of 7, shifting coalitions, the Non-Aligned Movement. Gradually they built pretty strong anti-Western momentum aimed at stopping Western hegemony.
A: (Brumberg) Certain aspects are relevant, but this is taking place in a different international context. (Heydmann) There are echoes of that, but also some important differences. Global democratization squeezed out authoritarian regimes, but now some democracies have failed so it is a congenial context for authoritarian claims to be an alternative to democracy.
A: (Wittes) The Non-Aligned Movement had power originally because it was anti-colonial and anti-imperial.

Q: (Gerald Chapman, unaffiliated) Could you go into more detail about the norms you spoke of that the global authoritarians don't like, such as the Law of the Sea?
A: (Heydmann) In addition to the Law of the Sea, they have a big problem with the ICC and universal referral to that body. The only way for non-signatories to the Treaty of Rome to be referred is via a resolution in the UNSC, which presents obvious problems.

Q: (National Endowment for Democracy) The Gulf Cooperation Council also impedes the application of liberal norms. Why is Saudi Arabia outside the frame of this conversation? Also, why is there no discussion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? Erdogan is trying to join.
A: (Brumberg) China is trying to express its power via the SCO and other methods. Sometimes it's aligned with Saudi Arabia. Authoritarianism is sustained in the region, and so are US relations with authoritarian regimes. China has investments on both sides of the Gulf and balances itself very carefully vis-à-vis sanctions and military intervention. A war economy is bad for China.
A: (Wittes) China's engagement in the Middle East is based on energy need. China is free-riding on the American security umbrella in the Gulf.

Q: (Unidentified speaker, Embassy of Egypt) What is your assessment of US policy toward Egypt, and how would you address the anti-US sentiment?
A: (Wittes) There's a big difference in Egyptian and American interests, but they both share interest in a stable Middle East. My worry concerning Egypt is that the beleaguered president will fall back on nationalism to rally support, and the US is an easy target. US engagement in the region is multifaceted.

Q: (Arohi Sharma, Senate intern) Do the US bases in the Middle East compromise our interests?
A: (Heydmann) The bases are a visible symbol of a US presence, which hurts and helps us. On the one hand, the bases can be a thorn in the side of our relationships, and they can constrain our opportunity to engage. But some view the bases as evidence of America's commitment to security in the region.

5. Observations

This event was attended by approximately 50-60 policy professionals and academics. The discussion of authoritarian regimes and their actions, specifically working in tandem to achieve goals and frustrate the US, was very interesting. There is certainly ample evidence to support their claims of China pointedly holding up an alternative system. The event was of little relevance to Morocco, but Daniel Brumberg and Steven Heydmann were very clever and articulate, and it is useful that MAC has relations with them for events and counsel.
1. **Title: Moving Beyond Rhetoric: How Should President Obama Change U.S. Policy in the Middle East?**
   Hosted by the Project on Middle East and Democracy (POMED)

Panelists:
- **Esraa Abdel Fattah**: Youth Committee Member, Al-Dostour Party of Egypt
- **Larry Diamond**: Director, Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, Stanford University
- **Brian Katulis**: Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
- **Stephen McInerney**: Moderator: Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy

2. **Overview**

During his first presidential term, President Obama promised a radically different approach towards the Middle East. Although this rhetoric was well-embraced, four years later, such acclamation was perceived to be simply empty words. Presently, there is still a lack of tangible policies to address the Middle East despite the historical upheaval of the Arab Spring. In an attempt to define policy options for President Obama’s second term, POMED authored a report on the topic with assessments from leading American and Middle East experts. It was clear that, despite the variety of responses, four core recommendations emerge in the report: taking bolder steps, engaging more broadly, using leverage and incentives, and creating more flexible policies.

3. **Summary**

Stephen McInerney opened the discussion by promoting the recent publication which addresses the changes that should be made in US policy towards the Middle East. He also expanded on the four recurring themes. As mentioned, the United States needs to take bolder steps. Presently, US policies are too cautious and the US needs, according to Larry Diamond, to “stop tinkering.” Secondly, the US needs to engage more broadly and step away from just government to government relations. Establishing and strengthening government to people and people to people relationships are a must. Thirdly, using leverage and incentives to reward or punish actions will encourage more engagement with the region. Finally, implementing more creative and flexible policies will allow for quicker responses, thus increasing America’s credibility. McInerney asked each panelist to express what they believed to be the best policy moving forward.

Larry Diamond’s, main advice was to “get serious.” Although Obama has been serious about altering current policies, the follow through has been disappointing. In getting serious, the administration needs to create both regional and country-specific policies. The US also needs to underscore its unequivocal unwillingness to accept pseudo-democracy as democracy. Diamond pointed to Morocco and Jordan as countries that are at the end of the day faux democracies, despite having promoted democratic reforms. He argued that the US cannot rely on such reforms because transitions eventually turn violent without real reform. Diamond stressed his belief that Morocco’s regime will not survive our lifetime and definitely not the next ten years and urged the Obama administration to lean hard on the Moroccan monarchy and push for real democratic reform. He also questioned Morocco’s legitimacy as a member of the UN Security Council.

Esraa Abdel Fattah noted that real power lies in the people, a lesson that the Egyptian government has yet to learn; and until the government recognizes this, there will always be turmoil in Egypt. Because of this, the US must focus on forging relationships directly with the people rather than solely focusing solely on government to government relationships. Fattah advocated for development projects created by the US that will immediately affect the daily lives of the populace. In her opinion, Egypt needs to stop dialogues and move to more concrete socioeconomic developments to help the people in the streets. Lastly, Fattah explained that this frustration with the United States is nothing new and that unfortunately it will continue, as she fundamentally believes that the US is making the same mistake with Morsi as it did with Mubarak.

Brian Katulis had four overall recommendations regarding moving beyond Obama’s 2009 rhetoric. First and foremost, he called for the banishment of labels like the “Arab Spring” and “Arab Awakening” due to their lack of neutral connotation. By eliminating such labels, it will be easier to understand the fluid battle for legitimacy and power within the region. Second, that the US needs a designated individual within the government to devise an integrated strategy for the region. Katulis cited John Brennan’s expertise and ability to exercise influence on counterterrorism policies as an example of the ideal candidate. Third, there is a need for more robust policy tools that both the American government and international organizations can use to affect a positive change despite the ongoing economic crisis. The question in point is not about how much money the Administration is spending, but where they
are spending it. Fourth, Like Diamond, Katulis called for for more country-specific strategies in addition to a regional strategy that places political reform in the context of other American strategic interests, rather than focusing only on a select set of policies like the prevention of an Iranian nuclear weapon.

4. Q & A

Q: (Mohamed Baboush, Tunisian citizen) Interesting papers have studied the high amount of American support for a democratic Tunisia; however, none seem to address how to bridge the gap between analysis/recommendations and implementation?
A: (Diamond) There needs to be more knowledge on the process of implementation. What is lacking is the sense of urgency and priority from higher levels. The US in regards to Tunisia is focusing on more mid-term rather than short term achievements. In terms of economic development, there first needs to be a higher level of education among the populace. Clear marching orders are lacking.

(Katulis) I am not familiar with Tunisia so I am going to answer this question by using Egypt as a frame of reference. In the case of Egypt, new policies should not be created. Due to budget cuts within the US, the Obama administration has tied all economic aid to the IMF; however the Administration has to keep in mind that this cannot be a “one-off” thing. Policy makers should not think in terms of a Marshall Plan, but instead how to create a link between the public and private sectors. The most important factor is to implement the already conceptualized ideas. We are stuck in Egypt and stuck in the US.

Q: Do you believe that the sentiment of Egyptians is of hopefulness or hopelessness?
A: (Fattah) Regardless of what happens in the streets of Egypt, Egyptians will fight with all their might and soul for their country. In that respect, Egyptians will always be and remain hopeful for change.

Q: How can the US help when so there is so much hatred of American’s on Egyptian grounds?
A: (Fattah) In order for this hatred to cease, America has to change image. If the US Administration really wants to alter its image it needs to stop giving money to Egypt and create projects on the ground.

(Diamond) There is a limit to what the US can do in regards to building projects within Egypt. Also, in order to have the capability of funding such projects there needs to be a financial flow and relationship with private enterprises to keep these projects that you are talking about sustainable. Before addressing this, there is a dire call for short term relief. Medium-term relief can be established by qualifying the local populace for jobs through education. I sympathize,, but the US simply cannot create projects and ignore the political aspect; imagine what will happen if there are no free elections? The US needs to focus on both political and economic factors.

(Fattah) Whether the elections are free or not free, the US will not be able to do anything. Historical evidence proves that the US will and cannot do anything.

Q: (Ari Ratner, former White House appointee at the State Department)I am frustrated with the lack of response from the American government. Bureaucracy is hindering effective action in the Middle East. We should not focus on country-specific strategies, but instead on a flexible overarching response. Why has this not happened yet? We already have the tools, but why are we not using them?
A: (Katulis) I agree that there should be a better structure which would in turn allow for a better response from the government. The already implemented structures deny us the ability of being nimble, which is why we need to establish either an individual or a group whose sole focus is the Middle East. We need to involve Egyptian civilians and begin talks on the hill on how we can become more flexible.

A: (Diamond) We need to rewrite our policy on foreign assistance. This is nothing new and attempts have been made, like the creation of the MCC. However, this movement has lost its momentum. There is a lack of creativity - of individuals thinking out of the box. For example, Tom Friedman created free public online courses available to anybody with an internet connection. Small and visionary initiatives like Friedman’s are lacking from the Secretary of State.

Q: (Nancy, Director of Freedom House in Egypt) The key problem with funding from organizations like the World Bank and USAID is that nobody really looks at the channel the funds go through. The money fails to reach the poor. How is this social development funding supposed to help small businesses when it goes directly into the pockets of the corrupt? These crooked individuals and organizations are never held accountable, how can the people be supported?
A: (Fattah) You are right about the corrupted channels, which brings me back to my other point that we do not need money but direct projects. There is a lack of credibility of the funds provided by the World Bank and USAID. Instead of money, the US needs to reestablish its credibility by building institutions that we can trust.

5. Observations
Approximately 40 professionals of diverse backgrounds including undergraduates, former members of the state department, and NGO representatives, attended this event. While the panelists and audience was primarily Tunisian and Egyptian focused, Larry Diamond was the only panelist to mention Morocco albeit in a negative light. This is not the first time that such arguments have been made about Morocco’s commitment to real democracy. Diamond’s assertions have been advanced by other Middle East experts, in both public and private forums. However misinformed, they reveal the continued challenges Morocco faces in telling its story of reform and underscore the need for continued communication about the progress Morocco is making in implementing the reforms of the 2011 Constitution.

Crisis in Mali and North Africa: Regional Dynamics and International Priorities

Date: February 6, 2013

1. Title: Crisis in Mali and North Africa: Regional Dynamics and International Priorities
   Hosted by the Brookings Institution, Africa Growth Initiative

   Participants:
   - **Daniel L. Byman**: Senior Fellow and Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
   - **Todd Moss**: Vice President for Programs and Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development
   - **Justin Vaisse**: Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution
   - **Mwangi S. Kimenyi**: Senior Fellow and Director, Africa Growth Initiative, The Brookings Institution
   - **Margaret Brennan**: Moderator: State Department Correspondent, CBS News

2. Overview

   This event brought together experts from several different professional and regional perspectives to discuss the current situation in Mali. Daniel Byman discussed the role of al-Qaeda and other militant Islamist groups in Mali and in the Sahel more generally. Todd Moss spoke about the role that the United States can play in stabilizing the country in the wake of the French intervention. Justin Vaisse discussed (and defended) the French role in Mali. Mwangi Kimenyi discussed what regional actors can do in the future to support African democracy. After each panelist gave a short presentation, moderator Margaret Brennan engaged them in a discussion of possible solutions to the crisis going forward. Among other things, this highlighted the difficulty in developing a unified Western and African response to this crisis and future instability in the region, and the animosity amongst various international actors in regards to addressing Sahel instability.

3. Summary

   Vaisse spoke specifically on the roots of the conflict in Mali and France’s military intervention. There have been a number of Tuareg uprisings in the past, usually resulting in a peaceful settlement with the government in Bamako promising reforms including programs to build up infrastructure in the region and a plan for autonomy. This time, however, the uprising became particularly violent and ultimately succeeded in taking control of territory in the north. Vaisse explained that this is due to three main factors differentiating it from previous uprisings. One, the rebels were better funded than before due to revenue from increased cocaine trafficking from Latin America through the Sahel. Two, the revolution in Libya resulted in an influx of fighters into Mali who had previously worked for Qaddafi. Three, and most importantly, well-trained and well-funded Islamists, who essentially hijacked the Tuareg movement, were able to succeed in rapidly advancing towards Bamako, which the Tuareg had failed to do. It is these Islamist militants who are the new important actors in the Sahel region and who pose a particular threat to stability. For this reason in particular, according to Vaisse, Captain Sanogo specifically asked the French to intervene in Mali. The French had been in the Sahel for years dealing with Islamist groups that kidnapped French citizens; thus they were thus familiar with the actors in the region.

   Moss spoke about the potential US role in this crisis. There are three stages of the international intervention: the
initial French military intervention, peacekeeping, and the rebuilding of democratic institutions and security infrastructure. The US will be able to play a support role in the third stage. In recent years, the US has made three main mistakes in Mali and the region in general that could have been prevented - the prevention of which could have also prevented the current crisis:

1. The US ignored the ethnic tensions in Mali that led to this uprising. Specifically, we ignored the fact that the peace deals Bamako made with the Tuareg in order to quell previous uprisings were never upheld. Thankfully, it will be possible in the future to make sure that the Tuareg demands are met and prevent another uprising since the Tuareg are not naturally aligned with the Islamist groups. Unfortunately, it will be some time before Bamako is willing to negotiate with the Tuareg or vice-versa.

2. The US accepted Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz as president of Mauritania following the 2008 coup d’état, despite the fact that this was not a legitimate democratic transition.

3. The US did not foresee this coup in Mali. Judging on previous US action in similar situations, it will be the US’ strong inclination to take strong counterterrorism measures against the combatants in the Sahel. This would be another mistake. Instead, Moss stressed that the US should balance a reasonable counterterrorism approach with smarter democracy-building support in Mali. It will be important that the US be proactive in this effort, instead of simply continuing to react to French actions in the country.

Next, Byman discussed the role of al-Qaeda in the region and the US counterterrorism response. Lately, the trend of terrorism in Mali (and throughout the Sahel) has been a shift away from the core of al-Qaeda and towards smaller, local terrorist organizations that are loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda. Fortunately, for the most part these groups present less of a direct threat to the US homeland. Unfortunately, they present more of a threat to regional stability. With this shift in the regional terrorist threat, US policy must shift accordingly. The previous tactic of chasing terrorist groups out of the country will likely backfire, as they will simply move to another country in the region - the presence of these groups in Mali in the first place was the result of having pushed AQIM out of Algeria. Instead, the US would do well to follow the advice that Moss just presented and balance a reasonable counterterrorism response with aggressive democratic institution-building in Mali. However, Byman was sure that the US would not take these measures in Mali, because Mali is simply not high enough on its list of foreign relations priorities. He suggested that what the US can do with the limited resources the US government will likely allot for our response in Mali is to support our allies in their counterterrorism efforts and enact a policy of containment against extremist groups in the country.

Kimenyi gave what he called an African perspective on the crisis in Mali and the French intervention. He was wary of any European military intervention in Mali because of the history of Western interventions in Africa. What concerned him especially was that despite the fact that the French had a quick success in their military operations in Mali, the core societal issues that precipitated the coup in Mali still remain. To truly prevent this from happening again, more infrastructure development will be necessary, in addition to a peace agreement that will give autonomy to the Tuareg. However, the French military intervention turned out to be necessary because of the failure of the African Union and ECOWAS to come together and address the crisis—the lack of unified response is indicative of the need to establish an African Union standing army. He highlighted the importance of an African response to an African problem.

4. Q & A

Discussion between moderator and speakers:

Q: (Brennan) The French seemingly saw the militant Islamist threat in Mali as much more dire than the Americans did. Why is there such a different calculation about the threat of Islamists between France and the United States?
A: (Vaisse) Well, the Pentagon did not see this as a direct threat now, but given five years it would have.
(Moss) Yes, in the short-term the Pentagon does not count Mali high on its list of priorities, but the military would have found the need to take counterterrorism measures in Mali. What is important to note here is the disparity between the military and the Department of State/Obama Administration: the military generally has an interventionist instinct, but the Administration and the diplomatic corps have a non-interventionist instinct.

Q: (Brennan) Why do we not have any good intelligence on these regional al-Qaeda affiliates?
A: (Byman) The intelligence community can predict strategic threats, but we cannot expect to disrupt every local plot, especially in the case of these local al-Qaeda affiliates. They operate in a region that is already difficult to monitor, and they do not have extensive foreign networks that we can track. We need to start combining intel-
gathering with social diplomacy. That is, we need diplomatic missions that will go in and work with local communities, in addition to human intel-gathering that we have relied on in the past. Furthermore, we need to funnel money into intel-gathering. There will be interest on the military side to take aggressive action in the region, but there are still serious political concerns that make such aggressive force dangerous.

(Vaisse) It is clear that, in light of increased terrorist activity in the Sahel, we are going to increase intel-gathering in the region. However, this comes with certain risks. We are dealing with a small number of dangerous people in a vast region. If we increase the amount of intelligence coming in about possible attacks, how do we know when it is or isn’t appropriate to go in and neutralize the threat with force? This may lead to us using more force than is advisable in a delicate region.

Q: (Brennan) How far away are we from a true democratic transition in Mali?
A: (Kimenyi) The short answer is, we are far from true democratic transition. For one thing, the current government in Mali does not have legitimacy because it was installed as a result of a coup. Also, neither the government in Bamako nor the citizens of southern Mali want to negotiate with the Tuareg. The illegitimate government needs to stand aside for democratic elections and the people of southern Mali need to be able to negotiate peace with the Tuareg in the north before a true democratic transition can take place.

Q: (Brennan) We have heard that the French hope to pull out of Mali in March. Is this really a deadline?
A: (Vaisse) We have been having difficulty determining the best date to pull out; you do not always get to choose who you work with. Given our intelligence, we underestimated the danger here and the effort it would take to catch the militants. We are planning a tentative timetable for elections in July. And yes, there will be cooperation from the US, but they will not launch kinetic ops in the country.

Q: (Brennan) AQIM has managed to largely fund its activities with ransom money from kidnappings. How do we counter this? Do we need to have more of a unified, non-kinetic Western response?
A: (Byman) When countries pay ransom to AQIM, it will continue to use this tactic. The US is frustrated with the European countries that do pay ransom to AQIM, like the French, who have paid close to 22 million euros in ransom. We understand that it’s their people who are being kidnapped, but we would prefer if they not negotiate with terrorists in any way. We would be much stronger if we had a unified counterterrorism response.
(Vaisse) We did not pay that much money in ransom, and you’re right, it IS our people who are being taken. (Kimenyi) Let me reiterate that Africans should be playing a bigger role on our own continent. The kind of Western intervention that we would welcome is more aid in development. The West should not be working on a unified counterterrorism plan for Africa; it should be working on a unified development plan.

Q: (Brennan) Does the West have a role to play in this kind of soft diplomacy?
A: (Moss) Well, politically speaking, regional actors like ECOWAS, the AU, and potentially Burkina Faso, will begin to take the lead. If the US and France just use air strikes to “contain” the terrorist threat in Mali, then we will certainly see these militant groups spilling over into Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria. What we really need is more regional involvement in negotiations.

Q: (Brennan) Can we talk about Algeria? Can they take a lead role in controlling AQIM?
A: (Vaisse) That is a really difficult question. The Algerian security forces have been ruthless in cracking down on AQIM, but they have really only done so selectively, in order to make the regime look better. Furthermore, they have the right of pursuit in Mali, and they haven’t used that.
(Byman) Algeria is a key power in approaching AQIM. They have a larger intelligence service and more counterterrorism resources than any other regional power. However, it has been difficult working with them; they are wary of cooperating with Western powers because they are fearful of giving up their autonomy in the region, given their troubled history with French colonialism. Also, Algeria sometimes massacres its own people and supports small terrorist ops in order to discredit Islamists and support the regime. Going forward, Algeria will be the most important question in going after these groups.
(Moss) It is important to keep in mind that AQIM is mostly Algerian; we cannot deal with this threat without Algeria’s cooperation.

Q & A with audience:

Q: (Leon Weintraub, University of Wisconsin-Madison) I recall that we had training programs in the Department of State for African forces. What was the scope of these efforts? Did they help at all?
A: (Moss) Well, you’re referring to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which involved several countries of the Sahel coming together to do training exercises. We have had important partners in this, and deployed our resources to this program, but the problem is that the governments involved kept falling to coups.
Mali, having been once considered the most stable democratic state in the Sahel region, was the keystone state in this program; that is why the coup in Mali was such a disaster for regional security. We really need to revisit our model for regional security.

(Vaisse) It is important to note that the Malian army is not a fighting army. Those who join the army are looking to get paid, and maintaining the status quo is a good way to do this. Although, the Malian army could be useful in the future for integrating the Tuareg further into Malian society.

(Kimenyi) I was not aware of these programs, but I can tell you that they have not been broad enough to have a real effect. The US should use AFRICOM to support African forces.

Q: (Jessica Gill, NPR) Can you elaborate further on where the interests and motivations of the Tuareg and those of the Islamist militants converge?

A: (Moss) We must not conflate terrorist interests with legitimate minority grievances. Even if these groups operate in the same geographic space and they do sometimes cooperate, they have fundamentally different motivations. The jihadists want strict Islamism, and the Tuareg simply want political autonomy and more infrastructure-building and investment in the north.

(Vaisse) We have seen the Tuareg cooperate with the French against AQIM. I would say that the situation in Mali is analogous to the situation in Afghanistan, with the Taliban cooperating with al-Qaeda.

(Byman) That is false. Afghanistan is not a fair analogy to Mali right now. There are so many ideological divisions at play within the militant groups in the north, between the Tuaregs and the jihadists, and between different jihadists groups themselves. These coalitions are constantly created and broken because of rivalry and opportunism.

(Moss) To be perfectly honest, given the tolerant religious climate in Mali, one would never expect jihadism to take root there.

5. Observations

This event was attended by 30-40 foreign policy professionals, including several officials from the US Department of State and other Foreign Ministries. The panelists did not say much that was directly applicable to Morocco, though Morocco could potentially be a helpful partner to the United States in providing support to regional military forces in fighting instability in the Sahel. Furthermore, Morocco could distinguish itself as an important partner in counterterrorism as Algeria continues to resist full cooperation with Western powers in fighting AQIM. Interestingly, what was most striking at this event was the level of animosity between the panelists. Vaisse was incredibly defensive of the French intervention and did not appreciate implications on the part of the other panelists that France had overstepped its boundaries in the region, and Kimenyi was incredibly wary of any Western interference in the region, seeing it as a necessarily destabilizing factor. This is why regional partnership will be so important in the future.
2. Overview

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies hosted a pair of expert panels that examined the actors and drivers of instability in northern Mali and the requirements for stabilizing this territory beyond the near-term military intervention.

3. Summary

Panel One

The first panel focused primarily on destabilizing factors in the region and within Mali itself. It highlighted terrorist organizations, drug trafficking, weak government, and porous borders as the primary factors of instability. Dr. Lounnas spoke at length about AQIM, Ansar al-Dine, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, noting that the Algerian government has repeatedly tried to “reach out” to Belmokhtar in particular, but has been unsuccessful in using this counterterrorism strategy. Lounnas noted that the composition of AQIM is mainly Algerians and Libyans and that the organization has not been successful recruiting Moroccans. It has been successful attracting recruits in Tunisia and Libya because they were weakened or collapsed states. He alleged that AQIM has retreated to the Afogas region, a mountainous region close to the Algerian border.

Rida Lyammouri focused on economic aspects of the conflict and warned that the increased presence of transnational organized criminal groups in the region is empowering militant Islamist groups. He argued that trafficking is a major component of the instability in Mali and the Greater Sahel, with South American planes delivering drugs to be transported to Europe. Despite the volume and frequency of drug trafficking, Lyammouri nevertheless stressed that AQIM is mainly financed by collecting ransoms for kidnapped tourists, journalists, or aid workers – with 90% of AQIM’s funds coming from ransom money and only 10% is from drugs. That said, militants are increasingly looking to illicit trafficking as a source of revenue, as trafficking has thrived in recent years due to widespread poverty, the region’s geographic location as a transit hub between South American and Europe, pervasive corruption, and governance failure.

Dr. Houngnikpo characterized issues in Mali by the “3T’s - Tuareg, terrorists, and traffickers”. He mainly discussed the history of Mali, providing background on the Tuareg and their grievances.

Panel Two

The second panel addressed priorities for stabilizing Mali. Colonel Patrick de Valthaire spoke about the recent French military intervention in Mali. He spoke about how the French coordinated their mission with the EU and ECOWAS and explained that the French actions have destabilized the Islamists’ logistics and capabilities. Regarding future action in Mali, he stated that EU forces will be training a Malian battalion starting in March 2013. He also stressed the importance of developing the capacity of the Malian government and security sector institutions to confront continued security challenges.

Johanna Mendelson Forman applied some lessons from her work on Central and South America to the problems in Mali. She argued that the marginalization of rural Malians was a root cause of the current conflict - one that must be addressed through inclusive development in order to avoid a recurrence of violence. Forman stressed that assistance at the local level was essential and that women needed to play a greater role in the resolution of the crisis.

Sharon Bean advocated development responses to help stabilize Mali, identifying two main areas for improvement: governance and communications. The lack of governance was a key driver of instability to begin with and the Malian government will only be able to restore stability with improved governance. Bean stated that the Malian government has long promised to improve governance and development in the region, but has often failed to deliver. This time, it must therefore engage in a consultative process with key stakeholders in the North before implementing a program. Through this consultation - and improved communication with important northern stakeholders - Bamako will be better able to overcome continued skepticism of its promises.

4. Q&A
Panel One – selected exchanges

**Q:** (Mohammed Tulba, Library of Congress) I am intrigued by the relationship between these groups and Algeria. The first question is why is MUJAO attacking Algeria? Also, is Ansar al-Dine close to Algeria? How is it possible for Ansar al-Dine to be close to both Algeria and AQIM, because they hate each other.

**A:** (Lounnas) MUJAO split from AQIM, but initially AQIM’s main aim was to strike Algeria so perhaps MUJAO did that to show what it can do. Ansar al-Dine is AQIM’s key to the local North Malian population. Algerians cutting Ansar al-Dine off from AQIM was key to diminishing AQIM’s power.

(Houngnikpo) I’ve always been baffled by Algeria’s position. When you go back in history, Algeria’s position vis-à-vis France, Algeria’s willingness to control terrorism as a foreign policy tool; how do you let go of that tool in your hand? You can even declare your opposition as terrorists if you want. It’s a very tricky issue.

**Q:** (William Zartman, SAIS) We don’t talk much about the Trans-Sahel Initiative these days. How is it we trained a lot of people in Mali, and then they turn around and leave or join rebel groups?

**A:** (Lyammouri) As for the military training, the US did its job. It’s up to the Malians to be responsible with their knowledge. When you teach a student, you don’t know if he’s going to cheat on the exam. If that person is willing to take bribes or be corrupted, that’s not your problem. You taught him how to fight, how to shoot, or how to monitor activities, but it’s up to him to sustain that. It’s about the sustainability of training, and that should be addressed by future foreign policy makers.

(Houngnikpo) [Desertion] is an indication of lacking history or culture [on the part of the trainers], because if you know how Tuareg culture operates, the importance of clan, you can’t lump a bunch of Tuareg together in a brigade and think that will solve things, you’re just dreaming. Three of four brigades defected with equipment and knowledge, everything, and joined the other side. I hope there are some lessons for decision-makers to take from this. We can’t just throw money at something because the government wants us to; we need to use our brain and ask ourselves, is this smart, is this feasible? We can’t talk about smart foreign policy while we make kind of dumb decisions.

(Lounnas) AQIM and Ansar al-Dine, these people are battle-trained, they fought in Algeria, they fought in Libya, and this is not the case of the Malian army. They [AQIM] are also well armed. That’s important to consider.

**Q:** (Lawrence Freedman, Africa Desk ENR Journal) To fight instability in the region, why are we not identifying the Qataris and the Saudis? They were behind the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which was an AQIM precursor. These countries put these people in motion. They were involved in the attack on our Ambassador in Libya in 2012. If we don’t identify these networks we won’t succeed. If we are drying up terrorism, why not go after the heart of terrorism? On another note, during a forum at the Atlantic Council last Friday someone alleged the troops from the North weren’t going to take Bamako because they have valuable relationships with illicit traders and traffickers in Bamako.

**A:** (Lounnas) Saudis and Qatar support religious communities that spread Salafism in the Maghreb, and this started after the Iranian revolution to counter that. When I was in Mauritania I noticed a lot of mosques and schools sponsored by Saudi Salafists.

(Houngnikpo) In terms of Qatari and Saudi networks, I think we have identified them, but the question is what to do about them. Remember, they were heavily involved in Libya, and we freed them.

**Q:** (Alvaro Teno, Embassy of Spain) Is there an assessment of the current negotiation process? What about factions that have split from Ansar al-Dine. Regarding trafficking I would like an assessment on the role that strong countries like Morocco or Algeria are to play in control of trafficking, or if there is interest on either side to monitor or control trafficking?

**A:** (Lyammouri) Regarding the trafficking, the border between Morocco and Algeria is really tight because of the Western Sahara dispute. To avoid that problem, traffickers moved to east Mauritania and Western Mali. Some trafficking is happening through the Moroccan- Algerian border, but it’s not like it used to be.

(Lounnas) According to a friend of mine who works on drug trafficking in Morocco and Algeria, she says drug lords in those countries can give political leaders lessons on regional cooperation. They do not recognize the closing of the borders, and they cooperate quite a bit.

(Houngnikpo) In terms of negotiations, we have a great deal of confusion. Who is talking to whom and why, what about, everyone is trying to solve whatever they can right now. The only thing I know for sure is that Captain Sanogo has sent a team to Ougadougou to negotiate the retirement of those who staged the coup. Trafficking should be a transnational regional issue. But when you go back to national interests, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, there seems to be disagreements about how to address that issue, and sovereignty, and those sorts of issues.

**Q:** (General Goodwin George Moore (ret.) SSES Nigerian Chapter) France is not alone in the war of northern Mali.
The UN authorized the ECOWAS and AU troop deployments to aid France in fighting the battle. Nigeria immediately deployed troops and its air force. The issue of always saying France is doing this, doing that, without also recognizing the other components, is not in the interest of France. Mr. Lounnas captured the essence of it by saying this war is not going to be the short tea party France thinks. It's the responsibility of the ECOWAS force to force them out, and acknowledging who is fighting this war alongside France.

A: (Hounnikpo) George, I'd like to be with you on ECOWAS, but unfortunately when I look at ECOWAS' record. The reality is until the French came in, there was nobody.

Q: (Brit Sloane, USIP) How do you see the rebuilding process going forward? What is the importance of a political solution and what does that look like - elections, a national conference process, etc.?

A: (Hounnikpo) Given the historical grievances, you can't have an interim organization handle those issues. We need to have a permanent, democratic political solution before we go into development. We need those who are legitimately selected to make those decisions.

Panel Two

Q: (Malik Chaka, Millenium Challenge Corporation) One of the panelists contrasted Malian and Nigerian treatment of the Tuareg - could he expand on that? I would also like to know how has the Salafists' ability and force been diminished by the French offensive in terms of casualties, fatalities, oil and fuel, and rolling stock like four wheel drive vehicles?

A: (Lounnas) We don't know how many have been killed. We know they've retreated. We know they lost a lot of men, we know they lost vehicles, but we aren't sure how it affects their ability to move and to fight. In my opinion, it's too soon to know how exactly they've been affected.

Q: (Maz Kelly, Booz Allen Hamilton) Given the political weakness and disorganization of Malian state, how involved does the international community have to be in the situation and implementation of an accord.

A: (Lyammouri) I think involvement of neighboring countries like Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Algeria is important, other than that it's not very important. I know the Swiss are working with the MNLA.

Hounnikpo) The West needs to be involved, how involved or not involved remains to be seen. But the West needs to come in with a common agenda or we won't be successful.

Q: (Commandant, National War College) Mali needs to fix its porous borders and improve transport in the country.

A: (Mendelson Forman) We need to take into account that Mali is not in a vacuum and porous borders are an issue across the region. We need to figure out how to work bilaterally and regionally, to support a fairly weak state, and decide whether, going forward, it should be priority to train forces to combat transnational crime.

Q: (David Throop, CSIS Africa program, SAIS, British Foreign Office, Mali desk) We can't treat Northern Mali as one coherent problem. People say one of the problems stems from the government's inability to establish itself in Northern Mali, but every Northern uprising has corresponded with an effort by the government to put down roots there. There has been a backlash every time. Instead of fixing things, it provokes resistance and violence and exacerbates the problem instead of solving it.

A: (Hounnikpo) I agree that security can't solve everything, and development needs to happen in the north, too.

Q: (Richard Logan, Naval War College) Algeria has a great deal of incentive to deal with porous borders, stabilizing Libya (small arms and light weapons in particularly) and the greater region. I would also be interested in some post-In Amenas commentary.

A: (de Vathaire) AQMI has been in Northern Mali for many years. The trigger for the French operation was the movement of forces to the south. As far as Algeria is concerned, I think the terrorists made a huge mistake attacking In Amenas- terrorists have forced Algeria to choose a side.

Q: (Angela Martin, USAID) Are there examples from other countries of stabilization programs where parts of the country are differently affected? There is obviously a huge disparity in wealth and affectedness. I've also heard some disturbing arguments blaming the Tuareg. How do you deal with the fact that Tuareg are being blamed and not the terrorists? Can you speak to this?

A: (Bean) I'm sure for many in the room the first thing that comes to mind is a national dialogue to build trust and develop some possible solutions. A lot of what we've seen causing conflict and tensions has come from lack of
dialogue. As far as economic issues, there’s been a lot of wrestling with how to encourage and employ a lot of the young people in north whose traditional livelihoods have been eroded by various factors such as climate change or modern times. It’s something we struggle with everywhere, even in the US. We want to provide youth with more economic opportunities and discourage illegitimate employment. (Houngnikpo) Tuareg are blamed, to an extent. We have a Tuareg problem, Africans say “all the Tuareg are terrorists or traffickers”, which is not true. Until Bamako takes the situation seriously, we’ll be stuck. (Mendelson Forman) In Colombia we saw a similar case. Colombia is an exception because it’s an economy that functions despite a 60 year internal war. Bamako doesn’t have the same resources; Mali is in a category of countries dependent on foreign aid. Coupled with the problem of giving aid to a government that’s neither accountable nor has the capacity to deliver services even if given the benefit of the doubt, you undermine citizen confidence.

5. Observations

This event was heavily attended by civilians and military personnel, US government employees, representatives from NGOs, scholars, and students. There were approximately 200 observers present. Dr. Matharin Houngnikpo presented many interesting and important observations, and his thoughts about Morocco would be very valuable (whether he supports Morocco or not- if he is critical, it would be useful opposition research). Both Dr. Lounnas and Mr. Lyammouri from the first panel are Moroccan, so it could be useful to cultivate relationships with them. Dr. Lounnas is an expert on terrorist groups in the Sahel, so he could provide some interesting commentary on the Polisario/terrorist connection.

For a complete video of the event, please visit: [http://africacenter.org/2013/02/video-priorities-for-stabilizing-mali-panel-discussions-at-acss/](http://africacenter.org/2013/02/video-priorities-for-stabilizing-mali-panel-discussions-at-acss/)
Furthermore, upcoming local elections in Morocco will be a case of determining the future and some immediate governance, some of these cases. Losing its core urban constituency and, more importantly, lose the ability to govern effectively. Some sources already claim that the PJD has been co-opted by the regime and has not taken adequate steps to effect the democratic changes it campaigned on. So it will be important for the PJD to address this issue quickly in order to maintain its influence.

Buehler presented an explanation of how the PJD came to power in Morocco and what challenges to governing they can expect to face in the future. Morocco did experience what Buehler referred to as an Arab Spring, but the country avoided a violent, explosive rebellion due in large part to the efforts of King Mohammed VI, who was able to quell the protests by proposing a new constitution and moving up the date of parliamentary elections. While not a democratic country, Morocco has a long history of political parties, and the PJD is the best organized of them. Given its strong support base, it could have made the Arab Spring protests in Morocco more destabilizing by endorsing them, but instead leveraged its support into bargaining power to guide the constitutional referendum and convince the regime to eliminate non-conservative social provisions in the constitution. It then won a sweeping victory in the November 2011 elections. However, while it commands overwhelming popular support, it does face challenges to governance, some future and some immediate. One immediate concern is the lack of power the PJD’s coalition holds in relation to the so-called “shadow government” of the regime. Foreign dignitaries have been bypassing the elected government in favor of meeting with this shadow government; the PJD’s coalition needs to find a way to command the respect and influence necessary to be seen as a legitimate government in the diplomatic community. Furthermore, upcoming local elections in Morocco will be crucial for the PJD to solidify its power, and it is possible that the regime would use its influence to reassert itself in these elections, which carry more popular weight than the general elections. Finally, in the long-term the PJD needs to be concerned with the possibility of co-optation. A significant part of its popular support comes from its oppositional position in relation to the regime, and if the monarchy were to co-opt the PJD as a vehicle for influence, it would lose its core urban constituency and, more importantly, lose the ability to govern effectively. Some sources already claim that the PJD has been co-opted by the regime and has not taken adequate steps to effect the democratic changes it campaigned on. So it will be important for the PJD to address this issue quickly in order to maintain its influence.

Lust spoke only briefly on trends in North African elections. First, she made a distinction between elections as political reform and elections as a referendum on reform. This distinction, she posited, is based in voter turnout - the more the public cares about quick political reform, the more likely one is to see high voter turnout. She presented the case of Morocco as an example of elections as a referendum on reform, positing that the voter turnout in the Moroccan elections indicates that the public is not especially concerned with seeing rapid democratic reform and is comfortable with the monarchy continuing to hold absolute power. In this case, then, who wins the election is really not entirely important (not least because the King ultimately wields absolute power no matter who wins and the public appears to have no issues with that). On the other hand, which party wins in Tunisian, Egyptian, or Libyan elections matters quite a bit because the public is more interested in quickly reforming the political system in each of these cases. Lust then commented on Benstead’s earlier findings about the significance (or lack thereof) of religiosity in democratization, stating that electoral cleavages can be based on many different metrics, including religion, and can possibly affect how democracy develops, depending on who gets elected.
Q: (Lynch) You mentioned the polarization of the electorate in Tunisia earlier, but your research states that 60% of Tunisian voters are undecided and 39% of Egyptian voters are undecided. Is this then a reasonable approximation of the “middle ground”? Also, can you speak briefly on the accountability of Islamist parties to their constituencies? What voters want from their elected officials and what the elected officials deliver are often very different things.

A: (Benstead) It is difficult to get a clear analysis of “undecideds” in Egypt and Tunisia. They could be this so-called “middle ground,” but what is more likely is that they are disenchanted with the elites and political parties; there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the current governments. To your second point, it does seem that the political elites are far more committed to ideological issues than voters; voters care more about jobs and improving the economy. In the long-run, accountability depends upon institutional development.

Q: (Lynch) What is the PJD doing? Are they succeeding in their goals or have they been co-opted by the regime? How are relations between the PJD and the opposition Islamist movement, and what is it in Morocco that allows for cooperation between ideological rivals?

A: (Buehler) As of now we cannot know whether or not the PJD victory is just cooptation. What will be telling is whether or not the PJD base expands. Currently its support base is upper middle class professionals in medium-sized cities. If they stop representing the urban vote and start expanding into rural areas, as the Moroccan Socialist Party did when it was co-opted by the regime, then we can say that they might not really be governing. Regarding the Justice and Charity Movement, it’s somewhat of a dying party, and it appears that its base has in some way supported the PJD. The PJD would not have won if they did not at least have tacit support from Justice and Charity’s base.

Q: (Lynch) Are the elections in Egypt and Tunisia just a vehicle for preserving the status quo? Also, you mentioned elections as reform and elections as a referendum on reform, but what about elections to placate the international community?

A: (Lust) Well, many people seem to conflate “revolution” and “elections” with “outcomes that I like.” There is not a clear reason why reform should be going faster, even if that is what the international community wants to see.

Q: (Researcher from POMED) Is the PJD unwilling to cross red lines? The party appears to keep self-censoring and deferring to the monarchy.

A: (Buehler) Well, the PJD doesn’t want to push the envelope too far. There was once a movement to ban the party and drawing the ire of the monarchy can be just as deleterious to their governing power as being co-opted by the regime.

Q: (Former State Dept official from the MENA Bureau) Has anyone done any research on the social background of lower-level members of the Islamist parties?

A: (Buehler) Well, for one, it is difficult to get good demographic data on political parties in the MENA region because these are developing nations. They do not keep good records of this and do not have the organization to do so. Though, perhaps tellingly, Islamists in Morocco are largely elected by the urban population, and the Moroccan Socialists are elected by the rural population.

5. Observations

This event was attended by roughly 40-50 policy professionals and GWU students. Benstead’s explanation of how religious polarization is not as much of a threat to democracy as conventional wisdom leads us to believe was extremely interesting; it could be useful in the future to pay attention to more statistics and survey-based studies of electoral participation in the Maghreb. Buehler is clearly an expert on Moroccan politics, and he could be an important connection to make, particularly as he made fairly objective statements about the political process in Morocco and didn’t make a firm assessment on whether or not the monarchy was looking to limit the PJD’s power, though he did strongly imply that the monarchy could look to co-opt the PJD, as it had done with the Moroccan Socialist Party. Furthermore, his statements about the idea of a ‘shadow government’ are important to be aware of, especially if this idea is gaining credibility in diplomatic, academic, and policy circles. Lastly, his assertions that the PJD would not have won without at least tacit support from Justice and Charity’s support base is interesting, as most experts have shied away from statements about potential linkages between the PJD and Justice and Charity. It will be important to at least follow Buehler’s work, as he seems to be becoming a voice on Morocco.

(Back to top)
Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response

Date: February 14, 2013

1. Title: Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response
   Hosted by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

   Participants:
   - Chairman Ed Royce: Committee Chairman (R-CA)
   - Representative Eliot L. Engel: Ranking Member (D-NY)

   Witnesses:
   - Ambassador Johnnie Carson: Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, US Department of State
   - Amanda Dory: Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense

2. Overview

   This Congressional hearing addressed the impact of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) power grab in northern Mali, which has destabilized the entire region. Chairman Royce applauded France's initiatives and rapid progress. Due to fact that AQIM hosts a cell in Paris, France has a high interest in assuring peace in the Sahel. Despite there being a direct threat to France, Chairman Royce reminded the audience that the situation in Mali has a worldwide impact, accusing the Administration of being tepid to French requests. Although the French intend to convert this mission into a UN peacekeeping one, Chairman Royce believes it is still too deadly to hand the conflict over to an “ineffective and ill-equipped peace force.”

3. Summary

   Chairman Royce opened the hearing with a brief description of Mali’s geographical location. He noted that prior to this hearing, many constituents believed that Mali was an island in the Pacific, rather than a fairly large country in Africa – perhaps as a way of emphasizing how poorly understand the issue of Mali was in US. Ranking Member Engel began by reiterating America’s support of France’s efforts to attempt to eliminate terrorism in the northern region of Mali. He was appalled that the Administration was charging Paris for using American airlifts; especially since France is a close NATO ally who is engaged in a mission that supports US interests.

   Other members gave their opening remarks. Representative Poe referenced the rebel leader, Mokhtar Benmokhtar, who also led the attacks on the Algerian gas facility. Representative Sherman expressed his opinion tha the US did not need to take a lead role in this mission, but instead stand strongly behind the French, particularly given to the current economic crisis. Representative Bass noted the uneven progress encountered in Mali specifically in comparison to successful and peaceful transitions of power in Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Somalia. She strongly urged the Malian President to consult all key political actors to work together in an open dialogue to achieve a political consensus. She concluded that the Malian government also needs to address the human rights abuses that were perpetuated by their own armed forces.

   Ambassador Carson explained that the current conflict in Mali reflects the fragility of governance in the region, the lack of economic development, particularly in the North, and the absence of meaningful opposition by which people can engage the government. He stressed that the March coup and loss of northern Mali demonstrate how quickly terrorists can take advantage of fragile states as poor governance, weak democratic institutions, and a lack of development and economic opportunity create fertile ground for terrorism and instability. Ambassador Carson outlined four challenges that Mali continues to face as it tries to overcome the current political and security crisis: the continued presence of AQIM in northern Mali, the need to restore democracy, the need to begin negotiations with northern minority groups like Tuareg, and an ongoing humanitarian crisis. He addressed each of these threats in turn, detailing US efforts to help Mali overcome them.

   In terms of security, Carson noted that the presence of extremists in the North poses a threat to the entire Sahel region. The US remains concerned about the activities of AQIM and MUJAO. The US is currently working with countries throughout the region to respond to this threat and deny a safe haven to terrorists. The US strongly supports French and African efforts in Mali and has been actively engaged in supporting them. As of February 13, 2013, the US has conducted 22 refueling missions and has provided 867,000 pounds of jet fuel to French aircrafts.
Carson acknowledged that continued progress and a transition to an UN-authorized effort will take time and stressed the importance of continued engagement in the meantime, including training for Malian defense and security forces as is being done by the EU training mission, and the restoration of humanitarian aid under the right conditions, as Mali's problems cannot be solved by military means alone.

Turning to the need to restore democracy, Carson welcomed the Malian national assembly’s approval of a political roadmap to restore Mali’s democracy as a critical first step towards legitimate and inclusive governance. Carson advised Malian officials to stringently follow the road map and ensure that all elections be conducted free from intimidation and interference by security forces. He urged Captain Sanogo and the rest of the military to remove themselves completely and permanently from Malian politics. In addressing the need to start negotiations, Carson stressed that the Malian government must recognize its indigenous population, who not only has a history of resisting foreign Islamic extremists, but also has legitimate political, social, and economic grievances. The US strongly supports the resumption of negotiations with all parties who have cut ties to terrorist organizations and who recognize the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian state. The US is working closely with neighboring countries and the international community to lend support to the negotiating process and establish long term open dialogue between the northern population and the government.

Lastly, Carson addressed the humanitarian crisis. Since the beginning of March of last year, thousands have been displaced and left homeless due to conflict, exacerbating a precarious humanitarian situation created by chronic food insecurity. The US has worked to alleviate some of the suffering, providing over $120 million in humanitarian assistance. This amount is part of $467 million in humanitarian aid to the Sahel region as a whole. Carson concluded by reminding the audience that military success will be fleeting without a democratic and credible government that is responsive to the needs of all Malians. In order to do so, all perpetrators must be held accountable for their human rights abuses so that the process of national reconciliation can begin.

Amanda Dory addressed the security concerns. She stated that the DoD is currently working with international and interagency partners to restore Malian sovereignty. She highlighted that the US is supporting the French via intelligence, refueling, and airlift carriers. Due to the March coup, the DoD’s direct engagement with Malian armed forces is restricted by Leahy law. She reiterated that there is no consideration of putting US armed forces on the ground. Instead, the US will continue work to support neighboring countries. Within the US, DoD is working closely with the State Department to help the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) define the requirements of this mission. Dory explained that part of the challenge prior to the coup was the differing opinion between the DoD and the Malian government. Between 2009-2012, the American government spent $41 million on training and equipping armed forces to put pressure on AQIM. However, the Malian government’s prime focus was the perceived threat of the Tuareg. Due to the lack of cohesion, DoD has shifted its efforts to Mauritania and Niger, who like the US are focused on combating counterterrorism. She concluded by reiterating that despite the lack of any indication of a direct attack, AQIM does have the capability to attack Western interests and kidnap Westerners in the Sahel region.

4. Q & A

Q: (Chairman Royce) Discussion is underway to transition the mission from French-led to a UN peacekeeping mission. I am worried that this will only lead us back to square one because there is still a heavy presence of very aggressive jihadists. Why are we pushing for a peacekeeping mission at this time? Do we have a set of ground conditions or benchmarks that must be met prior to deploying a peacekeeping force? If so, what are they?

A: (Carson) Currently, we are not sending in UN peacekeeping troops. It would be done in conjunction with France’s departure and based on the capacity of the Malian army. A roadmap will need to be created establishing a step by step process to reduce any unanticipated consequences. There is going to be an ongoing need for a counterterrorism operation in northern Mali and that will always reside in the hands of the French, not the UN.

Q: (Chairman Royce) Multiple news outlets report that our response to our French allies has been slow, especially compared to our response to Libya. What’s the hold? Can Congress help speed the process?

A: (Dory) Actually, we have responded as quickly as feasible. The French first requested intelligence, which was met almost instantly. Airlift support was a second priority. In fact, the French expressed their gratitude for our support.

Q: (Representative Engel) Over the last ten years we have spent tens of millions of dollars in training African troops. With Mali falling apart, what effective steps can the US take to deal with spillover effects in neighboring countries?

A: (Carson) Although it is no question that Mali is a political and military disappointment, we believe that much of the money we spent in the Sahel region has been put to good use. Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Chad, and Mauritania, all of whom received great military assistance from us and benefited from our programs, are responding
the way we want them too. In the case of Mali, the military not only failed to perform on the battlefield but also undertook a military coup dislodging the democratic government.

Q: (Representative Christopher Smith – R-NJ) What training is the US government using in regards to humanitarian aid, specifically to the alarming increase in sex trafficking?
A: (Dory) DOD has not engaged with the Malian forces since the coup. By cutting off our security assistance we are not actively participating in training them. Instead, we are collaborating with AFISMA to create country specific agendas. These countries will then be trained by the US. Regardless of the specific training programs, they all include human rights.

Q: (Representative Christopher Smith – R-NJ) Carson, in your testimony on June 29th you stated that an ECOWAS mission would be ill-advised, is this still your belief? What will be the mission of the AFISMA peacekeeping force and their rules of engagement?
A: (Carson) The Leahy amendment requires vetting and approving any units that we supply, train, and support to make sure they have clean human rights records. We do not endorse any military human rights violations. Thus, if any violations including sexual trafficking occur we cut off assistance, expose them, and bring it up with the Malian government. Not sure I used the term ill-advised. At the time, I was warning ECOWAS to make sure it had a planned, managed, and well resourced mission so as not to have African forces move in prematurely and be defeated by the very enemy they were trying to ward off.

Q: (Sherman) What other countries in the Sahel and West Africa are of security concern to the US in regards to Islamic extremists and terrorism?
A: (Carson) The criteria that make these states susceptible to terrorism are: weak governance, poor development, porous borders, and communities that feel they have legitimate grievances that are not being addressed by the central government. There is a growing awareness on part of governments across the Sahel that AQIM does constitute a serious threat, and that the governments of the region must respond to the economic and social needs of their people.

Q: (Representative Dana Rohrabacher – R-CA) Why does the US or France have to be involved in this conflict? Is this essentially an ethnic/tribal conflict? Do we have black Africans in the South and Arab Africans in the North?
A: (Carson) The situation is very complex. There are historical disagreements that divide the Tuareg in particular, which are located mostly in northern Mali and are of Berber and Arab descendants.

Q: (Representative Dana Rohrabacher – R-CA) Are you confident that the US can come into a situation like this that has historical, ethnic, tribal roots and make a difference?
A: (Carson) There are several things that are happening simultaneously in Mali which is why it is a complex problem. Issues of the Tuareg predate the arrival of AQIM, but AQIM in its existence in the region is a fact that needs to be dealt with. It is important to make sure that we do not inflate past conflicts. We may not have an immediate threat to our own homeland, but the region and the French do have serious concerns.

Q: (Representative Karen Bass – D-CA) Do you believe that Mali will be ready in time for the June elections? Who are the candidates besides the current President?
A: (Carson) We tried to respond as expeditiously to the French as possible. We have cut assistance in respect of section 7008 because of the military coup in March. I believe that it is possible to hold inclusive, credible, free, and transparent elections come July 31 per the roadmap. Also, neither the current President nor Prime Minster will be a candidate in the election.

Q: (Representative Steve Chabot – R-OH) Overall, the amount of aid to this region with a particular focus on Mali has reached around a billion dollars over the past seven years. It seems that as usual, the US bears most burden of these initiatives because other world leaders are not as well-equipped or don’t want to get involved and expect the US to take lead. In fact, we contributed $96 million while China and India together contributed only one million. Are other nations planning to provide assistance? How can we push for other countries to take a bigger financial assistance role? Why have we yet to see a real assistance from China?
A: (Carson) Others in the international community have initially pledged around 50 million Euros for European military training missions, which focus on retraining or rebuilding/rehabilitating the Malian military.

Q: (Representative David Cicilline D-RI) Do you believe that these terrorist organizations will be reflected in the
outcome of the future elections? Can there be reconciliation between Malians and Tuareg?

A: (Carson) AQIM does not have popular support across northern Mali. Mokhtar Belmokhtar is not Malian, but Algerian/Mauritanian, and he does not have enough followers to become an elected official. The overwhelming welcome that the French troops received across northern Mali reflects that they feel deeply oppressed by Sharia law. Mali has had 20 years of democracy and has had several president/parliamentary elections that have gone well; I have faith that this can be restored. In Bamako many citizens had a different perception than we did of what constitutes an imminent threat. Specifically, we have always been deeply concerned about the AQIM threat in Mali while the Malian government and Bamako thought the threat was their age-old traditional enemy the Tuareg. The Malian government has to accommodate the political grievances of the Tuareg.

Q: (Representative Ted Poe – R-TX) Are the weapons being used by Belmokhtar and other al-Qaeda groups from Qatar and Libya?

A: (Dory) A tremendous amount of weapons trafficking in the region is related to the access of weapons after Gaddafi’s fall. It is difficult to track whether there is a direct connection to Qatar.

Q: (Representative Gerry Connolly- D-VA) What is our sense of France’s capability? Should we worry? What about short and long-term?

A: (Dory) Thus far we have been very impressed with France’s capabilities. However, we cannot say “mission complete” any time soon.

Q: (Representative Grace Meng – D-NY) What are the immediate long term consequences for us and our allies if we just ignore Mali?

A: (Carson) When we turned are back on Somalia we suffered direly. We walked away from a relief effort in 1993 after the Black Hawk incident. When we turn our backs on them the whole world turns their back on them. France also cannot ignore Mali because it hosts the second largest Malian community.

5. Observations

The two panels provided a thorough overview of the current challenges in Mali, as well as current US interests and efforts there and in the region. Although the hearing was informative about AQIM’s international threat, witnesses did not provide any additional insight on the future of its operations in northern Mali and the Sahel. There was also little discussion of the regional impact of terrorism and the potential for a regional response to it. While important in highlighting the importance of North Africa for US interests, the hearing offered little of interest for Morocco, particularly as the Q&A portion underscored that Congressmen have little understanding or knowledge of this part of the world.

For a complete video of the hearing, please visit: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-crisis-mali-us-interests-and-international-response
2. Overview

Despite the changing regional dynamic of terrorism, the threat posed by international terrorism remains high, as al-Qaeda and its affiliates regroup and reassess their mission. This panel focused on the current terrorist threats in the world, regional and international counterterrorism cooperation, and how global policy makers should attempt to curb terrorism.

3. Summary

Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat provided an overview of terrorism in the world, noting that it is currently being placed out on a global playing field, “from Mali to Bali, Nigeria to Bulgaria, and the Middle East and North Africa to Southeast Asia.” Similar to its geographic distribution, the current terrorist threat comes from widely different groups, some homegrown, some state-sponsored, some with domestic aspirations, and others with a global reach and a desire to target internationally. Given this context, Eizenstat stressed that combating terrorism requires both international cooperation and the use of every legal means possible, including drone strikes, intelligence sharing, sanctions, and military training. In addition, combating terrorism requires preventing it in the first place through job creation, rule of law, and good governance to ensure that young people have opportunities and a stake in their own future. Eizenstat noted that in the absence of good governance, states fail, thus becoming safe havens for terrorism, as is the case in Mali today. The challenge is thus to promote nation-building, because if nation-building fails, a gaping hole will be left for terrorist action.

Following the keynote, Professor Yonah Alexander opened the rest of the panel discussion and marked the official release of a new report from the Potomac Institute, “Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications.” The report assesses the current threat of terrorism in the region given events in Mali and makes recommendations for confronting it.

Abderrahim Rahhaly highlighted Morocco’s efforts in combating terrorism and its approach both nationally and internationally. He noted that Morocco has long been trying to attract international attention to the volatility in the region and the links between terrorist groups operating there such as AQIM and Boko Haram. Now the world is paying attention to the region, but more cooperation is required to really confront its security challenges. Toward this end, Morocco is engaged in comprehensive counterterrorism efforts, which include elements of security, reform, and development in order to place the human factor first. Morocco has also undertaken religious reforms to ensure the promotion of tolerance, human rights, and the rule of law. As a result, Morocco has achieved some success in avoiding the terrorist threat that has affected its neighbors.

Despite this national success, Morocco nevertheless believes that it will not be successfully in confronting terrorism at the regional level without more regional cooperation, as trafficking and terrorist networks cross borders and proliferate in weakly governed areas. Due to the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the terrorist threat, Rahhaly underscored the importance of regional cooperation and highlighted Morocco’s efforts to promote it, as chair of the UN Counterterrorism Committee, as an active member of the Global Forum against Terrorism, as an advocate of stronger South Atlantic cooperation, and as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. The latter has allowed Morocco the opportunity to elevate security as a priority issue for the UNSC and has also allowed it to advance the issue of Mali, with the Council authorizing the deployment of an international force while under Morocco’s Presidency. Rahhaly also noted that Morocco is supporting the political process in Mali, providing humanitarian aid to the country, and providing funds for the international mission.

Dr. Mary Jane Deeb provided an historical overview of the Middle East and North Africa, arguing that it is necessary to see the MENA region in context. She characterized the region according to the three primary revolutions the region has experienced in its modern history: the Socialist revolution, the Islamist revolution, and the pro-democracy revolution, widely known as the Arab Spring. She provided her observations on the most recent revolution, arguing that the region is still in great flux, with instability and insecurity rampant due to the continued operation of militias in Libya and Tunisia and mass displacement and refugees flows due to conflict in Syria, among other security challenges. Deeb stressed that under such conditions cooperation in combating terrorism is difficult and unlikely. As a result, it might be preferable for the US and its allies to work with countries that did not experience the Arab Spring, such as Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and some of the Gulf countries.

Admiral Terry McKnight shared his experiences in promoting maritime security and anti-piracy programs. He argued that the best success story in combating terrorism was the success achieved in combating piracy in Somalia. He noted that this example provided some important lessons learned for combating non-maritime terrorism as well, largely because the success achieved in Somali was due to international cooperation. The mission was under the umbrella of the United Nations and had a high degree of cooperation and coordination among over twenty nations.
In addition, the mission was granted flexibility in its operations, which allowed it to adjust to changing conditions. McKnight stressed that international cooperation and flexibility are key in combating terrorism going forward.

Ambassador David Smith addressed the issue of cyber terrorism, stating that no one even really knows what it means or what it refers to. Is it using computers for terrorist ends, using the internet to for hacking enemies, or using the web to incite violence? To some degree it is all of those things and Smith stressed that there are three important trends regardless of the definition one chooses. First, the greater use of social media has made it easier to disseminate propaganda that can incite violence and advocate terrorism across borders. Second, the appearance of independent actors has allowed cyber terrorism to flourish. This is largely due to the first trend, which has allowed terrorist organizations to recruit across borders and individuals to “volunteer” even without being actively recruited. Third, the increased use of cyber attacks on industrial control systems is a new development, but one that is here to stay and has the capacity to threaten our way of life.

4. Q & A

Q: What measures are most important in countering extremism?
A: (Rahhaly) Morocco works to counter extremism by acknowledging and encouraging diversity and tolerance. It has recognized the diverse composition of Moroccan society and enshrined it in the Constitution. It has also worked to reform the religious field. One of the major elements of reform is the inclusion of women as religious figures in order to promote tolerance and equality. The only way to counter extremism is by promoting tolerance, creating open societies, and promoting human development.

(Deeb) The most important thing is education. Literacy levels are low in many places where terrorism thrives and as a result it is difficult to present an alternative to extremism. So the education and training of young people is so important, as is using the media as a medium to explain Islam and promote messages of tolerance.

Q: (DCM, Embassy of Algeria) In assessing the region, Dr. Deeb noted that Algeria is a military state, when the reality is that the government is elected. Could you please provide your rationale for this assessment?
A: (Deeb) The military is the basis of power in Algeria. The electoral system functions to some degree, but the power base is still the military, even if it is wearing civilian clothes.

Closing Remarks

General Gray concluded by arguing that terrorism is a tactic and that it is the environment in which terrorism thrives that needs to be fixed. It is not possible to just eliminate terrorism by killing terrorists. Rather, Gray stressed that the conditions have to be created so that terrorism cannot succeed.

5. Observations

Approximately 30 think tank experts, journalists, and students attended the event, which provided a broad overview of the challenges of countering terrorism. With the exception of Mr. Rahhaly, who provided a detailed analysis of Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts, each of the other speakers spoke quite generally about the issue. All of the panelists agreed that regional and international cooperation are essential for any counterterrorism strategy, but unfortunately none of them provided recommendations on how to achieve such cooperation given the divergent national interests and strategies of many countries at the forefront of these efforts. The event was nevertheless valuable, as Professor Alexander used it to launch his latest report on terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa. In the report, Professor Alexander makes several important recommendations of relevance to Morocco, namely the importance of resolving the Western Sahara conflict in order to improve regional cooperation in countering terrorism and addressing the humanitarian situation in the camps near Tindouf to eliminate a recruiting ground for terrorists. MAC should widely disseminate these messages from a credible third party in order to advance Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara and the refugee crisis.
The following information is from a trusted source regarding Libya’s Oil and gas sector.

(We) just finished the most comprehensive, most up-to-date profile of the Libyan hydrocarbons sector that is currently available. In it, we profile more than twenty of the top decision-makers in the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Oil and Gas, the General National Congress committees related to energy, and the National Oil Corporation, its subsidiaries and joint-ventures. This was a massive undertaking.

In addition to being an overt plug for what I think is a valuable product, it’s also a long-winded excuse for not having written more frequently about what’s going on in Libya these days. The below redresses that.

Politics: More politicking, more problems

Libyan politics are at a very messy stage in the transition from the revolution to the election of a permanent government. Early political hurdles were overcome, having been propelled by a shared sense of revolutionary purpose. That sentiment has now calcified and become brittle, susceptible to fracturing.

The General National Congress, the country’s nine-month old legislature, is struggling to retain its popular legitimacy. The population’s lack of faith in the GNC derives from the GNC’s slow pace of political progress – it doesn’t seem to do much of anything and is characterized more by politicking than policy-making, more by self-interest than national interest (a problem, incidentally, that Tripoli seems to share with Washington.)

In part, the inability of the GNC to make policy is due to its unclear mandate – is it supposed to genuinely legislate or is it simply to review the policies of its predecessor, the NTC, and to continue to steer the country down the political roadmap that will lead to a permanent government? The members of the GNC, let alone the population at large, appear unsure of what its exact remit is.

The GNC also faces logistical issues. A populist protest evicted the GNC from its regular meeting place for more than a month earlier this year and temporary meeting places have been repeatedly overrun. Even when the GNC is able to meet, many GNC members do not attend sessions – at any given time, 10% of GNC members are traveling abroad and still others are occupied with local concerns preventing them from attending GNC sessions. On top of that, the National Integrity Commission has disbarred sixteen GNC members on grounds that they their candidacies did not meet revolutionary criteria. With the resignation at the beginning of March of a GNC member from Misrata, 183 GNC members remain out of the 200 that were elected in July 2012.

The GNC’s legitimacy is also declining because of the government’s own failures to manage popular expectations. Take, for example, the GNC’s decision to hold national elections for the constitutional drafting committee instead of appointing the committee itself. This was a wise move that would ensure greater popular support for a draft constitution, but the GNC failed to articulate how complicated the electoral process would be. The GNC has yet to explain to the broader Libyan population that because the committee will have twenty members drawn from each of Libya’s three regions, the High Electoral Commission cannot simply dust off the electoral maps used for the GNC elections and superimpose them on the constitutional committee elections. Likewise, the High Electoral Commission has not explained that it has to devise new guidelines for candidates running for the constitutional drafting committee. Will candidates be allowed to be members of political parties or will they have to be independents? Will there be a minimum number of seats reserved for women and/or ethnic minorities and if so, how will this quota be imposed? Drawing new maps and devising new by laws for the elections takes time and neither the General National Congress nor the High Electoral Commission has explicitly and publically addressed these challenges.

The predicament that the GNC is now in is very similar to that the NTC before it faced – namely, will the GNC’s legitimacy decrease faster than its ability to implement policies that will further progress toward election of a permanent government. If the answer is yes, then Libya is looking into the abyss, with the likelihood of the eventual emergence of a strongman. Even if the answer is no, Libya is still facing a very rough road ahead.

Security: resource regionalism?
One can’t talk about Libya, without talking about security. The security situation has seen progress in some areas, only to regress in others. On the one hand, there have been various training programs overseas for recruits in various forces. The Ministry of Interior recently launched a campaign to oust some of the more recalcitrant militias from Tripoli, but what this amounts to in practice is the ouster of militias that have not at least in part joined forces with the national security apparatus. (Some militias have been recruited entirely or partially into the Ministry of Defense forces or the Ministry of Interior forces. Others have resisted efforts by the state to coopt them.) The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense have purchased new and potentially effective equipment. And we’re getting a clearer picture of who is control (at least nominally) of different units within the national security apparatus.

On the other hand, some violent groups have targeted the GNC and there was an assassination attempt against GNC president Mohamed Magarief in early March. Other groups have threatened other GNC members, resulting in their resignations. And the militias are posing a problem for oil companies in both the upstream and downstream. Militias have been involved in disturbances, disruptions, clashes and protests at several oil and gas installations throughout the country. Although the circumstances differ from one facility to the next, the root problem can be termed “resource regionalism.” If resource nationalism is about the state trying to extract greater benefits from the oil and gas sector at the expense of IOCs, then resource regionalism is different regions trying to extract greater benefit from the sector at the expense of the state. Libya’s oil and gas activity is one of the country’s precious few steady sources of employment and everyone wants a slice of the pie, or a bigger slice, or to keep the slice they already have. In some instances, the oil and gas facility clashes have been about local labor quotas, in other instances, they have been about formalizing and retaining responsibilities that were assumed informally during the revolution. Despite the differences, it is clear that the clashes will continue: targeting oil and gas facilities has proven to be a quick way for aggrieved parties to compel the state to acquiesce to their demands.

Likewise, the salafi jihadi threat in Libya is still extent. Normally thought to be confined to far eastern Libya, the In Amenas attack in Algeria in January suggests that there are salafi jihadi sympathizers in southwestern Libya and there are reports that salafi jihadi sentiments are becoming more prominent in Misrata, Libya’s third largest city. Most jihad-watchers are currently focused Mali and Tunisia, which are more dynamic environments, but we would be remiss to overlook Libya. I’m reluctant to be alarmist, but Libya is a target rich environment with poor security, which implies that there are still issues to be addressed.

Oil: 2013 bid round isn’t going to happen

On the oil front, Minister for Oil and Gas Abdulbari al-Arussi has said that Libya will hold an oil and gas licensing round by the end of 2013. There is no way that this will happen. There are simply too many issues for the sector to address before it can hold a licensing round and the sector’s unclear structure and general lack of bureaucratic capacity mean that mean that it won’t be able address any of the issues quickly.

The first challenge to holding a new licensing round is the need to review the EPSA-IV framework that was used in the three previous rounds during the Qadhafi regime. The Ministry of Oil and Gas and the National Oil Corporation (NOC) are well aware that IOCs are uninterested in participating in another EPSA-IV round and as a result the Ministry of Oil and Gas has convened a committee to review the framework and make recommendations for drafting a new hydrocarbons law. Even in the best of circumstance, hydrocarbons reform laws can take the better part of a year. Given Libya’s indeterminate state, one could easily expect the EPSA-IV review to last until at least the beginning of 2014.

The second issue is the structure of the oil and gas sector management itself. The exact relationship between the newly formed Ministry of Oil and Gas and the NOC is not entirely clear. The Ministry of Oil and Gas is the ostensible sector regulator and it would clearly like to push ahead with a bid round in order to definitively establish its authority over the NOC, but the NOC is very likely to rebuff any attempt by the ministry to hold a bid round precisely in order to prevent the ministry from locking in its authority over the NOC.

Lastly, even if these two hurdles were overcome, the Ministry of Oil and Gas would have to determine what acreage it would want to make available in the upcoming round – where do the sector’s exploration priorities lie, what is the right mix of prospectivity, and what about unconventional plays? The answers to these questions are not likely to emerge in the next nine months.

The fact that a bid round in 2013 is almost entirely unlikely does not mean, however, that the NOC and the Ministry of Oil and Gas are opposed to bilaterally negotiated market entry. There may be some progress to be made here, but again, it’s not going to yield results overnight, or even by the end of the year. END...
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2013 5:19 AM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: Interview with Rachid Benmouktar– Washington Post, J. Rubin

VERY HELPFUL ARTICLE with Rachid

**Under Morocco’s recently passed Constitution, the task is “to make people into citizens,” says Dr. Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah. In Morocco part of the task involves devolving power to localities.**

Washington Post, Right Turn by Jennifer Rubin (Washington, DC, April 10, 2013) -- Syria is in the midst of a bloody civil war. Lebanon is a shadow of its former self, no longer a vibrant, fully autonomous or
inclusive nation. Iraq is beset by sectarian violence. And Egypt is economically and politically teetering on the brink of another popular eruption under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Even where gradual, peaceful change is taking place there is no straight line from authoritarian rule to Western-style democracy. I spoke by phone today with Dr. Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah, a Moroccan governmental official deeply immersed in the civil and constitutional reforms ongoing. He puts it simply, “The biggest challenge? They are numerous!” he says cheerily. He gives some perspective on the enormity of tasks for countries emerging at a time of political and economic chaos in the region.

Under the recently passed Constitution, he explains the task is “to make people into citizens.” In Morocco part of the task involves devolving power to localities. He observes, “Auditing skills and expertise are very important. People need to be trained and to have some knowledge.” This is true, he cautions, for officials and ordinary citizens. That requires “young people with good education” and continued integration of “young women in private society [who can take] leadership in civil society.” One of the biggest challenges, he says, is that young people “are expecting something from government. We need to train them in entrepreneurship.” He adds that this is one area in which the United States can provide encouragement and assistance.

"In addition to its internal challenges, Morocco faces regional threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the violent separatist group, the Polisario Front."
In addition to its internal challenges, Morocco faces regional threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the violent separatist group, the Polisario Front. Until the security situation is resolved the dream of an integrated, prosperous North Africa remains a distant dream.

The take-away from our conversation is that the transformation of a country is no easy matter. Morocco at least has the benefit of a reformist monarchy and a shared national history. Elsewhere the picture is more grim. What we take for granted — a concept of citizenship, respect for a constitution, competent governance and an independent judiciary — have to, in large part, be started from scratch after tin-pot autocrats are overthrown. That requires immense patience which is often in short supply after years of political repression and economic stagnation. And that in turn requires a long-term commitment by the West in money, technical expertise, diplomatic support and anti-terrorism cooperation.

If we want the final chapter of the Arab Spring to be the emergence of peaceful, stable and relatively free governments with functioning economies, then we need to give not speeches but sustained help. That’s not an easy sell when we and other Western powers have budgetary and economic problems of their own. But the alternative is widespread violence, the re-emergence of anti-Western leaders and humanitarian disaster.
**Under Morocco’s recently passed Constitution, the task is “to make people into citizens,” says Dr. Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah. In Morocco part of the task involves devolving power to localities.**

Washington Post, Right Turn by Jennifer Rubin (Washington, DC, April 10, 2013) -- Syria is in the midst of a bloody civil war. Lebanon is a shadow of its former self, no longer a vibrant, fully autonomous or inclusive nation. Iraq is beset by sectarian violence. And Egypt is economically and politically teetering on the brink of another popular eruption under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Even where gradual, peaceful change is taking place there is no straight line from authoritarian rule to Western-style democracy. I spoke by phone today with Dr. Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah, a Moroccan governmental official deeply immersed in the civil and constitutional reforms ongoing. He puts it simply, “The biggest challenge? They are numerous!” he says cheerily. He gives some perspective on the enormity of tasks for countries emerging at a time of political and economic chaos in the region.

Under the recently passed Constitution, he explains the task is “to make people into citizens.” In Morocco part of the task involves devolving power to localities. He observes, “Auditing skills and expertise are very important. People need to be trained and to have some knowledge.” This is true, he cautions, for officials and ordinary citizens. That requires “young people with good education” and continued integration of “young women in private society [who can take] leadership in civil society.” One of the biggest challenges, he says, is that young people “are expecting something from government. We need to train them in entrepreneurship.” He adds that this is one area in which the United States can provide encouragement and assistance.

"In addition to its internal challenges, Morocco faces regional threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the violent separatist group, the Polisario Front."

Morocco is unique in some ways. Unlike the modern states carved out of British holdings, Morocco is an old country with a respected monarchy that combines religious and political power. The present King, like his father, therefore can speak with religious and secular authority in moving the country toward a modern economic and political system. Interestingly he comments that what Morocco can teach its neighbors is that “even in the dark years we were able to find a way.” This is a lesson about endurance and patience, as he tells it. “We were able to make good assessments and to be critical,” he says. With each step forward, he notes, “We build on success. We don’t have to go back to the beginning.”

In addition to its internal challenges, Morocco faces regional threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the violent separatist group, the Polisario Front. Until the security situation is resolved the dream of an integrated, prosperous North Africa remains a distant dream.

The take-away from our conversation is that the transformation of a country is no easy matter. Morocco at least has the benefit of a reformist monarchy and a shared national history. Elsewhere the picture is more grim. What we take for granted — a concept of citizenship, respect for a constitution, competent governance and an independent judiciary — have to, in large part, be started from scratch after tin-pot autocrats are overthrown. That requires
immense patience which is often in short supply after years of political repression and economic stagnation. And that in turn requires a long-term commitment by the West in money, technical expertise, diplomatic support and anti-terrorism cooperation.

If we want the final chapter of the Arab Spring to be the emergence of peaceful, stable and relatively free governments with functioning economies, then we need to give not speeches but sustained help. That’s not an easy sell when we and other Western powers have budgetary and economic problems of their own. But the alternative is widespread violence, the re-emergence of anti-Western leaders and humanitarian disaster.
WESTERN SAHARA / SITUATION REPORT
05/04/13

Three months after his highly charged trip to Algiers, French President François Hollande was in Rabat and Casablanca on April 3 and 4 for an official visit aimed at confirming the solidity of Franco-Moroccan relations regardless of which party happens to be in power in either country. In the period immediately following Hollande's election just under a year ago, it may be recalled, the incoming Socialist administration's stated policy objective in the Maghreb was to establish a more 'balanced' relationship with France's former possessions than had been the case under the preceding right-wing administrations, which had fairly unabashedly favoured Morocco over Algeria – prompting some suspicions that France's new centre-left government harboured greater sympathy for Algiers than for Rabat, and for the Algerian position on Western Sahara than for Morocco's claim to the territory.[1] After a brief period of ambiguity, however, French diplomacy began quietly to revert to form, on the Western Sahara question at least, and if any doubts lingered they will have been dispelled this month. As an unnamed adviser to François Hollande put it to French journal of record Le Monde on the eve of the President's trip to Morocco: “The French position is not reinvented every six months. We are not naive, we know that this issue is complicated, and an enormously sensitive one for the Moroccans.” Addressing the Moroccan parliament on April 4, President Hollande himself hammered home the message: “France supports the efforts of the Secretary General of the UN to achieve an acceptable political settlement. The plan presented by Morocco in 2007 provides for a status of broad autonomy for the people [of the Sahara]. Here and now, I repeat: this is a serious and credible basis for a negotiated solution.” Embattled at home in France where he faces record low approval ratings, Hollande was at least gratified with a standing ovation from Morocco's parliamentarians.

In anticipation, Polisario General Secretary and President of the SADR Mohamed Abdelaziz published an open letter to François Hollande in Algerian daily El Watan on April 2, in which he condemned the French position on Western Sahara as “an obstacle to [...] peace and justice” (adding, however, that it was “never too late” for Paris to change track). Algiers was also spurred to react to the French President's visit, with Foreign Ministry spokesmen Amar Belani taking issue with a 'scene-setting' dispatch issued by French government-owned news agency AFP just before Hollande's visit which explained that “concerning Western Sahara, fought over by Algeria and Morocco since 1975, France's position remains the same: Paris supports the Moroccan autonomy plan.” More than the French support for the autonomy plan, what irked the Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman particularly was the suggestion that the Western Sahara issue is a dispute between Morocco and Algeria. “To say
that Algeria and Morocco compete for the Western Sahara is a disconcerting error and I am surprised by such an aberration,” Belani said in a statement to official government news agency APS. “Algeria’s position is well known. Algeria has no ambition or claim to the territory of Western Sahara, for which it seeks genuine decolonization through the exercise of the Saharawi people’s inalienable right to self-determination.”

The Algerian Foreign Ministry may have been particularly touchy on that particular point because it detects a broader trend, beyond AFP’s “disconcerting error” to reduce the Western Sahara conflict to a dispute between Rabat and Algiers. In particular, the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Christopher Ross, when he suggested in his report to the Security Council last November that a phase of shuttle diplomacy with the neighbouring countries (i.e. Mauritania and Algeria) would be necessary before anything could be expected to come of renewed talks between the two official parties to the dispute (i.e. Morocco and Polisario), indicated that progress towards a solution depends on improved Algerian-Moroccan relations, thus seeming to imply that the dispute was, at base, between Algiers and Rabat. As we noted in our last report, this is not so very far removed from Morocco’s long-held position that the Sahara question is an “artificial” conflict created by Algeria that must ultimately be solved by direct negotiations between Rabat and Algiers. This position – anathema to Algiers, of course – is restated on every possible occasion by Morocco’s Islamist Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, notably in an interview with French journalists on Feb. 24 (“Everyone knows that the Sahara is Moroccan and that, in the context of autonomy, a solution could be found. And if Algeria were to decide to solve this problem, it could be resolved in one day”).

These points of interpretation aside, however, it is worth underlining the practical conclusion Ross drew in his remarks back in November: that there was no point in the present circumstances in continuing with the episodic ‘informal discussions’ between Morocco and Polisario that have become known as the Manhasset process. This admission of failure led to the emergence of divergent opinions at meetings of Polisario’s National Secretariat early this year. The majority view, backed by Mohamed Abdelaziz, was that everything should be done to demonstrate that the stalemate was Morocco’s responsibility, and generally to put Rabat as far as possible on the defensive. Supporters of this position argued that Polisario’s decision to suspend family visits between Tindouf and Laayoune in late January, in protest at security measures imposed by the Moroccan police on families coming from Tindouf, could be seen as part and parcel of this strategy of exposing Moroccan intransigence; the question of human rights abuses in the Moroccan-controlled Sahara is of course another live issue which serves to maintain the pressure on Rabat[2]. On the other hand, a minority of participants in the National Secretariat meetings, among them SADR Foreign Minister Ahmed Salem Ould Salek, argued that the Front needed to push for a quick resumption of UN-sponsored talks with Morocco, since there was no other realistic way forward given the “difficult” context prevailing in the region.

Difficult, the regional situation most certainly is. At the time of the National Secretariat discussions in which such complications were invoked, France’s ‘Operation Serval’ against AQMI and allied jihadist groups in northern Mali was just getting under way, and notwithstanding the largely symbolic first withdrawal of French troops on April 8 the continuing conflict in Mali’s desert north remains an extremely sensitive issue more than two months later. With the Algerian regime unsettled by the collapse of its strategy of attempting to entice the Tuareg
islamist faction Ansar Dine to break with AQMI and uncertain how to respond to the presence of French troops in its own 'backyard'\(^3\), Rabat has rushed to take advantage of the situation by offering its open and unambiguous support to Paris' campaign in Mali, spelled out very explicitly by King Mohamed VI in a speech (read on his behalf by PM Benkirane) to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation\(^4\) summit in Cairo on Feb. 6. As well as helping to restore Rabat's 'special relationship' with Paris, Morocco's support for the French-led effort to bring northern Mali back under the control of the central government has boosted its influence in Bamako, while Algeria's influence continues to decline: in an interview in early February\(^5\), Malian Foreign Minister Tiéman Coulibaly, was effusive in his thanks for Moroccan support, recalling that the UN Security Council resolution 2085 authorising military action to restore Mali's territorial integrity was passed under the Moroccan chairmanship of the Security Council:

> Morocco has always supported and continues to support Mali and its territorial integrity. We rely heavily on the support and cooperation of Morocco in overcoming the terrorist threat. We rely on the help and support of Morocco, which is a brotherly country with whom we have historic relations and was the first country from which we received humanitarian aid.

Coulibaly went on to add:

> There were only 500 jihadists at the outset. Now there are between 5,500 and 7,000. These jihadi groups were joined by young people with no prospects, including young Sahrawis from the [Tindouf] camps.

This latter claim – which despite being repeated by a Malian government minister remains tendentious at best\(^6\) – is clearly harmful for Polisario, and a boost to Rabat's long-running black propaganda campaign. Rabat followed up its advantage in mid-March with an African mini-tour by King Mohamed, taking him (together with a large chunk of the government, foreign intelligence chief Mohamed Yassine Mansouri and numerous Palace advisors) to Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. While Mali was a central part of discussions between the King and Presidents Sall, Ouattara and Bongo – all of whom are reported to have promised to support Morocco's reintegration into the African Union – the Western Sahara question is also understood to have been on the menu, and a member of Polisario's National Secretariat to whom we spoke shortly afterwards described the King's tour as being part and parcel of Rabat's attempts to have the process of negotiations with Polisario “buried” once and for all.

Meanwhile, the sudden outbreak of social unrest across southern Algeria that has occurred in parallel with the war in northern Mali\(^7\), and the first premises of the emergence of a 'Tuareg question' within Algeria itself\(^8\), have the authorities in Algiers all the more on edge. This adds to the difficulties for Polisario and the Sahrawis of the Tindouf camps: according to a leading member of a Sahrawi NGO, based in Algiers, the DRS intelligence and security service recently informed senior Polisario leaders that no contacts between Sahrawis and Algerian and non-Algerian Tuaregs would henceforth be tolerated without explicit prior approval from the DRS; furthermore, all travel by Tindouf-based Sahrawis to or within countries bordering on Algeria, even if arriving via third countries, will require prior authorisation from the DRS\(^9\).

More worryingly still, for Polisario, the uncertainty in Algeria with regard to the 2014 presidential election is now beginning to affect, albeit obliquely, the Western Sahara question. According to a senior civil servant at the Algerian Presidency, Algeria's long-held doctrine on Western Sahara – essentially the position outlined by
Foreign Ministry Amar Belani (see above), namely that Algeria demands that the recognition of the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination via a referendum in accordance with existing UN Security Council resolutions – will not change one iota as long as Bouteflika is in power. But speculation in Algiers political salons that Bouteflika might not stand for re-election in 2014 has encouraged a number of political figures to begin questioning the validity of this and other shibboleths. According to the same source, among those who have begun to entertain the idea that Algeria needs to rid itself of the dead weight of the Western Sahara conflict and adopt a new approach to building a more closely integrated Maghreb are at least two members of the politburo of the left-leaning Front des Forces Socialistes[10], several heads of nationalised companies and, above all, a number of leading parliamentarians from the ruling FLN. The President's entourage, having got wind of these private discussions, tends to see them as the beginnings of movement against a fourth term for Bouteflika; conversely, the more Bouteflika insists on the Western Sahara question in his discussions with foreign visitors[11], the more the dissenters get the message that he is inclined to run for re-election in 2014. Henceforth, the source at the Presidency concludes, in Algeria the Western Sahara question is a domestic political issue more than anything else.

It was perhaps with this in mind that SADR Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, speaking at a press conference at the SADR embassy in Algiers on March 26, went even further than usual in linking the Moroccan intelligence services and AQMI-offshoot MUJAO[12], claiming that “the Algerian diplomats kidnapped in April 2012 in Gao, northern Mali, and who have still not been released, were kidnapped on the orders of Moroccan Makhzen”. For good measure, Ould Salek added that:

The Moroccan secret services want to flood North Africa with large quantities of drugs. For Morocco, drugs and terrorism are two sides of the same coin. MUJAO was created by Morocco as a vector of instability and damage against Algeria and Western Sahara. The leaders of MUJAO currently reside in Rabat and hold diplomatic passports enabling them to move freely abroad, especially to Bamako, where the Moroccan embassy as of 2006 [sic] became MUJAO's headquarters. With drug money, Morocco is able to buy the silence of several countries, so that it can continue to violate the aspirations of the Sahrawi people to freedom.

Such claims, promptly taken up in the Algerian press, seem almost to have been calculated to make it all the more difficult for Algerian politicians to walk away from the Western Sahara question and begin the process of mending fences with Morocco.

By the time Christopher Ross embarked on his tour of the region in late March, therefore, the situation was, if anything, even more difficult. Speaking to us between Ross' visits to Morocco (March 20-21) and the Tindouf camps (March 25-26), the Polisario National Secretariat member quoted above indicated that the Front's leadership, while aware that the context was not particularly favourable and that Morocco was pushing in the opposite direction, would tell to Ross that there was an “urgent” need to resume direct negotiations between the two parties, and that Polisario was ready to do so without preconditions (although clearly this does not preclude exerting continued pressure on Morocco, over the question of human rights in particular[13]).

Speaking to us after Ross' meetings with the Polisario leadership[14], the National Secretariat member reported somewhat despondently that “nothing new” had come of them. Ross is said to have listened “attentively” to his interlocutors, who made a point of raising both the impasse in the negotiations process and the human rights
situation in the territories held by Morocco. Without laying out his conclusions explicitly, Ross reportedly insinuated (a) that it is becoming increasingly difficult to envisage organising a referendum and that an alternative solution, which would have to be acceptable to both parties and to the neighbouring countries, is needed to unblock the situation, and (b) that for a new round of direct negotiations to be worthwhile, a rough outline of such an alternative would be required, as a basis for discussion. The Secretary General's Personal Representative is also reported to have promised to cover the question of human rights in the report he is due to deliver to the Security Council on April 22, a week before the annual vote to renew MINURSO's mandate.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] See AMSR #115 (June 8, 2012)
[2] According to a Sahrawi NGO activist, Mohamed Abdelaziz described the very heavy jail sentences handed down in mid-February by a Moroccan military court on 24 Sahrawi activists detained after the break-up of the Gdeim Izik protest camp in November 2011 as a "godsend" and ordered that a file be prepared presenting the trials as an "exemplary case of Moroccan colonial practices in the Sahara".
[5] Atlasinfo.fr, 05/02/13
[6] A former Mauritanian government minister to whom we spoke in mid-March claimed that Mauritanian intelligence services have established a list of "around fifty" names of Sahrawis who have been taking part in the war in Mali, but added that these fighters are not members of Polisario or residents of the camps and had entered Mali from Mauritania, where they previously resided, rather than travelling through Algerian territory.
Reporting from Bamako, French daily Le Monde (April 7-8, 2013) indicates that the 200 jihadist prisoners captured in northern Mali by French and allied forces and held at the central prison in Bamako after being handed over to the Malian authorities include only a small minority of foreign fighters: four from Nigeria, four from Niger, two from Burkina Faso, one Gambian of Malian origin, one Tunisian, one Somali, one Mauritanian, two Algerians and "one Moroccan who identifies himself as Sahrawi". Around 80% of the prisoners are Malian nationals.
[7] See AMSR #122
[8] On March 29, the heads of the 30 Tuareg tribes of the Hoggar (southern Tamanrasset) met at the home of their Amenokal (or traditional leader) Ahmed Edabir to adopt a platform of demands for the Tuaregs of Algeria. While stressing their commitment to national unity, the Tuareg tribal leaders set up a 'Council of the Tribes of the Hoggar' and signed a lengthy letter to President Bouteflika demanding, amongst other things, that the central authorities reserve quotas for Tuaregs in government ministries, the diplomatic corps, the security services etc.
[9] Prior to this new regulation, Sahrawi residents of Algeria wishing to travel abroad were only required to give prior notification of their departure to the Gendarmerie (for inhabitants of the Tinduf camps) or the police (for those residing in Algiers or other cities), according to the same source.
[10] The FFS, which has of late toned down somewhat its once strident opposition to the regime as a whole, is a sister party of François Hollande's
PS, both being members of the Socialist International.

When Bouteflika received French National Assembly Speaker Claude Bartolone and the French ambassador to Algiers on March 11, for example, the bulk of his comments reportedly concerned the Western Sahara.

As we have noted in earlier reports, Polisario spokespeople, notably Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, have for some months been pushing the claim that MUJAO (the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa, an AQMI splinter group which first emerged in late 2011) is a puppet, and perhaps even a creation, of the Moroccan security services. See WSSR 11/01/2013.

Hence for example Mohamed Abdelaziz's unusual open letter to King Mohamed at the end of March, condemning the abuse by Moroccan security forces of Sahrawi women protesters in Laayoune during Christopher Ross' visit.

Ross met with SADR President Mohamed Abdelaziz, MINURSO coordinator M'hamed Khaddad, parliamentary speaker and head of the delegation to the Manhasset talks Khatri Addouh, members of the Sahrawi National Council (the SADR's quasi-parliament), and members of the National Secretariat.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yabladi</td>
<td>Les cadavres de 37 chiens destinés à la consommation découverts à Casablanca</td>
<td>The bodies of 37 dogs destined to be eaten discovered in Casablanca</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 4, 2013</td>
<td>In Morocco, a new food scandal has been brought to light by pure &quot;accident.&quot; A sausage vendor was arrested for a traffic violation in Boulevard Zerktouni, Casablanca and would have at worst, received a ticket. The policeman was curious and asked to look in the back of the truck. The man admitted that he had 37 dog carcasses whose meat was used to fill sausages to be sold in the old medina of Casablanca.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabladi</td>
<td>Entrepreneurs espagnols escroqués au Maroc : Rabat promet de « punir » les responsables</td>
<td>Spanish entrepreneurs cheated in Morocco: Rabat promises to &quot;punish&quot; those responsible</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 5, 2013</td>
<td>The Minister for Foreign Affairs Youssef Amrani acknowledged having received complaints from Spanish entrepreneurs who say they have been scammed in Morocco, at a breakfast briefing organized by the Europa Press news agency in Madrid last Tuesday. For more than two years, Spaniards have decried corrupt practices used against them in Morocco, without any government intervention. Despite the assurances of Youssef Amrani, the Association affected by extortion in Morocco (AAEM) is still wary. The new Ambassador of the European Union (EU) Rupert Joy, declares that a solution will be found as soon as possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabladi</td>
<td>Melilla : Le président ne veut plus d’imams originaires du Maroc</td>
<td>Melilla: The President does not want any Imams from Morocco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Juan José Imbroda, president of Melilla, has publicly stated that he wants an end to the arrival of imams from Morocco. He believes that all religious officials should be Spanish and appointed by the authorities of Madrid; and not preachers &quot;paid by Morocco.&quot; On February 5, during a trip to Madrid, he asked the Minister of Justice, Alberto Ruiz Gallardón, to send Spanish preachers to the mosques in Melilla. According to the Spanish Secret Police, if expelling Moroccan Imams comes to fruition this will benefit radical Salafists and Wahhabists, in that the perceived insult to Moroccan Islam will aid them in recruitment; local Salafists have already enrolled 20 new students in their schools.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| April 5, 2013 | Le comité de l’ONU sur la torture enquête sur les violations des droits de 42 Subsahariens | The article accuses Morocco of being either inexperienced and/or overzealous in the fight against illegal immigration. The UN Committee against Torture may initiate an investigation into the circumstances of the deportation of the 42 sub-Saharan refugees duly recognized by UNHCR to the Algerian border in December 2006. At the time the Moroccan authorities wanted to show the Spanish Government, led by the Socialist Zapatero, pledges of their willingness to combat illegal immigration by organizing raids against the sub-Saharan. The same year, Rabat hosted the first edition of the Euro-African conference devoted to this phenomenon, but without the participation of Algeria. The complaint filed by a Spanish lawyer relies on Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, and also claims that the police violently raided homes in Rabat and of raping a 27 year old woman.  
*Translated from French* |
| April 8, 2013 | Trafic de drogue: Le Maroc réclame la réouverture des frontières avec l'Algérie | The interior ministers of the 5+5 group met on Tuesday in Algeria to discuss the importance of the Sahel region and the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. Representatives from Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia as well as France, Italy, Spain, Malta and Portugal have agreed to intensify cooperation on border security through the exchange of expertise, experiences, information, analysis and evaluation. Specialized training courses will be organized for the CIMO experts to facilitate the transfer of technology and modernization of control systems and security of travel documents. Interior Minister, Mohand Laenser took this occasion to advocate for the reopening of the Moroccan-Algerian border.  
*Translated from French* |
| April 10, 2013 | Une marche en djellaba et foulard contre le mouvement FEMEN            | On March 23rd, Algeria was the first to rally against FEMEN’s movement. Tunisian women followed suit on April 6th by marching in djellabas and scarves. The Minister for Family and Solidarity, Bassima Hakkaoui, spoke against FEMEN: " Using nudity to protest brings us far back into prehistoric times, prior human evolution and when humans decided to cover themselves. There is a big difference between prehistoric and modern times we live in, what I consider the most advanced time since man appeared on earth. "  
*Translated from French* |
| April 11, 2013 | Benkirane n’exclut pas le recours à des élections anticipées          | Despite the early elections, the PJD has not seen a decrease in its power; especially in the recent elections in Tangier, Marrakech and Fez. The PJD has a comfortable edge as the other political parties seem more indecisive and divided as ever. Furthermore, Al Akhbar Al Youm posted an article on the increasing affiliation with the PJD. They currently have 23,000 affiliates compared to 2011’s 13,000.  
*Translated from French* |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Yabladi</strong></th>
<th><strong>Oil exploration in Morocco: 3 billion dirhams investment in 2013</strong></th>
<th>April 11, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three billion dirhams are set aside in 2013 for oil exploration. The ministry aims to increase the number of wells, but it is very expensive, especially when the state fails to honor its commitment. An analyst at Citigroup, said that &quot;Morocco remains an under-explored hydrocarbons market.&quot; The government has also launched an extensive program of exploration of shale gas, which requires a significant mobilization of funds.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Magharebia</strong></th>
<th><strong>Morocco at a crossroad</strong></th>
<th>April 5, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This article reports that Moroccan youths are in a dire economic situation, and given the proliferation of AQIM this poses not only an economic threat to Morocco, but also a security threat. According to a 2012 World Bank report, nearly half of all Moroccan youths ages 15-29 are either unemployed or not in school. Terrorist recruiters thrive in environments of high youth unemployment, because the frustration caused by unemployment and poverty makes youths, particularly young men, susceptible to extremist sentiments. With the Sahel security situation becoming increasingly precarious, the article claims, Morocco and the international community at large can no longer afford to address security issues with solely military tactics; instead, investment in the youth (in the form of schooling, job training, and sports programs) is necessary in order to prevent Morocco’s youth from becoming the next generation of extremists.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Magharebia</strong></th>
<th><strong>Morocco, Hollande discuss Sahel security</strong></th>
<th>April 8, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hollande during his two day trip to Morocco, indicated that the threat of terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel was a danger not just for the countries concerned and their neighbours, but for the whole of Africa and Europe. Also addressing Sahel security, King Mohammed VI stressed &quot;We are driven by the same clarity of vision over the vital need to ensure peace, security and stability for all African countries. Such conditions seem necessary to secure the lasting foundations of democracy, progress and human development&quot;.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>All Africa</strong></th>
<th><strong>Western Sahara: Social Movements Assembly Condemns Aggressive Behavoir By Moroccan Delegates and Reaffirms Solidarity With Saharawi</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 50 social justice organizations from several countries who attended the World Social Forum in Tunis have signed a declaration affirming their solidarity with the Sahrawi cause. This group, known as the Assembly of Social Movements, was interrupted during their WSF meeting by angry opposition by the Moroccan delegation. According to an ASM communique, &quot;[Moroccan delegates] took over the stage and violently attempted to prevent the reading of the last section of the declaration where we were affirming that we &quot;defend the right of peoples to self-determination and sovereignty, as in Palestine, the Western Sahara, and Kurdistan.&quot; The communique goes on to vehemently condemn this interruption</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### All Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 7, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Balearic Parties Urge Government to Pressurize Nation for Releasing Saharawi Prisoners</strong></td>
<td>The six political parties in the Balearic Islands, Spain, have asked the government to pressure the Moroccan regime to reverse the convictions of the 24 Gdeim Izik prisoners and set them free. This move comes after a delegation from the Balearic parliament visited Sahrawi refugee camps last week. The parties have also called for the establishment of a UN mechanism to ensure the respect of human rights in Western Sahara, and to allow observers and journalists to freely assess the situation in the field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Morocco: Polisario Front - the UN Report Is 'Balanced' but 'Shy'</strong></td>
<td>Ahmed Bukhari, the Polisario representative to the UN, stated that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s report on the situation in Western Sahara gave a balanced look on the issue, but betrayed a reluctance to criticize Morocco for its role in human rights abuses. In his words: &quot;The report is balanced but shy and reflecting the impact of the diversion tactics and intimidation practiced by Morocco to undermine UN efforts to resolve the question of occupied Western Sahara.&quot; Bukhari expressed his approval of Ban’s inclusion of language calling for a permanent mechanism by which to monitor the state of human rights in Western Sahara and for a solution to the issue that would respect the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, a right that he noted was enshrined in the UN Charter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Construction Week Online

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 7, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Colas lands Moroccan $177m high-speed rail deal</strong></td>
<td>Colas Rail has announced that its consortium (with French engineering firm Egis Rail) has won a $177m contract to design and build a high-speed rail line in Morocco. The consortium will design and build a 185km, double-track line between Tangiers and Kenitra.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Futurity.org

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 8, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Salty water threatens Morocco's oases farms</strong></td>
<td>According to a study by Duke University and Ibn Zohr University in Agadir, redirecting meltolffrom the Atlas Mountains to irrigate the desert oases of southern Morocco has increased the salinity of the groundwater to dangerous levels, making continued farming of dates and other crops unsustainable. “The flow of imported surface water onto farm fields has caused natural salts in the desert soil and underlying rock strata to dissolve and leach into local groundwater supplies,” said Avner Vengosh, professor of geochemistry and water quality at Duke’s Nicholas School of the Environment. This presents an even more pressing problem for the future: as natural oases in the Sahara begin to dry up as a result of climate change, local communities will have to rely on groundwater to survive, groundwater that now has an untenable salinity level. For a short-term solution to this problem, the researchers have discovered a previously overlooked low-saline water source that flows naturally into the Draa Basin from the adjacent Anti-Atlas Jabel Saghro Mountains. Flow from this low-saline source will dilute the groundwater and will hopefully mitigate the harmful effects of built-up salt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reuters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>U.N. warns of risk of Mali war</strong></td>
<td>UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon has warned that the Malian conflict might have disturbing spill over effects into Western</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sahara the Polisario Front. Western powers are concerned that Mali's vast and lawless Saharan region could become a launchpad for international militant attacks. In his report, Ban argued in favor of some form of independent rights monitoring but offered no details on how it would be carried out in the resource-rich territory. He also recommended renewing the mandate for the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara for another year until April 30, 2014, as well as adding 15 military observers and six U.N. police officers to the force.

Earlier this week Israel turned away two Moroccan MPs who were trying to enter Jordan through the West Bank, because they did not have entry visas for the West Bank. They were part of a delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe going to meet with Jordan’s King Abdullah II. While the Moroccan parliament is furious over this incident, Israel has defended its decision to turn them away, stating that any Moroccan citizen needs a visa to enter the West Bank through Israel, and that the MPs simply showed up at the Allenby border crossing with their Moroccan passports, without having coordinated their visit with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other delegates held European passports, and thus were able to enter the West Bank without visas.

13th Escort Taskforce of the Chinese navy on Tuesday arrived in Casablanca, beginning a five-day visit to the country. The visit by the escort taskforce, composed of two frigates and one supply ship, is the first of its kind made to the nation by a Chinese naval fleet, said Li Xiaoyan, commander of the escort taskforce. During the visit, Li will meet Morocco’s navy officers and government officials and introduce the Chinese navy's anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters of Somalia for more than four years.

Morocco has experienced a drop in tourism as a result of two main external circumstances: the European economic crisis and the Arab Awakening. The economic crisis has caused French and Spanish tourism (which in 2011 constituted half of Morocco's tourism industry) to drop sharply; in response, Morocco’s Tourism Ministry is trying to attract more tourists from more economically secure European countries such as Britain and Germany, and from Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. While Morocco has not suffered the same instability as some of its neighbors as a result of the Arab Awakening, public opinion on the safety of traveling in North Africa has changed markedly since 2011. Thus, the Ministry must also build up Morocco’s image as a safe and stable country to visit in order to rebuild its tourism industry.

This article is about the delay in applying internationally accepted standards on women’s rights in Morocco. Despite the country’s progressive Family Law, the largely conservative Moroccan Judiciary has consistently found loopholes in statutes meant to protect girls and women, and the infamous Article 475 of the Moroccan penal code has resulted in several high-profile cases of abuse and death of young Moroccan women. Recently, a grant from the Netherlands has led to the creation of a website called Marsadnissa, a database of past rulings on family law. This database will serve as a resource to both women’s rights attorneys and judges; the access to precedential rulings on women’s rights and family law will allow attorneys to better
Prince Moulay Hicham penned an article in the French journal *Pouvoirs* that states that Morocco will undergo democratic revolution in 2018, and that the Makhzen will subsequently cease to exist. This democratic revolution, according to him, will be led by Morocco’s leftist parties, and will be incited by the poor governance of the ruling PJD party.

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lemag.ma</td>
<td>Moulay Hicham: Les marocains se révolteront en 2018 et le Makhzen y succombera</td>
<td>The Moroccan people will revolt in 2018 and the Makhzen will fall.</td>
<td>April 10, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The View from Fez</td>
<td>Casablanca Airport - Lack of Action on Runway Confusion</td>
<td>Tuesday, April 9, <em>Soir Echos</em> reported that the Mohamed V airport at Casablanca is at risk of aircraft accidents, because of runway configurations. They claim that the three runways can lead to confusion among pilots wishing to land at the airport; putting both aircraft and passengers at risk. As of yet no accident has happened but there have been four close calls. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), urged ONDA, the National Airports Authority, to conduct a thorough safety audit to better understand how such confusion comes about and solve the problem as soon as possible. To date, the DGAC has not received any response from the ONDA says M'Barek El Fakir, head of investigations at DGCA. In turn, for ONDA, this is a &quot;case closed.&quot;</td>
<td>April 11, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog Name</td>
<td>Article Title/Date</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Le dernier rapport du FMI met à nu la politique économique du Maroc</td>
<td>The IMF published a report last week saluting Morocco’s macro-economic control despite the external shocks like the European crisis. However, the IMF indicates that it is worried about the government's ability to reduce the budget deficit to 4.8%. The decline in remittance and tourism revenue, in addition to a lack of foreign direct investment, indicate a loss of competitiveness for Morocco. The compensation fund and the pension system also remain concerning for the IMF. Raising the retirement age is considered as one of the solutions.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>TIC : Le Maroc est 89ème dans le rapport de World Economic Forum</td>
<td>On Wednesday, the World Economic Forum released a report on information technologies and communication. Out of a total of 144 countries, Morocco ranked 89th, two spots higher than in 2012. Morocco is the highest ranking in terms of Maghreb countries, with Algeria ranking 131st. However, it is lagging behind when compared to Arab countries, with Qatar (23rd) ranking higher than France (26th) and Belgium (24th).</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Coupe budgétaire de 15 milliards de dirhams au Maroc : Benkirane critiqué de toute part</td>
<td>Last Friday, Moroccan finance minister Nizar Baraka announced a 15bil dh spending cut, in order to address the country’s financial difficulties. This was met with outcry from both the government and the opposition, all criticizing PM Benkirane for being unable to find a “creative” solution to Morocco’s economic crisis, stating that austerity is not the way to revive the country’s lagging economy. Some economists have responded by stating that Morocco’s budget cuts are the result of pressure from the IMF for rapid reform.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translated from French
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Morocco: The Sahara at the heart of a crisis meeting in the Royal Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 15, 2013</strong></td>
<td>This article covers the United States’ decision to back the call to expand MINURSO’s mandate to monitor human rights in the Western Sahara region, and the regime’s reaction. The royal cabinet had a tense five-hour-long meeting on how to react to this statement. The author fears that this is a victory for the Polisario in the Security Council. He states that while the US has changed its position on the matter, Morocco will always be able to count on France’s support in the UNSC; however, France does not have the power to override the United States’ influence on the Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Police officers convicted of corruption in the region of Rabat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 16, 2013</strong></td>
<td>Sixteen officers were arrested and spent the night in jail for “abstention, disclosure of professional secrecy, bribery and corruption”. Various sentences were issued; one of the policeman was sentenced to 18 months, while eleven were sentenced to between three and eight months. The main officer accused is also a drug dealer and is sentenced to four years with a fine of 10,000 dhs; his accomplice is sentenced to serve one year and pay 5,000 dhs fine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>The Supreme Ulama Council opposes freedom of conscience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 16, 2013</strong></td>
<td>The Supreme Ulama Council has issued a fatwa against the freedom of conscience, stating that Muslims who renounce their religion should be treated as apostates and could be killed for their crime. While this fatwa does not affect Moroccan law, this goes in the face of a number of the country’s international commitments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>War in Mali: The AFP has angered the Polisario and Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 17, 2013</strong></td>
<td>An article written by AFP stating that Mujao and AQIM members were found in Tindouf and in Western Sahara angered both the Polisario Front and Algeria. Both deny these allegations. Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that this is “a gross disinformation campaign since it is well known to all that the Mujao are not in Algerian territory”. Moreover, AFP has also suggested that the Polisario Front is also present in northern Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to a report on RFI, since the beginning of 2013 Morocco and Algeria have been trying to reach a reconciliation, in the wake of the security crisis in the Sahel and the need of each country for partnership with the EU. There has already been some movement towards such reconciliation within the private sector, with companies on each side of the border expressing interest in forging business ties. Reconciliation on maritime borders and airspace, however, have been more difficult to negotiate.

Translated from French

Morocco is responsible for prolonging Western Sahara conflict, says Mauritanian diplomat

Former Mauritanian ambassador Mohamed Lemine Ould El Kateb has stated that Morocco is responsible for prolonging the Western Sahara conflict, according to the Algerian newspaper Al Chourouk. According to him, Morocco has not shown any flexibility on the matter, and that the conflict presented a regional security threat if allowed to continue.

This article provides commentary on UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s report on the Western Sahara crisis. The report deviated from the norm in a few ways, especially in its tone, which the author says indicated that the UN will be taking a new approach to Western Sahara. The report calls upon Rabat and Algiers to cooperate in finding a solution to the Western Sahara crisis, and the author of this article interprets this as being indicative of a shift in the UN approach away from Western Saharan independence. The author suggests that Rabat should expand Sahrawi freedoms in its autonomy plan to meet UN expectations and thus preclude more calls for Saharan independence. Another factor that the author finds reassuring is Ban’s inclusion of the involvement of Polisario fighters in AQIM-linked violence in the Sahel.

This op-ed states that Morocco must temper its reaction to the US backing of human rights monitors in MINURSO, lest it jeopardize a strong alliance that is crucial to both countries. In the author’s words, “Morocco and the United State need to further their cooperation rather than brawl over marginal issues.” The article suggests that Rabat expand its public diplomacy efforts in the US, emphasizing the importance of military cooperation between the two countries, and “improve public advocacy for the Kingdom’s position in the Sahara conflict.” He concludes: “It is not time for Moroccans to lash out at some obviously biased groups, like the RFK Center for Human Rights, but rather hit the right political and diplomatic notes with Washington.”

Moroccan police arrested nearly 200 soccer fans for acts of violence and vandalism after the April 11 game between Raja Casablanca and FAR Rabat. During the clashes, shops, cars, trams, and buses were destroyed.

The Moroccan Parliament’s spring legislative session opened on April 12, with a legislative agenda of tackling unemployment and legislative performance. House of Representatives Speaker
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Karim Ghellab</strong> said that the Parliament and the government should coordinate efforts to implement the related provisions of the new constitution. Several parliamentarians have brought attention to the lack of action on parliamentary proposals; the constitution granted more legislative power to parliament where it had previously resided with the government, and many MPs are especially concerned that priority has not been given to the legislative initiatives of parliamentarians. Parliament will also address the major structural reforms including the compensation and pension funds.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Magharebia</strong> Morroco, UK boost judicial co-operation On April 3, Morocco signed three judicial cooperation deals with Britain. These agreements cover extradition policies and mutual assistance in criminal matters. Moroccan Foreign Minister Saadeddine El Othmani said the Moroccan delegation's visit to the UK was part of efforts to develop the strategic partnership between the two countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Mamfakinch</strong> Vidéo du débat organisé par Node « Monarchie ou République, Quel modèle pour le Maroc » The association Node hosted an interesting debate between advocates of a &quot;parliamentary monarchy model&quot; and those who would like to one day see the emergence of a &quot;republican model&quot;. The debate was recorded and is provided on the website. The debate was a couple minutes over two hours.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Washington Post</strong> Morocco rejects any proposals to give UN mission in W. Sahara power to monitor human rights Spokesman Rodney Ford, for the American Embassy in Rabat confirmed US discussion to expand MINURSO mission to include human rights monitoring. The Moroccan statement, issued after a meeting among the king, Cabinet and political party heads on Monday, however, rejected any such proposal and said Morocco’s efforts to promote human rights were already internationally recognized.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 2013</td>
<td><strong>Proactive Investors</strong> Investor spotlight shines on Morocco ahead of busy drill campaign It is estimated that Morocco’s vast exploration area, which spans almost twice the area licensed in the Gulf of Mexico, could become one of the world’s top oil and gas provinces. Cairn said it expects drilling will start early in the second half with the Foum Draa well setting in motion a ten-well campaign. Cairn is carrying the first US$60mln of the well costs for the Foum Draa programme, it also has a 50% stake in the area. Other partners are San Leon with 14.17%, Serica with 8.33% and Longreach with 2.5% (the state oil firm retains the remaining 25%). Jefferies analyst Laura Loppacher highlights that economically Morocco is an attractive destination for oil investment thanks to the government’s accommodating approach so far.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article Title</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albawaba Business</td>
<td><em>Is Morocco going green?</em></td>
<td>With announcement of Africa’s second-largest wind farm being built in southern Morocco, ambitious plans are set to increase renewables in the country’s energy sector. The program aims to improve grid efficiency and generate 42% of domestic needs from renewable energy by 2020. A total of 16 companies submitted bids in 2012 to participate in the construction of the new wind energy projects. The projects will take the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs), with institutions such as ONEE, the Energy Investment Company (Société d’Investissements Energétiques), and the Hassan II Fund for Social and Economic Development (Fonds Hassan II pour le Développement Economique et Social) earmarked for key roles in developing the farms. Morocco thus far, looks like it is heading in the right direction to meet its 2020 target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today Business</td>
<td><strong>Wilmar buys 27.5% stake in Morocco sugar firm for S$333 mln</strong></td>
<td>Singapore’s Wilmar International said it has acquired a 27.5 percent stake in Cosumar, Morocco’s sole sugar supplier, for 2.3 billion Moroccan dirhams (S$333 million), expanding its sugar operations into Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Arabiya</td>
<td><strong>Morocco cancels war games with U.S. over Western Sahara</strong></td>
<td>Morocco canceled its 13th annual “African Lion” military exercises with the United States after the Obama administration supported adding human rights monitoring to the U.N. mission to the disputed Western Sahara territory. Moroccan Minister of Communication Mustapha Kalfi has decried the push to expand MINURSO’s mandate to include human rights monitoring, stating “it is an attack on the national sovereignty of Morocco and will have negative consequences on the stability of the whole region.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Politics Review</td>
<td><strong>Morocco’s Cancellation of Military Exercise a Major Disruption for U.S.</strong></td>
<td>Morocco’s last-minute cancellation of the “African Lion” war games (which were supposed to run from April 17-27) constitutes a big disruption for the US military, according to Yahia Zoubir, a professor of international relations and international management and director of research in geopolitics at Euromed Management in Marseilles. According to him, it will be difficult for the army to redeploy the 1,400 US troops already in Morocco for the exercises. Despite Morocco’s and the US’ longstanding alliance, this cancellation is likely to strain relations between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td><strong>France won’t block U.S. proposal on Western Sahara: envoys</strong></td>
<td>French envoys have stated that France is unlikely to use its veto power to block the US’ proposal to add human rights monitoring to MINURSO’s mandate, saying that this issue is between the US and Morocco and that France does not want to intervene. Without France’s veto, the resolution will likely pass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights</td>
<td><strong>Nowhere to Turn: The Consequences of the Failure to Monitor Human Rights Violations in Western Sahara</strong></td>
<td>The RFK Center produced a report on the human rights situation facing the Sahrawi people in Western Sahara and Tindouf. Information was collected through interviews and meetings during a visit to the regions. While the Equity and Reconciliation Commission established by Morocco in 2004 played an important role in initiating a process to deal with the atrocities of the past, many people believe that it has failed to implement recommendations from the victims; denying access to justice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and truth. The RFK Center urges for immediate action from the UN and demands that Morocco puts an end to the pattern of violence and impunity that affect the Sahrawi people who support the independence of Western Sahara.
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT #123
April 19, 2013

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- With socio-economic protests still rampant in the south while DRS investigators continue to probe allegations of corruption at Sonatrach and elsewhere, the political climate remains unsettled.
- According to a high-level source, President Bouteflika has finally made his mind up to stand for a fourth term of office next year. There has been no public announcement yet, however.
- As the process of amending the constitution moves ahead, it would seem that there are plans to set up a new National Security Council to oversee the work of the police, the gendarmerie and perhaps part of the DRS.
- This may augur moves to break the DRS up into two or more distinct services, to avoid excessive concentration of power after the body's present chief, 'Tewfik' Médiène, retires.
- Such circumstances inevitably generate speculation and rumours, including reports that Maj-Gen. Bachir Tartag, head of internal security at the DRS, is deliberately orchestrating the corruption investigations in order to destroy the entente between Bouteflika and Tewfik and prevent the President from being elected for a fourth term.

Foreign Relations

- With members of Algeria's political class beginning, discreetly, to entertain the possibility of abandoning the shibboleth of Sahrawi independence and building a more united Maghreb once Bouteflika is out of the way, there is a natural temptation for Bouteflika's circle to play up long-standing differences with Morocco in order to prevent such ideas gaining traction in the run-up to the 2014 presidential election.
- Meanwhile, Moroccan politicians, whipped into a frenzy by the surprise announcement that Washington backs inclusion of human rights monitoring in MINURSO's remit, have begun lashing out angrily at Algeria and reviving dormant claims to Algerian territory.
- If MINURSO is given a human rights component, elements with the Moroccan security services may be tempted to use dirty tricks to 'prove' that there is a pay-off between human rights and efficient security.
- Algiers is quietly gloating at the Moroccans' discomfiture, following Rabat's angry cancellation of the joint Moroccan-American African Lion war games.

Security

- Overall, reported levels of political violence have remained low, but with something of an uptick in the first half of April.
- Incidents of note in the north of the country include an attack by a former Islamist guerilla fighter on a civilian in Algiers and an attempt to ambush the convoy of the regional governor of Medea.
- No incidents were reported in the oil and gas producing areas of the south, where the authorities claim to have boosted security significantly, but there has been a rash of incidents in the south-west of the country, all involving the interception of fighters arriving from Mali or Mauritania.
- In a rare admission of weakness, AQMI has spoken of its “pressing need for men and materiel” in an appeal to the youth of Tunisia to join its ranks rather than leave to fight in Syria.
- A separate communiqué from AQMI, expressing solidarity with the “intifada of the South” has been rejected out of hand by the leaders of the unemployed youth protests that have been shaking southern Algeria.
In our monthly reports since the beginning of this year, we have followed the Algerian political scene as it enters an increasingly turbulent phase. An unprecedented wave of unrest in the southern provinces, the resurgence of half-buried corruption scandals and uncertainty about the 2014 presidential election have converged at a time when the duumvirate of President Bouteflika and DRS chief Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène that has dominated politics since 2004 appears to be giving way to a more complex, three-way game, in which the military chiefs are players alongside the head of state and his intelligence chief. Indirect echoes of the mood at the top, we reported, seemed to indicate a growing sense of unease.

Speaking to us in mid-April, a source with access to both Bouteflika and Tewfik expressed, for the first time, a degree of relief with regard to some of these issues – while at the same time hinting at new changes yet to come that may yet turn out to be equally unsettling. As far as the situation in the south is concerned, the source argued that things are “beginning to calm down”. On the face of things, this claim seems somewhat over-optimistic. Militant yet peaceful and well organised demonstrations by the unemployed have continued throughout the month (in Tamanrasset on April 10 and Ghardaïa on April 13, with another scheduled for Djelfa on April 20), while the three-day strike called by public service unions across the south at the beginning of the second week of April was widely observed (with a participation rate of just over 69% according to the organisers) and may herald further action. It is possible, however, that the source's optimism was inspired by a feeling that the authorities (and first and foremost the DRS) have begun to get to grips with the southern protest movement, and may now feel more confident of being able to manipulate and deflect it: the outbreak of rioting and wanton destruction of public property seen in the southern city of Ouargla on April 10 over allocations of social housing is, paradoxically, the kind of protest that the authorities appear relatively comfortable with – incidents such as this flare up regularly across the country and, insofar as the rioters' outlook is essentially parochial and depoliticised, are generally left to burn themselves out. It may be no coincidence that some eyewitnesses claimed to have seen groups of agents provocateurs deliberately encouraging the violence and destruction in Ouargla.

Behind the scenes, meanwhile, the same high-level source claimed that the suspense is at last over as regards the 2014 presidential election. Although no official announcement has yet been made, President Bouteflika has, according to the source, finally made his mind up and decided to stand for a fourth successive term. Speaking very guardedly, the source had nothing to say about how the other key players stand in relation to this decision, but appeared to imply that it was not opposed by DRS chief Tewfik.

A decision has also been taken to move ahead, at long last, with the revision of the constitution. This much at least is out in the open, President Bouteflika having met with the speakers of both houses of parliament, the head of the Constitutional Council and (tellingly) Assistant Defence Minister Maj-Gen. Abdelmalek Guenaizia on April 2 to set the ball rolling, before appointing a body of experts a few days later to draft the required amendments. There have also been leaks to the press concerning the likely content of the package they are working on, which according to Tout Sur Algérie (April 16) will include:
changes to the status of the Prime Minister, who is to be answerable to parliament rather than to the
President;

- the creation of a new position of Vice President (most likely appointed by the President rather than elected
on a joint ticket);

- reintroduction of an upper limit on the number of successive terms of office a President may serve
(although in all likelihood not a return to the two-term limit that existed prior to 2009[1]);

- the creation of a position of Minister of Defence, separate from the position of President of the
Republic[2];

- undefined measures to “provide a new framework for the activities of the security forces”[3].

The final point in this list is the most intriguing. It appears to refer to a forthcoming initiative to which the high-
level source quoted above also alluded, extremely cautiously, when we spoke in mid-April: the creation of a new
‘National Security Council’ to oversee the operations of the police, the Gendarmerie (currently part of the military and under the authority of the Defence Ministry) and, it would seem “part of” the DRS. The source gave nothing more away, other than to stress that the move was “not directed against Tewfik”. Vague though they may be, these hints bring to mind suggestions made earlier by separate sources that Tewfik – who, aged 74, cannot be expected to stay on in his present role indefinitely – has for some time been mulling plans to split the DRS into two or more separate institutions[4] before he retires, so that his successors will never again be able to concentrate the same degree of power in their hands as he has wielded since he took over the helm of the security and intelligence service back in 1990. Insofar as the DRS is, in many respects, the very core of the Algerian regime, such developments will be of the utmost importance over the coming period.

It is in this context that one of Tewfik’s potential successors, head of the Direction de la Sécurité Intérieure Maj-
Gen. Bachir Tartag, has come under the spotlight. Tartag, who took over the crucial internal security position in late 2011, had already been named in the media as the operational commander of the security forces’ response to the In Amenas hostage crisis[5]. He has now been identified by the press as the man in charge of the ongoing anti-corruption probes. Over the past month, DRS investigators have, amongst other things, searched the residences in Algiers and Oran of former Energy Minister Chakib Khelil (who appears to have been ‘allowed’ to flee to Switzerland before answering a summons to appear before investigating magistrates) and have reportedly called in for questioning President Bouteflika’s private secretary, Mohamed Rougab, in connection with alleged irregularities at the national housing agency. This has prompted specialist newsletter Maghreb
Confidentiel to allege that, as the “real orchestrator of the anti-corruption investigations”, Tartag is deliberately
trying, by targeting individuals close to Bouteflika, to “smash the fragile peace between his boss Tewfik and the
head of state, … cause the Bouteflika clan to implode and prevent the President from running for a fourth term
in 2014.”

It is of course technically correct that Maj-Gen. Tartag is, in his capacity as head of the DSI, in charge of the DRS’ criminal investigations department, which is carrying out the corruption probe. And it is conceivable that, if there is an agreement between Bouteflika and Tewfik to break up the DRS to prevent any intelligence chief after
Tewfik from monopolising power, Tartag may, as a potential successor to Tewfik, have a motive for seeking to scupper the understanding between them and do whatever he can to prevent Bouteflika from securing another five years in power. But it is worth stressing that we have no confirmation from other sources at this stage that this is indeed what Tartag is trying to do, or even that he would be able to operate independently of the wishes of Tewfik, his immediate boss, and Bouteflika, to whom the DRS is in principle answerable. Nevertheless, as Algeria inches towards what seems certain to be a highly controversial presidential election and with news of a possible reorganisation of the security services beginning to seep out, rumours such as this are very much worth monitoring and testing against the known facts, as possible indicators of the way in which the new and increasingly complex game of Algerian power politics may play itself out.

Foreign Relations

In his report to the Security Council last November, the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy Christopher Ross suggested, not uncontroversially, that progress towards a solution to the Western Sahara conflict depends on efforts to improve relations between Algeria and Morocco. Developments in Algeria, and a sudden and dramatic shift in relations between Morocco and the United States, suggest that no such improvement is to be expected in the short to medium term, at least.

As we have noted elsewhere[6], sources at the Algerian Presidency are adamant that Algeria's long-held position of support for Sahrawi self-determination via a UN sponsored referendum will not change a jot as long as Bouteflika is President. Insofar as any real improvement in Moroccan-Algerian relations is, from Rabat's point of view, predicated on a shift in Algiers' stance on Western Sahara, this would seem to preclude any meaningful change in relations between the two neighbours while Bouteflika is in power – which may, it now seems, extend beyond 2014. Furthermore, the same sources report that there has been increasing chatter in Algiers political salons concerning the need for Algeria to adopt a new approach to relations with its neighbours, up to and including abandoning the cause of Sahrawi independence; this, it would seem, is seen in a very poor light by the President's entourage, which views such mutterings as the beginnings of movement against a fourth term for Bouteflika. In the short term, therefore, the Bouteflika camp has every interest in amplifying traditional points of discord between Algeria and Morocco in order to prevent the question of inter-Maghreb relations and normalisation with Rabat gaining any traction. Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia has already set the tone, insisting when questioned by journalists and members of civil society bodies during a visit to Oran on April 12 that “the question of opening the border with Morocco is a highly political matter” that could not be settled quickly or easily.

Matters have been further complicated by Washington's unexpected shift on the question of including a human rights component in the mandate of MINURSO, contained in a draft UN Security Council resolution that the American delegation to the UN has circulated to the so-called Group of Friends of Western Sahara[7]. Predictably enough, Rabat has reacted with knee-jerk outrage, apparently expecting France to provide the support to which it has become accustomed and use its veto to block the move. But it would appear that this
will not be the case: France's UN Ambassador Gérard Araud told reporters on April 18 that his country was
"ready to vote for the American text if it is put on the table." It cannot be ruled out that behind-the-scenes
horse-trading might yet lead to the proposal being dropped before being put to the vote at the UNSC, but
barring this the Security Council seems set to add human rights monitoring in MINURSO's remit when it votes on
April 25.

Infuriated as it may be at Washington's diplomatic shift and Paris' unexpected defection, there is clearly a limit
beyond which Rabat – which can scarcely afford to break off relations with the US or France – cannot go, and
having already cancelled at short notice this year's African Lion war games with the US military in a histrionic fit
of pique, it would seem that that limit is now fairly close. De-recognising and expelling MINURSO remains a
theoretical option, but since this would amount to withdrawing from the UN 'Settlement Plan' which has served
as a relatively effective cover for Morocco's 'facts on the ground' for almost a quarter century it does not appear
the most likely. If MINURSO is allowed to stay on, with human rights monitoring as part of its mandate, it is
possible that elements within the Moroccan security apparatus may be tempted to provide 'proof' that, for
intelligence and security agencies, there is a pay-off between respect for human rights and efficiency, by
deliberately turning a blind eye to cross-border smuggling of drugs and weapons, AQMI recruitment[8], etc. The
consequences for Algerian-Moroccan relations would clearly be anything but positive. Even without this, there is
an obvious temptation for Moroccan politicians to lash out all the more strongly at Algeria (the real opposing
party in the Western Sahara dispute according to the Moroccan doxa). Hamid Chabat, Secretary General of the
Istiqlal Party, is already reported to have responded to the changes at the UN by reviving his party's historic
position of laying claim to a large slice of western Algeria.

Meanwhile, Algiers – able for once to bask in the contrast between Rabat's sudden cancellation of the African
Lion exercises and the signs of progress in its own military relationship with the US[9] – has been quietly gloating
at Rabat's discomfiture. As an unnamed Algerian diplomatic source, quoted by various Algerian electronic and
print media[10], puts it:

The anger and disappointment that prevail on the other side of the border are in direct proportion to the bitter
diplomatic failure [that Rabat has suffered]. [...] It has to be said that it is not so much the issue of monitoring of human rights that has provoked our neighbors' ire
as the essential political issue of the Security Council deciding to demolish the fiction of so-called Moroccan sovereignty [...] by imposing third-party monitoring [...].
This is therefore a major political shift, to which must be added another, equally important element: if the Security Council does allow MINURSO to report regularly on the violence to which the Sahrawis in the occupied territories
are systematically exposed, they will no longer hold back in denouncing the abuses and unfair trials they suffer,
asserting openly their right to freedom of assembly and expression, and stating clearly their demand for
independence.
So there is a real tectonic shift, which may shake up the situation on the ground and shake things up on the
international level. That is what Rabat is afraid of, and it explains the confused, angry and sometimes violent
reactions against Algeria.
The inappropriate, irresponsible and unacceptable language [...] is typical of this Pavlovian reflex that consists in
putting Algeria automatically in the dock whenever the Saharawi cause makes any gains on the international scene.
And yet, with a little serenity and insight, it is easy to see that the conditions that used to prevail regionally and
Security

Overall, there has not been no significant rise in political violence since our last report. Jihadist activity remained at low levels in March, with only seven jihadist operations reported nationwide in the whole month (around the same level observed since the beginning of the year, and about half the long term average), but picked up in early April, with five jihadist operations reported in the first half of the month; Kabylia in particular saw its worst week this year in early April, perhaps reflecting the end of the tough weather conditions that impede guerrilla activities in this mountainous region during the winter. Activity by the security forces meanwhile was down sharply, with seven operations reported in March (against 15 in February), and two in the first half of April.

There was however a rare incident in Algiers on March 16, in which a TV technician was stabbed to death by a “repentant jihadist” in the Bouzareah district. Unions and the media treated it as a “terrorist attack”, but the assailant's motive for is not clear and it is at least as likely that the incident was simply another one of many cases of unplanned, individual violence between former members of the armed islamist groups and their neighbours and colleagues, which have plagued society since the “national reconciliation” laws were brought into force.

One other notable incident in the north of the country occurred on April 3, when one policeman was killed and another wounded in a terrorist ambush on the RN-8 highway near Mezrana, wilaya of Médéa. The policemen were scouting out the road to be taken by the wali of Médéa on a visit to Tablat, in the north of the wilaya, when they came under heavy machine gun fire from jihadists hiding in the hills overlooking the road. The incident was reported by the official news agency APS and relayed by the press as “an attack against the governor’s escort”, while press accounts said the attack took place “just a few minutes before the governor’s car arrived at the spot”. The incident is significant not only because it occurred in an area that has been largely free of violence for a number of years but because it seems to represent a return to the tactic of targeted assassinations that is all the more surprising in that it requires a level of planning and intelligence gathering that might have been assumed to be beyond the capabilities of AQMI's hard-pressed units in the north of the country.

No incidents were reported in oil and gas producing areas, where the authorities claim to have considerably enhanced security measures, sending sending 5,000 additional soldiers to the south to patrol the oil and gas fields (El-Watan 22/03) and tightening security around the town of Hassi Messaoud and nearby oil facilities around the beginning of April (El-Khabar 01/04). Several checkpoints have been established in various parts of the town, stopping and checking vehicles and verifying whether occupants are actual residents of the area. In the last week of March, security forces are reported raided several “black spots” in Hassi Messaoud known to be lairs of drug dealers and criminals. Further, security forces have intensified patrols around oil facilities, with security staff in uniform and civilian clothing watching over around the clock. “Strict orders have been given” that expatriate workers should not move about without security escort – although this appears to be no more than the belated application of rules that have existed on paper for several years (and which apply, in principle, to the north as well as the south of the country).

The southern borders in general appeared relatively calm this past month, although this may still be due more to underreporting than to a real fall in jihadist and smuggling activity around Algeria’s borders. There were some signs of the jihadist presence moving west, to the usually comparatively quiet areas between Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, instead of the eastern sector, which extends from the Libyan border to the town of Bordj Baji Mokhtar in the southeast of the wilaya of Adrar, where most border incidents are usually concentrated. Three incidents have been reported in the great south-west since January 2013, against just one in the whole of 2012. According to El-Khabar (01/04), security forces are understood to have clashed with and besieged a group of jihadists on March 25-26 north of Timimoun in the wilaya of Adrar; they are believed to have made their way there from Mauritania. The army command on March 31 launched a “major operation” to “comb through” the Grand Erg Occidental between the wilayas of Ouargla and Béchar all the way to the Mauritanian border, to root out any jihadist presence in the area. The operation is supposed to be “completed before the summer,” according to security sources quoted by El Khabar. On April 1, according to L’expression (04/04), the Algerian army, acting on intelligence, intercepted two offroaders in the area near the border between Algeria, Mali and Mauritania and killed “at least nine” jihadists of various nationalities (from Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali) who are believed to have belonged to MUJAO. On April 13 Algerian security forces backed by helicopters tracked and destroyed two offroaders in an area around 190km from Bordj Baji Mokhtar, near the border with Mali, said...
Beyond Algeria's borders, the office of President François Hollande on March 23 officially confirmed the death of Abdellahamid Abou Zeid, emir of AQMI’s Katiba Tarek Ibn Ziad, reportedly killed in late February (see previous report). The next day the Algerian press reported that “Jemal Oukacha, alias Yahya Abou El Hammam was named Abou Zeid’s successor as the AQMI’s emir for the Sahara region”. This is doubly incorrect, insofar as Abou Zeid was not “emir of AQMI in the Sahara” but merely commander of one AQMI’s brigades in the region (albeit an important one), while Oukacha was already “emir of AQMI in the Sahara” as of September 2012[11]. AQMI issued a statement on April 6 denying the “death of the emir of the Sahara” and his replacement by Oukacha, explaining that Oukacha became emir after his predecessor died in a car accident “months before the French aggression began”, and, for good measure, accusing the French president of “lying to the French people to boost his sagging popularity”.

The Algerian press, followed by some foreign newspapers (e.g. Le Monde, 06/04), contrived to understand this to mean that AQMI was denying Abou Zeid’s death, even though the statement did not mention him and was clearly not talking about him. Meanwhile, the death of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, announced by Chadian officials in early March, remains unconfirmed, notwithstanding Chadian President Idris Déby’s insistence[12].

Online, AQMI issued a statement on March 17 to “the Muslim youth in the Maghreb and especially Tunisia” urging them not to take part in jihad in other countries unless “the leaders of jihad in your area, judging the move to be in the interest of Islam, authorise you to go”. Thus “we implore the young Muslims of Tunisia to stay in their land and not leave it in the hands of the enemies Islam”. Those who must leave:

would do better to join the jihad in the Islamic Maghreb, where your brethren in northern Mali are struggling in the face of the French Crusade, or in northern Algeria, where the need for men and materiel is pressing, after two decades of war against the infidels. France, with its allies in the region, is working hard to empty the Maghreb of its jihadist energy, not because they care about other fronts, but in order to cut the supply of fighters on the front to which it has sent its troops.

Although the statement did not mention it openly, the allusion to Syria is clear. AQMI is trying to persuade would-be jihadists in Tunisia and North Africa to join its ranks instead of leaving to fight in Syria – a rare if not unheard of admission of weakness.

In a separate statement, sent to Mauritanian news agency ANI on March 22, AQMI stated its support for the protests in Algeria's southern wilayas, which it termed the “Intifada of the South”, and called for more demonstrations against the regime. After listing a litany of “crimes of the Algerian regime” — ranging from “corruption” to the “forced deportation of three million people, a tenth of the Algerian population” — the jihadist organisation described the demonstrations in the south as “a legitimate response to the policy of marginalisation” that has long afflicted the southern provinces and called on the “young men of the South” to “unify their demands and their command”. Tahar Belabès, spokesman of the National Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Unemployed (CNDDC), which has been organising the protests in the south, promptly and categorically rejected AQMI's support in a statement to the media, in which he stressed that the movement “is peaceful and hates violence” and condemns “all attempts to manipulate or interpret” it. There have been no indications that AQMI’s statement has gained any traction whatsoever with rank and file protesters either.
It is difficult to see, however, how a limitation on the number of successive terms of office that would nonetheless permit Bouteflika to stand for a fourth time could have any worthwhile meaning – unless a mechanism is found whereby the amendments do not come into effect until after the 2014 presidential election.

This is not strictly speaking necessary, insofar as the existing constitution, although it does stipulate that the President is “responsible for national defence”, at no point states that the position of Defence Minister is held exclusively by the President of the Republic. The position of Defence Minister exists and, indeed, has been held in the past by individuals other than the President. The inclusion in the constitution of a clause explicitly prohibiting the President from holding the defence portfolio, on the other hand, would represent a potentially significant change in the balance of powers.

On this particular point, TSA adds, “our sources provided no further details”.

The ‘classic’ division would be into one domestic and one foreign intelligence agency, but this would be to overlook the real extent of the DRS’ remit, which goes way beyond intelligence gathering, notably on the domestic scene. Among the other options would be to split off the Direction Centrale de la Sécurité de l’Armée, possibly placing it directly under the authority of the Defence Ministry.

Besides the United States, this includes France, Spain, Britain and Russia.

In mid-April, the Moroccan Interior Ministry issued a statement indicating that the police and the DST (domestic intelligence agency) had succeeded in identifying and dismantling a six-man cell in Fès that had been actively recruiting Moroccan volunteers with the aim of sending them to join AQMI in Algeria.

On March 24, US AFRICOM commander Gen. Carter Ham flew to Tamanrasset to visit the Joint Operational Staff Committee (CEMOC), a structure, based at the headquarters of the Sixth Military Region of the Algerian armed forces, that was established at Algeria's initiative in 2009 to bring together representatives of the militaries of Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Algeria itself and provide a framework for cooperation between them in the Sahara-Sahel region.

Déby told French newspapers on April 15 that Belmokhtar “blew himself up as Chadian forces surrounded him” and “we could not take pictures of him”.

See AMSR #118 of October 17, 2012
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Angola: Diplomat</td>
<td>The ambassador of Morocco to Angola, Sidati El Ghallaoui Friday in Luanda highlighted the country's role in Africa, taking into account its experience in peace-building process. According to El Ghallaoui, Angola should be perceived as a model for the rest of the region, as it has attained high levels of development. Angola and Morocco cooperate in various fields especially in education, fisheries, agriculture and rural development. El Ghallaoui concludes that both countries are working together for the creation of a Joint Commission that will strengthen the already established bilateral relationship.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Gabonese President</td>
<td>President of the Gabonese Republic, Haj Ali Bongo Ondimba and his wife Sylvia Bongo, arrived Monday evening in Fez for a visit to the kingdom during which he will participate in the 6th agriculture conference and will attend the opening of the 8th Moroccan international agriculture fair (SIAM) in Meknes, which will be chaired by HM King Mohammed VI on April 23-24.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco Awards Ambassador Ousman Badjie</td>
<td>Gambia's ambassador to France, Ousman Badjie, was awarded the Great Ribbon of the Alawite Wissam last week by Morocco's ambassador to France, Chakib Benmoussa, in recognition of the important role he played in fostering closer ties between Morocco and Gambia. This award is part of the Kingdom's recent policy of cementing and expanding partnership with Sub-Saharan Africa. In recent weeks, King Mohammed VI has made a number of state visits to neighboring West African countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Recorder</td>
<td>France to negotiate UN text on Western Sahara</td>
<td>France signalled that it would push to modify the US proposal to MINURSO before casting its vote. French Foreign Ministry spokesman Philippe Lalliot told reporters &quot;we are not at the stage today to say whether we will vote for or against it.&quot; Although previously vetoing resolutions on the issue; on Thursday France declared that it would unlikely veto the American draft.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Maghreb states discuss judicial co-operation</td>
<td>Judges from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya are advocating increased integration and legal reform throughout the Maghreb region. They discussed the economic and social advantages to judicial integration at the Arab Maghreb Union judiciary committee session in Nouakchott, Mauritania. The gathering was a step on the road to closer judicial co-operation between Maghreb countries, especially in the field of standardisation of laws governing cross-border crime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Maghreb interior ministers devise common</td>
<td>Last week, interior ministers from Arab Maghreb Union countries met in Rabat and adopted a draft security strategy. The Rabat Declaration, approved at the April 21st meeting, highlighted the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
strategy

April 25, 2013

"desire for consultation and coordination expressed by the member states, especially in the fields of security and counterterrorism", Moroccan Interior Minister Mohand Laenser said. The declaration states that “[Terrorism] needs to be tackled jointly, through on-going coordination. This is because Maghreb countries are neighbours and belong to the same regional area, and face common challenges and threats.” They also discussed the importance of addressing such issues as funding for terrorist groups, the recruitment of religious extremists, and cross-border drug trafficking.

Magharebia

Morocco, Mauritania ink 17 accords

April 25, 2013

Morocco and Mauritania concluded their 7th joint commission session Wednesday (April 24th) in Nouakchott with the signing of 17 new cooperation accords, which spelled out plans for partnership in the fields of transportation, education, scientific research, energy, housing, and sanitation, among others. In his opening address to the session, Mauritanian Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf called on Moroccan business leaders to invest in his country’s fishing, mining and agriculture sectors.

Free Thought Blog

Civil society refuses the expansion of MINURSO privileges in Western Sahara

April 21, 2013

Protesters from several civil society organizations rallied outside the parliament building in Rabat on Sunday in protest of the US proposal to add human rights monitoring to the MINURSO mandate, because they consider this move to be a violation of Morocco’s national sovereignty. The protest was supposed to be in front of the US embassy, but one of the organizers thereof stated that they were prevented from protesting outside of the embassy because of a meeting between the US ambassador and the Moroccan foreign ministry.

Middle East Online

Gulf-Moroccan Forum in Tangier seeks to stimulate bilateral investment

April 21, 2013

The third Gulf-Moroccan Investment Forum will be held from May 6 to 8 in Tangier, Morocco. Over 400 Gulf and Moroccan businessmen are expected to participate in this three-day event to discuss the increase of bilateral investment opportunities and to study joint ventures. Forum chairman Mohamed Ait Bouselham highlights the promising investment opportunities in Tangier as it has become “an important economic hub in North Africa attracting big European and US companies.”

AFP

Morocco border issue could be resolved soon: Algeria

April 21, 2013

Algerian Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia urges the reopening of the Moroccan-Algerian border. Kablia praised his Moroccan counterpart Mohand Laenser, who visited Algiers earlier this month, for creating an environment conducive to the process. President Hollande has also pressured both countries into reopening the border to boost trade and cooperation. In light of the recent US proposal to expand MINURSO, Morocco has labeled the Polisario Front as a terrorist organization. Kablia was asked how long Algeria was going to support the Polisario Front. He avoided the question, merely stating that Algiers was “not a party to the conflict.”

Morocco World News

US proposal on MINURSO is not accepted by two members:

The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, José Manuel García-Margallo expressed his displeasure at the US proposal to expand MINURSO’s mandate and stated that he expected to see a revised resolution to re-authorize MINURSO
Spanish FM

April 21, 2013

He pointed out that two members, France and Spain, of the Group of Friends of the Sahara opposed this resolution, and for that reason it should be changed. The other members of the Group of Friends of the Sahara are the US, the UK, and Russia.

Yabiladi

Sahara: John Kerry accuses Morocco of human rights violations

April 21, 2013

This article is simply commenting on the ironic timing of the US Department of State report on human rights. Coming out days after the US proposed to add human rights monitoring to the MINURSO mandate, the report accuses Morocco, along with several other countries, of violating human rights. It specifically refers to abuse in the prison in Laayoune. The article states that the report largely echoes the report of Juan Mendez, UN special rapporteur on torture, then makes vague connections between Kerry and the RFK Center (which recently released an excoriating report on human rights in Western Sahara), because Kerry is married to a Kennedy.

Yabiladi

Morocco: Launching of construction for the El Jadida-Safi highway which will be opened in 2015

April 22, 2013

HM King Mohammed VI presided over a ceremony this Sunday beginning construction on a 4.8bil dhs highway between El Jadida and Safi. This highway will greatly decrease the time it takes to travel between the two cities and will hopefully increase travelers’ security. It should be finished by 2015.

Yabiladi

Algeria arrests a Moroccan Amazigh militant in Tizi-Ouzou

April 22, 2013

Khalid Zirari, vice president of the World Amazigh Congress, was arrested in Algeria over the weekend for participating in a protest for Kabyle autonomy in Tizi-Ouzou, the capital of Kabylie. Officially, he was arrested for participating in a non-authorized march organized by a separatist movement. He was supposed to be deported to Morocco and barred from re-entering Algeria, but as of this article’s publication (24 hours after he was arrested), no one had heard from him and Yabiladi was unable to make telephone contact with him.

Yabiladi

La vidéo qui accable la Minurso

A recent video released portrayed two UN soldiers, one Egyptian and the other Argentinean having a political discussion with members of the Polisario Front. The Egyptian soldier stated that “this land is yours and nobody can take it and you have to use the conditions of each situation with a new approach. For each
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Sahara/Morocco: The video that overwhelms MINURSO</th>
<th>Sahara/Morocco: The video that overwhelms MINURSO</th>
<th>April 23, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sahara/Morocco: The video that overwhelms MINURSO</td>
<td>situation weigh the pros and cons and act accordingly. This is your chance for you to be visible to the world so that you can reclaim your rights&quot;. A petition has been launched demanding the expulsion of the Egyptian UN soldier. Mohamed Taleb, a community actor in Laayoune calls for the resignation of the head of MINURSO, the German Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber due to his hostile position towards Morocco. With the release of the video, Morocco challenges MINURSO’s neutrality.</td>
<td>Sahara/Morocco: The video that overwhelms MINURSO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Translated from French**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>La question du Sahara bloque l'accord de pêche entre le Maroc et l'UE</th>
<th>La question du Sahara bloque l'accord de pêche entre le Maroc et l'UE</th>
<th>April 23, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La question du Sahara bloque l'accord de pêche entre le Maroc et l'UE</td>
<td>European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Maria Damanaki raised the issue of human rights in the Sahara in February during the fifth round of negotiations, after receiving a letter from the &quot;minister&quot; of the Polisario representative for Europe. The letter called for &quot;the suspension of negotiations due to the persistent human right violations Sahrawis face as well as the illegal plundering of Western Sahara’s natural resources.&quot; Without guaranteeing human rights of Sahrawis, Damanaki states that fishery agreements will not be negotiated. Due to this, a date has yet to be set for the sixth and hopefully final round of negotiations.</td>
<td>La question du Sahara bloque l'accord de pêche entre le Maroc et l'UE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Translated from French**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Espagne : Un réseau qui transportait de la drogue depuis le Maroc en autogire démantelé</th>
<th>Espagne : Un réseau qui transportait de la drogue depuis le Maroc en autogire démantelé</th>
<th>April 24, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Espagne : Un réseau qui transportait de la drogue depuis le Maroc en autogire démantelé</td>
<td>The Spanish Guardia Civil has dismantled a drug trafficking network that was carrying hashish from Morocco to Spain. The investigation began in December, when the Guardia Civil intercepted a gyroplane carrying the drugs into the country. From there they were able to arrest three members of the organization, which led to their discovery of money and drug stashes, along with computers containing information on the rest of the network’s business.</td>
<td>Espagne : Un réseau qui transportait de la drogue depuis le Maroc en autogire démantelé</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Translated from French**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>African Lion: Le Maroc revient sur sa décision d'annulation, mais les États-Unis n'acceptent qu'en partie</th>
<th>African Lion: Le Maroc revient sur sa décision d'annulation, mais les États-Unis n'acceptent qu'en partie</th>
<th>April 24, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Lion: Le Maroc revient sur sa décision d'annulation, mais les États-Unis n'acceptent qu'en partie</td>
<td>After the US abandoned its proposal to add human rights monitoring to the MINURSO mandate, Morocco has asked the US military to return and resume its annual African Lion joint military exercises. However, the US military responded that it would only be able to do some of the exercises, because the forces that had been in Morocco for the war games have been redeployed. African Lion will be able to resume in full next year.</td>
<td>African Lion: Le Maroc revient sur sa décision d'annulation, mais les États-Unis n'acceptent qu'en partie</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Translated from French**
### Yabiladi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| April 25, 2013 | Les Marocains souhaitent que l'Union européenne joue "un rôle plus important au Maroc"  
Etude | Moroccans want the EU to play "a more important role in Morocco"  
[Study]                                                                 | A survey, funded by the EU, conducted between November and December 2012 questioned a thousand Moroccans on their perception of the EU. Results are as follows: 77% believe that the EU is a key partner for the kingdom, 75% also believe that the EU contributes "a lot" to the development of the kingdom. 58% of respondents said that the EU has supported local populations during the Arab Spring and 68% think that the EU has brought peace and stability to the region, unlike the rest of the region where these figures are 40%, 32% and 37% respectively. The survey also indicates that 72% of Moroccans trust the EU, more than any other international institutions such as the Arab League (51%) and the UN (46%); more than their parliament (38%) and political parties (29%) but as much as their government (73%). Lastly, 83% believe that the EU should play a stronger role in Morocco.  
*Translated from French* |

### Yabiladi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| April 25, 2013 | Sahara : Manifestation des pro-Polisario à Laâyoune et Boujdour  
Sahara: Pro-Polisario demonstration in Laayoune and Boujdour | Immediately after the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 2099, around 30 to 40 pro-polisario individuals took over the streets and protested demanding the right to self-determination of Sahrawis and denounced the absence of an independent human rights monitoring. There was also a sit in in the UNHCR office in Laayoune. Police did not intervene in either event.  
*Translated from French* |

### Mamfakinch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| April 23, 2013 | كلمات المؤتمر الوطني للجمعية المغربية لحقوق الإنسان إلى مامفاكينش  
Words of the 10th national meeting of the Moroccan Conference on Human Rights to Mamfakinch | The Moroccan Conference on Human rights convened its 10th annual national meeting on April 19-21 and asked Mamfakinch to follow it as a partner organization. Mamfakinch has already partnered with the Conference in several areas, including immigrant rights, political prisoners, and monitoring human rights violations. Mamfakinch will continue to publish reports on the proceedings of the conference.  
*Translated from Arabic* |

### RTT News

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| April 23, 2013 | Morocco, EU Begin Negotiations for Closer Trade Ties  
Morocco, EU Begin Negotiations for Closer Trade Ties | The European Union and Morocco have begun first round of negotiations for finalizing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement. The agreement is expected to deepen existing trade relations in a host of areas not yet covered, such as services and public procurement, as well as to bring better protection for investments and new commitments on competition and intellectual property rights. The DCFTA will be an important step towards gradually integrating the Moroccan economy into the |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reuters</th>
<th>Compromise seen on Western Sahara allowing U.N. mission extension</th>
<th>Three Western diplomats said Washington has withdrawn its proposition after the resolution was reviewed by a group of countries including the United States, France, Spain, Britain and Russia. French Foreign Ministry spokesman Philippe Lalliot told reporters that &quot;there will be a resolution very soon for a new mandate of the MINURSO. We are close to a solution that will satisfy everybody.&quot; He declined to comment on the details of the resolution, which was due to be voted on April 25. A U.N. Security Council diplomat said that the draft resolution contained more human rights language than previous years, describing it as a &quot;step forward.&quot; However, according to Omar Mansour, a member of the Polisario's National Secretariat decision-making body, such compromise is a big mistake and embarrassment for the Sahrawis that could lead to the young generation turning to violence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>Morocco Says Working on Laws to Protect Women, Enhance Equality</td>
<td>In an interview in London with government spokesman Mustapha Khalfi that in the next two to three months Morocco will amend Penal Code 475 to criminalize violence against women and stop rapists from marrying victims to escape prosecution. Last February, according to Khalfi, the government set up 162 million dirham Family Solidarity Fund for divorced women who, for whatever reason, cannot receive alimony payments. He concludes that last year the government allocated 65 millions dhs for 223 civil society projects to help improve the lives of women nationwide, especially in rural areas and the sum is projected to increase this year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab News</td>
<td>Morocco to sign $ 2.4 bn IDB loan deal</td>
<td>Morocco expects to sign a $ 2.4 billion loan deal next month with the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Under this agreement, Morocco will receive $600 million each year from 2013 to 2016, most of which is a loan but some of which will be a direct donation. The country furthermore hopes to raise $1.5bil this year by selling its first sukuk. The Moroccan parliament approved legislation allowing the government and companies to issue sukuk last January. Morocco’s budget deficit is currently 22.9bil dhs, though the rate of economic growth has increased over the past year to 4.8% and is expected to reach 5.5% next year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Star Lebanon</td>
<td>Morocco opposition Islamists warn of 'explosion'</td>
<td>Fathallah Arsalane, spokesman for the Justice and Charity Party, told AFP in an interview that the party hopes to become a part of Moroccan politics. He disparaged the PJD-led governing coalition, alleging that it is toothless and that the country is instead ruled by a &quot;shadow government&quot; controlled by King Mohamed VI. He then slammed the authorities for failing to improve living conditions in the North African country which is grappling with widespread poverty and high youth unemployment. He claimed that unless the government tackles the social and economic injustices faced by a large percentage of the country, especially the country’s youth population, Morocco will likely experience an “explosion” of youth protests, which could take the form of anti-regime protests similar to those in Tunisia and Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Spain arrests 2 men suspected of al Qaeda group links</td>
<td>Spanish police have arrested two men suspected of being connected to Al Qaeda. The two men were Nou Mediouni, 23, from Algeria and Hassan El Jaouani, 52, from Morocco. Both men were unemployed and living in Spain at the time. They had been under surveillance for the past year as part of an operation that Spanish police carried out in cooperation with their counterparts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco Board TV</td>
<td>The activist and researcher for Morocco's Amazigh Cultural Institute (IRCAM), Ahmed Assid, spoke on Islam and education in Morocco, at a seminar organized by the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) in Rabat. According to him, religious education in Morocco &quot;is now outdated, and teaches religious values that contradict universal human rights values&quot;. He added that textbooks convey a “terroristic” Islam and that religious education emphasizes “spreading Islam by the sword”. Assid concludes the three minute video by stating that religious belief is a free choice and that nobody should be intimidated/threatened to follow their belief. Salafist preacher Hassan El Kattani called for not &quot;letting these remarks pass without reaction&quot; and filed a complaint against Assid for undermining Islam.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 24, 2013</td>
<td>April 24, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The View from Fez | Fez experienced two earthquakes early in the morning of April 25. The first, at 5:29, registered a 4 on the Richter scale, and the second, at 5:42, registered a 3.8. The earthquakes caused buildings to sway and people to leave their homes, but did not cause significant damage or casualties. |
| April 25, 2013 | April 25, 2013 |

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Based upon public and private reports, that are usually judged accurate, although the information contained herein have not been corroborated by third party sources.

A member of Polisario's National Secretariat describes UNSC Resolution 2099 as a “turning point in the Western Sahara conflict”. The resolution, which in the end did not provide for extending MINURSO's mandate to cover human rights monitoring, leaves the door open for other UN institutions to take up this matter. It is therefore important for the Saharawis to prove to the entire world that respect for human rights is an essential element in their struggle for independence. They must now show the world that the right to self-determination is the most primary of human rights. The demonstrations that took place in Laayoune, Smara and elsewhere in the territories under Moroccan control show that the Saharawis are exercising their right to demand independence; the response of the Moroccan occupiers was repression, leaving over 50 wounded. There is a new element, too: for the first time, the Moroccan occupiers have begun demolishing the homes of Saharawi activists. The Polisario Front will soon launch an international campaign for the protection of the Saharawi population in the territories held by Morocco. The Saharawis will celebrate the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Polisario Front on May 10 by calling for human rights to be respected in Western Sahara. Human rights organisations from all over the world will be coming to the refugee camps and the occupied territories to demand that human rights are respected and to condemn the repression meted out by the Moroccan occupiers. The international conference on the right of peoples to self-determination held in Algeria on Saturday, April 27 provided the occasion for Polisario to launch this campaign.

A leading member of a Saharawi NGO, who is based in Algiers, says that none of Polisario's leaders, when commenting on UNSC resolution 2099, so much as mentioned the possibility of resuming direct talks with Morocco [the subject of articles 4 & 5 of the resolution]. The dominant discourse within Polisario, following this resolution, is focussed on mobilising international pressure for the respect of human rights in the Sahara and, by extension, for the Saharawis' right to self-determination. That the Americans came out in favour of human rights monitoring showed that the efforts of Polisario and its friends do have a positive effect, even if Washington's subsequent U-turn has left a bitter taste in the Saharawis' mouths. The Algerians did not appreciate this American reversal either, seeing it as a sign of weakness in their support for the Saharawis. That is why several Algerian political leaders have loudly restated their support for the Saharawi cause. One of the collateral effects of the American U-turn is that there can no longer be any speculation about the possible re-opening of the Algerian-Moroccan border. The Algerians are no longer prepared to consider re-opening the border without some perspective of a solution to the Sahara conflict.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Saturday, May 04, 2013 1:31 PM
To: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Subject: Blog Monitoring May Week 1

**Subject:** Blog Monitoring May Week 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: UN 'Miss Opportunity' to Allow Western Sahara Human Rights Monitoring</td>
<td>April 25, 2013</td>
<td>Amnesty International described the MINURSO re-authorization as a “missed opportunity” in the fight to protect human rights in the region. AI’s Middle East and North Africa Director, Philip Luther said, &quot;The Security Council has failed the people of Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps by missing a unique opportunity to subject persistent human rights concerns.” Luther further stated that, given that the Moroccan government has claimed dedication to improving the state of human rights in Western Sahara and its accusations that human rights organizations do not pay enough attention to conditions in the Tindouf refugee camp, he would have expected the Moroccan government to be more amenable to adding human rights monitoring to MINURSO. However, he did note that the resolution acknowledges the need for improving human rights in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps. MINURSO is one of the few peacekeeping missions without a human rights monitoring mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Saharawi Representative Kamal Fadel Gives Talk On Western Sahara At Sydney University</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kamal Fadel, Polisario representative to Australia, gave a lecture at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS) at the University of Sydney about human rights and self-determination in Western Sahara. He underlined what the Polisario sees as “the UN's clear position towards Western Sahara” as well as the UN’s promise to organize an independent referendum for the territory and the fact the MINURSO is the only UN peacekeeping mission without the capability to monitor human rights. He concluded by stressing that for the United</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nations, Western Sahara remains a colonial case to which the UN doctrine and practice relating to decolonization must be applicable.

**All Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gambia: Moroccan, Lebanese Investors Meet Veep</td>
<td>Investors from SGI Group based in Morocco and Lebanon Monday called on the Gambian vice president and minister of Women's Affairs, Her Excellency Aja Dr Isatou Njie-Saidy. The three-man delegation was accompanied to State House by Gambia's ambassador to Morocco, Lamin Kabba Bajo. These investors are in the country to meet business stakeholders in the country. SGI Group is an international holding group specialized in consultancy and engineering for mega projects such as water treatment plants, waste water management, drainage, bridges, huge buildings, hotels and hospitals among a host of others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Date | April 30, 2013 |

**Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Renews Peace-Keeping Mission in W. Sahara Without a Human Rights Monitoring Component</td>
<td>Kerry Kennedy expressed his profound concern for the decision of the United Nations Security Council to renew the MINURSO mandate without a human rights component. The RFK Center calls upon the Security Council to allow Special Rapporteurs monthly visits to Western Sahara listing specific individuals. They also urge the Groups of Friends to continue to discuss the incorporation of a human rights mandate. Santiago A. Canton, Director of RFK Partners for Human Rights concludes that “It is inconceivable that some countries prefer to close their eyes and allow human rights violations to continue. However, even if the Security Council considers a permanent mechanism unnecessary, they can still have more effective supervision under the current Resolution, by facilitating more UN presence in the region”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Date | April 26, 2013 |

**Yabiladi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caisse de compensation au Maroc : Benkirane veut conditionner l’aide monétaire directe</td>
<td>One of the pillars of strategy for the compensation fund is to create direct monetary aid to the needy; specifically for their children’s education and medical care. In order to do so, the state will encourage these individuals to engage in literacy programs as well as participate in income-generating activities financed by the Solidarity Fund. Another pillar is to establish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Date | |

**Fund in Morocco:**
Benkirane wants to condition for direct cash assistance

April 26, 2013

a system of protection against the fluctuation of oil prices. Meaning, that if oil prices rise beyond the threshold set by the government, the surplus is automatically passed on to the consumer. The Compensation Fund advises the government to raise the price of commodities, while providing direct aid to poor. Such a vision, if implemented in July, does not conform with the IMF’s recommendations.

*Translated from French*

---

**Morocco/US: A Moroccan delegation meets with the Head of National Security Council**

April 28, 2013

On Friday, after the passing of Resolution 2099; Taieb Fassi Fihri, the king's counselor, Yassine Mansouri, Chief DGED, Youssef Amrani, No. 2 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Rashad Bouhlal, Ambassador of the Kingdom in Washington, met with Tom Donilon, the head of the National Security Council. The talks were mainly worn on the widening and deepening of the strategic relationship between the two friendly countries. This marks the first contact after the MINURSO ordeal.

*Translated from French*

---

**Reopening the Moroccan-Algerian border: Algiers’ three conditions**

April 28, 2013

An anonymous “senior official” from the TSA party stated that Rabat has to meet three Algerian terms before reopening the border. It is indicative that Amr Belani, spokesman of Foreign Affairs is the anonymous TSA official. The three terms are as follows: ending the smear campaign and aggressive stance vis a vie Algeria, cooperating to end drug trafficking and of course recognize Algeria’s stance on Western Sahara and allow the UN to assume its responsibilities. Belani concludes that "any approach that moves away or upset these three parameters will only needlessly pollute the atmosphere, making it a problematic environment. We want full normalization of our relations with our neighboring country as well as boost regional integration."
| Yabiladi | Maroc : L'exclusion d'élèves voilées d'une école privée à Tanger fait le buzz... « pour rien » | Last week, four students of Ibn Sina Institute of Tangier arrived at school wearing a long veil covering their torso and arms. However, Moroccan school code states that the veil cannot cover a student’s uniform; thus the four girls were ordered to go back home for violating the dress code. The case was picked up by the media; where the girls stated that they were proud to be Salafists and are free to wear what they pleased. They did not attend school for six days. Director Mansouri clarified that these students were not excluded and that the veil is not forbidden; they were sent home because they were not abiding by uniform protocol. He added “once they had agreed to wear their uniform properly, they were readmitted”. To avoid attracting press attention, the four students will not face the disciplinary board; unpunished actions are a cause of concern as they can push other students to also disobey the rules. | April 29, 2013 |
| Yabiladi | Maroc : Le roi d'Espagne en visite officielle cet été | King Juan Carlos of Spain will be making an official state visit to Morocco over the summer. He had originally planned to visit Morocco in March, but hernia surgery forced him to postpone the visit. This state visit is especially important for the two countries because Spain is in dire financial straits, and Morocco is Spain’s second largest market, after the European Union. | April 29, 2013 |
| Yabiladi | Affaire Nahari/Laghzioui : le prêcheur 2.0 est acquitté | Abdellah Nahari has been acquitted of incitement to murder, of which he was indicted for a June 2012 Youtube video in which he issued a fatwa calling for the death of Mokhtar Laghzioui for “misrepresentation of Islam and encouraging vice.” Laghzioui had, in a television interview, supported the call of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights for the parliament to strike down article 0 |
**April 30, 2013**

490 of the penal code, which criminalizes sex outside of marriage. Laghioui’s employer, leftist newspaper Al Ahdath Al Maghribia, decided to press charges against Nahari last summer, and since then secular, leftist, and human rights groups have rallied around Laghioui. Nahari, too, has gained a following of supporters, who claim that he is a victim of the authorities.

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Maroc : La France rappelle le droit de manifester au Sahara occidental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco: France reaffirms the right to protest in Western Sahara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

French foreign minister Philippe Lalliot has called upon Morocco to respect the Sahrawis’ right to peaceful protest in the wake of police crackdowns on recent protests in Laayoune. The protests began after the MINURSO reauthorization resolution passed without human rights monitoring. Yabiladi considers this call to be a threat and has accused France of taking a new stance on Western Sahara and abandoning its ally Morocco.

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Italie : Une cellule terroriste comprenant des Marocains démantelée</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy: A terrorist cell dismantled containing Moroccans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A terrorist cell responsible for recruiting people to join the jihad was discovered in the region of Apulia, Italy. The group had contacts worldwide, with bases at Bari and several branches in Lombardy and Sicily; where six arrests were conducted today. The arrested were Moroccans and Tunisians who are accused of international terrorism and incitement to racial hatred. Their movements were monitored; portraying frequented phone shops and cafes that distributed films praising suicidal attacks and urging anti-Semitism.

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Le PJD insiste sur l’interdiction de la chicha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The PJD insists on the prohibition of shisha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minister of the Interior, Mohand Laensar stated that with the instated shisa controls, 3,305 people were arrested in 2012 compared to the 667 in 2009; adding that 1200 hookahs were confiscated and many cafe owners licences were revoked. However, this is not enough in the eyes of Benkirane who wants to further the
### April 30, 2013

**Le Conseil des oulémas**

The Ulama Supreme Council believes in the religious ban on Muslim women to become imams. To back their opinion, the religious body called on the Hadith attributed to the Prophet Mohamed from Sahih Al-Bukhari’s book: "Never will succeed a people who entrusts his affairs to a woman". However citings by al-Bayhaq (994-1066) about Aisha prove otherwise: "Even Aisha, widow of the Prophet led the prayer with women having them sit in the same row as her".

*Translated from French*

---

### May 2, 2013

**Liberté de conscience au Maroc : Le ministre des Affaires islamiques prend ses distances avec les oulémas**

Freedom of conscience in Morocco: The Minister of Islamic Affairs distances himself from the Supreme Council of the Ulama

*Translated from French*

---

### Decline in unemployment rate

The unemployment rate fell by 0.5 percentage points this quarter partly due to creation of 99,000 jobs in the service sector. However, fisheries and construction industry have seen record losses; respectively 100,000 and 56,000.

*Translated from French*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Article Title</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC News</td>
<td>Clashes Erupt in Western Sahara After UN Vote</td>
<td>Conflicting reports emerged Saturday about clashes late Friday in the northern town of Laayoune. Hamoud Iguilid of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights said dozens chanted their hopes for rights monitors and protested peacefully. He said a young man who was hurt and a woman who lost a finger were among those injured.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait News Agency</td>
<td>OCCI to take part in 3rd GCC-Morocco Investment Forum</td>
<td>The Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) announced on Saturday that it will participate in the forthcoming Moroccan-GCC investment forum, to be held in Tangier between May 6 and 8. This event is important for businesses from GCC countries hoping to invest in Morocco; the strengthening of relations between Morocco and the GCC over the past few years has greatly expanded GCC direct investment in the country.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>Morocco’s Islamist prime minister warns criticism of Prophet Muhammad ‘not acceptable’</td>
<td>Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane took a not-so-veiled swipe at secular activist Ahmed Assid at a party rally late Saturday in Rabat when he stated that it is unacceptable to criticize the Prophet Muhammad. Assid has drawn fire for saying a Moroccan school textbook has implied that Islam could be imposed by force. At least one Salafist leader retorted that Assid was trying to paint Muhammad as a terrorist — a claim Assid denies — and called Assid an “unbeliever,” which could be seen as an incitement to violence.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arabiya</td>
<td>Morocco fair promotes self-sufficient agriculture in effort to cut imports</td>
<td>For the eighth year in a row, the central Moroccan city of Meknes hosted its annual agriculture event, attracting over 1,000 exhibitors from around the world. This year’s International Agriculture Fair focused on food security and self-sufficiency. Currently in Morocco, agriculture - some of it in the form of rudimentary and subsistence farming, and highly vulnerable to the vagaries of rainfall - employs about</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
40 percent of the workforce of over 11 million people. Five years ago Morocco inaugurated its “Green Plan” which set out to develop the agriculture and food production sectors in the country in order to improve food quality and the livelihoods of those who grow it, as well as reduce Morocco’s dependency on foreign crops. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the sector has developed rapidly over the past few years, as the Green Plan has led to huge investment and an increase in the amount of cultivable land. The Green Plan is set to run until 2018 at a cost of one billion dhs a year.

| DVIDS | Artillerymen help make convey a success during Exercise African Lion 13 | Marines successfully transported all their personnel and equipment from Cap Draa to Agadir, Morocco on April 20th. The joint task force consisting of U.S. Marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen were able to conduct modified joint training for Exercise African Lion 13; demonstrating their ability to adapt to unpredicted circumstances, restore mission essential tasks, build interoperability and create friendships during the remaining days of the evolution. The logistics component will continue to exercise vigilant, safe and rapid retrograde of almost 1,200 personnel and 250 short-tons of vehicles and equipment. | 0 |
| Bikya News | Morocco women battle against domestic abuse | This article is about the continuing problem of domestic violence in Morocco and some of the ways that Moroccans are trying to counter it. One of these solutions on the grassroots level is the establishment of safe houses in Moroccan cities for women fleeing their abusive husbands. Political solutions are also picking up steam; Morocco’s Social Development Minister Bassima Hakkaoui said last week that she would try to push forward a law protecting women that has been stuck in Parliament for 8 years. | 3 |
| Business Standard | UAE, Morocco discuss bilateral relations | The United Arab Emirates and Morocco have held talks over a number of issues of mutual interest and ways to boost existing relations between them. The discussions were held between Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s deputy prime minister | 0 |
Morocco’s BMCE Bank to raise $500 million in bond issue

May 2, 2013

If the general assembly on June 4th approves the move; Morocco's second-private lender, BMCE bank, will issue what would be its first foreign bond of $500 million to reinforce its financial resources.

May Day Demonstrations in Morocco Bring Thousands to the Streets

May 2, 2013

Thousands took to the streets of Rabat and Casablanca on Wednesday demanding jobs and higher pay during May Day demonstrations marked by tension, with a large security contingent deployed in the capital. Several thousand people marched up Rabat's central boulevard around midday, waving Moroccan and Berber flags, holding placards and chanting slogans, some of them strongly critical of the government. These slogans ranged from one PJD-aligned union calling for the end of corruption and proclaiming its support for the King to some unionists chanting, “The people want the fall of the government,” echoing the popular slogan used in Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring revolutions. In addition, the demonstrations were attended by unemployed graduates and public sector workers demanding more jobs and better working conditions.
From: Ed Gabriel <ed.gabriel@moroccanamericancenter.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2013 8:43 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Congressional Morocco Caucus Signed Dear Colleague and Signed House Administration Caucus Registration Form
Attachments: ny13emsil@mail.house.gov_20130501_173943.pdf;
ny13emsil@mail.house.gov_20130501_174342.pdf

And now we have a Morocco Caucus

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Join the Congressional Morocco Caucus

Dear Colleague:

We are pleased to announce the establishment of the Congressional Morocco Caucus for the 113th Congress.

As has been the case in past years, the Congressional Morocco Caucus will be a bipartisan group of Members committed to deepening the economic and strategic relationship between the United States and Morocco.

Morocco was the first nation to recognize the United States and Morocco remains one of America’s oldest and closest Muslim allies in the Middle East and North Africa. Morocco continues to be a vital strategic friend that shares our values and aspirations. Most recently, in the midst of the Arab spring, Morocco held a national referendum to revise their Constitution and institute far-reaching democratic reforms. Morocco has long been a strong partner on security issues, a strong trading partner for US business, and is a regional leader on democratic reforms. Morocco is also the only nation in Africa with a free trade agreement with the United States.

With all that is happening in the region, US relations with Morocco has taken on a renewed sense of urgency and strategic importance. We hope that you will join the Congressional Morocco Caucus so that we can work together on these critical issues. Now is the time to signal our strong support for Morocco and work together to ensure the success of their democratic aspirations.

For more information, or to join the Friends of Morocco Caucus, please contact Annie Yee in Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez’s office (5-2965) or Chris Berardini in Congressman Michael Grimm’s office (5-3371).

Sincerely,

Michael Grimm
Member of Congress
11th District of New York

Loretta Sanchez
Member of Congress
46th District of California

Bennie Thompson
Member of Congress
2nd District of Mississippi

Joe Wilson
Member of Congress
2nd District of South Carolina
May 1, 2013

The Honorable Candice Miller  
Chairwoman  
Committee on House Administration  
1309 Longworth House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairwoman Miller:

We would like to register the Congressional Morocco Caucus as a Congressional Member Organization for the 113th Congress. The Congressional Morocco Caucus will serve as an informal group of Members dedicated to strengthening bilateral relations and creating more opportunities for productive dialogue on issues of common concern between the United States and Morocco.

Representatives Michael Grimm, 11th District of New York; Loretta Sanchez, 46th District of California; Bennie Thompson, 2nd District of Mississippi; Joe Wilson, 2nd District of South Carolina will serve as Co-Chairs of the Congressional Morocco Caucus. The staff assigned to handle caucus related issues are listed below:

Rep. Loretta Sanchez  
Annie Yea (Staff)  
202-225-2965  
Annie.Yea@mail.house.gov

Rep. Michael Grimm  
Chris Berardini (Staff)  
202-225-3371  
Chris.Berardini@mail.house.gov

We trust that the information provided meets the requirements for registering a Congressional Member Organization in the 113th Congress. Thank you for your attention to this matter and please feel free to contact us with any questions.

Sincerely,

Loretta Sanchez  
Member of Congress

Michael G. Grimm  
Member of Congress
**Blog Name** | **Article Title/Date** | **Summary** | **Comments**
---|---|---|---
**Yabiladi** | Défense : Le premier drone 100% marocain prévu pour juin | The first Moroccan manufactured drone will be tested at a formal event at the end of June. Six researchers at the National School of Electricity and Mechanics worked on this project. Lahcen Daoudi, the Minister of Higher Education, will attend the event. *Translated from French* | 0
| Technologies solaires : Le Maroc a-t-il fait le mauvais choix ? | Morocco has chosen the most expensive solar tech, solar thermal cells, instead of the less expensive photovoltaic cells. However, in the next 10 years, solar thermal cells are expected to become less expensive than photovoltaic cells because of advances in solar thermal technology. Thermal is also better suited for operation in high temperatures. The US is a leading producer of photovoltaic, whereas Spain leads the market in thermal. *Translated from French* | 5
| Homosexualité au Maroc : 2 hommes condamnés à la prison et un autre couple poursuivi | Two men have been convicted of a violation of Article 489 of the Moroccan penal code, which forbids homosexuality. They have been in a relationship for 10 years, and for that they have been sentenced to 3 years in prison and a 1000 dirham fine. The couple was found out because one partner accused the other of sexual assault. Another same-sex couple being held in Salé are on trial for committing homosexual acts, and could receive the same sentence. This news is unfolding only a few days before the International Day Against Homophobia (May 17). *Translated from French* | 11
| Des pirates pro-Polisario | A number of Moroccan websites fell victim to a cyber attack by pro-Polisario hackers, including Istiqal’s French language journal | 0
Pro-Polisario pirates attack Moroccan websites
May 14, 2013

Noureddine Ziani, a Moroccan national and president of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers in Catalonia, is to be expelled from Spain by the Spanish National Intelligence Center (CNI) for allegedly being a DGED agent. However, Catalan independence parties believe the expulsion order is for political reasons, as Ziani is in favor of Catalan independence. A Spanish newspaper has discovered that the CNI had been investigating Ziani since 2010 for is pro-Catalan independence activities.

Mounir Majidi, personal secretary to Mohammed VI, is suing journalist Ahmed Reda Benchemsi for accusing him of peddling influence to increase his personal wealth last year. Majidi was accused of using Royal Air Maroc funds to purchase personal subsidiary companies with government assent. Benchemsi is currently a visiting scholar at Stanford University. If found guilty he faces a fine of 12000 euros or more.

Mohammed VI has decided to use personal funds to finance the reconstruction of the historic Taroudant Mosque. Built in the 16th Century, the mosque was partially destroyed by fire on May 7th.

In the face of the continued security threat posed by Saharan drug trafficking, Algeria has bolstered its security agreement with Morocco and tightened border security by adding 24 new checkpoints. According to this article, this security tightening is a
### Algeria

**Crackdown on the Algeria-Morocco border:** Algeria installs 24 new checkpoints in response to Morocco’s request to open up the land border. Algeria has accused Morocco of being lax in its security and has said that Saharan drug trafficking in Algeria originates in Morocco. Algerian Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia has stated that Algeria can only reopen the land border with Morocco if Morocco expands its efforts to address the drug trafficking problem.

*Translated from French*

**May 15, 2013**

### Yabiladi

**Suicide of Mbarek El Karassi: moment of madness or ultimate revolt against the local authorities in Marrakech?**

The sister of Mbarek El Karassi posted a video to Youtube on Tuesday, March 14 that accused the local authorities in the Essâada neighborhood of being responsible for her brother’s death. She claimed that the local kingpin and his deputy had a grudge against him, and for this reason imposed restrictions (solely on him) that made it impossible for him to conduct his business and eventually led to authorities confiscating his cart. After El Karassi committed suicide they allegedly intimidated the other vendors in the neighborhood to not reveal the truth of what happened.

*Translated from French*

**May 15, 2013**

### Yabiladi

**Marrakech: Drug trafficking at the Victor Hugo French high school**

A teacher at the Victor Hugo school in Marrakech has been arrested for drug trafficking. He was caught in possession of 25 grams of marijuana, and when police searched his residence they discovered 1,800 kg of hashish and an electronic scale. Police say that he was selling the drugs to students at the school and to tourists visiting Marrakech.

*Translated from French*

**May 16, 2013**

### Yabiladi

**Le Maroc participe à la reconstruction du Mali à hauteur de 5 millions de dollars**

Abdelilah Benkirane announced Thursday that Morocco would donate $5 million to aid in rebuilding Mali at a Brussels donor’s conference.

*Translated from French*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Moroccan MPs question youth employment progress</td>
<td>Moroccan parliamentarians questioned Employment Minister Abdelouahed Souhail April 29th on youth unemployment. He claimed that jobs are available in the civil society sector, but that youth skills often do not meet the needs of business. As a new plan, the government opened National Agency for the Promotion of Work (ANAPEC) at two universities to make students aware of business needs and requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco to create new textile sector jobs</td>
<td>Moroccan Trade Minister Abdelkader Amara said on Monday that Morocco plans to partner with private industry to create 250,000 jobs in the textile sector by 2025 Trade Minister Abdelkader Amara as saying on Monday. The program is expected to cost 30bil dhs and aims to capture 1% of the world market. The trade ministry is also expected to soon announce a program for decreasing youth unemployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Fate of Moroccan government in king's hands</td>
<td>According to Istiqlal spokesperson Adil Benhamza, the king called party leader Hamid Chabat &quot;to exhort him to keep [Istiqlal] ministers in the government&quot; in the wake of Istiqlal's announcement that it would be leaving the ruling coalition. According to an official statement, Istiqlal's national council took the decision unanimously because of what it called a &quot;lack of coordination between the members of the coalition, unilateral decision-making by the government.&quot; Istiqlal holds several important positions in the Moroccan cabinet. The king is empowered to serve as an arbiter in situations such as these, and may call upon PM Benkirane to reshuffle his cabinet or he may call for new elections. However, Istiqlal's national council would have to approve a cabinet re-shuffle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Constitutional reform forum opens in Marrakech</td>
<td>Lawmakers from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia and Morocco on Tuesday (May 14th) begin a two-day Marrakech workshop on constitutional reform. The Council of Europe organized the event, as part of the European Union program to strengthen democratic reform in the &quot;Southern Neighbourhood.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco confronts extremism among expats</td>
<td>PM Abdelilah Benkirane has faced tough questions lately on the issue of the radicalization of Moroccan expatriates. The Kingdom seeks to counter this by increasing its efforts to build mosques and send imams overseas to educate Muslim expatriates and deter them from being swayed by fundamentalist rhetoric. However, academics and expatriates agree that the efforts have not been sufficient. Currently, the government has only sent 30 imams overseas; in order to address extremism in the Moroccan diaspora, the government will have to send many more moderate imams to the largest Moroccan population centers outside of the country. Benkirane has also vowed to address other issues in the expat community, pledging to extend the RAMED medical assistance scheme to disadvantaged MREs who do not have medical insurance in their countries of residence and to give them...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco invests in automotive industry</td>
<td>Morocco is allocating 600 million dirhams (54 million euros) to investment projects in the automotive industry. The cooperating businesses include Delphi Packard Kénitra, Lear Automotive Morocco, Fujikura Automotive Morocco and Denso Thermal Morocco. The projects aim to create 5,700 jobs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadaliyya</td>
<td>The Facade of Political Crises in Morocco</td>
<td>This analysis posits that Istiqlal’s threat to leave the ruling coalition will have little bearing on the functioning of the government and that, in fact, it indicates the powerlessness of Moroccan elected officials and the uselessness of Moroccan elections. According to the author, Istiqlal made this move both in its own interest (to further embarrass PJD) and as a pawn of the monarchy; she suggests that this “scandal” could have been a calculated move that was formulated within the palace walls in order to portray the king as a “neutral” arbiter and deflect attention from the increasing unrest in Western Sahara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Morocco King urges key govt ally to stay in cabinet</td>
<td>Mohammed VI has urged Istiqlal “to keep its ministers in the government,” according to an Istiqlal spokesman. The party later released a statement claiming it “totally adheres to the royal wish to guarantee conditions of stability and to serve the higher interests of the nation.” A PJD spokesman indicated that the decision to withdraw from the government is not serious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV-TECH</td>
<td>Work begins on 160MW Noor 1 CSP project in Morocco</td>
<td>May 10th was the groundbreaking for the first solar project to be developed for the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN). The project will be developed by Saudi company ACWA, and serviced by several Spanish companies. The German govt has provided 115m Euros for the project. The plant is expected to be operational late 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Bureau</td>
<td>The Expanding Sahara: Deforestation in Morocco</td>
<td>Because of changing precipitation patterns, the Sahara Desert is likely to expand into bordering countries, reducing their agricultural productivity. In many countries, this global change is in addition to local environmental pressures. As a whole, the country loses an average of 30,000 hectares of forest per year. Fewer trees mean weaker root systems to protect soil. Erosion rates in both the Atlas and Rif mountains are among the highest in the world. The author concludes that he is not optimistic about Morocco’s ability to improve environmental management and respond to desertification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The North Africa Post</td>
<td>Security, Anti-Terrorism Struggle, Shared Concern for USA, Morocco</td>
<td>In their phone talk, President Obama and HM King Mohammed VI paid “a particular attention to the two countries’ cooperation in defense, security and the fight against terrorism”. President Obama has also expressed the wish to expand consultations with the King on topical international issues, including Syria, Mali and Palestine. The two leaders exchanged invitations to visit each other’s country to have thus the opportunity to continue their conversation in person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI Financial</td>
<td>Morocco’s covered bond framework a basis for the first African covered bond</td>
<td>The report Morocco Looks To Covered Bonds To Support Housing Finance indicates that under the proposed covered bond legislation, universal banks will be allowed to issue on-balance-sheet mortgage covered bonds called Obligations Sécurisées Hypothécaires (OSHs) and public sector covered bonds referred to as Obligations Sécurisées Territoriales (OSTs). S&amp;P believes that initially only domestic and local currency-denominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13, 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>Issuances. In terms of becoming an accepted funding product in the European markets is still unclear according to S&amp;P: “There are important details still to be finalized via additional circulars that we understand will be published later this year. Only then we will know what the first African covered bonds will finally look like”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2013</td>
<td>Middle East Online</td>
<td>A Moroccan street vendor in Marrakech died in the hospital after setting himself on fire in protest of having his goods confiscated. He had sold fruit and vegetables in the street, and then began selling old furniture, until a local official confiscated his goods. Some 40 people protested in Marrakesh on Monday evening, with larger protests expected around his funeral.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco News Board</td>
<td>Experts intimate with the lobbying world of Washington and familiar with the business opportunities in Algeria believe that a “new type “of pro-Algerian lobby was active and involved in pushing for this new American “proposal”. These experts assumptions are based on their knowledge of the financial attractiveness of the Algerian market. According to the author, “Algerian apologists in Washington, Paris and Madrid should bear the responsibility of the degradation of relations between Rabat and Algeria.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2013</td>
<td>Sahara Press Service</td>
<td>Addressing the Pan African Parliament from Johannesburg, CODESA president Aminetu Haidar claimed Morocco commits “violence and torture” against Sahrawis. The refusal of Morocco to allow human rights monitoring “reaffirms the need for the African Union to exercise all kind of pressure so that Morocco respect the rights of the Sahrawis.” Haidar also asked the Pan African Parliament to support the Saharawi people and the UN to send a commission of inquiry into the occupied territories of Western Sahara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15, 2013</td>
<td>Redstone Rocket</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Del Turner, commander of the Security Assistance Command, recently visited Morocco as part of the command’s strategic engagements with U.S. Africa Command. Turner’s team met with the Office of Security Cooperation, Moroccan Ministry of Defense’s general inspector of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Abdelaziz Bennani and the director 4th Bureau of the Moroccan Army. “Lt. Gen. Bennani specifically pointed out that we have an ‘indestructible military relationship,’” Whitaker said. “Much of the discussion with Morocco involved critical FMS cases, EDA (Excess Defense Articles), training and spare parts.” USASAC’s motto is “Strength in Cooperation,” and according to Whitaker, that is exactly what these recent engagements were about.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 2013</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>“According to the information received by Amnesty International,” six Sahrawi activists were “tortured and otherwise ill-treated and that their 'confessions' were extracted under torture in police custody.” The men were arrested May 9th following May 4-5 protests in Laayoune.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Senegal’s President Macky Sall has urged “the friends of Morocco”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Review

drive to have Morocco rejoin AU
to join his efforts in bringing the north African country back to the African Union, stating that the reunion would help the body in reaching a sustainable solution to the Western Sahara crisis. President Sall believes that the hardest part in resolving the conflict had been attained with the acceptance of the Kingdom to grant a broader autonomy for the disputed territory. "We have always defended the position of Morocco. From our point of view, the best strategy today is to bring Morocco to join his friends in the African Union to improve the action," he said.

ShareCast

Cairn Energy plans exploration in Morocco
May 17, 2013
Cairn Energy is planning an exploration program offshore Morocco. The multi-well exploration program is on track to start later this year and is targeting more than 3.5bn barrels of oil equivalent of mean unrisked gross prospective resource.
Dear Team,

Below please find the March/April 2013 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

---

March/April Events Bulletin

March 5
_dateline_ Egypt and North Africa: Updates from the Field

March 8
_The Arab Awakening: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead_

March 18
_Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries - Can Partners Help?_

March 20
_Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat_

March 28
_Algeria Between Reform and Stability_

April 8
_Political Change and Security in North Africa_

April 10
_Morocco's Reforms - Stalled or In Process?_

---

Dateline Egypt and North Africa: Updates from the Field
1. **Title:** Dateline Egypt and North Africa: Updates from the Field  
   Hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

   **Participants:**  
   **Eric Trager:** Next Generation Fellow, The Washington Institute  
   **Aaron Y. Zelin:** Richard Borow Fellow, The Washington Institute  
   **David Pollock:** Kaufman Fellow, The Washington Institute  
   **Robert Satloff:** Executive Director, The Washington Institute

2. **Overview**

   As Secretary Kerry makes his inaugural Middle East trip, states across North Africa face rising tensions among the forces for democracy, stability, and Islamic political ascendency. In Egypt and Tunisia, revolutions have given way to uncertainty and violence, while Morocco's model of stable reform - a monarch with an Islamist prime minister - tends to obscure other elements lurking just beneath the surface. To assess these changes and their consequences for the region and the United States, three Washington Institute fellows recently conducted intensive research trips to each of these countries, where they spoke frankly with a wide range of government officials, opposition leaders, security officers, and human rights activists, both secularist and fundamentalist. At this policy forum, the panelists discussed their findings.

3. **Summary**

   Robert Satloff opened the forum by noting that the current political climate of North Africa is complex and that the various countries of the region all face very different issues. Egypt is struggling to tackle economic and political issues at the same time as restoring security and the rule of law. Moving west, Tunisia faces political uncertainty and the rise of a Salafist movement. Algeria is confronting insurgent terrorism and a security blowback from Mali. All the way to the west, Morocco endured the Arab Spring quietly, but there are subterranean political developments in course there. Each of the panelists addressed the country they visited on a recent trip to the region, with Eric Trager discussing Egypt, Aaron Zelin discussing Tunisia, and David Pollack discussing Morocco only, as he was not able (authorized?) to visit Algeria on this most recent occasion.

   Eric Trager provided an assessment of the political players in Egypt, devoting most of his presentation to an analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s politics, policies, and power within the Egyptian system. He profiled emerging political leaders in the Brotherhood, as well as non-Islamist parties and actors. In closing, Trager noted several important factors for US policy going forward. First, he argued that Egypt will not be a major regional player for the time being given its own domestic issues. Second, the US must force the Muslim Brotherhood to make tough changes that would lead it to moderate its behavior now. Lastly, though mass upheaval is unlikely, the US must be monitor possible triggers for further instability.

   Aaron Zelin characterized Tunisia as experiencing stagnation and polarization. It has failed to lived up to lofty expectations following its revolution and many of the problems that incited the revolution remain, particularly the continued issue of having more college graduates than available jobs. Zelin also noted that the perceived deterioration of security is very much present.

   David Pollack discussed what he termed “the most interesting country in the region – Morocco.” For Pollack, Morocco is the most interesting because not much is happening there. He questioned how Morocco has managed to get through the Arab Spring without much upheaval, particularly since it is afflicted with many of the same development challenges as it neighbors, including poverty, high illiteracy rates, and high youth unemployment – perhaps indicating that its revolution is to come. He also questioned its role as a potential model, citing the arguments of observers, namely Ignatius and Zakaria, that the country is a model of how a monarch can lead his country through a gradual process of democratization. Pollack argued that neither view is right – Morocco is neither reforming nor is it ripe for revolution. It is a special case that entails a mixture of modest reforms and stability, for both the present and the future.

   To support his assertions, Pollack addressed three themes: the status of the reforms, the status of the PJD and the Islamists, and potentially lessons learned from Morocco’s experience. In addressing the first, Pollack detailed the emergence of the February 20th movement and its protests against corruption. He stated that King Mohammed VI
responded immediately to these protests by pursuing reforms and a new Constitution that placed some limits on the King's power. These reforms were followed by the election of a true opposition party for the first time in Moroccan history and a new government led by a Prime Minister that was not appointed by the King, but rather by the winning party, the PJD. These measures of reform quieted the popular protests, but Pollack argued that they were less than meets the eye. In reality, the King and the palace control much of political and economic life. In addition, the PJD is a compliant party that is not a real Islamist party – the real Islamist party is the JCO. Pollack provided examples of what he perceived to be the King and the palace's continued control of the country, citing the case of the list of corrupt officials being published as a faux attempt at reform, since there was no punishment for these officials and many of them still profit from political and economic favors from the palace. He also cited continued redlines on criticizing the King, referencing arrests and detentions of the King's critics, as well as the palace's practice of using political and economic power to keep political parties compliant.

Turning to the PJD, Pollack stated that the party is neither independent nor Islamist. During his stay in Morocco, he met with a senior minister in the PJD cabinet who reinforced this opinion when he noted that, “the PJD is not in government in order to confront the King, no to Islamize the country, which is already Muslim.” Pollack stressed that the Palace always wins when there is controversy between the PJD and the King. He referenced several examples to support this point: the PJD's plan to have television programs only broadcast in Arabic, which was rejected by the Palace; the PJD's plan for education reform, which was rejected by the Palace; and the PJD's attempt to ban commercials about gambling, which the Palace only agreed to limit and not ban. The true Islamist party, according to Pollack, is thus the JCO – an important grassroots movement whose size observers can only estimate. Guesses vary from .5 to 1 million, with .5 million people attending the funeral of the former leader of the JCO Sheikh Yassine. While in Morocco, Pollack had the fortunate opportunity to meet with several JCO leaders – a rare occurrence for a secretive and banned, but tolerated organization. These leaders argued that Islam and democracy are incompatible in theory, but that there are ways to make them compatible in practice through gradual implementation, which the JCO can explore “when we come to power.”

Turning to the question of sharia, the JCO interlocutor stated that yes, the JCO wanted to implement true Islam and create a just society. He also stressed that sharia isn’t just about cutting off people’s hands as it is perceived in the West. He did say that ultimately, yes, the implementation of sharia is a priority, but only when a just society has been established (insinuating that there would be no need to cut off people’s hands for stealing because there would be no injustice and thus no need to steal). At that point in the interview, the interlocutor said to Pollack, “Why are you concerned with petty thieves when the biggest thief in the country – whether in Morocco or Saudi Arabia – is the King?” Pollack responded, “So do you want to cut off the King’s hand?” To which the JCO leader did not reply, noting instead that they want a different government, neither a phony PJD revolution nor the overthrow of the monarchy. The JCO is even accepting of Morocco under a real constitutional monarchy in which the King has no power and only a symbolic role. Based on this conversation, Pollack argued that Morocco is still repressive in many ways, despite some reform. He stressed that if the repression continues and the JCO continues to gain followers, there is the potential for a well-organized, fundamentalist revolution by the JCO.

Yet, despite this assertion, Pollack still believes that Morocco is stable and will remain so. Why? For one, the King is still personally popular and he maintains the advantage of being able to blame the government and his own entourage for anything that goes wrong. Moroccan citizens tend to do this as well, blaming the palace team for corruption. Second, the example of the Arab Spring two years later is not appealing to many Moroccans. The country has allowed a measure of reform which has assuaged some of the discontent and provided a glimmer of hope for further reform. That said Pollack does not believe that there is anything Morocco can teach the Arab world. Morocco is special and the blend of the King’s personality, the fear of contagion, and modest reform is difficult to replicate.

Robert Satloff provided a concluding remark about the pace of change across the Maghreb, noting that in Egypt, Islamists have rushed to consolidate their power; in Tunisia, they have sought to stretch out the process; and in Morocco, Islamists have both stretched it out and remained deferent to traditional power structures, hoping eventually that power will land on their doorstep.

4. Q & A

Q: (Ralph Nurnburger) During your trip, were you able to get an assessment of the status of the Western Sahara or the security situation in the region?
A: (Pollack) You can’t talk to a Moroccan official without them mentioning the Western Sahara. It is part of the standard discourse. They reference the autonomy situation and note that although things aren’t perfect in the south, they are better than in the camps. This nationalist cause is helpful to the government and the palace in terms of domestic political security as it serves as a rallying cause, even though the status quo is tenable. Whenever there
are protests, the King says the country must remain united for territorial sovereignty and it works. As for security, the spillover from the region has literally not touched Morocco. A recent report from Yonah Alexander notes zero attacks in 2012. It is a point of caution for Morocco and they want cooperation with their neighbors in confronting this challenge. They blame Algeria for blocking regional cooperation, just like Algeria blames Morocco.

Q: (Jennifer Lambert, US Department of State) What has been the impact of Sheikh Yassine’s death on JCO? What about the role of Nadia Yassine?
A: (Pollack) The JCO is very secretive and did not talk about internal issues with me – they were not prepared to talk about the impact of his death, which is still uncertain. Sheikh Yassine was charismatic and JCO lost that, but it has not led to splits in the movement, nor is there a new charismatic leader. Nadia was an effective spokesperson and her role as a woman was unique and unlike other Islamist organizations, perhaps as a testament to the strong Sufi traditions of the JCO. But, I think her star has faded with the death of her father – she owed her position to her father and for now has dropped from view.

Q: (Yonah Alexander) Could you provide your assessment of the impact of refugee flows on the security situation in the Sahel?
A: (Pollack) The refugee issue didn’t come up during my visit. Morocco is intent on securing its borders and it does that effectively – it has a very large security apparatus. There don’t appear to be big population flows throughout the country.

5. Observation

Approximately 30 think tank experts and WINEP patrons attended the event and another 50 participants watched online. While Morocco was discussed in detail, David Pollack was highly skeptical of Morocco’s reform process and its potential as a model. He used the term “makhzan” throughout his presentation when referring to the power structure in the palace. It is clear that he primarily met with the PJD and the JCO during his visit to Morocco, thus skewing his perceptions. Bizarrely, Pollack seemed to be pushing for a real Islamist party to come to power, as if Morocco could only reform under the leadership of an Islamist party, like Egypt and Tunisia are trying to do. Given the negative outcomes, at least so far, in those countries, this was a surprising stance to take, particularly for an organization like WINEP which had tended to provide more positive assessments of Morocco and has a pretty anti-Islamist bent. Pollack also provided no alternatives to Morocco’s current path of reform, only observations, thus limiting the usefulness of his assessments. MAC should nevertheless reach out to Pollack and WINEP to provide them briefings and information on reform.

(Back to top)
Khouri identified eight trends of the Arab Awakening.

1. There is a clear set of grievances common to all of the uprisings that are expressed in different ways. These grievances are a combination of calls for political rights and for “material needs” (jobs and economic opportunities), and understanding the balance of these two categories is crucial to understanding the uprisings in any one country. Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia is an example of how a lack of political rights and material needs sparked revolution; Bouazizi’s sole means of subsistence was destroyed, and then he was denied political recourse. According to Khouri, it will be important to pay attention to protests in Kuwait; if we can identify what grievances have sparked protests in a largely homogenous, wealthy country, then we will be better-able to understand the motivations behind protests in other Arab countries.

2. The intensity and depth of the sentiments driving these protests are far beyond what we initially thought; it goes far beyond “breaking the barrier of fear.” That is, these revolutions aren’t simply about Arab populations overcoming the activation barrier of airing their grievances with the government in public; rather, they are fueled by deep-seated discontent with the old regimes and passion for democratic change.

3. In spite of these general commonalities in motivation, there are tremendous differences in the types of protests we see and the levels of government response. This is attributable to the disparities in regime type and government legitimacy between the different Arab states.

4. The technical logistics of democratic transitions, such as constitution-writing and institution-building, are much more important than elections; agreeing on a set of laws governing the country is crucial in transitioning from a one-party autocracy or a monarchy to an elected democracy.

5. It is easy to either exaggerate or underestimate the role of religion and Islamist parties, but we should be careful to do neither. Religiosity, or lack thereof, will be an important factor to take into account in the construction of post-revolutionary identity in these nascent democracies; it is entirely possible that, when a strong Arab democracy emerges, it will have a degree of religiosity in its governing structure. We must be cognizant of this and its potential implications, including the potential for the majority religious identity to infringe upon the rights of religious minorities (such as the Copts in Egypt). However, it is becoming clear that Islamist parties and candidates in countries such as Egypt are beginning to lose their popularity; in recent polls Mohammed Morsi only garnered 25% of popular support, whereas before he had 50%. Furthermore, Islamist parties such as Ennahda appear to be fracturing. In sum, Muslim religiosity may play a larger role in the new Middle Eastern democracy than it does in Western society, but in the end Islamists are like any other politicians and are susceptible to public disapproval for failing to effectively govern.

6. We must be patient with these nascent democratic institutions, because it is clear that none of the actors involved in these democratic transitions have any experience in elected, accountable democratic governance. It is simply too soon for us to say that, in light of recent violence in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, the Arab Awakening has failed.

7. One significant shift that we have seen since the beginning of the Arab Awakening is that the citizenry of these countries are no longer content to live under autocratic government. The populations of these countries expect government accountability and are willing to change the government if need be.

8. Returning to the issue of material rights versus political rights, it is clear that, while material rights have driven the protests at a grassroots level, the true issues underlying the popular revolutions are political rights and social justice. The evidence for this is the fact that people in the MENA region have been voicing discontent on such critical issues as dignity, respect, justice, and political participation for the past five years.

Khouri concluded his discussion by stating that, in order to understand the Arab Awakening and its aftermath, we must keep in mind the “5 R’s”: (citizen) revolt, rights, respect, reconfiguration, and re-legitimization. While there have been obvious growing pains in the establishment of elected democracies in the post-Arab Awakening states, the problems inherent in this transition are vastly overwhelmed by the fact that now, for the first time after decades of autocracy, there are millions of Arabs who are writing constitutions.

Wright began by noting that we should not judge the Arab Awakening a failure based solely upon political strife in
countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, because there is a distinction between the politics of change and the culture of change. While true political change may be stalled, democratic change has become an inexorable part of popular culture in these countries, and is unlikely to disappear. She then presented her own list of significant political trends of the Arab Awakening:

1. There are now 120 million Arabs who have been empowered by democratic revolution. Wright expects that each of the 22 Arab regimes will be challenged. However, more people in the Arab world are afraid of democratic change now than two years ago, due to a number of factors, including political and social turmoil, the unpredictability and violence of reform, the lack of effective political managers, and the lack of a defined, effective new order emerging to fill the power vacuum. This is why the constitution-writing process will be crucial to effective democratic transition in each of these states.

2. Almost every Arab country is worse off, economically speaking, than it was two years ago. While many Arabs in the MENA region have far more freedoms, there are far fewer jobs. No country, not even those who have not seen democratic revolution, is immune to this economic turmoil.

3. The so-called “proliferation of democracy” has negative consequences. It has resulted in the creation of far too many political parties; for example, in Libya 130 parties ran for 80 seats in the legislature. This proliferation is the result of many different political opinions and a lack of willingness on the part of legislative hopefuls to pool their resources and collaborate to affect the kind of change that they can agree upon. This not only weakens candidates, but the democratic process as a whole.

4. Far from being a monolithic group, Islamists exist on a spectrum. Despite the conventional wisdom that political strife in nascent Arab democracies exists largely in an Islamist versus secularist dichotomy, there are deepening divisions between different Islamist parties and within Islamist parties. On the extreme end of the spectrum, the Salafists have influence disproportionate with their numbers, because they still have the kind of energy, focus, and discipline that even the Muslim Brotherhood no longer has.

5. With the proliferation of arms and militias in countries such as Libya, Syria, and Egypt, the security situation in the region is deteriorating.

6. Local tribes have re-emerged as the primary source of identity where modern nation-states have failed. This is especially prevalent in Libya, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria.

7. Nascent democracies in the MENA region will have to accept the demographic realities of their populations: these populations are overwhelmingly young, and these young people expect healthcare, jobs, and education from the governments that they put into power.

8. Corruption is already running rampant in new Arab democracies because everyone in the new administrations feels entitled to a piece of the proverbial pie.

9. Women have fared very poorly in terms of political pull, seats in parliament, and basic security.

10. Sykes-Picot – and the maintenance of current borders - may not survive this political unrest. Wright was confident that the boundaries of some countries, Iraq in particular, are liable to change.

4. Q & A

Q: (Joshua Policak, Department of State Office of Global Women’s Issues) Do the issues we’ve seen with regard to the status of women in these countries represent the failure of modernism and equality in these countries?

A: (Wright) I’m not sure that we can say this is the failure of modernism. Women have been a driver of change in this region, especially as women’s literacy increases. However, these ascendant women are confronted with the very real challenges of latent patriarchal tradition and tribalism. Also, it has only been two years since the Arab Awakening began; it is too early to state with any confidence that modernism has failed.

(Khouri) We cannot say that this represents the breakdown of the modern nation-state in the Arab world, because, frankly, the Arab world has never before had modern nation-states. These states are still tackling questions of basic governance and constitution-writing, and in these patriarchal societies that lack a strong women’s movement it follows that women’s rights will be put on the back-burner until the issues of state formation have been dealt with. It will take time for women to have their voices heard, but we cannot categorically call this a failure. However, there have been some encouraging developments, such as the push to address equality of the sexes in Tunisia.

Q: (Jane Harman, Woodrow Wilson Center) How much of a role will anti-Zionism play in these transitions? Is Israel
even relevant?

A: (Wright) Israel is never irrelevant. Arab governments in trouble will always use Israel as a diversionary tactic. While we have not yet seen much of this yet, and in fact the Egyptian government went as far as to openly collaborate with Israel on security issues in the Sinai Peninsula, it is only a matter of time.

(Khoury) The issue of Israel/Palestine is enormously important to people around the region, who by and large strongly support Palestinian rights. While the Israeli-Arab conflict has not played into the Arab Awakening protests, there appears to be a connection between the sense that these authoritarian Arab regimes lack legitimacy and the humiliation felt by Arab populations over their governments being unable to stand up to Israel and the United States. Furthermore, these populations are worried that support for Israel will become the metric by which the US and other major powers judge the legitimacy of democratically elected Arab governments.

Q: Will Sunni/Shia sectarianism replace the Israeli-Arab conflict in political significance?

A: (Khouri) I believe the sectarian divide is greatly exaggerated; we were never concerned with sectarianism until the US invaded Iraq. While there has been sectarian violence, which has made sectarianism front-page news, this does not constitute a major, long-term issue in the MENA region. If anything, the root of this violence is more closely tied to issues of tribalism, and not sectarianism.

(Wright) I have to disagree; my great fear is that sectarianism could define the region more and more in the years to come, especially with respect to alliances with Iran. For example, Saudi Arabia supports Western economic intervention in Iran (via sanctions), and would support US military intervention in Iran; I fear that this is fueled by the so-called “guardians” of Sunni Islam wanting to attack the center of Shia power.

Q: (John Anderson, former Foreign Service Officer) What might the form and shape of democratic transition in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf look like?

A: (Khouri) The difference in the Gulf is that there are no anti-monarch revolutionary pressures to speak of; that is, the people are more interested in reform than overthrowing the regime, similar to the situation we see in Morocco. There are small movements in Saudi Arabia to open up and liberalize the country, and this will result in a very slow movement towards liberalization. It is possible that we may see a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia in the future.

5. Observation

The event was attended by approximately 40 people, a mix of policy professionals, students, and casual observers. In my opinion, the panelists did not have enough time to fully flesh out the observations that they made, so it is difficult to pull meaningful conclusions from the speeches, either specifically in relation to Morocco or in general. Essentially, Wright and Khouri came to the same general conclusion: It is too soon to tell whether or not these revolutions have been successful, and with some qualifications, we may be cautiously optimistic about their eventual outcomes. One thing I found notable in relation to Morocco was that they both emphasized the importance of constitution-writing; this presents an opportunity for MAC to highlight the progressiveness of Morocco’s new constitution. While there have been some hiccups in its implementation, Morocco having a new constitution that protects human and civil rights can be presented as an evidence that the country’s gradual democratic transition is a model for the rest of the Arab world.

(Back to top)
2. Overview

More than two years after the outbreak of pro-reform revolutions in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the economic situation in the region remains precarious. Progress in restoring confidence as well as sustainable and rapid economic growth will depend on internal forces and the return of political stability. External partners may also play a role in helping normalize and eventually improve the underlying growth fundamentals of these economies. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel discussion that both examined economic and political reforms within the region and assessed the degree to which external partners could play in addressing the challenges Arab governments face as they transition to democracy.

3. Summary

Nemat Shafik believes that the future of the region will be determined largely by domestic forces with little external aid. She also made note of the commonalities between the nations: a decline in economic growth, an increase in unemployment, high economic expectations, stretched government budgets, a decline in currency reserves, and a lack of a serious internal plan. She emphasized that the last similarity is particularly hindering due to the government’s “lack of a destination point” on both an economic and political front.

Despite the lack of a macroeconomic crisis, Shafik believes that the overall outlook of each country is nowhere near positive. The shaky international markets and spillover effect from the civil war in Syria are factors threatening the stability of the region. She stated that there are five reforms that need to be implemented immediately: a transition from rent seeking to actual capitalism, increased exports, reform of the labor market (to include women) and education, increased bank financing, and moving from untargeted subsidies to safety nets, which simultaneously creates space for investment. She concluded that the involvement of external partners, although important, should be limited and urged the creation of institutions that will enable a separation of powers, transparency, and competitiveness.

Jean-Pierre Chauffour reiterated the need to “stick to one direction”. He pointed out that political reforms go hand in hand with the current economic situation. Chauffour called for immediate economic integration with European markets. In order for this to occur, according to Chauffour, Europe needs to rebuild its credibility in five ways. Primarily, it needs to facilitate market access for imported products. This has already been achieved with Morocco, but can be done with other countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. In addition, encouraging labor mobility, promoting solar exports, improving the regulatory environment, and fostering overall closer economic relationships with the Mediterranean are other ways Europe can demonstrate its commitment.

Marwan Muasher echoed the need to establish institutions. Muasher is frustrated that Middle Eastern policymakers continue to attempt to isolate political from economic reforms. He noted that the solution is simple and “so self-evident”; economic and political reform must go hand in hand. Muasher reminded the audience that change takes time and that the current status of the Egyptian economy, although dire, is much better than it was during the 1980s. He argued that the bad economic conditions might actually be a blessing in disguise for countries in the region that have not foregone a democratic transition because it will force those governments to open their political space to outside forces. According to Muasher, the solution resides in detail-orientated, inclusive, measurable plans that include performance indexes and specific timeframes that center on unemployment and the fiscal deficit.

Ibrahim Saif focused on how conditions for social justice could be created, reached, and enabled. He reminded the audience that the Arab Spring began with the economic demands. Saif believes that the root problem is political identity and polarization. Specifically, economic forces are still driven by political connections and networking. Saif cited citing Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia as examples of such dynamics. Furthermore, he underscored that weak and inefficient bureaucracies have led civilians to turn their backs on the process of reform. Another aggravation is the lack of capacity from the private sector. Saif concluded that domestic markets must be reconstructed, formal institutions must be established, open dialogue with unions must be created, and budget priorities on how to spend public money must be defined.

4. Q & A

Q: (Uri Dadush) Is there a difference between the Gulf and Maghreb countries?
A: (Muasher) The region’s governments are split between two camps. Countries that are in the midst of reform like
Egypt and Tunisia or those like the Gulf monarchies whose governments believe that they are immune to the demands for reform. The latter have failed to internalize the message of reform.

Q: (Mohammed Schenaou) What kind of considerations are constraining the IMF from doing more to address the region’s economic challenges?
A: (Shafik) The IMF does not envision itself as the sole provider for all the necessary financing to encourage growth. In fact, the IMF relies heavily on individual pledges from European partners.

Q: (Mohamed Mensouri, American University) How can countries engage their society?
A: (Chauffour) What we do is try to complement the IMF. The populace has great expectations. Countries need to try to promote dialogue by advocating education, women’s participation, transparency, citizen participation in politics, and the strengthening of Parliaments.

Q: (Ed Miker, advisor to the government of Oman) Is there evidence of short term gains that could serve as an inspiration for long term gains?
A: (Muasher) I don’t believe in short term gains. Earlier, people knew that sacrifices needed to be made in order to pursue democracy. Now, however, people feel like they are sacrificing for nothing because they do not believe that their governments are serious about reform. Also their ability to sacrifice is limited.

(Shafik) I believe that freedom is a short term gain; people can stand up and speak their mind. Signals of support from the international community also mean a lot.

(Chauffour) The short term gains are few low hanging fruits. A short term gain that could have some very short term results would be moving away from rent seeking to capitalism. Another short term problem that is easily fixable is reopening the border between Morocco and Algeria, which has been inhibiting them from trading and information sharing.

5. Observation

This event attended by approximately 75 individuals, composed primarily of college students and regional experts, in addition to a few officials from regional embassies. Jean-Pierre Chauffour is the lead country economist for Morocco and regional trade coordinator in the Middle East and North Africa Region for the World Bank, so it could be useful to cultivate a relationship with him. He was also the only panelist to highlight Morocco’s successful relationship with Europe and that the reopening the border between Morocco and Algeria will be highly beneficial. However, the insight provided by the panelists was nothing new; all reiterated the need for the establishment of clear domestic plans and that reform was time-sensitive.

For a complete recording of the event, please visit: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/18/economic-turmoil-in-arab-countries-can-partners-help/fn0v

---

Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat

Date: March 20, 2013

1. Title: Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat
   Hosted by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

   **Participants**
   - **Jane Harman:** Director, President, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Former Member, US House of Representatives)
   - **Michael E. Leiter:** Senior Counselor to the Chief Executive, Officer, Palantir Technologies (Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center)
   - **Kenneth L. Wainstein:** Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism)

2. Overview

   This hearing was convened for the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to hear testimony on how the US can update its
counterterrorism policies in response to an evolving terrorist threat, namely the move from a centralized al-Qaeda with a powerful and well-funded core to a loosely connected network of al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations. Harman emphasized the importance of moving away from the use of kinetic power and towards combating the narrative that the US is at war with Islam. Leiter focused on redirecting US focus in reacting to terrorist threats toward intelligently addressing them. Wainstein focused on giving US counterterrorism programs more legitimacy by bringing them under congressional oversight.

3. Summary

Senators Menendez (D-NJ) and Corker (R-TN) opened the hearing with a few observations on the changes that we have seen in the past few years in the nature of global terrorism. Menendez noted, as would every other speaker in the course of the hearing, that while we have significantly degraded the central organization of al-Qaeda, the emergence of a decentralized al-Qaeda presents new challenges going forward. Loosely connected al-Qaeda affiliates use the weakened core organization for funding and support while pursuing their own regional goals. Of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has emerged as the biggest threat to the US homeland. Given this shift, Menendez concluded, the most pressing question of this hearing is how do we address these new terrorist threats? Senator Corker agreed with Senator Menendez and added that recent violence in North and West Africa at the hands of al-Qaeda affiliates makes this hearing especially timely. He stressed that that the United States needs to evolve its counterterrorism strategy to respond to the evolution in the global terrorism threat. He made three observations on how we must change our counterterrorism strategy. First, any new strategy must be mindful of the shift in al-Qaeda structure from a centralized organization to one with several nodes around the world. Second, given this plurality of nodes, any new counterterrorism strategy must involve cooperation with our foreign allies. Third, going forward Congress should play a more active role in authorizing the use of force.

Harman began by stating that while many of our tactics have been helpful in fighting the war on terror since 2001, many are proving to be counter-productive, and in a broader sense our strategy is all wrong. We have yet to develop a “positive-sum roadmap” for the way forward - a narrative of what goals we want to achieve and how we are going to achieve them. This is crucial particularly because the terrorist threat has evolved; while our tactics, primarily the deployment of kinetic force, have helped to destroy the core of al-Qaeda, and we now face the new threat of a more horizontal organization. If anything, this more decentralized al-Qaeda entity is strengthened by our use of kinetic force in the Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central Asia, because our use of kinetic force, especially drone strikes, is supporting the proliferation of the al-Qaeda narrative that the United States is at war with Islam and with Muslims, not at war with terrorism. In order to choke off the power of this narrative, we need to win hearts and minds; in other words, we have to win the argument. She presented five recommendations to change our approach to the war on terror to not continue to alienate the Muslim world. The first is to stop our piecemeal counterterrorism reactions to terrorist attacks. We need to come up with an integrated government counterterrorism policy. In addition, we need to provide more support to the Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism, which is the most important body in implementing our non-kinetic counterterrorism strategy. The second recommendation is that we make smarter investments with regards to our foreign aid expenditures. We must carefully analyze the foreign aid budgets and find ways to plus up funds to the countries that need it most and resist funding for so-called “flavor of the month” countries. The third recommendation is that we live our morals. Such objectionable tactics as rendition, “enhanced interrogation”, and targeted killings are not helping us win the argument. In her words, playing whack-a-mole with our enemies does nothing to counter the narrative that we are at war with Islam. The fourth recommendation is that we reduce the over-classification of intelligence. Far too much of our intelligence is classified, and this is keeping our policy makers from seeing the bigger picture. The final recommendation is that we “drain the swamp”, or cut off the recruitment pipeline at its source. The way to do this, in addition to refuting the narrative that the US is at war with Islam, is to push reform in authoritarian Muslim governments.

Leiter began with assessing US security vis-à-vis global terror and what we should now focus on given that reality. The United States is in a better position to detect and disrupt a catastrophic attack like 9/11 than it ever has been. As such, we should not read too much into recent events such as the attacks in Benghazi and Algeria, and the proliferation of AQIM. While these events do have implications for our interests abroad, they do not constitute direct threats to the homeland, and we should not treat them as such. He identified terrorism in North Africa, the conflict in Syria, and Hizbullah as regional threats that we need to keep a closer eye on, because all three of these are growing problems that clearly threaten regional stability. However, there are some roadblocks to paying appropriate attention to and taking appropriate action on these regional threats. The first issue is so-called “terrorism fatigue.” In short, international terrorism has been at the forefront of the national dialogue for the past ten years and Americans are getting tired of talking about it. The second issue is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The US and the international community at large need to secure the stock of nuclear materials and work to prevent
the creation of improvised nuclear devices and complex bioterrorism attacks. The third issue is the weakening of the counterterrorism infrastructure. Leiter is concerned that we do not properly contextualize the significance of terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks are a fact of life today, and yet, as with the 9/11 attack in Benghazi, we tend to treat every terrorist attack as a systemic failure on the part of our counterterrorism infrastructure. This will only result in driving the smart people we need away from a career in counterterrorism and alienate our overseas partners in counterterrorism. The final issue is remaining on the offense on all fronts of this battle. The focus on the kinetic use of force has sapped focus from what we need to do in order to drain the swamp. We must expand our efforts on soft power. Leiter concluded by noting the cost of the war on terror over the past decade - in twelve years we have poured $100 billion into this effort, and we have not reaped proportional benefits. We need to take a more logical approach to this and employ mission-focused budgeting.

Wainstein’s testimony only added marginally to the others’ presentations. He began by stating that since 9/11 we have made enormous efforts to build and reorganize our counterterrorism infrastructure to address the threat that al-Qaeda has posed. While this succeeded in improving our readiness for another 9/11-style attack from a strong, centralized al-Qaeda, this type of threat doesn’t exist anymore. Instead, a decentralized al-Qaeda threatens our interests by threatening regional stability in the Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central Asia. Thus, we must reevaluate our counterterrorism programs once again. He warned that, in doing this, we must not allow the executive branch to have unilateral power. The executive branch cannot police itself. Congress needs to be more involved; this will provide our counterterrorism strategy a level of legitimacy that unilateral executive action cannot. He had two recommendations for Congress in this endeavor: any characteristics of an updated defense authorization that would differ from the one we put in place on September 18, 2001?

4. Q & A

Q: (Menendez, D-NJ) Most of the government’s most significant counterterrorism actions take place at the strategic level. Have we done enough to cut the recruitment pipeline or discredit al-Qaeda’s jihadist narrative? A: (Harman) This is precisely what I was talking about - we need to win the argument in order to win the war. Our current “drone-centric” foreign policy is not only inefficient, it actually weakens our position in the diplomatic battle that is crucial to ensuring our own security. What we can do with our kinetic tactics, in addition to expanding public diplomacy, is to devise a strict legal framework around our use of drones and put the use of drones under the purview of FISA. A rules-based drone program will help us in winning the argument.

Q: (Menendez) At the end of the day, having rules for when we strike won’t win hearts and minds; we need to be able to help populations on the ground. Shouldn’t our policy consider other things? A: (Leiter) The simple answer is yes. In my view, soft power has been woefully under-funded and under-focused for two main reasons. One, it is much easier to get funding for programs that bring business to Representatives’ home districts, as opposed to funding for an army of diplomats in the basement of the State Department. And two, it is easier and quicker to see results (or at least changes) when we undertake kinetic tactics. What can we do about this? One thing we can do is reallocate funds to the Departments of State and Homeland Security; the Department of Defense tends to be the worst representative of our government to communicate the message that we are not at war with Islam. In addition, we need to maintain foreign aid and rule of law programs; this will be especially crucial in the developing stages of new Arab democracies in the wake of the Arab Spring. It is important for us to remember: the Arab Spring protests were driven by local populations calling for modern democracy, not al-Qaeda. (Wainstein) The Arab Spring has proven to be a trade-off. We have lost some tactical partners in the war on terror, but if the Arab Spring is the way to improve the condition of the people in these countries, then it’s a counterterrorism win for us. We need to solidify the partnerships we do have in the region, before al-Qaeda gains more of a foothold in these new democracies.

Q: (Corker, R-TN) Let’s go back to the legal case. The decimation of the core of al-Qaeda makes it much harder for us to tie these peripheral groups back to the authorization for the use of force that we signed on September 18, 2001.

A: (Harman) I would like to emphasize that absolutely no one who voted for this authorization in 2001 believed that it would last until now; we thought this would be a temporary authorization. We absolutely cannot continue to approach the “war on terror” using this framework. As I said before, it is crucial that we win the argument, and we can do this with a whole of government approach to counterterrorism, smarter investments, and by living our values.

Q: (Corker) In that case, I believe that this defense authorization needs to be updated. What are some of the characteristics of an updated defense authorization that would differ from the one we put in place on September 18, 2001?
A: (Leiter) The last AUMF is, at the same time, too broad, too narrow, and too vague; it is difficult to look at it and say how it would apply to some of these newer terrorist organizations that are gaining power. (Wainstein) Until now, the executive branch has been able to shoehorn its actions into the AUMF. Putting this under the purview of Congress will lend legitimacy to the process.

(Harman) I’m not sure that Congress should give a blanket authorization for the use of force, but yes, Congress’ role in oversight and legislating needs to be much more assertive than it has been in the past 12 years. Also, calling this a “war on terror” is not helping; terror is a tactic, not an enemy.

Q: (Murphy, D-CT) You talked about winning with actions, not just words, so I have a question about how actions we take here factor in abroad. We’ve seen a pretty remarkable increase in anti-Islam behavior here in the past five years. Ms. Harman, how much does this matter in winning the argument?

A: (Harman) This actually matters a lot. Our record is mixed on Islamophobia; we have made some serious missteps, but we have seen some outreach to Muslim communities on the part of local police forces, such as what we have seen in Los Angeles. We should encourage this; more of this outreach will make it more attractive for members of the Muslim community to turn in people who may be turning towards extremism, but who have clean police records and otherwise operate under the radar. In a broader sense, projecting tolerance must be a big part of the counterterrorism approach. Let’s remember, more Muslims have been the target of al-Qaeda attacks than have non-Muslims.

(Leiter) What is important here is that Islamophobia in the US undermines the willingness of the American Muslim community to address the Muslim community abroad in order to fight the narrative that the US is at war with Islam. When they see Islamophobia here, they’re less likely to stand up and say that America is a good place to be Muslim.

Q: (Kaine, D-VA) The narrative does not have to be won by us, necessarily; it can be won by another country that shows that terrorism isn’t the way to success. The salient examples here are Morocco and Turkey. Turkey, in particular, is a strong Muslim nation with a growing GDP and can serve as an alternative success model.

A: (Harman) I strongly agree with you. There is a big opportunity for us in this right now, especially given the strong relationship between President Obama and PM Erdogan. By and large, Turkey offers a moderate model of an Islamist society; Islamists are not necessarily bad, but terrorists are.

(Leiter) The US has a good track record with this type of partnership, as in Indonesia and Jordan. In places like Libya and Egypt, we have to use our foreign aid that makes them walk the right path, but we have to take a sophisticated look of who is in this government and how we can work with them. Just looking superficially at what groups are in power and saying we can’t work with them because they are Islamist will be akin to cutting off our nose to spite our face.

Q: (Menendez) What do you envision as the elements of “draining the swamp”? What are the partnerships that have worked particularly well and what partnerships have we not tapped that we should tap?

A: (Harman) I think we need to focus on public-private partnerships. The private sector has the tools and the agility to make an impact that the public sector simply does not. In particular, the private sector and the NGO community are uniquely equipped to fight illiteracy in these countries, which is a major factor in terrorist recruitment.

(Leiter) We need to do a better job of engaging the American Muslim community and we have to accept that what the US says about Islam on a global basis is generally dismissed; we are not a credible speaker on this subject. We need to empower moderate voices abroad that can counter al-Qaeda’s message. Something that has worked well for us in the past is disaster relief - it shows a non-military face, depicts us as humanitarians, and has been incredibly effective. We need to use our partnerships and empower other voices abroad to help us show that al-Qaeda has a bankrupt ideology and that there is an alternative way to protect Islam.

5. Observation

This hearing was not especially well-attended, likely because it convened considerably later than previously expected, due to voting in the Senate. MAC can capitalize on was the testimony asserting that the US should strengthen its partnerships with moderate Muslim states and hold them up as examples for the rest of the Muslim world; Morocco is a pretty clear example of this. It is interesting to consider if MAC can be useful in promoting voices in the Moroccan American community to speak out on this issue as an antidote to those charging the US with Islamophobia. Given that Harman and Leiter both alluded to the needed to reach out to the Muslim-American community, MAC should maintain its relationship with Harman and reach out to Leiter.
1. Title: Algeria Between Reform and Stability
   Hosted by John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies

   Participants:
   William Zartman: Professor Emeritus, Conflict Management, JHU-SAIS
   Eamonn Gearon: Professional Lecturer, African Studies Program, JHU-SAIS
   Daniele Moro: Moderator: African Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS

2. Overview

The John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies hosted a discussion on whether or not Algeria is on a path of reform or stability, including topics such as how the country avoided the Arab uprisings, the importance of the April 2014 elections, and the security and politics of the Sahara.

3. Summary

The panel discussion began with an Al Jazeera documentary that examined the bitterness that is still present in Algeria as a result of French colonial rule and how French colonialism fueled resentment between France and its Muslim community. Dr. Zartman began the discussion with remarks about the struggle between reform and stability in the region after the Arab Spring. In terms of indicators for a revolution, Dr. Zartman listed three characteristics Algeria shares with the region: an aging autocratic ruler with no clear indication of his successor, high youth unemployment, and a lack of motivation to move beyond a hydrocarbon economy. Despite these shared characteristics, Dr. Zartman highlighted six key factors that have discouraged Algerians from revolution.

First and foremost, Algerians are terrified of falling back into a civil war, as the atrocious committed in the 1990s remain at the forefront of their minds. Second, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, Algerian history demonstrates the military’s lack of fear and hesitation to shoot civilians, especially if power were handed to an Islamist government. Third, the Algerian populace understands that the military and President Bouteflika are codependent and that Bouteflika’s fall would be insignificant. Regardless of Bouteflika’s departure the military will maintain significant power. Fourth, protestors demands are provincial-specific and thus lack the wider appeal that inspires national protests - there have been protests, but none have largely regional events. Fifth, the Algerian government has been able to suppress, buy off, and/or discredit small groups of protestors. Finally, the impact of the 2010-2011 elections gave legitimacy to the current government. According to Dr. Zartman, these elections were seen as free and fair, giving Bouteflika’s government a certain amount of democratic legitimacy. Also, both the National Rally for Democracy (RND) and the National Liberation Front (FLN) have seen gains, whilst the Islamist parties have become irrelevant. Nevertheless, Dr. Zartman concluded with a warning, if President Bouteflika goes back on his word and runs for President or if the newly elected President is an older-generation RND or FLN affiliate, this could cause an uproar.

Eammon Gearon noted that after 132 years under French occupation, the atrocious civil war that led to Algeria’s independence simultaneously created Salafi jihad extremists. These extremists created the basis for the emergence of AQIM. According to Gearon, Algeria has faced more violence than any other nation in the region, which contributes to its need for a robust military role that provides consistent stability. Being a colony for over a century has lead to much resentment and deep rooted skepticism of foreigners.

Gearon explained that although these small extremist groups linked to AQIM are aiming to spread fear and instability throughout the region, they do not want to govern the nation, especially in such troublesome times. He elaborated that these terrorist organizations profit from acts of kidnapping and ransom, citing the In Aminas oil platform incident as an example. Gearon noted that such incidents promote the success of AQIM’s mission to spread terror. Due to this success, Gearon concluded that Algeria’s security situation will most likely get worse before it gets better. Gearon also warned the Algerian government to wean itself from its dependency on its hydrocarbon industry, which has in the past suffered major drops in price, directly affecting the country’s stability.

4. Q & A

Q: (Lawrence Freeman, African Desk Arab Magazine) What is the relationship between Algeria and Morocco?
A: (Zartman) There is a long-standing rivalry between Algeria and Morocco. Algeria fears AQIM and anti-Algerian groups located in the North Atlas Mountains of Morocco. Furthermore, Algeria is keen on uniting North African states whilst keeping Morocco ostracized. For example, in the 1980s Algeria called for security cooperation with Sahel countries and pointedly left out Morocco.

Q: (Michelle Payn, POMED) What is the percentage of youth unemployment in Algeria and why is it so high?
A: (Gearon) Overall unemployment is at 10%. However, when looking at individuals younger than 25 years old, the percentage rises to 25-30%. Algeria, like Libya, depends on its hydrocarbon industry, which relies on foreign workers and machines. Algeria does not have an economy, but a savings account.

Q: (Former Ambassador to Italy) What efforts are being made to diversify Algeria’s economy?
A: (Gearon) With the increase in the price of oil, there is a lack of desire and drive to diversify the economy. (Zartman) Although a downward trend in oil prices may put pressure on the government to diversify, there is currently no political will to expand the Algerian economy beyond oil exploration.

Q: (Gare Smith, lawyer) What is the best security approach? Can education be included?
A: (Gearon) One that encompasses the three following aspects: having a robust amount of military equipment, recognizing and discussing social issues, and diversifying the economy. (Zartman) Education is not even a fish in the water. Building schools is not going to make a dent. I would like to extend Mr. Gearon’s answer by adding one other aspect. AQIM has never attacked an oil facility until now, securing oil facilities is now a number one priority. Although AQIM planned to make a fire and attract attention, their original plan did not constitute of killing hostages; this only occurred due to the government’s intervention.

5. Observation

This event was mainly attended by students, former and current ambassadors, and a couple of reporters. There were around 30 attendees. Due to his extensive knowledge and background on the security and politics of the Sahara, Eamonn Gearon could be quite useful for MACP. Although he has not been explicit on his stance on the issue of Western Sahara, he wrote a book titled The Sahara: A Cultural History. Labeling Algeria’s economy as a savings account was also a unique and intriguing perspective. Dr. Zartman provided interesting insight on the domestic factors that have saved Algeria from succumbing to a revolution. He also believes that Algeria is purposefully leaving Morocco in the dark, inhibiting the possibility of a bilateral relationship.

For the documentary link “Veterans: The French in Algeria”, please visit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=NOPfoaTaINU#
Keynote Address:
Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson: Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, US Department of State

Panel 3:
Laurence Ammour: Research Fellow, International Security and Defense, Institute of Political Science (Bordeaux, France)
Glynn Torres-Spelliscy: Professor, The New School for Public Engagement
Lahcen Achy: Non-Resident Scholar, Carnegie Middle East Center
Christianna Nichols Leahy: Chair, Political Science Department, McDaniel College

2. Overview

The countries of North Africa have experienced considerable political and social upheaval over the past two years. However, concurrently, violent extremist networks and criminal organizations have grown and are expanding their operations throughout the region. This conference explored the range and scale of challenges that confront the states of North Africa, the United States, and the international community with the aim of identifying policy options for the future.

3. Summary

Panel 1: Response and Strategies of Regimes and Political Parties

Anouar Boukhars opened by detailing the questions the panelists sought to address, namely: how have existing regimes adjusted to the new political landscape? What is the status of political and economic reform efforts? Are Islamist parties who assumed power gaining or losing popularity? What are the political, cultural, and economic cleavages that drive and shape events on the ground? Is the pessimism about the prospects of the Arab Spring misplaced? What are US interests in the region?

Boukhars provided the context for answering these questions with a brief overview of the political situation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. He noted that two years after the Arab Spring, the fate of democracy is unclear in North Africa. Morocco is the only country that experienced a peaceful transition, but the question remains whether or not the reform process there represents a true third way or merely a cosmetic shift that leaves the country ripe for revolution. Per Boukhars, neither of those characterizations is right, but it is nevertheless too early to tell the outcome of political reform in Morocco. In Tunisia, insecurity, deepening political polarization, and ideological extremism continue to plague the country and inhibit progress on political reform. Algeria has weathered popular upheavals and the opposition remains weak, but there have only been limited reforms and the government has used money to limit dissent. Nonetheless, the issue of President Bouteflika’s successor presents potential complications for the future.

Marina Ottaway spoke about political reform in Morocco, a country she visited in late March – her third visit there since the start of the Arab Spring. Ottaway noted that she was struck by how little change had taken place in the country. She observed that people’s debates and political discussions remained the same as when she was there in June 2012. For example, at that time reforms to the press code was about to be published. In March 2013, it was still about to be published. The same applied to subsidy reform. Despite this observation, Ottaway argued that the reform is more than just cosmetic in Morocco. The question is whether the pace of change is enough to satisfy Morocco and the aspirations of the people.

She answered with an overview of the Arab uprising in Morocco. In February 2011, demonstrations began in Morocco, but there was not an uprising and there was an immediate response from the government. The King kept his word – a new Constitution was approved in July and elections took place in November. How was this possible? First, Morocco had a history of minor reform from the top since the time of King Hassan II. The country made very real human rights progress and had experience with an opposition government. Second, the PJD is the most moderate of the Islamist parties in the region and was willing to work on a third way – partnering with the King for reform. Third, the Palace and the King’s entourage were confident enough to know that they were still ultimately in control – they could run circles around everyone else. As Ottaway noted, in Morocco today, there is a very strong distinction between “le gouvernment” and “le pouvoir.”

Therefore, Ottaway’s assessment is that the reform process is real, but slow. There is no doubt that the King will
push through reforms, but he will need to be pressured by the government and the people. That is not currently happening in Morocco - reform has been from the top without a push from the bottom. The King and his advisors know that they have to move forward with reform, but want to avoid the fallout from it. The King is comfortable and the government is hesitant to push for its prerogatives as defined in the Constitution. The PJD is terrified of confrontation with the King and it will be difficult to pressure him without confrontation. Ottaway stressed that the PJD has been far too cautious. With regard to the Constitution and what the PJD and the Parliament can do, Ottaway argued that Morocco is not a constitutional monarchy like it says – it is more like a semi-Presidential system except with a King instead of a President. There are executive powers reserved for the King and the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister has been asking for his powers, rather than using them. As for the Parliament, which is empowered to adopt the organic laws required to implement the Constitution, it has an idea of what needs to be done, but hasn't done much. Only three of eighteen organic laws have been adopted thus far.

Despite the stalled status of reform, King Mohammed VI has thus far remained unscathed. He is popular, legitimate, and has a cadre of capable advisors. Furthermore, there is no real opposition in Morocco. The USFP is weak, so if pressure is not coming from the PJD, it is not happening. While in Morocco, Ottaway tried to identify a possible opposition, but couldn’t. While the JCO, which Ottaway described as a potential game changer, represents a possibility, it isn’t there yet. According to representatives of the organization that Ottaway spoke with, the group isn’t interested in politics just yet. In addition, they confessed that they don’t think they could mobilize people in the streets at this time, “even if they tried.” As for other opposition groups, whatever Salafists there are in the country don’t appear to be a factor and are certainly not organized. Finally, the protest movement is still alive, but is localized and ineffective at the national level.

In conclusion, Ottaway noted that Morocco represents an interesting experiment in reform from the top. If it can happen this way, it is the best option. Although wanting to avoid sounding too conservative, Ottaway argued that uprisings generally don’t result in happy endings. If Morocco is able to make this process work, it will be great for the country and a great example for other countries and monarchs. For now, however, the lesson from Morocco is that reform from the top won't work without a push from the bottom.

Monica Marks addressed political reform in Tunisia. She underscored the transition that had occurred within the country as a result of the revolution – several ministers went from being in jail to holding ministerial positions in the very building in which they were held in confinement. Despite this evident symbolism, unfortunately there has not been a lot of progress in Tunisia. Marks ascertained that this was for institutional reasons, political reasons, and practical reasons. Institutionally, the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for security reform, is the most corrupt and is still staffed 90% by people who were there before the revolution. Politically, the drafting of the Constitution is still ongoing, which makes other reform more difficult. Pragmatically, the country is plagued by bureaucracy.

Jason Ullner gave a brief history of political reform in Algeria – referencing the civil war, the process of reconciliation, and the military’s carte blanche for retaining power. Ullner argued that there has been slow, creeping reform in Algeria, although it is not clear who is in charge of what, with the DRS, the military, and Bouteflika all having some degree of power. Defining Algeria as a one-party state dominated by the FLN, Ullner addressed why, despite having similar problems to countries that experienced revolution – a massive youth bulge, food subsidies, etc. – Algeria had not experienced an uprising. He argued that Algeria had its Arab Spring in 1991-1992. He doesn’t view this as just an excuse, because he believes that Bouteflika is a different kind of leader, rather than a dictator; Bouteflika doesn’t inspire ire like Ben Ali, and Algeria does have freedoms that didn’t exist in neighboring countries, such as freedom of the press. Ullner noted that there have indeed been protests, but that they were small – largely because of DRS repression, but also because there has been no groundswell for drastic change. The Algerian people want slow, peaceful reform from within the government. In this regard, Ullner has seen a few steps in the right direction and believes that the government is coming along and headed in the right direction.

With regard to US interests in Algeria, Ullner stated that oil is always at the forefront, followed by Algeria’s stance as a strong counterterrorism partner based on its historic experience in fighting Islamist terrorism. US-Algeria bilateral relations are rooted in this security cooperation and the two countries have strong intelligence and military relations. Algeria remains a bedrock for the US, particularly given instability in Mali and Libya. Seeking to deny suggestions that these relations came under pressure when Americans were killed at the attack on the In Amenas gas facility, Ullner stressed that the US maintained daily contact with its Algerian counterparts and the US was not caught off guard by developments. Defending this answer, Ullner argued that the “Algerians have a certain way of doing things” and that relations have only gotten better between the two countries since the attack at In Amenas. He cited the US-Algeria Strategic Dialogue as an indication of the strength of bilateral relations and noted that the US has encouraged Algeria to play a more active role in security issues in the region, including going beyond its borders.
Panel 2: Security Threats

Fernando Reinares assessed the security threats to and from the Sahel. He argued that terrorism is not the main problem North African countries face today, but certainly an important one. In order to put the current situation in context, Reinares provided a brief overview of the evolution of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Founded in 2007, AQIM was at the start, an Algerian group with an Algerian agenda. It mostly carried out attacks within Algeria. Algerian counterterrorism efforts, however, became increasingly successful in later years, reducing the organization’s capacity and forcing the organization to look again toward a sanctuary in northern Mali. With their new sanctuary established after the coup in Mali, AQIM started establishing alliances with other terrorist groups that began to operate in the region – MUJAO, a splinter group that in practices operates as a supporting aid, and Ansar Dine. At present, Reinares estimated that AQIM currently has 600-800 fighters and vast economic resources, but has settled primarily around Kidal and also made a tactical withdrawal to Mauritania.

Fred Wehrey addressed whether or not Libya is a failed or failing state. In making this assessment, he defined the three criteria for a failing state: the inability to control large swathes of territory; the lack of capacity to deliver services to its citizens; and the export of problems to its neighbors. Wehrey argued that Libya meets these conditions, but is in critical, but stable condition nonetheless, as failing assumes the existence of a state in the first place, which is not the case in Libya – Gaddafi was the state. Wehrey also presented some positive assessments. First, the idea of a unified Libya exists. Second, oil production is increasing. Third, there is a lack of meddling by neighbors. Fourth, the political/ideological spectrum is narrow. Finally, infrastructure in the country has remained intact. For these reasons, Wehrey is optimistic, despite continued challenges, including marginalization of the periphery and the reality that the security sector is informal and dispersed.

Patrick Worman provided a macro-level analysis of the security threat in North Africa. He noted that there is a new AQIM focus on the Sahel because of the operational space it’s been afforded there over the past few years – both as a result of the Algerian security services success in pushing them out and increased insecurity in neighboring countries. AQIM is now primarily fighting in countries ill-prepared to deal with them. The US is likewise concerned about al-Qaeda outreach efforts to AQIM trying to export instability and has developed policies to limit this, taking a holistic approach, including development and security measures. In terms of specific threats to the region, Worman only discussed Algeria and Libya, noting that he did not want to overlook Morocco, but that the country was a good news story as it maintains the longest counterterrorism partnership with the US and is not the locus of the current threat, which is in a band of Southern Algeria and the Sahel. As for Algeria, Worman noted that US-Algerian relations have become closer over the past 5-10 years because the threat is in Algeria's backyard, it has significant experience and strong capacity in counterterrorism operations, and there is broad public support for counterterrorism efforts throughout the country.

In Libya, Worman explained, the US is trying to cut down on the space within which terrorists can operate. They are trying to do so in a policy environment skeptical of US actions, which make its all the more difficult. In conclusion, Worman noted that the US preferences if for building long-term counterterrorism capacity in partner countries, building institutions in those countries, and building a unity of purpose among partner countries.

Keynote Address

Janet Sanderson provided personal observations on North Africa and US policy toward the region and shared her candid assessment of what the US got right and wrong. To start, she explained that the US government did not see the Arab Spring coming. It understood the issues behind it, but did not predict that 2011 would be a defining year. It is easy to understand common factors now, but the US didn’t see the match that set it off. In the Maghreb, the US has been hampered in its mindset by its history in the region and its assessment that France was more involved there. This meant that the US rarely put the Maghreb at the top of the agenda, with a few exceptions such as the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement and engagement with Gaddafi after his initial overture to the West. North Africa thus factored lightly in the US agenda. Presently, it has been said that North Africa is the Obama Administration’s orphan and Sanderson acknowledged that this assessment is true. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs avoided leader to leader contact despite other contacts. However, benign neglect was not limited to the Obama Administration – it was the case under Clinton too, when it was clear that our approach was engagement light. For example, the US warmly embraced Morocco, but didn’t engage in a politically substantive way. It engaged with Algeria based on counterterrorism issues alone, despite the clear US business interests in the country. It deemed Gaddafi crazy and left Tunisia to the Europeans. With the Arab Spring, the US was forced to pay attention to the region, but it saw developments though its own prism focusing on counterterrorism. As important as this issue is in
the region, Sanderson underscored that it should not define US engagement there. In terms of the US response, the tools were not always the most nimble and effective, and the US often made events all about itself rather than the countries of the region.

In conclusion, Sanderson argued that the US can do better in the Maghreb and needs to redefine relations in the region. Its interests in promoting regional security, encouraging counterterrorism cooperation, securing access to energy and oil, and encouraging human rights, democracy, and the rule of law demand a reassessment of US relations in the Maghreb. There have been importance developments – an increase in exchange visits, Strategic Dialogues with Morocco and Algeria, and a broadened agenda for discussion and engagement. The question is whether the US is prepared to sustain the effort or not. In either case, this will require engagement from North Africa countries too as relations have to be based in partnerships.

Panel 3: Prospects for Regional Cooperation

Laurence Ammour gave a presentation on the Western Sahara issue, which she described as the blind spot of Algerian regional policy. Ammour referenced the Algerian position on regional counterterrorism cooperation and its veto of Moroccan membership in the Counterterrorism Center based in Algeria as evidence of Algeria’s longstanding belief that is has preeminence in the Sahel and Sahara, quoting one official that said, “Last time I checked, Morocco doesn't have a Sahel border.” Implicit in this statement was Algeria’s assertion that Western Sahara will never be part of Morocco. The question that comes out of this for Ammour is: why has Algeria maintained this policy on the Western Sahara for over 40 years with no evolution? She sought to address this question by analyzing how the Western Sahara related to the domestic and foreign policy of Algeria. She argued that geopolitics and history explain Algeria’s support for the Polisario and its broader stance on the Western Sahara. The relationship between Morocco and Algeria has been historically defined by border disputes – Morocco’s territorial ambitions to broaden its borders to those of historic “greater Morocco,” and Algeria’s desire to limit Morocco’s territorial ambitions and thereby assert and maintain geopolitical dominance of the Maghreb. The Western Sahara issue is a central part of geopolitical balancing in the region, as it is a marker of the territorial inequality between Morocco and Algeria. An additional factor is the dominant role of the military in both the founding of the Algerian state and in current domestic politics. The Western Sahara issue has proven useful domestically not only to justify military expenditures, but also to further Algeria’s regional influence.

Why, however, in spite of developments in the region, including the political decline of the Polisario Front and the numerous incidents of Polisario involvement in terrorist and criminal activities (Ammour had a list of these on a power point she showed) has Algeria’s stance not evolved accordingly? The reality is that little has changed in Algeria – Algerian leaders have failed to adapt to international relations and new political realities. Leaders are stuck in old ideologies. Unfortunately, Ammour sees little hopes for an evolution in Algeria's policy or for normalization of Moroccan-Algerian relations anytime soon. It is nevertheless time to move forward to resolve the humanitarian issue and ensure security cooperation to prevent the region from becoming even more of a hotbed for extremism and criminal activity in the region.

Glynn Torres-Spelliscy explained the legal issues behind resource development in the Western Sahara. He stressed that he was not assessing the wisdom of a policy choice on the issue either way, but was merely providing information on the legal options that apply to the situation there. There is a range of legally acceptable behavior on this issue and wisdom and legality are two very different concepts. Torres-Spelliscy also underscored that the issue of resource and economic development is an important one, as it offers the potential for cooperation without settling the question of the future political status of the Sahara. Development is likewise essential for both humanitarian and security issues and should not be limited before a political resolution.

Torres-Spelliscy detailed current economic challenges and opportunities in the Sahara before providing the legal context. The challenges are that the Sahara has limited arable land and is one of the least densely populated places in the world. On the positive side, it has natural resources, namely phosphates, fish, and the potential for oil and gas, and the potential for agro-business. Economic development thus sounds difficult, but possible. Given that, what are the legal means for developing the territory? Torres-Spelliscy stated that Morocco has de-facto control of the territory, which is legally listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory at the UN with Spain as the original administrative power. Although Spain attempted to transfer this power to Morocco and Mauritania via the Madrid accords, it was legally not allowed to do so. There is thus no administrative power in the territory. From a legal perspective, Morocco can either be sovereign, an administrative power, or an occupier. In this case, Morocco is not sovereign, it is not the legal administrator, but potentially a de-facto administrator, and it is not an occupier, as the country is listed as Non-Self Governing – not occupied. Fortunately, this issue does not have to be resolved legally in order for development to be allowed because there are some legal principals beyond this for the administration of natural
resources. Several General Assembly Resolutions affirm the value of foreign economic investment if certain conditions are met, namely that the development must benefit the population and be in accordance with their wishes. Under Moroccan de-facto control, the benefits for the population are disputed. There is no doubt that Morocco has made serious investment in infrastructure and that looks likely to continue with the launch of the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council program for the territory. On the other hand, there are some questions about the distribution of these benefits. With regard to consultation, there is not sufficient legal evidence that the people have been consulted. There is no doubt that consultation has taken place and continues to do so in the Moroccan-controlled territory, but there has been no engagement with those Sahrawis displaced in the camps. That is where the issue stands today, although Torres-Spelliscy did note two signs of progress in conclusion: the 2011 request for a framework to develop a process for resource extraction and the 2012 agreement with UNEP to begin information sharing on the issue.

Lahcen Achy explored prospects for regional integration in the Maghreb, underscoring that the Western Sahara crisis has an impact on the whole region and on this issue. Why is regional integration important? According to Achy, it is needed to seize economic opportunities in the post-Arab Spring period, overcome reliance on Europe, and enhance security in the region. Despite these obvious advantages, the status of regional integration is disappointing. The region is losing 2-3% of GDP a year by not integrating, in addition to the added opportunity cost of spending. The region remains unattractive to large foreign investors because of limited opportunities for regional exports. Who bears the cost of this lack of integration? Achy argued that it's primarily the region's non-oil producing states of Morocco and Tunisia and the border areas within each country. Who benefits from the current status? Achy argued that is the countries that are less ready economically in terms of creating a policy environment for more open trade—namely, the least diversified economies and most dysfunctional business environments of Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania. Given these circumstances, what are the prospects for more integration in the near future? Unfortunately, they are not very good. Achy underscored that in order for increased integration to become widely appealing, countries require domestic reform first—on issues ranging from governance and corruption to the rule of law and leadership. The challenge is to engage people and not just leaders. Fortunately, people-to-people exchanges are starting and could provide the impetus for more exchange at the national level.

4. Q & A

Panel 1

Q: (World Affairs Council – Harrisburg, PA) Is it fair to think of the Islamist parties in Tunisia and Morocco as similar to European Christian Democratic parties? If that is an apt comparison, what should US engagement be with these parties? Lastly, is there a chance for an Islamist resurgence in Algeria.

A: (Marks) That is certainly what Ennadha wants to be like. (Ottaway) The State Department has accepted that these parties have won elections—unlike what they did with Hamas. As for the comparison, it’s a bit more complicated. They are more like the Christian Democrat parties of the past. The best comparison is conservative elements within the current US Republican party. (Ullner) There will be a place for Islamists in Algerian politics, but the Islamist parties lost seats in the Spring 2012 election. It is unlikely that an Islamist will be President.

Q: (DCM – Algerian Embassy) I would like to make a correction to your assertions—Morocco is not the only country going through peaceful reform, Algeria is too.

A: (Ottaway) I beg to differ. Algeria hasn’t reached a turning point. Yes, it has lots of political parties, and yes, there are some reforms, but Bouteflika is still the President and it is difficult to say a country is changing when it has the same government.

Q: (McDaniel student) Are you at all concerned about the status of women in any of these countries?

A: (Marks) The situation is Tunisia is much more positive and not nearly as bad as the analyses have been. Women have a voice within the Ennadha party and there are no threats to them from a legal perspective. That said, women have spoke of a rise in the security threat they face. (Ottaway) There is fear among women in Egypt and Tunisia about their rights. This isn’t the case in Morocco, but there is hostility between secular and conservative groups, although there hasn’t been a change there from previous years.

Q: (Embassy of Spain) Could you evaluate the social and economic performance of the PJD, as well as the current status of the opposition movement and the leadership of the JCO?

A: (Ottaway) The potential is always there for renewed unrest in any country. I don’t see anything imminent—and have not seen increased levels of discontent. As for the JCO, it’s a paradox to me. It has to get involved in politics;
otherwise it will become irrelevant by sidelining itself. There are several obstacles to political engagement by the JCO, however. First, there is the death of Sheikh Yassine and the lack of a new leader. Second, JCO will not only have to recognize the monarchy, but also the King as the commander of the faithful. Third, I don't think the situation is ripe. It was a surprising admission that representatives from the group said they would not mobilize people. Nevertheless, it seems bound to happen.

Q: (Boukhars) What I heard from US counterterrorism officials with regard to cooperation with Algeria differs from what I have heard today – is the relationship really that seamless?
A: (Ullner) The relationship has improved dramatically over the last ten years, but no, of course it is not on the level of say, US-England. In terms of how to influence Algeria, they don’t want money. They want assistance on the state level – training and a constructive relationship, not the US telling them want to do.

Panel 2

Q: Does the US government have a “hearts and minds” strategy?
A: (Worman) We have been refining it since 9/11. We first increased assistance for development – which was like throwing money at the problem. This evolved into supporting to local NGOs who do development work. Morocco has likewise developed this time of program to counterterrorism – treating it holistically through socio-economic assistance programs to target vulnerable demographics. The US prefers this type of an approach.

Panel 3

Q: (Charles Liebling, Western Sahara Endgame Blog) No one had discussed the options of independence or a referendum in the Western Sahara.
A: (Torres-Spelliscy) When you have a government in de-facto control, there are three legal scenarios. If the situation were to change, through a referendum or otherwise, and Morocco no longer be in de-facto control, it would be a different situation.

Q: (Marina Ottaway) Can you think of any examples of regional integration in places where political issues have been unresolved?
A: (Achy) Both West Africa and the MERCOSUR trade block have trade and economic integration despite differences in political systems.
C: (Ottaway) But this is different – it is more than just political differences. This is open conflict - unarmed, but open.
A: (Achy) If there is pressure, there might be some room for integration to drive a political solution. The countries need to address this issue and not avoid it like they are now. The circumstances are right given instability in the region.
(Ammour) Insecurity is in border areas and the economic figures about border trade reinforce the point about insecurity. There is trade, it is just in illicit goods. That is why regional integration could be so important. It could address insecurity in the border areas while improving development at the same time.

Q: What are the prospects for foreign investment?
A: (Achy) It is there, but the question is how to make it larger. For that, the Maghreb needs to represent a larger market for investors.

Q: Would it be possible to address these peripheral border areas individually or does it require regional cooperation?
A: (Ammour) It is easier if it’s done regionally because if you develop borders through those means, you are developing two countries at the same time.
(Achy) It only works if it happens on both sides of the border. So borders need to be open.

5. Observation

Approximately 50 students, policymakers, and North Africa experts attended the all-day conference at McDaniel College. Generally, the panelists did not offer any really new insights into political, economic, and security developments in the Maghreb, although the conference was very valuable in that it dedicated an entire day to discussions on North Africa, which is important in and of itself given the way North Africa is not often prioritized in the US. The conference also helped clarify how the US – both experts and policymakers – continue to view the region. Some valuable conclusions can thus be drawn from the event. First, Morocco continues to be viewed as different from its neighbors in its approach to reform and as a potential model for its neighbors. That said, there is still widespread concern and skepticism about the political will of the Palace to initiate reform, the capacity of the PJD government to push for it, and the current pace of implementing reform. Second, the US prioritizes its
counterterrorism relationships in the region and is unlikely to shift from that stance anytime soon. This is clearly the case with Algeria – a country which both representatives from the State Department emphasized as an important ally, despite obvious political issues that neither sought to mention. Third, the US continues to engage in the region bilaterally rather than regionally. This has an obvious impact on prospects for the US to promote regional integration and a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Finally, obvious progress has been made in getting North Africa on the radar of the United States at the very least. Whether or not this is sustainable is yet to be seen, but conferences like this one – and the words of Janet Sanderson admitting that the lack of engagement has been a problem – are hopeful signs for the future.

---

Morocco’s Reforms – Stalled or in Process?

MAMS Event Report
Date: April 10, 2013

1. Title: Morocco’s Reforms – Stalled or in Process?
   Hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States

   Participants:
   Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah: President, National Observatory for Human Development
   Ivan Vejvoda: Vice President, Policy Programs, German Marshall Fund
   Hassan Mneimneh: Moderator: Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund

2. Overview

   Among the states of North Africa, Morocco was the most proactive in responding to its Arab uprising, the February 20th Movement. King Mohammed VI called for a new constitution, which was quickly adopted. This paved the way for new elections and a new government coalition, led by the moderate Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Now, more than a year later, commentators and analysts are questioning to what degree reforms have been implemented and if the current government can promote needed reforms while balancing its relationships with the palace. Dr. Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah discussed the realities of the constitutional reform process and the pace of reform, pressing upon the need for further work and the obstacles ahead on the road to democratic reform. Benabdellah then presented the process by which his organization has begun to formulate a plan for the development Morocco’s southern provinces.

3. Summary

   Mneimeh introduce Benabdellah and reviewed the recent history of liberal reforms in Morocco. According to Mneimeh, the recent constitutional reforms in Morocco were not enacted in response to the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia and protests in Morocco. Rather, the Arab Spring reinvigorated a reform process that began almost 20 years ago, during the reign of King Hassan II. In fact, King Hassan II appointed Benabdellah Minister of Education in order to “clean house,” as it were, in preparation for the introduction of democratic reforms.

   Benabdellah indicated a few key impediments to Morocco’s development that must be overcome: the lack of democracy, weak economy, fractured education and healthcare systems, the lack of inclusion of women, and poor governance. The main issue to be solved is the lack of democracy, especially in local government. However, Morocco is a complex country; it is large, multiethnic, and multilingual, and there has long been a separation between the “useful Morocco” (mostly urban centers) and the largely neglected countryside. For all of these reasons, it has long been difficult to write a reformed and inclusive constitution. The reform push accelerated rapidly once the Arab Spring came to Morocco, with protests calling out against corruption (but, significantly, not calling for the overthrow of the government). Since then, the country has advanced significantly. There have been improvements in human rights protections. The new constitution incorporates the standards set by all of the international conventions that Morocco has ratified. It gave more recognition to the country’s minority groups by naming Amazigh as a national language. However, Morocco still has a long way to go with its democratic reforms, and the country is facing a number of crises, including the influx of immigrants, weak economy, and fluctuating consumer prices.

   Benabdellah then presented what he referred to as the Moroccan government’s agenda for development, to be
carried out in three steps. The first step is to learn as much as much as possible from development experts. To this end, Benabdellah and other members of the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE) have met with scholars, consultants, elected officials, and local authorities in order to draft a roadmap for regionalization and further development. They then prepared a preliminary document in the beginning of January to serve as a starting point for the regionalization process. The second step was to take that document and bring it to the southern provinces of Morocco, where regionalization will be most crucial. It was important that they treated this presentation openly, frankly, and as a two-way discussion, both presenting information and taking suggestions from the people they met. Development is both desperately needed and particularly tricky in the south, due to factors such as the more nomadic culture, proximity to the border with Algeria, and the proliferation of Saharan drug trafficking. Thus, development in the south will require a revision of security, economic, and social policies in order to attract investment to the region and create jobs for its impoverished residents. The third step was to return to Rabat with this input from the residents of the southern provinces and their previous research and to assess it. CESE organized the information into a comprehensive report on the state of development and human rights in the country. The next step will be to put together a team to address the three main impediments to development in the south that the report indicated: economic/social issues, environmental issues, and cultural issues. Benabdellah is confident in Morocco’s potential for success in development and reform.

4. Q & A

Q: Despite the existence of the 2004 Family Code there is a high level of illiteracy and disparity between men and women. Is this a rural or country wide phenomenon?
A: (Benabdellah) It is a rural phenomenon, and there are three factors that explain why such high levels still exist. Firstly, when Morocco was still a protectorate of France, only coastal cities were developed, creating a lag between rural and urban areas. Secondly education programs are a failure. After the recognition of Amazigh as an official language, the system attempted to standardize three Berber dialects into one. In addition, there is an overall lack of teachers and most teachers tend to migrate to the cities to find jobs. Lastly, until the 90s gender discrimination was very widespread. Families did not and still do not want to send their daughter to schools, but instead have them stay at home or be hired as maids. Although the illiteracy rate has decreased dramatically we have yet to solve the alarming dropout rate.

Q: (Pamela Beecroft, Center for International Private Enterprise) What are two or three approaches Morocco should take as it begins its road towards democracy?
A: (Benabdellah) Democracy goes hand in hand with education. We are stuck in a traditional paradigm which consists of employing new leaders based on their networking and money. Efforts are now being made to move beyond this and employ leaders based on their merit and knowledge. There needs to be a behavioral change. Authority figures need to serve the people. Also, universal values need to be implemented in the daily lives of Moroccans. The administration and the civil society need to work together. For example, the INDH fosters participation between people, local authorities, and elected leadership and has also introduced projects to lower the rate of unemployment. Lastly, accountability, assessment, and evaluation need to be implemented and enforced to maintain transparency.

Q: What is the relationship between the EU and Morocco in terms of trade and can it be extended to other facets?
A: (Benabdellah) Our partnership with the EU and the US is important; part of our progress is creating more openness with our partners. Despite the European crisis, Morocco maintained its resilience. Agreements between Morocco and the EU go beyond simple trade agreements with Morocco slowly integrating European norms. However, implementing EU political and financial standards tends to be complex and at times unfavorable.

Q: (Alvaro Ortega, Embassy of Spain) Can you assess the special commitment currently given to developing the North?
A: (Benabdellah) The current commitment to developing the North has some historical ties. Pre-independence, the only developed cities in Morocco were those located on the coast. Furthermore, each city had a specific function. For example, Rabat was the administrative city, Casablanca the fiscal hub, and Marrakesh the heart of tourism. Tangier was rich because it was an international city. However, when Morocco gained its independence, the city collapsed with the departure of 300 banks. For thirty to forty years, Tangier was forgotten. A road is currently being created from Tangier to Oujda. Citizens from Casablanca and Marrakesh are coming to work in Tangier, completing the comprehensive ecosystem of the “northern development” that is composed of education, transportation, communication, and technology. Due to the current crisis in Mali, investors are fearful of spillover effects and are thus hesitant to invest. However, Morocco is demonstrating its success in biodiversity, citing Argan oil in southern local industries, green energy in Ourzazate, and promising solar and wind power in Tantan.
Q: (Robert Holley, Moroccan American Center for Policy) What is the role of civil society in promoting cultural reform specifically for southern associations to become legitimate and independent?

A: (Benabdellah) The current associations are not playing the role we want them to. The government is being selective in accepting or rejecting associations, basing its decisions on what projects are being planned. Many of the NGOs that have historically opposed the government were the most vocal in the discussions we hosted, which is excellent because debate is part of democracy. There is a lack of standardization in rules and norms. Once these norms and rules are fixed, legitimacy can be established and respected by the authorities.

Q: (Robert Holley, Moroccan American Center for Policy) The absence of external partners and subsequently the lack of international resources directly impacts regional development in the south of Morocco. This being said, how can the government encourage external investment?

A: (Benabdellah) There is no international investment because there is no Moroccan investment. The government needs to create incentives that will in turn lead to an attractive market for investors. The current law states that associations cannot receive foreign money. An independent fund specific to aiding southern associations needs to be created to include training, capacity building, and mobility, which will then empower the people.

5. Observation

There were approximately 30 people in attendance from MAC, the German Marshall Fund, and DC-based think tanks and embassies. Benabdellah discussed both Morocco’s successes and failures in development and in democratic change in a very frank way. He did not avoid uncomfortable topics in his speech nor did he skirt uncomfortable questions from the audience. This speaks to the openness of his organization and other government bodies in Morocco who are working to implement the reforms established in the most recent constitution and bodes well for the legitimacy of the reform process. Experts like Benabdellah are excellent advocates for Morocco, as they highlight Morocco’s successes and challenges in a frank and credible way. Further visits by such experts will help tell Morocco’s story in the US.
March/April Events Bulletin

March 5
Dateline Egypt and North Africa: Updates from the Field

March 8
The Arab Awakening: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead

March 18
Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries - Can Partners Help?

March 20
Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat

March 28
Algeria Between Reform and Stability

April 8
Political Change and Security in North Africa

April 10
Morocco's Reforms - Stalled or In Process?

-----------------------------

Dateline Egypt and North Africa: Updates from the Field

Date: March 5, 2013

1. Title: Dateline Egypt and North Africa: Updates from the Field
   Hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

   Participants:
   Eric Trager: Next Generation Fellow, The Washington Institute
   Aaron Y. Zelin: Richard Borow Fellow, The Washington Institute
   David Pollock: Kaufman Fellow, The Washington Institute
   Robert Satloff: Executive Director, The Washington Institute

2. Overview

   As Secretary Kerry makes his inaugural Middle East trip, states across North Africa face rising tensions among the forces for democracy, stability, and Islamic political ascendancy. In Egypt and Tunisia, revolutions have given way to uncertainty and violence, while
Morocco’s model of stable reform - a monarch with an Islamist prime minister - tends to obscure other elements lurking just beneath the surface. To assess these changes and their consequences for the region and the United States, three Washington Institute fellows recently conducted intensive research trips to each of these countries, where they spoke frankly with a wide range of government officials, opposition leaders, security officers, and human rights activists, both secularist and fundamentalist. At this policy forum, the panelists discussed their findings.

3. Summary

Robert Satloff opened the forum by noting that the current political climate of North Africa is complex and that the various countries of the region all face very different issues. Egypt is struggling to tackle economic and political issues at the same time as restoring security and the rule of law. Moving west, Tunisia faces political uncertainty and the rise of a Salafist movement. Algeria is confronting insurgent terrorism and a security blowback from Mali. All the way to the west, Morocco endured the Arab Spring quietly, but there are subterranean political developments in course there. Each of the panelists addressed the country they visited on a recent trip to the region, with Eric Trager discussing Egypt, Aaron Zelin discussing Tunisia, and David Pollack discussing Morocco only, as he was not able (authorized?) to visit Algeria on this most recent occasion.

Eric Trager provided an assessment of the political players in Egypt, devoting most of his presentation to an analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s politics, policies, and power within the Egyptian system. He profiled emerging political leaders in the Brotherhood, as well as non-Islamist parties and actors. In closing, Trager noted several important factors for US policy going forward. First, he argued that Egypt will not be a major regional player for the time being given its own domestic issues. Second, the US must force the Muslim Brotherhood to make touch changes that would lead it to moderate its behavior now. Lastly, though mass upheaval is unlikely, the US must be monitor possible triggers for further instability.

Aaron Zelin characterized Tunisia as experiencing stagnation and polarization. It has failed to lived up to lofty expectations following its revolution and many of the problems that incited the revolution remain, particularly the continued issue of having more college graduates than available jobs. Zelin also noted that the perceived deterioration of security is very much present.

David Pollack discussed what he termed “the most interesting country in the region – Morocco.” For Pollack, Morocco is the most interesting because not much is happening there. He questioned how Morocco has managed to get through the Arab Spring without much upheaval, particularly since it is afflicted with many of the same development challenges as it neighbors, including poverty, high illiteracy rates, and high youth unemployment – perhaps indicating that its revolution is to come. He also questioned its role as a potential model, citing the arguments of observers, namely Ignatius and Zakaria, that the country is a model of how a monarch can lead his country through a gradual process of democratization. Pollack argued that neither view is right – Morocco is neither reforming nor is it ripe for revolution. It is a special case that entails a mixture of modest reforms and stability, for both the present and the future.

To support his assertions, Pollack addressed three themes: the status of the reforms, the status of the PJD and the Islamists, and potentially lessons learned from Morocco’s experience. In addressing the first, Pollack detailed the emergence of the February 20th movement and its protests against corruption. He stated that King Mohammed VI responded
immediately to these protests by pursuing reforms and a new Constitution that placed some limits on the King’s power. These reforms were followed by the election of a true opposition party for the first time in Moroccan history and a new government led by a Prime Minister that was not appointed by the King, but rather by the winning party, the PJD. These measures of reformed quieted the popular protests, but Pollack argued that they were less than meets the eye. In reality, the King and the palace control much of political and economic life. In addition, the PJD is a compliant party that is not a real Islamist party – the real Islamist party is the JCO. Pollack provided examples of what he perceived to be the King and the palace’s continued control of the country, citing the case of the list of corrupt officials being published as a faux attempt at reform, since there was no punishment for these officials and many of them still profit from political and economic favors from the palace. He also cited continued redlines on criticizing the King, referencing arrests and detentions of the King’s critics, as well as the palace’s practice of using political and economic power to keep political parties compliant.

Turning to the PJD, Pollack stated that the party is neither independent nor Islamist. During his stay in Morocco, he met with a senior minister in the PJD cabinet who reinforced this opinion when he noted that, “the PJD is not in government in order to confront the King, no to Islamize the country, which is already Muslim.” Pollack stressed that the Palace always wins when there is controversy between the PJD and the King. He referenced several examples to support this point: the PJD’s plan to have television programs only broadcast in Arabic, which was rejected by the Palace; the PJD’s plan for education reform, which was rejected by the Palace; and the PJD’s attempt to ban commercials about gambling, which the Palace only agreed to limit and not ban. The true Islamist party, according to Pollack, is thus the JCO – an important grassroots movement whose size observers can only estimate. Guesses vary from .5 to 1 million, with .5 million people attending the funeral of the former leader of the JCO Sheikh Yassine. While in Morocco, Pollack had the fortunate opportunity to meet with several JCO leaders – a rare occurrence for a secretive and banned, but tolerated organization. These leaders argued that Islam and democracy are incompatible in theory, but that there are ways to make them compatible in practice through gradual implementation, which the JCO can explore “when we come to power.”

Turning to the question of sharia, the JCO interlocutor stated that yes, the JCO wanted to implement true Islam and create a just society. He also stressed that sharia isn’t just about cutting off people’s hands as it is perceived in the West. He did say that ultimately, yes, the implementation of sharia is a priority, but only when a just society has been established (insinuating that there would be no need to cut off people’s hands for stealing because there would be no injustice and thus no need to steal). At that point in the interview, the interlocutor said to Pollack, “Why are you concerned with petty thieves when the biggest thief in the country – whether in Morocco or Saudi Arabia – is the King?” Pollack responded, “So do you want to cut off the King’s hand?” To which the JCO leader did not reply, noting instead that they want a different government, neither a phony PJD revolution nor the overthrow of the monarchy. The JCO is even accepting of Morocco under a real constitutional monarchy in which the King has no power and only a symbolic role. Based on this conversation, Pollack argued that Morocco is still repressive in many ways, despite some reform. He stressed that if the repression continues and the JCO continues to gain followers, there is the potential for a well-organized, fundamentalist revolution by the JCO.

Yet, despite this assertion, Pollack still believes that Morocco is stable and will remain so. Why? For one, the King is still personally popular and he maintains the advantage of being able to blame the government and his own entourage for anything that goes wrong. Moroccan citizens tend to do this as well, blaming the palace team for corruption. Second, the example of the Arab Spring two years later is not appealing to many Moroccans. The country has allowed a measure of reform which has assuaged some of the discontent and
provided a glimmer of hope for further reform. That said Pollack does not believe that there is anything Morocco can teach the Arab world. Morocco is special and the blend of the King’s personality, the fear of contagion, and modest reform is difficult to replicate.

Robert Satloff provided a concluding remark about the pace of change across the Maghreb, noting that in Egypt, Islamists have rushed to consolidate their power; in Tunisia, they have sought to stretch out the process; and in Morocco, Islamists have both stretched it out and remained deferent to traditional power structures, hoping eventually that power will land on their doorstep.

4. Q & A

Q: (Ralph Nurnburger) During your trip, were you able to get an assessment of the status of the Western Sahara or the security situation in the region?
A: (Pollack) You can’t talk to a Moroccan official without them mentioning the Western Sahara. It is part of the standard discourse. They reference the autonomy situation and note that although things aren’t perfect in the south, they are better than in the camps. This nationalist cause is helpful to the government and the palace in terms of domestic political security as it serves as a rallying cause, even though the status quo is tenable. Whenever there are protests, the King says the country must remain united for territorial sovereignty and it works. As for security, the spillover from the region has literally not touched Morocco. A recent report from Yonah Alexander notes zero attacks in 2012. It is a point of caution for Morocco and they want cooperation with their neighbors in confronting this challenge. They blame Algeria for blocking regional cooperation, just like Algeria blames Morocco.

Q: (Jennifer Lambert, US Department of State) What has been the impact of Sheikh Yassine’s death on JCO? What about the role of Nadia Yassine?
A: (Pollack) The JCO is very secretive and did not talk about internal issues with me – they were not prepared to talk about the impact of his death, which is still uncertain. Sheikh Yassine was charismatic and JCO lost that, but it has not led to splits in the movement, nor is there a new charismatic leader. Nadia was an effective spokesperson and her role as a woman was unique and unlike other Islamist organizations, perhaps as a testament to the strong Sufi traditions of the JCO. But, I think her star has faded with the death of her father – she owed her position to her father and for now has dropped from view.

Q: (Yonah Alexander) Could you provide your assessment of the impact of refugee flows on the security situation in the Sahel?
A: (Pollack) The refugee issue didn’t come up during my visit. Morocco is intent on securing its borders and it does that effectively – it has a very large security apparatus. There don’t appear to be big population flows throughout the country.

5. Observation

Approximately 30 think tank experts and WINEP patrons attended the event and another 50 participants watched online. While Morocco was discussed in detail, David Pollack was highly skeptical of Morocco’s reform process and its potential as a model. He used the term “makhzan” throughout his presentation when referring to the power structure in the palace. It is clear that he primarily met with the PJD and the JCO during his visit to Morocco, thus skewing his perceptions. Bizarrely, Pollack seemed to be pushing for a real Islamist party to come to power, as if Morocco could only reform under the leadership of an Islamist party, like Egypt and Tunisia are trying to do. Given the negative outcomes, at least so far, in those countries, this was a surprising stance to take, particularly for an organization like WINEP which had tended to provide more positive assessments of Morocco and has a pretty
anti-Islamist bent. Pollack also provided no alternatives to Morocco’s current path of reform, only observations, thus limiting the usefulness of his assessments. MAC should nevertheless reach out to Pollack and WINEP to provide them briefings and information on reform.

(Back to top)

The Arab Awakening: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead

Date: March 8, 2013

1. Title: The Arab Awakening: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead
   Hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center Middle East Program

   Participants
   Rami G. Khouri: Director, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut
   Robin Wright: Wilson Center-USIP Distinguished Scholar
   Haleh Esfandiari: Moderator: Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center

2. Overview

   This event provided a brief overview of some preliminary conclusions that scholars have made on the state of Arab democracy two years after the Arab Awakening, as well as some of their predictions for the future. Both speakers presented their analyses of the Arab Awakenings, the current status of the major players and issues, and some thoughts on trends that are emerging.

3. Summary

   Khouri identified eight trends of the Arab Awakening.

   1. There is a clear set of grievances common to all of the uprisings that are expressed in different ways. These grievances are a combination of calls for political rights and for “material needs” (jobs and economic opportunities), and understanding the balance of these two categories is crucial to understanding the uprisings in any one country. Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia is an example of how a lack of political rights and material needs sparked revolution; Bouazizi’s sole means of subsistence was destroyed, and then he was denied political recourse. According to Khouri, it will be important to pay attention to protests in Kuwait; if we can identify what grievances have sparked protests in a largely homogenous, wealthy country, then we will be better-able to understand the motivations behind protests in other Arab countries.
   2. The intensity and depth of the sentiments driving these protests are far beyond what we initially thought; it goes far beyond “breaking the barrier of fear.” That is, these revolutions aren’t simply about Arab populations overcoming the activation barrier of airing their grievances with the government in public; rather, they are fueled by deep-seated discontent with the old regimes and passion for democratic change.
   3. In spite of these general commonalities in motivation, there are tremendous differences in the types of protests we see and the levels of government response. This is attributable to the disparities in regime type and government legitimacy between the different Arab states.
4. The technical logistics of democratic transitions, such as constitution-writing and institution-building, are much more important than elections; agreeing on a set of laws governing the country is crucial in transitioning from a one-party autocracy or a monarchy to an elected democracy.

5. It is easy to either exaggerate or underestimate the role of religion and Islamist parties, but we should be careful to do neither. Religiosity, or lack thereof, will be an important factor to take into account in the construction of post-revolutionary identity in these nascent democracies; it is entirely possible that, when a strong Arab democracy emerges, it will have a degree of religiosity in its governing structure. We must be cognizant of this and its potential implications, including the potential for the majority religious identity to infringe upon the rights of religious minorities (such as the Copts in Egypt). However, it is becoming clear that Islamist parties and candidates in countries such as Egypt are beginning to lose their popularity; in recent polls Mohammed Morsi only garnered 25% of popular support, whereas before he had 50%. Furthermore, Islamist parties such as Ennahda appear to be fracturing. In sum, Muslim religiosity may play a larger role in the new Middle Eastern democracy than it does in Western society, but in the end Islamists are like any other politicians and are susceptible to public disapproval for failing to effectively govern.

6. We must be patient with these nascent democratic institutions, because it is clear that none of the actors involved in these democratic transitions have any experience in elected, accountable democratic governance. It is simply too soon for us to say that, in light of recent violence in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, the Arab Awakening has failed.

7. One significant shift that we have seen since the beginning of the Arab Awakening is that the citizenry of these countries are no longer content to live under autocratic government. The populations of these countries expect government accountability and are willing to change the government if need be.

8. Returning to the issue of material rights versus political rights, it is clear that, while material rights have driven the protests at a grassroots level, the true issues underlying the popular revolutions are political rights and social justice. The evidence for this is the fact that people in the MENA region have been voicing discontent on such critical issues as dignity, respect, justice, and political participation for the past five years.

Khoury concluded his discussion by stating that, in order to understand the Arab Awakening and its aftermath, we must keep in mind the “5 R’s”: (citizen) revolt, rights, respect, reconfiguration, and re-legitimization. While there have been obvious growing pains in the establishment of elected democracies in the post-Arab Awakening states, the problems inherent in this transition are vastly overwhelmed by the fact that now, for the first time after decades of autocracy, there are millions of Arabs who are writing constitutions.

Wright began by noting that we should not judge the Arab Awakening a failure based solely upon political strife in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, because there is a distinction between the politics of change and the culture of change. While true political change may be stalled, democratic change has become an inexorable part of popular culture in these countries, and is unlikely to disappear. She then presented her own list of significant political trends of the Arab Awakening:

1. There are now 120 million Arabs who have been empowered by democratic revolution. Wright expects that each of the 22 Arab regimes will be challenged. However, more people in the Arab world are afraid of democratic change now than two years ago, due to a number of factors, including political and social turmoil, the unpredictability and violence of reform, the lack of effective political managers,
the lack of a defined, effective new order emerging to fill the power vacuum. This is why the constitution-writing process will be crucial to effective democratic transition in each of these states.

2. Almost every Arab country is worse off, economically speaking, than it was two years ago. While many Arabs in the MENA region have far more freedoms, there are far fewer jobs. No country, not even those who have not seen democratic revolution, is immune to this economic turmoil.

3. The so-called “proliferation of democracy” has negative consequences. It has resulted in the creation of far too many political parties; for example, in Libya 130 parties ran for 80 seats in the legislature. This proliferation is the result of many different political opinions and a lack of willingness on the part of legislative hopefuls to pool their resources and collaborate to affect the kind of change that they can agree upon. This not only weakens candidates, but the democratic process as a whole.

4. Far from being a monolithic group, Islamists exist on a spectrum. Despite the conventional wisdom that political strife in nascent Arab democracies exists largely in an Islamist versus secularist dichotomy, there are deepening divisions between different Islamist parties and within Islamist parties. On the extreme end of the spectrum, the Salafists have influence disproportionate with their numbers, because they still have the kind of energy, focus, and discipline that even the Muslim Brotherhood no longer has.

5. With the proliferation of arms and militias in countries such as Libya, Syria, and Egypt, the security situation in the region is deteriorating.

6. Local tribes have re-emerged as the primary source of identity where modern nation-states have failed. This is especially prevalent in Libya, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria.

7. Nascent democracies in the MENA region will have to accept the demographic realities of their populations: these populations are overwhelmingly young, and these young people expect healthcare, jobs, and education from the governments that they put into power.

8. Corruption is already running rampant in new Arab democracies because everyone in the new administrations feels entitled to a piece of the proverbial pie.

9. Women have fared very poorly in terms of political pull, seats in parliament, and basic security.

10. Sykes-Picot – and the maintenance of current borders - may not survive this political unrest. Wright was confident that the boundaries of some countries, Iraq in particular, are liable to change.

4. Q & A

**Q:** (Joshua Policek, Department of State Office of Global Women’s Issues) Do the issues we’ve seen with regard to the status of women in these countries represent the failure of modernism and equality in these countries?

**A:** (Wright) I’m not sure that we can say this is the failure of modernism. Women have been a driver of change in this region, especially as women’s literacy increases. However, these ascendant women are confronted with the very real challenges of latent patriarchal tradition and tribalism. Also, it has only been two years since the Arab Awakening began; it is too early to state with any confidence that modernism has failed.

(Khoury) We cannot say that this represents the breakdown of the modern nation-state in the Arab world, because, frankly, the Arab world has never before had modern nation-states. These states are still tackling questions of basic governance and constitution-writing, and in these patriarchal societies that lack a strong women’s movement it follows that women’s rights will be put on the back-burner until the issues of state formation have been dealt with. It will take time for women to have their voices heard, but we cannot
categorically call this a failure. However, there have been some encouraging developments, such as the push to address equality of the sexes in Tunisia.

Q: (Jane Harman, Woodrow Wilson Center) How much of a role will anti-Zionism play in these transitions? Is Israel even relevant?
A: (Wright) Israel is never irrelevant. Arab governments in trouble will always use Israel as a diversionary tactic. While we have not yet seen much of this yet, and in fact the Egyptian government went as far as to openly collaborate with Israel on security issues in the Sinai Peninsula, it is only a matter of time.

(Khouri) The issue of Israel/Palestine is enormously important to people around the region, who by and large strongly support Palestinian rights. While the Israeli-Arab conflict has not played into the Arab Awakening protests, there appears to be a connection between the sense that these authoritarian Arab regimes lack legitimacy and the humiliation felt by Arab populations over their governments being unable to stand up to Israel and the United States. Furthermore, these populations are worried that support for Israel will become the metric by which the US and other major powers judge the legitimacy of democratically elected Arab governments.

Q: Will Sunni/Shia sectarianism replace the Israeli-Arab conflict in political significance?
A: (Khouri) I believe the sectarian divide is greatly exaggerated; we were never concerned with sectarianism until the US invaded Iraq. While there has been sectarian violence, which has made sectarianism front-page news, this does not constitute a major, long-term issue in the MENA region. If anything, the root of this violence is more closely tied to issues of tribalism, and not sectarianism.

(Wright) I have to disagree; my great fear is that sectarianism could define the region more and more in the years to come, especially with respect to alliances with Iran. For example, Saudi Arabia supports Western economic intervention in Iran (via sanctions), and would support US military intervention in Iran; I fear that this is fueled by the so-called “guardians” of Sunni Islam wanting to attack the center of Shia power.

Q: (John Anderson, former Foreign Service Officer) What might the form and shape of democratic transition in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf look like?
A: (Khouri) The difference in the Gulf is that there are no anti-monarch revolutionary pressures to speak of; that is, the people are more interested in reform than overthrowing the regime, similar to the situation we see in Morocco. There are small movements in Saudi Arabia to open up and liberalize the country, and this will result in a very slow movement towards liberalization. It is possible that we may see a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia in the future.

5. Observation

The event was attended by approximately 40 people, a mix of policy professionals, students, and casual observers. In my opinion, the panelists did not have enough time to fully flesh out the observations that they made, so it is difficult to pull meaningful conclusions from the speeches, either specifically in relation to Morocco or in general. Essentially, Wright and Khouri came to the same general conclusion: It is too soon to tell whether or not these revolutions have been successful, and with some qualifications, we may be cautiously optimistic about their eventual outcomes. One thing I found notable in relation to Morocco was that they both emphasized the importance of constitution-writing; this presents an opportunity for MAC to highlight the progressiveness of Morocco’s new constitution. While there have been some hiccups in its implementation, Morocco having a new constitution that protects human and civil rights can be presented as an evidence that the country’s gradual democratic transition is a model for the rest of the Arab world.
Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries - Can Partners Help?

Date: March 18, 2013

1. Title: Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries - Can Partners Help?
   Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Participants:
- Marwan Muasher: Vice President of Studies, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Ibrahim Saif: Senior Associate, Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Jean-Pierre Chauffour: Lead Country Economist, Morocco; Regional Trade Coordinator in the Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank
- Nemat Shafik: Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
- Uri Dadush: Moderator: Senior Associate and Director, International Economic Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

2. Overview

More than two years after the outbreak of pro-reform revolutions in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the economic situation in the region remains precarious. Progress in restoring confidence as well as sustainable and rapid economic growth will depend on internal forces and the return of political stability. External partners may also play a role in helping normalize and eventually improve the underlying growth fundamentals of these economies. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel discussion that both examined economic and political reforms within the region and assessed the degree to which external partners could play in addressing the challenges Arab governments face as they transition to democracy.

3. Summary

Nemat Shafik believes that the future of the region will be determined largely by domestic forces with little external aid. She also made note of the commonalities between the nations: a decline in economic growth, an increase in unemployment, high economic expectations, stretched government budgets, a decline in currency reserves, and a lack of a serious internal plan. She emphasized that the last similarity is particularly hindering due to the government’s “lack of a destination point” on both an economic and political front.

Despite the lack of a macroeconomic crisis, Shafik believes that the overall outlook of each country is nowhere near positive. The shaky international markets and spillover effect from the civil war in Syria are factors threatening the stability of the region. She stated that there are five reforms that need to be implemented immediately: a transition from rent seeking to actual capitalism, increased exports, reform of the labor market (to include women) and education, increased bank financing, and moving from untargeted subsidies to safety nets, which simultaneously creates space for investment. She concluded that the involvement of external partners, although important, should be limited and urged the creation of institutions that will enable a separation of powers, transparency, and competitiveness.
Jean-Pierre Chauffour reiterated the need to “stick to one direction”. He pointed out that political reforms go hand in hand with the current economic situation. Chauffour called for immediate economic integration with European markets. In order for this to occur, according to Chauffour, Europe needs to rebuild its credibility in five ways. Primarily, it needs to facilitate market access for imported products. This has already been achieved with Morocco, but can be done with other countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. In addition, encouraging labor mobility, promoting solar exports, improving the regulatory environment, and fostering overall closer economic relationships with the Mediterranean are other ways Europe can demonstrate its commitment.

Marwan Muasher echoed the need to establish institutions. Muasher is frustrated that Middle Eastern policymakers continue to attempt to isolate political from economic reforms. He noted that the solution is simple and “so self-evident”; economic and political reform must go hand in hand. Muasher reminded the audience that change takes time and that the current status of the Egyptian economy, although dire, is much better than it was during the 1980s. He argued that the bad economic conditions might actually be a blessing in disguise for countries in the region that have not foregone a democratic transition because it will force those governments to open their political space to outside forces. According to Muasher, the solution resides in detail-orientated, inclusive, measurable plans that include performance indexes and specific timeframes that center on unemployment and the fiscal deficit.

Ibrahim Saif focused on how conditions for social justice could be created, reached, and enabled. He reminded the audience that the Arab Spring began with the economic demands. Saif believes that the root problem is political identity and polarization. Specifically, economic forces are still driven by political connections and networking. Saif cited Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia as examples of such dynamics. Furthermore, he underscored that weak and inefficient bureaucracies have led civilians to turn their backs on the process of reform. Another aggravation is the lack of capacity from the private sector. Saif concluded that domestic markets must be reconstructed, formal institutions must be established, open dialogue with unions must be created, and budget priorities on how to spend public money must be defined.

4. Q & A

Q: (Uri Dadush) Is there a difference between the Gulf and Maghreb countries?
A: (Muasher) The region’s governments are split between two camps. Countries that are in the midst of reform like Egypt and Tunisia or those like the Gulf monarchies whose governments believe that they are immune to the demands for reform. The latter have failed to internalize the message of reform.

Q: (Mohammed Schenaou) What kind of considerations are constraining the IMF from doing more to address the region’s economic challenges?
A: (Shafik) The IMF does not envision itself as the sole provider for all the necessary financing to encourage growth. In fact, the IMF relies heavily on individual pledges from European partners.

Q: (Mohamed Mensouri, American University) How can countries engage their society?
A: (Chauffour) What we do is try to complement the IMF. The populace has great expectations. Countries need to try to promote dialogue by advocating education, women’s participation, transparency, citizen participation in politics, and the strengthening of Parliaments.
Q: (Ed Miker, advisor to the government of Oman) Is there evidence of short term gains that could serve as an inspiration for long term gains?

A: (Muasher) I don’t believe in short term gains. Earlier, people knew that sacrifices needed to be made in order to pursue democracy. Now, however, people feel like they are sacrificing for nothing because they do not believe that their governments are serious about reform. Also their ability to sacrifice is limited.

(Shafik) I believe that freedom is a short term gain; people can stand up and speak their mind. Signals of support from the international community also mean a lot.

(Chauffour) The short term gains are few low hanging fruits. A short term gain that could have some very short term results would be moving away from rent seeking to capitalism. Another short term problem that is easily fixable is reopening the border between Morocco and Algeria, which has been inhibiting them from trading and information sharing.

5. Observation

This event attended by approximately 75 individuals, composed primarily of college students and regional experts, in addition to a few officials from regional embassies. Jean-Pierre Chauffour is the lead country economist for Morocco and regional trade coordinator in the Middle East and North Africa Region for the World Bank, so it could be useful to cultivate a relationship with him. He was also the only panelist to highlight Morocco’s successful relationship with Europe and that the reopening the border between Morocco and Algeria will be highly beneficial. However, the insight provided by the panelists was nothing new; all reiterated the need for the establishment of clear domestic plans and that reform was time-sensitive.

For a complete recording of the event, please visit:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/18/economic-turmoil-in-arab-countries-can-partners-help/fn0v

Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat

Date: March 20, 2013

1. Title: Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat
Hosted by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Participants
Jane Harman: Director, President, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Former Member, US House of Representatives)
Michael E. Leiter: Senior Counselor to the Chief Executive, Officer, Palantir Technologies (Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center)
Kenneth L. Wainstein: Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism)

2. Overview
This hearing was convened for the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to hear testimony on how the US can update its counterterrorism policies in response to an evolving terrorist threat, namely the move from a centralized al-Qaeda with a powerful and well-funded core to a loosely connected network of al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations. Harman emphasized the importance of moving away from the use of kinetic power and towards combating the narrative that the US is at war with Islam. Leiter focused on redirecting US focus in reacting to terrorist threats toward intelligently addressing them. Wainstein focused on giving US counterterrorism programs more legitimacy by bringing them under congressional oversight.

3. Summary

Senators Menendez (D-NJ) and Corker (R-TN) opened the hearing with a few observations on the changes that we have seen in the past few years in the nature of global terrorism. Menendez noted, as would every other speaker in the course of the hearing, that while we have significantly degraded the central organization of al-Qaeda, the emergence of a decentralized al-Qaeda presents new challenges going forward. Loosely connected al-Qaeda affiliates use the weakened core organization for funding and support while pursuing their own regional goals. Of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has emerged as the biggest threat to the US homeland. Given this shift, Menendez concluded, the most pressing question of this hearing is how do we address these new terrorist threats? Senator Corker agreed with Senator Menendez and added that recent violence in North and West Africa at the hands of al-Qaeda affiliates makes this hearing especially timely. He stressed that the United States needs to evolve its counterterrorism strategy to respond to the evolution in the global terrorism threat. He made three observations on how we must change our counterterrorism strategy. First, any new strategy must be mindful of the shift in al-Qaeda structure from a centralized organization to one with several nodes around the world. Second, given this plurality of nodes, any new counterterrorism strategy must involve cooperation with our foreign allies. Third, going forward Congress should play a more active role in authorizing the use of force.

Harman began by stating that while many of our tactics have been helpful in fighting the war on terror since 2001, many are proving to be counter-productive, and in a broader sense our strategy is all wrong. We have yet to develop a "positive-sum roadmap" for the way forward - a narrative of what goals we want to achieve and how we are going to achieve them. This is crucial particularly because the terrorist threat has evolved; while our tactics, primarily the deployment of kinetic force, have helped to destroy the core of al-Qaeda, and we now face the new threat of a more horizontal organization. If anything, this more decentralized al-Qaeda entity is strengthened by our use of kinetic force in the Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central Asia, because our use of kinetic force, especially drone strikes, is supporting the proliferation of the al-Qaeda narrative that the United States is at war with Islam and with Muslims, not at war with terrorism. In order to choke off the power of this narrative, we need to win hearts and minds; in other words, we have to win the argument. She presented five recommendations to change our approach to the war on terror to not continue to alienate the Muslim world. The first is to stop our piecemeal counterterrorism reactions to terrorist attacks. We need to come up with an integrated government counterterrorism policy. In addition, we need to provide more support to the Department of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism, which is the most important body in implementing our non-kinetic counterterrorism strategy. The second recommendation is that we make smarter investments with regards to our foreign aid expenditures. We must carefully analyze the foreign aid budgets and find ways to plus up funds to the countries that need it most and resist funding for so-called “flavor of the month” countries. The third
recommendation is that we live our morals. Such objectionable tactics as rendition, “enhanced interrogation”, and targeted killings are not helping us win the argument. In her words, playing whack-a-mole with our enemies does nothing to counter the narrative that we are at war with Islam. The fourth recommendation is that we reduce the over-classification of intelligence. Far too much of our intelligence is classified, and this is keeping our policy makers from seeing the bigger picture. The final recommendation is that we “drain the swamp”, or cut off the recruitment pipeline at its source. The way to do this, in addition to refuting the narrative that the US is at war with Islam, is to push reform in authoritarian Muslim governments.

Leiter began with assessing US security vis-à-vis global terror and what we should now focus on given that reality. The United States is in a better position to detect and disrupt a catastrophic attack like 9/11 than it ever has been. As such, we should not read too much into recent events such as the attacks in Benghazi and Algeria, and the proliferation of AQIM. While these events do have implications for our interests abroad, they do not constitute direct threats to the homeland, and we should not treat them as such. He identified terrorism in North Africa, the conflict in Syria, and Hizbullah as regional threats that we need to keep a closer eye on, because all three of these are growing problems that clearly threaten regional stability. However, there are some roadblocks to paying appropriate attention to and taking appropriate action on these regional threats. The first issue is so-called “terrorism fatigue.” In short, international terrorism has been at the forefront of the national dialogue for the past ten years and Americans are getting tired of talking about it. The second issue is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The US and the international community at large need to secure the stock of nuclear materials and work to prevent the creation of improvised nuclear devices and complex bioterrorism attacks. The third issue is the weakening of the counterterrorism infrastructure. Leiter is concerned that we do not properly contextualize the significance of terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks are a fact of life today, and yet, as with the 9/11 attack in Benghazi, we tend to treat every terrorist attack as a systemic failure on the part of our counterterrorism infrastructure. This will only result in driving the smart people we need away from a career in counterterrorism and alienate our overseas partners in counterterrorism. The final issue is remaining on the offense on all fronts of this battle. The focus on the kinetic use of force has sapped focus from what we need to do in order to drain the swamp. We must expand our efforts on soft power. Leiter concluded by noting the cost of the war on terror over the past decade - in twelve years we have poured $100 billion into this effort, and we have not reaped proportional benefits. We need to take a more logical approach to this and employ mission-focused budgeting.

Wainstein’s testimony only added marginally to the others’ presentations. He began by stating that since 9/11 we have made enormous efforts to build and reorganize our counterterrorism infrastructure to address the threat that al-Qaeda has posed. While this succeeded in improving our readiness for another 9/11-style attack from a strong, centralized al-Qaeda, this type of threat doesn’t exist anymore. Instead, a decentralized al-Qaeda threatens our interests by threatening regional stability in the Middle East, North Africa, and South/Central Asia. Thus, we must reevaluate our counterterrorism programs once again. He warned that, in doing this, we must not allow the executive branch to have unilateral power. The executive branch cannot police itself. Congress needs to be more involved; this will provide our counterterrorism strategy a level of legitimacy that unilateral executive action cannot. He had two recommendations for Congress in this endeavor: any legislation passed must both be cognizant of the executive’s need to make quick decisions, and it must provide flexibility in our counterterrorism capabilities.
4. Q & A

Q: (Menendez, D-NJ) Most of the government’s most significant counterterrorism actions take place at the strategic level. Have we done enough to cut the recruitment pipeline or discredit al-Qaeda’s jihadist narrative?
A: (Harman) This is precisely what I was talking about - we need to win the argument in order to win the war. Our current “drone-centric” foreign policy is not only inefficient, it actually weakens our position in the diplomatic battle that is crucial to ensuring our own security. What we can do with our kinetic tactics, in addition to expanding public diplomacy, is to devise a strict legal framework around our use of drones and put the use of drones under the purview of FISA. A rules-based drone program will help us in winning the argument.

Q: (Menendez) At the end of the day, having rules for when we strike won't win hearts and minds; we need to be able to help populations on the ground. Shouldn't our policy consider other things?
A: (Leiter) The simple answer is yes. In my view, soft power has been woefully under-funded and under-focused for two main reasons. One, it is much easier to get funding for programs that bring business to Representatives’ home districts, as opposed to funding for an army of diplomats in the basement of the State Department. And two, it is easier and quicker to see results (or at least changes) when we undertake kinetic tactics. What can we do about this? One thing we can do is reallocate funds to the Departments of State and Homeland Security; the Department of Defense tends to be the worst representative of our government to communicate the message that we are not at war with Islam. In addition, we need to maintain foreign aid and rule of law programs; this will be especially crucial in the developing stages of new Arab democracies in the wake of the Arab Spring. It is important for us to remember: the Arab Spring protests were driven by local populations calling for modern democracy, not al-Qaeda.
(Wainstein) The Arab Spring has proven to be a trade-off. We have lost some tactical partners in the war on terror, but if the Arab Spring is the way to improve the condition of the people in these countries, then it’s a counterterrorism win for us. We need to solidify the partnerships we do have in the region, before al-Qaeda gains more of a foothold in these new democracies.

Q: (Corker, R-TN) Let’s go back to the legal case. The decimation of the core of al-Qaeda makes it much harder for us to tie these peripheral groups back to the authorization for the use of force that we signed on September 18, 2001.
A: (Harman) I would like to emphasize that absolutely no one who voted for this authorization in 2001 believed that it would last until now; we thought this would be a temporary authorization. We absolutely cannot continue to approach the “war on terror” using this framework. As I said before, it is crucial that we win the argument, and we can do this with a whole of government approach to counterterrorism, smarter investments, and by living our values.

Q: (Corker) In that case, I believe that this defense authorization needs to be updated. What are some of the characteristics of an updated defense authorization that would differ from the one we put in place on September 18, 2001?
A: (Leiter) The last AUMF is, at the same time, too broad, too narrow, and too vague; it is difficult to look at it and say how it would apply to some of these newer terrorist organizations that are gaining power.
(Wainstein) Until now, the executive branch has been able to shoehorn its actions into the AUMF. Putting this under the purview of Congress will lend legitimacy to the process.
(Harman) I’m not sure that Congress should give a blanket authorization for the use of force, but yes, Congress’ role in oversight and legislating needs to be much more assertive than it has been in the past 12 years. Also, calling this a “war on terror” is not helping; terror is a tactic, not an enemy.

Q: (Murphy, D-CT) You talked about winning with actions, not just words, so I have a question about how actions we take here factor in abroad. We’ve seen a pretty remarkable increase in anti-Islam behavior here in the past five years. Ms. Harman, how much does this matter in winning the argument?
A: (Harman) This actually matters a lot. Our record is mixed on Islamophobia; we have made some serious missteps, but we have seen some outreach to Muslim communities on the part of local police forces, such as what we have seen in Los Angeles. We should encourage this; more of this outreach will make it more attractive for members of the Muslim community to turn in people who may be turning towards extremism, but who have clean police records and otherwise operate under the radar. In a broader sense, projecting tolerance must be a big part of the counterterrorism approach. Let’s remember, more Muslims have been the target of al-Qaeda attacks than have non-Muslims.

(Leiter) What is important here is that Islamophobia in the US undermines the willingness of the American Muslim community to address the Muslim community abroad in order to fight the narrative that the US is at war with Islam. When they see Islamophobia here, they’re less likely to stand up and say that America is a good place to be Muslim.

Q: (Kaine, D-VA) The narrative does not have to be won by us, necessarily; it can be won by another country that shows that terrorism isn’t the way to success. The salient examples here are Morocco and Turkey. Turkey, in particular, is a strong Muslim nation with a growing GDP and can serve as an alternative success model.
A: (Harman) I strongly agree with you. There is a big opportunity for us in this right now, especially given the strong relationship between President Obama and PM Erdogan. By and large, Turkey offers a moderate model of an Islamist society; Islamists are not necessarily bad, but terrorists are.
(Leiter) The US has a good track record with this type of partnership, as in Indonesia and Jordan. In places like Libya and Egypt, we have to use our foreign aid that makes them walk the right path, but we have to take a sophisticated look of who is in this government and how we can work with them. Just looking superficially at what groups are in power and saying we can’t work with them because they are Islamist will be akin to cutting off our nose to spite our face.

Q: (Menendez) What do you envision as the elements of “draining the swamp”? What are the partnerships that have worked particularly well and what partnerships have we not tapped that we should tap?
A: (Harman) I think we need to focus on public-private partnerships. The private sector has the tools and the agility to make an impact that the public sector simply does not. In particular, the private sector and the NGO community are uniquely equipped to fight illiteracy in these countries, which is a major factor in terrorist recruitment.
(Leiter) We need to do a better job of engaging the American Muslim community and we have to accept that what the US says about Islam on a global basis is generally dismissed; we are not a credible speaker on this subject. We need to empower moderate voices abroad that can counter al-Qaeda’s message. Something that has worked well for us in the past is disaster relief - it shows a non-military face, depicts us as humanitarians, and has been incredibly effective. We need to use our partnerships and empower other voices abroad to help us show that al-Qaeda has a bankrupt ideology and that there is an alternative way to protect Islam.
5. Observation

This hearing was not especially well-attended, likely because it convened considerably later than previously expected, due to voting in the Senate. MAC can capitalize on was the testimony asserting that the US should strengthen its partnerships with moderate Muslim states and hold them up as examples for the rest of the Muslim world; Morocco is a pretty clear example of this. It is interesting to consider if MAC can be useful in promoting voices in the Moroccan American community to speak out on this issue as an antidote to those charging the US with Islamophobia. Given that Harman and Leiter both alluded to the needed to reach out to the Muslim-American community, MAC should maintain its relationship with Harman and reach out to Leiter.

(Back to top)
Bouteflika’s fall would be insignificant. Regardless of Bouteflika’s departure the military will maintain significant power. Fourth, protestors demands are provincial-specific and thus lack the wider appeal that inspires national protests - there have been protests, but none have largely regional events. Fifth, the Algerian government has been able to suppress, buy off, and/or discredit small groups of protestors. Finally, the impact of the 2010-2011 elections gave legitimacy to the current government. According to Dr. Zartman,, these elections were seen as free and fair, giving Bouteflika’s government a certain amount of democratic legitimacy. Also, both the National Rally for Democracy (RND) and the National Liberation Front (FLN) have seen gains, whilst the Islamist parties have become irrelevant. Nevertheless, Dr. Zartman concluded with a warning, : if President Bouteflika goes back on his word and runs for President or if the newly elected President is an older-generation RND or FLN affiliate, this could cause an uproar.

Eammon Gearon noted that after 132 years under French occupation, the atrocious civil war that led to Algeria’s independence simultaneously created Salafi jihad extremists. These extremists created the basis for the emergence of AQIM. According to Gearon, Algeria has faced more violence than any other nation in the region, which contributes to its need for a robust military role that provides consistent stability. Being a colony for over a century has lead to much resentment and deep rooted skepticism of foreigners.

Gearon explained that although these small extremist groups linked to AQIM are aiming to spread fear and instability throughout the region, they do not want to govern the nation, especially in such troublesome times. He elaborated that these terrorist organizations profit from acts of kidnapping and ransom, citing the In Aminas oil platform incident as an example. Gearon noted that such incidents promote the success of AQIM’s mission to spread terror. Due to this success, Gearon concluded that Algeria’s security situation will most likely get worse before it gets better. Gearon also warned the Algerian government to wean itself from its dependency on its hydrocarbon industry, which has in the past suffered major drops in price, directly affecting the country’s stability.

4. Q & A

Q: (Lawrence Freeman, African Desk Arab Magazine) What is the relationship between Algeria and Morocco?
A: (Zartman) There is a long-standing rivalry between Algeria and Morocco. Algeria fears AQIM and anti-Algerian groups located in the North Atlas Mountains of Morocco. Furthermore, Algeria is keen on uniting North African states whilst keeping Morocco ostracized. For example, in the 1980s Algeria called for security cooperation with Sahel countries and pointedly left out Morocco.

Q: (Michelle Payn, POMED) What is the percentage of youth unemployment in Algeria and why is it so high?
A: (Gearon) Overall unemployment is at 10%. However, when looking at individuals younger than 25 years old, the percentage rises to 25-30%. Algeria, like Libya, depends on its hydrocarbon industry, which relies on foreign workers and machines. Algeria does not have an economy, but a savings account.

Q: (Former Ambassador to Italy) What efforts are being made to diversify Algeria’s economy?
A: (Gearon) With the increase in the price of oil, there is a lack of desire and drive to diversify the economy.
Although a downward trend in oil prices may put pressure on the government to diversify, there is currently no political will to expand the Algerian economy beyond oil exploration.

Q: (Gare Smith, lawyer) What is the best security approach? Can education be included?
A: (Gearon) One that encompasses the three following aspects: having a robust amount of military equipment, recognizing and discussing social issues, and diversifying the economy.
(Zartman) Education is not even a fish in the water. Building schools is not going to make a dent. I would like to extend Mr. Gearon’s answer by adding one other aspect. AQIM has never attacked an oil facility until now, securing oil facilities is now a number one priority. Although AQIM planned to make a fire and attract attention, their original plan did not constitute of killing hostages; this only occurred due to the government’s intervention.

5. Observation

This event was mainly attended by students, former and current ambassadors, and a couple of reporters. There were around 30 attendees. Due to his extensive knowledge and background on the security and politics of the Sahara, Eamonn Gearon could be quite useful for MACP. Although he has not been explicit on his stance on the issue of Western Sahara, he wrote a book titled The Sahara: A Cultural History. Labeling Algeria’s economy as a savings account was also a unique and intriguing perspective. Dr. Zartman provided interesting insight on the domestic factors that have saved Algeria from succumbing to a revolution. He also believes that Algeria is purposefully leaving Morocco in the dark, inhibiting the possibility of a bilateral relationship.


Political Change and Security in North Africa

Date: April 8, 2013

1. Title: Political Change and Security in North Africa
   Hosted by McDaniel College and CNA Strategic Studies

   Participants:

   Panel 1:
   **Marina Ottaway**: Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
   **Monica Marks**: Rhodes Scholar, Tunisia
   **Jason Ullner**: Former Algeria Desk Officer, US Department of State
   **Anouar Boukhars**: Moderator: Assistant Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College

   Panel 2:
   **Fernando Reinares**: Senior Researcher, International Terrorism, Real Instituto Elcano (Madrid, Spain)
   **Fred Wehrey**: Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
2. Overview

The countries of North Africa have experienced considerable political and social upheaval over the past two years. However, concurrently, violent extremist networks and criminal organizations have grown and are expanding their operations throughout the region. This conference explored the range and scale of challenges that confront the states of North Africa, the United States, and the international community with the aim of identifying policy options for the future.

3. Summary

Panel 1: Response and Strategies of Regimes and Political Parties

Anouar Boukhars opened by detailing the questions the panelists sought to address, namely: how have existing regimes adjusted to the new political landscape? What is the status of political and economic reform efforts? Are Islamist parties who assumed power gaining or losing popularity? What are the political, cultural, and economic cleavages that drive and shape events on the ground? Is the pessimism about the prospects of the Arab Spring misplaced? What are US interests in the region?

Boukhars provided the context for answering these questions with a brief overview of the political situation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. He noted that two years after the Arab Spring, the fate of democracy is unclear in North Africa. Morocco is the only country that experienced a peaceful transition, but the question remains whether or not the reform process there represents a true third way or merely a cosmetic shift that leaves the country ripe for revolution. Per Boukhars, neither of those characterizations is right, but it is nevertheless too early to tell the outcome of political reform in Morocco. In Tunisia, insecurity, deepening political polarization, and ideological extremism continue to plague the country and inhibit progress on political reform. Algeria has weathered popular upheavals and the opposition remains weak, but there have only been limited reforms and the government has used money to limit dissent. Nonetheless, the issue of President Bouteflika’s successor presents potential complications for the future.

Marina Ottaway spoke about political reform in Morocco, a country she visited in late March – her third visit there since the start of the Arab Spring. Ottaway noted that she was struck by how little change had taken place in the country. She observed that people’s debates and political discussions remained the same as when she was there in June 2012. For example, at that time reforms to the press code was about to be published. In March 2013, it was still about to published. The same applied to subsidy reform. Despite this observation, Ottaway
argued that the reform is more than just cosmetic in Morocco. The question is whether the pace of change is enough to satisfy Morocco and the aspirations of the people.

She answered with an overview of the Arab uprising in Morocco. In February 2011, demonstrations began in Morocco, but there was not an uprising and there was an immediate response from the government. The King kept his word – a new Constitution was approved in July and elections took place in November. How was this possible? First, Morocco had a history of minor reform from the top since the time of King Hassan II. The country made very real human rights progress and had experience with an opposition government. Second, the PJD is the most moderate of the Islamist parties in the region and was willing to work on a third way – partnering with the King for reform. Third, the Palace and the King’s entourage were confident enough to know that they were still ultimately in control – they could run circles around everyone else. As Ottaway noted, in Morocco today, there is a very strong distinction between “le gouvernment” and “le pouvoir.”

Therefore, Ottaway’s assessment is that the reform process is real, but slow. There is no doubt that the King will push through reforms, but he will need to be pressured by the government and the people. That is not currently happening in Morocco - reform has been from the top without a push from the bottom. The King and his advisors know that they have to move forward with reform, but want to avoid the fallout from it. The King is comfortable and the government is hesitant to push for its prerogatives as defined in the Constitution. The PJD is terrified of confrontation with the King and it will be difficult to pressure him without confrontation. Ottaway stressed that the PJD has been far too cautious. With regard to the Constitution and what the PJD and the Parliament can do, Ottaway argued that Morocco is not a constitutional monarchy like it says – it is more like a semi-Presidential system except with a King instead of a President. There are executive powers reserved for the King and the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister has been asking for his powers, rather than using them. As for the Parliament, which is empowered to adopt the organic laws required to implement the Constitution, it has an idea of what needs to be done, but hasn’t done much. Only three of eighteen organic laws have been adopted thus far.

Despite the stalled status of reform, King Mohammed VI has thus far remained unscathed. He is popular, legitimate, and has a cadre of capable advisors. Furthermore, there is no real opposition in Morocco. The USFP is weak, so if pressure is not coming from the PJD, it is not happening. While in Morocco, Ottaway tried to identify a possible opposition, but couldn’t. While the JCO, which Ottaway described as a potential game changer, represents a possibility, it isn’t there yet. According to representatives of the organization that Ottaway spoke with, the group isn’t interested in politics just yet. In addition, they confessed that they don’t think they could mobilize people in the streets at this time, “even if they tried.” As for other opposition groups, whatever Salafists there are in the country don’t appear to be a factor and are certainly not organized. Finally, the protest movement is still alive, but is localized and ineffective at the national level.

In conclusion, Ottaway noted that Morocco represents an interesting experiment in reform from the top. If it can happen this way, it is the best option. Although wanting to avoid sounding too conservative, Ottaway argued that uprisings generally don’t result in happy endings. If Morocco is able to make this process work, it will be great for the country and a great example for other countries and monarchs. For now, however, the lesson from Morocco is that reform from the top won’t work without a push from the bottom.

Monica Marks addressed political reform in Tunisia. She underscored the transition that had occurred within the country as a result of the revolution – several ministers went from being
in jail to holding ministerial positions in the very building in which they were held in confinement. Despite this evident symbolism, unfortunately there has not been a lot of progress in Tunisia. Marks ascertained that this was for institutional reasons, political reasons, and practical reasons. Institutionally, the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for security reform, is the most corrupt and is still staffed 90% by people who were there before the revolution. Politically, the drafting of the Constitution is still ongoing, which makes other reform more difficult. Pragmatically, the country is plagued by bureaucracy.

Jason Ullner gave a brief history of political reform in Algeria – referencing the civil war, the process of reconciliation, and the military’s carte blanche for retaining power. Ullner argued that there has been slow, creeping reform in Algeria, although it is not clear who is in charge of what, with the DRS, the military, and Bouteflika all having some degree of power. Defining Algeria as a one-party state dominated by the FLN, Ullner addressed why, despite having similar problems to countries that experienced revolution – a massive youth bulge, food subsidies, etc. – Algeria had not experience an uprising. He argued that Algeria had its Arab Spring in 1991-1992. He doesn’t view this as just an excuse, because he believes that Bouteflika is a different kind of leader, rather than a dictator; Bouteflika doesn’t inspire ire like Ben Ali, and Algeria does have freedoms that didn’t exist in neighboring countries, such as freedom of the press. Ullner noted that there have indeed been protests, but that they were small – largely because of DRS repression, but also because there has been no groundswell for drastic change. The Algerian people want slow, peaceful reform from within the government. In this regard, Ullner has seen a few steps in the right direction and believes that the government is coming along and headed in the right direction.

With regard to US interests in Algeria, Ullner stated that oil is always at the forefront, followed by Algeria’s stance as a strong counterterrorism partner based on its historic experience in fighting Islamist terrorism. US-Algeria bilateral relations are rooted in this security cooperation and the two countries have strong intelligence and military relations. Algeria remains a bedrock for the US, particularly given instability in Mali and Libya. Seeking to deny suggestions that these relations came under pressure when Americans were killed at the attack on the In Amenas gas facility, Ullner stressed that the US maintained daily contact with its Algerian counterparts and the US was not caught off guard by developments. Defending this answer, Ullner argued that the “Algerians have a certain way of doing things” and that relations have only gotten better between the two countries since the attack at In Amenas. He cited the US-Algeria Strategic Dialogue as an indication of the strength of bilateral relations and noted that the US has encouraged Algeria to play a more active role in security issues in the region, including going beyond its borders, which is has historically refused to do.

Panel 2: Security Threats

Fernando Reinares assessed the security threats to and from the Sahel. He argued that terrorism is not the main problem North African countries face today, but certainly an important one. In order to put the current situation in context, Reinares provided a brief overview of the evolution of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Founded in 2007, AQIM was at the start, an Algerian group with an Algerian agenda. It mostly carried out attacks within Algeria. Algerian counterterrorism efforts, however, became increasingly successful in later years, reducing the organization’s capacity and forcing the organization to look again toward a sanctuary in northern Mali. With their new sanctuary established after the coup in Mali, AQIM started establishing alliances with other terrorist groups that began to operate in the region – MUJAO, a splinter group that in practices operates as a supporting aid, and Ansar Dine. At present, Reinares estimated that AQIM currently has 600-800 fighters and vast
economic resources, but has settled primarily around Kidal and also made a tactical withdrawal to Mauritania.

Fred Wehrey addressed whether or not Libya is a failed or failing state. In making this assessment, he defined the three criteria for a failing state: the inability to control large swathes of territory; the lack of capacity to deliver services to its citizens; and the export of problems to its neighbors. Wehrey argued that Libya meets these conditions, but is in critical, but stable condition nonetheless, as failing assumes the existence of a state in the first place, which is not the case in Libya – Gaddafi was the state. Wehrey also presented some positive assessments. First, the idea of a unified Libya exists. Second, oil production is increasing. Third, there is a lack of meddling by neighbors. Fourth, the political/ideological spectrum is narrow. Finally, infrastructure in the country has remained intact. For these reasons, Wehrey is optimistic, despite continued challenges, including marginalization of the periphery and the reality that the security sector is informal and dispersed.

Patrick Worman provided a macro-level analysis of the security threat in North Africa. He noted that there is a new AQIM focus on the Sahel because of the operational space it’s been afforded there over the past few years – both as a result of the Algerian security services success in pushing them out and increased insecurity in neighboring countries. AQIM is now primarily fighting in countries ill-prepared to deal with them. The US is likewise concerned about al-Qaeda outreach efforts to AQIM trying to export instability and has developed policies to limit this, taking a holistic approach, including development and security measures. In terms of specific threats to the region, Worman only discussed Algeria and Libya, noting that he did not want to overlook Morocco, but that the country was a good news story as it maintains the longest counterterrorism partnership with the US and is not the locus of the current threat, which is in a band of Southern Algeria and the Sahel. As for Algeria, Worman noted that US-Algerian relations have become closer over the past 5-10 years because the threat is in Algeria’s backyard, it has significant experience and strong capacity in counterterrorism operations, and there is broad public support for counterterrorism efforts throughout the country.

In Libya, Worman explained, the US is trying to cut down on the space within which terrorists can operate. They are trying to do so in a policy environment skeptical of US actions, which make its all the more difficult. In conclusion, Worman noted that the US preferences if for building long-term counterterrorism capacity in partner countries, building institutions in those countries, and building a unity of purpose among partner countries.

Keynote Address

Janet Sanderson provided personal observations on North Africa and US policy toward the region and shared her candid assessment of what the US got right and wrong. To start, she explained that the US government did not see the Arab Spring coming. It understood the issues behind it, but did not predict that 2011 would be a defining year. It is easy to understand common factors now, but the US didn’t see the match that set it off. In the Maghreb, the US has been hampered in its mindset by its history in the region and its assessment that France was more involved there. This meant that the US rarely put the Maghreb at the top of the agenda, with a few exceptions such as the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement and engagement with Gaddafi after his initial overture to the West. North Africa thus factored lightly in the US agenda. Presently, it has been said that North Africa is the Obama Administration’s orphan and Sanderson acknowledged that this assessment is true. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs avoided leader to leader contact despite other contacts. However, benign neglect was not limited to the Obama Administration – it was the case under Clinton too, when it was clear that our approach was engagement light. For example,
the US warmly embraced Morocco, but didn’t engage in a politically substantive way. It engaged with Algeria based on counterterrorism issues alone, despite the clear US business interests in the country. It deemed Gaddafi crazy and left Tunisia to the Europeans. With the Arab Spring, the US was forced to pay attention to the region, but it saw developments though its own prism focusing on counterterrorism. As important as this issue is in the region, Sanderson underscored that it should not define US engagement there. In terms of the US response, the tools were not always the most nimble and effective, and the US often made events all about itself rather than the countries of the region.

In conclusion, Sanderson argued that the US can do better in the Maghreb and needs to redefine relations in the region. Its interests in promoting regional security, encouraging counterterrorism cooperation, securing access to energy and oil, and encouraging human rights, democracy, and the rule of law demand a reassessment of US relations in the Maghreb. There have been important developments – an increase in exchange visits, Strategic Dialogues with Morocco and Algeria, and a broadened agenda for discussion and engagement. The question is whether the US is prepared to sustain the effort or not. In either case, this will require engagement from North Africa countries too as relations have to be based in partnerships.

Panel 3: Prospects for Regional Cooperation

Laurence Ammour gave a presentation on the Western Sahara issue, which she described as the blind spot of Algerian regional policy. Ammour referenced the Algerian position on regional counterterrorism cooperation and its veto of Moroccan membership in the Counterterrorism Center based in Algeria as evidence of Algeria’s longstanding belief that is has preeminence in the Sahel and Sahara, quoting one official that said, “Last time I checked, Morocco doesn’t have a Sahel border.” Implicit in this statement was Algeria’s assertion that Western Sahara will never be part of Morocco. The question that comes out of this for Ammour is: why has Algeria maintained this policy on the Western Sahara for over 40 years with no evolution? She sought to address this question by analyzing how the Western Sahara related to the domestic and foreign policy of Algeria. She argued that geopolitics and history explain Algeria’s support for the Polisario and its broader stance on the Western Sahara. The relationship between Morocco and Algeria has been historically defined by border disputes – Morocco’s territorial ambitions to broaden its borders to those of historic “greater Morocco,” and Algeria’s desire to limit Morocco’s territorial ambitions and thereby assert and maintain geopolitical dominance of the Maghreb. The Western Sahara issue is a central part of geopolitical balancing in the region, as it is a marker of the territorial inequality between Morocco and Algeria. An additional factor is the dominant role of the military in both the founding of the Algerian state and in current domestic politics. The Western Sahara issue has proven useful domestically not only to justify military expenditures, but also to further Algeria’s regional influence.

Why, however, in spite of developments in the region, including the political decline of the Polisario Front and the numerous incidents of Polisario involvement in terrorist and criminal activities (Ammour had a list of these on a power point she showed) has Algeria’s stance not evolved accordingly? The reality is that little has changed in Algeria – Algerian leaders have failed to adapt to international relations and new political realities. Leaders are stuck in old ideologies. Unfortunately, Ammour sees little hopes for an evolution in Algeria’s policy or for normalization of Moroccan-Algerian relations anytime soon. It is nevertheless time to move forward to resolve the humanitarian issue and ensure security cooperation to prevent the region from becoming even more of a hotbed for extremism and criminal activity in the region.
Glynn Torres-Spelliscy explained the legal issues behind resource development in the Western Sahara. He stressed that he was not assessing the wisdom of a policy choice on the issue either way, but was merely providing information on the legal options that apply to the situation there. There is a range of legally acceptable behavior on this issue and wisdom and legality are two very different concepts. Torres-Spelliscy also underscored that the issue of resource and economic development is an important one, as it offers the potential for cooperation without settling the question of the future political status of the Sahara. Development is likewise essential for both humanitarian and security issues and should not be limited before a political resolution.

Torres-Spelliscy detailed current economic challenges and opportunities in the Sahara before providing the legal context. The challenges are that the Sahara has limited arable land and is one of the least densely populated places the world. On the positive side, it has natural resources, namely phosphates, fish, and the potential for oil and gas, and the potential for agro-business. Economic development thus sounds difficult, but possible. Given that, what are the legal means for developing the territory? Torres-Spelliscy stated that Morocco has de-facto control of the territory, which is legally listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory at the UN with Spain as the original administrative power. Although Spain attempted to transfer this power to Morocco and Mauritania via the Madrid accords, it was legally not allowed to do so. There is thus no administrative power in the territory. From a legal perspective, Morocco can either be sovereign, an administrative power, or an occupier. In this case, Morocco is not sovereign, it is not the legal administrator, but potentially a de-facto administrator, and it is not an occupier, as the country is listed as Non-Self Governing – not occupied. Fortunately, this issue does not have to be resolved legally in order for development to be allowed because there are some legal principals beyond this for the administration of natural resources. Several General Assembly Resolutions affirm the value of foreign economic investment if certain conditions are met, namely that the development must benefit the population and be in accordance with their wishes. Under Moroccan de-facto control, the benefits for the population are disputed. There is no doubt that Morocco has made serious investment in infrastructure and that looks likely to continue with the launch of the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council program for the territory. On the other hand, there are some questions about the distribution of these benefits. With regard to consultation, there is not sufficient legal evidence that the people have been consulted. There is no doubt that consultation has taken place and continues to do so in the Moroccan-controlled territory, but there has been no engagement with those Sahrawis displaced in the camps. That is where the issue stands today, although Torres-Spelliscy did note two signs of progress in conclusion: the 2011 request for a framework to develop a process for resource extraction and the 2012 agreement with UNEP to begin information sharing on the issue.

Lahcen Achy explored prospects for regional integration in the Maghreb, underscoring that the Western Sahara crisis has an impact on the whole region and on this issue. Why is regional integration important? According to Achy, it is needed to seize economic opportunities in the post-Arab Spring period, overcome reliance on Europe, and enhance security in the region. Despite these obvious advantages, the status of regional integration is disappointing. The region is losing 2-3% of GDP a year by not integrating, in addition to the added opportunity cost of spending. The region remains unattractive to large foreign investors because of limited opportunities for regional exports. Who bears the cost of this lack of integration? Achy argued that it’s primarily the region’s non-oil producing states of Morocco and Tunisia and the border areas within each country. Who benefits from the current status? Achy argued that is the countries that are less ready economically in terms of creating a policy environment for more open trade – namely, the least diversified economies and most dysfunctional business environments of Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania. Given these circumstances, what are the prospects for more integration in the near future?
Unfortunately, they are not very good. Achy underscored that in order for increased integration to become widely appealing, countries require domestic reform first—on issues ranging from governance and corruption to the rule of law and leadership. The challenge is to engage people and not just leaders. Fortunately, people-to-people exchanges are starting and could provide the impetus for more exchange at the national level.

4. Q & A

Panel 1

Q: (World Affairs Council – Harrisburg, PA) Is it fair to think of the Islamist parties in Tunisia and Morocco as similar to European Christian Democratic parties? If that is an apt comparison, what should US engagement be with these parties? Lastly, is there a chance for an Islamist resurgence in Algeria.

A: (Marks) That is certainly what Ennadha wants to be like.

(Ottaway) The State Department has accepted that these parties have won elections—unlike what they did with Hamas. As for the comparison, it’s a bit more complicated. They are more like the Christian Democrat parties of the past. The best comparison is conservative elements within the current US Republican party.

(Ullner) There will be a place for Islamists in Algerian politics, but the Islamist parties lost seats in the Spring 2012 election. It is unlikely that an Islamist will be President.

Q: (DCM – Algerian Embassy) I would like to make a correction to your assertions—Morocco is not the only country going through peaceful reform, Algeria is too.

A: (Ottaway) I beg to differ. Algeria hasn’t reached a turning point. Yes, it has lots of political parties, and yes, there are some reforms, but Bouteflika is still the President and it is difficult to say a country is changing when it has the same government.

Q: (McDaniel student) Are you at all concerned about the status of women in any of these countries?

A: (Marks) The situation is Tunisia is much more positive and not nearly as bad as the analyses have been. Women have a voice within the Ennadha party and there are no threats to them from a legal perspective. That said, women have spoke of a rise in the security threat they face.

(Ottaway) There is fear among women in Egypt and Tunisia about their rights. This isn’t the case in Morocco, but there is hostility between secular and conservative groups, although there hasn’t been a change there from previous years.

Q: (Embassy of Spain) Could you evaluate the social and economic performance of the PJD, as well as the current status of the opposition movement and the leadership of the JCO?

A: (Ottaway) The potential is always there for renewed unrest in any country. I don’t see anything imminent—and have not seen increased levels of discontent. As for the JCO, it’s a paradox to me. It has to get involved in politics; otherwise it will become irrelevant by sideling itself. There are several obstacles to political engagement by the JCO, however. First, there is the death of Sheikh Yassine and the lack of a new leader. Second, JCO will not only have to recognize the monarchy, but also the King as the commander of the faithful. Third, I don’t think the situation is ripe. It was a surprising admission that representatives from the group said they would not mobilize people. Nevertheless, it seems bound to happen.

Q: (Boukhars) What I heard from US counterterrorism officials with regard to cooperation with Algeria differs from what I have heard today—is the relationship really that seamless?
A: (Ullner) The relationship has improved dramatically over the last ten years, but no, of course it is not on the level of say, US-England. In terms of how to influence Algeria, they don’t want money. They want assistance on the state level – training and a constructive relationship, not the US telling them want to do.

Panel 2

Q: Does the US government have a “hearts and minds” strategy?
A: (Worman) We have been refining it since 9/11. We first increased assistance for development – which was like throwing money at the problem. This evolved into supporting to local NGOs who do development work. Morocco has likewise developed this time of program to counterterrorism – treating it holistically through socio-economic assistance programs to target vulnerable demographics. The US prefers this type of an approach.

Panel 3

Q: (Charles Liebling, Western Sahara Endgame Blog) No one had discussed the options of independence or a referendum in the Western Sahara.
A: (Torres-Spelliscy) When you have a government in de-facto control, there are three legal scenarios. If the situation were to change, through a referendum or otherwise, and Morocco no longer be in de-facto control, it would be a different situation.

Q: (Marina Ottaway) Can you think of any examples of regional integration in places where political issues have been unresolved?
A: (Achy) Both West Africa and the MERCOSUR trade block have trade and economic integration despite differences in political systems.
C: (Ottaway) But this is different – it is more than just political differences. This is open conflict - unarmed, but open.
A: (Achy) If there is pressure, there might be some room for integration to drive a political solution. The countries need to address this issue and not avoid it like they are now. The circumstances are right given instability in the region.
(Ammour) Insecurity is in border areas and the economic figures about border trade reinforce the point about insecurity. There is trade, it is just in illicit goods. That is why regional integration could be so important. It could address insecurity in the border areas while improving development at the same time.

Q: What are the prospects for foreign investment?
A: (Achy) It is there, but the question is how to make it larger. For that, the Maghreb needs to represent a larger market for investors.

Q: Would it be possible to address these peripheral border areas individually or does it require regional cooperation?
A: (Ammour) It is easier if it’s done regionally because if you develop borders through those means, you are developing two countries at the same time.
(Achy) It only works if it happens on both sides of the border. So borders need to be open.

5. Observation

Approximately 50 students, policymakers, and North Africa experts attended the all-day conference at McDaniel College. Generally, the panelists did not offer any really new insights into political, economic, and security developments in the Maghreb, although the conference was very valuable in that it dedicated an entire day to discussions on North Africa, which is important in and of itself given the way North Africa is not often prioritized in the US.
conference also helped clarify how the US – both experts and policymakers – continue to view the region. Some valuable conclusions can thus be drawn from the event. First, Morocco continues to be viewed as different from its neighbors in its approach to reform and as a potential model for its neighbors. That said, there is still widespread concern and skepticism about the political will of the Palace to initiate reform, the capacity of the PJD government to push for it, and the current pace of implementing reform. Second, the US prioritizes its counterterrorism relationships in the region and is unlikely to shift from that stance anytime soon. This is clearly the case with Algeria – a country which both representatives from the State Department emphasized as an important ally, despite obvious political issues that neither sought to mention. Third, the US continues to engage in the region bilaterally rather than regionally. This has an obvious impact on prospects for the US to promote regional integration and a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Finally, obvious progress has been made in getting North Africa on the radar of the United States at the very least. Whether or not this is sustainable is yet to be seen, but conferences like this one – and the words of Janet Sanderson admitting that the lack of engagement has been a problem – are hopeful signs for the future.

(Back to top)

Morocco’s Reforms – Stalled or in Process?

MAMS Event Report
Date: April 10, 2013

1. Title: Morocco’s Reforms – Stalled or in Process?
Hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States

Participants:

Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah: President, National Observatory for Human Development
Ivan Vejvoda: Vice President, Policy Programs, German Marshall Fund
Hassan Mneimneh: Moderator: Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund

2. Overview

Among the states of North Africa, Morocco was the most proactive in responding to its Arab uprising, the February 20th Movement. King Mohammed VI called for a new constitution, which was quickly adopted. This paved the way for new elections and a new government coalition, led by the moderate Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Now, more than a year later, commentators and analysts are questioning to what degree reforms have been implemented and if the current government can promote needed reforms while balancing its relationships with the palace. Dr. Rachid Benmokhtar Benabdellah discussed the realities of the constitutional reform process and the pace of reform, pressing upon the need for further work and the obstacles ahead on the road to democratic reform. Benabdellah then presented the process by which his organization has begun to formulate a plan for the of development Morocco’s southern provinces.

3. Summary

Mneimeh introduce Benabdellah and reviewed the recent history of liberal reforms in Morocco. According to Mneimeh, the recent constitutional reforms in Morocco were not
enacted in response to the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia and protests in Morocco. Rather, the Arab Spring reinvigorated a reform process that began almost 20 years ago, during the reign of King Hassan II. In fact, King Hassan II appointed Benabdellah Minister of Education in order to "clean house," as it were, in preparation for the introduction of democratic reforms.

Benabdellah indicated a few key impediments to Morocco’s development that must be overcome: the lack of democracy, weak economy, fractured education and healthcare systems, the lack of inclusion of women, and poor governance. The main issue to be solved is the lack of democracy, especially in local government. However, Morocco is a complex country; it is large, multiethnic, and multilingual, and there has long been a separation between the “useful Morocco” (mostly urban centers) and the largely neglected countryside. For all of these reasons, it has long been difficult to write a reformed and inclusive constitution. The reform push accelerated rapidly once the Arab Spring came to Morocco, with protests calling out against corruption (but, significantly, not calling for the overthrow of the government). Since then, the country has advanced significantly. There have been improvements in human rights protections. The new constitution incorporates the standards set by all of the international conventions that Morocco has ratified. It gave more recognition to the country’s minority groups by naming Amazigh as a national language. However, Morocco still has a long way to go with its democratic reforms, and the country is facing a number of crises, including the influx of immigrants, weak economy, and fluctuating consumer prices.

Benabdellah then presented what he referred to as the Moroccan government’s agenda for development, to be carried out in three steps. The first step is to learn as much as much as possible from development experts. To this end, Benabdellah and other members of the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE) have met with scholars, consultants, elected officials, and local authorities in order to draft a roadmap for regionalization and further development. They then prepared a preliminary document in the beginning of January to serve as a starting point for the regionalization process. The second step was to take that document and bring it to the southern provinces of Morocco, where regionalization will be most crucial. It was important that they treated this presentation openly, frankly, and as a two-way discussion, both presenting information and taking suggestions from the people they met. Development is both desperately needed and particularly tricky in the south, due to factors such as the more nomadic culture, proximity to the border with Algeria, and the proliferation of Saharan drug trafficking. Thus, development in the south will require a revision of security, economic, and social policies in order to attract investment to the region and create jobs for its impoverished residents. The third step was to return to Rabat with this input from the residents of the southern provinces and their previous research and to assess it. CESE organized the information into a comprehensive report on the state of development and human rights in the country. The next step will be to put together a team to address the three main impediments to development in the south that the report indicated: economic/social issues, environmental issues, and cultural issues. Benabdellah is confident in Morocco's potential for success in development and reform.

4. Q & A

Q: Despite the existence of the 2004 Family Code there is a high level of illiteracy and disparity between men and women. Is this a rural or country wide phenomenon?
A: (Benabdellah) It is a rural phenomenon, and there are three factors that explain why such high levels still exist. Firstly, when Morocco was still a protectorate of France, only coastal cities were developed, creating a lag between rural and urban areas. Secondly education programs are a failure. After the recognition of Amazigh as an official language,
the system attempted to standardize three Berber dialects into one. In addition, there is an overall lack of teachers and most teachers tend to migrate to the cities to find jobs. Lastly, until the 90s gender discrimination was very widespread. Families did not and still do not want to send their daughter to schools, but instead have them stay at home or be hired as maids. Although the illiteracy rate has decreased dramatically we have yet to solve the alarming dropout rate.

**Q:** (Pamela Beecroft, Center for International Private Enterprise) What are two or three approaches Morocco should take as it begins its road towards democracy?

**A:** (Benabdellah) Democracy goes hand in hand with education. We are stuck in a traditional paradigm which consists of employing new leaders based on their networking and money. Efforts are now being made to move beyond this and employ leaders based on their merit and knowledge. There needs to be a behavioral change. Authority figures need to serve the people. Also, universal values need to be implemented in the daily lives of Moroccans. The administration and the civil society need to work together. For example, the INDH fosters participation between people, local authorities, and elected leadership and has also introduced projects to lower the rate of unemployment. Lastly, accountability, assessment, and evaluation need to be implemented and enforced to maintain transparency.

**Q:** What is the relationship between the EU and Morocco in terms of trade and can it be extended to other facets?

**A:** (Benabdellah) Our partnership with the EU and the US is important; part of our progress is creating more openness with our partners. Despite the European crisis, Morocco maintained its resilience. Agreements between Morocco and the EU go beyond simple trade agreements with Morocco slowly integrating European norms. However, implementing EU political and financial standards tends to be complex and at times unfavorable.

**Q:** (Alvaro Ortega, Embassy of Spain) Can you assess the special commitment currently given to developing the North?

**A:** (Benabdellah) The current commitment to developing the North has some historical ties. Pre-independence, the only developed cities in Morocco were those located on the coast. Furthermore, each city had a specific function. For example, Rabat was the administrative city, Casablanca the fiscal hub, and Marrakesh the heart of tourism. Tangier was rich because it was an international city. However, when Morocco gained its independence, the city collapsed with the departure of 300 banks. For thirty to forty years, Tangier was forgotten. A road is currently being created from Tangier to Oujda. Citizens from Casablanca and Marrakesh are coming to work in Tangier, completing the comprehensive ecosystem of the “northern development” that is composed of education, transportation, communication, and technology. Due to the current crisis in Mali, investors are fearful of spillover effects and are thus hesitant to invest. However, Morocco is demonstrating its success in biodiversity, citing Argan oil in southern local industries, green energy in Ourzazate, and promising solar and wind power in Tantan.

**Q:** (Robert Holley, Moroccan American Center for Policy) What is the role of civil society in promoting cultural reform specifically for southern associations to become legitimate and independent?

**A:** (Benabdellah) The current associations are not playing the role we want them to. The government is being selective in accepting or rejecting associations, basing its decisions on what projects are being planned. Many of the NGOs that have historically opposed the government were the most vocal in the discussions we hosted, which is excellent because debate is part of democracy. There is a lack of standardization in rules and norms. Once
these norms and rules are fixed, legitimacy can be established and respected by the authorities.

**Q:** (Robert Holley, Moroccan American Center for Policy) The absence of external partners and subsequently the lack of international resources directly impacts regional development in the south of Morocco. This being said, how can the government encourage external investment?

**A:** (Benabdellah) There is no international investment because there is no Moroccan investment. The government needs to create incentives that will in turn lead to an attractive market for investors. The current law states that associations cannot receive foreign money. An independent fund specific to aiding southern associations needs to be created to include training, capacity building, and mobility, which will then empower the people.

**5. Observation**

There were approximately 30 people in attendance from MAC, the German Marshall Fund, and DC-based think tanks and embassies. Benabdellah discussed both Morocco’s successes and failures in development and in democratic change in a very frank way. He did not avoid uncomfortable topics in his speech nor did he skirt uncomfortable questions from the audience. This speaks to the openness of his organization and other government bodies in Morocco who are working to implement the reforms established in the most recent constitution and bodes well for the legitimacy of the reform process. Experts like Benabdellah are excellent advocates for Morocco, as they highlight Morocco’s successes and challenges in a frank and credible way. Further visits by such experts will help tell Morocco’s story in the US.
Blog Name | Article Title/Date | Summary | Comments |
--- | --- | --- | --- |
Morocco News Board | 7th Edition of Moroccan American Bridges | AMPA, the Association of Moroccan Professionals, will be organizing the 7th annual Moroccan American Bridges conference, to be held in Casablanca on June 21, 2013. The program includes sessions on building and financing start-ups, identifying cross-Atlantic business opportunities and achieving career growth in Morocco. In addition, the speakers will address new business models and industry trends that can be imported and tailored to the Moroccan market. Finally, the event will also feature a startup competition and a career fair for companies looking to hire U.S.-based or US-trained Moroccan professionals. In past years, MAB hosted prestigious speakers such as Mohamed Elmandjra, ex-CEO at Meditelecom in Casablanca and ex-President at Massimo corp. in Los Angeles and Othman Laraki, VP of Growth & International at Twitter in San Francisco. | 2 |
AFP | Morocco denies ‘torturing’ Sahrawi protesters | Morocco has denied torturing the 6 Sahrawi detainees who were arrested in Laayoune on May 9 for their roles in protests against the reauthorization of MINURSO without a human rights monitoring mandate. In response to the detainees’ accusations that the Moroccan security service had tortured them and had gotten confessions from them when they were under duress, the MAP stated, “What was reported is nothing but pure lies.” If convicted, the men face up to 10 years in prison. | 0 |
Bahrain News | A High-Level Human Rights Delegation to Visit Morocco | A high-level delegation from the Bahraini Human Rights Affairs Ministry, led by Human Rights Affairs Minister Dr. Salah bin Ali Abdulrahman, is set to visit Morocco from May 20 to 23, at the invitation of the Moroccan Inter-ministerial Delegation on Human Rights. The delegation will hold meetings with senior officials to learn about Morocco's experience in human rights as well as ways of dealing with the Special Rapporteurs of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). They hope to discuss potential future cooperation on human rights advances in both countries. | 0 |
Bahrain News | Minister of Human Rights: Bahrain and Morocco are on the Path of Reform, Democracy and Reinforcing Rights and Freedoms | The Bahraini minister of human rights met with the Moroccan interior minister, with the former praising the historical cooperative relations between Bahrain and Morocco and the latter stressing a culture of human rights. The Bahraini minister spoke of advances in prisoner and detainee rights, including new monitoring systems in police stations and increased training for law enforcement officials. Both men made note of purportedly misleading international organization reports on human rights in their countries. The Moroccan minister expressed his position that both Bahrain and Morocco are under similar circumstances, and that foreign powers are using human rights trouble in those countries for their own benefit. | 0 |
Your Olive Branch | Building Schools for Morocco’s Rural Poor | This article is a profile on Teach4Morocco, a national non-profit established in 2011 and based in Meknes that hopes to improve the Moroccan educational system and raise the low literacy rates in the country, particularly in rural areas. The organization was established by a | 0 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghrebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco Looks to Modernise Counter-Terror Methods</td>
<td>May 19, 2013</td>
<td>Teach4Morocco's first project was the reconstruction of a school in the small village of Ichbaken, in a remote region of the Atlas Mountains. It has now build two schools, and particularly hopes to help poor, rural girls, who are often denied access to education and married off at young ages. According to Laziri, the country's education system is much more urban-oriented, and requires a paradigm shift to reach the lower-educated populations in rural areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghrebia</strong></td>
<td>Morocco Terror Cells Had Big Plans, Members Confess</td>
<td>May 17, 2013</td>
<td>Eight members of Nador-based terror cells were arrested on May 5th and arraigned May 14th for their affiliation with “Al-Mouahidon” and “Attawhid” and their future plans to launch jihadist operations in Morocco. The members also confessed to planning to rob banks in order to finance their attacks. These terrorist groups, among others, were brought down by the National Security Directorate General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ibn Kafka</strong></td>
<td>Maroc: Pourquoi Chabat veut un remaniement ministériel</td>
<td>May 20, 2013</td>
<td>Hamid Chabat, the secretary general of Istiqlal, is calling for a rebalancing of the cabinet run by Abdelilah Benkiraine to benefit a larger portion of the skilled labor force in the health professions in Morocco. (Policy tends to lean toward more restrictive taxation for public infrastructure, and more lenient policy for foreign companies investing in private projects.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yabiladi</strong></td>
<td>Le déficit commercial du Maroc multiplié par 5 entre 2000 et 2012</td>
<td>May 17, 2013</td>
<td>In 2000, Morocco’s commercial deficit was 44m dirhams. By 2012, it had grown to 201m. The deficit is explained by increased energy purchases, food products, and goods and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yabiladi</strong></td>
<td>Homophobie au Maroc : « On</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 17th was the International day against Homophobia. To combat homophobia in Morocco the LGBT magazine Aswat launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Condamnés pour homosexualité au Maroc : « On n’a rien fait d’illégal »</td>
<td>Two Moroccan youths were condemned to four months in prison by the court of Temara for committing, according to police reports, “an act of flagrant homosexuality” in a car. The two men continue to assert their innocence. One of the men stated: “We were just talking in the car, nothing more. We did nothing illegal.” Their attorney will discuss the possibility of an appeal with the men’s families.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Installation du PAM en Europe pour contrer l’influence du PJD sur les MRE ?</td>
<td>The Modernity and Authenticity Party (PAM) has opened an office in Brussels, following a long-standing PJD policy of reaching out to the Moroccan expatriate community. This is the second bureau that PAM has opened in Europe, after opening one in Paris in late March, and the party intends on opening another bureau in Amsterdam. Fatima El Ayadi, PAM member in the House of Councillors, said that the opening of these bureaus corresponds with the party’s effort to fully respect the Moroccan constitution by ensuring the inclusion of Moroccans living abroad. The PJD is not concerned about PAM’s new move, and does not believe that the party will be able to dip into</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Crise à la majorité : Benkirane « Nous ne voulons pas renoncer à notre monarchie »</td>
<td>Istiqlal has proposed naming a new head of government from the PJD. In a meeting with PJD secretaries, Benkirane stated that “there is a current in favor of reform and another that opposes it. The party (PJD) is perfectly aware of its responsibility.” Benkirane also indicated to the palace that “we want neither the destruction of our country nor to renounce our monarchy.” According to another PJD secretary, “neither the PJD nor the government have received official correspondence from Istiqlal informing them of the decision” to retire from government. Istiqlal is for changing Benkirane, for whom the ideal replacement may be Saâdeddine El Otmani, the current minister of foreign affairs, a man of dialogue who is seen as not resorting to populism.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Installation du PAM en Europe pour contrer l’influence du PJD sur les MRE ?</td>
<td>The Modernity and Authenticity Party (PAM) has opened an office in Brussels, following a long-standing PJD policy of reaching out to the Moroccan expatriate community. This is the second bureau that PAM has opened in Europe, after opening one in Paris in late March, and the party intends on opening another bureau in Amsterdam. Fatima El Ayadi, PAM member in the House of Councillors, said that the opening of these bureaus corresponds with the party’s effort to fully respect the Moroccan constitution by ensuring the inclusion of Moroccans living abroad. The PJD is not concerned about PAM’s new move, and does not believe that the party will be able to dip into</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Homophobia in Morocco: “We know we’re not in France, we don’t require marriage for all”

May 17th, 2013

a campaign called “Love for all” According to a contributor to the magazine, the campaign “on Facebook and Twitter permits us to open a discussion. It is also an opportunity for LGBT individuals to express themselves and assert their rights.” However, the campaigners are aware that Morocco is not France, and are not pressing for a law guaranteeing marriage equality. They are instead campaigning to repeal article 489 of the Moroccan Penal Code, which punishes homosexuality with imprisonment and a fine.

Translated from French
influence on Moroccan expatriates?

May 21, 2013

PJD’s voter base abroad by copying its tactic.

Translated from French

Yabiladi

Sahara: New tension between Morocco and MINURSO in the port of Dakhla

May 21, 2013

On Saturday, 3 members of the MINURSO peacekeeping force allegedly entered the port of Dakhla and began to take photographs of fishers. Moroccan security forces immediately requested that they stop what they were doing, but did not confiscate the cameras. Yabiladi is eager to point out that this comes on the heels of a video which surfaced last month of an Egyptian MINURSO peacekeeper telling Sahrawis that they should fight for their independence.

Translated from French

Yabiladi

Maroc: Un Professor Accuse de Precher l’Atheisme a l’Ecole

May 22, 2013

Zakaria Ajnekhat, an arabic language instructor in Ouled Hamdane, was accused of promoting atheism to his students. Ajnekhat was reported to the police by parents of the students. According to Ajnekhat, his arrest was a set up by the (Salafist) chair of a parents organization who has convinced the Ministry of Education that Ajnekhat has “denied the existence of God, denied that alcohol is forbidden by religion, cast doubt on the authenticity of the Quran and encouraged women to demonstrate their charms.” The Moroccan Code states that a case of this nature, condemning religion (and specifically Islam), faces a penalty of up to three years in prison.

Translated from French

Yabiladi

Maroc: Une Femme Meurt Apres le Demantement d’un Bidonville a Mohammedia

May 22, 2013

After the collapse of a shantytown in Mohammedia Tuesday, which killed a local woman, the local Human Rights Association (AMDH) began an investigation into the living conditions of the neighborhood which uncovered that over 26 structures are illegally constructed. In 2004, Morocco began a social initiative called “Cities without Slums” which will benefit over two million people. As of 2013, thirteen cities have declared that they are “cities without slums.”

Translated from French

Yabiladi

Amnesty brosse un sombre tableau des droits de

In its annual report, published today, Amnesty International accuses Moroccan authorities of “restricting freedom of expression, engaging in pursuits against detractors of the monarchy and state institutions, as well as against Sahrawi supporters of self-
Amnesty paints a somber picture of Human Rights in Morocco
May 23, 2013

The report also cites mistreatment of peaceful protesters at a royal ceremony in August. As concerns terrorism, the report accuses Moroccan authorities of illegally detaining Mohammed Hajib, a German-Moroccan, and sentencing him to 10 years in prison on the basis of a confession extracted through torture and without an attorney present. Amnesty reiterated last week’s claim that 6 Sahrawis were also tortured, as well as calling on the Moroccan authorities to improve refugee and migrant rights. The report accuses the Polisario Front of not improving human rights in the Tindouf camps. Finally, the report suggests Moroccan law is not in alignment with a 1997 UN protocol guaranteeing equality between the sexes.

Translated from French

Yabiladi

| Sahara : Rabat interdit à un journaliste espagnol d'entrer à Laâyoune | Sahara: Rabat forbids Spanish journalist from entering Laayoune |
| May 23, 2013 |

Last week, Morocco expelled an Italian journalist from Laayoune; today, they banned a Spanish journalist from entering. After being interviewed by security for 30 minutes, the journalist was put on a plane destined for the Canary Islands. He had been in Western Sahara attempting to cover the 40th anniversary of the Polisario. In other news, a planned pro-Polisario march did not take place after increased security was deployed to the town of Smara.

Translated from French

Yabiladi

| Massacre de Londres : L'un des deux tueurs proche du Marocain Fouad Belkacem | Massacre of London: One of the Killers Linked to Moroccan Fouad Belkacem |
| May 24, 2013 |

Michael Adebolajo one of the killers of the Woolwich massacre, has links to (now imprisoned) extremist Fouad Belkacem, leader of Sharia4Belgium; the two attended past extremist movements. The two were linked between the extremist groups Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4UK--branches of the larger extremist Al-Muhajiroun movement.

Translated from French

Yabiladi

| Benkirane Contre Chabat: Le Palais a-t-il Opte Pour Le Chef du Gouvernement? | Benkirane Versus Chabat: The After a long wait, the head of government was reassured yesterday that he would remain in office, along with the current cabinet, until 2016. The king maintained neutrality in the conflict between Benkirane and Chabat, claiming “full trust [in] all the members of this team.” At this time, cabinet is committed to the path of reform, in particular taxation, pension/retirement, and workers’ compensation. |
| May 24, 2013 |

Translated from French
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AllAfrica</td>
<td>Moroccan: Japanese Parties Voice Support to Democratic Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>Via democratic referendum, various political parties in Japan have maintained support for the Western Saharan region to “freely choose its destiny” in order to “make possible the regional integration and stability in the region.” Supporters of this statement expressed concern over reported human rights violations and called for international involvement in the situation.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AllAfrica</td>
<td>Moroccan: Spanish Solidarity Movement With the Saharawi People Urges Its Government to Grant Diplomatic Status to the Polisario Front Mission</td>
<td>Spanish associations in solidarity with the Saharawi people urged the Spanish Foreign Ministry to grant diplomatic status to Polisario Front mission in Spain as the sole and legitimate representative of the Saharawi people. In the letter, the associations urged for “making efforts to push forward necessary political initiatives, moving towards a just and final solution, in defense of the right of the legitimate Saharawi people right to self-determination through free and transparent referendum, as the only way to complete the decolonization of Western Sahara.”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AllAfrica</td>
<td>Zimbabwean National Union Party Affirms Its Firm Position of the Saharawi Cause</td>
<td>The head of the Zimbabwean National Union Party reaffirmed his party’s support for the Polisario’s position in the Western Sahara crisis. He said: “We are for the SADR in its legitimate struggle for freedom and completing the liberation of the rest of its territories occupied by the Kingdom of Morocco.” He claimed that the Moroccan presence in Western Sahara stems entirely from the desire to control the territory’s valuable natural resources.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco News Board</td>
<td>Sahel: Algeria's Proxy War</td>
<td>Hassan Masiky claims that the terrorist organizations in the Sahara and the Sahel, particularly MUJAO and Ansar Eddine, are under the patronage of Algeria--and therefore, engaged in a proxy war against the Touareg people. The U.S. and France have yet to acknowledge Algeria’s role in perpetuating the crisis in Mali and the W. Sahara [Algeria views the Touareg movements in the Sahel as “clear and present danger to the unity of Algeria.”]</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait News Agency</td>
<td>Moroccan, Kuwait Seek Closer Economic Ties-Official</td>
<td>The Moroccan Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Technology’s trade sector announced the initiative to deepen ties with Kuwait via mutual investments and social and economic developments. The announcement “underscored the significance of establishing inter-Arab economic integration for the common interest of the Arab people.”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco to launch 4G mobile license tenders by the end 2013 (sic)</td>
<td>The head of Morocco’s telecom agency said that they would apply for 4G licenses by the end of the year, and expects service to be available by the end of 2014. Morocco would be among the first African countries with 4G capability.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 2013</td>
<td>The head of Morocco’s telecom agency said that they would apply for 4G licenses by the end of the year, and expects service to be available by the end of 2014. Morocco would be among the first African countries with 4G capability.</td>
<td>The head of Morocco’s telecom agency said that they would apply for 4G licenses by the end of the year, and expects service to be available by the end of 2014. Morocco would be among the first African countries with 4G capability.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 2013</td>
<td>Saudi-backed firm plans to pump $230m into Morocco</td>
<td>The Saudi-Moroccan Investment Company for Development plans to invest $230m in large projects by the end of 2015. Investments will run across several sectors including real estate, tourism and agriculture, the company’s managing director, Mohammed Yasin, said. The corporation’s capital is shared equally between the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia and the Treasury of the Kingdom of Morocco.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 2013</td>
<td>In Morocco, TV Is Part of Power Game</td>
<td>According to this article, the Moroccan television media has become a pawn in an alleged power struggle between the PJD and the Royal Palace, ever since the PJD decided to put television reform on its legislative agenda. The Palace has always held tight control of the television networks, and when the PJD came to power in 2011 they immediately began attempting to reform the media in order to wrest control from the monarchy. The struggle between the government and the monarchy for control over setting guidelines has resulted in gaps in productivity that have seriously harmed the Moroccan television industry.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23, 2013</td>
<td>DLR looks to Morocco for new solar research and test center</td>
<td>The German Aerospace center (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt; DLR) is devising plans for a solar power research and test center in Morocco on behalf of the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (Masen), as part of the Moroccan Solar Plan. The project is partially funded by the German Government and implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. One possible location of the solar power research and test center is Ouarzazate, which is also the building site of the first solar power plants as part of the Moroccan Solar Plan.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
This report contains public and private information, which has not been corroborated by third party sources.

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
May 23, 2013

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- Almost a month after he was airlifted to Paris for treatment following a “minor stroke”, there has been no sign of President Bouteflika and speculation as to his condition is rising to fever pitch.
- Bouteflika's health problems come just as he had made up his mind to run for a fourth successive term of office next year.
- Concordant sources suggest that one of the main aims of the corruption investigations, which are being driven by the DRS, is to prevent Bouteflika from running for a fourth term.
- The question of the fourth term may have been laid to rest by the President's health problems; paradoxically, the situation may become more complicated if Bouteflika were to make a full recovery and return in fighting form.

Foreign Relations

- Interior Minister Ould Kablia has announced new security measures along the border with Morocco, and complained bitterly of the Moroccan authorities' lack of cooperation in combatting smuggling.
- Inclined for domestic political reasons to talk up problems on the border with Morocco, Ould Kablia has tended to downplay far greater threats on Algeria's eastern borders.
- As they move against jihadist groups in the mountains along the border with Algeria, the Tunisian authorities are appealing for ever greater military assistance from the Algerians.
- A Tunisian security official draws a pessimistic prognosis for the situation in Tunisia, which is compared to Algeria in the early '90s.

Security

- Jihadist activity nationwide accelerated markedly in April and early May, with security operations lagging somewhat behind them. There were no incidents in Algiers, however.
- A convoy of Italian expatriate workers has been ambushed in north-west Algeria in what may have been a kidnapping attempt, although none were taken hostage or wounded.
- Repeated acts of car-jacking and brigandry in the Hassi Mesaadou area indicate that security is still not optimal around Algeria's oldest oil hub.
- There have been a number of incursions in the south-eastern oil province of Illizi by small groups of armed men from Libya, including one near In Amenas, and a failed attack on a security forces convoy transporting jihadist prisoners in the same province.
On April 27, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was airlifted to the Val de Grâce military hospital in Paris after suffering a "transient ischemia" - a temporary blockage of a blood vessel often called a mini-stroke. "The President is in very good health," his doctor Rachid Bougherbal told the press after the news was announced, adding that the President would return to Algiers "in not more than seven days." Almost four weeks later, there has still been no sign of Bouteflika and only the scantest of official communications about his condition, and speculation about his real state of health and its political consequences is mounting to fever pitch.

One of the earliest rumours had to do with the causes of the President's cerebrovascular accident. On the very day of his evacuation to Paris, *Le Quotidien d'Oran* ran a report, widely taken up by other Algerian media, quoting “certain sources close to the presidential circle” as claiming that the stroke occurred after Bouteflika learnt that his influential brother Saïd had been implicated in corruption scandals currently being investigated by the DRS intelligence and security service, forcing the President to dismiss him as an advisor. This story may well be apocryphal – we have had no confirmation from sources at the Presidency that Saïd Bouteflika has been sacked, and an Algerian businessman with family ties to the nomenklatura has expressed doubt that the President would even be capable of such a move, such is the “fusional” relationship between the two brothers – but it is symptomatic of the tense climate generated by the corruption investigations and of the uncertainty that they are generating.

In our last report, we noted claims in specialist newsletter *Maghreb Confidentiel* to the effect that Maj-Gen. Bachir Tartag, head of internal security at the DRS, had deliberately orchestrated the corruption investigations in order to “smash the fragile peace between his boss Tewfik[1] and the head of state, cause the Bouteflika clan to implode and prevent the President from running for a fourth term in 2014”. In the absence of confirmation from other sources, we suggested that such claims were nonetheless worth monitoring and testing against the facts as they unfolded. Evidence has since been mounting that the corruption investigations are indeed closely linked to the succession question.

At least two sources have, over the past month, suggested that – contrary to the 2009-10 crackdown on graft, which appears to have been driven by Bouteflika himself – this time the anti-corruption campaign is very much driven by the DRS. According to a project manager at Sonatrach who has had contact with current and former DRS officers involved in the corruption investigations:

> The DRS says it is concerned about foreign investigations into Algerian affairs: the FBI has opened a preliminary investigation, the British suspect a BVI-registered subsidiary of Sonatrach of tax fraud, the Canadians have begun proceedings against SNC-Lavalin for corruption in its contracts with Sonatrach. But the DRS' concern is only a pretext, the aim of which is to demonstrate to Bouteflika and his entourage the need to launch a wide-ranging inquiry targeting people close to the President, which could affect him personally. The DRS has been piling on the pressure, instrumentalising this inquiry and the fight against corruption in general to settle two fast-approaching successions: Bouteflika's and Tewfik's. For this reason, the inquiry has become a major issue for the DRS.

An official at El Mouradia presidential palace adds further detail to the picture:

> Contrary to what has been said in some quarters, Tartag has been chosen by Tewfik, against Bouteflika's will, as his successor at the head of the DRS.
The Presidency is mobilising all its resources to keep track of the investigation into corruption at Sonatrach. The DRS has been putting out some worrying signals, and the Presidency is not being kept informed of how the investigation is proceeding. The President is being kept out of the loop, supposedly so as to “spare” him. Aside from the President himself, the DRS is eavesdropping on everybody at the Presidency, where the atmosphere has been toxic since December.

Given the prevailing mood in relations between the Presidency and the DRS due to the tug-of-war over the succession, corruption investigations could go on for months. Tewfik has put people who are close to him in charge of these investigations: aside from Tartag, you also have Generals Gobrini and Djebbar. Virtually all the top brass of the DRS are taken up with the succession question, and the corruption investigations are one symptom of this amongst others. Tewfik’s men want to use these investigations to raise the pressure and force Bouteflika to submit to their will: no fourth term. Tewfik has said that “we’ll settle Bouteflika’s succession first”, implying that he himself will also go once he has taken care of Bouteflika’s succession.

There are at least four points that are worth drawing out of this. Firstly, it would appear that, while he is certainly involved in overseeing the corruption investigations as head of the Directorate of Internal Security, Gen. Tartag is neither the sole driver of the campaign nor acting against Tewfik, but with him. Secondly, the sources seem to believe that Tewfik, who is now 72 and whose health may no longer be what it was, is contemplating his own departure at some point in the future. Thirdly, for the first time in years, it is seriously suggested that Tewfik is not acting in tandem with Bouteflika. And finally, the corruption investigations have a clear political objective: to make it impossible for Bouteflika to stand for a fourth successive term of office.

In mid-April, it will be recalled, a source with access to both Bouteflika and Tewfik suggested guardedly that Bouteflika had, after months of hesitation, finally made up his mind to stand for a fourth term, while remaining coy as to other players’ stances on this decision. The matter may now have been settled by Bouteflika’s health issues, however. Over the past week, press reports have been increasingly pessimistic: on May 17, French newsmagazine *Le Point* quoted “concordant” Algerian and French sources as suggesting that the President’s condition when he was admitted to Val-de-Grâce was far worse than stated in the official announcement and that “certain vital functions are badly affected”, and on May 19, Algerian French-language daily *Mon Journal* and its Arabic-language sister publication *Jaridati* claimed that Bouteflika, suffering from cancer as well as immunodeficiency and metabolic problems, had been secretly flown back to Algeria in a coma four days previously. On May 21, French daily *Le Parisien* quoted a member of the French government as saying that Bouteflika had been transferred from Val-de-Grâce to the Institution Nationale des Invalides, another French military hospital that specialises in treating the war-wounded and the severely handicapped, for “convalescence” (which was later partially confirmed by the French Defence Ministry).

To be sure, the official version – as expressed by Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and presidential advisor Farouk Ksentini – remains that Bouteflika the President, “whose life was never in danger and whose health is improving day by day” is resting at his doctors’ insistence but nonetheless “continues to follow the daily operations of government, pending his return to continue his mission in the service of Algeria and the nation”. This is essentially the same line as we had been given, in private, by a staffer at El Mouradia presidential palace since the beginning of Bouteflika’s hospitalisation: the President had suffered a very minor stroke which was by no means life-threatening and had been promptly dealt with, and had been told to rest by his doctors; speaking
to us again on May 15, the same source claimed that Bouteflika had made a full recovery and had been due to return that very day, but had postponed “for 24 hours” (the source ventured no explanation for this). But the longer Bouteflika’s return is postponed, the less convincing such reassurances sound.

Thus, even if Bouteflika is not physically dying, his political death seems increasingly probable. It is telling that – in contrast with his previous hospitalisation at Val-de-Grâce in November 2005 (for a bleeding ulcer), when gushing messages wishing him a speedy recovery and a swift return to his position at the helm of the state were de rigueur for almost all mainstream politicians and parties – Algeria's political class, and in particular the two main government parties, the RND and the FLN, have this time remained entirely silent throughout his hospitalisation. As if uncertain of what is expected of them, party leaders have been refusing to make the slightest comment on the matter to the press. This is far from the reaction one might have expected had the fourth term been a 'done deal' within the ruling establishment. Even more explicitly, former Navy Commander Gen. Mohand Tahar Yala, who last year founded a political grouping he calls the Citizenship Movement, on May 19 penned a violent attack on Bouteflika that was published by Algerian daily El Watan and news portal Algérie Focus, in which he accuses the President of “high treason” for his role in establishing a “predatory” system of corruption that has wasted and pillaged Algeria’s wealth[4] and calls for him to be removed from office immediately[5].

If, on the other hand, Bouteflika's condition really is as bad as has been suggested, the ruling establishment – and in particular Tewfik and the other senior officers of the DRS, together perhaps with the tops of the military – will have had time to prepare for his disappearance and deal with its consequences. Indeed, if our sources are correct when they suggest that the DRS top brass have been actively striving to prevent Bouteflika running for a fourth term, the most awkward scenario for Tewfik et al might, paradoxically, be for Bouteflika to make a full recovery as promised and return in fighting form.

Foreign Relations

Algeria has tightened security on its western border with Morocco, establishing 24 new monitoring points to combat smuggling of subsidised food products and fuel, Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia announced at a press conference on May 13. Ould Kablia slammed what he termed the "passivity" of the Moroccan authorities with regard to cross-border smuggling:

We are doubly penalized. The smugglers take fuel out of the country and bring drugs in. We are forced to import fuel oil, pending the
While the new anti-smuggling measures undoubtedly do constitute a response (albeit an inadequate one) to a very real problem, Ould Kablia’s public grumbling about the attitude of the Moroccan authorities may also be in part politically motivated. As we noted in our last report, the Bouteflika camp, of which Ould Kablia is a key member, has every interest in amplifying traditional points of discord between Algeria and Morocco in order to prevent the question of inter-Maghreb relations and normalisation with Rabat gaining any traction in the run-up the 2014 presidential election. In a telling contrast, at the same press conference Ould Kablia tended to downplay problems on the borders with Libya and Tunisia.

The danger to the east is, however, far greater. Indeed, Algeria’s border with Morocco is in most respects its least troublesome frontier these days, the perennial problem of smuggling notwithstanding. The French-led military intervention in northern Mali has pushed AQMI and its allies right up to the Malian-Algerian border, where incursions and clashes have been frequent. The 1,000 km long border with Libya has theoretically been closed since the war of 2011, but it remains impossible to shut the jihadists out entirely, even after security was supposedly enhanced in the wake of the In Amenas attack. And now the situation in north-west Tunisia is taking a turn for the worse, prompting the Algerian authorities to close the border with Tunisia too.

Back in December of last year, armed islamists clashed with the Tunisian gendarmerie in Djebel Chaambi, near Kasserine, close to the Algerian border, killing one gendarme and wounding three others. Eleven days later, the Tunisian Interior Minister announced that a training camp “run by three Algerians close to AQMI leader Abou Mossaâb Abdelouadoud” had been discovered in the area; some 16 armed islamists, among them three Libyans, had been arrested, and another 18 were still at large. The jihadist groups were not stamped out, however, and in late April the Tunisian military began a more concerted campaign against the armed groups in Djebel Chaambi and a smaller group further north in Djebel Salloum, also situated along the border. More than a dozen members of the Tunisian national guard and army were wounded, some of them severely, in the first half of May by landmines laid by the group to protect their encampments.

Publicly, Tunisian officials say the Djebel Chaambi group numbers no more than 20, a good half of them Algerian. Speaking to us in private, a Tunisian government security official estimated the number of terrorists in the Djebel Chaambi area at “200 individuals of various nationalities, but mostly from northern Mali and Libya”. Tunisian officials have suggested that the armed groups want to use the heavily wooded and inaccessible borderlands as a base for attacks elsewhere, perhaps on targets in Algeria, and although there has been no
official confirmation that jihadist groups in north-west Tunisia have launched cross-border raids, it is worth recalling an unusual incident in the north-eastern Algerian wilaya of Khenchela in February, in which by some accounts as many as 50 jihadists, "most of them Tunisians and Libyans", attempted to storm an Algerian army camp.

At the end of April, Gen. Rachid Ammar, chief of staff of the Tunisian armed forces, accompanied PM Ali Laarayedh on a visit to Algiers, during which they met with Gen. Ammar's opposite number, Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaid-Saleh. Flowing from this, a direct line of communication between ground and air operations in Algeria and Tunisia was reportedly set up to facilitate the exchange of information between the security services, while the Algerians presented their plans for expanded aerial surveillance along their eastern border to prevent the infiltration of armed groups as well as weapons smuggling across Tunisia from Libya[7]. By mid-May, the Algerian army had reportedly deployed more than 6,000 troops on the Tunisian border (eight brigades of regular troops and special forces).

The Tunisian government security official quoted above argues that what the Tunisian and Algerian armies are fighting in north-west Tunisia is:

the military wing of a broader Salafist-Jihadist movement spanning Tunisian mosques, whose membership is estimated at 35,000 to 40,000. [...] In addition to their base camps in the mountains, their activities include recruitment, propaganda and fundraising in mosques. We are in a situation similar to that of Algeria in the early 90s — except that Tunisia is ill prepared to deal with it. Security officials have asked their political superiors to activate the security treaty signed with Algeria in 1983 and the Algerians have replied favourably. They closed their borders and put their intelligence resources (human and technological) at Tunisia's disposal, but that appears to be insufficient and there is a request underway for Algeria to extend the terms of the 1983 treaty to include cooperation in personnel and materiel. To put it bluntly, we want the Algerians to send us units and equipment to control the whole mountainous border area. The Tunisian army lacks the necessary equipment (anti-mine gear, night-vision, infrared sights, etc), and what it has is old and not serviceable. As soon as the Algerians take charge of the border areas, Tunisian army and security forces units will take care of Salafist-Jihadists inside the country. In addition to the shortage of equipment, Tunisian forces are hampered by a wobbly political class and the lack of a firm grip on domestic threats. It is likely the jihadists will seek revenge for the army’s operations in Djebel Chaambi by carrying out attacks in the cities. The political class and civil society organisations appear to underestimate the threat.

If such pessimistic forecasts to the east are even partly confirmed, sections of the Algerian establishment – and notably the military – are likely to find themselves all the more inclined to appreciate the relative stability of their western neighbour in the coming period.

Security

After a period of several months in which its presence in the north of Algeria appeared to be waning, AQMI's activity picked up notably in late April and early May. The last week of April was the busiest in terms of jihadist activity since early July 2012, and the whole month was the busiest since August 2012. Fourteen jihadist operations were recorded in April (up from seven in March, seven in February and eight in January) and six in the first half of May. The security forces initially lagged behind, with only seven operations reported in April (comparable to March) but appear to have stepped up their efforts in May, with eight operations recorded in the first half of the month.

ALGIERS and its environs remained quiet. The most noteworthy incidents in northern Algeria took place in the WEST[8]. During the night of April 20-21, a jihadist group attacked a convoy of Italian staff heading to a work site near Theniet el-Had, between the wilayas of Aïn Defla and Tissemsilt. The attackers first shelled the convoy with home-made mortars (heb heb) and then attacked directly, but the gendarmes escorting the convoy fired back and repulsed them, according to London-based According to Al-Qods Al-Arabi. It is believed the jihadists were trying to kidnap the Italian staff. Three gendarmes were wounded in the operation but none of the
foreign nationals were hurt\[9\]. Also of note was the arrest by the security forces two jihadists in the town of Chlef on May 3, one of whom was found to be carrying a suicide belt according to the Algerian press – an indication that suicide bombings remain a possibility in the north of country, despite a lull in the use of this tactic.

The oil and gas producing regions of the SOUTH saw at least three incidents. On April 24 armed men attacked a civil engineering team working on the road between Hassi Messaoud and El-Oued and made away with an offroader. A force of gendarmes chased the assailants, forcing them to abandon the vehicle, according to the Algerian press. The recurrent carjackings and acts of brigandry around Hassi Messaoud notably indicate security is still not optimal in the region (El Watan on May 11 published a long article on “exceptional security measures” in the town, but a close reading shows these are aimed mostly at angry local protesters calling for jobs, not against jihadist activity). Near In Amenas, wilaya of Illizi, the security forces arrested a group of “Libyan terrorists” driving an offroader, Algeria’s privately owned Ennahar TV claimed on May 8 (the station did not give the exact date or any further details on the incident). Two other Libyans travelling in a 4WD vehicle were arrested by the Algerian security forces inside Algerian territory near Debdeb, wilaya of Illizi, on or around May 17. They were found to be carrying Kalashnikovs and satellite phones.

Elsewhere in the south, an Algerian army position near Tinzaouatin, wilaya of Tamanrasset, on the border with Mali, was hit by “rocket shells” from Mali on April 25 and riposted by shelling over the border. El-Khabar (27/04) reported that the attack was the work of “jihadist groups” and had “nothing to do with French or Chadian forces in northern Mali”. Two days later, the army killed two “armed men” who were trying to cross into Algeria from Mali near Tinzaouatin (El-Khabar 28/04). On the border with Libya, the Algerian army clashed with a jihadist group near Djanet, wilaya of Illizi, on April 26, an operation that left two jihadists dead and two soldiers wounded according to El-Khabar (27/04), while Echorouk reported that the operation started when Algerian army surveillance aircraft spotted a convoy of four offroaders with armed men on board that tried to cross into Algerian territory from Libya. The Algerian press also reported that a “heavily armed group” attacked and robbed the post office at Bordj Baji Mokhtar (wilaya of Adrar) on May 13 and “fled over the border into Mali”, although the next day the Gendarmerie issued a statement describing the event as a “criminal robbery” and ruling out “any terrorist involvement”.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[2] This is, however, dismissed by another source with close knowledge of the workings of the DRS, who argues that Tewfik, having received his formative training from the KGB in the Soviet Union, has as his model the founder of the Cheka (the KGB's forerunner) Felix Dzerzhinsky, who worked on through years of illness and died of a heart attack after delivering a speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
[3] Publication was blocked by the authorities at the last minute, and the papers’ proprietor Hichem Aboud has reportedly been charged with
“harming state security”. Aboud, who was once editor in chief of the Army's mouthpiece *El Djeïch*, is thought to have ties to the DRS and/or sections of the military hierarchy.

[4] In 2012, Gen. Tahar Yala issued at least two statements in the name of his new organisation and gave a number of interviews in which he called for “radical change” but did not hold forth at length on the theme of corruption and carefully avoided attacking Bouteflika personally.

[5] Although Gen. Tahar Yala does not suggest it explicitly, one option might be impeachment under article 88 of the constitution, which allows for a sitting head of state to be removed on grounds of “serious and lasting illness”. This possibility has been floated in the last few days by dissident human rights lawyer Ali Yahia Abdenour.

[6] "The security of [Tunisia and Libya] is a matter for those countries. I will not comment. We secure our borders from within." There is no infiltration of terrorists from these countries, and "even if there are one or two, they are arrested very swiftly. The Tiguettourine incident will not happen again."

[7] Back in December, Algerian Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia visited Tunis for talks on security and border issues, while Algerian Gendarmerie Commander Maj-Gen. Ahmed Boustila inspected new installations and units along the border with Tunisia (16 new advanced posts for the border guards, seven new intervention squads and an air squadron).

[8] Although most of north-west Algeria has been largely free of jihadist activity for several years, small groups remain active in the wilayas of Ain Defla, Chlef and Tipaza, responsible for one or two incidents every month.

[9] This incident was not reported this way in mainstream Algerian press. *El-Watan* (21/04) reported an APS story that “three gendarmes were wounded on April 21 by a roadside bomb explosion near Theniet el-Had”. No mention at all of foreign nationals. *El-Khabar* (22/04) reported “roadside bomb hits escort of foreign workers”, without giving details of the nature of the attack or the nationality of the foreign workers.
The Combative Consigliere

Will Susan Rice bring out a more muscular side of Barack Obama?

BY JAMES TRAUB | JUNE 6, 2013

After the White House announced that Susan Rice would be replacing Tom Donilon as the president's national security advisor, I asked a foreign policy analyst who is close to the White House if he thought the change in personnel portended a change in policy. "Sure," he said, sardonically. "Susan will bring her magic wand and solve every problem in the world through
intervention." He was mocking not Rice herself, but naïve activists who imagine that a more idealistic national security advisor will forge a more idealistic approach to the world.

More than four years in, Barack Obama has figured out what kind of foreign-policy president he wants to be -- less the visionary of the 2008 campaign than the faithful steward of national interests who closes out the ruinous misadventures of the post-9/11 era and husbands, rather than recklessly spends, America's limited resources. And it is reasonable to assume that this strategic recoupment will necessarily define Rice's tenure, whatever her personal convictions.

But I wonder if that's so. At first, after all, Secretary of State John Kerry looked a lot like his predecessor. Someone -- me, actually -- called him "Hillary Clinton in pants." But that hasn't been true at all. Hillary was an icon, with an iconic sense of her own role as America's face to the world; Kerry is a private figure enamored of back channels and shuttle diplomacy. Hillary was preoccupied with "cross-cutting" issues like the status of women; Kerry is a throwback who yearns to broker deals among sovereign states. And so he has frontally attacked deadlocked situations in Syria, Pakistan, and Palestine which his predecessor largely left to others. Good for him, I say.

Rice and Donilon are more obviously dissimilar. Donilon is a political insider with a deep regard for process, a man committed more to the neutral principle of ensuring that all voices are heard than to any specific policy outcome. He is a cautious man who wins the plaudits of foreign-policy realists for helping Obama steer clear of reckless entanglements, in Syria and elsewhere. Rice is a foreign-policy professional with deep convictions and a blithe self-assurance about her own judgments. She is a morally driven figure who makes those same realists uncomfortable. Michele Flournoy, the former under secretary of defense, says that Rice "may be more willing to take action in support of our values than many others would be who are more realpolitik."

The distinction is meaningful, but easily overdrawn. I once asked Rice if she considered herself idealistic, and she bridled. "'Idealistic' to me connotes believing in things or wanting things that are not achievable," she said. She would accept "principled," but she was fine with "pragmatic."

At the United Nations, where she has been the U.S. ambassador, she is known for aggressively pushing American interests, not global goods. Rice also has an extremely well-developed instinct for where the president wants to be on any given issue, and will not stray beyond his views. She will wave no magic wands of intervention. Yes, she pushed the president to intervene in Libya; but she has not done so with Syria. She did not, intriguingly, join Hillary and former CIA director David Petraeus and others in urging the president last year to arm the rebels.

So why does it matter that Susan Rice will be the next national security advisor rather than, say, the estimable Tony Blinken, the current deputy? Is it just a question of style -- of Rice's famously
short fuse, her battle-tested skills as a turf warrior, her special relationship with the president as a fellow African-Americansuperstar? All those things matter, and have already been subjected to a great deal of scrutiny (as in here, for example). But one senior administration official I spoke with said that the salient differences between Rice and Donilon are not in temperament but in outlook.

Again, think of the analogy with Kerry, whose travel schedule and pubic oratory give the impression that he is tugging the White House deeper into the Middle East at the very moment it is trying to leave the region's savage conflicts behind. Kerry isn't doing this because he's a lone wolf, but because he knows the region so well and is passionately committed to sorting out its problems. Susan Rice has a different, if overlapping, set of commitments. She spent much of the eight years between Democratic administrations at the Brookings Institution writing about the connection between weak and failing states and American national security -- and, yes, humanitarian intervention. The one issue she made her own as ambassador to the U.N. was nation-building and peacekeeping in Africa.

Both Rice and Kerry, in short, care deeply about the kind of intractable and generally unrewarding -- and morally urgent -- problems which have absorbed the energies of American statesmen since the end of the Cold War. The "pivot" to Asia, for which Donilon is given a good deal of credit, represents a recognition that the United States needs to prepare itself for both new opportunities and new threats in the region; but also a national exhaustion, even disgust, with the thankless task of peace-making, state-building, democracy promotion, and above all military intervention of the last generation. Americans don't want to meddle with the insides of countries any more.

But the Middle East is going to keep tugging at the American sleeve. What is Washington going to do if not just Syria, but also Lebanon and Iraq, slide deeper into sectarian warfare? What if declining oil prices destabilize Saudi Arabia, or a third intifada breaks out in Palestine? The African success story is real; but so, at the same time, is state failure in much of the continent. In Dispensable Nation, Vali Nasr harshly criticizes Obama for favoring drones and counterinsurgency over diplomacy and development, and mocks the pivot to Asia as a kind of escapist fantasy. It's a one-sided narrative, but there's a lot of merit in it.

So I wonder if Rice will rebalance the rebalancing, and remind Obama that America can not walk away from the world's weak and failing places. Egypt and Libya need the United States, no matter how vexing they are; and Washington needs to let Egypt's president, Mohammed Morsi, know that cracking down on Hamas will not be enough to buy American goodwill if he continues cracking down on his domestic opposition as well.

Meanwhile, the rebels in Syria need the United States as well. Kerry has done Obama a favor by
arranging with Moscow to bring the two sides together in Geneva, and thus buy more time for U.S. inaction. But the conference is almost mathematically certain to fail -- if it is held at all -- and then Washington will have to choose between obviously futile diplomatic encouragement and some form of military assistance, whether facilitated or provided directly. Is it such a foregone conclusion that Obama will continue to stand by as the body count mounts towards 100,000? The wisdom of restraint may come to feel intolerably craven. And Rice -- and Kerry -- may wind up urging him to arm the rebels. They might even work together!

The Barack Obama we have come to know over the last four years is a deeply cautious man with an acute awareness of how noble-sounding missions can miscarry disastrously. And the economic failure he inherited has compelled him to argue for "nation-building at home" rather than abroad. But he is a complex man with an ambitious sense of his nation's destiny, and his own. Tom Donilon reinforced one side of Obama. Perhaps Susan Rice will reinforce the other.
Please note that attached are the final reports for both the Fez synagogue and Gdeim Izik publicity and the results are extremely positive. The articles were published in thousands of US newspapers, much like AP, UPI or Reuters publishes, when one article is circulated through all of their outlets. In this case we use the NAPS news service, which is highly effective. We are very pleased with the results and hope you are too. See summaries below, as well as the full reports, attached.

Fez Synagogue:

**Media/Web Coverage Highlights**

- **NAPS ARTICLE** – 2,100 US newspaper placements for “Morocco: An Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity,” written by MACP, and published in all 50 US states (see list below). Combined print and online audience exceeded 17.5 million readers, and the article appeared in 79 of the top 100 US media markets.

- **MOROCCO ON THE MOVE** – Ten news and blog columns were posted to Morocco on the Move, and then republished by Middle East Online, allAfrica.com, Atlas Times, and elsewhere, resulting in almost 200 total placements and more than 2 million media impressions.

- **PRESS RELEASES** – Two releases were distributed on PR Newswire, which were picked up and posted by 545 media outlets on Feb. 14th and 25th, 2013 (listed alphabetically at end of report), including major media such as the Wall Street Journal, Houston Chronicle, Boston Globe, Miami Herald, Reuters, Yahoo News, and S.F. Chronicle.

- **E-LETTERS** – Both releases were distributed directly to MACP’s key contacts including more than 3,000 policymakers, opinion leaders, and journalists.

- **PITCHING REPORTERS** – Pitch calls and e-mails also went to hundreds of Jewish and general US media, driving dozens of additional stories.

- **RESULTS** – Generated more than 3,000 total media, Web placements and 60 million media impressions.

Gdeim Izik:

**Media/Web Coverage Highlights**

- **NAPS article** – 2,056 US newspaper placements for article, “Advancing Rule of Law in Morocco,” written by MACP, and published in all 50 US states (see listed below). The combined print and online audience was almost 8 million readers, and the article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets.

PR Newswire – Press Release distributed on PR Newswire, picked up and posted by 194 media outlets on Feb. 18, 2013 (listed alphabetically at end of the report), including major media such as the Wall Street Journal, Houston Chronicle, Boston Globe, Miami Herald, Reuters, Yahoo News, Columbus Dispatch and San Francisco Chronicle. The postings led to more than 250 total media and Web placements, generating more than 20 million media impressions.
Media Coverage Report

RE: Media Report on Restoration of Historic Synagogue in Fez

Pursuant to your request, this report provides a full breakout of US press coverage from the announcement of the restoration of the Slat al Fassiyine synagogue in Fez, to which King Mohammed VI delivered remarks.

On Feb. 13 a high-level delegation of Moroccan religious and government leaders came to Fez to inaugurate restoration of the historic Slat al Fassiyine synagogue — and underscore Morocco’s commitment to religious tolerance and honoring its 3,000 year old Jewish heritage. To highlight this important message in US outreach, MAC launched an intensive, multi-faceted communications effort that continues to generate results today.

On the eve of the event, MAC’s media team was already posting and tweeting from MOTM to alert reporters. The day of the ceremony, the MAC team went to work posting and tweeting to shape initial coverage and highlight the King’s remarks as the lead news of the day. The MAC team issued a Press Release to reporters and PR Newswire, “Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends Restoration of Historic Synagogue, Stresses Spiritual Diversity, Calls for Restoration of all Synagogues in Morocco,” to reach both print and online press. The Fez synagogue was also highlighted in a follow-up release, “King Mohammed VI Welcomes Bill Clinton to Morocco; Former US President Praises North African Nation’s Tolerance, Democratization,” which like the first was e-mailed to policy makers and opinion leaders and pitched to hundreds of reporters. Next, a longer-lead NAPS article, “Morocco: An Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity,” was sent to extend Morocco’s key messages to thousands of US newspapers. Highlights of the MAC communications campaign are below.

Media/Web Coverage Highlights

- **NAPS ARTICLE** – 2,100 US newspaper placements for “Morocco: An Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity,” written by MACP, and published in all 50 US states (see list below). Combined print and online audience exceeded 17.5 million readers, and the article appeared in 79 of the top 100 US media markets.

- **MOROCCO ON THE MOVE** – Ten news and blog columns were posted to Morocco on the Move, and then republished by Middle East Online, allAfrica.com, Atlas Times, and elsewhere, resulting in almost 200 total placements and more than 2 million media impressions.

- **PRESS RELEASES** – Two releases were distributed on PR Newswire, which were picked up and posted by 545 media outlets on Feb. 14th and 25th, 2013 (listed alphabetically at end of report), including major media such as the Wall Street Journal, Houston Chronicle, Boston Globe, Miami Herald, Reuters, Yahoo News, and S.F. Chronicle.

- **E-LETTERS** – Both releases were distributed directly to MACP’s key contacts including more than 3,000 policymakers, opinion leaders, and journalists.

- **PITCHING REPORTERS** – Pitch calls and e-mails also went to hundreds of Jewish and general US media, driving dozens of additional stories.

- **RESULTS** – Generated more than 3,000 total media, Web placements and 60 million media impressions.
Placements of NAPS Article – 2,100 US Newspapers, print/online

NAPS Article: “Morocco: Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity” (Feb. 21, 2013)

The final report for the NAPS article, “Morocco: An Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity,” shows it generated 2,100 placements in newspapers in all 50 US states (including those listed below). Combined print/online audience was 17.5 million readers (double our 1st NAPS article). The article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets, 79 of the top 100 markets, and 160 of the top 300 markets.

THE HOUR, NORWALK, CT
NJ.COM, NEWARK, NJ
HOMEREPORTERNEWS, BROOKLYN, NY
REGISTERSTAR, HUDSON, NY
DAILYFREEMAN, KINGSTON, NY
CATSKILLSHOPPERONLINE, LIBERTY, NY
IONIANNEWS, NEW ROCHELLE, NY
CHELSEAOW, NEW YORK, NY,
QCHRON, REGO PARK, NY,
BIGBEARGRIZZLY, BIG BEAR LAKE, CA,
DESSERTNEWS, CALIFORNIA CITY, CA,
CHAMPIONNEWSPAPERS, CHINO, CA,
COASTREPORTONLINE, COSTA MESA, CA,
FONTANAHERALDNEWS, FONTANA, CA,
HIGHLANDNEWS, HIGHLAND, CA,
LADOWNTOWNNEWS, LOS ANGELES, CA,
WAVENEWSPAPERS, LOS ANGELES, CA,
MALIBUTIMES, MALIBU, CA,
TBREWS, MANHATTAN BEACH, CA,
The POLYPOST, POMONA, CA,
PVNNEWS, ROLLING HILLS ESTATE, CA,
NEWSMIRROR, YUCAIPIA, CA,
JOURNAL-TOPICS, DES PLAINES, IL,
THEGILMANSTAR, GILMAN, IL,
HERSCHERPILLOT, HERSHEY, IL,
BUGLENEWSPAPERS, PLAINFIELD, IL,
HERALDARGUS, LA PORTE, IN,
THENEWSDISPATCH, MICHIGAN CITY, IN,
GILROYDISPATCH, GILROY, CA,
MORGANHILLTIMES, GILROY, CA,
SANBENITOCOUNTY TODAY, GILROY, CA,
NEWS.GOOGLE.COM, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
PACIFICSUN, SAN RAFAEL, CA,
SONOMA WEST, SEBASTOPOL, CA,
HOMETOWN-SHOPPER, UIKIAH, CA,
NEWARKPOSTONLINE, NEWARK, DE,
DELcotimes, PRIMOS, PA,
FOXBOROREPORTER, FOXBORO, MA,
CAPEANNPLANET, GLOUCESTER, MA,
HOME&NEWSHERE, READING, MA,
SENTINELSOURCE, KEENE, NH,
LEESBURG2DAY, LEESBURG, VA,
INSIDENOVA, MANASSAS, VA,
NORTHERNASPORTS, SPRINGFIELD, VA,
SUNGAZETTE, SPRINGFIELD, VA,
CLARKSVILLENWS, CLARKSVILLE, TX,
AIMITEXAS, DALLAS, TX,
DALLASWEEKLY, DALLAS, TX,
KAUFMANHERALD, KAUFMAN, TX,
DAILYTRIBUNE, MT PLEASANT, TX,
TERRELLTRIBUNE, TERRELL, TX,
ANTRIMREVIEW, BELLAIRE, MI,
ALVINSUN, ALVIN, TX,
THEANAHUACPROGRESS, ANAHUAC, TX,
BAYCITYTRIBUNE, BAY CITY, TX,
LEADER-NEWS, EL CAMPO, TX,
GALVESTONDAILYNEWS, GALVESTON, TX,
REDELEYEXPONENT, REDELEY, CA,
THEDINUBASENTINEL, REEDLEY, CA,
THESANGERHERALD, SANGER, CA,
WPCVA, CHATHAM, VA,
NEWSADVANCE, LYNCHBURG, VA,
SMITHMOUNTAINEAGLE, WITZ, VA,
PALLTIMES, OSWEGO, NY,
SKANEATELESJOURNAL, SKANEATELES, NY,
SOUTHCOUNTYLEADER, BIXBY, OK,
BALEDGER, BROKEN ARROW, OK,
CATOOSATIMES, CATOOSA, OK,
CLEVELANDAMERICAN, CLEVELAND, OK,
THECOLLINSVILLENW, COLLINSVILLE, OK,
COWETAAMERICAN, COWETA, OK,
GRANDLAKENEWS, GROVE, OK,
MIAMIOK, MIAMI, OK,
OWASSOREPORTER, OWASSO, OK,
SANDSPRINGSLEADER, SAND SPRINGS, OK,
SAPULPAHERALDONLINE, SAPULPA, OK,
SKLOATOOKJOURNAL, SKIATOOK, OK,
TULSABUSINESS, TULSA, OK,
WAGONERTRIBUNE, WAGONER, OK,
BENSONNEWS-SUN, BENSON, AZ,
GVNEWS, GREEN VALLEY, AZ,
EXPLORERNEWS, TUCSON, AZ,
INSIDETUCSONBUSINESS, TUCSON, AZ,
WILLCOXGLOBE, WILLCOX, AZ,
ELPASOONLINE, EL PASO, TX,
HARLANONLINE, HARLAN, IA,
ENTRPRISER, BELLINGHAM, WA,
DOANELINE, CRETE, NE,
DAILYNEBRASKAN, LINCOLN, NE,
CASS-NEWS, PLATSMOUTH, NE,
SEWARDINDEPENDENT, SEWARD, NE,
SANGRECHRONICLE, ANGELOTE, NM,
RIOGRANDESUN, ESPANOLA, NM,
气BOLABOONER, GRANTS, NM,
TAOSNEWS, TAOS, NM,
MICHIGANSTANDARD, BATON ROUGE, LA,
TCTIMES, FENTON, MI,
STANDARDBANNER, JEFFERSON CITY, TN,
JOURNALTRIBUNE, BIDDEFORD, ME,
DENNEWS, CHARLESTON, IL,
PARISBEACON, PARIS, IL,
ANNANER, ANNA, IL,
COURIERINDEPENDENT, CARTERVILLE, IL,
New Life for “Slat Al Fassiyine” synagogue in Fez

February 12, 2013 by Morocco On The Move

The project of the Slat Fassiyine synagogue in Fez is complete. This historic monument in the medina of Fez dating back to the XVIth century has been fully restored. Its inauguration will take place Wednesday, February 13 under the patronage of His Majesty King Mohammed VI and is organized by The Judeo-Moroccan Heritage Foundation (FPCJM) […]

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI commends ‘spiritual diversity’ at synagogue renewal in Fez

February 13, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

Agence France Press/AFP, by Fadel Senna (Fez, Morocco, Feb. 13, 2013) — King Mohammed VI hailed the “spiritual wealth and diversity” of Morocco at a ceremony on Wednesday to mark the end of the restoration of a 17th century synagogue in the city of Fez. The ceremony was held in the medina, the Old […]

King Hails Restoration of Synagogue, Urges Restoration for all Morocco Synagogues

February 14, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

** Click here for King Mohammed VI’s full remarks**

MACP (Washington, DC, Feb. 14, 2013) – In a message at the restoration ceremony of the 17th century Slat al Fassiyine Synagogue in Fez, HM King Mohammed VI reiterated his commitment to religious freedom and spiritual diversity, and emphasized the importance of the three-thousand-year-old Jewish legacy […]

Morocco Inaugurates Restored Synagogue In Push For Tolerance – Le Soir

February 18, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

LE SOIR/Worldcrunch, by Hassan Alaoui (Fez, Morocco, Feb. 18, 2013) – It had served over the years as a prison, a carpet factory and a boxing gym. But last week, the building in this ancient Moroccan city’s central medina was officially returned to its original incarnation: the Slat-al-Fassiyine synagogue was inaugurated by King Mohammed […]

King Mohammed VI Calls for Restoration of all Moroccan Synagogues – The Jewish Voice

February 20, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

The Jewish Voice, by JV staff (February 20, 2013) — In a message at the restoration ceremony of the 17th century Slat al Fassiyine Synagogue in Fez, HM King Mohammed VI reiterated his commitment to religious freedom and spiritual diversity, and emphasized the importance of the three-thousand-year-old Jewish legacy in Morocco. “As […]
Morocco: An emerging model for Muslim-Jewish relations – Common Ground

February 20, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

Common Ground, by Adina Friedman (Washington, DC, Feb. 19, 2013) – At a ceremony last Wednesday marking the end of the restoration of a 17th Century synagogue in Fez’s Old City, in a message read by Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, King Mohammed hailed Morocco’s “spiritual wealth and diversity” and its “values of coexistence, tolerance and [...]”

Bill Clinton hails Morocco’s tolerance, democratization – Middle East Online

February 25, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

Middle East Online (Washington, DC, Feb. 25, 2013) — Former US president Bill Clinton, who was on a private visit to Morocco, was received on Sunday in the Rabat royal palace by HM King Mohammed VI. The audience underscored the ties of friendship uniting the royal family and the Clinton family, and the good will [...]”

King Mohammed welcomes Bill Clinton, who lauds Morocco’s tolerance, democratization

February 25, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

*Click here for video highlights of former US President Bill Clinton’s visit to Morocco*

MACP, YouTube, MAP (Washington, DC, Feb. 25, 2013) – Former US president Bill Clinton, who was on a private visit to Morocco, was received on Sunday in the Rabat royal palace by HM King Mohammed VI. The audience underscored the friendship [...]”

Press Release: Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends…

February 14, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

CONTACT: Garth Neuffer, 202.470.2055 gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Thursday, February 14, 2013

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends Restoration of Historic Synagogue, Stresses Spiritual Diversity, Calls for Restoration of all Synagogues in Morocco

Washington, DC (Feb. 14, 2013) − In a message at the restoration ceremony of the 17th century Slat al Fassayine Synagogue in Fez, [...]”

Press Release: King Mohammed VI Welcomes Bill Clinton…

February 25, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

CONTACT: Garth Neuffer, 202.470.2055 gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Monday, February 25, 2013

King Mohammed VI Welcomes Bill Clinton to Morocco; Former US President Praises North African Nation’s Tolerance, Democratization

Washington, DC (Monday, Feb. 25, 2013) — Former US president Bill Clinton, who was on a private visit to Morocco, was received on Sunday in [...]”
MACP Releases on PR Newswire and Pitched to Reporters – Posts at 545 Major Media Outlets, 800+ Total Placements

MACP Press Releases:

- “Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends Restoration of Historic Synagogue, Stresses Spiritual Diversity, Calls for Restoration of all Synagogues in Morocco” (Feb. 14, 2013)
- “King Mohammed VI Welcomes Bill Clinton to Morocco; Former US President Praises N.African Nation’s Tolerance, Democratization” (Feb. 25)

aePiot News
AlipesNews
Alpha Exclusive
AlphaTrade Finance
Anchorage Daily News
AssignmentEditor.com
Atlanta Business Chronicle
Austin American-Statesman (Austin, TX)
Austin Business Journal
Baltimore Business Journal
Belleville News-Democrat
Best Growth Stock Market Report
Beyond The Dow
Birmingham Business Journal
Biz Daily (Singapore)
Biz Wire Express
Bizjournals.com, Inc.
boomerVilleUS.com
Boston Business Journal
Boston Globe
Brian’s Roar
Buffalo News (Buffalo, NY)
Business First of Buffalo
Business First of Columbus
Business First of Louisville
Business Journal of Greater Milwaukee
Business Journal of Phoenix
Business Journal of the Greater Triad Area
Business Review (Albany)
BusinessRockford
California Chronicle

Carlsbad Current-Argus (Carlsbad, NM)
Charlotte Business Journal
Chicago Business News
Cincinnati Business Courier
Cincinnati Enquirer
Codewit News
Columbus Dispatch
Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, GA)
Contra Costa Times
Crossover.co.ke (Magnificent Ltd/Kenya)
Daily Breeze (Torrance, CA)
Daily Herald
Dallas Business Journal
Dayton Business Journal
Dealbreaker
Denver Business Journal
Design 4 Law - Articles About Design And Law
Digital Journal
El Nuevo Herald
El Paso Times
eMoneyDaily
eZanga
Ezerin’Com Communication Agency
Farmington Daily Times (Farmington, NM)
Fayetteville Observer
Feed Head Lines
FinancialContent - PR Newswire
FindLaw Legal News
FinRoad
Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Fort Worth, TX)
Global Newsweek
Government News (Ulitzer)
Great American Financial Resources
GYL: Licensing and Certification Resource Directory
Health Care Enrichment Program
Houston Business Journal
Houston Chronicle
Human Rights Today
Idaho Statesman
Indianapolis Business Journal
Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (Ontario, CA)
inPixels
Inside Bay Area
International Business Times
International Development News Today
Investle
InvestorPoint.com
InvestTalk
Island Packet (Bluffton, SC)
iStockAnalyst
Jacksonville Business Journal
Kansas City Business Journal
Kansas City Star
KGO-TV ABC-7 (San Francisco, CA)
KING-TV NBC-5 (Seattle, WA)
KVOR 740-AM (Colorado Springs, CO)
Las Cruces Sun-News
Las Vegas Business Press
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Latest News Today
Lexington Herald-Leader (Lexington, KY)
Living by the Seasons
Long Beach Press-Telegram (Long Beach, CA)
Los Angeles Business from bizjournals
Los Angeles Daily News (Woodland Hills, CA)
Luso Financial Planning
Market Intelligence Center
Market Pulse
MarketWatch
Maxim Group
Memphis Business Journal
Miami Herald
Minneapolis / St. Paul Business Journal
Money Canada
Money Show
MrBayStreet.com
myMotherLode.com
Nashville Business Journal
New Mexico Business Weekly
New York Business Journal
News & Observer (Raleigh, NC)
News Info Guide
News Tribune (Tacoma, WA)
Newsday (Melville, NY)
NorthStar News
NorthWest Cable News (Seattle, WA)
Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK)
Olympian (Olympia, WA)
OnCuba Magazine
One News Page Global Edition
Orlando Business Journal
Pacific Business News
Pasadena Star-News (Pasadena, CA)
Pettinga Financial
Philadelphia Business Journal
Pittsburgh Business Times
Portland Business Journal
PR Newswire
Press-Enterprise
Puget Sound Business Journal
Record Publishing Company (Ravenna, OH)
Redlands Daily Facts (Redlands, CA)
ReleasePlus
Reuters
Ruidoso News (Ruidoso, NM)
Sacramento Bee
Sacramento Business Journal
San Antonio Business Journal
San Bernardino County Sun (San Bernardino, CA)
San Francisco Business Times
San Francisco Chronicle
San Gabriel Valley Tribune
San Jose Business Journal
San Jose Mercury News
Santa Cruz Sentinel (Santa Cruz, CA)
SiliconValley.com (Silicon Valley, CA)
Socialmulti
South Florida Business Journal
Spoke
St. Louis Business Journal
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN)
State House News Service (Affiliated Services)
Stocklink
StockNod
Street Insider
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS)
Tampa Bay Business Journal
TC Palm
Telegraph-Macon (Macon, GA)
The Bellingham Herald
The Daily Herald
The Herald
The HRIS World
The Online Investor
The Sacramento Bee
The State (Columbia, SC)
The Sun News (Myrtle Beach, SC)
TheStreet.com
Ticker Technologies
Times Union (Albany, NY)
Triangle Business Journal
Tribune (San Luis Obispo, CA)
Twitter (Ulitzer)
US Politics Today
Value Investing News
Vanguardia
Vertical Continuity Your Social Marketing Space
VisionMonday
Wall Street Journal
Wall Street Select
Washington Business Journal
Web 2.0 Journal
Web Lens
WFMZ
Whittier Daily News (Whittier, CA)
Wichita Business Journal
Wichita Eagle (Wichita, KS)
Worcester Telegram & Gazette
Worth
WR Hambrecht & Co.
WRAL-TV CBS-5 (Raleigh, NC)
WSBNN Wall Street Business News Network
Yahoo! Politics
Zecco
Two Weekly E-Letters

The MAC Communications team also sent the two press releases out directly as Weekly E-Letters to MAC’s contact list of more than 3,000 policy makers, opinion leaders, reporters, and other interested US audiences in the Washington, DC area.
Sampling of Jewish Press Coverage

The MAC Communications team contacted more than 100 US Jewish media outlets to generate additional coverage, which includes:

Here are the more prominent ones:

**Jewish Week New York**
http://www.thejewishweek.com/features/lens/fez-synagogue-reopens

**Jewish Ledger (CT)**
http://www.jewishledger.com/2013/02/morocco-restores-ancient-synagogue/

**Israel International News (Arutz 7)**
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/262244

**Intermountain Jewish News (CO)**
http://www.ijn.com/ijn-news/international/3769-fez-moroccos-synagogue-is-restored

**GreenProphet.com**
http://www.greenprophet.com/2013/02/all-moroccan-synagogues-to-be-renovated-says-king-mohammed-vi/

**Times of Israel**
http://www.timesofisrael.com/moroccos-islamist-pm-inaugurates-fez-synagogue/

**Euro Jewish Congress**

**Your Jewish News**
http://www.yourjewishnews.com/2013/02/25768.html

**Jewish People Around the World**

**JSpace.com**
Media Coverage Report
RE: Media Report on Restoration of Historic Synagogue in Fez

Pursuant to your request, this report provides a full breakout of US press coverage from the announcement of the restoration of the Slat al Fassiyine synagogue in Fez, to which King Mohammed VI delivered remarks.

On Feb. 13 a high-level delegation of Moroccan religious and government leaders came to Fez to inaugurate restoration of the historic Slat al Fassiyine synagogue—and underscore Morocco’s commitment to religious tolerance and honoring its 3,000 year old Jewish heritage. To highlight this important message in US outreach, MAC launched an intensive, multi-faceted communications effort that continues to generate results today.

On the eve of the event, MAC’s media team was already posting and tweeting from MOTM to alert reporters. The day of the ceremony, the MAC team went to work posting and tweeting to shape initial coverage and highlight the King’s remarks as the lead news of the day. The MAC team issued a Press Release to reporters and PR Newswire, “Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends Restoration of Historic Synagogue, Stresses Spiritual Diversity, Calls for Restoration of all Synagogues in Morocco,” to reach both print and online press. The Fez synagogue was also highlighted in a follow-up release, “King Mohammed VI Welcomes Bill Clinton to Morocco; Former US President Praises North African Nation’s Tolerance, Democratization,” which like the first was e-mailed to policy makers and opinion leaders and pitched to hundreds of reporters. Next, a longer-lead NAPS article, “Morocco: An Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity,” was sent to extend Morocco’s key messages to thousands of US newspapers. Highlights of the MAC communications campaign are below.

Media/Web Coverage Highlights

- **NAPS ARTICLE** – 2,100 US newspaper placements for “Morocco: An Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity,” written by MACP, and published in all 50 US states (see list below). Combined print and online audience exceeded 17.5 million readers, and the article appeared in 79 of the top 100 US media markets.

- **MOROCCO ON THE MOVE** – Ten news and blog columns were posted to Morocco on the Move, and then republished by Middle East Online, allAfrica.com, Atlas Times, and elsewhere, resulting in almost 200 total placements and more than 2 million media impressions.

- **PRESS RELEASES** – Two releases were distributed on PR Newswire, which were picked up and posted by 545 media outlets on Feb. 14th and 25th, 2013 (listed alphabetically at end of report), including major media such as the Wall Street Journal, Houston Chronicle, Boston Globe, Miami Herald, Reuters, Yahoo News, and S.F. Chronicle.

- **E-LETTERS** – Both releases were distributed directly to MACP’s key contacts including more than 3,000 policymakers, opinion leaders, and journalists.

- **PITCHING REPORTERS** – Pitch calls and e-mails also went to hundreds of Jewish and general US media, driving dozens of additional stories.

- **RESULTS** – Generated more than 3,000 total media, Web placements and 60 million media impressions.
Placements of NAPS Article – 2,100 US Newspapers, print-online

NAPS Article: “Morocco: Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity” (Feb. 21, 2013)

The final report for the NAPS article, “Morocco: An Oasis of Tolerance & Diversity,” shows it generated **2,100 placements** in newspapers in all 50 US states (including those listed below). Combined print/online audience was **17.5 million readers** (double our 1st NAPS article). The article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets, 79 of the top 100 markets, and 160 of the top 300 markets.

<p>| THE HOUR, NORWALK, CT |
| NJ.COM, NEWARK, NJ |
| HOMEREPORTERNEWS, BROOKLYN, NY |
| REGISTERSTAR, HUDSON, NY |
| DAILYFREEMAN, KINGSTON, NY |
| CATSKILLSHOPPERRONLINE, LIBERTY, NY |
| IONIANNEWS, NEW ROCHELLE, NY |
| CHELEASENOW, NEW YORK, NY, |
| QCHRON, REGO PARK, NY, |
| BIGBEARGRIZZLY, BIG BEAR LAKE, CA, |
| DESERTNEWS, CALIFORNIA CITY, CA, |
| CHAMPIONNEWSPAPERS, CHINO, CA, |
| COASTREPORTONLINE, COSTA MESA, CA, |
| FONTANAHERALDNS, FONTANA, CA, |
| HIGHLANDNEWS, HIGHLAND, CA, |
| LADOWNTOWNNEWS, LOS ANGELES, CA, |
| WAVENEWS, LOS ANGELES, CA, |
| MALIBUTIMES, MALIBU, CA, |
| TBRNEWS, MANHATTAN BEACH, CA, |
| THEPOLYPOST, POMONA, CA, |
| PVNEWS, ROLLING HILLS ESTATE, CA, |
| NEWSMIRROR, YUCAIPA, CA, |
| JOURNAL-TOPICS, DES PLAINES, IL, |
| THEGILMANSTAR, GILMAN, IL, |
| HERSCHERPILOT, HERSHEY, IL, |
| BUGLENWSPAPERS, PLAINFIELD, IL, |
| HERALDARGUS, LA PORTE, IN, |
| THENEWS DISPATCH, MICHIGAN CITY, IN, |
| GIRODISPATCH, GILROY, CA, |
| MORGANHILLTIMES, GILROY, CA, |
| SANBENITOCTOUNCITYTODAY, GILROY, CA, |
| NEWS.GOOGLE.COM, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA |
| PACIFICSUN, SAN RAFAEL, CA, |
| SONOMAWEST, SEBASTOPOL, CA, |
| HOMETOWN-SHOPPER, UKIAH, CA, |
| NEWARKPOSTONLINE, NEWARK, DE, |
| DELCOTIMES, PRIMOS, PA, |
| FOXBOROREPORTER, FOXBORO, MA, |
| CAPEANPLANET, GLOUCESTER, MA, |
| HOMENEWSHERE, READING, MA, |
| SENTINELSOURCE, KEENE, NH, |
| LEESBURG2DAY, LEESBURG, VA, |
| INSIDENOVA, MANASSAS, VA, |
| NORTHERNASPORTS, SPRINGFIELD, VA, |
| SUNGAZETTE, SPRINGFIELD, VA, |
| CLARKSVILLENEWS, CLARKSVILLE, TX, |
| AIMMEDIATEXAS, DALLAS, TX, |
| DALLASWEKLY, DALLAS, TX, |
| KAUFMANHERALD, KAUFMAN, TX, |
| DAILYTRIBUNE, MT PLEASANT, TX, |
| TERRELLTRIBUNE, TERRELL, TX, |
| ANTRIMREVIEW, BELLAIRE, MI, |
| ALVINSUN, ALVIN, TX, |
| THEANAHUACPROGRESS, ANAHUAC, TX, |
| BAYCITYTRIBUNE, BAY CITY, TX, |
| LEADER-NEWS, EL CAMPO, TX, |
| GALVESTONDAILYNEWS, GALVESTON, TX, |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Name</th>
<th>City, State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WMICENTRAL, SHOW LOW, AZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WICKENBURGSUN, WICKENBURG, AZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEBANONDAILYRECORD, LEBANON, MO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEMONITOR, MCALLEN, TX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICAZETTE, ANAPOLIS, ND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYEASTERNSHOREMD, EASTON, MD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STARDOM, EASTON, MD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECILDAILY, ELKTON, MD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYUPPERCHESAPEAKE, ELKTON, MD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEFLUME, BAILEY, CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAWLINSTIMES, RAWLINS, WY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COASTWEEKEND, ASTORIA, OR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAILYASTORIAN, ASTORIA, OR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEASIDE-SUN, SEASIDE, OR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEREFLECTOR, BATTLE GROUND, WA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINOOKOBERVER, LONG BEACH, WA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWSRECORD.ORGTN*, CINCINNATI, OH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERALD-ONLINE, LOUISBURG, KS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERALD-ONLINE, LOUISBURG, KS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDALIADEMOOCRAT, SEDALIA, MO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMITHVILLSHERMD, SMITHVILLE, MO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAPHIC-ONLINE, ST JOSEPH, MO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCNURSINGNEWS, ST JOSEPH, MO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWSPRESSNOW, ST JOSEPH, MO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLATETECHRONICLE, WESTON, MO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORESTHILLSMESSENGER, FORESTHILL, CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGCITIZEN, GALT, CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GALATHERALONLINE, GALT, CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEDGER-DISPATCH, JACKSON, CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNNA, SACRAMENTO, CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDTIMES, WATERTOWN, WI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWSEXAMINER, CONNERSVILLE, IN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRONICLE-TRIBUNE, MARION, IN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRCULATOR, PORTLAND, IN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELBYNEWS, SHELBYVILLE, IN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAREDOSBARGAINBOOK, LAREDO, TX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMTONLINE, LAREDO, TX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRCLEVILLETODAY, CIRCLEVILLE, OH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEOTHERPAPER, COLUMBUS, OH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGANDAILY, LOGAN, OH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOBOGALUSA, BOGALUSA, LA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMMONDSTAR, HAMMOND, LA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOBSERVEREVEUR, LA PLACE, LA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEHULLABALOO, NEW ORLEANS, LA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THESTTAMMANYNEWS, SLIDELL, LA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST-VOICE, BURGAW, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACHEVALLEYDAILY, UT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOABSSUNNEWS, MOAB, UT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOABSSUNNEWS, MOAB, UT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENRIVERSTAR, GREEN RIVER, WY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRANFORD7EVEN, BRANFORD, CT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNALINQUIRER, MANCHESTER, CT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLETOWNPRESS, MIDDLETOWN, CT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWNTIMESNEWS, SOUTHURY, CT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNCHRONICLE, NORTH ATTLEBORO, MA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWPORTRI, NEWPORT, RI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEPENDENTRI, WAKEFIELD, RI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCATREGISTER, GREENSBORO, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCGCAROLINIAN, GREENSBORO, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACONENWS, HILLSBOROUGH, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMESTOWNNEWS, JAMESTOWN, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTGOMERYHERALD, TROY, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNALNOW, WINSTON-SALEM, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLTIMES, GENEVA, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAUGHLINEERTAINER, LAUGHLIN, NV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTLANDLEADER, PORTLAND, TN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYSPARTANNEWS, SPARTA, TN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESSREGISTER, CLARKSDALE, MS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESROTTIMES, HERNANDO, MS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURCELLREGISTER, PURCELL, OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASSAUCOUNTYRECORD, CALLAHAN, FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASSAURECORD, CALLAHAN, FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBNEWSLEADER, FERNANDINA BEACH, FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LACICYREPORTER, LAKE CITY, FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEALMATIMES, ALMA, GA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEBLACKHEARTIMES, BLACKSHEAR, GA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOUGLASENTERPRISE, DOUGLAS, GA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEPRESS-SENTINEL, JESUP, GA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRDAILYHERALD, ROANOKE RAPIDS, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREDERICKSBURGTAVERN, FREDERICKSBURG, TX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONZALESINQUIRER, GONZALES, TX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEROTUNDAONLINE, FARMVILLE, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHSIDEMESSENGER, KEYSVILLE, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINCE GEORGE JOURNAL, P.GEORGE, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHMONDCITYNEWS, RICHMOND, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMESDISPATCH, RICHMOND, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VANCNEWS, SOUTH HILL, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE MONITOR, SUTHERLAND, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSSROADSCHRONICLE, CASHIERS, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEFRANKLINPRESS, FRANKLIN, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAYCOUNTYPROGRESS, HAYESVILLE, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEROKEESCOUT, MURPHY, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITCHELLNEWS, SPRUCE PINE, NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLINTONCHRONICLE, CLINTON, SC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHIPPEWAVALLEYMOMS, EAU CLAIRE, WI,  
FULTONDEMOCRAT, CANTON, IL,  
LEECOUNTYCOURIER, TUPELO, MS,  
THEINDEPENDENT, GRAND ISLAND, NE,  
LEXCH, LEXINGTON, NE,  
BRENBAMANNER, BREHAM, TX,  
WACOTRIB, WACO, TX,  
CENTRALWINES, ABBOTSFORD, WI,  
PRICECOUNTYDAILY, PHILLIPS, WI,  
ARCHERCOUNTYNEWS, ARCHER CNTY, TX  
THESUNFLOWER, WICHITA, TX,  
MBVISIT, CONWAY, SC,  
TRINITYJOURNAL, WEAVERVILLE, CA,  
CASCADECATTLEMAN, YREKA, CA,  
CASCADEHORSEMAN, YREKA, CA,  
SIDNEYHERALD, SIDNEY, MT,  
WILLISTONHERALD, WILLISTON, ND,  
TOPSAILVOICE, BURGAW, NC,  
STATEPORTVOICE, BURGAW, NC,  
WHITEVILLE, WHITEVILLE, NC,  
THECHARTONLINE, JOPLIN, MO,  
BELMONDNEWS, BELMOND, IA,  
THEWILLISTONTRAIDER, LAKESIDE, MT,  
DAILYTREADEOR, LUBBOCK, TX,  
THEDAILYCOURIER, GRANTS PASS, OR,  
DOOJO, ASHLAND, MO,  
COCOMOVOICE, BOONVILLE, MO,  
LAKEEXPO, LAURIE, MO,  
DAILYDEM, FORT MADISON, IA,  
DAILYGATE, KEBUK, IA,  
JOURNALPILOT, CARTHAGE, IL,  
PALMYRA-SPECTATOR, PALMYA, MO,  
EXPONENT-TELEGRAM, CLARKSBURG, WV,  
MOUNTAINSTATESMAN, GRAFTON, WV,  
DOTHANEAGLE, DOThan, AL,  
SOUTHEASTSUN, ENTERPRISE, AL,  
GREATWHITEENTERPRISES, OMRO, WI,  
FLORALA, FLORENCE, AL,  
MOULTONADVERTISER, MOULTON, AL,  
HICKORYRECORD, HICKORY, NC,  
JOURNALPATRIOT, N. WILKESBORO, NC,  
BROWNSVILLEHERALD, BROWNSVILLE, TX,  
VALLEYBARGAINBOOK, BROWNSVILLE, TX,  
VALLEYMORNINGSTAR, HARLINGEN, TX,  
HARRISONDAILYTIMES, HARRISON, AR,  
NEWTONCOUNTYTIMES, JASPER, AR,  
BOLIVARNEWS, BOLIVAR, MO,  
BUFFALOREFLEX, BUFFALO, MO,  
THELICKINGNEWS, LICKING, MO,  
MARSHFIELDMAIL, MARSHFIELD, MO,  
MARYSVILLEONLINE, MARSHFIELD, MO,  
NEWS-JOURNAL, MOUNTAIN GROVE, MO,  
REPUBLICMONENWS, REPUBLIC, MO,  
SOUTHCOUNTYMAIL, ROGERSVILLE, MO,  
WEBSTERCOUNTYTIMES, SEYMOUR, MO,  
CEDARREPUBLICAN, STOCKTON, MO,  
NAVIGATORTIMELAPER, ALBION, IL,  
SIDRADMERS, WEST FRANKFORT, IL,  
THEHOALSNEWS, SHOALS, IN,  
SUNCOMERCIAL, VINCENNES, IN,  
MCCLEANNEWS, CALHOUN, KY,  
THE-MESSENGER, MADISONVILLE, KY,  
MESSENGER-INQUIRER, OWENSBORO, KY,  
TIMESLEADER, PRINCETON, KY,  
THECORRYJOURNAL, CORRY, PA,  
TITUSVILLEHERALD, TITUSVILLE, PA,  
AUBURNVILLAGER, AUNURN, AL,  
ATHENSOSIOTODAY, ATHENS, OH,  
JACKSONCOUNTYDAILY, JACKSON, OH,  
PIKECOUNTYDAILY, WAVERY, OH,  
ANCHORAGEPRESS, ANCHORAGE, AK,  
FRONTIERSMAN, WASILLA, AK,  
PERRYVILLENWS, PERRYVILLE, MO,  
BIHIOPEER, SPEARFISH, SD,  
TIMBERLAKES.DAKOTA, TIMBER LAKE, SD,  
LAURELOUTLOOK, LAUREL, MT,  
DDTONLINE, GREENVILLE, MS,  
THERACQUETTE, POTSDAM, NY,  
TRI-PARISHTIMES, HOUMA, LA,  
PARAGOULDAILYPRESS, PARAGOULD, AR,  
RECORDGAZETTE, BANNING, CA,  
IMPERIALVALLEYNEWS.COM, HOLTVILLE, CA  
SANDIEGONEWSCAPE.COM, HOLTVILLE, CA  
YUMANENWSNOW.COM, HOLTVILLE, CA,  
DESERTENTERRAINER, PALM DESERT, CA,  
HIDESERTSTAR, YUCCA VALLEY, CA,  
LIBERTYCOUNTYTIMES, CHESTER, MT,  
CHOTEUAUCANTHA, CHOTEAU, MT,  
CUTBANKPIONEERPRESS, CUTBANK, MT,  
FAIRFIELDSUNTIMES, FAIRFIELD, MT,  
LEWISTOWNNEWS, LEWISTON, MT,  
MONTROSEPRESS, MONTROSE, CO,  
TELLURIDENEWS, TELLURIDE, CO,  
BROWNWOODTX, BROWNWOOD, TX,  
SAVANNAHREPORTER, SAVANNAH, MO,  
THECLAYTIMESJOURNAL, LINEVILLE, AL,  
THERANDOPHLLEADER, ROANOKE, AL,  
STARHERALD, SCOTTSBLUFF, NE,  
WYOSPORTS, CHEYENNE, WY,  
THEEAGLEPOST, HOPKINSVILLE, KY,  
KENTUCKYNEWERA, HOKINSVILLE, MO,  
JOURNALREVIEW, CRAWFORDSVILLE, IN,  
NEWSBUG, RENNSALER, IN,  
DOUGLAS-BUDGET, DOUGLAS, WY,  
DAILYPROGRESS, CHARLOTTEVILLE, VA,  
MCCHNESS, McCONNELSVILLE, OH,  
PERRYDAILY, NEW LEXINGTON, OH,  
MINICASSIA, BURLY, ID,  
ALBANEWS, ALBIA, IA,  
PORTLAVACAWAVE, PORT LAVACA, TX,  
NPTELEGRAPH, NORTH PLATTE, NE,  
DELTAWINDONLINE, DELTA JUNCTION, AK,  
NEWSMINER, FAIRBANKS, AK,  
STARNES, WAINwright, AB,  
THEESHELBYNEWS, SHELBYVILLE, IN,
New Life for “Slat Al Fassiyine” synagogue in Fez

February 12, 2013 by Morocco On The Move

The project of the Slat Fassiyine synagogue in Fez is complete. This historic monument in the medina of Fez dating back to the XVIth century has been fully restored. Its inauguration will take place Wednesday, February 13 under the patronage of His Majesty King Mohammed VI and is organized by The Judeo-Moroccan Heritage Foundation (FPCJM) [...]

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI commends ‘spiritual diversity’ at synagogue renewal in Fez

February 13, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

Agence France Press/AFP, by Fadel Senna (Fez, Morocco, Feb. 13, 2013) — King Mohammed VI hailed the “spiritual wealth and diversity” of Morocco at a ceremony on Wednesday to mark the end of the restoration of a 17th century synagogue in the city of Fez. The ceremony was held in the medina, the Old […]

King Hails Restoration of Synagogue, Urges Restoration for all Morocco Synagogues

February 14, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

** Click here for King Mohammed VI’s full remarks**

MACP (Washington, DC, Feb. 14, 2013) – In a message at the restoration ceremony of the 17th century Slat al Fassiyine Synagogue in Fez, HM King Mohammed VI reiterated his commitment to religious freedom and spiritual diversity, and emphasized the importance of the three-thousand-year-old Jewish legacy […]

Morocco Inaugurates Restored Synagogue In Push For Tolerance – Le Soir

February 18, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

LE SOIR/Worldcrunch, by Hassan Alaoui (Fez, Morocco, Feb. 18, 2013) – It had served over the years as a prison, a carpet factory and a boxing gym. But last week, the building in this ancient Moroccan city’s central medina was officially returned to its original incarnation: the Slat-al-Fassiyine synagogue was inaugurated by King Mohammed […]

King Mohammed VI Calls for Restoration of all Moroccan Synagogues – The Jewish Voice

February 20, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

The Jewish Voice, by JV staff (February 20, 2013) — In a message at the restoration ceremony of the 17th century Slat Al Fassiyine Synagogue in Fez, HM King Mohammed VI reiterated his commitment to religious freedom and spiritual diversity, and emphasized the importance of the three-thousand-year-old Jewish legacy in Morocco. “As […]
Morocco: An emerging model for Muslim-Jewish relations – Common Ground

February 20, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

Common Ground, by Adina Friedman (Washington, DC, Feb. 19, 2013) – At a ceremony last Wednesday marking the end of the restoration of a 17th Century synagogue in Fez’s Old City, in a message read by Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, King Mohammed hailed Morocco’s “spiritual wealth and diversity” and its “values of coexistence, tolerance and [...]”

Bill Clinton hails Morocco’s tolerance, democratization – Middle East Online

February 25, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

Middle East Online (Washington, DC, Feb. 25, 2013) — Former US president Bill Clinton, who was on a private visit to Morocco, was received on Sunday in the Rabat royal palace by HM King Mohammed VI. The audience underscored the ties of friendship uniting the royal family and the Clinton family, and the good will [...]”

King Mohammed welcomes Bill Clinton, who lauds Morocco’s tolerance, democratization

February 25, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

*Click here for video highlights of former US President Bill Clinton’s visit to Morocco*

MACP, YouTube, MAP (Washington, DC, Feb. 25, 2013) – Former US president Bill Clinton, who was on a private visit to Morocco, was received on Sunday in the Rabat royal palace by HM King Mohammed VI. The audience underscored the friendship [...]”

Press Release: Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends Restoration of Historic Synagogue, Stresses Spiritual Diversity, Calls for Restoration of all Synagogues in Morocco

February 14, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

CONTACT: Garth Neuffer, 202.470.2055 gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Thursday, February 14, 2013

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends Restoration of Historic Synagogue, Stresses Spiritual Diversity, Calls for Restoration of all Synagogues in Morocco

Washington, DC (Feb. 14, 2013) – In a message at the restoration ceremony of the 17th century Slat al Fassayine Synagogue in Fez, [...]”

Press Release: King Mohammed VI Welcomes Bill Clinton...
2 MACP Releases on PR Newswire and Pitched to Reporters—Posts at 545 Major Media Outlets, 800+ Total Placements

MACP Press Releases:

- “Morocco’s King Mohammed VI Commends Restoration of Historic Synagogue, Stresses Spiritual Diversity, Calls for Restoration of all Synagogues in Morocco” (Feb. 14, 2013)
- “King Mohammed VI Welcomes Bill Clinton to Morocco; Former US President Praises N.African Nation’s Tolerance, Democratization” (Feb. 25)

aePiot News
AlipesNews
Alpha Exclusive
AlphaTrade Finance
Anchorage Daily News
AssignmentEditor.com
Atlanta Business Chronicle
Austin American-Statesman (Austin, TX)
Austin Business Journal
Baltimore Business Journal
Belleville News-Democrat
Best Growth Stock Market Report
Beyond The Dow
Birmingham Business Journal
Biz Daily (Singapore)
Biz Wire Express
Bizjournals.com, Inc.
boomerVilleUS.com
Boston Business Journal
Boston Globe
Brian’s Roar
Buffalo News (Buffalo, NY)
Business First of Buffalo
Business First of Columbus
Business First of Louisville
Business Journal of Greater Milwaukee
Business Journal of Phoenix
Business Journal of the Greater Triad Area
Business Review (Albany)
BusinessRockford
California Chronicle

Carlsbad Current-Argus (Carlsbad, NM)
Charlotte Business Journal
Chicago Business News
Cincinnati Business Courier
Cincinnati Enquirer
Codewit News
OnCuba Magazine
One News Page Global Edition
Orlando Business Journal
Pacific Business News
Pasadena Star-News (Pasadena, CA)
Pettinga Financial
Philadelphia Business Journal
Pittsburgh Business Times
Portland Business Journal
PR Newswire
Press-Enterprise
Puget Sound Business Journal
Record Publishing Company (Ravenna, OH)
Redlands Daily Facts (Redlands, CA)
ReleasePlus
Reuters
Ruidoso News (Ruidoso, NM)
Sacramento Bee
Sacramento Business Journal
San Antonio Business Journal
San Bernardino County Sun (San Bernardino, CA)
San Francisco Business Times
San Francisco Chronicle
San Gabriel Valley Tribune
San Jose Business Journal
San Jose Mercury News
Santa Cruz Sentinel (Santa Cruz, CA)
SiliconValley.com (Silicon Valley, CA)
Socialmulti
South Florida Business Journal
Spoke
St. Louis Business Journal
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN)
State House News Service (Affiliated Services)
Stocklink
StockNod
Street Insider
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS)

Tampa Bay Business Journal
TC Palm
Telegraph-Macon (Macon, GA)
The Bellingham Herald
The Daily Herald
The Herald
The HRIS World
The Online Investor
The Sacramento Bee
The State (Columbia, SC)
The Sun News (Myrtle Beach, SC)
TheStreet.com
Ticker Technologies
Times Union (Albany, NY)
Triangle Business Journal
Tribune (San Luis Obispo, CA)
Twitter (Ullitzer)
US Politics Today
Value Investing News
Vanguardia
Vertical Continuity Your Social Marketing Space
VisionMonday
Wall Street Journal
Wall Street Select
Washington Business Journal
Web 2.0 Journal
Web Lens
WFMZ
Whittier Daily News (Whittier, CA)
Wichita Business Journal
Wichita Eagle (Wichita, KS)
Worcester Telegram & Gazette
Worth
WR Hambrecht & Co.
WRAL-TV CBS-5 (Raleigh, NC)
WSBNN Wall Street Business News Network
Yahoo! Politics
Zecco
Two Weekly E-Letters

The MAC Communications team also sent the two press releases out directly as Weekly E-Letters to MAC’s contact list of more than 3,000 policy makers, opinion leaders, reporters, and other interested US audiences in the Washington, DC area.
Sampling of Jewish Press Coverage

The MAC Communications team contacted more than 100 US Jewish media outlets to generate additional coverage, which includes:

Here are the more prominent ones:

Jewish Week New York
http://www.thejewishweek.com/features/lens/fez-synagogue-reopens

Jewish Ledger (CT)
http://www.jewishledger.com/2013/02/morocco-restores-ancient-synagogue/

Israel International News (Arutz 7)
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/262244

Intermountain Jewish News (CO)
http://www.ijn.com/ijn-news/international/3769-fez-moroccos-synagogue-is-restored

GreenProphet.com
http://www.greenprophet.com/2013/02/all-moroccan-synagogues-to-be-renovated-says-king-mohammed-vi/

Times of Israel
http://www.timesofisrael.com/moroccos-islamist-pm-inaugurates-fez-synagogue/

Euro Jewish Congress

Your Jewish News
http://www.yourjewishnews.com/2013/02/25768.html

Jewish People Around the World

JSpace.com
March 25, 2013

Media Coverage Report

RE: Media Report on the Gdeim Izik Trial and Sentencing

Pursuant to your request, this report provides you with a breakout of press coverage to date on the Gdeim Izik trial and sentencing in Rabat.

On Feb. 16, a Moroccan court handed down verdicts in the highly charged Gdeim Izik case, concluding an open and transparent judicial process, in the presence of more than 60 international observers from 11 countries and in accordance with Moroccan law, and finding 24 defendants guilty of murder, looting, and violence in the 2010 Laayoune riot that killed 11 policemen attempting to peacefully disperse a protest. More than a week prior, the MAC media team had begun posting and tweeting from MOTM to help shape the debate and set the stage for the court’s application of the rule of law to deliver justice in the case.

When the ruling came down on a Saturday night, the MAC team went to work, posting a story early Sunday to get into the weekend news cycle for US media. After reacting quickly to get the news on MOTM and in the MOTM twitter feed, the MAC team then issued a Press Release on PR Newswire, “Morocco Court Returns Verdicts in Gdeim Izik Case — International Observers Say Trial ‘Fair & Transparent’,” to drive publicity in both print and online spheres, and followed up with a longer-lead NAPS article, “Advancing Rule of Law in Morocco,” to extend Morocco’s key messages to thousands of newspapers across the US. The release and NAPS article formed the basis for MAC responses to inquiries and information to Hill offices, US media, and our other audiences in the policy community. Highlights of the MAC communications campaign are below.

Media/Web Coverage Highlights

- **NAPS article** — 2,056 US newspaper placements for article, “Advancing Rule of Law in Morocco,” written by MACP, and published in all 50 US states (see listed below). The combined print and online audience was almost 8 million readers, and the article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets.

- **Morocco On The Move** — Four postings of news and blog columns, including Feb. 8 commentary by MACP Executive Director Jordan Paul, “Transparency, Justice, and the Rule of Law in Morocco.” Republished by allAfrica.com, Atlas Times, Legal News, Sahara Question, and elsewhere, resulting in 150 total placements and more than 2 million media impressions.

- **PR Newswire** — Press Release distributed on PR Newswire, picked up and posted by 194 media outlets on Feb. 18, 2013 (listed alphabetically at end of the report), including major media such as the Wall Street Journal, Houston Chronicle, Boston Globe, Miami Herald, Reuters, Yahoo News, Columbus Dispatch and San Francisco Chronicle. The postings led to more than 250 total media and Web placements, generating more than 20 million media impressions.
Placements of NAPS Article – 2,056 US Newspapers, print/online

NAPS Article: “ADVANCING RULE OF LAW IN MOROCCO” (Feb. 21, 2013)

The final report for the NAPS article, “Advancing Rule of Law in Morocco,” shows it generated 2,056 placements in newspapers (including those listed below) in all 50 US states. The combined print and online audience was almost 8 million readers. The article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets, 79 of the top 100 markets, and 159 of the top 300 markets.

CAPITAL GAZETTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD
TIMES DISPATCH, RICHMOND, VA
NEW JERSEY.COM, NEWARK, NJ
HOME REPORTER NEWS, BROOKLYN, NY
NORFOLK DAILY NEWS, NORFOLK, VA
REGISTER STAR, HUDSON, NY
IONIAN NEWS, NEW ROCHELLE, NY
CHELSEA NOW, NEW YORK, NY
THE HOUR.COM, NORWALK, CT
DESSERT NEWS, CALIFORNIA CITY, CA
COAST REPORT ONLINE, COSTA MESA, CA
FONTANA HERALD NEWS, FONTANA, CA
HIGHLAND NEWS, HIGHLAND, CA
MOUNTAIN-NEWS, LAKE ARROWHEAD, CA
LA DOWNTOWN NEWS, LOS ANGELES, CA
MALIBU TIMES, MALIBU, CA
STAR DEMOCRAT, EASTON, MD
THE GILMAN STAR, GILMAN, IL
BUGLE NEWSPAPERS, PLAINFIELD, IL
HERALD ARGUS, LA PORTE, IN
THE NEWS DISPATCH, MICHIGAN CITY, IN
GILROY DISPATCH, GILROY, CA
SAN BENITO COUNTY TODAY, GILROY, CA
GOOGLE NEWS.COM, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
THE ATLANTA VOICE, ATLANTA, GA
PACIFIC SUN, SAN RAFAEL, CA
GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, GALVESTON, TX
NEWARK POST ONLINE, NEWARK, DE
EL NUEVO HERALDO, MIAMI, FL
FOXBORO REPORTER, FOXBORO, MA
SENTINEL SOURCE, KEENE, NH
TAOS NEWS, TAOS, NM
INSIDE NOVA, MANASSAS, VA
SUN GAZETTE, SPRINGFIELD, VA
CLARKSVILLE NEWS, CLARKSVILLE, TX
AIM MEDIA TEXAS, DALLAS, TX
DALLAS WEEKLY, DALLAS, TX
KAUFMAN HERALD, KAUFMAN, TX
DAILY TRIBUNE, MT PLEASANT, TX
BAY CITY TRIBUNE, BAY CITY, TX
LEADER-NEWS, EL CAMPO, TX
YOUR HOUSTON NEWS, HOUSTON, TX
DELCO TIMES, PRIMOS, PA
JOURNAL-SPECTATOR, WHARTON, TX
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, PLEASANTVILE, NJ
THE NEWS OBSERVER, BLUE RIDGE, GA
THE HARTWELL SUN, HARTWELL, GA
FRANKLIN COUNTY CITIZEN, LAVONIA, GA
NORTHWEST GEORGIA NEWS, ROME, GA
LEDGER NEWS, WOODSTOCK, GA
CLEVELAND JEWISH NEWS, BEACHWOOD, OH
THE POST NEWSPAPERS, MEDINA, OH
CHASKA HERALD, CHASKA, MN
EDEN PRAIRIE NEWS, EDEN PRAIRIE, MN
JORDAN NEWS, JORDAN, MN
INDEPENDENT REVIEW, LITCHFIELD, MN
CORONADO NEWS CA, CORONADO, CA
IMPERIAL BEACH NEWS CA, IMPERIAL BEACH, CA
THE INTELLIGENCER, EDWARDSVILLE, IL
THE JOURNAL-NEWS, HILLSBORO, IL
HERALD PUBS, MASCOUTAH, IL
OKAWVILLE TIMES, OKAWVILLE, IL
ST LOUIS AMERICAN, ST. LOUIS, MO
STEGEN HERALD, STE GENEVIEVE, MO
SULLIVAN JOURNAL, SULLIVAN, MO
SONOMA WEST, SEBASTOPOL, CA
E MISSOURIAN, WASHINGTON, MO
TIMES ONLINE, BEAVER, PA
HERALD STANDARD, UNIONTOWN, PA
MOHAVE DAILY NEWS, BULLHEAD CITY, AZ
HAVASU NEWS, LAKE HAVASU CITY, AZ
PARKER PIONEER, PARKER, AZ
LEBANON DAILY RECORD, LEBANON, MO
THE MONITOR, MCALLEN, TX
MY EASTERN SHORE MD, EASTON, MD
CECIL DAILY, ELKTON, MD
RAWLINS TIMES, RAWLINS, WY
COAST WEEKEND, ASTORIA, OR
DAILY ASTORIAN, ASTORIA, OR
SEASIDE-SUN, SEASIDE, OR
THE REFLECTOR, BATTLE GROUND, WA
CHINOOK OBSERVER, LONG BEACH, WA
NEWS RECORD, CINCINNATI, OH
HERALD-ONLINE, LOUISBURG, KS
REPUBLIC-ONLINE, PAOLA, KS
KEARNEY COURIER, KEARNEY, MO
LIBERTY TRIBUNE, LIBERTY, MO
SEDALIA DEMOCRAT, SEDALIA, MO
SMITHVILLE HERALD, SMITHVILLE, MO
NEWS PRESS NOW, ST JOSEPH, MO
BENTON COUNTY ENTERPRISE, WARSAW, MO
PLATTE CHRONICLE, WESTON, MO
FOREST HILLS MESSENGER, FORESTHILL, CA
EG CITIZEN, GALT, CA
GALT HERALD ONLINE, GALT, CA
THE WHEATLAND CITIZEN, WHEATLAND, CA
NEWS EXAMINER, CONNERSVILLE, IN
HARTFORD CITY NEWS TIMES, HARTFORD CITY, IN
INDIANAPOLIS Recorder, INDIANAPOLIS, IN
CHRONICLE-TRIBUNE, MARION, IN
SHELBY NEWS, SHELBYVILLE, IN
WINCHESTER NEWS GAZETTE, WINCHESTER, IN
CIRCLEVILLE TODAY, CIRCLEVILLE, OH
LOGAN DAILY, LOGAN, OH
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAMMOND STAR, HAMMOND, LA</td>
<td>THE FRANKLIN PRESS, FRANKLIN, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'OBSERVATEUR, LA PLACE, LA</td>
<td>CLAY COUNTY PROGRESS, HAYESVILLE, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THESTTAMMANYNEWS, SLIDELL, LA</td>
<td>CHEROKEE SCOUT, MURPHY, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST-VOICE, BURGAW, NC</td>
<td>MITCHELL NEWS, SPRUCE PINE, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELY NEWS, ELY, NV</td>
<td>CLINTON CHRONICLE, CLINTON, SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACHE VALLEY DAILY, LOGAN, UT</td>
<td>REEDLEY EXPONENT, REEDLEY, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOAB SUN NEWS, MOAB, UT</td>
<td>THE DINUBA SENTINEL, REEDLEY, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHFIELD REAPER, RICHFIELD, UT</td>
<td>THE SANGER HERALD, SANGER, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN RIVER STAR, GREEN RIVER, WY</td>
<td>NEWS ADVANCE, LYNCHBURG, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNAL INQUIRER, MANCHESTER, CT</td>
<td>SOUTH COUNTY LEADER, BIXBY, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLETOWN PRESS, MIDDLETOWN, CT</td>
<td>CATOOSA TIMES, CATOOSA, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWN TIMES NEWS, SOUTHBURY, CT</td>
<td>THE CLEVELAND AMERICAN, CLEVELAND, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SUN CHRONICLE, NORTH ATTLEBORO, MA</td>
<td>THE COLLINSVILLE NEWS, COLLINSVILLE, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMESTOWN NEWS, JAMESTOWN, NC</td>
<td>COWETA AMERICAN, COWETA, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTGOMERY HERALD, TROY, NC</td>
<td>GRAND LAKE NEWS, GROVE, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNAL NOW, WINSTON-SALEM, NC</td>
<td>MANNFORD EAGLE, MANNFORD, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTLAND LEADER, PORTLAND, TN</td>
<td>OWASSO REPORTER, OWASSO, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESS REGISTER, CLARKSDALE, MS</td>
<td>SAND SPRINGS LEADER, SAND SPRINGS, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESOTO TIMES, HERNANDO, MS</td>
<td>SAPULPA HERALD ONLINE, SAPULPA, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURCELL REGISTER, PURCELL, OK</td>
<td>TULSA BUSINESS, TULSA, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARBOR COUNTRY-NEWS, NEW BUFFALO, MI</td>
<td>WAGONER TRIBUNE, WAGONER, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASSAU COUNTY RECORD, CALLAHAN, FL</td>
<td>BENSON NEWS-SUN, BENSON, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASSAU RECORD, CALLAHAN, FL</td>
<td>EXPLORER NEWS, TUCSON, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAKE CITY REPORTER, LAKE CITY, FL</td>
<td>INSIDE TUCSON BUSINESS, TUCSON, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ALMA TIMES, ALMA, GA</td>
<td>WILLCOX RANGE NEWS, WILLCOX, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE BLACKSHEAR TIMES, BLACKSHEAR, GA</td>
<td>SOUTHWEST IOWA NEWS, COUNCIL BLUFFS, IA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOUGLAS ENTERPRISE, DOUGLAS, GA</td>
<td>OMAHA NEWSTAND, OMAHA, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLTON COUNTY HERALD, FOLKSTON, GA</td>
<td>SEWARD INDEPENDENT, SEWARD, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PRESS-SENTINEL, JESUP, GA</td>
<td>RIO GRANDE SUN, ESPANOLA, NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR DAILY HERALD, ROANOKE RAPIDS, NC</td>
<td>STANDARD BANNER, JEFFERSON CITY, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREDERICKSBURG STANDARD, FREDERICKSBURG, TX</td>
<td>JOURNAL TRIBUNE, BIDDEFORD, ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONZALES INQUIRER, GONZALES, TX</td>
<td>PARIS BEACON, PARIS, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHSIDE MESSESSER, KEYSVILLE, VA</td>
<td>ANNA NEWS, ANNA, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SMOKY MOUNTAIN TIMES, BRYSON CITY, NC</td>
<td>COURIER INDEPENDENT, CARTERVILLE, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSSROADS CHRONICLE, CASHIERS, NC</td>
<td>WAYNE CO JOURNAL BANNER, PIEDMONT, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELMOND NEWS, BELMOND, IA</td>
<td>THE CORRY JOURNAL, CORRY, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE DAILY COURIER, GRANTS PASS, OR</td>
<td>TITUSVILLE HERALD, TITUSVILLE, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAILY DEM, FORT MADISON, IA</td>
<td>ATHENS OHIO TODAY, ATHENS, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNAL PILOT, CARTHAGE, IL</td>
<td>JACKSON COUNTY DAILY, JACKSON, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALMYRA-SPECTATOR, PALMYA, MO</td>
<td>PIKE COUNTY DAILY, Waverly, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPONENT-TELEGRAM, CLARKSBURG, WV</td>
<td>ANCHORAGE E-PRESS, ANCHORAGE, AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTHAN EAGLE, DOTHAN, AL</td>
<td>FLATHEAD NEWS GROUP, COLUMBIA FALLS, MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHEAST SUN, ENTERPRISE, AL</td>
<td>RECORD GAZETTE, BANNING, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HICKORY RECORD, HICKORY, NC</td>
<td>IMPERIAL VALLEY NEWS, HOLTVILLE, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNAL PATRIOT, NORTH WILKESBORO, NC</td>
<td>SAN DIEGO NEWSCAPE, HOLTVILLE, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWNSVILLE HERALD, BROWNSVILLE, TX</td>
<td>YUMA NEWS NOW, HOLTVILLE, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VALLEY MORNING STAR, HARLINGEN, TX</td>
<td>DESERT ENTERTAINER, PALM DESERT, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARRISON DAILY TIMES, HARRISON, AR</td>
<td>HI DESERT STAR, YUCCA VALLEY, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWTON COUNTY TIMES, JASPER, AR</td>
<td>LIBERTY COUNTY TIMES, CHESTER, MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAWRENCE COUNTY RECORD, MOUNT VERNON, MO</td>
<td>FAIRFIELD SUN TIMES, FAIRFIELD, MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWS-JOURNAL, MOUNTAIN GROVE, MO</td>
<td>LEWISTOWN NEWS, LEWISTON, MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH COUNTY MAIL, ROGERSVILLE, MO</td>
<td>MONTROSE PRESS, MONTROSE, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEBSTER COUNTY CITIZEN, SEYMOUR, MO</td>
<td>TELLURIDE NEWS, TELLURIDE, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE STANDARD, SPRINGFIELD, MO</td>
<td>THE SAVANNAH REPORTER, SAVANNAH, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PULASKI COUNTY MIRROR, ST. ROBERT, MO</td>
<td>THE RANDOLPH LEADER, ROANOKE, AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAR REPUBLICAN, STOCKTON, MO</td>
<td>STAR HERALD, SCOTTSBLUFF, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVIGATOR JOURNAL, ALBION, IL</td>
<td>THE EAGLE POST, HOPKINSVILLE, KY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SHOALS NEWS, SHOALS, IN</td>
<td>JOURNAL REVIEW, CRAWFORDSVILLE, IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MESSENGER-INQUIRER, OWENSBORO, KY</td>
<td>DAILY PROGRESS, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMES LEADER, PRINCETON, KY</td>
<td>PERRY DAILY, NEW LEXINGTON, OH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MOROCCO ON THE MOVE – 4 Postings of News & Blog Columns, Republished for 150 Total Placements

TRANSPARENCY, JUSTICE, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN MOROCCO – JORDAN PAUL, MACP

February 8, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

MACP, by Jordan Paul (Washington, DC, Feb. 8, 2013) – The Moroccan government has invited judges, lawyers, human rights activists, and reporters – from Morocco and around the world – to observe the trial, beginning today in Rabat, of 24 defendants charged with inciting violent riots that led to the brutal killing [...]

MOROCCAN COURT HANDS DOWN SENTENCES IN GDEIM IZIK CASE; INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS CALL “JUST” – MIDDLE EAST ONLINE

February 17, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

**International, Moroccan observers confirm sentences are ‘just and in accordance with requirements of fairness and transparency’**

Middle East Online (Rabat, Morocco, Feb. 17, 2013) – A Moroccan military court on Sunday handed prison sentences, including life terms, to a group of individuals accused of killing members of the security forces in the Western Sahara in 2010. [...]

MOROCCO COURT RETURNS GDEIM IZIK VERDICTS – INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS SAY TRIAL ‘FAIR & TRANSPARENT’

February 18, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

MACP (Rabat, Morocco, Feb. 18, 2013) — On Saturday night, a Moroccan court handed down verdicts in the highly charged Gdeim Izik case, concluding an open and transparent judicial process. In the presence of more than 60 international observers from 11 countries and in accordance with Moroccan law, 24 defendants were found guilty and sentenced [...]

PRESS RELEASE: MOROCCO COURT RETURNS VERDICTS...

February 18, 2013 by Morocco on the Move

CONTACT: Garth Neuffer, 202.470.2055 gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Monday, February 18, 2013

Morocco Court Returns Verdicts On Gdeim Izik - International Observers Say Trial ‘Fair, Transparent’
Rabat, Morocco (Feb. 18, 2013) — On Saturday night, a Moroccan court handed down verdicts in the highly charged Gdeim Izik case, concluding an open and transparent judicial [...]

Case 2:16-cr-00365 Document 212-4 Filed 06/02/19 Page 1218 of 1649
MACP Release on PR Newswire – Initial Posts at 194 Major Media Outlets, 250 Total Placements

MACP Press Release: “Morocco Court Returns Verdicts in Gdeim Izik Case – International Observers Say Trial ‘Fair and Transparent’” (Feb. 18, 2013)

aePiot News
AlipesNews
Alpha Exclusive
AlphaTrade Finance
AnchorAge Daily News
AssignmentEditor.com
Atlanta Business Chronicle
Austin American-Statesman (Austin, TX)
Austin Business Journal
Baltimore Business Journal
Belleville News-Democrat
Best Growth Stock Market Report
Beyond The Dow
Birmingham Business Journal
Biz Daily (Singapore)
Biz Wire Express
Bizjournals.com, Inc.
boomerVilleUS.com
Boston Business Journal
Boston Globe
Brian’s Roar
Buffalo News (Buffalo, NY)
Business First of Buffalo
Business First of Columbus
Business First of Louisville
Business Journal of Greater Milwaukee
Business Journal of Phoenix
Business Journal of the Greater Triad Area
Business Review (Albany)
BusinessRockford
California Chronicle
Carlsbad Current-Argus (Carlsbad, NM)
Charlotte Business Journal
Chicago Business News

Cincinnati Business Courier
Cincinnati Enquirer
Codenewswire
Columbus Dispatch
Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, GA)
Contra Costa Times
Crossover.co.ke (Magnificent Ltd/Kenya)
Daily Breeze (Torrance, CA)
Daily Herald
Dallas Business Journal
Dayton Business Journal
Dealbreaker
Denver Business Journal
Pettinga Financial
Philadelphia Business Journal
Pittsburgh Business Times
Portland Business Journal
PR Newswire
Press-Enterprise
Puget Sound Business Journal
Record Publishing Company (Ravenna, OH)
Redlands Daily Facts (Redlands, CA)
ReleasePlus
Reuters
Ruidoso News (Ruidoso, NM)
Sacramento Bee
Sacramento Business Journal
San Antonio Business Journal
San Bernardino County Sun (San Bernardino, CA)
San Francisco Business Times
San Francisco Chronicle
San Gabriel Valley Tribune
San Jose Business Journal
San Jose Mercury News
Santa Cruz Sentinel (Santa Cruz, CA)
SiliconValley.com (Silicon Valley, CA)
Socialmulti
South Florida Business Journal
Spoke
St. Louis Business Journal
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN)
State House News Service (Affiliated Services)
Stocklink
StockNod
Street Insider
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS)
Tampa Bay Business Journal
TC Palm
Telegraph-Macon (Macon, GA)
The Bellingham Herald
The Daily Herald
The Herald
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Islamists, secularists must co-operate, expert says</td>
<td>This is an interview with Jawad Kerdoudi, head of the Moroccan Institute of International Relations (IMRI), in which he discusses the future of democracy in the country. Open and free democracy is not something that can be legislated, and is instead a long-term process that must grow organically to take root in the Maghreb. The rise of Islamist parties is a trend that has sprung up throughout the entire region, and while there is cause to be cautious about Islamists coming to power (Iran is an example), in order to protect the development of democracy the secularist parties and the Islamist parties must learn to cooperate, such that Morocco will have an all-inclusive democratic process. Kerdoudi suggests that secularists make more of an effort to reach out to moderate Islamists who, like them, favor democratic processes. He also states that economic and social development in the country is crucial for the flourishing of democracy.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco signs migration deal with EU</td>
<td>Morocco and the European Union on Friday (June 7th) signed a cooperation agreement on migration and mobility, MAP reported. &quot;I am delighted that Morocco is the first country from the Mediterranean region to enter into a partnership of this kind with the EU,&quot; European Union Internal Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said after signing the accord in Luxembourg with Moroccan Foreign Minister Saadeddine El Othmani. Morocco and the EU will work together to combat illegal immigration and human trafficking. The EU will also begin facilitating visa procedures for certain groups of Moroccans, including students, researchers and business people.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakome</td>
<td>De l'absentéisme royal</td>
<td>This article criticizes the king for his frequent and extended absences from Morocco since the beginning of the year. It suggests that he is neglecting his royal duties by remaining in France while Morocco is in the middle of a political crisis, and that he may be in violation of the Moroccan Constitution. Translated from French</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakome</td>
<td>Finance islamique : le roi Mohammed VI, entre business et religion</td>
<td>Attijariwafa Bank, the banking affiliate of the royal holding company SNI, is in the top position in the Moroccan Islamic finance market. King Mohammed VI, in his position as Amir al-Mu’minin, will moreover decide the composition and the operating procedures of the &quot;Sharia Board,&quot; charged with controlling the conformity of future Islamic banks and their products on the Moroccan market. This article questions the potential conflict of interest inherent in the relationship between Attijariwafa and King Mohammed VI.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed VI between business and religion</td>
<td>June 13, 2013</td>
<td>Last Friday, Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane received Ahmed Mohammed Al Jarwan, President of the Arab parliament, who is visiting the capital city of Rabat for a regional symposium on citizens and parliament. The Moroccan prime minister highlighted the role the Arab parliament was playing in expressing opinions and aspirations of Arab people. Al Jarwan praised Morocco’s successes in maintaining peace and stability at national and regional levels.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Standard</td>
<td>Arab parliament’s president visits Morocco</td>
<td>June 8, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The View From Fez</td>
<td>Fes Forum - Second Session on the Role of Global Markets</td>
<td>June 9, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Maroc: L’Etat Prepare les Salafistes a Participer au Jeu Politique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Morocco: The State Prepares the Salafists to Participate in the Political Game</td>
<td>June 10, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco: Benkiraine does not Rule out Further Price Increases</td>
<td>And Benkiraine now worried about Salafists potentially gaining more government control. This is a familiar occurrence in Morocco; in 1997 a group of nine Islamists entered government under the reign of El Khatib. “With the Salafists, the same outcome is possible, it is only a matter of time.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Morocco/Spain: A New Ambassador in Rabat</th>
<th>June 10, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco/Spain: Un Nouvel Ambassadeur à Rabat</td>
<td>Just over a year after a drastic increase in fuel prices, Benkiraine returns to the scene stating that more increases in the pricing of consumer goods is imminent. He stated that the government &quot;could make painful but necessary [increases],&quot; adding that &quot;his government came to a crisis, which cannot be [solved with] smiles and increases in wages and pensions or lower prices.&quot; Benkiraine claims that the reform process will reap long-term macro-structural benefits despite short-term costs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Le Maroc est sixième producteur mondial d’huile d’olive</th>
<th>June 11, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco is the world’s sixth largest producer of olive oil</td>
<td>In 2010, Morocco was ranked the sixth largest supplier of olive oil. Its largest clients are the EU (50% of Morocco’s olive oil exports) and the US (37%). Over the past couple of years the Moroccan olive oil industry has not seen any growth, but olive oil production is a key focus of the Green Morocco Plan. The Plan hopes to update the Kingdom’s technology for producing olive oil in order to increase both the quantity and quality of production, which does not always meet international standards.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Armement : Israël a vendu du matériel électronique de pointe au Maroc et à l’Algérie</th>
<th>June 11, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On Tuesday, Ha’aretz published a report on Israel’s military exports, including a list of Muslim countries to which Israel has sold armaments, which were manufactured under a British label. This list included Morocco, Algeria, the UAE, Egypt, and Pakistan. The United States has also extended contracts to Israel to manufacture armaments to be sold to countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, and Iraq. To Morocco,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td><strong>Parlement : Le PJD veut plafonner les rémunérations des hauts fonctionnaires à 1,2 million dh par an</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parliament:</strong> The PJD wants to cap salaries of senior officials at 1.2 million dirhams per year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12, 2013</td>
<td>A PJD group in the lower chamber submitted a proposal June 7th of a bill that will have its first reading in the Commission of Finance and Economic Development. This law would be a way to avoid a potential remake of an earlier affair in which the former treasurer of the kingdom, Salaheddine Mezouar, and general treasurer, Bensouda, exchanged premiums. The proposition is essentially to reduce the increasing cost of salaries. From 2003-2012 salaries represented 35.6% of the general budget, increasing on average by 7% a year while the economy only increased by 4.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th><strong>Italie : Arrestation d’un Marocain soupçonné de terrorisme</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy:</strong> Arrest of a Moroccan suspected of Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12, 2013</td>
<td>Anas El Abboubi, alias Anas Abdu Shakur, 21, was arrested Wednesday morning in the northern Italian town of Brescia on suspicion of terrorism. According to the police report, el Abboubi had planned to attack a train station and a military barracks. He is also the head of the Italian branch if extremist group Sharia4. Four other Moroccans are under investigation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th><strong>Qatar Airways lance des vols directs entre Doha et Casablanca</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar Airways Launches Direct Flights between Doha and Casablanca</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13, 2013</td>
<td>According to an official release, “with the launch of the new service of direct flights, passengers in Asia-Pacific, South Asia and Middle East can now enjoy a unique connection via the Casablanca hub operator in Doha.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th><strong>Argenteuil : Les deux</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argenteuil:</strong> A second young, veiled Muslim woman was attacked in Argenteuil, and according to her lawyer these attackers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
agressions de femmes voilées pourraient être liées

Argenteuil: The two attacks against veiled women could be connected

June 13, 2013

AllAfrica

Morocco: UN Chief Committed to Negotiating a Solution in Western Sahara Conflict

June 10, 2013

After meeting with the head of the Polisario Front, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has reiterated the UN's prior assertions to assist both Morocco and the Polisario in negotiating a solution to the longtime dispute over the future status of the Western Sahara. UN Chief Ban also "expressed his concern over the increasing "frustration and vulnerability" that the absence of a settlement and the instability of the Sahel region have produced among young people in the refugee camps near Tindouf"--therefore pointing out the need for a solution for the future generations of the region.

AllAfrica

Morocco: UN Decolonization Committee Assesses Western Sahara Question

June 10, 2013

The UN Special Committee on Decolonization began its two week "Committee of 24" discussions to analyze the cases of the Falkland Islands, Puerto Rico, the Western Sahara, and other regions under contention. The meeting will consider the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and will especially evaluate the increasing need for the UN mission in Western Sahara, MINURSO, to monitor the human rights crises in the region.

AllAfrica

Morocco: Transferring Saharawi Political Prisoner Yahya Mohamed Hafed to Hospital

June 12, 2013

Sahrawi human rights activist Yahya Mohamed Hafed has been transferred from Ait Melloul prison to the Aianczykan regional hospital. He is suffering from a number of severe gastrointestinal conditions and will be closely monitored.

AllAfrica

Morocco: President of Republic Invites Ban Ki-Moon to Visit Western Sahara

June 12, 2013

Polisario Secretary General Mohammed Abdelaziz said on Tuesday, in a press conference in New York, that he has invited UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to visit Western Sahara to give a boost to the peace process. Abdelaziz said he met with Ban and "invited him to give more interest, more attention to Western Sahara." He urged Ban to visit the region, saying his presence "will be seen as encouraging for the peace effort and could contribute to easing tensions."

Reuters

IMF Thinks Morocco is too Hesitant Over Reform

June 12, 2013

An IMF delegation currently visiting Morocco has asserted that the government has been too hesitant in moving ahead with economic reforms. The IMF is encouraging Morocco to reform its subsidy and pension systems to cut public spending.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Article</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 10, 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>Benkiraine has responded: &quot;I have received them (The IMF delegation) and they said that our government is hesitant about reforms,&quot; Benkirane told a meeting of his Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD) on Sunday. &quot;I reassured them and I said that we are moving ahead with reforms at the right time.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2013</td>
<td>POMED</td>
<td>King Mohammed VI of Morocco has been in France since May, leaving the country’s government in a political deadlock after the opposition party, Istiqal, said it would withdraw from the Islamist PJD-led government coalition earlier that month. The King then called upon Istiqal’s leaders to request that they remain in the government until he returned. The King’s continued absence from Morocco also prevented him from meeting with Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his recent visit to the country. Some speculated that the snub was politically motivated, as Erdogan had dismissed Morocco in 2011 during his visit to the Arab Spring countries, while others said it was simply due to the king’s absence. During this visit, Erdogan expressed support for UN moderated talks to resolve the Western Sahara dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2013</td>
<td>NASDAQ</td>
<td>Kosmos Energy Inc has partnered with Atwood Oceanic Inc to begin a long-term drilling engagement off the coast of Morocco. The contract is set to last three years with a day rate of $595,000 and a total value of $652 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2013</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>Morocco will have difficulty cutting subsidies so long as oil prices stay high despite pressure from the IMF for structural reform. The General Affairs and Governance Minister of Morocco stated: &quot;If oil prices were to fall drastically, so would the size of the financial effort we would need to make to dismantle subsidies for fuels. As long as global commodity prices are high, the reform of the subsidy system will be difficult to implement.&quot; Last year, subsidies accounted for nearly 80% of Morocco’s deficit, therefore, when the IMF extended their line of credit, the government agreed to a set of economic reforms including subsidy, tax, and pension reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13, 2013</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>Morocco plans to more than triple its citrus fruit exports to 1.3 million metric tons by 2018 as a development program raises output, according to Ahmed Derrab, secretary general of industry group ASPAM. ASPAM represents 80% of Moroccan citrus producers. In the 1998-2011 period, Morocco’s total citrus exports averaged 528,000 tons a year, according to finance and economy ministry data. The EU, which Derrab said offers the highest margins for Moroccan citrus, accounts for 30 percent of its exports while Russia takes 50 percent, with the remainder going mainly to the U.S., Canada and Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2013</td>
<td>Brazil-Arab</td>
<td>The Arab Brazilian Chamber of commerce has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Moroccan Investment Promotion Agency to promote cooperation in investment and implementation of joint projects between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2013</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Qatar and UAE’s MSCI indicators have been upgraded from frontier market to emerging market status for the 2013 fiscal year whereas Morocco has been downgraded from emerging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
market back to frontier market. The MSCI indicator “is used by pension schemes and investors around the world to decide asset allocation and so a change in classification can have serious consequences for a country’s economy. An upgrade can potentially mean a much higher weighting of global assets are allocated towards a country’s index, therefore increasing foreign direct investment.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Polisario Front Praises Positions Expressed in Washington, New York, and Geneva June 16, 2013</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Polisario Front, during his recent visit to the U.S, released a statement praising the commitment and encouragement demonstrated by the international community towards the need to accelerate a just solution, which ensures self-determination for the Saharawi people. The Secretary general also expressed concern “over the escalation of human rights violations in the Saharawi occupied territories, calling for addressing the protection and monitoring of human rights in the Territory.”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: U.S. Encourages Negotiations Between Polisario Front and Morocco, says Sherman June 16, 2013</td>
<td>U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, released a statement in Algiers stating that the U.S. will support both the Polisario Front and Morocco in engaging in negotiations over the Western Sahara conflict. She stated that the U.S. encourages the settlement agreement between the two parties to &quot;work with the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization for a durable and credible solution acceptable by both parties.&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jakarta Post</td>
<td>Islam Brings Moroccans, Indonesians Closer June 17, 2013</td>
<td>Due to the strong interest of Indonesian students to study Islam in Moroccan universities, Morocco has offered over 200 scholarships for Indonesian students to study in Morocco. “If Indonesian Muslims visit Morocco, they will be very happy to see that there is no difference in the way Moroccans and Indonesians practice Islam. They will feel at home.”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Moroccan: 8 milliards de dirhams pour le prochain métro aérien de Casablanca</td>
<td>Announced a few weeks ago, the Skytrain project is currently in a study, with the work scheduled to begin in January 2014, the Moroccan weekly Eco Life reported Friday. According to the report, the subway should be ready in 2017 &quot;if all goes as planned.&quot; The new Skytrain will carry 400,000 passengers per day, significantly more than the 250,000 carried by the current tramway. <strong>Translated From French</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Crise en Espagne : +62% d'Espagnols envoyés au Maroc par leurs entreprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14, 2013</td>
<td>The number of Spaniards coming to Morocco for work has increased by 62% over the past two years, from 1637 in 2010 to 2660. Furthermore, according to a Spanish consultancy, many more Spaniards are believed to be working in Morocco without having registered. Abdelilah Benkirane declared that “there are many things to do for Spaniards in Morocco, and it will be a pleasure to receive our Spanish friends.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2013</td>
<td>Translated From French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Le Maroc lance la chasse aux immigrés clandestins, enfin de manière très courtoise pour les Européens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2013</td>
<td>Last year, Morocco required applicants for residence permits to provide a criminal record and a medical certificate. This year, the Ministry of the Interior recommended in very courteous terms, that Europeans who have exceeded the three-month stay granted tourists regularize their situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translated From French</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Afrique : Le Maroc a participé à une saisie record de faux médicaments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco participated, starting in April, in a customs operation to seize a record number of fake, and potentially deadly, medications. According to the World Customs Organization, 550 million fake drugs, including fake antibiotics, anti-inflammatories, blood pressure medication, and insulin, were seized. Besides Morocco, customs services of 22 other African countries took part in this operation, organized in partnership with the Institute for anti-counterfeit medicines (IRACM), including Algeria, South Africa, Senegal, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yabiladi</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sahara: Washington Revise sa Position et Salue, Depuis Algiers, le Plan d'Autonomie</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18, 2013</td>
<td>Wendy Sherman, deputy U.S. Secretary of State, has motioned that the Moroccan plan is a “credible option” in the negotiations over the Western Sahara. This is the first time that the Obama administration has appealed to the Moroccan initiative for the Western Sahara. This is a new development considering that two months ago, the U.S. conducted a sharply hostile policy in Morocco, when presented to the UN Security Council a draft resolution proposing to extend the mandate of MINURSO to monitor human rights in the Sahara. It was only after a diplomatic offensive by Morocco and its allies that Washington decided to withdraw its controversial project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Yabiladi</strong></th>
<th><strong>Pompage Solaire au Maroc: 400 Million Dirhams pour Developper le Projet</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 18, 2013</td>
<td>Morocco has raised 400 Million dirhams for the implementation of a national program to provide small and medium farms with solar power. The project, whose implementation is planned for the end of 2013, aims to install a park of 3,000 photovoltaic pumping systems, all for a combined installed capacity of 15 MW-Peak (power of a photovoltaic panel per unit time).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Yabiladi</strong></th>
<th><strong>Parlement : En pleine crise, Karim Ghellab accorde des primes à ses collaborateurs</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 19, 2013</td>
<td>“Budgetary rigor is not for everyone.” Ghellab, the Istiqlalien president of the chamber of representatives, last week gave bonuses to his close collaborators from the public budget ranging from 110,000-140,000 dh ($13,000-$16,500). Moroccan daily Assabah alleged that he had also been unwilling to negotiate his decision with opposition members of the chamber of representatives. This is not the first time the Moroccan government has managed its finances poorly; on the occasion of International Women’s Day Mohammed Biadallah offered his 150 female employes gold necklaces, and last April, after cutting the investment budget by 15 billion dirhams, Benkirane bought his ministers new BMWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Maroc-Algérie : Alger froissée par la manifestation pour l'ouverture de la frontière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19, 2013</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Maroc : Chabat annonce que sa rencontre avec le roi est prévue la semaine prochaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2013</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Maroc : Un homme condamné à 10 ans de prison pour pédophilie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2013</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Sahara: Mustapha Salma se Laisse Mourir de Faim pour sa Famille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara: Mustapha Salma On Hunger Strike to See his Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2013</td>
<td>Polisario dissident Mustapha Salma was rushed to the hospital yesterday after fainting. Salma has been on hunger strike for the past month in an act of protest against the Mauritanian government for not being allowed to enter the Tindouf refugee camps to see his family. He has been banned from Mauritania for two years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Le Maroc commence à réduire les subventions sur le pétrole et le sucre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco Begins Reduction of Sugar and Petrol Prices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21, 2013</td>
<td>The Minister of General Affairs announces cuts in public subsidies for commodities under pressure from the IMF. On the eve of Ramadan, a period generally known for increases in prices, the Moroccan government announced that it will begin to reduce government subsidies for basic staples. &quot;We will begin, in the next two weeks - before Ramadan - the automatic adjustment of prices for energy products and sugar, with the exception of city gas,&quot; said the Minister for General Affairs and governance, Mohamed Najib Boulif. The change would allow the government to lower subsidies by 20%, to be limited to 42 billion dirhams so that the public deficit remains within the specified limits for the 2013 budget.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFP</th>
<th>Morocco journalist convicted of defaming minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2013</td>
<td>Youssef Jajili, editor of the Al-Aan magazine, has been given a 2 month suspended prison sentence and fined 50,000 dirhams on charges of defamation. His magazine ran an article last year claiming that PJD Trade Minister Abdelkader Amara had used 10,000 dirhams of public money to pay for a lavish champagne ball in Burkina Faso. The PJD said that the magazine made “false claims,” using “false witnesses and a false copy of the bill,” and that Jajili was trying to “undermine the PJD.” In response Reporters Without Borders issued a statement reading “Two years after the adoption of a new constitution... this prison sentence for defamation, even if suspended, and heavy fine, shows how little of the promised reform of Morocco's press code has been achieved.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counting Pips</th>
<th>Morocco holds rate, encourages loans to small businesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco’s central bank held its key rate steady at 3.0 percent, saying inflation is expected to remain in line with the bank’s price stability objective and the risks are balanced. Bank Al-Magrib also said it would implement a new program to encourage banks to lend to very small, small, and medium-sized enterprises,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
particularly industrial companies that are export-oriented due to a continued deceleration in non-agricultural activity and bank credit. The program, with a minimum duration of two years, provides banks with liquidity collateralized mostly by private securities issued by such businesses.

| Sahara Press Service | Western Sahara: the inconvenient uprising nobody wants to talk or hear about (Open Democracy) | June 18, 2013

This article reports that the British periodical Open Democracy wrote an article in which it referred to the Western Sahara crisis as “the inconvenient uprising nobody wants to talk (or hear) about.” It reiterated the point made by some analysts (including Stephen Zunes on Jadaliyya two weeks ago) that the Arab Spring actually began with the Gdeim Izik protests. The rest of the Sahara Press Service article was a series of block quotes.

| Reuters | Morocco Inflation Rise to 2.8 % in May | June 20, 2013

Morocco’s annual consumer price inflation rose from 2.4% to 2.8% from April to May due to rising food prices. On a monthly basis, consumer price inflation rose 0.5% as vegetable prices jumped 6.6% while non-food inflation was 0.1%.

| Reuters | Morocco’s RAM Airline to buy 20 New Planes by 2020 | 0

Morocco’s Royal Air Maroc (RAM) wants to buy between 20 and 30 new-generation planes, including 15 medium-haul and 5 long-haul jets as soon as possible, its chief executive said on Thursday. "We wish to renew our fleet with the new-generation planes, and we need between 20 and 30 additional jets by 2020", stated RAM CEO Driss Benhima.
Dear Team,

Below please find the May 2013 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a monthly list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

May Events Bulletin

May 20
How Arab Public Opinion is Reshaping the Middle East

May 21
The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region

May 22
The Middle East & North Africa FYI 2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges

May 22
Perilous Desert: Security Challenges in the Sahara and Sahel

How Arab Public Opinion is Reshaping the Middle East

Date: May 20, 2013

1. Title: How Arab Public Opinion is Reshaping the Middle East
   Hosted by Brookings Institution Saban Center

   Participants:
   - Martin Indyk: Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Brookings
   - Shibley Telhami: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings
   - Kim Ghattas: State Department Correspondent, BBC News

2. Overview

Shibley Telhami has recently published a book with roughly ten years of polling data from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the
3. Summary

Dr. Telhami summarized his key points and primarily covered one chapter of his new book, “Arab Identities,” but also promised to return to a couple of related topics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Al Jazeera. Essentially, for Telhami the question for Westerners interested in the Middle East is not “Why do they hate us?” but “How do they see themselves?” Telhami believes that the central issue is foreign policy. To support this argument, he offered three points of evidence, namely:

1. There are no new demographic or economic problems that serve to explain the Arab Spring. Telhami believes it is due to a feeling of Arab governments either being impotent or collaborators, vis-à-vis Israel, the US, and the West in general.  
2. Using one of his poll questions, “who is the world leader you most admire?” Popular answers included Jacques Chirac in 2003, when he treated Arafat as a foreign dignitary, Hassan Nasrallah in 2006, and Hugo Chavez in 2009. Following the Arab Spring a common answer was Recep Erdogan. What these individuals have in common is a real or perceived ability and record of standing up to the West, or in the case of Chirac a perception of siding with the Arabs.  
3. Finally, Telhami indicated that in general, most of the people he polled self-identify as Arabs or Muslims more than Egyptians, Jordanians, etc. He sees this as a decline of identification with the state and a corresponding trans-national identification with ethnicity or religion. Cited as evidence were the increased consumption of transnational media and a widespread belief that the primary duty of Arab governments is to work to benefit all Arabs rather than solely their citizens.

Ghattas then added some context, in the form of asking Telhami if the question is not one exclusively of attitudes towards foreign policy, but the more basic question of human dignity. Indyk supported this question, by asking Telhami to explain how the Palestinian issue relates, and if it is emblematic of, an Arab lack of dignity. On this question, Telhami indicated Turkey, which, while not Arab, is acting from a position of power and has still made the Palestinian conflict a priority. He further clarified that the Palestinian conflict is a collective experience of humiliation ingrained in Arab history. Unsurprisingly, Ghattas disagreed, claiming that more often repressive governments use the Israeli issue to distract from real domestic problems, while admitting that an anti-Israel attitude has been ingrained in the minds of most Arabs.

Indyk then asked if the Sunni-Shi`a divide affected Arab identity, to which Telhami responded in the positive, citing the preferred news sources of various Lebanese sects. He clarified, however, that confession is not always the defining factor, stating that in Egypt (Sunni), 90% are pro-Syrian rebels (Sunni), but only 60% pro-Bahraini rebels (Shia). In both cases a majority side with the rebels, but confessional alignment skews the level of support.

There was then a brief discussion of how leaders manipulate the historical narrative to suit their own purposes and the empowering nature of the internet.

4. Q & A

Q: (Tamam Harazi Syrian Journalist) Assad said he was on the right side of the Israeli-Palestinian conference. I have seen people on Facebook congratulating Israel for carrying out airstrikes on Syria.  
A: (Telhami) In Lebanon in 2006 Hezbollah welcomed Israeli action at first, but later changed their minds believing Israel went too far. In Syria in 2007 there were small acts of rebellion, prior to the civil war. Finally, for a dictator, nostalgia for the past is not a beneficial policy.

Q: (Jay Roddy, Arabic-English Translator) Is there any divergence of data between successful revolutions and failed demonstrations?  
A: (Telhami) The only post-revolution country I covered was Egypt, where there was little change in attitudes, except for a slight increase in identification with the state.
Q: (Tom Sullivan, MA student) On the topic of Saddam Hussein selling the invasion of Kuwait, did he manipulate the historical narrative?
A: (Telhami) Saddam did manipulate it. I had access to the “Hussein tapes,” like the “Nixon tapes,” and what is surprising is Hussein made identical public and private statements, so they were not made only for public consumption, but also he actually believed these things, or at least wanted his private staff to think so.

Q: (Elana Farsah, Arab-Palestinian-American) The government is not respecting Palestine, and Kerry is with the EU negotiating not to label products of settlement origin as such, and Erdogan was not to go to Gaza?
A: (Telhami) John Kerry understands the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, though he may not be going about it in the best way, which, by the way, Israeli public opinion matches Palestinian public opinion on this issue. The biggest factor is that people no longer believe; the majority of people on both sides have no trust in the two-state solution.

Q: (Indyk) On the Al Jazeera phenomenon, is it falling in popularity?
A: (Telhami): There’s nothing in the polls to suggest this, though it is certainly anecdotally true, for two reasons. First, you can’t decouple Al Jazeera from Qatar. In the past Qatar was a minor player, but today it is a relevant foreign policy player, and people realize that. Second, Al Jazeera is still the boldest news source. They have the most resources and deep pockets. The biggest threat to Al Jazeera is from the internet. In 2000, people’s first choice for a news source was TV, but now, a significant minority says the internet.

(Ghattas) Al Jazeera was ahead in the Egyptian uprising, but there are different countries. Al Jazeera is seen as the sponsor of some, but not other revolutions. For example it is seen as being favorable to the Syrian rebels, but not to the Bahraini. Now, Lebanese who are pro-Hezbollah can’t watch Al Jazeera! It’s the wrong channel! Also the region is not monolithic, and people can have different opinions.

5. Observations

Roughly 100 people were in attendance, including an Arab League Ambassador. By my count, the word “Morocco” was used three times. However, the country is one of six used for sampling in Telhami’s book, so it may be worthwhile to obtain a copy and see his arguments and conclusions vis-à-vis Morocco.

Audio of the event as well as a complete transcript are available here:
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/05/21-arab-public-opinion

The Growing Crisis in Africa’s Sahel Region

Date: May 21, 2013

1. Title: The Growing Crisis in Africa’s Sahel Region
   Hosted by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

   Participants:
   Panel 1
   **Donald Yamamoto:** Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
   **Nancy Lindborg:** Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID

   Panel 2
   **Rudolph Atallah:** Senior Fellow, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic Council
   **Mima Nedelcovych:** Partner, Schaffer Global Group
   **Nii Akuetteh:** Independent Policy Analyst

2. Overview
This event had five speakers split over two panels. The first panel included members of the current administration discussing what the government is doing to address the crisis in Mali and what the government should do going forward to facilitate reconstruction. The second panel included speakers from think tanks and the private sector. Atallah spoke about how the US may address the security crisis in the region. Nedelcovych spoke about how private industry may support development in the region. Akuetteh spoke from an African perspective on how the US should play a key role in supporting the region’s reconstruction.

3. Summary

Panel 1

Yamamoto began by noting the developmental difficulties that the countries of the region face. The 80 million people of the Sahel live in some of the poorest countries on earth and routinely rank among the lowest on the human development scale. This was exacerbated by the security vacuum left by the crises in Libya and Mali. The US has been working in tandem with countries in the region as well as with regional organizations in order to address these myriad problems and help ensure the region’s security capabilities. The primary vehicle in this effort has been the Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). He then explained the important roles that Sahel countries have played in supporting both the French and African (AFISMA) interventions in Mali. To that end, the US is providing $96 million to support AFISMA countries contributing troops and police, such as Niger and Burkina Faso. However, this military aid will mean little if we fail to address the longstanding political and economic issues (such as poor governance, weak democratic institutions, and lack of development and economic opportunities) that both contribute to and are exacerbated by these security crises. While these challenges are daunting, we have seen some progress in the region, in countries such as Niger, which has made “remarkable political and economic reforms” since its 2010 coup, and Mali, which is heading towards free and democratic elections and has created a Malian peace and reconciliation committee.

Lindborg began by mentioning the Brussels conference that she and Yamamoto had attended the previous week, where 80 nations had come together to show their support (both figurative and monetary) for Mali. At the conference, the Malian president commended the international community for their continued support in rebuilding Mali. Lindborg reaffirmed Yamamoto’s statement that the complex network of issues, including poor governance, poverty, and humanitarian crises have left the region especially vulnerable, and that we need to address the root causes of this vulnerability if we are to ensure security in the region and lift its population out of their perpetual state of poverty. USAID is tackling these issues in four ways: (1) continued humanitarian assistance, (2) building resilience to reduce chronic crisis that results from chronic poverty, (3) improving governance, particularly establishing legitimacy of new governments, and (4) countering violent extremism. She concluded by emphasizing that the development of strong, legitimate governments will be at the heart of counteracting extremism and protecting development gains.

Panel 2

Atallah began by addressing the new threat of suicide bombing in Mali, a phenomenon that has never before seen in the Sahel and is indicative of an escalation of AQIM jihadist activity; he fears that this escalation will follow a pattern set by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The root causes of extremist violence in this region are complex, and understanding why extremism has taken root in the Sahel requires a thorough analysis of the principal regional issues that precipitated the Mali crisis. Atallah underscored two such issues: first, militants linked to al-Qaeda who had been repressed under authoritarian regimes, largely from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Algeria, have experienced newfound freedom of movement since the start of the Arab Spring. AQIM’s message has also been bolstered by Western intervention in Mali. Second, Mali’s delicate security situation was stressed by the confluence of marginalized peoples into remote border regions. Extremist groups are attractive to such marginalized groups. Atallah then specifically noted Morocco, in contrast to Mali, as a model in the region for reform, progress, and security, noting its counterterrorism infrastructure that has both reactive and preventative components (the preventative components being the 2011 constitutional reforms - improvement of education, human rights, and the inclusion of the Amazigh population). He concluded by giving three recommendations for resolving the Mali crisis: (1) Bring USAID back into northern Mali, such that we may work to stamp out the poverty that fuels extremism in the so-called “Arc of Instability;” (2) Assist the countries of the Sahel to address their porous borders; and (3) Counter AQIM’s ubiquitous media presence, especially in new social media such as Twitter.

Nedelcovych addressed the issue from a business perspective. He represents the Schaffer Group, which is an agroindustry company that has undertaken several partnerships in Africa to strengthen the farming industry in the region. Most recently, Schaffer has been working on a major project in Niger and Mali. The Group has always made
a point of bringing small farmers into the company’s investment scheme in order to promote the kind of resilience that Lindborg mentioned in her testimony. He mentioned Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: if a society cannot meet its most basic needs (food, water, shelter), then extremism may flourish. This is where American businesses can step in to play their role in solving the Mali crisis - investing in the region to build up agricultural infrastructure and support local farmers (agroindustry has a particular role to play in this crisis because this industry employs people in high poverty areas). However, a base level of security is needed for American investors to take this risk.

Akuetteh’s first point was that the crisis in the Sahel is difficult to address partially because it covers such a large area; he suggested that we make this area a bit larger by adding the Western Sahara to our definition of “Sahel,” because the crisis in Western Sahara is spilling over into Mali. This is a large area with myriad stressors, and this has serious implications for US interests. The US is likewise uniquely qualified to help the countries of this region address these myriad stressors. US interests in the area have really picked up since 9/11, and this is the basis of his first recommendation: the US needs to undergo a serious review of its strategy in the region now, over a decade after 9/11, particularly since there is escalating extremism in the region. His second recommendation was that we must “push hard on democracy” in the region, because inclusive, democratic governance is crucial to fighting home-grown terrorism. His third recommendation is that the US pay special attention to Mali (as it appears to be the epicenter of violence in the region), but not in terms of military support. The US should be a leader in supporting Mali in two areas. First, the US must help to facilitate free and open elections in Mali and help craft a contingency plan in the event that the July elections fail (he is not especially optimistic about the upcoming elections, following recent events in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya). Second, the US must help to facilitate Mali’s reconstruction, particularly in regards to the reconciliation between Bamako and the marginalized populations of the North.

4. Q & A

Panel 1

Q: (Representative Chris Smith, R-NJ) Can the Malian elections reasonably be held in July and be free, fair, and inclusive? Also, infectious diseases flourish in political crises and compound them. Ms. Lindborg, can you speak to how we plan to handle the Malaria crisis in the Sahel?

A: (Lindborg) For the elections, we are working closely with our international partners and with the Malians, taking on a support role in a reconciliation approach. We are also providing support to the UNDP and UNHCR in their handling of the mechanics of the upcoming elections. While we have not yet solved all of the structural issues in Mali that could impede free and fair elections, it is imperative that we hold these elections so that they can begin to rebuild democratic institutions. With respect to the malaria crisis, as part of USAID’s resilience agenda, it has put together a cross-sector approach that will address all aspects of the spread of infectious diseases, including programs in disease prevention, family planning, and food distribution.

Q: (Smith) Was the Brussels conference a success?

A: (Lindborg) Yes, it was a success in that it managed to raise money for the Malian crisis and keep the crisis the center of attention in the international community.

Q: (Yamamoto) Has the Pan-Sahel Initiative worked? Has the coordination thereof improved?

A: (Yamamoto) Yes, I would say so, in terms of both US involvement and cooperation from other African countries. The Initiative’s handling of the Malian crisis will be crucial, both because it will prove the effectiveness of African cooperation in handling security crises and because the Mali crisis appears to be the lynchpin of all of the other Sahel crises that we must handle.

Q: (Representative Karen Bass, D-CA) Can you briefly discuss the role of AFRICOM in Mali?

A: (Yamamoto) In Mali, AFRICOM has played a key support role to the French and African interventions, providing such services as refueling French aircraft and giving strategic assistance to other African countries involved in the intervention.

Q: (Bass) Describe the character of the Brussels conference and what new information it brought to light that can help us. Also, how much money did the US pledge to this cause?

A: (Lindborg) We announced a $32 million pledge for humanitarian assistance, specifically for refugees. We have already pledged $550 billion in assistance over the entire region.

Q: (Representative Randy Weber, R-TX) Can we identify countries in the Sahel who are US-friendly? That is, who share our democratic, free-market values and do not pose the threat of radical Islamism, so that we can streamline our decisions about to whom we give aid money?
A: (Lindborg) Our humanitarian assistance program is entirely need-based, and is not influenced by the politics of the states that receive aid. Our development assistance program is about supporting democracies, and there are myriad different governments that receive this aid. Currently, the development assistance program operates primarily in Senegal; we did have a project in Mali, before it destabilized, and we are beginning to expand projects in Niger, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mauritania.

Q: (Weber) Where will we be providing assistance next?
A: (Lindborg) It is impossible to tell; the Sahel is chronically underdeveloped. We need to expand our aid partnership with foreign allies, particularly the EU.

(Yamamoto) It is also important that we continue to coordinate with other regional organizations and the Sahel diaspora community.

Q: (Representative Tom Cotton, R-AR) I was surprised by Mali falling apart. We had previously considered it the greatest democratic success in the Sahel. Was it actually a strong democracy before this crisis began? If not, what did we miss in our assessment of Malian democracy? How does that bear on our assessments of other countries?
A: (Yamamoto) The key issue here is fragility. Mali was a very democratic country, but its democratic institutions were fragile. What we're trying to do is give aid in order to stabilize it, address the humanitarian crisis and extremism, and promote dialog between the north and Bamako.

(Lindborg) Any time that you have marginalized populations, such as the Tuareg in northern Mali, you are setting the stage for unrest.

Q: (Representative Paul Cook, R-CA) What is the glue that will hold some confederation of African states together? How can we help?
A: (Yamamoto) Every day we have a tremendous impact. One form in which we can bring the African states together is by honoring the AU as a regional governing body; to this end, we have nominated an ambassador to the AU. For smaller regional groups, such as ECOWAS, we can help them face challenges on their own, continue to promote good will, and set an example for good governance.

(Lindborg) Progress is possible, but it will take time. We need to help countries, communities, the private sector, and regional NGOs feel that they have a stake in their own future; people need to feel included in that future and understand the support we have for them.

Q: (Smith) In reference to this inclusion, are we including faith-based groups? Also, what is the unmet need for refugees and internally displaced persons?
A: (Lindborg) Faith-based groups are important because they have been there since the beginning. Also, we can use them to leverage the generosity of the public. As for the refugee issue, the UN has appealed for $410 million for Malian refugees, of which we have pledged $180 million.

Panel 2

Q: (Smith) Are you concerned about the July elections in Mali? Please elaborate.
A: (Akuetteh) Don’t get me wrong, there is a real need for elections; properly run elections can ameliorate a number of other destabilizing issues in the country, such as ethnic divisions and the influence of the MNLA. However, it is critical that we make sure that we do this right. One key issue is registering people to vote - I am nervous about our ability to register refugees and IDPs, who must have a voice in these elections, before July. We need to come up with a contingency plan, in the likely event that something will go wrong.

(Nedelcovych) We need to have elections now; we cannot wait until we are sure that we can hold perfect elections, because that may never happen, and putting the elections on hold also means putting private investment on hold. Putting investment on hold would have devastating effects on Malian development.

(Atallah) I agree that we should push elections, but first it is critical that we address the local grievances that precipitated the beginning of the crisis. If we force the election without addressing these grievances, it will just be another failed election.

Q: (Smith) Why are American companies so reluctant to invest in Africa?
A: (Nedelcovych) The key issue in this reluctance is uncertainty. However, I think it is misplaced. Many of the reactions to investment throughout the rest of Africa are very positive; real business deals are happening.

Q: (Smith) Elaborate on the burden Malian refugees place on border countries, and how they may be repatriated.
A: (Akuetteh) Mali’s neighbors are also at risk of implosion, and refugees stress them more. The US has been doing a good job in alleviating this issue through humanitarian assistance, but there is more work to be done. On another note, Africans want to know why there is not more US investment in Africa. China has been heavily investing in the
continent; why is it that you can’t upstage the Chinese? The US has far more positive assets for investment, such as a large African diaspora community, democracy, and free-market capitalism. The US should have a much bigger private sector presence on the continent.

Q: (Smith) How did we underestimate AQIM?
A: (Atallah) This issue has been festering for two decades. AQIM is a threat in that it subsumes and enhances regional extremist groups and is operating all across the Sahel and North Africa. We cannot quantify AQIM, and that would be irrelevant; the issue is that they always bring more people into the fold. We have to begin to address this issue before what is happening in the Sahel begins to happen in North Africa.

Q: (Bass) Is there a degree of coordination between the different factions of AQIM?
A: (Atallah) It depends on where and how we define it, but yes, there is basically coordination between the factions of AQIM. However, we do not know much about these links because we do not know much about the region. What we do know is this: AQIM has become the wealthiest branch of al-Qaeda. Many smaller extremist groups join them not because of ideological agreement, but because of financial necessity. We need to stop enabling AQIM by paying ransom for the hostages they take, which has become one of their main sources of funding.

Q: (Bass) Tell us more about the issue of drug trafficking in the Sahel. How can countries in the region best counter it?
A: (Akuetteh) Well, Kofi Annan has taken a step in the right direction by creating a West African committee on drugs. There are three big issues here that both perpetuate the drug trade and are exacerbated by it: corruption, the contamination of democracy, and health problems created by drug consumption. In order to truly break free of the drug trade, we are going to need international assistance.

Q: (Smith) What constructive criticism can you give us? And Mr. Atallah, can you elaborate upon your recommendations?
A: (Atallah) We aren’t taking enough steps to facilitate AFRICOM. Also, USAID can be doing a lot more in the Sahel to facilitate its development and aid marginalized populations. As for my three recommendations: 1) We have no radar coverage in this strip of the Sahara. This is a problem; 2) Movements across the Sahara cannot be controlled because of the tough terrain; 3) AQIM is technologically savvy, and is using social media to its advantage. It has an audience, and we have to counter its message.

(Nedelcovych) We need to ask ourselves: Are we addressing the illness, or just the symptoms? Our current strategy of simply going after terrorists is like playing whack-a-mole; what we need to do is address the root issues of instability, such as poverty, hunger, and disease.

(Akuetteh) The US needs to make it clear that we are going to help Mali; we need to play a bigger role in Malian development. Also, I have to reiterate that we must come up with a contingency plan should the Malian elections become problematic, and we need to more thoroughly review what went wrong with Mali.

5. Observations

This hearing was, as most seem to be, not especially well attended. All in all, the second panel was of far more interest to MAC than the first, partially because it is easier for MAC to speak to/partner with members of the private sector, and partially because there were so many mentions of issues directly relating to Morocco. It would be worthwhile for MATIC to form a relationship with Nedelcovych; it could present Morocco’s recent investment in wind and solar energy technology as a complement to his focus on agro industry. Akuetteh could also be a good person for MAC to approach because of his impressive credentials in Africa analysis and his recognition of the issue of Sahrawi extremism spilling over into the surrounding area. The most important person for MAC to form a relationship with is Atallah because of his ringing endorsement of Morocco’s anti-terror strategy and constitutional reforms.

(Back to top)

The Middle East & North Africa FY 2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges

Date: May 22, 2013

1. Title: The Middle East & North Africa FY 2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges

Hosted by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Participants:
Congressman Doug Collins (R-GA)
Congressman Ted Deutch (D-FL)
Congressman Ted Yoho (R-FL)
Congressman Gerald Connolly (D-VA)
Congressman Randy Weber (R-TX)
Ambassador Elizabeth Jones: Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State
Alina Romanowski: Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the Middle East, USAID

2. Overview

The hearing provided an overview of allocations for State Department and USAID Middle East and North Africa programming budgets for the coming fiscal year (2014). The speakers presented their requests for budget allocations for new programming initiatives in the MENA region, including democratic initiatives, education reform, humanitarian aid, and security.

3. Summary

Ambassador Jones highlighted the tectonic nature of the political, social, and economic changes occurring in the Middle East and North Africa, which included developments in human rights, pluralism, and participation. The goal of State Department involvement in the region is to protect US interests, namely: protecting the security of Israel, promoting peace initiatives in the Middle East, tracking the Iranian defense systems, supporting the Syrian people in conflict, and ensuring the security of US diplomats and foreign workers.

The State Department requested funding to advance and protect US interests in the region and insists that US engagement in the region is vital to the global political climate. The State Department requests $7.36 billion to be distributed among regional programs; however, four major areas of funding allocation were highlighted:

1. Israel: Aid to Israel will be designated as military assistance to support US troops stationed there as well as aid in counter-terrorism efforts. A portion of the aid will also be allocated to Palestine for building cooperative partnerships with the Palestinian government and in pursuance of a mutually beneficial and peaceful transition to the two-state solution.

2. Egypt: Financial aid to Egypt will be designated to economic reform, investments, and strategy as well as military and security assistance to maintain strategic cooperative relations with Egypt in order to sustain access to strategic locations such as the Suez Canal.

3. MENA Incentive Fund: The MENA Incentive Fund is a $580 million project with the goal of incentivizing governments to initiate political, economic, social, and institutional reform with the hope of future democratization. The financial assistance will incentivize governments to create reform initiatives to benefit the whole of society including educational reform, pluralism, and security, among others.

4. Syria: Financial assistance will be provided to Syria in two manners: for humanitarian aid for displaced citizens and refugees, as well as to generate domestic investment and inclusive reform for the nation in transition. By proxy, these investments will also help to weaken Iranian influence in the region and aid in removing/weakening terrorist organizations.

Alina Romanowski requested $1.2 billion in USAID funding to support a region in democratic transition dedicated to programs for: constitution building, elections, inclusive investments to generate growth, civil society reconstruction, and to increase political participation. Romanowski highlighted five priority areas:

1. Syria: There are over a million refugees outside of Syria, mainly in Jordan; the priority for Syria domestically is humanitarian aid for civilians. In Jordan, priority lies in providing financial assistance to help refugees safely return to their nation of origin.

2. Egypt: USAID initiatives in Egypt are to help Egyptians invest back into the domestic economy through the restructuring of education, increased job support, and reform of citizen rights. Through the Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, USAID will initiate the Egyptian Higher Education Initiative to raise higher education graduation rates and create more jobs.
3. Tunisia: USAID plans to assist in economic as well as political reform in Tunisia which includes workforce development, increased transparency of government proceedings, educational development, and human rights initiatives.

4. Yemen: Financial assistance in Yemen will prioritize constitutional review, facilitate elections, voter registry reform, healthcare reform, and restructure the educational system to be more inclusive, particularly for young girls.

5. Palestine: Financial assistance in Palestine is targeted toward democratic initiatives and increased international cooperation and relations with neighboring countries.

4. Q & A

Q: (Congressman Deutch) What conditions has the State Department put on foreign aid to Egypt?
A: (Jones) Due to Egypt’s strategic location/position in the region, foreign military funding to the Egyptian military helps assure security in the region and provides benefits such as access to borders, Suez Canal access, etc. Assistance to support Egypt’s transition to democracy also gives the US access to promote democratic values such as free speech, freedom of religion, participation, etc.

Q: (Congressman Deutch) Where is Egypt’s "red line"—meaning, where is the point where US funding is no longer effective in rebuilding the state and we must withdraw our efforts?
A: (Jones) US engagement in Egypt is the most important strategy to continue democratic support in this time of transition.

Q: (Congressman Weber) What is the US’ role in raising awareness about human rights violations in Iran?
A: (Jones) The US has been providing assistance to Iranian internet companies to circumvent Iranian restrictions to provide more access for the Iranian people to gain information. Strategies such as these are imperative in helping Iranian civil society to increase the space for which they have to operate.

Q: (Congressman Connolly) How can Congress increase help in the humanitarian crisis in Syria?
A: (Romanowski) Financial assistance in Syria is targeted at creating jobs for the Syrian workforce by providing funds to build schools, hospitals, etc. and then employing Syrians to build them and work in them.

Q: (Congressman Yoho) What are we doing differently in the Middle East (than before)?
A: (Jones) The State Department is providing two different kinds of assistance. The first is the MENA Incentive Fund which works with governments to incentivize them to promote and encourage democratic reform and work on the tools needed for democracy such as rule of law, weapon abatement, election and voter reform, etc. The second facet in which the State Department is involved is in civil society—training people and providing resources for groups to engage in political and public life.

(Romanowski) USAID’s goal is to draw on the private sector by encouraging investment domestically and building on small and medium enterprises. For example, the Egyptian higher Education Enterprise, which will bring the private sector into the process of education reform.

5. Observations

The hearing brought to light several advantages and disadvantages to US financial assistance in the Middle East and North Africa. Firstly, it is clear that the US’ strategic interests to promote democracy, protect security of Israel, and keep Iranian influence at bay is greatly aided by the State Department and USAID’s financial assistance and humanitarian assistance. US foreign aid is also advantageous to the emergence of civil society and greater political participation in the region—both Jones and Romanowski pointed out various initiatives to promote pluralism, freedom of speech and religion, education reform, and, especially, constitutional reform. This could present the opportunity for MAC to highlight the independent reform initiatives that Morocco has facilitated such as constitutional reform, increased public openness and government transparency, human rights development, and greater participation. Though Morocco was not mentioned in the proceedings, the MENA Incentive Fund was expressed as an inclusive initiative to incentivize government leaders to promote and encourage democracy politically, socially, and economically in the region. Secondly, the Members of Congress in attendance seemed skeptical of providing additional funding to programs that had not succeeded in the past. Ambassador Jones and Ms. Romanowski spent a good portion of the hearing defending their requests—claiming that the new strategy of providing the plan, structure, and resources for reform will be incentives for governments to implement the reform.
Perilous Desert: Security Challenges in the Sahara and Sahel

Date: May 22, 2013

1. Title: Perilous Desert: Security Challenges in the Sahara and Sahel
   Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

   Participants:
   Panel 1: Libya
   Frederic Wehrey: Carnegie Endowment
   Christopher Chivvis: RAND Corporation
   Peter Cole: Small Arms Survey/United Nations
   Anouar Boukhars: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

   Panel 2: Mali
   Roland Marchal: CNRS
   Bruce Whitehouse: Lehigh University
   Gilles Yabi: International Crisis Group
   Anouar Boukhars: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

   Panel 3: Regional Dynamics
   Wolfram Lacher: Stiftun Wissenschaft und Politik
   Christophe Boutin: Observatoire d'Etudes Geopolitiques
   Rudolph Atallah: Atlantic Council
   Sarah Chayes: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

   Panel 4: Algeria
   Anouar Boukhars: Carnegie Endowment
   Mohammed el-Katiri: The Hague Institute
   Frederic Wehrey: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

2. Overview

   While the world's attention was fixed on the momentous events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya after the outbreak of the Arab Awakening, the states to the south were undergoing their own transformations with major global implications. Long overlooked by policymakers and scholars, the broader Sahara region has always been underappreciated for its geopolitical significance. Changes over the last two years mean that it is no longer possible to treat the region as a backwater since what happens there affects the Arab World, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Europe. In addition, the region is increasingly the source of transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking, and migration flows. To explore regional sources of instability and what can be done to minimize the threat of simmering conflicts, Carnegie gathered top experts from the United States, Europe, and the region at an all-day conference to mark the launch of the new book Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara. The conference was held under Chatham House Rule.

3. Summary

Panel 1: Libya

Frederic Wehrey discussed the current political crisis in Libya, describing the situation as dire. The country faces a catch 22 – it needs reconciliation to reform the security sector, but it needs security sector reform for reconciliation. A dilemma that has complicated the situation further is that political groups have allied with armed groups on common aims.
Peter Cole addressed regional border security, arguing that it is managed through personal and family networks that circumvent official institutions. New security apparatus are emerging as new groups emerge and other groups fragment. This is the case for both personal and institutional groups alike—official border security is deeply fragmented and the state has no capacity to enforce border security.

Christopher Chivvis put the international approach to Libya in perspective. He noted that the international community was responsible for the military intervention but left the post-conflict reconstruction to the state. Why? There was no western funding available for it, the security situation seemed okay, and the Libyan themselves preferred it that way. That decision has obviously not worked as evident by the current mess in Libya. So the US and the international community now need to make a policy choice about what the international approach to Libya should be. Options include containment and dealing with the consequence or an assertive role to help mitigate the country’s descent toward violence. Chivvis advocated the latter, arguing that progress on all other fronts will be difficult without security and that if there isn’t an assertive role, it is possible that a redeployment of NATO or a UN peacekeeping mission will be required in the future.

Panel 2: Mali

Bruce Whitehouse debunked the myth that Mali was a model democracy before the coup. Yes, it has made progress since 1991 in establishing a vibrant press and free media, decentralizing politically, promoting economic growth, and making key social advances, including increased school enrollment, infrastructure, and government services. Behind the good governance myth, however, was continued corruption and impunity, massive land expropriation, and increased mistrust in law enforcement and the justice system, and declining voter participation—the lowest in West Africa from 1992-2007.

Marchal explored the current security threat in Mali. He argued that Gao represents the most serious threat, largely due to the presence of MUJAO, which transformed itself from a drug trafficking katiba to a smart political actor over the past year. MUJAO took advantage of the Tuareg and social hierarchies in Mali, recruiting from captive lineages and among the youth in order to expand its ranks. It also used coercion. The French intervention interrupted some of MUJAO’s activities, but did not address many of Mali’s underlying issues and thus Marchal argued that withdrawal will be difficult in the near term.

Yabi addressed some these underlying issues, namely the continued fragmentation of society and the lack of political leadership in Bamako, and proposed several solutions. Most importantly, addressing crisis in Mali require regional cooperation. For reconciliation to occur, Mali needs to address the root causes of the rebellion and the coup, the emergence of extremist groups, and the consequences of those three elements. The problem is the result of a combination of a weak Malian state and a complicated regional environment. External realities certainly played a role rendering regional cooperation all the more important. The most important of these external factors were extremist groups and drug trafficking groups. AQIM’s arrival in the north of Mali from Algeria certainly altered the dynamics, as did the arrival of cocaine trafficking, which Yabi argued changed the stakes financially and otherwise. To address these two critical issues, Mali’s neighbors need to get involved; Mali isn’t just a Malian problem and doesn’t just require a Malian solution.

Panel 3: Regional Dynamics

Wolfram Lacher discussed Sahel-Sahara security dynamics. He underscored the development of non-state actors operating in the region, the vast increase and importance of smuggling (notably Moroccan hash, Algerian subsidized products, and Libyan weapons, among others), and the movement of both AQIM and Tuareg fighters as the principle drivers of instability and insecurity in the region. He also pinpointed the Western interventions in Libya and Mali as having regional security repercussions, namely in the dissemination of jihadi activity. Lacher noted that fighters from Libya, the Western Sahara, Mauritania, and Algeria are all moving throughout the region, in some instances heading home when their countries have becoming safe havens themselves. He cited Libya as the epicenter of regional insecurity, but continued to stress smuggling as one of the most, if not the most, important drivers of conflict, particularly in Libya, Mali, and Niger. Smuggling is the key to the economy of conflict and is financing armed groups and fueling rivalries. Whatever success the French intervention in Mali had in disrupting terrorism, it hasn’t disrupted smuggling networks meaning that that driver of insecurity is ever present. Overcoming these challenges requires an overall political approach to communities in the border areas, where these issues—and insecurity—are most prevalent.

Rudolph Atallah addressed the security threat in Tunisia, noting that the spread of AQIM-affiliated groups in the
country and the rise of extremism has the potential to create a far bigger threat than in Libya if things go wrong. It is not clear at this point which way the security situation there is headed, but Tunisia has a bigger population and thus the potential threat is far greater. Atallah also briefly discussed the French intervention in Mali, arguing that it stopped the Islamists from moving south and also forced the international community to address the problem. However, it only forced a tactical withdrawal, not a strategic defeat for AQIM, which is still in the country.

Christophe Boutin spoke largely about the Western Sahara. He cited the UN report that noted the risk of a spillover of the Mali crisis into the Western Sahara and referenced French press citations of recruitment in the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf and Polisario-member involvement in terrorism with MUJAO in Northern Mali. He termed the Polisario’s response to these allegations as “le démenti clair du Polisario (the clear denial of the Polisario).” Boutin stressed that the camps are insecure and that the broader area east of the berm was insecure as well. Only 20% of the area controlled by the Polisario east of the berm is actually controlled by the Polisario. As a result of this insecurity (and in fact exemplary of it), MINURSO has cancelled night patrols and patrols to the Mauritanian border are always accompanied by the Polisario. Boutin also stressed that the camps are a target for terrorism and trafficking in the region and that youth in the camps are a particular target. Boutin closed by quoting the UN report that argued that insecurity in the region reiterated the urgency of resolve the Western Sahara crisis. He called for a solution based on Morocco’s autonomy plan, as Morocco has shown great leadership in counterterrorism cooperation, promoting a moderate version of Islam, and implementing reform under the leadership of King Mohammed VI.

Panel 4: Algeria

Frederic Wehrey opened by citing Algeria’s important, albeit complex role in the region, noting that is has been called many things – “reluctant hegemon,” “paranoid neighbor,” and “indispensable power.” The panel addressed some of those labels, assessing internal Algerian politics and Algeria’s role in regional dynamics.

Geoff Porter argued that Algeria was at a turning point politically, with Bouteflika recovering from a health scare, an ongoing reform process, and a question of succession generating a lot of international attention. In spite of renewed attention to the country, Porter argued that western perceptions of Algerian politics are nevertheless wrong and sought to explain why that was the case. He caveated it by stressing that he doesn’t know how Algerian politics works these days. The most important of these false perceptions is the concept of “le pouvoir” that is a term widely used by western analysts. What does this mean? It is used to refer to the political, military, and commercial elite, in addition to the DRS, to which the counterweight is Bouteflika’s clan. There are a few issues with this. First, many of the military elite are retired or dead. Second, the mystique of the DRS has become infectious – is it really still omnipotent? Porter pointed to the In Amenas incident as raising questions about its omnipotence. With regard to Bouteflika’s clan, many left and their replacements are not from Bouteflika’s traditional center of power in Oran and the West. Porter thus argued that this term and these categories don’t reflect realities on the ground. He also argued that there are shifting paradigms in Algeria and that current terms don’t work either for “us or them.” He concluded by noting that he felt a sense of excitement in Algiers about a real political transition –the country isn’t befallen by anxiety about this, rather, there is a potential for a real shift toward political institutions.

Mohammed el-Katiri assessed the many challenges Algeria faces today. The most prominent of these include real protests, a generational transitional at the political level, a difficult regional environment given instability in neighboring countries, and social and economic grievances throughout the country. All of this has lead Algerians in power to question and re-align their priorities. El-Katiri argued that the government has shown resilience and capability in response to these challenges, particularly in its ability to adapt to address security threats in the region.

Anouar Boukhars presented the view of Algeria from the Sahel, namely perceptions of Algeria that he witnessed in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. He found common perceptions that there is a need to harmonize regional views to promote peace and stability, which is challenged by fragmentation in Tunisia and Libya, transition in Algeria, distrust between Morocco and Algeria, and the weakness of states in the Sahel. Likewise, people agreed that Algeria’s role in promoting peace is crucial and influential, given its army and equipment, its counterterrorism experience, its leadership in counterterrorism initiatives and the US counterterrorism structure in the Sahel. Neighbors nevertheless express frustration with the resources Algeria has expended to fight AQIM; its resources are applied disproportionate to its capabilities. Why is this the case? First, its policy of non-intervention; second, its distrust of foreign interference. Algeria rightly pointed out that the Libyan intervention and a NATO failure for post-conflict reconstruction led to weapons trafficking, which aided fighters in Mali. Despite these ongoing challenges, and the failure of CEMOC, the Algerian-created joint military operations center to fight regional terrorism, to propose and implement any concrete measures to help Mali, there is still a sense that Algeria is the best placed to be the region’s counterterrorism leader. The US certainly remains the most supportive of Algerian leadership, while acknowledging
4. Q & A

Panel 1: Libya

Q: (Yabi) Could you provide an assessment of the control of the southern and Algerian borders and touch on the role this plays in instability in the rest of the region?
A: (Cole) There is trafficking out of Mali for sure – of people, labor, etc. It is done by gangs and bands, not battalions.

Q: (Jamestown Foundation) Could you touch a bit more on arms trafficking in the region? Also, is there a Libyan link to terrorism in Algeria, most notably in the In Amenas attack?
A: (Cole) There was support from elements in Libya for the In Amenas – fueling and logistical support. Libya was also where the wounded terrorists were treated. It is possible that Libyan border guards were involved as well. The cross-border flows are significant. For the borders with Egypt and Tunisia, it is not on the same scale, but with Algeria, it can be measured in tons.

Q: Is there a threat to the US from AQIM? You seemed to have said no, but I disagree.
A: (Chivvis) AQIM has neither the capacity nor the desire to attack the US. That doesn’t mean that won’t change in the future.

Panel 2: Mali

Q: (Chayes) What was the role of the Malian state as dysfunctional and unjust in fueling radicalization? What is a substantive response to the fact that the state was unjust or is that just a pretext for radical groups?
A: (Yabi) It is both. But we need to make a distinction between radical groups and armed extremist groups. Gao had radical groups, but they weren’t armed. When armed groups came from abroad, they had a ready pool of recruits. In additional, radicalization is not a passive progress – there are active recruiters and entrepreneurs from the Gulf and Pakistan pushing this sort of thing. The lack of a state doesn’t create radicalization, but it creates an environment that allows it to occur.

Q: (DCM, Embassy of Algeria) Why are you so pessimistic about our ability to stop narco-trafficking with the common fight against terrorism?
A: (Yabi) The number of people involved in trafficking is much higher than those involved in terrorism – it’s a business and many countries not affected by terrorism are affected by trafficking. It would be a mistake to equate the two and to conflate policy toward combating them both – they are distinct and require distinct policies.

Panel 3: Regional Dynamics

Q: (Marchal) Why is the focus on Northern Mali when talking about smuggling and trafficking? Solutions need to be designed to address the problem across the region.
A: (Lacher) I don’t think we have done that. The problem is different in each country and must be addressed accordingly. This is not the same historic smuggling that has been going ok. The incentives and drivers shift and economic policies impact this as well.

Q: (Polisario Representative to the US) Could you please provide details on the links between Morocco and MUJAO?
A: (Boutin) Morocco is not supporting MUJAO. MUJAO is a threat to Morocco and Morocco is working to mitigate it. In Mali, it is Sahrawis that are joining MUHAO and AQIM.

Q: (Polisario Representative to US) Why are you saying that life is perfect west of the berm and that the threat is only east of the berm? Aren’t there human rights issues west of the berm that are causing instability?
A: (Boutin) I didn’t say that. I was merely citing the UN report that said that MINURSO has not been harassed on the West side of the berm, but that has happened on the east side. Even members of the Polisario have begun to reference the possibility of terrorist infiltration in the refugee camps.

Q: (Polisario Representative to US) You need to make a distinction between Sahrawi and Polisario.
A: (Boutin) You are right, AFP said that people were returning to the Polisario camps and the Sahrawi fighter captured in Mali was a Polisario fighter. Should we go further and distinguish them by tribe and say Rguibat?
Panel 4: Algeria

Q: (Marina Ottaway, Wilson Center) Could you clarify your point about "le pouvoir?"

A: (Porter) What I wanted to stress was that ministries are personality driven in the same way that they are in the US. They are responsive to vested interests, just like Congress is responsive to lobbyists here.

Q: (DCM, Embassy of Algeria) Algeria has institutions and a presidency and the power is in these institutions. It has also made a firm commitment to combat terrorism – setting up CEMOC?

A: (Boukhars) I don’t doubt Algeria’s commitment to combating terrorism. But CEMOC didn’t succeed. Look at Mali. Look at its request for French intervention. Where is the regional force CEMOC was designed to create? Where is the communications structure? If it succeed, if there are results, show me.

(Shouting from DCM)

(Shouting from Polisario Representative) Why do you have two Moroccans up there “diabolizing” (demonizing) Algeria?

Q: (Marchal) The assessment of DRS is a bit off – it is the only intelligence service that has allowed an armed group on its territory and not rooted it out.

A: (Boukhars) It has been effective in dealing with violent groups in Algeria – it has boxed in AQIM in the North. It is not the best, but it has been effective internally.

Q: Is too much blame being assigned to Algeria and to CEMOC?

A: (Boukhars) It needs to be bolstered, strengthened, and expanded. If CEMOC was operational, I am not saying what happened in Mali wouldn’t happen, but leadership is lacking. Likewise, I am not saying that Algeria is complicit or that it nurtures extremist groups. What I am saying is that if Algeria wants to play a leading role, it has to play that role. Algeria has the capacity to play a leadership role and with leadership comes responsibility.

A: (Porter) There is a policy debate going on in Algeria about changes to its foreign policy of non-intervention.

Q: (Yabi) What is your assessment of the terrorist threat in Algeria?

A: (Porter) Algeria has a problem with the enormity of its borders and the south is at risk because of the terrorist incursion into Mali. There is no threat in Algiers.

5. Observation

Approximately 75 policymakers, North Africa experts, and security specialists attended the all-day conference. The conference was important in and of itself in that it was exemplary of the increased attention being paid to the Maghreb and Sahel region, particularly among security experts. Carnegie nevertheless remains the think tank with the strongest Maghreb and Sahel focus, largely due to the work on Anouar Boukhars, but increasingly due to the work of other experts as well. The panels served as an important vehicle for disseminating information about the current security situation in four prominent Sahel countries, but there was little new information presented. The question and answer sessions thus proved more interesting, particularly as a result of continued rants courtesy of the DCM from the Embassy of Algeria, who seems to do the same thing at every event. This time he was supported in his ranting by the new representative of the Polisario Front to DC, who introduced himself to the think tank community with several shouts and interruptions contesting the vision of Western Sahara articulated by a number of the panelists during the two afternoon panels on regional dynamics and Algeria. Both Algeria and the Polisario continue to look foolish when they try to speak in public on these issues. The fact that Morocco does not do this is helpful, particularly since many of Morocco’s messages are already being articulated by the panelists. Even when they are not as positive as MAC would be in expressing them (which they often are, particularly on security), it is nevertheless better to have them coming from the panelists. That said, there is still a negative aspect of these kinds of exchanges. When Algeria and the Polisario have outbursts on the issue of the Sahara, it makes experts less likely to want to engage and discuss the subject matter, particularly in public forums. There isn't much MAC can do about this, but it does render the personal meetings and direct engagement with think tank experts and policymakers all the more important in order to keep them apprise of developments in the conflict and the region.
May Events Bulletin

May 20
How Arab Public Opinion is Reshaping the Middle East

May 21
The Growing Crisis in Africa's Sahel Region

May 22
The Middle East & North Africa FYI 2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges

May 22
Perilous Desert: Security Challenges in the Sahara and Sahel

How Arab Public Opinion is Reshaping the Middle East

Date: May 20, 2013

1. Title: How Arab Public Opinion is Reshaping the Middle East
   Hosted by Brookings Institution Saban Center

   Participants:
   Martin Indyk: Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Brookings
   Shibley Telhami: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings
   Kim Ghattas: State Department Correspondent, BBC News

2. Overview

Shibley Telhami has recently published a book with roughly ten years of polling data from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. Despite the claims of the event’s title, the talk mostly consisted of one point: how, as indicated by the data, do Arabs identify themselves? Related to this question is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Kim Ghattas was there theoretically to question Telhami, but ended up adding an interesting dimension to his work, that of dignity.

3. Summary

Dr. Telhami summarized his key points and primarily covered one chapter of his new book, “Arab Identities,” but also promised to return to a couple of related topics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Al Jazeera. Essentially, for Telhami the question for Westerners interested in the Middle East is not “Why do they hate us?” but “How do they see themselves?” Telhami believes that the central issue is foreign policy. To support this argument, he offered three points of evidence, namely:
1. There are no new demographic or economic problems that serve to explain the Arab Spring. Telhami believes it is due to a feeling of Arab governments either being impotent or collaborators, vis-à-vis Israel, the US, and the West in general.

2. Using one of his poll questions, “who is the world leader you most admire?” Popular answers included Jacques Chirac in 2003, when he treated Arafat as a foreign dignitary, Hassan Nasrallah in 2006, and Hugo Chavez in 2009. Following the Arab Spring a common answer was Recep Erdogan. What these individuals have in common is a real or perceived ability and record of standing up to the West, or in the case of Chirac a perception of siding with the Arabs.

3. Finally, Telhami indicated that in general, most of the people he polled self-identify as Arabs or Muslims more than Egyptians, Jordanians, etc. He sees this as a decline of identification with the state and a corresponding trans-national identification with ethnicity or religion. Cited as evidence were the increased consumption of transnational media and a widespread belief that the primary duty of Arab governments is to work to benefit all Arabs rather than solely their citizens.

Ghattas then added some context, in the form of asking Telhami if the question is not one exclusively of attitudes towards foreign policy, but the more basic question of human dignity. Indyk supported this question, by asking Telhami to explain how the Palestinian issue relates, and if it is emblematic of, an Arab lack of dignity. On this question, Telhami indicated Turkey, which, while not Arab, is acting from a position of power and has still made the Palestinian conflict a priority. He further clarified that the Palestinian conflict is a collective experience of humiliation ingrained in Arab history. Unsurprisingly, Ghattas disagreed, claiming that more often repressive governments use the Israeli issue to distract from real domestic problems, while admitting that an anti-Israel attitude has been ingrained in the minds of most Arabs.

Indyk then asked if the Sunni-Shi`a divide affected Arab identity, to which Telhami responded in the positive, citing the preferred news sources of various Lebanese sects. He clarified, however, that confession is not always the defining factor, stating that in Egypt (Sunni), 90% are pro-Syrian rebels (Sunni), but only 60% pro-Bahraini rebels (Shia). In both cases a majority side with the rebels, but confessional alignment skews the level of support.

There was then a brief discussion of how leaders manipulate the historical narrative to suit their own purposes and the empowering nature of the internet.

4. Q & A

Q: (Tamam Harazi Syrian Journalist) Assad said he was on the right side of the Israeli-Palestinian conference. I have seen people on Facebook congratulating Israel for carrying out airstrikes on Syria.
A: (Telhami) We are measuring majorities, obviously significant minorities may feel differently about Israel or Iran.
(Ghattas) In Lebanon in 2006 Hezbollah welcomed Israeli action at first, but later changed their minds believing Israel went too far. In Syria in 2007 there were small acts of rebellion, prior to the civil war. Finally, for a dictator, nostalgia for the past is not a beneficial policy.

Q: (Jay Roddy, Arabic-English Translator) Is there any divergence of data between successful revolutions and failed demonstrations?
A: (Telhami) The only post-revolution country I covered was Egypt, where there was little change in attitudes, except for a slight increase in identification with the state.
Q: (Tom Sullivan, MA student) On the topic of Saddam Hussein selling the invasion of Kuwait, did he manipulate the historical narrative?
A: (Telhami) Saddam did manipulate it. I had access to the “Hussein tapes,” like the “Nixon tapes,” and what is surprising is Hussein made identical public and private statements, so they were not made only for public consumption, but also he actually believed these things, or at least wanted his private staff to think so.

Q: (Elana Farsah, Arab-Palestinian-American) The government is not respecting Palestine, and Kerry is with the EU negotiating not to label products of settlement origin as such, and Erdogan was not to go to Gaza?
A: (Telhami) John Kerry understands the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, though he may not be going about it in the best way, which, by the way, Israeli public opinion matches Palestinian public opinion on this issue. The biggest factor is that people no longer believe; the majority of people on both sides have no trust in the two-state solution.

Q: (Indyk) On the Al Jazeera phenomenon, is it falling in popularity?
A: (Telhami): There’s nothing in the polls to suggest this, though it is certainly anecdotally true, for two reasons. First, you can’t decouple Al Jazeera from Qatar. In the past Qatar was a minor player, but today it is a relevant foreign policy player, and people realize that. Second, Al Jazeera is still the boldest news source. They have the most resources and deep pockets. The biggest threat to Al Jazeera is from the internet. In 2000, people’s first choice for a news source was TV, but now, a significant minority says the internet. (Ghattas) Al Jazeera was ahead in the Egyptian uprising, but there are different countries. Al Jazeera is seen as the sponsor of some, but not other revolutions. For example it is seen as being favorable to the Syrian rebels, but not to the Bahraini. Now, Lebanese who are pro-Hezbollah can’t watch Al Jazeera! It’s the wrong channel! Also the region is not monolithic, and people can have different opinions.

5. Observations

Roughly 100 people were in attendance, including an Arab League Ambassador. By my count, the word “Morocco” was used three times. However, the country is one of six used for sampling in Telhami’s book, so it may be worthwhile to obtain a copy and see his arguments and conclusions vis-à-vis Morocco.

Audio of the event as well as a complete transcript are available here: http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/05/21-arab-public-opinion

The Growing Crisis in Africa’s Sahel Region

Date: May 21, 2013

1. Title: The Growing Crisis in Africa’s Sahel Region
   Hosted by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

Participants:
Panel 1

**Donald Yamamoto:** Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs  
**Nancy Lindborg:** Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID

Panel 2

**Rudolph Atallah:** Senior Fellow, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic Council  
**Mima Nedelcovych:** Partner, Schaffer Global Group  
**Nii Akuetteh:** Independent Policy Analyst

2. Overview

This event had five speakers split over two panels. The first panel included members of the current administration discussing what the government is doing to address the crisis in Mali and what the government should do going forward to facilitate reconstruction. The second panel included speakers from think tanks and the private sector. Atallah spoke about how the US may address the security crisis in the region. Nedelcovych spoke about how private industry may support development in the region. Akuetteh spoke from an African perspective on how the US should play a key role in supporting the region’s reconstruction.

3. Summary

Panel 1

Yamamoto began by noting the developmental difficulties that the countries of the region face. The 80 million people of the Sahel live in some of the poorest countries on earth and routinely rank amongst the lowest on the human development scale. This was exacerbated by the security vacuum left by the crises in Libya and Mali. The US been working in tandem with countries in the region as well as with regional organizations in order to address these myriad problems and help ensure the region’s security capabilities. The primary vehicle in this effort has been the Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). He then explained the important roles that Sahel countries have played in supporting both the French and African (AFISMA) interventions in Mali. To that end, the US is providing $96 million to support AFISMA countries contributing troops and police, such as Niger and Burkina Faso. However, this military aid will mean little if we fail to address the longstanding political and economic issues (such as poor governance, weak democratic institutions, and lack of development and economic opportunities) that both contribute to and are exacerbated by these security crises. While these challenges are daunting, we have seen some progress in the region, in countries such as Niger, which has made “remarkable political and economic reforms” since its 2010 coup, and Mali, which is heading towards free and democratic elections and has created a Malian peace and reconciliation committee.

Lindborg began by mentioning the Brussels conference that she and Yamamoto had attended the previous week, where 80 nations had come together to show their support (both figurative and monetary) for Mali. At the conference, the Malian president commended the international community for their continued support in rebuilding Mali. Lindborg reaffirmed Yamamoto’s statement that the complex network of issues, including poor governance, poverty, and humanitarian crises have left the region especially vulnerable, and that we need to address the root causes of this vulnerability if we are to ensure security in the region and lift its population out of their perpetual state of poverty. USAID is tackling these issues in four ways: (1) continued humanitarian assistance, (2) building resilience to reduce chronic crisis that results from chronic poverty, (3) improving governance, particularly establishing legitimacy of new governments, and (4) countering violent
extremism. She concluded by emphasizing that the development of strong, legitimate
governments will be at the heart of countering extremism and protecting development
gains.

Panel 2

Atallah began by addressing the new threat of suicide bombing in Mali, a phenomenon that
has never before seen in the Sahel and is indicative of an escalation of AQIM jihadist
activity; he fears that this escalation will follow a pattern set by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The
root causes of extremist violence in this region are complex, and understanding why
extremism has taken root in the Sahel requires a thorough analysis of the principal regional
issues that precipitated the Mali crisis. Atallah underscored two such issues: first, militants
linked to al-Qaeda who had been repressed under authoritarian regimes, largely from
countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Algeria, have experienced newfound
freedom of movement since the start of the Arab Spring. AQIM’s message has also been
bolstered by Western intervention in Mali. Second, Mali’s delicate security situation was
stressed by the confluence of marginalized peoples into remote border regions. Extremist
groups are attractive to such marginalized groups. Atallah then specifically noted Morocco,
in contrast to Mali, as a model in the region for reform, progress, and security, noting its
counterterrorism infrastructure that has both reactive and preventative components (the
preventative components being the 2011 constitutional reforms - improvement of
education, human rights, and the inclusion of the Amazigh population). He concluded by
giving three recommendations for resolving the Mali crisis: (1) Bring USAID back into
northern Mali, such that we may work to stamp out the poverty that fuels extremism in the
so-called “Arc of Instability;” (2) Assist the countries of the Sahel to address their porous
borders; and (3) Counter AQIM’s ubiquitous media presence, especially in new social media
such as Twitter.

Nedelcovych addressed the issue from a business perspective. He represents the Schaffer
Group, which is an agroindustry company that has undertaken several partnerships in Africa
to strengthen the farming industry in the region. Most recently, Schaffer has been working
on a major project in Niger and Mali. The Group has always made a point of bringing small
farmers into the company’s investment scheme in order to promote the kind of resilience
that Lindborg mentioned in her testimony. He mentioned Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: if a
society cannot meet its most basic needs (food, water, shelter), then extremism may
flourish. This is where American businesses can step in to play their role in solving the Mali
crisis - investing in the region to build up agricultural infrastructure and support local
farmers (agroindustry has a particular role to play in this crisis because this industry
employs people in high poverty areas). However, a base level of security is needed for
American investors to take this risk.

Akuetteh’s first point was that the crisis in the Sahel is difficult to address partially because
it covers such a large area; he suggested that we make this area a bit larger by adding the
Western Sahara to our definition of “Sahel,” because the crisis in Western Sahara is spilling
over into Mali. This is a large area with myriad stressors, and this has serious implications
for US interests.. The US is likewise uniquely qualified to help the countries of this region
address these myriad stressors. US interests in the area have really picked up since 9/11,
and this is the basis of his first recommendation: the US needs to undergo a serious review
of its strategy in the region now, over a decade after 9/11, particularly since there is
escalating extremism in the region. His second recommendation was that we must “push
hard on democracy” in the region, because inclusive, democratic governance is crucial to
fighting home-grown terrorism. His third recommendation is that the US pay special
attention to Mali (as it appears to be the epicenter of violence in the region), but not in
terms of military support. The US should be a leader in supporting Mali in two areas. First, the US must help to facilitate free and open elections in Mali and help craft a contingency plan in the event that the July elections fail (he is not especially optimistic about the upcoming elections, following recent events in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya). Second, the US must help to facilitate Mali’s reconstruction, particularly in regards to the reconciliation between Bamako and the marginalized populations of the North.

4. Q & A

Panel 1

Q: (Representative Chris Smith, R-NJ) Can the Malian elections reasonably be held in July and be free, fair, and inclusive? Also, infectious diseases flourish in political crises and compound them. Ms. Lindborg, can you speak to how we plan to handle the Malaria crisis in the Sahel?
A: (Lindborg) For the elections, we are working closely with our international partners and with the Malians, taking on a support role in a reconciliation approach. We are also providing support to the UNDP and UNHCR in their handling of the mechanics of the upcoming elections. While we have not yet solved all of the structural issues in Mali that could impede free and fair elections, it is imperative that we hold these elections so that they can begin to rebuild democratic institutions. With respect to the malaria crisis, as part of USAID’s resilience agenda, it has put together a cross-sector approach that will address all aspects of the spread of infectious diseases, including programs in disease prevention, family planning, and food distribution.

Q: (Smith) Was the Brussels conference a success?
A: (Lindborg) Yes, it was a success in that it managed to raise money for the Malian crisis and keep the crisis the center of attention in the international community.

Q: (Smith) Has the Pan-Sahel Initiative worked? Has the coordination thereof improved?
A: (Yamamoto) Yes, I would say so, in terms of both US involvement and cooperation from other African countries. The Initiative’s handling of the Malian crisis will be crucial, both because it will prove the effectiveness of African cooperation in handling security crises and because the Mali crisis appears to be the lynchpin of all of the other Sahel crises that we must handle.

Q: (Representative Karen Bass, D-CA) Can you briefly discuss the role of AFRICOM in Mali?
A: (Yamamoto) In Mali, AFRICOM has played a key support role to the French and African interventions, providing such services as refueling French aircraft and giving strategic assistance to other African countries involved in the intervention.

Q: (Bass) Describe the character of the Brussels conference and what new information it brought to light that can help us. Also, how much money did the US pledge to this cause?
A: (Lindborg) We announced a $32 million pledge for humanitarian assistance, specifically for refugees. We have already pledged $550 billion in assistance over the entire region.

Q: (Representative Randy Weber, R-TX) Can we identify countries in the Sahel who are US-friendly? That is, who share our democratic, free-market values and do not pose the threat of radical Islamism, so that we can streamline our decisions about to whom we give aid money?
A: (Lindborg) Our humanitarian assistance program is entirely need-based, and is not influenced by the politics of the states that receive aid. Our development assistance program is about supporting democracies, and there are myriad different governments that
receive this aid. Currently, the development assistance program operates primarily in Senegal; we did have a project in Mali, before it destabilized, and we are beginning to expand projects in Niger, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mauritania.

Q: (Weber) Where will we be providing assistance next?
A: (Lindborg) It is impossible to tell; the Sahel is chronically underdeveloped. We need to expand our aid partnership with foreign allies, particularly the EU.
(Yamamoto) It is also important that we continue to coordinate with other regional organizations and the Sahel diaspora community.

Q: (Representative Tom Cotton, R-AR) I was surprised by Mali falling apart. We had previously considered it the greatest democratic success in the Sahel. Was it actually a strong democracy before this crisis began? If not, what did we miss in our assessment of Malian democracy? How does that bear on our assessments of other countries?
A: (Yamamoto) The key issue here is fragility. Mali was a very democratic country, but its democratic institutions were fragile. What we're trying to do is give aid in order to stabilize it, address the humanitarian crisis and extremism, and promote dialog between the north and Bamako.
(Lindborg) Any time that you have marginalized populations, such as the Tuareg in northern Mali, you are setting the stage for unrest.

Q: (Representative Paul Cook, R-CA) What is the glue that will hold some confederation of African states together? How can we help?
A: (Yamamoto) Every day we have a tremendous impact. One form in which we can bring the African states together is by honoring the AU as a regional governing body; to this end, we have nominated an ambassador to the AU. For smaller regional groups, such as ECOWAS, we can help them face challenges on their own, continue to promote good will, and set an example for good governance.
(Lindborg) Progress is possible, but it will take time. We need to help countries, communities, the private sector, and regional NGOs feel that they have a stake in their own future; people need to feel included in that future and understand the support we have for them.

Q: (Smith) In reference to this inclusion, are we including faith-based groups? Also, what is the unmet need for refugees and internally displaced persons?
A: (Lindborg) Faith-based groups are important because they have been there since the beginning. Also, we can use them to leverage the generosity of the public. As for the refugee issue, the UN has appealed for $410 million for Malian refugees, of which we have pledged $180 million.

Panel 2

Q: (Smith) Are you concerned about the July elections in Mali? Please elaborate.
A: (Akuetteh) Don’t get me wrong, there is a real need for elections; properly run elections can ameliorate a number of other destabilizing issues in the country, such as ethnic divisions and the influence of the MNLA. However, it is critical that we make sure that we do this right. One key issue is registering people to vote - I am nervous about our ability to register refugees and IDPs, who must have a voice in these elections, before July. We need to come up with a contingency plan, in the likely event that something will go wrong.
(Nedelcovych) We need to have elections now; we cannot wait until we are sure that we can hold perfect elections, because that may never happen, and putting the elections on hold also means putting private investment on hold. Putting investment on hold would have devastating effects on Malian development.
I agree that we should push elections, but first it is critical that we address the local grievances that precipitated the beginning of the crisis. If we force the election without addressing these grievances, it will just be another failed election.

**Q:** Why are American companies so reluctant to invest in Africa?
**A:** The key issue in this reluctance is uncertainty. However, I think it is misplaced. Many of the reactions to investment throughout the rest of Africa are very positive; real business deals are happening.

**Q:** Elaborate on the burden Malian refugees place on border countries, and how they may be repatriated.
**A:** Mali’s neighbors are also at risk of implosion, and refugees stress them more. The US has been doing a good job in alleviating this issue through humanitarian assistance, but there is more work to be done. On another note, Africans want to know why there is not more US investment in Africa. China has been heavily investing in the continent; why is it that you can’t upstage the Chinese? The US has far more positive assets for investment, such as a large African diaspora community, democracy, and free-market capitalism. The US should have a much bigger private sector presence on the continent.

**Q:** How did we underestimate AQIM?
**A:** This issue has been festering for two decades. AQIM is a threat in that it subsumes and enhances regional extremist groups and is operating all across the Sahel and North Africa. We cannot quantify AQIM, and that would be irrelevant; the issue is that they always bring more people into the fold. We have to begin to address this issue before what is happening in the Sahel begins to happen in North Africa.

**Q:** Is there a degree of coordination between the different factions of AQIM?
**A:** It depends on where and how we define it, but yes, there is basically coordination between the factions of AQIM. However, we do not know much about these links because we do not know much about the region. What we do know is this: AQIM has become the wealthiest branch of al-Qaeda. Many smaller extremist groups join them not because of ideological agreement, but because of financial necessity. We need to stop enabling AQIM by paying ransom for the hostages they take, which has become one of their main sources of funding.

**Q:** Tell us more about the issue of drug trafficking in the Sahel. How can countries in the region best counter it?
**A:** Well, Kofi Annan has taken a step in the right direction by creating a West African committee on drugs. There are three big issues here that both perpetuate the drug trade and are exacerbated by it: corruption, the contamination of democracy, and health problems created by drug consumption. In order to truly break free of the drug trade, we are going to need international assistance.

**Q:** What constructive criticism can you give us? And Mr. Atallah, can you elaborate upon your recommendations?
**A:** We aren’t taking enough steps to facilitate AFRICOM. Also, USAID can be doing a lot more in the Sahel to facilitate its development and aid marginalized populations. As for my three recommendations: 1) We have no radar coverage in this strip of the Sahara. This is a problem; 2) Movements across the Sahara cannot be controlled because of the tough terrain; 3) AQIM is technologically savvy, and is using social media to its advantage. It has an audience, and we have to counter its message.

We need to ask ourselves: Are we addressing the illness, or just the symptoms? Our current strategy of simply going after terrorists is like playing whack-a-
mole; what we need to do is address the root issues of instability, such as poverty, hunger, and disease.

(Akuetteh) The US needs to make it clear that we are going to help Mali; we need to play a bigger role in Malian development. Also, I have to reiterate that we must come up with a contingency plan should the Malian elections become problematic, and we need to more thoroughly review what went wrong with Mali.

5. Observations

This hearing was, as most seem to be, not especially well attended. All in all, the second panel was of far more interest to MAC than the first, partially because it is easier for MAC to speak to/partner with members of the private sector, and partially because there were so many mentions of issues directly relating to Morocco. It would be worthwhile for MATIC to form a relationship with Nedelcovych; it could present Morocco’s recent investment in wind and solar energy technology as a complement to his focus on agro industry. Akuetteh could also be a good person for MAC to approach because of his impressive credentials in Africa analysis and his recognition of the issue of Sahrawi extremism spilling over into the surrounding area. The most important person for MAC to form a relationship with is Atallah because of his ringing endorsement of Morocco’s anti-terror strategy and constitutional reforms.

(Back to top)

The Middle East & North Africa FY 2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges

Date: May 22, 2013

1. Title: The Middle East & North Africa FY 2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges
   Hosted by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

   Participants:
   Congressman Doug Collins (R-GA)
   Congressman Ted Deutch (D-FL)
   Congressman Ted Yoho (R-FL)
   Congressman Gerald Connolly (D-VA)
   Congressman Randy Weber (R-TX)
   Ambassador Elizabeth Jones: Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State
   Alina Romanowski: Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the Middle East, USAID

2. Overview

The hearing provided an overview of allocations for State Department and USAID Middle East and North Africa programming budgets for the coming fiscal year (2014). The speakers presented their requests for budget allocations for new programming initiatives in the MENA region, including democratic initiatives, education reform, humanitarian aid, and security.

3. Summary
Ambassador Jones highlighted the tectonic nature of the political, social, and economic changes occurring in the Middle East and North Africa, which included developments in human rights, pluralism, and participation. The goal of State Department involvement in the region is to protect US interests, namely: protecting the security of Israel, promoting peace initiatives in the Middle East, tracking the Iranian defense systems, supporting the Syrian people in conflict, and ensuring the security of US diplomats and foreign workers.

The State Department requested funding to advance and protect US interests in the region and insists that US engagement in the region is vital to the global political climate. The State Department requests $7.36 billion to be distributed among regional programs; however, four major areas of funding allocation were highlighted:

1) Israel: Aid to Israel will be designated as military assistance to support US troops stationed there as well as aid in counter-terrorism efforts. A portion of the aid will also be allocated to Palestine for building cooperative partnerships with the Palestinian government and in pursuance of a mutually beneficial and peaceful transition to the two-state solution.

2) Egypt: Financial aid to Egypt will be designated to economic reform, investments, and strategy as well as military and security assistance to maintain strategic cooperative relations with Egypt in order to sustain access to strategic locations such as the Suez Canal.

3) MENA Incentive Fund: The MENA Incentive Fund is a $580 million project with the goal of incentivizing governments to initiate political, economic, social, and institutional reform with the hope of future democratization. The financial assistance will incentivize governments to create reform initiatives to benefit the whole of society including educational reform, pluralism, and security, among others.

4) Syria: Financial assistance will be provided to Syria in two manners: for humanitarian aid for displaced citizens and refugees, as well as to generate domestic investment and inclusive reform for the nation in transition. By proxy, these investments will also help to weaken Iranian influence in the region and aid in removing/weakening terrorist organizations.

Alina Romanowski requested $1.2 billion in USAID funding to support a region in democratic transition dedicated to programs for: constitution building, elections, inclusive investments to generate growth, civil society reconstruction, and to increase political participation. Romanowski highlighted five priority areas:

1) Syria: There are over a million refugees outside of Syria, mainly in Jordan; the priority for Syria domestically is humanitarian aid for civilians. In Jordan, priority lies in providing financial assistance to help refugees safely return to their nation of origin.

2) Egypt: USAID initiatives in Egypt are to help Egyptians invest back into the domestic economy through the restructuring of education, increased job support, and reform of citizen rights. Through the Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, USAID will initiate the Egyptian Higher Education Initiative to raise higher education graduation rates and create more jobs.

3) Tunisia: USAID plans to assist in economic as well as political reform in Tunisia which includes workforce development, increased transparency of government proceedings, educational development, and human rights initiatives.

4) Yemen: Financial assistance in Yemen will prioritize constitutional review, facilitate elections, voter registry reform, healthcare reform, and restructure the educational system to be more inclusive, particularly for young girls.

5) Palestine: Financial assistance in Palestine is targeted toward democratic initiatives and increased international cooperation and relations with neighboring countries.
4. Q & A

Q: (Congressman Deutch) What conditions has the State Department put on foreign aid to Egypt?
A: (Jones) Due to Egypt’s strategic location/position in the region, foreign military funding to the Egyptian military helps assure security in the region and provides benefits such as access to borders, Suez Canal access, etc. Assistance to support Egypt’s transition to democracy also gives the US access to promote democratic values such as free speech, freedom of religion, participation, etc.

Q: (Congressman Deutch) Where is Egypt’s “red line”—meaning, where is the point where US funding is no longer effective in rebuilding the state and we must withdraw our efforts?
A: (Jones) US engagement in Egypt is the most important strategy to continue democratic support in this time of transition.

Q: (Congressman Weber) What is the US’ role in raising awareness about human rights violations in Iran?
A: (Jones) The US has been providing assistance to Iranian internet companies to circumvent Iranian restrictions to provide more access for the Iranian people to gain information. Strategies such as these are imperative in helping Iranian civil society to increase the space for which they have to operate.

Q: (Congressman Connolly) How can Congress increase help in the humanitarian crisis in Syria?
A: (Romanowski) Financial assistance in Syria is targeted at creating jobs for the Syrian workforce by providing funds to build schools, hospitals, etc. and then employing Syrians to build them and work in them.

Q: (Congressman Yoho) What are we doing differently in the Middle East (than before)?
A: (Jones) The State Department is providing two different kinds of assistance. The first is the MENA Incentive Fund which works with governments to incentivize them to promote and encourage democratic reform and work on the tools needed for democracy such as rule of law, weapon abatement, election and voter reform, etc. The second facet in which the State Department is involved is in civil society—training people and providing resources for groups to engage in political and public life. (Romanowski) USAID’s goal is to draw on the private sector by encouraging investment domestically and building on small and medium enterprises. For example, the Egyptian higher Education Enterprise, which will bring the private sector into the process of education reform.

5. Observations

The hearing brought to light several advantages and disadvantages to US financial assistance in the Middle East and North Africa. Firstly, it is clear that the US’ strategic interests to promote democracy, protect security of Israel, and keep Iranian influence at bay is greatly aided by the State Department and USAID’s financial assistance and humanitarian assistance. US foreign aid is also advantageous to the emergence of civil society and greater political participation in the region—both Jones and Romanowski pointed out various initiatives to promote pluralism, freedom of speech and religion, education reform, and, especially, constitutional reform. This could present the opportunity for MAC to highlight the independent reform initiatives that Morocco has facilitated such as constitutional reform, increased public openness and government transparency, human
rights development, and greater participation. Though Morocco was not mentioned in the proceedings, the MENA Incentive Fund was expressed as an inclusive initiative to incentivize government leaders to promote and encourage democracy politically, socially, and economically in the region. Secondly, the Members of Congress in attendance seemed skeptical of providing additional funding to programs that had not succeeded in the past. Ambassador Jones and Ms. Romanowski spent a good portion of the hearing defending their requests—claiming that the new strategy of providing the plan, structure, and resources for reform will be incentives for governments to implement the reform.


(Back to top)

Perilous Desert: Security Challenges in the Sahara and Sahel

Date: May 22, 2013

1. Title: Perilous Desert: Security Challenges in the Sahara and Sahel
   Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

   Participants:
   Panel 1: Libya
   Frederic Wehrey: Carnegie Endowment
   Christopher Chivvis: RAND Corporation
   Peter Cole: Small Arms Survey/United Nations
   Anouar Boukhars: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

   Panel 2: Mali
   Roland Marchal: CNRS
   Bruce Whitehouse: Lehigh University
   Gilles Yabi: International Crisis Group
   Anouar Boukhars: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

   Panel 3: Regional Dynamics
   Wolfram Lacher: Stiftun Wissenschaft und Politik
   Christophe Boutin: Observatoire d’Etudes Geopolitiques
   Rudolph Atallah: Atlantic Council
   Sarah Chayes: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

   Panel 4: Algeria
   Anouar Boukhars: Carnegie Endowment
   Mohammed el-Katiri: The Hague Institute
   Frederic Wehrey: Moderator: Carnegie Endowment

2. Overview

While the world’s attention was fixed on the momentous events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya after the outbreak of the Arab Awakening, the states to the south were undergoing their
own transformations with major global implications. Long overlooked by policymakers and scholars, the broader Sahara region has always been underappreciated for its geopolitical significance. Changes over the last two years mean that it is no longer possible to treat the region as a backwater since what happens there affects the Arab World, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Europe. In addition, the region is increasingly the source of transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking, and migration flows. To explore regional sources of instability and what can be done to minimize the threat of simmering conflicts, Carnegie gathered top experts from the United States, Europe, and the region at an all-day conference to mark the launch of the new book Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara. The conference was held under Chatham House Rule.

3. Summary

Panel 1: Libya

Frederic Wehrey discussed the current political crisis in Libya, describing the situation as dire. The country faces a catch 22 – it needs reconciliation to reform the security sector, but it needs security sector reform for reconciliation. A dilemma that has complicated the situation further is that political groups have allied with armed groups on common aims.

Peter Cole addressed regional border security, arguing that it is managed through personal and family networks that circumvent official institutions. New security apparatus are emerging as new groups emerge and other groups fragment. This is the case for both personal and institutional groups alike – official border security is deeply fragmented and the state has no capacity to enforce border security.

Christopher Chivvis put the international approach to Libya in perspective. He noted that the international community was responsible for the military intervention but left the post-conflict reconstruction to the state. Why? There was no western funding available for it, the security situation seemed okay, and the Libyan themselves preferred it that way. That decision has obviously not worked as evident by the current mess in Libya. So the US and the international community now need to make a policy choice about what the international approach to Libya should be. Options include containment and dealing with the consequence or an assertive role to help mitigate the country’s descent toward violence. Chivvis advocated the latter, arguing that progress on all other fronts will be difficult without security and that if there isn’t an assertive role, it is possible that a redeployment of NATO or a UN peacekeeping mission will be required in the future.

Panel 2: Mali

Bruce Whitehouse debunked the myth that Mali was a model democracy before the coup. Yes, it has made progress since 1991 in establishing a vibrant press and free media, decentralizing politically, promoting economic growth, and making key social advances, including increased school enrollment, infrastructure, and government services. Behind the good governance myth, however, was continued corruption and impunity, massive land expropriation, and increased mistrust in law enforcement and the justice system, and declining voter participation – the lowest in West Africa from 1992-2007.

Marchal explored the current security threat in Mali. He argued that Gao represents the most serious threat, largely due to the presence of MUJAO, which transformed itself from a drug trafficking katiba to a smart political actor over the past year. MUJAO took advantage of the Tuareg and social hierarchies in Mali, recruiting from captive lineages and among the youth in order to expand its ranks. It also used coercion. The French intervention
interrupted some of MUJAO’s activities, but did not address many of Mali’s underlying issues and thus Marchal argued that withdrawal will be difficult in the near term.

Yabi addressed some these underlying issues, namely the continued fragmentation of society and the lack of political leadership in Bamako, and proposed several solutions. Most importantly, addressing crisis in Mali require regional cooperation. For reconciliation to occur, Mali needs to address the root causes of the rebellion and the coup, the emergence of extremist groups, and the consequences of those three elements. The problem is the result of a combination of a weak Malian state and a complicated regional environment. External realities certainly played a role rendering regional cooperation all the more important. The most important of these external factors were extremist groups and drug trafficking groups. AQIM’s arrival in the north of Mali from Algeria certainly altered the dynamics, as did the arrival of cocaine trafficking, which Yabi argued changed the stakes financially and otherwise. To address these two critical issues, Mali’s neighbors need to get involved; Mali isn't just a Malian problem and doesn’t just require a Malian solution.

Panel 3: Regional Dynamics

Wolfram Lacher discussed Sahel-Sahara security dynamics. He underscored the development of non-state actors operating in the region, the vast increase and importance of smuggling (notably Moroccan hash, Algerian subsidized products, and Libyan weapons, among others), and the movement of both AQIM and Tuareg fighters as the principle drivers of instability and insecurity in the region. He also pinpointed the Western interventions in Libya and Mali as having regional security repercussions, namely in the dissemination of jihadi activity. Lacher noted that fighters from Libya, the Western Sahara, Mauritania, and Algeria are all moving throughout the region, in some instances heading home when their countries have becoming safe havens themselves. He cited Libya as the epicenter of regional insecurity, but continued to stress smuggling as one of the most, if not the most, important drivers of conflict, particularly in Libya, Mali, and Niger. Smuggling is the key to the economy of conflict and is financing armed groups and fueling rivalries. Whatever success the French intervention in Mali had in disrupting terrorism, it hasn't disrupted smuggling networks meaning that that driver of insecurity is ever present. Overcoming these challenges requires an overall political approach to communities in the border areas, where these issues – and insecurity – are most prevalent.

Rudolph Atallah addressed the security threat in Tunisia, noting that the spread of AQIM-affiliated groups in the country and the rise of extremism has the potential to create a far bigger threat than in Libya if things go wrong. It is not clear at this point which way the security situation there is headed, but Tunisia has a bigger population and thus the potential threat is far greater. Atallah also briefly discussed the French intervention in Mali, arguing that it stopped the Islamists from moving south and also forced the international community to address the problem. However, it only forced a tactical withdrawal, not a strategic defeat for AQIM, which is still in the country.

Christophe Boutin spoke largely about the Western Sahara. He cited the UN report that noted the risk of a spillover of the Mali crisis into the Western Sahara and referenced French press citations of recruitment in the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf and Polisario-member involvement in terrorism with MUJAO in Northern Mali. He termed the Polisario’s response to these allegations as "le démenti clair du Polisario (the clear denial of the Polisario)." Boutin stressed that the camps are insecure and that the broader area east of the berm was insecure as well. Only 20% of the area controlled by the Polisario east of the berm is actually controlled by the Polisario. As a result of this insecurity (and in fact exemplary of it), MINURSO has cancelled night patrols and patrols to the Mauritanian border are always
accompanied by the Polisario. Boutin also stressed that the camps are a target for terrorism and trafficking in the region and that youth in the camps are a particular target. Boutin closed by quoting the UN report that argued that insecurity in the region reiterated the urgency of resolve the Western Sahara crisis. He called for a solution based on Morocco’s autonomy plan, as Morocco has shown great leadership in counterterrorism cooperation, promoting a moderate version of Islam, and implementing reform under the leadership of King Mohammed VI.

Panel 4: Algeria

Frederic Wehrey opened by citing Algeria’s important, albeit complex role in the region, noting that is has been called many things – “reluctant hegemon,” “paranoid neighbor,” and “indispensable power.” The panel addressed some of those labels, assessing internal Algerian politics and Algeria’s role in regional dynamics.

Geoff Porter argued that Algeria was at a turning point politically, with Bouteflika recovering from a health scare, an ongoing reform process, and a question of succession generating a lot of international attention. In spite of renewed attention to the country, Porter argued that western perceptions of Algerian politics are nevertheless wrong and sought to explain why that was the case. He caveated it by stressing that he doesn’t know how Algerian politics works these days. The most important of these false perceptions is the concept of “le pouvoir” that is a term widely used by western analysts. What does this mean? It is used to refer to the political, military, and commercial elite, in addition to the DRS, to which the counterweight is Bouteflika’s clan. There are a few issues with this. First, many of the military elite are retired or dead. Second, the mystique of the DRS has become infectious – is it really still omnipotent? Porter pointed to the In Amenas incident as raising questions about its omnipotence. With regard to Bouteflika’s clan, many left and their replacements are not from Bouteflika’s traditional center of power in Oran and the West. Porter thus argued that this term and these categories don’t reflect realities on the ground. He also argued that there are shifting paradigms in Algeria and that current terms don’t work either for “us or them.” He concluded by noting that he felt a sense of excitement in Algiers about a real political transition – the country isn’t befallen by anxiety about this, rather, there is a potential for a real shift toward political institutions.

Mohammed el-Katiri assessed the many challenges Algeria faces today. The most prominent of these include real protests, a generational transitional at the political level, a difficult regional environment given instability in neighboring countries, and social and economic grievances throughout the country. All of this has lead Algerians in power to question and re-align their priorities. El-Katiri argued that the government has shown resilience and capability in response to these challenges, particularly in its ability to adapt to address security threats in the region.

Anouar Boukhars presented the view of Algeria from the Sahel, namely perceptions of Algeria that he witnessed in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. He found common perceptions that there is a need to harmonize regional views to promote peace and stability, which is challenged by fragmentation in Tunisia and Libya, transition in Algeria, distrust between Morocco and Algeria, and the weakness of states in the Sahel. Likewise, people agreed that Algeria’s role in promoting peace is crucial and influential, given its army and equipment, its counterterrorism experience, its leadership in counterterrorism initiatives and the US counterterrorism structure in the Sahel. Neighbors nevertheless express frustration with the resources Algeria has expended to fight AQIM; its resources are applied disproportionate to its capabilities. Why is this the case? First, its policy of non-intervention; second, its distrust of foreign interference. Algeria rightly pointed out that the Libyan intervention and a NATO
failure for post-conflict reconstruction led to weapons trafficking, which aided fighters in Mali. Despite these ongoing challenges, and the failure of CEMOC, the Algerian-created joint military operations center to fight regional terrorism, to propose and implement any concrete measures to help Mali, there is still a sense that Algeria is the best placed to be the region’s counterterrorism leader. The US certainly remains the most supportive of Algerian leadership, while acknowledging that it could indeed do more.

4. Q & A

Panel 1: Libya

Q: (Yabi) Could you provide an assessment of the control of the southern and Algerian borders and touch on the role this plays in instability in the rest of the region?
A: (Cole) There is trafficking out of Mali for sure – of people, labor, etc. It is done by gangs and bands, not battalions.

Q: (Jamestown Foundation) Could you touch a bit more on arms trafficking in the region? Also, is there a Libyan link to terrorism in Algeria, most notably in the In Amenas attack?
A: (Cole) There was support from elements in Libya for the In Amenas – fueling and logistical support. Libya was also where the wounded terrorists were treated. It is possible that Libyan border guards were involved as well. The cross-border flows are significant. For the borders with Egypt and Tunisia, it is not on the same scale, but with Algeria, it can be measured in tons.

Q: Is there a threat to the US from AQIM? You seemed to have said no, but I disagree.
A: (Chivvis) AQIM has neither the capacity nor the desire to attack the US. That doesn’t mean that won’t change in the future.

Panel 2: Mali

Q: (Chayes) What was the role of the Malian state as dysfunctional and unjust in fueling radicalization? What is a substantive response to the fact that the state was unjust or is that just a pretext for radical groups?
A: (Yabi) It is both. But we need to make a distinction between radical groups and armed extremist groups. Gao had radical groups, but they weren’t armed. When armed groups came from abroad, they had a ready pool of recruits. In additional, radicalization is not a passive progress – there are active recruiters and entrepreneurs from the Gulf and Pakistan pushing this sort of thing. The lack of a state doesn’t create radicalization, but it creates an environment that allows it to occur.

Q: (DCM, Embassy of Algeria) Why are you so pessimistic about our ability to stop narco-trafficking with the common fight against terrorism?
A: (Yabi) The number of people involved in trafficking is much higher than those involved in terrorism – it’s a business and many countries not affected by terrorism are affected by trafficking. It would be a mistake to equate the two and to conflate policy toward combating them both – they are distinct and require distinct policies.

Panel 3: Regional Dynamics

Q: (Marchal) Why is the focus on Northern Mali when talking about smuggling and trafficking? Solutions need to be designed to address the problem across the region.
A: (Lacher) I don’t think we have done that. The problem is different in each country and
must be addressed accordingly. This is not the same historic smuggling that has been going on. The incentives and drivers shift and economic policies impact this as well.

**Q:** (Polisario Representative to the US) Could you please provide details on the links between Morocco and MUJAO?

**A:** (Boutin) Morocco is not supporting MUJAO. MUJAO is a threat to Morocco and Morocco is working to mitigate it. In Mali, it is Sahrawis that are joining MUHAO and AQIM.

**Q:** (Polisario Representative to US) Why are you saying that life is perfect west of the berm and that the threat is only east of the berm? Aren’t there human rights issues west of the berm that are causing instability?

**A:** (Boutin) I didn’t say that. I was merely citing the UN report that said that MINURSO has not been harassed on the West side of the berm, but that has happened on the east side. Even members of the Polisario have begun to reference the possibility of terrorist infiltration in the refugee camps.

**Q:** (Polisario Representative to US) You need to make a distinction between Sahrawi and Polisario.

**A:** (Boutin) You are right, AFP said that people were returning to the Polisario camps and the Sahrawi fighter captured in Mali was a Polisario fighter. Should we go further and distinguish them by tribe and say Rguibat?

**Panel 4: Algeria**

**Q:** (Marina Ottaway, Wilson Center) Could you clarify your point about “le pouvoir?”

**A:** (Porter) What I wanted to stress was that ministries are personality driven in the same way that they are in the US. They are responsive to vested interests, just like Congress is responsive to lobbyists here.

**Q:** (DCM, Embassy of Algeria) Algeria has institutions and a presidency and the power is in these institutions. It has also made a firm commitment to combat terrorism – setting up CEMOC?

**A:** (Boukhars) I don’t doubt Algeria’s commitment to combating terrorism. But CEMOC didn’t succeed. Look at Mali. Look at its request for French intervention. Where is the regional force CEMOC was designed to create? Where is the communications structure? If it succeed, if there are results, show me.

(Shouting from DCM)

(Shouting from Polisario Representative) Why do you have two Moroccans up there “diabolizing” (demonizing) Algeria?

**Q:** (Marchal) The assessment of DRS is a bit off – it is the only intelligence service that has allowed an armed group on its territory and not rooted it out.

**A:** (Boukhars) It has been effective in dealing with violent groups in Algeria – it has boxed in AQIM in the North. It is not the best, but it has been effective internally.

**Q:** Is too much blame being assigned to Algeria and to CEMOC?

**A:** (Boukhars) It needs to be bolstered, strengthened, and expanded. If CEMOC was operational, I am not saying what happened in Mali wouldn’t happen, but leadership is lacking. Likewise, I am not saying that Algeria is complicit or that it nurtures extremist groups. What I am saying is that if Algeria wants to play a leading role, it has to play that
role. Algeria has the capacity to play a leadership role and with leadership comes responsibility.
(Porter) There is a policy debate going on in Algeria about changes to its foreign policy of non-intervention.

Q: (Yabi) What is your assessment of the terrorist threat in Algeria?
A: (Porter) Algeria has a problem with the enormity of its borders and the south is at risk because of the terrorist incursion into Mali. There is no threat in Algiers.

5. Observation

Approximately 75 policymakers, North Africa experts, and security specialists attended the all-day conference. The conference was important in and of itself in that is was exemplary of the increased attention being paid to the Maghreb and Sahel region, particularly among security experts. Carnegie nevertheless remains the think tank with the strongest Maghreb and Sahel focus, largely due to the work on Anouar Boukhrs, but increasingly due to the work of other experts as well. The panels served as an important vehicle for disseminating information about the current security situation in four prominent Sahel countries, but there was little new information presented. The question and answer sessions thus proved more interesting, particularly as a result of continued rants courtesy of the DCM from the Embassy of Algeria, who seems to do the same thing at every event. This time he was supported in his ranting by the new representative of the Polisario Front to DC, who introduced himself to the think tank community with several shouts and interruptions contesting the vision of Western Sahara articulated by a number of the panelists during the two afternoon panels on regional dynamics and Algeria. Both Algeria and the Polisario continue to look foolish when they try to speak in public on these issues. The fact that Morocco does not do this is helpful, particularly since many of Morocco’s messages are already being articulated by the panelists. Even when they are not as positive as MAC would be in expressing them (which they often are, particularly on security), it is nevertheless better to have them coming from the panelists. That said, there is still a negative aspect of these kinds of exchanges. When Algeria and the Polisario have outbursts on the issue of the Sahara, it makes experts less likely to want to engage and discuss the subject matter, particularly in public forums. There isn’t much MAC can do about this, but it does render the personal meetings and direct engagement with think tank experts and policymakers all the more important in order to keep them apprise of developments in the conflict and the region.

(Back to top)
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

June 28, 2013

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- President Bouteflika has been undergoing treatment in Paris for two full months.

- The first and to date only pictures of Bouteflika since he was medevacked to France created a stir when they were released on June 12, but have so far not been followed with any action.

- The need to pass the supplementary finance law is making it increasingly urgent to put an end to the President's absence - either by having Bouteflika impeached for incapacity or bringing him home to resume his duties.

- If, as seems increasingly possible, Bouteflika returns to Algeria in early July, his level of activity during Ramadan - when in previous years he has held a round of individual meetings with all his cabinet ministers - will provide a measure of how far he has really recovered from his stroke.

- While one source claims that Bouteflika has made a good recovery and even intends to run for president again next year, Prime Minister Sellal looks increasingly as if he is being groomed as a successor.

Foreign Relations

- Algeria, and in particular the military, has been drawing closer to the US since the In Amenas attack in January, and this rapprochement has moved forward with Washington's decision to put multi-million dollar bounties on the heads of Mokhtar Belmokhtar and other leading Algerian jihadis, and the G8's condemnation of ransom payments to terrorist groups.

- However, the Algerian regime remains incorrigibly suspicious of outside involvement in the region, and there will be elements within it who will look askance at AFRICOM's latest initiatives in Mali and Niger.

- In many ways, the Algerian regime remains psychologically and politically closer to the Russians, as evidenced during Foreign Minister Medelci's visit to Moscow in late June.

- Algiers' proximity to Moscow, and mistrust of the intentions of western countries, is further encouraged by events in Syria.

Security
· Political violence in the north appears to be increasingly limited to specific areas of Kabylia.

· The situation in the oil and gas producing south is increasingly alarming, due both to overspill from the conflict in northern Mali and to continued activity on the part of groups based close to or just over the eastern borders with Tunisia and Libya.

· Amid worrying signs that the latter have some interest in oil and gas industry targets, there are reports that security forces in the south have been placed on heightened alert until the end of Ramadan in response to intelligence suggesting that an attack on "vital infrastructure" is being prepared.

· All incidents in the south close to the borders with Mali and Mauritania have been attributed to AQMI offshoot MUJAO, while Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Katibat Al Moulathamine and the shadowy Sons of the Sahara for Islamic Justice have been mentioned in connection with incidents along the eastern borders.

Political Trends

It is now two full months since President Bouteflika was medevacked to Paris following what is now officially acknowledged to have been a stroke[1] (rather than a transient ischemia, or 'mini-stroke', as initially claimed). The first images of the President at the French military hospital where he is receiving treatment - in the company of Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Maj-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd Saleh and Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal - may have created a stir when they were released on June 12, but they have not as yet been followed by any real change in the situation: Bouteflika remains abroad and apparently out of action, the government keeps ticking over, and the media continues to speculate about the past, present and future. It is almost as if Algerians were getting used to having an absentee head of state, and some Western observers have even suggested that, with business and the day-to-day life of the state effectively carrying on as normal, this bears out the late President Houari Boumediene's adage that Algeria is a country of institutions, not personalities. It is, however, precisely for institutional reasons that this situation cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely: the extended absence of the President of the Republic creates an institutional vacuum that must one way or another be filled. With or without Bouteflika's consent and/or participation, other stakeholders will therefore have to find a solution soon, and there are some indications that a solution - or at least a temporary fix - may be forthcoming within a week.

According to the Algerian constitution, all government bills must be discussed by the Council of Ministers before being submitted to parliament, and meetings of the Council of Ministers, the constitution stipulates, are chaired by the President of the Republic; after they have been discussed and approved by parliament, they must be signed into law by the President. While Bouteflika could theoretically sign laws in his Parisian hospital room - as, ostensibly, he has begun to do with presidential decrees, of which four, dated May 27, have been published in the latest official gazette[2] - it remains the case that the Council of Ministers cannot be convened without his physical presence. Thus, while ministers may be able to take care of day-to-day business, the government is unable to initiate legislation as long as the President is unavailable.

Various items have begun piling up, but one in particular requires urgent attention. In addition to the annual budget, usually approved in December for the following year, Algeria has become accustomed to passing a mid-year 'supplementary budget' (loi des finances complémentaire, or LFC). Generally approved in July, this has become a necessary part of the process of government: as well as adjusting revenue and expenditure for the rest of the year, these sometimes also introduce important new economic regulations (such as the now
infamous '49-51 rule' providing for majority Algerian ownership of joint venture companies, enshrined in the 2009 LFC). This year, the LFC appears to have taken on special political importance. In response to the unprecedented protest movement that has been shaking the country's southern provinces[3], plans for new taxes and reductions in consumer subsidies crafted by Finance Minister Karim Djoudi to take account of weakening oil prices and declining demand for Algerian oil and gas have apparently been thrown out; instead, the supplementary budget has reportedly been rewritten to include a range of measures (such as the creation of new government jobs for southerners, including 6,000 positions in the police force, etc.) aimed at buying social peace in the south. With parliament due to go into recess for a month at the end of July at the very latest, the presence of the head of state is therefore increasingly urgently required to get this piece of legislation adopted.=

One option might have been to bring into play article 88 of the constitution, which provides for the impeachment of the President in case of "serious and lasting illness" and his replacement on an interim basis by the Speaker of the upper house of parliament. There has, however, been no indication that the Constitutional Council, which is responsible for initiating this process, is to be convened. It is thus looking increasingly likely that Bouteflika will be kept on as President, at least for the time being, and will be brought back to chair the upcoming Council of Ministers meeting. This was in effect the scenario that was suggested - to some scepticism, at the time - by a statement issued by the Algerian Presidency and dutifully carried by APS on June 12 to the effect that President Bouteflika had instructed Prime Minister Sellal to move ahead on finalising the 2013 LFC and "all other legislation that the government has been working on" in preparation for a Council of Ministers meeting. Sellal has since been promising that the Council of Ministers meeting will be held "soon". Against this background, there would seem to be an increasingly strong chance that the President may be brought home soon - perhaps in time for the holy month of Ramadan (begins July 8 or 9) and possibly for Algeria's independence day (July 5)[4].

If this does turn out to be the case, Ramadan will provide an important indicator as to Bouteflika's real condition. Over his three successive terms of office, Bouteflika has established a tradition of holding individual performance assessment meetings with each of his ministers during the holy month. Failure to do so this year would be a pointer that his stroke has left lasting damage to his physical and/or mental condition. If on the other hand he does hold his Ramadan interviews as usual, this would lend greater credence to the claims of a staffer at the Presidency, made in conversations with us in mid-June, that Bouteflika is not only in relatively good health but also still intends to run for a fourth term next year.

The same source claims that Prime Minister Sellal has been chosen by Bouteflika himself as his future Vice President (if and when the constitution is amended) and ultimately his successor - perhaps mid-way through his hoped-for fourth term, circa 2017; others have implied that the Prime Minister has been designated by other players within the power structure, in particular DRS chief Tewfik, as their candidate to succeed Bouteflika, as of 2014 if not sooner. One way or another, it is noticeable that Sellal has been acquiring a distinctly presidential air. Over the past month he has made two visits to the provinces (El Bayadh in the west of the country, Souk Ahras in the east, as if to emphasise balance between Algeria's competing regions) with a large retinue of ministers in tow, which were highly reminiscent of the provincial inspection tours that used to be Bouteflika's speciality; presided over the annual meeting of the country's Walis (provincial governors), normally very much the President's job; and begun standing in for Bouteflika at international gatherings.

Foreign Relations

2013 has seen a certain rapprochement between Algiers and Washington, in large measure a consequence of the January 16 attack on the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas in the southern Wilaya of Illizi. But with
powerful forces still pulling in the opposite direction, it would probably be overhasty to conclude that a lasting and close strategic relationship is just around the corner.

Within a fortnight of the In Amenas attack, French specialist newsletter Maghreb Confidentiel claimed that "In Amenas is boosting the Algerian-American axis":

The attack against the In Amenas gas facility on January 16 has pushed Washington to further beef up its security ties with Algiers. According to Maghreb Confidentiel's sources, Algeria has since that date been placed on the "A list" of countries with which the United States cooperates fully in defence and intelligence. And US Ambassador in Algiers Henry S. Ensher is pressing to have that temporary classification made permanent. This could accelerate the negotiations for the purchase by Algiers of US-made drones. The talks, which were launched several years ago, have been in the doldrums, Washington having demanded a right of oversight over the way in which they are used as a prior condition for any sale, which Algiers sees as intolerable interference.

In exchange for this all-out assistance, the United States hopes to push Algeria to review its role in the region. For US diplomats, Algeria may have had the best analysis of events in Libya and their impact on the region, but it has remained far too stand-offish: if it had really played its role to the full, the French operation in Mali could have been avoided.

The prospect of closer military cooperation has since been confirmed to us, up to a point, by a retired Algerian Air Force officer, who told us in May that:

The In Amenas attack was a turning point for the Algerian armed forces. [Not least because] on a strategic level, the faction which has been arguing for years that Algeria should buy American-made military equipment now has the upper hand. Algeria is looking to acquire American drones and AWACS, and contacts are under way - with more formal talks likely to begin soon - concerning closer cooperation between Algeria and AFRICOM.

For a country which, as little as five or six years ago, was considered the Russian arms industry's biggest customer in Africa if not the world, this is already quite a turnaround.

On the diplomatic level, meanwhile, Algiers has been gratified to see the United States, together with the other G8 states when they gathered for the Lough Erne summit this month, formally adopting Algeria's long-held stance of complete opposition to the payment of ransoms to terrorist groups. Similarly, the US State Department's announcement in early June that it was offering a reward of up to $5m for information leading to the capture or killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (and similar bounties for Yahia Abou El Hammam and Malik Abou Abdelkarim of AQMI's Saharan branch and MUJAO's Oumar Ould Hamaha) has been greeted with satisfaction.

However, while Algiers may be pleased to see the US and other powers (notably France, which had become notorious for throwing money at Saharan hostage-takers) coming round to its positions, suspicion bordering on paranoia remains one of the hallmarks of the Algerian regime. A fear of imperialist encirclement, and even of dismemberment, having been part of its make-up since its earliest days, it was the regime's instinctive reaction to oppose NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011, and likewise French intervention in northern Mali (at least until it could no longer be avoided). Consequently, however keen some figures within the regime may be to move towards closer military cooperation with the United States, there will inevitably be others who look
very much askance at any new encroachment by outside powers - including reports[5] that AFRICOM has begun airlifting matériel to Taoudeni in northern Mali (ostensibly for "elite units" of the Malian army) and building two new airstrips, one in Mali and the other in Niger, to facilitate "rapid interventions" by American forces.

Indeed, psychologically, and to a large extent politically, Algeria's elite still has more in common with the Russians than with the United States. This proximity has been reinforced by events in and around Syria - of late in particular by American, French and British moves to arm Syrian rebel forces, in collaboration with Qatar and Saudi Arabia - and was very much in evidence when Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci was in Moscow this past week for a meeting of the Algerian-Russian High Commission. At a joint press conference on June 25, his opposite number Sergei Lavrov stressed the "convergence" of views between the two countries:

We found that our approaches to international issues have traditionally been close. We and our Algerian colleagues are in favor of the supremacy of international law and strengthening the key role of the United Nations in ensuring balance and stability in international relations.

On the question of terrorism and security, Lavrov added, acidly:
The attached should be seen. It’s a very strong report on the terrorism in North Africa linked to the Polisario, and separately, a summary of the document. Although I’m sure you may not be able to read it entirely, you must/should glance through it please. It will be widely distributed on occasions when someone reports or makes statements positively about the Polisario. Ed
Chronology
Documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region.

May 22, 2013
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace releases a new book, Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahel, edited by North Africa experts Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars. The book cites increasing inroads by AQIM and its allies in terrorism and trafficking across the Sahara/Sahel region, including Libya, Mali, Mauritania, and the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria. In a chapter on the Western Sahara, Boukhars writes that the unresolved Western Sahara conflict has “negatively impacted trans-Saharan security. The undergoverned areas abutting the Western Sahara, especially northern Mauritania and the Polisario-administered camps in southwest Algeria, are becoming major hubs for drug trafficking, the smuggling of contraband, and the circulation of weapons.” Boukhars further notes that, “There is growing evidence to suggest dangerous connections between criminal organizations, AQIM, and the Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf.”

April 16, 2013
Agence France press reports that jihadists fleeing French and African forces are attempting to seek refuge and reorganize in neighboring countries and on Malian territory, including in the Algerian camps of the Polisario Front. According to an African soldier quoted by AFP, members of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) had fled to the Algerian camps of the Polisario Front. The source further noted, “Recently, when the highest UN authorities have expressed their concern and called for urgent settlement of the Western Sahara problem, it is because of the risk of terrorists turning the refugee camps into a new home for jihadists.”

April 9, 2013
UN leader Ban Ki-Moon calls for urgent international efforts to end the Western Sahara conflict because of fears the Mali war will spill over into the territory. In a report to the 15-member Security Council, Ban argued, "The rise of instability and insecurity in and around the Sahel requires an urgent settlement of this long-standing dispute.” The report continued, "All governments consulted raised serious concerns over the risk that the fighting in Mali could spill over into neighboring countries and contribute to radicalizing the Western Saharan refugee camps," with one government leader in the region calling the Western Sahara camps “a ticking time bomb,” according to the report.

March 16, 2013
The Foreign Minister of Mali, Tieman Coulibaly, confirms that Polisario fighters were among the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups in his country. “Polisario elements from the Tindouf camps have been identified with MUJAO fighters operating in northern Mali,” Coulibaly said, adding that Polisario militia members had been recruited to fight as mercenaries and paid monthly “salaries ranging from 200 to 600 Euros.”

March 1, 2013
Le Figaro reports that a fighter from the Polisario Front was among seven militants taken prisoner after a fierce battle between French/Chadian forces and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali. The battle in the mountains of northern Mali reportedly killed key al-Qaeda leader Abou Zeid and 42 other jihadists.

February 27, 2013
The Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies publishes a new report on terrorism in North Africa, “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications,” which notes that al-Qaeda has “established links with Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling into Europe with terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario Front.” The report also recommends that the international community take a “closer look at the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria: in order to reduce the flow of recruits to terrorist and criminal groups.”

February 4, 2013
Malian foreign minister, Tiéman Coulibaly, confirms the presence of Polisario fighters among the terrorist groups in Mali. In an interview with Atlasinfo, he notes, “In the beginning, they were only 500 insurgents. Now they are between 5,500 to 7,000 terrorists in northern Mali who were joined by lost youths, including young Sahrawis from the camps.”

January 29, 2013
Al-Arabiya reports that 300 fighters from the Polisario are fighting as part of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Northern Mali.

December 2012
A CNA Strategic Studies’ report, “Security Challenges in Libya and the Sahel,” warns “there is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, as well as indications that Sahrawi from the camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali.” The report stresses that this development poses “immediate concerns for the security of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria.”

November 11, 2012
Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin notes that jihadists have been flooding into Mali, arguing that “AQIM is on the rise throughout the Maghreb, opportunistically teaming up with other groups (like the violent, separatist Polisario) and setting up shop wherever the central government is in disarray.”

October 28, 2012
Jeune Afrique publishes a feature article, “Mali : Polisario connection” citing updated reports that new recruits from the Polisario-run refugee camps and elsewhere across the Sahel have joined jihadists in Northern Mali. The article cites French intelligence reports that groups of 40-60 men, up to 300 volunteers, arrived in Timbuktu and Gao during October, many of whom express themselves in Hassaniya, the Arabic dialect used by Moors and Sahrawis. The article also discusses the presence of Salafi Jihadism in the camps, noting that it “is not a recent phenomenon.” Jeune Afrique says Sahrawis who had received military training in the Polisario camps have been implicated in other terrorist incidents in the region and notes that neither the Polisario Front nor Algerians have been able to stop the “Salafist virus” among young people in the Tindouf camps, and have been even less able to prevent these “desperados” from leaving the camps to join jihadist movements. While Algerian and Polisario security forces now police the Tindouf camps together, the extremist appeal remains strong for young Sahrawis, and “no roadblock, no patrol, no minefield will prevent [them] from taking the path to Timbuktu.”

October 22, 2012
Agence France Presse reports that hundreds of jihadist fighters have poured into Mali to support the Islamists of AQIM and MUJAO that have controlled the northern part of the country for seven months. Quoting a Malian security official, the article notes, “in the Timbuktu region and around Gao, hundreds of jihadists, mostly Sudanese and Sahrawi, have arrived as reinforcements to face an offensive by Malian forces and their allies.” The article also cites one of MUJAO’s top leaders, Habib Ould Issouf, who said that recruits were coming from the camps of Tindouf Algeria, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and elsewhere.  

October 8, 2012
Jeune Afrique publishes an editorial citing reports by European/Maghreb intelligences sources that hundreds of recruits are joining al-Qaeda-linked extremist groups in northern Mali from the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria and from across the region. The editorial argues that young Sahrawis have increasingly joined AQIM and MUJAO because of their lack of hope for a future – “trained in weapons, indoctrinated by Salafist imams who openly advocate in the camps for the creation of an Islamic State in the Western Sahara, these fighters are welcomed with open arms by their Algerian brothers.”

September 2012
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes a report written by Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime in the Sahara-Sahel region” examining the growing impact of organized crime in the region and the involvement of both state and militant groups in such crime. Lacher implicates Sahrawi networks with close ties to the Polisario in the drug and aid trafficking that accounts for much of the organized crime in the region: “In the triangle between Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria, Sahrawi networks—often with the direct involvement of officials in the Polisario movement, which seeks independence for Western Sahara—trade subsidized Algerian goods and humanitarian aid southward and cigarettes northward to Algeria and Morocco.” Lacher further notes, “In some cases, Sahrawi cannabis resin smugglers with close ties to the Polisario have been known to take cocaine to Morocco on their way back from Mali.”

August 9, 2012
Jeune Afrique reports that dozens of youth from the refugee camps near Tindouf have joined MUJAO, the AQIM splinter group whose current spokesman, Abou Walid Saharoui, is a former member of the Polisario Front.

July 28, 2012
Spain evacuates all of its aid workers, as well as three other foreign nationals, from refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, citing “well-founded evidence of a serious increase in insecurity in the region” and “the serious risks of new kidnappings.”

July 20, 2012
The three Spanish aid workers kidnapped from a refugee camp near Tindouf, Algeria in October 2011 and held in northern Mali are released, allegedly for an $18.4 million ransom.

June 27, 2012

Soufan Group issues an intelligence brief warning about the spread of violence extremism in the Sahel. The report details the fallout from the conflict in Libya and its unintended benefits for AQIM: “buoyed by the flow of arms and fighters out of Libya, the group initiated skirmishes with government forces in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger during the last months of 2011.” The report cites growing links between militants operating in the region, particularly AQIM and the Polisario Front. It notes, “More ominously, AQIM also increased its linkages with other rebel forces in the Sahel, including the Polisario Front... In late October, three aid workers—an Italian and two Spaniards—were seized by AQIM militants (aided by Sahrawi sympathizers) inside a camp administered by the Polisario separatists near the Algerian town of Tindouf. The connection was not surprising given that the large numbers of idle young Polisario fighters with no prospects present the terrorist group with a ready pool of potential recruits, both for its military operations as well as the drug smuggling and other criminal activities it is increasingly involved in.”

April 6, 2012

Malian separatists declare independence in northern Mali in what experts fear may be a "rogue state" in the Sahara. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad received support from militant Islamic group Ansar Dine, AQIM, and an AQIM splinter group, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, in its conquest of Gao and Timbuktu, creating “a security nightmare” in the region. Experts warn that along with AQIM, “the Polisario will gain more power,” as a result of the crisis in Mali. Africa security expert Dr. J. Peter Pham echoes these concerns, emphasizing the importance of resolving the Western Sahara conflict. “It is like before 9/11, when we might have asked ourselves: ‘Who cares about Afghanistan?’ But jihadists ultimately need a place to operate and what we are now seeing is the creation of a safe haven for terrorists and extremists who are being squeezed out elsewhere.”

March 12, 2012

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes a paper underscoring the “disturbing reality” that growing numbers of disenchanted Polisario youth and fighters are being recruited by AQIM and a “vast network” of regional drug traffickers. The paper, by McDaniels College professor Anouar Boukhars, cites the October 23 kidnapping of Western aid workers in the Polisario camps as confirmation that, “the deteriorating social and political conditions in the camps in Tindouf represent a tinderbox waiting to explode.” It also notes that AQIM-Polisario member links pose “a major security threat to the Maghreb and the Sahel.”

February 21, 2012

Experts testify to a United Nations Security Council special session that drug cartels and smugglers now traffic almost $1 billion in cocainc a year from Latin America into Africa’s Sahel. They add that traffickers are forming alliances with AQIM and other militants, in a region that has seen an influx of Libyan weapons. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned leaders: “inaction could be catastrophic.”

February 2, 2012

ICTS releases a study reporting the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria have become “a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises,” and recommends Western aid to the camps “prioritize permanent resettlement” for the refugees. Noting expanding AQIM links with Polisario members, South American drug cartels, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab, as well as AQIM’s access to the influx of Libyan weapons in the Sahel, the study cites a 500% rise in terrorist attacks in the region since 9/11. It argues that AQIM is seeking to extend an “arc of instability” across Africa to exploit turbulence from the Arab Spring and destabilize the region.

---

January 11, 2012
Algerian and Mauritanian security agencies reportedly break up major trafficking and money laundering rings. Officials say the rings are believed linked with groups such as al-Qaeda, which is working with the Polisario to traffic arms and drugs from Mauritania to northern neighbors. Mali reportedly steps up efforts against AQIM and what is believed its latest offshoot, “Al Qaida in Polisario Camps.”

January 3, 2012
Security expert Dr. J. Peter Pham, Atlantic Council, reports that economic and political reforms in Africa are “threatened by the spread of violent extremism” and “increasing links” between AQIM and other militants in the Sahel, recently “buoyed by the flow of arms and fighters” from Libya. “More ominously, AQIM has increased its linkages with the Polisario,” evident in AQIM’s October 23 kidnappings near Tindouf, which were “aided by Polisario sympathizers” inside the Polisario’s camps. The camps offer “a ready pool of potential recruits” from “large numbers of idle young fighters.”

December 27, 2011
Mali reportedly distances itself from the Polisario, accusing it of kidnapping, drug trafficking, and suspected collusion with a Sahrawi branch of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. A source close to the government says Mali is "angry" with the Polisario, and Malian officials say the October 23 kidnapping was done in collusion with the ‘Sahrawi link’ of AQIM.

December 24, 2011
Mali refuses entry to "eight young Sahrawis" coming from Niger. “They had no papers. There are laws to be respected in Mali especially when it comes to dubious propaganda,” said Malian police.

December 17, 2011
Mali warns the Polisario, “our country is not the Wild West where they can come to kill and kidnap people.” Bamako will "no longer accept the violation of its territorial integrity by the Polisario Front," says a Malian Minister. A local official adds, "everybody here knows who AQIM's accomplices are, they even assisted in abducting the Europeans in Tindouf. His name is Omar al Sahraoui, but neither Mali, nor Algeria, nor the Polisario are doing anything to capture him." In 2010, al Sahraoui, reportedly a Polisario veteran, was sentenced to 12 years for kidnapping Spanish aid workers for AQIM, according to Mauritanian court papers. He was later released in a trade for the aid workers.

December 15, 2011
Members of the Polisario launch an armed incursion into northern Mali, killing one and abducting three others, ostensibly looking for the kidnappers of three Western aid workers taken October 23 from the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria.

December 10, 2011
A splinter group of AQIM confirms it is holding three aid workers kidnapped October 23 near the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. The group, linked by some to al Sahraoui, calls itself "Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa."

November 30, 2011
The US House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism & Intelligence hears testimony that AQIM is expanding its ties in the Sahel with the Polisario, as well as militant Nigerian group Boko Haram and Somalia-based al-Shabaab.
November 28, 2011
UK Foreign Secretary William Hague says AQIM’s expanding terrorist ties to other militant groups in the Sahel could have a “profoundly destabilizing” effect on a region already rocked by the Arab Spring.49

November 24, 2011
AQIM kidnaps two French tourists from their hotel at night in eastern Mali, claiming they are spies. Officials later report that the abductions were coordinated with the Polisario.50

November 7, 2011
Algerian Chief of Staff General Qaid Saleh reportedly reprimands Polisario chief Mohammed Abdul Aziz for allowing an al-Qaeda presence inside the Polisario-controlled camps in Tindouf.51

November 6, 2011
Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin cites alarm at AQIM kidnappings in the Polisario camps. “This is a catastrophe waiting to happen. The need to empty the camps, deprive AQIM of a supply of victims and accomplices, and restore order has never been greater.”52

October 26, 2011
Spanish daily El Pais reports on the Tindouf abductions, noting that, “to cross the checkpoints of the Algerian army and Polisario, kidnappers benefited from support of Polisario’s military.”53

October 25, 2011
Spain requests a UN security mission to the Polisario-run camps. “We’ve asked the UN to send a mission to Algeria to assess the security situation in the camps of Tindouf” – Foreign Minister Trinidad Jimenez.54

October 23, 2011
An AQIM splinter group kidnaps three Western aid workers from the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, reportedly with Polisario-insider help. “Unarmed AQIM militants entered the Sahrawi refugee camp in Tindouf, western Algeria, where sympathizers of the Polisario Front gave them weapons and help them seek out the hostages.”55

September 29, 2011
Mauritanian President reports that AQIM has acquired Libyan arms, including surface-to-air missiles.56

September 20, 2011
US terrorism expert Yonah Alexander, International Center for Terrorism Studies, says the “Polisario is intensifying activities to transport and smuggle illegal drugs in both North Africa and Europe. The Polisario is working with Al Qaida in both the drug and weapons trade.”57

September 15, 2011
Malian security forces hunt for rival gangs of drug smugglers from Mali, Niger, and the Polisario, after a desert gun battle over ton of cocaine and hashish leaves four dead, according to a Malian army official.

September 10, 2011
Analysts say that Libyan dictator Qaddafi’s fall seriously weakens the Polisario in its dispute with Morocco on the Western Sahara, after widespread reports that Polisario mercenaries sided with Qaddafi.

May 29, 2011
US Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart urges colleagues in Congress to give "serious attention" to evidence that Polisario members are "participating as mercenaries in Colonel Qaddafi's murderous campaign."

May 20, 2011
The US Administration expresses concern to Algeria that “credible sources report” that Polisario mercenaries are being paid by Qaddafi “to fight NATO-led forces and kill Libyan protesters and rebels.”

April 21, 2011
The London Telegraph reports that senior NATO officials have received information that Col. Qaddafi is hiring 450 Polisario mercenaries for $10,000 each to fight Libyan rebels and prop up his regime.

January 16, 2011
Former Polisario Chief Police Inspector, Mustapha Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud says “the situation is grave for the youth who are marginalized” in Polisario-run camps in Algeria. “The camps are fertile grounds for Islamic fundamentalist groups and drug traffickers.

January 6, 2011
Terrorism cell and arms cache broken up in W. Sahara suggest “links between AQIM and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front.” Washington Post columnist J. Rubin writes, “there is ample evidence the Polisario Front... is in league with al-Qaeda.”

January 3, 2010
US DEA former Director of Operations, Michael Braun, calls conditions ‘dismal for Saharans living in the Polisario-run camps,’ which have become a “breeding-ground for potential future AQIM recruits.”

December 21, 2010
Leaders arrested in one of the Sahel’s largest drug-smuggling rings are purported to have close ties to the Polisario Front. Nigerien officials call it, “one of the major drug trafficking networks” in the Sahara. It is known as "Polisario" because 90% of its members come from camps of the Polisario Front.

---

December 9, 2010
Experts cite growing concern about violence instigated by pro-Polisario militants in Laayoune, W. Sahara. “Situation is becoming more dangerous, because of the violence and because al-Qaeda is now present.” – Analyst T. Tarik.68

November 10, 2010
Algeria reports “Cocaine that comes from Brazil, Peru, and Colombia supports the nucleus of al-Qaeda in the region” – Algerian head of the National Office for Combating Drugs & Addiction, Abdelmalek Sayeh. 69

October 18, 2010
Drug ring linked to AQIM is dismantled in Morocco. VOA cites experts, evidence from Mauritania, Mali indicating AQIM has worked in the last two years “to recruit Sahrawis who are trained fighters to carry out their operations.”70

August 23, 2010
AQIM frees three Spanish kidnapping victims after Mauritania agrees to release the perpetrator, Omar Sahraoui, who is “believed to have been a senior commander of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.” 71

July 2010
Mauritania sentences reported Polisario veteran, Omar al Sahraoui, to 12 years for the 2009 kidnapping of Spanish aid workers. Mauritanian court papers document that he was paid by AQIM along with at least three other Polisario veterans to organize and carry out the crime.72

April 12, 2010
Security expert calls the Western Sahara conflict a “vicious cycle” that terrorists can exploit; cites “evidence that members of the military arm of the Polisario Front have been involved in illicit activities.”73

February 2010
Polisario veteran Omar le Sahraoui arrested in Mali, extradited to Mauritania for kidnapping Spanish aid workers. 74

December 30, 2009
Armed assailants from AQIM katibat Tarek Ibn Zaid attacked Telemeses, Niger, killing one civilian and three soldiers. The Tarek Ibn Zaid katibat is largely comprised of Sahrawis. 75

November 29, 2009
AQIM claims responsibility for kidnapping three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania. Mauritanian security services later discover that AQIM had hired Omar al Sahraoui—who was reportedly a member of the Polisario’s hierarchy—and at least three other Polisario veterans to organize and carry out the abductions.76

June 4, 2005
Two GSPC katibas, including the katiba Tarek Ibn Ziad, comprised primarily of Sahrawis, attack an army base in Lemghety, Mauritania, killed 15 Mauritanian soldiers and injuring 17.77

Security in the Sahara and Sahel: The growing threat posed by the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf

Evidence has become overwhelming that members from the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria are fighting alongside al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for United and Jihad (MUJAO) in northern Mali, and continue to engage in drug and arms smuggling in the Sahara/Sahel. Recent reports confirm that the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf have become not only a recruiting ground for terrorists and traffickers operating in the region, but also a potential place of refuge for jihadists forced out of northern Mali by the actions of French and African forces.

Indeed, on May 22, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released a new book, “Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara,” which reported that AQIM “has found an attractive base of supporters and recruits” in the Sahara/Sahel region. It cited increasing inroads by the group in Libya, Mali, Mauritania, and the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf, which the book said represent “a tinderbox waiting to explode.”

A week earlier, the UN Security Council warned that an “Arc of Instability” was stretching across the region, which, if left unchecked, “could transform the continent into a breeding ground for extremists and a launch pad for larger-scale terrorist attacks around the world.”

These warnings followed earlier reports about the extent of Polisario-member involvement in terrorism and trafficking in the region. On April 16, Agence France Press cited reports from an African soldier that jihadists in northern Mali were attempting to reorganize in neighboring countries, including in the Algerian camps of the Polisario Front. According to the soldier quoted by AFP, members of MUJAO had fled to the Algerian camps of the Polisario Front.

On March 15, the Foreign Minister of Mali, Tieman Coulibaly, confirmed that, “Polisario elements from the Tindouf camps have been identified with MUJAO fighters operating in northern Mali,” adding that Polisario militia members were recruited and paid monthly "salaries ranging from 200 to 600 Euros" to fight for the AQIM-linked MUJAO. A member of the Polisario Front was likewise among seven militants taken prisoner in the battle that killed AQIM leader Abou Zeid on March 1.

These developments and the region’s descent into instability and terrorist violence have only increased the urgency to negotiate a solution to resolve the dispute over the Western Sahara – a long-standing conflict that has significantly inhibited regional cooperation to fight terrorism. This urgency has recently been acknowledged by UN leader Ban-Ki Moon, who on April 9 called for urgent international efforts to end the Western Sahara conflict because of fears the Mali war will spill over into the territory.

In a report to the 15-member Security Council, Ban argued, "The rise of instability and insecurity in and around the Sahel requires an urgent settlement of this long-standing dispute."
The UN report added, “All governments consulted raised serious concerns over the risk that the fighting in Mali could spill over into neighboring countries and contribute to radicalizing the Western Saharan refugee camps,” which one government leader in the region called “a ticking time bomb.”

A review of documented incidents and expert reports confirms that the Polisario-run camps are becoming a recruiting ground for AQIM, a hub for opportunistic Polisario members trafficking arms across the Sahel and drugs into Europe, and a threat to the security of the region and reforms of the Arab Spring. The most significant of these recent developments includes:

- **Members of the Polisario are fighting alongside AQIM and MUJAO in northern Mali and are engaged in terrorist incidents throughout the region** – On February 4, 2013, Malian foreign minister Tiéman Coulibaly confirmed the presence of Polisario fighters among terrorist groups in Mali. He noted that Polisario militia members had been recruited to fight as mercenaries for MUJAO. His statement reaffirmed previous reports that as many as 300 members of the Polisario were fighting in northern Mali.6

- **Members of the Polisario have developed high-level links with al-Qaeda leaders operating in Mali** - On March 1, 2013, Le Figaro and France 24 reported that a fighter from the Polisario Front was among seven militants take prisoner after the battle which killed key al-Qaeda leaders Abou Zeid.7

- **The Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria have become a recruiting ground for traffickers and terrorists** – In December 2012, CNA Strategic Studies warned “there is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, as well as indications that Sahrawi from these camps have jointed terrorist groups based in Mali.”8

The CNA study cited the threat as posing “immediate concerns for the security of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria,” not to mention US interests in the region.

According to the May 2013 book, “Perilous Desert,” from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, growing numbers of disenchanted Polisario youth and fighters are being recruited by AQIM and a vast network of regional drug traffickers, adding that “there is growing evidence to suggest dangerous connections between criminal organizations, AQIM, and the Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf.”9

- **Polisario-linked drug and arms smuggling rings are operating in the Sahel** – In the last two years, Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali have arrested dozens of Polisario members caught leading or operating major drug and arms trafficking rings in the region. These rings have been linked to AQIM and South American cartels engaged in trans-Atlantic drugs-for-arms trade with end markets in Europe and the Americas.
Recent estimates of the value of this trafficking amount to nearly $1 billion US dollars annually.\(^\text{10}\)

In September 2012, a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report detailed the extent of Polisario involvement, implicating Sahrawi networks with close ties to the Polisario in the drug and aid trafficking that accounts for much of the organized crime in the region. The report notes, “In the triangle between Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria, Sahrawi networks—often with the direct involvement of officials in the Polisario movement, which seeks independence for Western Sahara—trade subsidized Algerian goods and humanitarian aid southward and cigarettes northward to Algeria and Morocco.”\(^\text{11}\)

Further, a February 2013 study by the IUCTS cites intelligence reports that confirm al-Qaeda “has established links with Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling through terrorist-trafficking networks that include members of the Polisario Front” in Algeria.\(^\text{12}\)

- **Polisario recruits have carried out and assisted in AQIM kidnappings** – On October 23, 2011, Polisario insiders reportedly helped an offshoot of AQIM kidnap three Western aid workers from the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria.\(^\text{13}\) The Spanish aid workers were held for 9 months and released for an alleged ransom of $18.4 million. As a result of the insecurity in the camps, in July 2012 Spain evacuated all of its aid workers, citing “well-founded evidence of a serious increase in insecurity in the region” and “the serious risk of new kidnappings.”\(^\text{14}\)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GayStar News</td>
<td>Morocco says no to the ‘threat’ of gay marriage</td>
<td>Justice Minister Mustafa Ramid (PJD), has stated that “Morocco can not even open a public debate on the issue” of gay marriage, in response to the possibility of revising a legal agreement with France mutually recognizing the validity of marriages between the two countries’ nationals to include homosexuals. A letter signed by French Justice minister Christiane Taubira said that France’s legalization of gay marriage did not cover 11 countries, including Morocco. It reads “In the case of an intended marriage between two people of the same sex, if one of the spouses is a national of one of these countries, the state registrar shall not solemnise the marriage.”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait News Agency</td>
<td>KFAED, Morocco sign seven agreements</td>
<td>The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) and Moroccan Minister of Economy and Finance Nizar Baraka have signed seven agreements to finance development projects, in deals totaling $1.25 billion. The projects, including roads, dams, and education, will be financed over the next five years at $250 million per year.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Libertés individuelles : Y-a-t-il eu un mariage d’homosexuels français à Essaouira ?</td>
<td>There is considerable controversy in Morocco over whether or not the wedding of two gay Frenchmen was held in Essaouira over the weekend. The Minister of Tourism, Lahcen Haddad, vehemently denies that such a ceremony took place, but various unions and parties are claiming that it did. Notably, it appears that those who are disseminating information about the homosexual event’s existence are anti-Benkirane politicians, hoping to tarnish the PM’s reputation. The Mogador Regional Council has echoed Haddad’s denials, stating in a communiqué that the aforementioned information is “irresponsible and unfounded,” and “likely to harm the image of our country.”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Pays en déliquescence : Le Maroc mieux classé que la Turquie, la Tunisie ou l’Algérie</td>
<td>Morocco was ranked as #93 (out of 178) on the 2013 Failed States Index, a 6-place improvement from 2012. It was ranked above Turkey, Tunisia, and Algeria. States are ranked based on scores from 0 (most vulnerable) to 120 (least vulnerable), which represent tallies of a state’s vulnerability based on twelve indicators; Morocco scored 74.3. While its ranking has improved since last year, Morocco is still in the “countries in danger” category.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article Title</td>
<td>Article Text</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Femen au Maroc : Une première militante, seins nus, au royaume</td>
<td>For the first time, a representative of Femen Morocco has posted a nude picture of herself with her face uncovered. Until now, the Femen Morocco website, which was launched in March, only had a few photos of its members, all of them with their faces covered. This photo depicts a woman standing in front of the city of Essaouira holding a sign reading “FREE FEMEN,” in support of Amina Sboui, the Femen Tunisia member who was the center of recent controversy. Femen announced that its movement is gaining traction in North Africa, stating that there will be “millions... from Morocco to Tunisia.” Some Moroccans have warned that it is unsafe for these women to protest topless in the Kingdom, stating, “Morocco is not Tunisia.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>France : Trois Marocains poursuivis pour coups et insultes racistes à cause d'une cigarette</td>
<td>Three Moroccan nationals are currently being held in Agen for hurling racial insults at two women and violently beating a man. The three men allegedly approached the women while under the influence of alcohol and asked for a cigarette. When they refused, the men allegedly began to insult them and beat a man who came to their rescue. The trial had been scheduled for last Friday morning, but was postponed pending a psychiatric evaluation of the accused.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Maroc-Algérie : Alger accuse Rabat d’« escalade préméditée »</td>
<td>The war of words between Morocco and Algeria continues unabated. Friday, Rabat made it known that it refused the three conditions that Algiers laid out for the reopening of the land border, describing this approach as “a practice of another age.” Algeria is, once again, quick to respond, accusing Morocco this time of “premeditated escalation” against Algeria.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco faces human trafficking crisis</td>
<td>UN Special Rapporteur Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, on an invitation by the Moroccan government, visited Rabat, Casablanca, and Tangier last week to discuss the problem of human trafficking.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2013</td>
<td>UN News Centre</td>
<td>“Morocco faces considerable challenges as a source, transit, and increasingly as a destination country for trafficking in persons,” the UN News Centre quoted the official as saying on 25 June.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2013</td>
<td>Standard Digital</td>
<td>Earlier this week, more than 130 Moroccan businessmen visited Nairobi to negotiate a trade partnership. The agreement, already signed by the Kenyans, could be ready as early as September, depending on when Moroccan authorities sign.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2013</td>
<td>EU Neighborhood Info Center</td>
<td>Moroccan government officials, businesspeople, and civic society leaders met with the European Training Foundation (ETF) to discuss options to improve human capital in the country’s small business sector.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 2013</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>Mohamed Benjelloun, chairman of the Moroccan Gas Distributor’s Association, has stated that his organization may strike as early as this week, in order to pressure the government to raise distribution margins. “Our margins have not changed since 1998,” Benjelloun said. The threat of a strike increases pressure on the government’s subsidy reform plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2, 2013</td>
<td>The Herald Scotland</td>
<td>The Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture and the state buying agency ONICL have confirmed that the restrictions on feed wheat imports have been lifted, allowing imports to meet Moroccan feed manufacturers' annual demand of 60,000 tons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2, 2013</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>A group of nearly 60 international CEOs and thought leaders gathered under the patronage of His Majesty King Mohammed VI in Marrakech for the annual CEO Retreat of A.T. Kearney's Global Business Policy Council, June 27-29. This was the first time the closed-door symposium, founded over 20 years ago, was held in Morocco.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2, 2013</td>
<td>Jurist</td>
<td>Eric Goldstein of HRW writes a piece criticizing torture. While he acknowledges the efforts of MVI’s truth commission, he points out that “the judiciary has been a laggard in the reform process. A partially reformed state, as it eases up on naked force as a tool of repression, may rely more on a subservient judiciary to punish opponents who go too far.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| July 2, 2013 | The Local                           | The discovery of a wetsuit-clad skeleton floating in the sea near Alicante, Spain, with flippers, phone, waterproofed clothes, a 
| **ID mystery** | **July 2, 2013** | Moroccan passport and a wad of cash has triggered speculation as to the victim's identity, origin and cause of death. According to the story, currents and sea creatures are believed to be responsible for stripping the body of flesh, of which "not an ounce" remained. The passport was issued to a Moroccan man, Abdelaziz Elfayafi, born January 8, 1989 in Imzouren. |
| **Express Tribune** | **Expanding scope: Morocco for exploring avenues of cooperation** | **July 3, 2013** | Moroccan Ambassador Mustafha Salahdine has suggested that Pakistan's businessmen organise an Economic Day for Morocco and invite Moroccan businessmen to explore new avenues of cooperation between the two countries. In this regard, his embassy will do the maximum to facilitate the event and make it successful. He added that Morocco wanted increased trade with Pakistan as the two countries had good potential to promote bilateral trade in different areas. |
A year and a half ago, in the wake of the election of the PJD-led government in Morocco, a heady rush of optimism with regard to Moroccan-Algerian relations in general and the question of the border in particular swept through the region. At the end of January 2012, Algerian Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia himself publicly described the future reopening of the border as "very plausible". In private a former adviser to the Algerian presidency suggested that, while reopening the border had not been broached officially with the Moroccans, the idea had indeed been discussed at the El Mouradia presidential palace. Although this initial impetus fizzled out in the following months, the goal of bringing Algiers and Rabat closer together came to the fore again at the end of November 2012, when Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's Personal Envoy Christopher Ross presented his report to the UN Security Council in which he argued, in effect, that progress on the Western Sahara question depended on improved relations between Algeria and Morocco and promised to engage in a round of shuttle diplomacy largely to this end.

Instead of the hoped for rapprochement, however, Rabat and Algiers have descended over the past weeks and months into an increasingly virulent war of words, beginning with the media and leaders of political parties and spreading to government spokesmen, to the point where by mid-June Algerian news portal TSA was evoking a full blown "diplomatic crisis"[1]. By the end of June, Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci was complaining to the Arabic service of the Russia Today news channel that Algeria was "more or less a deliberate target" for Moroccan narcotics exports, while Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani grumbled in a statement to official Algerian news agency APS about the "premeditated escalation" in Moroccan media attacks on Algeria. There has been speculation in the media that this could degenerate still further – with some of the more alarmist commentators even wondering whether it might result in armed confrontation. While such a dramatic outcome remains highly unlikely, it is clear that tension between the two neighbours is at a peak. How and why have we arrived at this situation, and what are the implications?

If the hoped for rapprochement has failed to materialise, it does not seem to have been for lack of trying on Christopher Ross' part at least. Touring the region this spring, the UN envoy added a second, unscheduled visit to Morocco on April 11 during which he met King Mohammed VI at his palace in Fes for discussions that centred chiefly on Moroccan-Algerian relations and the security situation in the Sahara-Sahel region. This unexpected stop-over was greeted with dismay by a majority of Polisario's leadership, according to an Algiers-based Saharawi activist (especially given that Ross had contented himself with politely listening to their positions when
he had visited Tindouf shortly before, without engaging any substantive discussions). Most members of the
Polisario leadership, including Secretary General Mohammed Abdelaziz, saw Ross' surprise audience with the
King as a sign that he was moving towards giving his blessing to the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western
Sahara in his upcoming report; according to the same source, only M'hamed Khaddad, Polisario's MINURSO
coordinator, is said to have judged – accurately, it would seem – that Ross would mainly focus on attempting to
convinced the Moroccans to give open-minded consideration to Algeria's pre-conditions for opening the border
between the two countries.

A diplomat from a North African country who has long been based in Algiers, where he has over years become
friends with the present Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, confirms that the question of reopening the
Moroccan-Algerian border was raised with the governments of both countries in the first months of 2013 by
various “friends and intermediaries”, including the US government as well as Christopher Ross. In response to
these solicitations, the source says:

Two meetings were held discreetly in Europe between representatives of Algeria and of Morocco, in order to
examine the question of reopening the border. Both countries sent a diplomat and a member of the intelligence
services to these meetings, which came to nothing in the end. It was obvious from the outset that they would end
in failure. The Algerians demanded that the Moroccans stop flooding Algeria with tons of cannabis before the
borders could be opened; the Moroccans for their part stated up front that opening the borders also meant, as far
as they were concerned, freedom of movement for Saharawi refugees in Tindouf – which came down to
demanding that Algiers should allow the Saharawis of Tindouf to return to Morocco [or Moroccan-held territory] as
soon as the borders are reopened. In fact, for both Algeria and Morocco these meetings were simply a chore that
had to be done to keep the intermediaries and friends (USA, UN, etc.) satisfied, and each had decided in advance to
blame the other for their failure. The Moroccans accuse the Algerians of showing bad faith and digging up pretexts
to maintain the tension in the region; the Algerians accuse the Moroccans of setting prior conditions
before reopening the border can even be discussed. Initially, both voiced these accusations only in private discussions with
their friends and intermediaries, by way of justifying the failure of the bilateral contacts. But unforeseen events
have prompted both Algeria and Morocco to make these disputes public[2].

The Algiers-based Saharawi activist quoted above has suggested that any tentative moves that there may have
been towards reopening the border between Morocco and Algeria fell victim – as “collateral damage” – to
manoeuvring at the UN over Security Council Resolution 2099 in late April: the hopes of Polisario and its
supporters in Algiers had been raised by a US-penned draft tasking MINURSO with human rights monitoring,
only to be dashed at the last minute when it became apparent that Moroccan lobbying had been powerful
enough to force a turn-around; the Algerians, the source argues, felt this to be a humiliating measure of the
deficiencies of their own lobbying, for which a number of Algerian politicians sought to compensate by restating
as loudly as possible their undying support for the Saharawi cause. Henceforth, the source suggests, the
Algerians will “never agree” to reopen the border without reasonable grounds to believe that a solution to the
Western Sahara question is near.

There is reason to believe, however, that the real origins of the deterioration of Algerian-Moroccan relations lie
elsewhere: in the internal politics of both Morocco and Algeria.
On the Moroccan side, the coalition government formed in December 2011 around the moderate islamist PJD (the largest single party in parliament) and the conservative nationalist Istiqlal (the second largest) has been in crisis since shortly after the election of Hamid Chabat as General Secretary of the Istiqlal in September 2012. Surfing on mounting popular discontent with the PJD-led government's performance in power, Chabat was openly critical of the government's record and began to call for a reshuffle that would give the Istiqlal a larger number of portfolios and therefore greater clout within the coalition. At an extraordinary meeting on May 12 of this year the party's National Council voted to quit the government, but Chabat was persuaded by King Mohammed to postpone action on this decision until he came back from his travel to France. Against this background, the Istiqlal and the PJD have been trying to score points by striving to outdo one another in patriotism – a theme which comes with virtually no political cost domestically, however much damage its misuse may cause to the country's foreign relations. Istiqlal politicians have proved particularly virulent, with Hamid Chabat in particular going as far as to revive – in the midst of the national panic over the possible inclusion of human rights monitoring in the MINURSO's mandate – his party's old irredentist line that calls for the "restitution" of the "eastern Sahara" (i.e. western Algeria[3]). Chabat, who has taken to dressing in Saharawi traditional costume when appearing at public meetings, repeated this demand at a party rally on May 1, suggesting that the territorial claim ought to be taken to the United Nations and announcing that he would be demanding that the issue be placed on the agenda for discussion in the cabinet; less than a fortnight later, at another public meeting, he raised his irredentist demand again, adding that certain PJD ministers ought to be "tried for treason" for having dared to suggest that the question of the "eastern Sahara" was a thing of the past.

On the Algerian side, Chabat's provocations fell on fertile ground, for more than one reason. In earlier reports[4] we suggested that the Bouteflika camp, looking ahead to the 2014 presidential election, tended to see all discussion of the need for a new departure in relations with Morocco as a challenge to Bouteflika and to his ambitions for a fourth successive term, and therefore had every interest in amplifying traditional points of discord between Algeria and Morocco in order to prevent this issue from gaining any traction. This might have been expected to fizzle out after President Bouteflika was flown to France on April 23 for treatment after suffering a stroke and his chances of standing for re-election began to fade. But instead the festering political and institutional crisis that has broken out since Bouteflika was medevacked to Paris has actually added new incentives for Morocco-bashing. To begin with, according to the North African diplomat quoted above, there is a deep-rooted fear among Algeria's political class of Morocco seeking to take advantage of any unplanned political transitions and other moments of instability in Algeria[5]. On top of this, Bouteflika's incapacitation has led to speculation that he may be declared unfit for office and deposed in application of Article 88 of the Algerian constitution; in that case, the presidency would, according to the constitution, be entrusted on an interim basis, pending fresh elections in no more than 45 days, to the Speaker of the upper house of parliament, Abdelkader Bensalah – who happens to be of Moroccan extraction and only acquired Algerian nationality in 1965, and furthermore did not take part in the war of independence. Even though the interim President is barred by the constitution from standing in the ensuing election and could therefore only hold office for at most 45 days, according to the North African diplomat even this would be too much for many high-ranking officers in the Algerian army and the DRS intelligence and security service, unable to countenance someone with Bensalah's
profile acceding to the highest office[6]. Indeed, it has been plausibly suggested that it was in this knowledge that Bouteflika had Bensalah installed as Speaker of the upper house in 2002, as an added protection against a “medical coup d'état”. Thus, in today's particular circumstances, playing up tensions with Morocco can be seen as a defensive measure on the Bouteflika clan against the impeachment of the President, insofar as it serves to remind those who would invoke Article 88 in order to remove him of all the reasons for their mistrust of their western neighbour and its sons.

This is not to say, however, that the non-adoption by the UN Security Council of the initial American draft of Resolution 2099 has been without effect. Speaking to us very shortly after the final, expurgated draft was adopted towards the end of April, a member of Polisario's National Secretariat went so far as to describe it as a “turning point in the Western Sahara conflict”. Although the resolution did not in the end extend MINURSO's mandate to cover human rights monitoring, it did leave the door open for other UN institutions to take up the matter, argued the National Secretariat member, adding that it was “therefore important for the Saharawis to prove to the entire world that respect for human rights is an essential element in their struggle for independence. They must now show the world that the right to self-determination is the most primary of human rights.” Accordingly, Polisario, its leaders and sympathisers have indeed been actively lobbying both the UN and Washington on the issue of human rights. Pro-Polisario Saharawis who took to the streets of Laayoune on May in what the Moroccan press described as “the largest pro-independence demonstrations ever seen in Laayoune” pointedly waved American flags along with the flag of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. And, according to a leading member of a Saharawi association who accompanied Mohammed Abdelaziz on his trips to Washington and Geneva in early June, the Polisario General Secretary and SADR President focussed on just one request in his meetings with US Senators and State Department officials: that the US administration should renew its support for the idea of expanding MINURSO's mandate to include the protection of the civilian population of the Moroccan-administered territories of Western Sahara[7]. On June 12, Mohamed Abdelaziz met UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the British ambassador to the United Nations Mark Lyall Grant, then holder of the rotating presidency of the Security Council, inviting them both to visit Western Sahara. This was follow up with a meeting in Geneva with United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, to whom he suggested that the High Commission should intervene to defend the rights of Saharawis living under Moroccan rule.

Meanwhile, the competition for influence in Africa and beyond has redoubled between Morocco and Algeria. In a specifically African context, both are clearly very much concerned with building and sustaining diplomatic leverage for use in relation to the Western Sahara question. Thus, coinciding with the African Union's 50th anniversary celebrations in May, Algeria has been playing up its African debt write-off initiative, which has seen it cancel debts it held for some 14 African countries[8], worth a total of almost $1bn since 2010, while Morocco has been pursuing an economic and trade pact with the members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (i.e. the countries that use the CFA franc[9], which is guaranteed by the French treasury, binding them very much into France's orbit). At the same time, Rabat seems to have made the best of its own African connections and of the fact that it is this year's chair of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, at the United
Nations in mid-May, when at the initiative of Togo the UN Security Council debated security in Africa and issued a Presidential Statement calling on Sahel and Maghreb states to intensify inter-regional cooperation and coordination and adopt a “comprehensive strategy” to fight terrorism. For its part, Algeria hosted a meeting on Sahel security of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (a grouping first launched by then Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton in September 2011) in Oran in late June, at which it was able to grandstand as both a victim of and a rampart against islamist terrorism in the wake of January's attack on the BP/Statoil/Sonatrach gas facility at In Amenas.

END

[1] 'Le DRS déconseille à des députés algériens de se rendre au Maroc', TSA, 10/06/13. TSA's article claims that, “due to the context of diplomatic crisis” with Morocco, Algeria's intelligence and security service had advised a group of Algerian parliamentarians who had recently visited the “liberated zones” of Western Sahara on the eastern side of the berm against following this up with a fact-finding visit to Morocco so as to avoid any “provocations from the Moroccan authorities.”

[2] Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani appears to have been alluding to these meetings when he told official Algerian news agency APS on June 30 that “We were surprised, during discussions that we had wanted to keep confidential, to hear [Moroccan government representatives], as if they were laying down the law, that if they were to cooperate more effectively [in cracking down on drug smuggling to Algeria] the border would have to be opened first.”


[5] The diplomat points in particular to two memories which, he suggests, remain very much alive: on the one hand, the border dispute which blew up in the chaotic atmosphere of the first months of Algerian independence and culminated in the “Guerre des Sables” of 1963, during which the Istiqal Party's daily newspaper Al-Alam famously published the party's irredentist map of “Greater Morocco” taking in around a third of Algerian territory as well as the whole of the Western Sahara, Mauritania and a large slice of Mali; and on the other, the audience granted to FIS leader Abassi Madani by King Hassan II on his yacht when he docked in Algiers in 1990, during which they are reported to had a remarkably friendly exchange on the question of the Sahara.

[6] Article 73 of the constitution, furthermore, specifically stipulates that any candidate for election as President must, amongst other things, be an Algerian national by birth and, if born before July 1942, be able to attest to his participation in the independence struggle.

[7] Mohamed Abdelaziz' American interlocutors at both the Senate and the State Department are said to have listened politely without taking any particular position, or even implying such, other than to insist on the need to find a solution via negotiations with Morocco under the auspices of the UN Secretary General and his Special Representative. The same source implied that the extension of MINURSO's remit requested by the Polisario General Secretary's also freezing Morocco's exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara, although it is hard to see quite what role the UN mission might play in this regard.

[8] Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, the Seychelles and Tanzania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog Name</th>
<th>Article Title/Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Yabiladi** | **Maroc : Vers une légalisation de l'exposition d'espèces protégées sur la place Jemaâ El Fna ?** | The high commission on water and forest is currently working on legalizing the activities of so-called “charmers” in the Jemaa El Fna, who often exhibit protected species. According to the institution, the exhibition is an integral part of Moroccan culture. According to opponents, it is a blow to the environment and animal welfare.  
*Translated from French* | 6 |
| **Yabiladi** | **Collaboration avec les terroristes : 6 ans dans les geôles espagnoles pour un Marocain** | Faiçail Errai, a Moroccan living in Spain, has been sentenced to six years in prison for collaborating with Ansar al Mujahidine, “an international terrorist organization affiliated with Al Qaeda.” Errai used his computer skills to organize some 35 domain names for the organization, that used the websites for recruitment.  
*Translated from French* | 0 |
| **Yabiladi** | **L'ex-président musulman de Melilla expulsé d'Israël** | Mustafa Aberchan, former president of the autonomous city of Melilla and current leader of the opposition party CpM (Coalition for Melilla), as well as three other members of his group, were held at Ben Gurion Airport for several hours before being expelled to Turkey. The group attempted to enter Gaza. They had permission to enter Israel, but not Gaza. CpM later denounced the incident as being “very serious.”  
*Translated from French* | 3 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Russia wishes to sell Morocco a diesel submarine of the Amur 1650 class, according to Viktor Komardin, adjunct chief of Russian company Rosoboronexport. The offer comes just a week after Saadedine El Otmani, minister of foreign affairs, had visited Russia. The submarine goes pretty fast and has torpedoes, and costs around $330 million. Morocco and Russia signed a military cooperation accord in February 2012. The sub would be Morocco’s first.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 5, 2013</td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Morocco and Spain are cooperating in an anti-terrorist operation to track individuals trying to escape justice by fleeing to North Africa. After the dismantling of cells in Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish are increasing security precautions, including increasing police presence on ferry lines. Early last week, AQIM accused Mohammed VI of collaborating with “the occupiers,” of Ceuta and Melilla, and called for the recovery of the two cities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 6, 2013</td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>On 2 and 3 July, representatives from the Polisario and Morocco, as well as from Algeria and Mauritania, met at the High Commission of Refugees offices in Geneva to discuss the possibility of voluntary return of refugees. The Moroccan delegation was led by the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Nacer Bourita (Nasser Burrito) while the Polisario were represented by MINURSO coordinator Mohamed Khaday. A statement from the HCR announced additional visits in 2014, as well as stressing that “the option of voluntary return of refugees to their places of origin is essential for future political solution agreed with the parties under the auspices of the United Nations.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 7, 2013</td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>On Friday, July 5, Moroccan MPs took part in a meeting organized in the Netherlands at the initiative of the Moroccan community residing in Holland. On the agenda was the situation of Moroccans in the Europe and their indispensable position in the development of Morocco. MPs in the ruling coalition reaffirmed their dedication to serving the Moroccan expatriate community.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 7, 2013</td>
<td><em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Maroc/Algérie : Hamid Chabat brandit de nouveau la récupération du Sahara oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco/Algeria: Hamid Chabat once again brandishes the recovery of Eastern Sahara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 1 May, Hamid Chabat called for the retrocession of Eastern Sahara. On 6 July, on the occasion of a party meeting in the border town of Bouarfa, he reiterated his demand. He declared that “his party maintains a claim for the recovery of the entire territory of Eastern Sahara, including Tindouf, Bechar, Knadssa, Hassi Beida, and all of the plundered territory.”

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Maroc-UE : l'accord de pêche sera-t-il renouvelé le 18 juillet ?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco-EU: Will the fisheries agreement be renewed on July 18?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sixth round of negotiations to renew the Morocco-EU fisheries agreement will occur on July 18. Previous negotiations failed due to controversy over the Western Sahara crisis. This article speculates that King Juan Carlos’ visit to Morocco just before the negotiations are set to take place in Brussels may be a “catalyst” for successful negotiations.

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Maroc : 68,5% de la population fait confiance à Abdelilah Benkirane selon un sondage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco: According to a poll, 68.5% of the population have confidence in Abdelilah Benkirane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10, 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68.5% of Moroccans trust Abdelilah Benkirane, while only 46.8% of them are in favor of the economic policy of his government. These are some of the main conclusions of the recent poll released by the Averty Market Research & Intelligence Office, in partnership with Tariq Ibnou Ziad Initiative and Hespress. According to the results, women have less confidence in Benkirane than men and older Moroccans have more confidence in Benkirane than younger Moroccans.

*Translated from French*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yabiladi</th>
<th>Maroc : Le cèdre de l'Atlas dans la liste rouge des espèces menacées de l'UICN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco: Atlas Cedar on the UICN red list of endangered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (UICN) has released its 2013 list of endangered species, in which it promotes the Atlas Cedar from Least Concern to Endangered. In addition to illegal harvesting, parasites and drought have contributed to the decrease in the number of trees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yabiladi</td>
<td>Gouvernement : Mezouar, l’ami d’El Himma, au secours de Benkirane</td>
<td>Benkirane has started negotiations with head of the RNI (National Assembly of Independents) Salaheddine Mezouar. However, more extremist PJDists are wary of Mezouar, who as former finance minister was a friend of former Interior Minister Fouad El Himma, who in turn was very close to the King. Mezouar is seen as a possible replacement for current President of the chamber of representatives Karim Ghellab. <em>Translated from French</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Local Thesis Has Always Lacked Sincerity, Says Abdelkader Bensalah</td>
<td>The Speaker of Algeria’s Council of the Nation (Upper House of Parliament) Mr. Abdelkader Bensalah said Sunday in relation to the Algerian-Moroccan relations that “Moroccan thesis has always lacked sincerity,” especially when comes to the Western Sahara issue. Bensalah went on to say that &quot;each time that the issue of Western Sahara is raised in international meetings, particularly in the United Nations, Morocco's officials and media do not hesitate to make accusations against Algeria, as if Algeria is the source of all the evils and disasters in Morocco.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>Morocco: Council of Ministers Renews Its Call for Urgent Intervention to End Local Practices in Western Sahara</td>
<td>The Council of Ministers has reiterated Saharawi Government's call for the urgent intervention to put an end to the practices of Moroccan state, urging to set up a UN mechanism to protect human rights in the Western Sahara. The statement, in this regard, recalled to the unfair military trial of unarmed Saharawi civilians, calling on the United Nations to assume its responsibility vis-à-vis the decolonization of Western Sahara, through self-determination referendum for the Saharawi people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadaliyya</td>
<td>Dissecting ‘Opposing’ Views: Morocco Reacts to Events in Egypt</td>
<td>This article analyzed the potential meaning behind the differing reactions to the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, focusing specifically on the King’s official statement and Minister of State Abdella Baha’s (who is a member of PJD) press release - the King’s statement welcomed interim president Adly Mansour, whereas Baha’s press release decried the overthrow as a “coup d’état against a legitimate democracy.” The article posited that this may not actually reflect divisions in the Moroccan regime, but may actually be a calculated move on the part of the palace and the PJD that would serve both parties’ political ends. In short, the apparent difference in opinion would put distance between the palace and the governing coalition, which could serve to dispel rumors that the King had co-opted the PJD as a tool of control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghrebia</td>
<td>Moroccans Prepare for Ramadan</td>
<td>Many people participating in Ramadan are worried about the increases in prices that occur around the holidays. “Prices are very high,” Hamid Settati, a teacher and father of three, who was shopping at the Bab Marrakech market, told Magharebia. &quot;I have noticed increases in the prices of many Ramadan foods as compared to previous year. Good products are expensive as...&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
compared to products of less quality." On the other hand, many small business owners welcome this time of year due to the high demand they see for their products. "Ramadan is very important to us, as sellers of dates, because it is an opportunity to recover from a year of recession," Souk Ould Mina date seller Omar told Magharebia. "Ramadan is the only month in the year where we make profit because of the strong demand on our consumer products as compared to other months." The Minister Delegate of General Affairs has reassured consumers that the government has taken strict measures to ensure price control of products due to the fact that the supply in markets is twice higher than demand for sugar, oil, and butter; four times higher for tomatoes; and six times higher for legumes during Ramadan.
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
July 31, 2013

Executive Summary

Political Trends
- President Bouteflika has returned to spend the rest of Ramadan in Algeria, but his condition seems if anything worse than when PM Sellal and CoS Gaid Saleh visited him in Paris in June.
- A fortnight after Bouteflika's return, no Council of Ministers meeting has been convened it is still unclear when this will be possible.
- Nonetheless, there are signs that the decision has been taken to keep Bouteflika on until the presidential election scheduled next April, if only to buy more time for the establishment to manage the unforeseen situation created by his health problems.
- Although there have been hints that former PM Ouyahia again has the favours of DRS chief Tewfik, there still seems to be no consensus candidate of the entire military-security establishment.

Foreign Relations
- The official message of greetings issued by the Algerian Presidency on the anniversary of King Mohamed VI's accession to the throne is surprisingly laudatory, suggesting that some in Algiers may want to contain the escalating war of words with Rabat.
- The conciliatory letter to Mohamed VI came a few days after PM Sellal slapped down Moroccan irredentists in a speech in Tindouf, in which he also announced that Algeria intends to develop alone the massive Gara Djebilet iron ore deposit near the contested border.
- Drug trafficking from Morocco has been declared "a new form of terrorism" and Algeria's "number one security threat", while the smuggling of Algerian refined products to Morocco and other neighbouring countries is also being highlighted as a major security and economic problem.
- On the eastern borders, in addition to smuggling of refined products, the presence of jihadist groups in Tunisia and Libya is a growing problem, prompting an unprecedented military mobilisation along the border with Tunisia. At the same time, Tunisian media close to the ruling Ennahda party have been trying to blame Algeria's DRS for the country's worsening security.

Security
- There has been no uptick in jihadist activity for Ramadan this year, but there has been a marked shift towards the use of explosives by AQMI instead of ambushes, road blocks, etc.
- While Algiers has remained quiet, small scale clashes have continued in the oil and gas producing south, with the more offensive jihadist operations still concentrated on the eastern borders.
- The Ministry of Energy is said to be considering building an airstrip at Tiguentourine to save expatriate workers from having to travel by road from In Amenas.
- To take account of the shifting security situation, the military authorities are reported to be considering establishing a 7th Military Region for the south-east, based at Illizi.
On July 16, some 82 days after he was flown to France for treatment following a stroke, President Bouteflika finally returned to Algeria. Pictured on arrival at Boufarik air base in a wheelchair, the President seemed, if anything, in an even weaker state than he had appeared in photographs and video released a month previously while he was still undergoing therapy at the Institution Nationale des Invalides in Paris, and once again TV images were broadcast without sound, suggesting that his voice (and perhaps even his mental faculties) may have been impaired. A curt communiqué from the Presidency informed the public that the head of state would be observing a period of “rest and rehabilitation”, of unspecified length.

It was immediately clear that Bouteflika was in no fit state to conduct the round of individual performance assessments that have become a Ramadan tradition since he took office in 1999. Indeed, it is dubious whether he is capable of working at all as things now stand: two weeks after his return, there has still been no Council of Ministers meeting – despite the increasingly urgent need for one, the last dating back to the end of December 2012 – and no new presidential decrees have been issued [1]. The most pressing piece of business remains the 2013 supplementary finance law, which has to be approved by a meeting of the Council of Ministers before being enacted by presidential decree [2]. Constitutionally, only the President can chair the Council of Ministers. But it is still not clear how soon he will be considered well enough – or presentable enough – to do so.

Nonetheless, it is looking increasingly as though the choice has been made to keep Bouteflika on as President until the end of his current term in April of next year, barring any sudden new worsening of his health. His very return, one week into the holy month of Ramadan, itself points in this direction: spending Ramadan, a month of spiritual communion, among one’s fellow countrymen is to all intents and purposes a social and political obligation for all Arab heads of state; if, on the other hand, Bouteflika had been left to continue his treatment (or slowly fade away) abroad during Ramadan, this would have been a strong hint that he had been written off as a lost cause by the rest of the establishment. Despite all the inconvenience it may cause, muddling through with an enfeebled Bouteflika until the scheduled election date presents the advantage for the military and the DRS of buying time. Past experience suggests that the Algerian military-security establishment prefers to take its time digesting unforeseen political circumstances: back in September 1998, when then President Liamine Zeroual decided to throw in the towel, he had initially intended to resign with immediate effect but was prevailed upon by the military chiefs and DRS commander Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène to stay on for five more months to give them time to pick a successor and prepare the elections.

There have been some limited indications that preparations have begun. A scandal that has suddenly broken out concerning the use of government advertising budgets to favour certain newspapers over others for political reasons may, according to a source with decades of experience of the workings of the DRS, be a precursor to a purge of the 'independent' media, and in particular of those newspapers held to be too close to the Bouteflika clan (the President's brother Said Bouteflika is understood to have been instrumental in setting up a number of new newspapers recently, apparently with the connivence of the DRS's head of media management, 'Colonel Fawzi', who was dismissed as the advertising scandal broke). Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal has
been continuing his inspection visits to the provinces, during which, according to one usually well-informed media source, he has been distributing additional funding to the provincial authorities (wilayas) in a manner that is entirely reminiscent of the allocation of special funds to the wilayas in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, which were used to boost the Bouteflika campaign against his challenger, Ali Benflis. Thus the media and the local administration seem to be being primed to give maximum support to the 'official' candidate when the time comes.

But there still appears to be no clear candidate of the establishment. While Sellal has been tipped as a likely successor and has begun, as we noted last month, to adopt something of a presidential bearing on his tours of the provinces, he is said not to be particularly keen to assume the role. On the other hand, there have been signs that former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, who was long thought to be DRS chief Tewfik's favoured candidate[3] but seemed to have fallen by the wayside when he left the government in September of last year and the leadership of the RND a few months later, may be making a comeback: the day after Bouteflika's return, Ouyahia was summoned for an audience with Tewfik, news of which was duly leaked via an online newspaper of which Tewfik's own son is co-owner, in what one usually astute source has suggested was a deliberate hint that the head of the DRS had once again bestowed his blessing on the former PM. Meanwhile, Ali Benflis, the former head of government and FLN leader who stood against Bouteflika in 2004 with the complicity of the army chiefs (only to see victory snatched from him due to a rapprochement between Bouteflika and Tewfik), is actively putting together his campaign team and is said to be waiting for the nod from the top brass. Further complicating the search for a consensus candidate of the military-security establishment, there have been suggestions that some elements within the army's officer corps are more and more openly resentful of the predominant role that the DRS acquired at the expense of the army after Tewfik's 2004 deal with Bouteflika.

One possibility, if the army chiefs and the DRS prove incapable of finding a suitable candidate for 2014 that they can all agree on, might be a semi-open election, in which no single candidate would be clearly identified as the regime's choice (even if all would-be candidates are carefully screened and precautions are taken to ensure that no truly hostile contender stands a chance of winning). From a certain point of view, this might seem a tempting choice: it might help to re-engage the interest of an increasingly jaded electorate, offering at least the illusion of democratic change, while winning the praise of the international community. But the chaos that is currently engulfing Egypt, where the military is playing a very high-stakes game, may make their risk-averse Algerian counterparts think twice before taking such a leap into the unknown.

**Foreign Relations**

In a letter to King Mohamed VI of Morocco to mark the 14th anniversary of his accession to the throne on July 29, President Bouteflika (or whoever is currently writing his mail for him) spoke in glowing terms of his “firm determination to boost Algerian-Moroccan relations and raise them to the highest levels in the interest of our two brotherly peoples” and lauded the “grandiose achievements Morocco has made thanks to the important reforms that you initiated as of the beginning of your reign, [and which] reflect the wisdom of your policy.”
While protocol of course dictates that such greetings should at least be polite, this letter was outstandingly glowing in its praise for the Moroccan monarchy (“I pray that God Almighty grant you and the entire, honorable royal family health and prosperity and guide the Moroccan people to even greater progress” etc.), suggesting that the Algerian Presidency may feel it is time to tone down the rhetoric that has been flying in both directions of late.

In a speech five days before Morocco's Fête du Trône, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal also seemed – at first glance, in any case – to be extending a hand of friendship. “Algeria has no problems with neighboring countries,” proclaimed Sellal. “Its position, based on good neighborliness, is constant. Algeria has no scores to settle with anyone and seeks no trouble with anyone. We are advocates of good, not evil. We support dialogue to ensure peace and security, in our Algerian nation and in the entire Maghreb nation.”

But the Prime Minister's remarks were not entirely devoid of ambiguity. In his ardent statement of Algeria's good faith, it is possible to read an implicit criticism of the bad faith of others, especially when taken together with his strident call, clearly directed at Morocco, “for the Maghreb countries to consult and cooperate in securing their common borders and fighting the phenomenon of smuggling”. Perhaps most significantly of all, he delivered his speech during his inspection visit to the south-western wilaya of Tindouf, on the border with Morocco – an area to which Hamid Chabat, head of Morocco's nationalist Istiqlal Party, has recently sought to revive the historic Moroccan claim, provoking paroxysms of indignation in the Algerian media and political class. While in Tindouf, furthermore, Sellal announced an immense, $15bn plan to develop the massive iron ore deposits at Gara Djebilet, some 140 km from the town of Tindouf. According to the 1972 Rabat accords on the Algerian-Moroccan border, in which Morocco theoretically renounced its claim to Tindouf, Morocco and Algeria were supposed to develop Gara Djebilet jointly – but this has remained a dead letter in light of Morocco's failure to ratify those accords. The last time Algiers raised the prospect of developing the deposits back in 2005, when the Ministry of Energy and Mining announced an (ultimately inconclusive) international bid round, was also during a period of heightened tension with Rabat. On balance, therefore, Sellal's statements in Tindouf seem to have been calculated more than anything else to cock a snook at Hamid Chabat and his fellow irredentists in Rabat.

At the same time, the hue and cry over cross-border smuggling, which has been building up for the past couple of months, reached new peaks in July. While official news agency APS reported that some 78 tonnes of Moroccan cannabis had been seized by the Algerian security forces in the first six months of this year (up 9.1% on last year), independent daily L'Expression, reporting that as much as a tonne had been seized in a series of raids in different parts of the country between July 13 and 23[41], cast the phenomenon as “a new form of insecurity: narcoterrorism”. Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia used similar language when he announced on July 24 that henceforth the army was to be put in charge of combatting drug smuggling: “We are waging a war. It is a war against a new form of terrorism: drugs trafficking.” Driving the point home, an anonymous “senior Algerian official” told Reuters that “we consider drug trafficking today to be the first threat to our security. Terrorism comes second.” And at the end of the month, Farouk Ksentini, head of the Algerian government's official human rights commission, chipped in with his contribution:

Drugs have become a weapon that is used against Algeria and it is the duty of the Algerian state to guard against this scourge through tough decisions to protect both its population and its economy. [The international
As Morocco begins to debate the possibility of legalising the production and sale of cannabis – at the initiative of the ruling PJD and the Parti de l’Authenticité et de la Modernité, which is close to the Palace – such complaints are hardly likely to die down.

The other side of the coin, of course, is the trafficking of subsidised Algerian goods, and in particular refined products, out of Algeria. This too has been abundantly commented upon. Mid-month, Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia condemned fuel smuggling as a threat both to national security and the economy, claiming that as much as 25% of petrol and diesel produced in Algeria is smuggled abroad, and a few days later Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi suggested that 1.5bn litres of fuel seep over the country's borders every year, enough to fuel 600,000 vehicles. Emergency measures taken so far to stem the flow include the digging of trenches along parts of Algeria's western and eastern borders, and fuel rationing in border areas, which is proving highly unpopular. Beyond this, it has been decided at an inter-ministerial meeting called by PM Sellal to discuss the problem of smuggling to mobilise no fewer than 17 “mobile operational brigades” of customs officers, comprising a total of 540 men, to patrol the border with Morocco, and another nine brigades comprising 217 men, on the border with Tunisia.

For while the Algerian political class' rhetoric tends to vilify Morocco almost as a matter of course, trafficking is a mounting problem on the country's eastern borders as well. Here, in addition to fuel smuggling, Algeria faces a growing threat not so much from the metaphorical terrorism of drugs but the altogether real terrorism of AQMI and allied groups, with small but tenacious armed groups active just across the border in the areas of Djebel Chaambi (Tunisia's highest mountain) and El Kef. This appears to have given rise to a new cross-border trade in fertilizer, for use in bomb-making (see below, Security). In addition, according to Tunisian radio station Mosaïque FM (July 12), Algeria has alerted Tunisian and Libyan authorities that Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Al Mouaqjoun Bi Dimaa ('those who sign in blood') has established a thirty-strong group, which moves between northern Mali, Niger, south-east Libya and southern Tunisia and supposedly planning attacks against oil facilities and other French and US interests in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The group is said to be made up of jihadists of various nationalities sprung from prison in Niamey, Niger, in early June in a jailbreak that Belmokhtar's organisation is thought to have organised in collaboration with AQMI-offshoot MUJAO.

Algerian Gendarmerie sources quoted by the Algerian press have suggested that smuggling across the Tunisian border has been drastically reduced if not brought virtually to a hault over the last few days as a side-effect of the exceptional military mobilisation decreed after the arrest in the Algerian wilaya of El Oued in mid-July of Kamal Ben Arbia, a.k.a. Abou Fida, an Algerian jihadist who is said to have been one of the leaders of the group that is active in the Djebel Chaambi area. But while the interrogation of Ben Ariba is said to have provided valuable intelligence on the Djebel Chaambi group, this was not enough to prevent the slaying of nine Tunisian soldiers in a jihadist ambush near the border with Algeria on July 29 – the bloodiest single incident to date in Tunisia’s incipient insurgency. Consequently, tension in the border area now running very high, and seems to be
spilling over into the political arena: as of July 30, Tunisian media close to the ruling Ennahda party began to spread rumours that Algeria's DRS was somehow behind the “Chaambi massacre” and possibly even the killings of two leftist opposition politicians in Tunis, with one commentator calling on President Moncef Marzouki to summon the Algerian ambassador to provide an explanation. Although these conspiracy theories have not been taken up officially by the Ennahda-led government in Tunis, they can scarcely be expected to go down well in Algiers.

Security

With levels of jihadist activity in July running at about the same as in June and slightly below what we saw in May (10 jihadist operations in June, 11 in July), there has clearly been no “Ramadan effect” this year — the holy month of fasting, considered a particularly favourable period for martyrdom by jihadists, frequently saw a spike in armed activity in the past. As of the end of the 1990s, as the armed groups' strength dwindled, this effect has become more irregular (the last time it was observed was in 2011).

There was however one noticeable change in the pattern of AQMI operations: whereas in the recent past bomb attacks have made up only about a third of AQMI operations, in July all but one were bombings. No shooting ambushes, fake checkpoints, homemade mortar attacks or other types of the usual small-scale AQMI operations have been reported since late June — only bombings. The conclusion the Algerian press jumped to – namely that this is a sign of an “AQMI so weakened that it can no longer afford to attack the security forces directly” – may be a little hasty. The fact is that making and deploying IEDs requires infrastructure (smuggling networks, workshops and experts to make the bombs and operatives to place the devices and remotely detonate them, etc.), and AQMI clearly still has that infrastructure in place. It also of course requires access to the necessary inputs, and this factor may provide part of the explanation of the abrupt turn to bombings as the dominant tactic. Since the spring, there have been repeated reports of large quantities of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the basic ingredient in the commonest form of homemade bomb, being smuggled into Algeria, where it is subject to strict controls, from increasingly lawless western Tunisia. Algerian daily Al Mihwar Al Yaoumi (29/07) reports that an Algerian gendarmerie investigation has traced shipments of ammonium nitrate seized near the border back to private trading companies in Tunisia, while El Watan (27/07) has claimed that confessions extracted from Kamal Ben Arbia (see above) had confirmed the existence of a Tunisian group belonging to AQMI operating along the border with Algeria (specifically with the Wilaya of El Oued) that specialises in fertilizer smuggling[6].

Algiers and its environs were quiet over the past month, while AQMI’s “heartland” in Kabylia saw only four operations. In the wilaya of Bouira, after a wave of jihadist attacks starting in late May (see previous report), it was the army’s turn to go on the offensive, with large-scale search and destroy missions in the central part of the wilaya that reportedly left 15 jihadists dead between July 5 and 15. In one notable incident in the North-East, a roadside bomb exploded on July 28 on the path of a Gendarmerie patrol near the base camp of Japanese employees of COJAAL (the Japanese consortium working on Algeria’s East-West highway development project) in the area of Harrouche, in the south of the wilaya of Skikda, causing no victims.
In the **SOUTH** and the **OIL AND GAS PRODUCING REGIONS** while there were no actual attacks on oil facilities in July, the Algerian authorities are clearly worried that jihadist groups coming from the eastern border might be targeting them. On July 7, according to *El-Khabar*, a purported attempt by two **MUJAO** jihadists to target facilities of Sonatrach drilling subsidiary ENTP in Hassi Messaoud was blocked when the army and Border Guard “managed to foil a sophisticated attempt to infiltrate the Algeria-Libya border” and arrested the two jihadists, seizing “80kg of Indian-made explosives hidden in a Toyota offroader” (the newspaper gave no further details). And on July 17-18 Algerian army helicopters reportedly intercepted two offroaders carrying six jihadists in the area of the Algeria-Tunisia-Libya tripoint and destroyed one of them, while the second managed to escape. Two men, believed to be of Tunisian nationality, were killed in the operation and a number of “heavy machine guns” and “mortar shells” were recovered. In this case, it is believed the group was trying to deliver weapons from Libya to Tunisian jihadists.

On July 20, *L’Expression* reported that the Algerian authorities considerably stepped up border security along the length of the border with Tunisia and put border guard and army units in the area “on maximum alert” in reaction to intelligence information obtained from a detained jihadist (presumably Kamal Ben Arbia) to the effect that a “$50m shipment of weapons” was on its way from Libya to Tunisian jihadists holding out in the Djebel Chaambi mountain area not far from the Algerian border. Meanwhile, in response to the concerns of international oil firms in the wake of the In Amenas attack in January[7], the Ministry of Energy and Mining is reported to be considering building a runway at the Tiguentourine site so that staff can be flown in directly from Hassi Messaoud instead of flying to In Amenas and completing the journey by road.

On Algeria’s southern border, meanwhile, things were comparatively quiet, with only three noteworthy operations over the past month. According to “senior security sources” quoted in *El-Khabar*, Algerian army commandos on July 7 carried out a night-time raid on a jihadist group “near Tin Sika, west of Tinzaouatine” on the border with Mali, wilaya of Tamanrasset, in which seven armed men, believed to belong to **AQMI**, were killed and an eighth captured. “Informed sources” told the newspaper the operation was based on intelligence obtained from smugglers who had been “robbed” by the jihadists. A week later, on July 14, the army raided a “secret fuel depot” hidden in the desert to the east of Bordj Baji Mokhtar and “guarded by armed men”, believed to be smugglers working for jihadist groups. Seven armed men, two of them Malian nationals, were arrested and 10,000 litres of fuel recovered as well as an offroader, small arms, communications devices and GPS navigation instruments. And during the night of July 26, Army and Gendarmerie units intercepted a “suspect truck” near the village of Arak, about half way between In Salah and Tamanrasset, and killed two of the three people on board. The truck was found to be carrying 12 machine guns and 5 million Algerian dinars in cash (about $60,000). The two slain men are believed to be AQMI fighters; the third, the driver, said he did not know the two men were “terrorists” and had taken them for smugglers.

Hence the pattern we observed last month – whereby jihadist activity on Algeria’s southern border mostly turns around survival (smuggling supplies into Mali and fighters out of it) while on the eastern border it is generally more offensive in nature – appears to be holding and may even have grown more marked[8]. To take account of
this new reality the Algerian authorities are reportedly considering re-drawing the map of military command areas to create a 7th Military Region, based in Illizi, to cover the border areas with Libya and Niger. Currently that sector is part of the 4th Military Region, headquartered in Ouargla, more than 1,000 km from the southern section of Algeria’s border with Libya.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] A handful of decrees were issued during Bouteflika's hospitalisation in France – including the annual round of military promotions on July 4, and before that the ratification of a memorandum of understanding on visas with Spain and the appointment of a new ambassador to Paris – but there are serious doubts as to the legality of these documents: either they were signed by Bouteflika himself from his Parisian sickbed, which according to certain Algerian constitutional lawyers contvernes the principle of national sovereignty; or, as seems more likely, they were signed on his behalf, perhaps using a scanned version of his signature, by his office in Algiers (most likely by his brother and advisor Said).

[2] When parliament is in recess as it now is, the President is empowered to pass urgent legislation by decree, subject to ex post facto parliamentary approval when the assembly reconvenes.

[3] Aside from his long-standing collaboration with the DRS and his appetite for hard work, Ouyahia's advantages, in Tewfik's eyes, lay in the fact that he does not belong to the generation that fought the war of independence, making it possible to present him as a candidate of renewal, and the fact that he is neither a westerner nor an easterner but a Kabyle, offering the hope that he could be passed off as a candidate of national unity.

[4] At the end of the month, this haul was easily surpassed when 1.83 tonnes of cannabis were seized in a single operation in the Wilaya of Tlemcen.

[5] Six Gendarmerie helicopters together with three Air Force fighters equipped with night-vision equipment are reported to be covering the border, from El Tarf in the north to El Oued in the south, while on land some 500 Gendarmerie and Army vehicles are patrolling the border strip. Orders have reportedly been issued to stop and check any person or vehicle moving within thirty miles of the border.

[6] Strangely, however, El Watan's story – also covered by various Tunisian media – refers explicitly to the smuggling of phosphates (of which Tunisia is a significant producer) rather than ammonium nitrate. Although it is technically possible to use phosphate rock to produce white phosphorus, which can be used in incendiary devices and as such has some history of use by non-state actors dating back to the late 19th and early 20th century, it cannot be used to produce the kind of explosives typically used by AQMI. An earlier version of the story which appeared in El Khabar (24/07) did not mention the alleged AQMI fertilizer smuggling ring in Tunisia but did claim that an Algerian customs service patrol with army support had intercepted a shipment of one tonne of “phosphates for use in making bombs” near the Tunisian border east of El Oued during the night of July 20-21.

[7] Representatives of BP and Statoil told Reuters (17/07) that they are still waiting for “cast-iron assurances” from Algiers before they send expat staff back to In Amenas: 

Sources close to BP and Statoil say the companies want to make sure the [troop] reinforcements [at the site] are sustained. One of the major issues is where the army’s decisions are being made — at the Defence Ministry or at the base camp,” one of the sources said. Another source said: “We want to make sure the higher number of troops are maintained when we go back.”

[8] Bucking this trend, however, an account in Algerian daily El Mihwar of the interception of the truck carrying weapons and other goods apparently destined for AQMI fighters near Arak, Wilaya of Tamanrasset, on July 26 seemed to imply that the vehicle was travelling north (perhaps towards Biskra) rather than south.
Enclosed is an a complete analysis of the encouraging actions taken in the House and Senate Appropriations committees that could turn out very favorable for Morocco. Please read the attached as it is very important to have a full understanding of the complexities and opportunity involved in this current action. I suggest that we carefully consult closely in the coming weeks, so as not to make any confusion. I am available to meet with you on this subject at your convenience. Also, we will translate this document into French tomorrow, so you will have it by the end of Friday. Ed
**Appropriations Report**

One of our principle goals has been to secure appropriations bill language mandating the spending of US money in the Western Sahara and removing any restrictions on US assistance to Morocco, thus further supporting Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara. This July, both the House and Senate Committees debated their versions of the Foreign Operations bill and below are the results:

**House Appropriations Report**

The language for Morocco was highly favorable, as *this section that will have the full force of law* (if passed and signed by the President) states that US assistance for Morocco *shall* be spent in territories administered by Morocco. It also requires that a report from the State Department be submitted to ensure that money is being spent according to their wishes. In the same report, the committee also requests information on what the US is doing to support a decision based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, including efforts to find durable solutions to the refugee crisis in the Polisario-run camps.

After the House language became public, and before the Appropriations committee took action on the bill, the RFK Center sent a letter from Kerry Kennedy and Santiago Canton and lobbied the House Appropriations Committee to remove the language. The Polisario and Algerian lobbyists recruited Representative Betty McCollum to delete the provision favorable to Morocco and insert language that would ban spending US assistance in territories administered by Morocco, require a report on human rights conditions, and report on what the US is doing to support a referendum. This amendment was an attempt to remove our language that signals US support for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and funding in the south and replace it with language that would support a referendum.

McCollum and the Algeria/Polisario lobbies furiously lobbied both the Committee and the US State Department. In the below request from McCollum, the State Department sent the following misleading reply:

**Email from Representative McCollum’s staff to the State Department:**

*Hi,*

*Attached is the report language for your reference.*

*The earliest we can get an answer on if this is reflective of current policy and if the State Department has a position on this language and the language in the bill would be very helpful.*

**Part of the Reply from the State Department:**
(SBU) The Western Sahara is disputed territory bordered by Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. It is currently administered by Morocco. Spain’s withdrawal from its African colony, Spanish Sahara, in 1975, led to a territorial dispute which was taken up by the UN Security Council. In 1991, the Security Council established the UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara to offer a choice between independence (favored by the Polisario Front) and integration into Morocco (favored by Morocco). When Morocco’s current monarch, King Mohamed VI, ascended to the throne in July 1999, he strongly reasserted Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara.

(SBU) The United States does not recognize Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The U.S. government has sought to avoid actions which may be seen to undermine support for the UN-mediated process.

(SBU) Any aid provided in the Western Sahara could be perceived as tacit acceptance of Moroccan sovereignty there and as undermining our efforts to support the UN process. Thus, historically, the State Department has not directed U.S. foreign assistance to the territory of Western Sahara. For the same reasons, the U.S. government is not currently planning to use any bilateral assistance funds designated for Morocco for programming in the Western Sahara.

So with the support of the RFK Center, the Algeria and the Polisario lobbies, McCollum, and the misleading response from the State Department, McCollum was able to attempt to offer her amendment to remove our language and insert language that is harmful to Morocco.

Fortunately, we learned about this in advance from our sources on the Committee and were able to recruit three Champions: Representative Jim Moran (D-VA), Representative Kay Granger (R-TX, Chairwoman), and Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL) to strongly support the favorable bill language. We also organized a broader outreach to every single member and staffer who was either neutral or supportive of our language (all members except Representatives Barbara Lee, Frank Wolf, and McCollum).

Due to our annual briefings on this issue, the committee Members were generally aware of it when we spoke with them before the vote, knew that they supported Morocco, and were able to understand why the amendment offered by Representative McCollum was so harmful to current US policy. Over 20 members of the Committee had signed public letters supporting current US policy and all of them were reminded of this before and during the debate.

Thanks to our efforts, both to secure the original provision in the bill and then to educate and organize Members to oppose the effort to remove it, the
amendment was defeated by an overwhelming majority on voice vote (a voice vote is only allowed when the outcome is so one sided that a recorded vote is deemed unnecessary). If and when this bill is passed and signed by the President later this year, it will be a significant victory for Morocco, as it would send a strong signal that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is supported in American law.

Our ongoing efforts to educate Members on this issue resulted in a massive victory for Morocco and a clear defeat for Algeria and the Polisario. This overwhelming defeat in the House should enable us to retain the preferred language when the Senate and House meet in conference where Senator Leahy is almost certain to oppose it. We have the support of almost the entire Committee (Democrats and Republicans) and it will be difficult for Senator Leahy to remove something that has so much public support in the House.

Senate Appropriations Report

Last year, in our effort to remove the FMF restriction on Morocco, we helped secure support for removing the Leahy restriction from the bill and to remove any FMF restrictions on Morocco. This was never made public because Congress never passed the bill. However, the watered down compromise language that we secured last year now appears in this year’s Senate report and has no restrictions on FMF funding to Morocco, a victory for Morocco. In this case, Senator Leahy’s only recourse is to request a report on the Western Sahara. If this language is included in the final Senate version of the bill, it would mean that Leahy has nothing against Morocco in the bill and that FMF assistance to Morocco can go forward without restrictions.

Further, The Leahy language in the report acknowledges the strategic importance of Morocco, and then goes on, in a neutral manner, to request a report on certain human rights issues. The statement doesn’t pass judgment, but simply asks for a State Department report. Most importantly, the report does not necessarily have to turn out negative. Morocco can work with the US Embassy and State to actually write a favorable report that would result in a positive situation for Morocco.

What next?

Given the amendment introduced by McCollum and the attempts by the RFK Center and the Algeria/Polisario lobbies, we expect a vigorous debate about our section of the House bill in the fall. We will remain extremely vigilant if either the House or Senate bill goes to the floor so as to prevent the opposition from removing this provision at any cost. Representative McCollum’s amendment backfired on the opposition, which will only strengthen the position of the House, as the House leadership now knows their strength going into conference with the Senate. Since the Senate bill does not include any provision against Morocco, this means that we can focus our full efforts on retaining the
positive language without worrying about also trying to remove something from the Senate bill.

Much work remains to be done before the appropriations bill is signed into law. However, our position is strong thanks to our continued outreach in the both the House and Senate, and represents for the first time an opportunity to concretize in US law support for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara. **It is important that we fully understand and appreciate the importance and complexity of what has been achieved in the appropriations process to date, and that we carefully consult closely in the coming weeks, so as not to cause any confusion during this effort.** We look forward to speaking with you soonest on this issue.

Please find below is a side-by-side comparison of the House Bill and Report Language versus the Senate Report Language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Bill &amp; Report Language</th>
<th>Senate Report Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In the House Report</strong></td>
<td><strong>In the Senate Report</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco—The Committee supports not less than $7,000,000 for Morocco, which is the same as the request.</td>
<td>Morocco- The Committee notes that Morocco is a strategic ally in North Africa where the United States has an interest in preventing terrorism and promoting democracy. The Committee directs the Secretary of State to update the report required by section 7041(g) of division I of Public Law 112-74, including on steps taken during the previous 12 months by the Government of Morocco to release political prisoners and support a human rights monitoring and reporting role for the U.N. Mission in Western Sahara in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Section 7042 of House Bill

(g) MOROCCO — Funds appropriated in Title III of this Act that are available for assistance for Morocco shall be made available for any region or territory administered by Morocco, including the Western Sahara: Provided, That the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations, not less than 90 days after enactment of this Act, on requirements under this section in the report accompanying this Act.

In the House Report

Subsection (g), “Morocco” requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, to submit a report, not less than 90 days after enactment of this Act, which shall include: (1) a description of the needs related to development and democratic reform in the regions and territories administered by Morocco and how funds made available in Title III of this Act for assistance for Morocco will be used to address such needs; and (2) steps taken to resolve the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara, based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, including efforts to address durable humanitarian solutions to the protracted refugee crisis in the camps near Tindouf, Algeria.
| Democratic Transition Fund | **In the House Report**  
Near East — The Committee recommendation includes not less than $360,000,000 for assistance for Jordan and supports continued funding for strategic priorities in the Middle East, including for Morocco, the Near East Regional Democracy program, and the Middle East Regional Cooperation program. | **In the Senate Report**  
The Committee recommends $5,000,000 for Transition Fund, a new multi-donor trust fund for extraordinary costs to assist Arab countries in transition, including Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, and Yemen. |
Morocco on the Move just achieved its goal for the year in terms of monthly hits. See below

I wanted to give you a quick update with a few highlights from our Morocco On The Move stats, because we’ve got some good news:

- At about 11:30 PM Wednesday, July 31 (with about 30 minutes to spare), we succeeded in achieving one of our key MOTM goals for the year, which was to double the best monthly viewer total we had last year. In December 2012, a couple of months into a steep & steady climb that began in Oct-Nov. last year, we reached 8,224 views for the month, which was almost double our previous average monthly rate that had hovered around 4,000 for most of the year before. Last month, July, we more than doubled it again, hitting 16,475 total views, which puts us on a good track to meet our final 2013 MOTM monthly target of exceeding 20,000 views for the month.

- In terms of annual totals, we had almost 60,000 views in 2012, which isn’t bad for our first full year with the new website. In 2013, we passed that number in May, and now stand at more than 98,000 for the first seven months, and on a track to more than triple our total views in 2013 compared to last year. The first chart below and attached tells that story well.

- I’ve attached a second chart and map to give you a sense of where our viewers are coming from:
  - More than 60% are from the US. Anecdotal evidence indicates that is weighted toward the DC – NY corridor, but we also have plenty of evidence from tweets and comments of broader coverage across the US.
  - About 15% comes from Morocco, our second major market.
  - The final 25% comes most heavily from Western Europe, from India (Bollywood connection), from the Gulf states, from Australia and Japan, from Egypt and Israel, and from Algeria and South Africa. Quite an interesting mix.

- That’s the quick highlights reel. There lots more where that came from, including the surprising popularity and staying power of many of our older MOTM posts, many reposts from our site by other blog sites, the increasing number of quality retweets from our Twitter casting, our increasingly popular Facebook page, and the broader opposition research were doing now via Twitter.

- And last but not least, the launch of our new MOTM page is only days away (counting on both hands). Tomi assured me on the phone today we would see the new beta version of site by Tuesday-Wednesday next week, and we should be able to launch publicly later the following week. It is taking our Web expert vendor team a little bit longer than they expected to make sure all of the content on the “old” MOTM is synched up properly with the new site. Our increasing audience and post and tweet numbers offers some good evidence as to why. But the launch is in sight, and we’re looking forward to it helping us reach our final 2013 target. 20,000 views a month has a very nice ring to it. And we should certainly have more than enough news and content later this fall to keep viewers mighty interested...
Increasing Audience for Morocco on the Move

2013 Stretch Objective (agreed to in Strategic Plan): Reach a 2013 Monthly High for MOTM Views of 20,000


January 2013: Spike in MOTM viewership because of terrorist news in Mali and Algeria

2012 High Point (DEC) Total Monthly MOTM Views: 8,224

2012 (12 month Total: 59,735) 2013 (1st 7 months: 98,485 – On pace to Triple year Total)

**Total January through July 2013 – 98,485**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Views</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>68,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>15,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Moroccan youth enjoy 'Holidays for All' programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco to Boost Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco political clashes draw youth attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Moroccan expatriates promised political representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharebia</td>
<td>Morocco Coalition Talks Kick off</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Party (PJD) on Monday (August 5th) about joining the governing coalition. “It was in nobody's interest to compromise the political stability of this country and its social cohesion”, he told party members on August 2nd, adding that RNI now had an historic responsibility to shoulder.

Toussaint-Alex Mianzoukouta, a forty year old Congolese man who taught French in Rabat, died of his injuries after being pushed out of a police van. He had been visiting friends in the Boucalef quarter of Tangiers, known to be a neighborhood for irregular Sub-Saharan immigrants. On the route to Oujda, the desert camp where individuals in the country illegally are held, a dispute arose between those rounded up in the van and police. Mianzoukouta was thrown out of the van, receiving injuries to his head and neck. After being in a coma, he died in Hospital Mohammed V in Tangiers on 30 July.

The Moroccan Ministry of Communication has denied reports that Le Monde was banned from the country after running an article called “The Dangerous Missteps of the King.” Le Monde had previously reported that their paper was absent from Moroccan newsstands. According to a source in the Ministry, the newspapers arrived according to standard procedure.

Mustapha Ramid, PJDist Minister of Justice, has opened an investigation into who ordered charges against protesters in Rabat. Moroccan news organization Akbar al Youm has reported that Benkirane was not consulted in the decision to take forceful action in the protests. Benkirane telephoned the Interior Minister, who said that he too was not informed on the decision.
### Yabiladi

#### Friday in Rabat

**August 6, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Yabiladi</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opération Transit</strong> : Boom des arrivées des MRE à la veille de l'Aïd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Transit</strong> : Boom in arrivals of MLA at the close of Eid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 6, 2013</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transit lines between Spain and Morocco have recorded record numbers of Moroccans traveling to their home country in comparison with last year’s figures. For example, the Algésiras-Tangiers line has recorded 106,368 passengers in one week, a 2.7% increase. Port officials believe the increase in usage is due to Moroccans returning home to celebrate Eid with their families.

*Translated from French*

#### Yabiladi

**Morocco/US: Is the Moroccan Lobby Strengthened by the Recruitment of Rev Jesse Jackson**

**August 7, 2013**

One of the strongest advocates of civil rights in the United States was yesterday received by King Mohammed VI. If this recruitment follows through, Morocco will have a brand advocate within the Democratic Party and the African-American community in the US. Reverend Jackson also "considered that the settlement of the Sahara issue through a fair and transparent negotiation process supervised by the United Nations, noting that Algeria and Morocco are able to find common ground,” which should appeal to Moroccan officials.

*Translated from French*

#### Yabiladi

**Tétouan : des dizaines d'hectares de forêt consumés par le feu**

**Tetouan: Dozens of hectares of forest consumed by fire**

**August 7, 2013**

Near the commune of Azla, in Northern Morocco, dozens of hectares of forest are ablaze. The Gendarmerie, civil security, and water and forest officials are working to control the fire. Despite the size of this fire, 2013 has shown a marked decrease in the amount of forest fires. So far only 429 hectares have been destroyed this year, as opposed to an average of 1530 each year.

*Translated from French*

#### Yabiladi

**Melilia : le président de la ville rejette les comparaisons avec Gibraltar**

**Melilla: President of the city rejects comparison to Gibraltar**

Juan Jose Imbrodo, president of Melilla, is tired of hearing about comparisons between the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the British enclave of Gibraltar. He stated that Gibraltar is a "colony,” unlike his town. His reasoning was quite absurd, claiming that “those who are born on the Rock have never been British because they were not born on English soil; Melillans yes, because we are born on Spanish territory.”

*Translated from French*
<p>| August 8, 2013 | Yabiladi | Morocco: International drug-trafficking network dismantled by Europol | August 8, 2013 | Europol has made 36 arrests and seized 1.5 tons of hashish, with the cooperation of French, Spanish, and Moroccan police. 32,000 euros in cash, 200 mobile phones and 13 cars were also seized, in operations in Morocco, Portugal, Spain, and France. |
|---------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| August 8, 2013 | Yabiladi | Morocco/Spain: Mounir Molina, an inmate pardoned despite his trial having begun one week ago | August 8, 2013 | Danielgate risks overshadowing a concurrent problem, that of the 29 other individuals “erroneously pardoned.” The two Spanish police unions are pressing both the Spanish and Moroccan governments for a solution, knowing that Spain had demanded extradition and not pardons for these 29, most of whom were arrested for drugs charges. Molina's trial would have begun 1 August had he not been pardoned, however, the law provides that only those who have been definitely imprisoned can benefit from a pardon. |
| August 8, 2013 | Yabiladi | Morocco: Al Hoceima shaken by earthquake of 4.6 on the Richter scale | August 8, 2013 | A 4.6 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter just outside of the city of Al Hoceima struck early Thursday morning, according to the National Center for Scientific and Technical Research (CNRST). While residents were able to feel the quake, no structural damage or injuries were reported. |
| August 8, 2013 | Yabiladi | Grace Royale: 385 Detenus Liberés Pour | | Just days after the scandal DanielGate, a new batch of royal pardons was announced Thursday by the Palace, on the occasion of Eid El Fitr. This time, the king pardoned 385 prisoners for “humanitarian reasons.” |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Times Live</strong></th>
<th><strong>Pedophile Pardon Embarrasses Spain, Morocco</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 7, 2013</strong></td>
<td>Spain had a seemingly simple request for Morocco's king: Pardon 18 Spaniards convicted in his country, and let 30 others return to Spain to serve out their prison terms. Instead, the monarch pardoned 48 Spanish prisoners, including a man convicted of raping children. The apparent bureaucratic mix-up has embarrassed both nations, prompting rare protests in Morocco and an ultimately successful scramble to find the freed paedophile. It has also raised legal questions about the fate of the other 29 Spaniards believed incorrectly pardoned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>International Business Times</strong></th>
<th><strong>Why Is Rev. Jesse Jackson In Morocco?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 8, 2013</strong></td>
<td>MAP reports that Rev Jesse Jackson visited Morocco on a business trip. According to the National Newspaper Publisher’s Association, Jackson met with human rights activists as well as the King. Actual Jackson quote of the day: “If blacks and whites in South Africa could work it out; if East and West Germany could work it could, then surely Morocco and Algeria can work it out.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We are pleased to send you the final results on our NAPS articles regarding Morocco's march to reform. NAPS is proving to produce spectacular results. See attachment and below. Ed

**Media/Web Coverage Highlights**

- **NAPS ARTICLE** – 2,150 US newspaper placements for “*Morocco and the Progressive Path to Reform,*” written by MACP, and published in all 50 US states (see list in attached report). Combined print and online audience exceeded 23 million readers, and the article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets.

- **MOROCCO ON THE MOVE** – Seven news and blog columns were posted to *Morocco on the Move* and then republished by *allAfrica.com, Atlas Times,* and elsewhere, resulting in more than 100 total placements and 2 million media impressions.

- **PRESS RELEASE** – MAC distributed a press release via *PR Newswire,* which was picked up and posted by 351 media outlets on March 7th, 2013 (listed by circulation at end of report), including major media such as *Wall Street Journal, Reuters, New York Newsday, Boston Globe, Miami Herald, Minneapolis Star-Tribune, SF Chronicle, Yahoo News* and more than 100 US local TV news stations.

- **E-LETTER** – The press release was also distributed directly to MACP’s key contacts including more than 3,000 policymakers, opinion leaders, and journalists as MAC’s weekly E-letter on March 11.

- **RESULTS** – Generated more than 2,500 total media and Web placements, and more than 40 million media impressions.
Media Coverage Report

RE: Media Report on “Morocco and The Progressive Path to Reform”

This report provides a full breakout of US press coverage from the announcement by King Mohammed VI this Spring regarding recommendations by the National Council of Human Rights for implementing key Morocco Constitutional reforms, particularly in the judiciary.

On March 3, King Mohammed VI announced that he welcomed the approach and content of four reports he had received from Morocco’s human rights watchdog, the National Human Rights Council (CNDH), with recommendations to advance changes in the judicial system as set forth by Morocco’s 2011 Constitutional reforms. To highlight the importance and context of this news for key US audiences, MAC launched a multi-faceted communications outreach effort that generated strong results throughout the Spring this year.

As soon as the story appeared on a Sunday, MAC’s media team immediately began posting and tweeting the news from MOTM, with banner stories from Middle East Online, Med Africa Times, and an eloquent column praising the King’s commitment to reform by analyst Joseph Braude in the Huffington Post. To reach print, broadcast, as well as online media, the MAC team issued a Press Release, “Committed to Speedy Reform, King Mohammed VI Welcomes New Recommendations From Morocco Human Rights Council,” via PR Newswire, and featured the news in an MOTM Blog Commentary. The Press Release was then sent as a MAC Weekly E-letter to policy makers and opinion leaders, coinciding with a Washington visit by CNDH’s Driss El Yazami. To extend Morocco’s key messages, a longer-lead NAPS article, “Morocco & the Progressive Path to Reform,” was sent out to thousands of US newspapers. Highlights of MAC’s communications campaign are below.

Media/Web Coverage Highlights

- **NAPS ARTICLE** – 2,150 US newspaper placements for “Morocco and the Progressive Path to Reform,” written by MACP, and published in all 50 US states (see list below). Combined print and online audience exceeded 23 million readers, and the article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets.

- **MOROCCO ON THE MOVE** – Seven news and blog columns were posted to Morocco on the Move and then republished by allAfrica.com, Atlas Times, and elsewhere, resulting in more than 100 total placements and 2 million media impressions.

- **PRESS RELEASE** – MAC distributed a press release via PR Newswire, which was picked up and posted by 351 media outlets on March 7th, 2013 (listed by circulation at end of report), including major media such as Wall Street Journal, Reuters, New York Newsday, Boston Globe, Miami Herald, Minneapolis Star-Tribune, SF Chronicle, Yahoo News and more than 100 US local TV news stations.

- **E-LETTER** – The press release was also distributed directly to MACP’s key contacts including more than 3,000 policymakers, opinion leaders, and journalists as MAC’s weekly E-letter on March 11.

- **RESULTS** – Generated more than 2,500 total media and Web placements, and more than 40 million media impressions.
NAPS Article: “Morocco & Progressive Path to Reform” (April 11, 2013)

The final report for the NAPS article, “Morocco & Progressive Path to Reform,” shows it generated **2,150 placements** in newspapers in all 50 US states (including those listed below). Combined print/online audience was **23 million readers** (30% more than our 2nd NAPS article). The article appeared in 44 of the top 50 US media markets, 79 of the top 100 markets, and 160 of the top 300 markets.

**THEHOUR, NORWALK, CT**
**NJ.COM, NEWARK, NJ**
**HOMEREPORTERNEWS, BROOKLYN, NY**
**REGISTERSTAR, HUDSON, NY**
**DAILYFREEMAN, KINGSTON, NY**
**CATSKILLSHOPPERONLINE, LIBERTY, NY**
**IONIANNEWS, NEW ROCHELLE, NY**
**CHELSANOW, NEW YORK, NY**
**QCHRAN, REGO PARK, NY**
**BIGHOOGAZETTE, BIG BEARLAKE, CA**
**DESERTNEWS, CALIFORNIACTY, CA**
**CHAMPIONNEWSPAPERS, CHINO, CA**
**COASTREPORTONLINE, COSTAMESA, CA**
**FONTANAHERALDNEWS, FONTANA, CA**
**HIGHLANDNEWS, HIGHLAND, CA**
**WAVENEWSPAPERS, LOS ANGELES, CA**
**MALIBUTFIMES, MALIBU, CA**
**TBNNEWS, MANHATTAN BEACH, CA**
**THEPOLYP, POMONA, CA**
**PVNEWS, ROLLING HILL ESTATE CA**
**NEWSMIRROR, YUCAIPA, CA**
**JOURNAL-TOPICS, DES PLAINES, IL**
**THEGILMANSTAR, GILMAN, IL**
**HERSCHERPILOT, HERSCHER, IL**
**BUGLENEWSPAPERS, PLAINFIELD, IL**
**HERALDARGUS, LA PORTE, IN**
**THENEWSDISPATCH, MICHIGAN CITY, IN**
**GILROYDISPATCH, GILROY, CA**
**MORGANHILLTIMES, GILROY, CA**
**SANBENITOCOUNTYTODAY, GILROY, CA**
**NEWS.GOOGLE.COM, MTN VIEW, CA**
**PACIFICNEWS, SAN RAFAEL, CA**
**SONOMAWEST, SEBASTOPOL, CA**
**HOMETOWN-SHOPPER, UKIAH, CA**
**NEWARKPOSTONLINE, NEWARK, DE**
**PRESSATLANTICITY, PLEASANTVILLE, NJ**
**DELCOTIMES, PRIMOS, PA**
**FOXBOROREPORTER, FOXBORO, MA**

**CAPEANNPLANET, GLOUCESTER, MA**
**HOMENEWSHERE, READING, MA**
**SENTINELSOURCE, KEENE, NH**
**LEESBURG2DAY, LEESBURG, VA**
**INSIDENOVA, MANASSAS, VA**
**NORTHERNASPORTS, SPRINGFIELD, VA**
**SUNGAZETTE, SPRINGFIELD, VA**
**CLARKSVILLENEWS, CLARKSVILLE, TX**
**AIMMEDIATEXAS, DALLAS, TX**
**DALLASWEEKLY, DALLAS, TX**
**KAUFMANHERALD, KAUFMAN, TX**
**DAILYTRIBUNE, MT PLEASANT, TX**
**SCNTX, PLANO, TX**
**UTDMERCURY, RICHARDSON, TX**
**YOURSTEPHENVILLE, STEPHENVILLE, TX**
**TERRELLTRIBUNE, TERRELL, TX**
**WAXAHACITX, WAXAHACHE, TX**
**ANTRIMREVIEW, BELLAIRE, MI**
**ALVINSUN, ALVIN, TX**
**THEANAHUACPROGRESS, ANAHUAC, TX**
**MOROCCO ON THE MOVE** – Seven Postings of News & Blog Columns, Republished for more than 100 Placements

✓ **Moroccan King welcomes approach, content of CNDH reports on reform – Middle East Online**

   **March 3, 2013 by Morocco on the Move**

   Middle East Online (Rabat, Morocco, March 3, 2013)—King Mohammed VI, welcomed the approach and content of thematic reports submitted by the National Council of Human [...]

✓ **Human Rights Watchdog in Morocco calls for judicial reforms, King lauds approach – MedAfrica Times**

   **March 4, 2013 by Morocco on the Move**

   MedAfrica Times, by S. Addamah (Rabat, Morocco, March 4, 2013) — The National Human Rights Council has called in four recent reports for reforms in the realm of justice [...]}

✓ **New Hopes From Rabat: King sends message systematic reform continues – Huffington Post**

   **March 5, 2013 by Morocco on the Move**

   Huffington Post, by Joseph Braude, Middle East Specialist (Washington, DC, March 5, 2013) -- ...I feel encouraged by the announcement of the King’s intention to dramatically reduce the role of military courts in Morocco. It would be in keeping with a tradition of reforms [...]’

✓ **Commentary: Not “American Way” but it’s working in Morocco – Jean AbiNader**

   **March 7, 2013 by Morocco on the Move**

   MATIC, by Jean AbiNader (Washington, DC, March 7, 2013)—The US government has an almost knee-jerk reaction to democracy promotion [...]

✓ **Press Release: Committed to Speedy Reform...**

   **March 7, 2013 by Morocco on the Move**

   Committed to Speedy Reform, HM King Mohammed VI Welcomes New Recommendations From Morocco’s Human Rights Council

   Washington, DC (March 7, 2013)—Keeping with his commitment to speedy implementation of reforms in Morocco, and dedication to advancing human rights & an independent judiciary [...]

✓ **Committed to speedy reform, King welcomes Morocco’s Human Rights Council reports**

   **March 7, 2013 by Morocco on the Move**

   MACP (Wash, DC, March 7, 2013)—Demonstrating Morocco’s commitment to systematic reform, advancing human rights, & implementation of its new Constitution, King Mohammed VI welcomed recommendations on judicial reform by National Human Rights Council/CNDH[...]

✓ **CNDH President highlights Morocco’s efforts to protect human rights in US visit**

   **March 14, 2013 by Morocco on the Move**

   MWN/MAP (Washington, DC, March 13, 2013) — President of Morocco’s National Council of Human Rights (CNDH), Driss El Yazami, highlighted in Washington progress in human rights and strengthening of the rule of law, in meetings with officials from the State Dept., Congress, [...]

6
MACP Press Release on PR Newswire & Pitched to Reporters – Posts at 351 Major Media Outlets, 450+ Total Placements

MACP Press Releases:

✓ “Committed to Speedy Reform, King Mohammed VI Welcomes New Recommendations From Morocco Human Rights Council” (March 7, 2013)

Yahoo! Politics
San Francisco Chronicle
Reuters
Boston Globe
MarketWatch
The Sacramento Bee
New York Business Journal
Orlando Business Journal
New Mexico Business Weekly
Pittsburgh Business Times
Portland Business Journal
Pacific Business News
Philadelphia Business Journal
Minneapolis / St. Paul Business Journal
Memphis Business Journal
Los Angeles Business from bizjournals
Chicago Business News
Cincinnati Business Courier
Dallas Business Journal
Dayton Business Journal
Denver Business Journal
Houston Business Journal
Jacksonville Business Journal
Kansas City Business Journal
Charlotte Business Journal
Bizjournals.com, Inc.
Wichita Business Journal
Tampa Bay Business Journal
Triangle Business Journal
Washington Business Journal
San Francisco Business Times
San Jose Business Journal

South Florida Business Journal
St. Louis Business Journal
Puget Sound Business Journal
San Antonio Business Journal
Sacramento Business Journal
Business First of Louisville
Business First of Columbus
Business Journal of Phoenix
Business Journal of Greater Milwaukee
Birmingham Business Journal
Baltimore Business Journal
Business First of Buffalo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boston Business Journal</th>
<th>WKRN ABC-2 (Nashville, TN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Review (Albany)</td>
<td>WFXI NBC-29 (Miami, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Journal of the Greater Triad Area</td>
<td>WAFB CBS-9 (Baton Rouge, LA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin Business Journal</td>
<td>WAVE NBC-3 (Louisville, KY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta Business Chronicle</td>
<td>WDFX NBC-13 (Birmingham, AL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Business Times</td>
<td>WBKO NBC-2 (Petersburg, VA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TheStreet.com</td>
<td>WICS NBC-5 (Peoria, IL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati Enquirer</td>
<td>WGGG NBC-16 (North Charleston, SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus Dispatch</td>
<td>WJBF NBC-6 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFSB-TV CBS-3 (Hartford, CT)</td>
<td>WJBF NBC-6 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Newswire</td>
<td>WKEF NBC-2 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPTV-TV FOX-12 (Beaverton, OR)</td>
<td>WFTS NBC-15 (Tallahassee, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press-Enterprise</td>
<td>WGNX NBC-30 (Miami, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTHR NBC-13 (Indianapolis, IN)</td>
<td>WGBA NBC-26 (Green Bay, WI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWTV-TV CBS-9 (Oklahoma City, OK)</td>
<td>WGNX NBC-30 (Miami, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSMV-TV NBC-4 (Nashville, TN)</td>
<td>WJXX NBC-20 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCTV-TV CBS-5 (Kansas City, MO)</td>
<td>WJ XX NBC-20 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISTV NBC-10 (Columbia, SC)</td>
<td>WJXX NBC-20 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGO-TV ABC-7 (San Francisco, CA)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Herald</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFIE NBC-14 (Evansville, IN)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPHO-TV CBS-5 (Phoenix, AZ)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOTV-TV CBS-6 (Tulsa, OK)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLTV ABC-7 (Tyler, TX)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAFF CBS-9 (Baton Rouge, LA)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Journal</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAVX NBC-3 (Louisville, KY)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quincy Herald-Whig (Quincy, IL)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFMZ</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WKRN ABC-2 (Nashville, TN)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WXIX FOX-19 (Cincinnati, OH)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoke</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAFF NBC-48 (Huntsville, AL)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSFA NBC-12 (Montgomery, AL)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNEM-TV CBS-5 (Saginaw, MI)</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticker Technologies</td>
<td>WJZZ NBC-31 (Jacksonville, FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLOX ABC-13 (Biloxi, MS)</td>
<td>WAOW-TV ABC-9 / MYOW-TV CW-34 (Wausau, WI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTOC CBS-11 (Savannah, GA)</td>
<td>WKAQ NBC-22 (Knoxville, TN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KOLD CBS-13 (Tucson, AZ)
WTVM ABC-9 (Columbus, GA)
KXXV-TV ABC-25 (Waco, TX)
WTRF-TV CBS-7 (Wheeling, WV)
InvestTalk
Inside Bay Area
Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (Ontario, CA)
Island Packet (Bluffton, SC)
Whittier Daily News (Whittier, CA)
Idaho Statesman
Great American Financial Resources
Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Fort Worth, TX)
Wichita Eagle (Wichita, KS)
Kansas City Star
Carlsbad Current-Argus (Carlsbad, NM)
Business Rockford
Buffalo News (Buffalo, NY)
Beyond The Dow
Belleville News-Democrat
Worth
Anchorage Daily News
WRAL-TV CBS-5 (Raleigh, NC)
WR Hambrecht & Co.
Fayetteville Observer
Farmington Daily Times (Farmington, NM)
Contra Costa Times
Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, GA)
Daily Breeze (Torrance, CA)
WBOY-TV NBC-12 (Clarksburg, WV)
WTOL CBS-11 (Toledo, OH)
WMBF NBC-32 (Myrtle Beach, SC)
FinancialContent - PR Newswire
KVOR 740-AM (Colorado Springs, CO)
LaMusica
Long Beach Press-Telegram (Long Beach, CA)
Los Angeles Daily News (Woodland Hills, CA)
Las Cruces Sun-News
Lexington Herald-Leader (Lexington, KY)
Market Intelligence Center
Miami Herald
News & Observer (Raleigh, NC)
Market Pulse
Maxim Group
Newsday (Melville, NY)
News Tribune (Tacoma, WA)
Olympian (Olympia, WA)
Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK)
San Gabriel Valley Tribune
Ruidoso News (Ruidoso, NM)
San Bernardino County Sun (San Bernardino, CA)
Record Publishing Company (Ravenna, OH)
Redlands Daily Facts (Redlands, CA)
Pasadena Star-News (Pasadena, CA)
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN)
Santa Cruz Sentinel (Santa Cruz, CA)
San Jose Mercury News
Street Insider
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS)
TC Palm
Telegraph-Macon (Macon, GA)
The Bellingham Herald
The Daily Herald
The Sun News (Myrtle Beach, SC)
The State (Columbia, SC)
Tribune (San Luis Obispo, CA)
Value Investing News
Times Union (Albany, NY)
KCEN-TV NBC-9 (Temple, TX)
Indianapolis Business Journal
KLFY CBS-10 (Lafayette, LA)
KTVN-TV CBS-2 (Reno, NV)
One News Page Global Edition
WJRT-TV ABC-12 (Flint, MI)
KTRE ABC-9 (Lufkin, TX)
Web 2.0 Journal
KUSI-TV IND-51 (San Diego, CA)
La Mega 97.9 FM
SYS-CON Media
US Politics Today
International Development News Today
WDAM NBC-7 (Hattiesburg-Laurel, MS)
WVVA NBC-6 (Bluefield, WV)
WCIV-TV ABC-4 (Charleston, SC)
KALB-TV CBS-2 / NBC-5 (Alexandria, LA)
WGFL-TV CBS-4 (Gainesville, FL)
WFXG-TV FOX-54 (Augusta, GA)
WFJM-TV NBC-21 (Youngstown, OH)
WFLX FOX-29 (West Palm Beach, FL)
WFFF-TV FOX-44 / WVNY-TV ABC-22 (Colchester, VT)
WDSI-TV FOX-61 (Chattanooga, TN)
AD HOC NEWS
Money Canada
WFXS-TV FOX-55 (Wausau, WI)
WFXR-TV FOX-21/27 (Roanoke, VA)
WGEM-TV NBC-10 (Quincy, IL)
WHBF CBS-4 (Rock Island, IL)
KDUH-TV ABC-3 (Scottsbluff, NE)
WKOW-TV ABC-27 (Madison, WI)
WICU-TV NBC-12 (Erie, PA)
KCOY CBS-12 (Santa Maria, CA)
KFRE-TV CW-59 (Fresno, CA)
KFDA CBS-10 (Amarillo, TX)
WMBB-TV ABC-13 (Panama City, FL)
WLTV CW-38 (Columbus, GA)
KAUZ-TV CBS-6 (Wichita Falls, TX)
WLAX-TV FOX-25/48 (La Crosse, WI)
KCAU ABC-9 (Sioux City, IA)
WLNS CBS-6 (Lansing, MI)
KAZT IND-7 (Phoenix/Prescott, AZ)
US News Online
WOI ABC-5 (West Des Moines, IA)
WMDT-TV ABC-47 / CW-3 (Salisbury, MD)
WQOW-TV ABC-18 (Eau Claire, WI)
WOWK-TV CBS 13 (Huntington, WV)
WREX-TV NBC-13 (Rockford, IL)
eZanga
Dealbreaker
WSJV-TV FOX-28 (South Bend, IN)
WSFX-TV FOX-26 (Wilmington, NC)
Telecom Innovation (Ulitzer)
WTNZ FOX-43 (Knoxville, TN)
WTEN ABC-10 (Albany, NY)
Twitter (Ulitzer)
Government News (Ulitzer)
Biz Daily (Singapore)
AssignmentEditor.com
Amor 93.1 FM
All Port Jobs
aePiot News
WBOC-TV FOX-21 (Salisbury, MD)
WAND-TV NBC-17 (Decatur, IL)
The State Journal (Charleston, WV)
KXMB-TV CBS-12 (Bismarck, ND)
NOCO-TV CBS-5 (Fort Collins, CO)
State House News Service (Affiliated News Services)
KION CBS-46 (Salinas, CA)
KWES-TV NBC-9 (Midland, TX)
KFVE MyNetworkTV-5 (Honolulu, HI)
KXJB-TV CBS-4 / KVLY-TV NBC-11 (Fargo, ND)
KMEG-TV CBS-14 (Sioux City, IA)
KLKN ABC-8 (Lincoln, NE)
KLJB-TV FOX-18 (Davenport, IA)
KSTC-TV IND-45 (Saint Paul, MN)
KSWT-TVS CBS-13 (Yuma, AZ)
KRHD-TV ABC-40 (Bryan-College Station, TX)
KSFY-TV ABC-13 (Sioux Falls, SD)
KTTC NBC-10 (Rochester, MN)
KNOE-TV CBS-8 (Monroe, LA)
WXOW ABC-19 (La Crosse, WI)
KOAM-TV CBS-7 (Pittsburg, KS)
WXVT-TV CBS-15 (Greenville, MS)
WZDX-TV FOX-54 (Huntsville, AL)
KOTA ABC-3 (Rapid City, SD)
KMPH-TV FOX-26 (Fresno, CA)
KNDU-TV NBC (Kennewick, WA)
KPTH-TV FOX-44 (Dakota Dunes, SD)
KPTM-TV FOX-42 (Omaha, NE)
KQCW CW-12/19 (Tulsa, OK)
WPFO-TV FOX-23 (Portland, ME)

Vertical Continuity Your Social Marketing Space
Socialmulti
The HRIS World
WSHM-TV CBS-3 (Springfield, MA)
WTLH-TV FOX-49 (Tallahassee, FL)
WUPV-TV CW-65 (Tallahassee, FL)
KNDO-TV NBC-3 (Yakima, WA)
KIII-TV ABC-3 (Corpus Christi, TX)
KGWN-TV CBS-5 (Fort Collins, CO)
KFMB 760-AM (San Diego, CA)
KFMB 100.7 Jack-FM (San Diego, CA)
KFJX-TV FOX-14 (Pittsburg, KS)
KEYC-TV CBS-12 / FOX-12 (Mankato, MN)
NorthStar News
MrBayStreet.com
ReleasePlus
One News Page Unites States Edition
OnCuba Magazine
WLNE-TV ABC-6 (Providence, RI)
WLTZ-TV NBC-38 (Columbus, GA)
WOLF-TV FOX-56 (Wilkes-Barre, PA)
FinanzNachrichten.de (ABC New Media AG)
Web Lens
WSBNN The Wall Street Business News Network
Ezerin’Com Communication Agency
Feed Head Lines
DCXposed
eMoneyDaily
Codewit News
Crossover.co.ke (Magnificent Ltd/Kenya)
AlphaTrade Finance
Austin American-Statesman (Austin, TX)
KTEN NBC-10 (Denison, TX)

KSWO-TV ABC-7 (Lawton, OK)
KTIV NBC-4 (Sioux City, IA)
KTVG-TV FOX-17 / KSNB-TV FOX-4 (Kearney, NE)
AlipesNews
KUAM-TV NBC-8 / CBS-11 (Hagatna, Guam)
California Chronicle
Brian's Roar
boomerVilleUS.com
Biz Wire Express
Luso Financial Planning
WXTX-TV FOX-54 (Columbus, GA)
WVNS-TV CBS-59 (Ghent, WV)
Latest News Today
Living by the Seasons
News Info Guide
KWQC NBC-6 (Davenport, IA)
NorthWest Cable News (Seattle, WA)
KYTX CBS-19 (Tyler, TX)
KXVO-TV CW-15 (Omaha, NE)
KXLT FOX-47 (Rochester, MN)
El Paso Times
KING-TV NBC-5 (Seattle, WA)
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Las Vegas Business Press
myMotherLode.com
Health Care Enrichment Program
GYL: Licensing and Certification Resource Directory
Investle
inPixels
Global Newsweek
Money Show
NebraskaTV (Kearney, NE)
Worcester Telegram & Gazette
Stocklink
StockNod
Wall Street Select
WBCB-TV CW-21 (Youngstown, OH)
MAC Weekly E-Letter

✓ On March 11, MAC Communications team also sent the press release out directly as a Weekly E-Letter to MAC’s contact list of more than 3,000 policy makers, opinion leaders, reporters, & other interested US audiences in the Washington, DC area.
The following information is provided from private and public sources, none of which has been corroborated.

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
August 28, 2013

Executive Summary

Political Trends
- President Bouteflika has still not resumed his official duties and remains largely out of sight.
- While most sources seem to agree that Bouteflika remains so badly weakened by his stroke that a fourth term of office is unthinkable, one well informed private source claims on the contrary that he has made a full recovery, is in control of the situation and intends to run again in 2014. The forthcoming Council of Ministers may provide important pointers as to which version is correct.
- Prime Minister Sellal has been continuing his inspection visits of the provinces, during which his manner seems increasingly confident and statesmanlike, not to say presidential.
- With parliament due to reconvene on Sept. 2, the fractious FLN leadership has been instructed to put its house in order ahead of what looks like being a busy legislative season.

Foreign Relations
- A recent speech PM Sellal clearly expressed the siege mentality of Algeria's rulers since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, and restated Algiers' refusal to assume regional leadership.
- Algiers is nonetheless being dragged into a more interventionist role, especially to the east, where it is contributing very heavily to the crackdown on a jihadist group in Tunisia's Djebel Chaambi and providing training and other assistance to the Tunisian and Libyan military.
- An outbreak of ugly ethnic violence in Bordj Badji Mokhtar on Algeria's border with Mali is the result of overspill from the conflict in northern Mali and is symptomatic of the dwindling efficiency of Algiers' traditional mechanisms of control in the Sahara region.
- To the west, Algeria's crackdown on fuel smuggling has caused severe socio-economic and even political tension in Morocco's Orientale province.
- Polisario and its supporters have picked up on the hue and cry in the Algerian press over Moroccan drug smuggling.

Security
- There has been a marked uptick in jihadist activity, notably in AQMI's principal base in Kabylia.
- Threats of attacks against the Egyptian embassy in Algiers in response to the Egyptian government's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood probably did not emanate from a bona fide terrorist group, and the capital remained quiet throughout the month.
- There have been fewer incursions across Algeria's eastern borders, although there were reports that a group of MUJAO fighters had entered the country in an attempt to spring a number of their imprisoned comrades from jail in Ouargla.
- With the Algerian army and gendarmerie heavily committed along the border with Tunisia, there has been an upsurge in jihadist activity along the southern borders with Mali and Niger, suggesting that there may be limits to the Algerian military's ability to lock down all the borders, all the time.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar has announced the merger of his group with MUJAO to form a new united jihadist organisation calling itself Al Mourabitoun, with ambitions to become Al-Qaeda’s leading franchisee “between the Nile and the Atlantic”.

Political Trends

With parliament in recess and much of the country on holiday, August in Algeria is usually a slack period, politically speaking. This year it has been particularly slow, the usual inhibiting factors being compounded by the illness of the once all-powerful head of state. However, with a clutch of important political issues requiring urgent attention, there is a latent tension in the situation, which seems increasingly ripe for release.

As expected, President Bouteflika failed to conduct the individual assessment meetings with government ministers that had been a fixture of Ramadans past. Neither did he put in an appearance at nighttime prayers for the 27th Ramadan[1] at the Grand Mosque in Algiers, or for the Eid Al-Fitr prayers at the end of Ramadan, occasions he has always made a point of attending in the past. Rumours began to fly after his Eid no-show that he had been flown back to France for further treatment, and on Aug. 24 there was a sudden Twitter-fuelled burst of reports that he had died. Neither stories turned out to be true, but they were very much indicative of public perceptions of the President's condition since he returned to Algeria, apparently wheelchair-bound, in mid-July.

Bouteflika did, however, make two short appearances on Algerian state TV news in the middle of the month. On Aug. 14, he was pictured receiving Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal at his Algiers residence, wearing a dark-blue dressing gown; the following day he was shown, again at his residence in the capital, in the company of armed forces Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd Salah (for whom he donned a white shirt). In both instances, the images were broadcast without the sound. Speaking to us some time later, a usually well informed Algerian source, who is close to a number of DRS officers at various levels, volunteered the information that as a result of the stroke he suffered in April Bouteflika can still barely speak, and stutters when he does.

The same source added that the country's top decision-makers, looking ahead to next year's presidential election, are actively looking for a “compromise candidate” – a compromise, that is, between the different elements within the establishment – who can be relied upon not to challenge their power and privileges once in office. The source remained somewhat vague as to just who was involved in this search, but seemed to suggest that the armed forces' officer corps would not have much of a say: the military, the source claimed, is thoroughly dominated by the DRS and, contrary to earlier suggestions from other sources, has not been able to capitalise on events in Mali in order to reassert itself as an independent actor. Furthermore, the source pointed out, the military's leading figure, Lt-Gen. Gaid Salah, who is 73, is likely soon to take retirement. This would seem to imply that the hunt for a successor is essentially the DRS's business. This picture may up to a point reflect the source's own closeness to the DRS, however. Indeed, the very fact that so much effort is going into reaching a consensus – and the fact that no such consensus has yet been found – would seem to suggest that this is not a matter DRS chief Lt-Gen. Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène can decide on his own. More broadly, possible shifts in the balance of forces between the DRS and the armed forces' top brass remain very much worth monitoring over the coming period, in particular with the army cast once again, thanks to the turmoil on Algeria's borders, as the saviour of the nation.
As for the range of potential establishment candidates, the source’s only observation was that Ali Benflis – Bouteflika’s former chief-of-staff and one-time Prime Minister who ended up running against him in 2004 with the tacit approval of the then head of the armed forces, and whose name has again been floated this year as a possible contender in 2014 – does not seem well placed as things stand. And indeed, after a very brief flurry of interest, the press has largely been ignoring Benflis of late. On the other hand, PM Ahmed Ouyahia – who, it will be recalled, was received by Tewfik in mid-July – received another boost in early August when members of the RND (the party he headed until January of this year) from across the country began signing a petition calling on him to run for President in 2014. Arguably, however, the most likely candidate remains the current Prime Minister, Abdelmalek Sellal, who has been continuing his inspection visits to the provinces, now at a rate of around one per week, and displaying an increasingly assured and presidential manner.

The general consensus at the present time, therefore, is that Bouteflika's prospects of recovering sufficiently to run for a fourth term of office next year are negligible, and that he is being kept so to speak on political life support while the rest of the establishment casts around for an alternative. There have been a few dissenting voices, however. Kabyle news agency Siwel, for example, claimed on Aug. 24 that Bouteflika was planning to convene a meeting of the Council of Ministers in the coming days after which he would announce a thorough shake-up of the government, with several ministers set to lose their jobs for failing to show sufficient loyalty to the President during his spell in hospital in France. Siwel is the media arm of Kabyle-separatist singer Ferhat Mehenni's self-proclaimed “Provisional Government of Kabylia” and as such would not normally be expected to have privileged access to the inner circles of the Algerian executive branch. Curiously, however, the tone of its report does chime with the account given to us by a private source of long standing at the Presidency itself. The source, who has proved generally reliable and often highly valuable over the years, is not only adamant that Bouteflika “has recovered, speaks, and walks” but even goes as far as to claim that the President's return to Algeria in a wheelchair was nothing but “a ploy”: having realised while in hospital in France that most of the establishment and the political class had written him off as all but dead, he wanted to be able to gauge their attitude towards him, in this putatively moribund state, up close and in person, and so chose to play the part on arrival in Algiers. Once the political/security elite realised that he was not dying after all, everyone “fell back into line”. DRS chief Tewfik, the source insists, remains faithful to the President and is not trying to undermine him or squeeze him out. Pointing out that Bouteflika is “only” 75 years old, the source further claims that he still intends to run for a fourth successive term of office in 2014.

This account is radically at odds with the few openly observable signs so far, not to mention with what other sources have been telling us for some time, and the suggestion that Bouteflika has gone to the length of using props to help him play mind-games with other members of the establishment appears, prima facie, almost outlandish. But it is worth underlining the fact that the source has, in principle, excellent access and has over many years provided numerous invaluable insights. On the crucial question of how far Bouteflika remains an active player, therefore, there is little choice but to reserve one's judgement for the time being. On this and related issues, however, events over the coming days may provide important pointers.

While Siwel may be alone in casting it as a prelude to Bouteflika's own version of the night of the long knives, it is
by no means the only news source to have evoked an imminent Council of Ministers meeting: media of various stripes, including the international Al-Jazeera news channel, had been confidently reporting that a Council of Ministers meeting – which of course can only be chaired by the President of the Republic – was be held on Aug. 28. There was never any official announcement to this effect, however, and in the end ministers are reported to have gathered without President Bouteflika for a regular and very low-key working meeting under the chairmanship of PM Sellal.

But there is still an urgent need for a Council of Ministers meeting, insofar the constitution requires that all government legislation – including this year's supplementary finance law and the long-awaited bill to amend the constitution – be discussed and approved by this body before being submitted to parliament. When it finally does take place, the Council of Ministers meeting should provide important clues as to Bouteflika's physical and political vitality. If, as our source at the Presidency claims, Bouteflika has made a full recovery, it would provide the opportunity to demonstrate this to the media, and the nation at large; should it be followed by the reshuffle predicted by Siwel, this would suggest that Bouteflika has recovered not only his physical but also his political potency. On the other hand, minimal or no photographic coverage of the Council of Ministers would suggest that the President is still in weak health and has made only a token appearance to enable a 'pro forma' meeting to be held.

Meanwhile, the commission in charge of drafting the constitutional amendments is understood to have submitted its report to the executive branch, with Algerian media reports suggesting that a bill to amend the constitution was to be presented to the Council of Ministers “at the end of August”. Its contents have not yet been officially released, but leaks to the press indicate that the draft does include provisions for the President to appoint a Vice President, who would take over the running of the country should the head of state be incapacitated. This would clearly put whoever is designated Vice President – PM Sellal is currently seen as the most obvious candidate – on track to succeed Bouteflika formally at the end of his current term of office. If, as per our first source, Bouteflika has failed to make an adequate recovery and the DRS is driving the succession process, such a mechanism could conceivably provide a means of easing Bouteflika out and his successor in[2].

Whatever the reasons for the delay in convening the Council of Ministers, the resumption of the legislative process after the summer break will also require the removal of a number of other blockages. Once adopted by the Council of Ministers, government bills must be passed to the Bureau of the National People's Assembly (lower house of parliament) for inclusion in the schedule of parliamentary debates. However, contrary to usual practice the Assembly went into recess at the end of July without electing a new bureau for the forthcoming autumn session, which begins on Sept. 2. This appears to have been because chronic faction fighting within the FLN, which has just under half the seats in the National People's Assembly, had effectively made it impossible to hold a vote. In preparation for a particularly busy parliamentary session, not to mention the upcoming presidential election, the FLN needed fixing.

Accordingly, the Interior Ministry has “authorised” (“ordered” would probably be closer to the mark) the party to hold a long overdue Central Committee meeting at which it is supposed to dispense with the provisional
leadership that has been in charge since the ouster of Abdelaziz Belkhadem in February and elect a new General Secretary. Former Speaker of parliament Amar Saadani is tipped as the favourite for post, and according to several Algerian media reports enjoys the backing of Bouteflika (Saadani, it is worth remarking, was one of the leading lights of the pro-Bouteflika faction within the FLN in 2003-2004 when the majority of the party stood behind Ali Benflis, and unlike Belkhadem has never been known to express any presidential ambitions of his own). With the CC meeting scheduled for Aug. 29-30, the hope is clearly that this will make it possible for the FLN to put its house in order in time for the opening of the autumn session of parliament on Sept. 2. In the run-up to the meeting, the FLN's various factions have by and large persisted in their fractious ways. A sudden outbreak of peace and unanimity behind Saadani, however, might be a sign that Bouteflika, having risen from his wheelchair, is once more casting his disciplinal shadow over the former single party.

Foreign Relations

Visiting the Wilaya of Jijel on Aug. 15, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal delivered a speech to a gathering of local representatives of civil society. Addressing the situation on Algeria's borders and the after-effects of the Arab Spring, his comments gave an unusually clear reflection of the siege mentality that has beset Algeria's leadership since the first tremors of the Arab Spring in late 2010.

“We are,” intoned the Prime Minister, “sitting on a volcano”. The effects of the Arab Spring had been devastating, he argued, leading amongst other things to a climate of civil war in Egypt and an increasingly unstable situation in neighbouring Tunisia. But “there will be no Arab Spring in Algeria. We are working to make sure of that, and we are on the right path.” With upheavals and armed conflict afflicting so many of its neighbours, Algeria had “come under pressure from all sides to take on the role of a regional power” (an apparent allusion to the sollicitations of Washington, and to a lesser extent France). “But our policy is and always has been quite clear, and it is this which has enabled us to maintain the stability of our country”: Algeria remains true to its principled stance of “non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries”, and its only ambition with regard to its neighbours is to “ease tensions, not inflame them”. At the same time, Algeria is “on its guard [and] determined to confront any attempts at destabilisation”, for Algerians “know how precious stability is, especially after having lived through a decade of difficulties that almost threatened the very existence of the Algerian state and the Algerian people”. While “we shall never use force against our own children”, Algeria has the means to counter any attacks on its stability and national security, the Prime Minister warned.

And yet, despite (or indeed because of) the means at its disposal, the Algerian regime finds itself being pulled, volens nolens, into an increasingly interventionist role, notably to the east. An incipient dispute with the Tunisian authorities over wild allegations of DRS manipulation of Tunisia's violent islamists (see previous report) has been patched up[3], and security cooperation between Algeria, Tunisia and Libya is becoming more organised. At the very end of July, senior officers from the Algerian and Tunisian militaries are reported to have met to plan a common response to the deteriorating situation in the Djebel Chaambi area on the Tunisian side of the border, where a jihadist group had killed nine Tunisian soldiers on July 25. In early August a Tunisian
security official told us:

On the military side of things, Tunisian army units in Djebel Chaambi have formed a joint operations room with Algerian army units. The Algerians have extended logistical and intelligence assistance to the Tunisians and mobilised elite units and some 20,000 troops on the border between the two countries, including 7,000 on the Djebel Chaambi sector of the border.

The Algerian press subsequently quoted a Tunisian army spokesperson as describing “the exchange of information between Tunisia and Algeria” as “the key to the success of this operation”. Meanwhile, the Algerian and Libyan governments are setting up a joint commission to coordinate counter-terrorism and anti-smuggling operations following Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan’s visit to Algiers on Aug. 5, and Algiers is also reported to have begun counter-terrorism training programmes with the Tunisian and Libyan militaries.

But this is scarcely a partnership of equals. The 20,000 troops reportedly committed by Algiers to the Tunisian border area is the equivalent of around two thirds of the entire strength of the Tunisian land forces, which are badly overstretched with internal security commitments across the country, while the Libyan army is, if not altogether a fiction, a shaky and unreliable force to say the least. Faced with threats that are increasingly clearly transnational – as emphasised by Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Laareyedh on Aug. 27 when he announced that the Tunisian hardline islamist group Ansar Al-Sharia, held responsible for the murders of two secularist politicians and henceforth considered a terrorist organisation, had pledged allegiance to Abdelmalek Droudkel, leader of Algeria’s AQMI – the Algerian army and security forces are obviously going to be called upon to do a lot of the heavy lifting. It will be increasingly difficult to do so while remaining strictly within Algeria’s borders, as events in Djebel Chaambi have shown.

Meanwhile, events on Algeria’s southern borders, which for a time seemed to be more or less contained, have again taken a worrying turn for Algiers with an outbreak of extremely ugly ethnic violence between Arabs and Tuaregs in the town of Bordj Badji Mokhtar on the border with Mali[4]. The precise circumstances which sparked the bloodletting are hazy (some press reports claimed, probably fancifully, that the two groups “quarrelled over a smuggled arms shipment”, while others indicated that the violence erupted when Arab shop owners killed a Tuareg youth who had opened a store in their area, and others still suggested a petty theft provided the spark). But it is fairly clear that the Bordj Badji Mokhtar violence is, one way or another, an overspill from the conflict in neighbouring Mali. Many, if not most, of the Tuaregs involved in the fighting were refugees from northern Mali[5], who have often been treated by the Algerian authorities with shocking disregard (some told the press that when they sought the Gendarmerie’s protection during the rioting they were told to “go get help from France or Burkina Faso”). Their competition with locals for scarce resources and opportunities to make a living appears to have been exacerbated by a strike by local lorry drivers, on whom the town relies for almost all supplies, in protest at fuel rationing – itself a consequence of the conflict in northern Mali, the Algerian authorities having imposed draconian restrictions on sales of refined products in the area in a bid to dry up supplies of smuggled fuel to AQMI and allied groups across the border.

A source close to the DRS has hinted that the Bord Badji Mokhtar events are seen in Algiers as a worrying manifestation of a broader problem. It is particularly striking that the authorities’ traditional strategy of relying on local notables to maintain the peace in the vast, ethnically diverse south proved largely ineffective in
containing the violence – a peace initiative relying on elders of both communities, fostered by the Wali (provincial governor) of Adrar, brought only a short lull in the fighting – forcing the gendarmerie to bring in as many as 1,500 reinforcements from Algiers to separate the camps. Although the violence appears now to have died down, the Bordj Badji Mokhtar events may be seen as another symptom of a longer-term trend, on which we have commented in the past, whereby the DRS, a past master in manipulating the tribes and clans of the Sahara, seems to be progressively losing its hand, first in northern Mali and Niger, and now within Algeria itself.

By contrast, Algeria's western border with Morocco may seem relatively stable, but tension has been rising here too over the past months, as we have observed on several occasions, as Algeria moves to crack down on smuggling of Moroccan cannabis into Algeria and subsidised Algerian fuel into Morocco. As well as increasing patrols along the border and restricting supplies of fuel to retailers in nearby areas, the authorities have now begun to dig a trench along sections of the border – an expedient which, like the wall of shipping containers hurriedly built along sections of the border with Libya earlier this year, smacks of improvisation, if not desperation. Such measures do, however, seem to be having an effect, in particular on fuel smuggling – to the point where drastic fuel shortages have been reported in eastern Morocco, impacting on the local economy (including the crucial agricultural sector, which it would seem had become reliant on cheap Algerian diesel to run tractors and other farm machinery). This, understandably enough, is fuelling considerable bitterness and even political tensions in eastern Morocco: Orientale province is reported to be “on the brink of rioting” as a result of the fuel shortages, and a pharmacy belonging to the mayor of the provincial capital Oujda (a member of the nationalist Istiqlal Party) has been burnt down by local residents enraged by his blandishments in the press about Moroccans having “no need of Algeria to get by”. At the same time, the crackdown on drug smuggling is producing ever more hauls of Moroccan cannabis, often quite far from the border (6.4 tonnes of sifted cannabis resin were seized by the Algerian army near Hassi R'mel in the Wilaya of Laghouat on Aug. 19), generating ever more virulent coverage in the Algerian media[6].

This theme has also been picked up on by Polisario and its supporters, with Pierre Galand, the Belgian chairman of the European Coordinating Committee of Saharawi support groups (EUCOCO) proclaiming from the platform of the summer school for SADR cadres near Algiers in August that “Morocco is taking on a very serious responsibility in threatening to flood [Algeria] with tons of drugs in an attempt to influence its position on the Western Sahara conflict”. In a similar vein, Speaker of the Saharawi National Council Khatri Addouh stated from the same platform that:

Morocco harbors terrorists and criminal groups which are active in northern Mali and parts of Africa, terrorists it is preparing to carry out attacks in order to destabilize the region and hinder the process of settling the Saharawi question in accordance with international law. The Moroccan authorities were behind the establishment of the terrorist group MUJAO, in order to weaken the position of the Saharawi state, [as was shown by MUJAO's] kidnapping of Western nationals from the refugee camps [in Tindouf] and its attacks on the interests of certain countries in the region, including Algeria.

To be sure, neither Galand nor Addouh were speaking for the Algerian government. But their remarks – made at an event held under the watchful eye of the DRS, and reported uncritically by Algeria's official news agency APS – can certainly be said to partake of a general climate of Morocco-bashing in the Algerian media that the Algerian authorities, for the time being, show no particular sign of wanting to restrain.

Security

Jihadist activity, which had been running at relatively low levels earlier in the summer, spiked in the last week of July and has remained high throughout August. With 25 security incidents reported, including 13 jihadist
operations, in the period 01/08 to 25/08, this August may in fact have seen the heaviest jihadist activity since May 2012. Furthermore, whereas in July AQMI used only bombings (see previous report), the past few weeks have seen it revert to its usual mix of operations, including shootings and fake checkpoints (albeit with a marked preference for remote-controlled bomb attacks).

**Algiers** was calm throughout the month, despite a rash of threats of violence against diplomatic missions. The US embassy and consulates in Algeria remained closed for several days in early August in response to a terror alert covering most of the Middle East and North Africa. And on August 21 Algerian daily *Echourouk* quoted the Egyptian ambassador to Algeria as saying that the authorities had tightened security around Egyptian diplomatic facilities after diplomats received faxes and phone calls from unknown individuals — some styling themselves the “Amazigh Islamist Front” — threatening “physical elimination” of embassy staff and attacks against the facilities “similar to what happened in Benghazi, Libya” (where the Egyptian consulate had been hit by a bomb blast on Aug. 17 in apparent retaliation for the crackdown by the Egyptian army on the Muslim Brotherhood). The Egyptian embassy in Tunisia reportedly received similar messages. These threats do not, however, appear to emanate from organised groups capable of following them up with action: there is no evidence that the hitherto unheard of Amazigh (i.e. Kabyle or Berber) Islamist Front actually exists, and it is conceivable that it may have been an embellishment by *Echourouk*, which has acquired a certain reputation for Kabyle-baiting.

**Kabylia** itself, meanwhile, saw a sharp upsurge of AQMI activity, with nine operations recorded between July 29 and August 25, up from only four in the preceding month and four in June. And while jihadist activity in Kabylia over the period of May-July had been concentrated in the northwest and centre of the wilaya of Bouira, over the past few weeks it has spread to other parts of Bouira and across the wilayas of Boumerdès and Tizi Ouzou.

The only incident reported in the oil and gas producing regions came around August 11 when, according to *El-Khabar*, the army and Gendarmerie tightened security and launched a search and destroy mission around the towns of Ouargla and Chott (wilaya of Ouargla), hunting for jihadists who had reportedly crossed in from Libya with the intention of attacking the prison in Ouargla to help MUJAO members held there escape. The authorities were also investigating escape attempts by the prisoners themselves, claimed the newspaper, adding that “judicial sources” would neither deny nor confirm the report. The situation around the prison “appeared perfectly calm” on August 11, “with no trace of exceptional security measures”, according to *El Khabar*, whose story comes in the wake of (and may even have been inspired by) a wave of attacks on prisons in Iraq and Yemen by local Al-Qaeda affiliates in late July, in which dozens of jihadist prisoners were freed.

To the east, on the border with Tunisia, there have been fewer incursions since the massive joint Algerian-Tunisian operation against jihadists in Tunisia's Djebel Chaambi was launched in late July, probably because of the heavy presence of Algerian security forces in the area. The only incident of note came on August 2 when Algerian security forces, according to *El-Mihwar* (04/08), intercepted and killed three jihadists who were trying to cross the border on foot from Tunisia to Algeria in the Bir El-Ater sector (wilaya of Tébessa). They were carrying suicide belts and are thought to have been planning to attack an Algerian border post. The slain jihadists were said to belong to the Djebel Chaambi group.

The southern borders, on the other hand, saw more jihadist activity than in the previous months – suggesting, perhaps, that with its heavy new commitments on the border with Tunisia, the Algerian military is becoming dangerously stretched and may not be able to sustain a prolonged lockdown along all the country's borders simultaneously. The security forces on Aug. 3-4 intercepted a jihadist group, believed to be MUJAO members, at a point near Bordj Baji Mokhtar on the border with Mali. An army helicopter destroyed five offroaders, killed five jihadists and recovered five kalashnikovs. It is believed the jihadists were “on their way to Libya to arrange a weapons shipment”. As of August 3, according to *El-Khabar* quoting “reliable security sources,” the Algerian army stepped up security on the border and put units on alert around Bordj Baji Mokhtar after receiving
information that a group of seven jihadists had sneaked in from Mali with the intention of carrying out suicide bombings inside Algeria before the end of Ramadan (Aug. 8). Then on August 6, “informed security sources” told El-Mihwar that the Gendarmerie had foiled a suicide bombing attack against an observation post in the wilaya of Tamanrasset, near the border with Mali. Two MUJAO jihadists were detained and “a huge quantity of explosives, up to 680 kg, seized”. El-Mihwar later reported that the army on August 22 foiled an attempt by AQMI to smuggle weapons into Algeria, probably from Libya, close to the Niger-Libya-Algeria tripoint. Three army and Border Guard units detained five smugglers and seized a shipment of 18 machine guns, 10 RPGs and “three anti-aircraft missiles”[7].

Finally, in a potentially very significant development beyond Algeria’s borders, MUJAO and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Moulathhamoun Brigade issued a statement via Mauritanian news agency ANI on August 22 announcing the merger of the two groups into a new outfit, named Al-Mourabitoun[8]. Both Belmokhtar and MUJAO’s leader Ahmad Ould Amer “stepped aside” and pledged allegiance to a new emir of the unified group, whom they did not name but described as “a veteran of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets in the 80s and against the Americans in 2002 [who] came to Azawad a while ago and was one of the leaders of the fight against France”. The statement continues with a litany of threats against the jihadists’ enemies, with a special emphasis on France and French interests in North Africa.

A day later, Belmokhtar gave an interview to ANI in which he said the merger decision was “unanimous” and explained that Al-Mourabitoun aims to “unite all jihadis, indeed all Muslims, from the Nile to the [Atlantic] ocean”. The new outfit, he added, “remains committed to its pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan and we reaffirm our allegiance to Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri and to Al-Qaeda’s way of jihad and its political and military vision as laid down by the late Sheikh Osama bin Laden may God bless his soul”. Belmokhtar explained his decision to step aside as emir by his belief that “it is now time to let a new generation of leaders take charge” – a somewhat disingenuous argument, since a “veteran of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets” would be at least as old as if not older than Belmokhtar himself (born 1972). Indeed, it seems likely that Belmokhtar, who is now the most experienced surviving jihadist leader in the Sahara-Sahel region, remains the de facto emir of the group and that his “resignation” is little more than window-dressing. Belmokhtar’s rhetoric suggests that he is positioning the new group to compete with, or even supplant, the much weakened AQMI as the main Al-Qaeda franchise in the region. It remains to be seen how the remnants of AQMI's Sahara branch, its leadership in Kabylia and the Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan will react to this.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] Laylat Al-Qadr, or the 'night of destiny': the date on which, according to Islamic tradition, the first verses of the Holy Quran were revealed to
On the other hand, it is worth recalling that the source at the Presidency did suggest in June that Bouteflika, intent on standing for re-election in 2014, wanted the constitution amended to include an appointed Vice President, which would give him the possibility of bowing out in the middle of his fourth term and handing over to his designated successor.

At the end of July, Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s ruling Ennahda party, issued a statement stressing the “importance of relations with neighbouring countries, first and foremost Algeria” and firmly condemning rumours of Algerian involvement in destabilising Tunisia that had been propagated by press and social media close to Ennahda. This was followed on Aug. 1 by a very similar communiqué from the Tunisian Foreign Ministry, and on Aug. 6 Foreign Minister Othman Jarandi and Defence Minister Rachid Sebbagh flew to Algiers for talks with the Algerian government, chiefly centering on security cooperation.

Clashes between the Arab tribe of Barabiche and the Tuareg tribe of Idnan broke out on Aug. 14, with a pitched battle raging in the main street of the town for several hours before the security forces intervened. Six people were killed and dozens wounded. Violence flared up again on Aug. 19, again leaving several dead and dozens wounded. Officially the death count of the whole episode is ten, although some press accounts have suggested that in reality more than 40 people were killed.

Algerian daily Echorouk (21/08) reported that the army on August 19 intercepted ten offroaders at the border with Mali carrying Idnan tribesmen who were apparently on their way to Bordj Baji Mokhtar to “support their cousins” in the fight against the Barabiche. The army “dealt with them peacefully” after they were found to be armed with no more than sticks.

“Morocco just will not stop pouring its poison into Algeria,” screeched Algerie1.com, a news site understood to be close to the DRS. Commenting on the economic and social crisis in eastern Morocco caused by the crackdown on smuggling of subsidised Algerian products, the same outlet commented: “This just goes to show how the illegal exportation of Algerian fuel and food contributes to the stability of the Kingdom, which nonetheless has no hesitation in using its diplomatic and media machine against Algeria, [seen as no more than] a milch cow.”

This is the first time the threat of anti-aircraft missile smuggling – formerly a leitmotiv of the Algerian press' reporting of security incidents on the southern and south-eastern borders – has been mentioned since October 2012.
Literally “people of the garrisons,” a name given to fighters who manned the border outposts of the early Muslim empires. Later it became the name of a Berber Muslim dynasty that ruled Morocco, Muslim Spain and parts of what is today Algeria and Mauritania in the 11th-12th centuries, known in the West as the Almoravids.
And I’m home in DC this week, Ed
Subject: FYI

To: anyone who

Subject: Bouteflika's Back

He’s back. After almost five months out of the public eye, first in a Paris hospital and then at home in Algiers recuperating, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika shuffled some high profile posts in his cabinet on 11 September 2013, thereby signaling that anyone who had counted him out has severely underestimated his endurance. Beyond that, though, the shuffle’s implications are less than certain.

Of note, Tayeb Belaiz replaced Daho Ould Kabila as Interior Minister. Army Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaid Salah replaced Abdelmalek Guenaizia as Deputy Defense Minister (but also significantly retained his post as Chief of Staff.) And Mourad Medelci was replaced by Ramtane Lamamra as Foreign Minister.

There will no doubt be ample speculation about what the cabinet shuffle means: that Bouteflika was acting up his illness in order to lure out his detractors, that Bouteflika sacked those who proved less loyal during his absence, or that the fact that the cabinet shuffle went ahead is proof that the head of military intelligence (DRS) is well and truly sick.

But the shuffle defies easy interpretation. Although some of Bouteflika’s allies were promoted, others were dismissed. And still others remained in their positions. In particular, Bouteflika ended up dismissing his staunch allies Ould Kabila, Guenaizia, and Medelci. Although he did manage to promote close allies Belaiz and Gaid-Salah to Interior and Defense, Foreign Affairs has gone to a technocratic diplomat. Equally important, the technocratic Youcef Yousfi retained his post as Minister of Energy and Mines. Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal hung in too, but there was really no alternative to him at this juncture. At the end of the day, high-level Algerian politics are about consensus and negotiation, rather than outright confrontation. The cabinet shuffle fits this pattern. Final tally for Bouteflika: some victories, some losses, some ties.

It is hard to discern what precipitated the shifts. It has long been recognized that Bouteflika has been battling with his antagonists over the future division of power and influence in Algeria. The struggle has mostly been glimpsed like a shadow play, with puppets moving behind a scrim and only vague suggestions of their confrontations’ actual damage and implications. At times, the fighting claims victims, but because the sides are so equally matched, it has largely been a stalemate and the few victims are usually marginal.

At risk of mixing analogies, what has transpired since Bouteflika’s hospitalization in April has been akin to the late stages of a drawn-out chess match, with Bouteflika and his antagonists chasing each other’s pieces around the board, sometimes opportunistically snatching a pawn here, sometimes losing a rook or knight there, but neither side has enough pieces left to craft a series of moves that would checkmate the other. Making matters worse, most of the remaining pieces aren’t black or white. They’re grey.

In fact, the cabinet shuffle has only two definitive immediate implications. First, Bouteflika is not done yet. To what end, it is not entirely clear. Is he laying the groundwork to run again in 2014? Will he revive his constitutional amendment proposal to change his current term from five years to seven years and thereby sidestep a 2014 presidential contest? Has he accepted his fate and is now simply trying to shore up his legacy and protect those dear and near to him from being persecuted and prosecuted after he is gone?

Second, the diplomatic and business communities will welcome the development because the shuffle could ease some of the uncertainty that has effected Algiers for the last five months. On the diplomatic front, at the very least Algeria’s partners and allies now know who they will be interacting with for the immediate future. The business community is also breathing a small sigh of relief. Although business largely proceeded apace even during Bouteflika’s absence, Bouteflika’s indeterminate status hung like a heavy cloud over companies’ strategic decision-making. Even though the cabinet shuffle is far from definitive, at the very least, companies now have a data point that is less than five months old upon which to base their decisions about how to proceed in Algeria.

There are also other developments which are as of yet unsubstantiated, particularly regarding transferring some functions that were historically part of the DRS’s remit to the Army. If these prove to be true, Bouteflika may well have captured his opponent’s queen and checkmate may not be too far off.

I’m off to Stockholm next week for the ISS Global Strategic Review, and then Tunis next month for the North Africa Oil and Gas Summit. I’ll be speaking about North Africa politics, security and the hydrocarbons sector at both. Hope to see some of you there.

Best, Geoff
Please see attached report on Atlantic Council’s report on “Morocco’s Role in Regional Security and Development”.

Thanks

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
MAMS Event Report
Date: October 22, 2013

1. Title: Morocco’s Role in Regional Security and Development
   Hosted by the Atlantic Council

Participants:
   Dr. J. Peter Pham: Moderator: Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council
   Christopher Leins: Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Department of Defense

2. Overview

This event, the fourth in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors that include recommendations for US policy actions in support of Morocco, began with a brief review of the topics presented in the draft paper which had been circulated in advance of the event. Dr. Pham gave an overview of Morocco’s role in regional security and the merits of their counterterrorism strategy, while highlighting opportunities and recommendations for changes in US policy. The group discussion focused on Morocco’s growing role as a regional leader in regional security, and how their economic influence has increased their regional potentially global security influence. The group also evaluated and expanded the paper’s recommendations.

3. Summary

Dr. Pham began by discussing an increasing recognition of Morocco’s role in African security, which is further enhanced by Morocco’s economic and cultural ties on the continent. Despite this, he said, the US takes Morocco. A prime example of this was the “unfortunate drop-in” during the latest MINURSO renewal, which resulted in the cancellation of the bilateral US-Moroccan African Lion security exercises in the spring. In a region where government fragility is “par for the course”, he said, Morocco is stable and its interests are often aligned with those of the US. As a regional economic leader, notably in the financial sector, Morocco is expanding its networks throughout Africa, which could help pave the way for increased security cooperation.

There are lessons to be learned from Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy, which is both aggressive and comprehensive. The three main tenants are a law-and-order approach to security, a targeting of terrorists through their financial networks, and an economic development approach to marginalize the enabling causes of radicalism. Specific Moroccan programs, including religious training exchanges, as well as the security forces training in places such as Mali, are not adequately lauded or supported. The holistic approach taken by Morocco stands out in the field of counterterrorism, one with certain replicable parts. From a US policy perspective, there is great opportunity for triangulation; scaling up effective programs carried out by a leader in regional security of increasing geopolitical ‘heft’.

One main stumbling block to Morocco’s growing role in regional security is the Western Sahara. The dispute is no longer ‘frozen,’ Dr. Pham said. The legally dubious inclusion of the Western Sahara - officially recognized by only nine member countries in the African Union (AU) effectively holds the other members hostage. At present, there is no defined mechanism for the removal of an AU member, so the issue would have to be resolved by other means. Until this happens, the regionalization of security cooperation is more...
piecemeal and difficult to scale-up, facilitating an environment that has proven to be ideal for global terrorist networks.

Group discussion began with the assertion that current US policy does not do enough to encourage regional economic integration in Africa. The US should insist on a regional dimension to programs and investments, it was recommended. US aid should follow this guideline, focusing on initiatives such as the Trans-African Highway Network. Good security cooperation is based on good economic cooperation, one participant said.

The US should also support Moroccan efforts towards security regionalization, supporting existing programs and forums that Morocco has led. US Military efforts, including the African Lion exercises, have gradually aimed to become more regional, though the process is a slow one. Joint military exercises can pay real dividends, in terms of both training and relations. It’s hard to underestimate how the US-Morocco relationship improved after 1999, one participant said, when both US and UN exercises were performed with Morocco.

More regional-based security efforts are inhibited in part because, it was said, “Algeria gets in the way of everything”. The US is somewhat of an enabler to Algerian intransigence, it was suggested, by not calling them to account for misdeeds in Libya and Mali, and by not making the improvement of Moroccan-Algerian relations a diplomatic priority. The US can help by supporting programs that already exist “below the political noise level” as a foundation for improving Moroccan-Algerian relations. Again, economics can be a strong facilitator of improved relations. The US can leverage its free trade agreement with Morocco by supporting value-added chains that encourage cross-border economic activity. The North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) could also be retooled to support better relations across North Africa.

Morocco is expanding ties not only throughout Africa, but also across the Atlantic basin into South America. This not only carries economic implications but also potential US policy opportunities. Just as Morocco’s influence in Africa can be leveraged into high-impact policy outcomes, the same could potentially done as Morocco becomes a leader in the broader South-South context. Triangulation and the scaling-up of Moroccan initiatives are excellent ways to have low-input, high-impact policy outcomes, and their scope could potentially increase as the Moroccan economic influence expands globally. US policy should further emphasize its strategic partnership with Morocco with a focus on triangulation in order to achieve shared goals.

4. Observations

This event was attended by more than 20 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received, as the commentary indicated, and the Atlantic Council will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of and expanding Morocco’s leadership efforts in regional security.
Very good article on Morocco’s oil success story, announcing the farm-in by Kosmos with British company Cairn regarding the offshore Sahara. Combined with the Kosmos-BP announcement last week for Agadir, this points to a very positive story for Moroccan oil development. Kudos to Amina and her team for successfully bringing in such huge companies to Morocco, including the Sahara. She has created a very good image for her country with the major oil companies. Ed

OilPrice.com

Mon, 28 October 2013

North African Downfall Spells Success for Morocco

By Daniel J. Graeber

Libyan efforts to get its oil sector back to pre-war levels were stymied last weekend when protests disrupted operations in the west of the country. Work was halted at the El Sharara oilfield, which interrupted activity at the western port of Zawiya. That complicates an already fragile situation lingering in the east of the country. Meanwhile, U.S. supermajor Marathon tried, unsuccessfully, to pull out of the country amid the ongoing turmoil. Further west, however, sits Morocco, where Marathon's rivals are eagerly laying the groundwork for what could be a major oil and gas bonanza.

Companies operating in the once-mighty Libya are reviewing their commitments more than two years after former leader Moammar Gadhafi died after falling into rebel hands. Two short weeks ago, the bulls were running through the streets of Tripoli on word oil production in the war-torn country was on the rebound. Last week, however, the government moved to thwart Marathon's efforts to leave a country still wandering aimlessly through the post civil-war era. Mid-October enthusiasm ensued when oil production moved close to 700,000 barrels per day, though that was roughly half of its pre-civil war level.

Libya has struggled to deal with protesters demanding the centers of oil power move east to Benghazi, home of the revolution that ultimately brought an end to the Gadhafi era. That struggle started a new epoch where oil may be seen as one of Libya's key weaknesses. Now, demonstrations in the west of the country have halted production at oil fields and export terminals, pushing exports down to 250,000 bpd. The "institutional vacuum" in Libya prompted economists from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to warn the region was in serious economic trouble.
Enter Morocco: Cairn Energy is the latest company to sweep deeper into the country, announcing Monday it farmed into frontier exploration acreage in a deal with regional explorer Kosmos Energy and the Moroccan National Oil Co. Cairn said it would help finance surveys offshore, where it plans to start drilling by the middle of next year. The company added it started drilling an exploration well offshore in a play where it already serves as the operator. Meanwhile, Gulfsands Petroleum, once a standout in the Syrian market, announced it started drilling into its concessions in Morocco. Gulfsands' CEO Mahdi Sajjad said the company plans to announce its results as early as November.

Morocco is considered frontier territory. Exploration activity offshore, however, is bustling along at twice the pace as it was during the past decade. Onshore, the U.S. Energy Department's Energy Information Administration estimates Morocco may hold 20 trillion cubic feet in recoverable shale oil and natural gas reserves. Wary of political instability and terrorism further east, investors may be looking for a safe port in the West African nation, which was isolated from much of the Arab Spring. Nearby Ghana is already capitalizing on the success from its 600 million barrel Jubilee field. If Morocco can duplicate that victory, and keep its political house in order, it could take over where Libya once reigned.

By. Daniel J. Graeber of Oilprice.com
FYI - MACP today issued the attached press release to PR Newswire and key US media, citing a new report that provides a detailed chronology of documented incidents and expert reports confirming Polisario-member involvement in illicit activities - including terrorism and trafficking - in the Sahara/Sahel region from 2005 to 2013. The report, "Security in the Sahara and Sahel: The growing threat posed by the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf"


" is available as a PDF file at:


FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE I HAVE ALSO REPRINTED THE MACP REPORT REFERRED TO IN THE PRESS RELEASE BELOW, SO YOU CAN SEE IT EASILY WITHOUT GOING ON LINE

*This story is also posted at Morocco On The Move at:

*For more on the topic, check out MOTM's new page on "The Truth About The Polisario," where you can find additional fact sheets and reports:
http://moroccoonthemove.com/policy/the-truth-about-the-polisario/#sthash.7DX2jNbT.dpbs
<http://moroccoonthemove.com/policy/the-truth-about-the-polisario/#sthash7DX2jNbT.dpbs>

Chronology

Moroccan American Center for Policy

The Truth about the Polisario October 2013

Documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region.

May 28, 2013

Washington Post's Jennifer Rubin interviewed N. Africa expert Anouar Boukhars, who cited the UN Secretary General's warning about terrorist reach into the Polisario-run camps in Algeria. "This is the first time that the
UN chief acknowledged what many experts have been describing for years now as a 'ticking time bomb'...Even the Polisario have not ruled out terrorist infiltrations. "Rubin wrote: "In a region awash with weapons, human and drug trafficking, and political unrest, al-Qaeda's local affiliates, especially AQIM, are flourishing. Throw into the mix the violent separatist Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the Western Sahara while maintaining squalid refugee camps in Algeria, and you have a breeding ground for new generations of terrorists."17


Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who led the Jan. 16, 2013 attack at In Amenas in Algeria, joined Mali-based al-Qaeda splinter group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) for two attacks in Niger that killed 20 people at a military base and uranium-mine site supplying France's nuclear power plants.18 MUJWA spokesman Abu Walid Sahraoui, identified as a former Polisario Front member by LeMonde,19 said the attacks targeted "the enemies of Islam in Niger... We attacked France, and Niger because of its co-operation with France, in the war against Sharia."

May 22, 2013

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace releases a new book, Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahel, edited by N. Africa experts Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars. The book cites increasing inroads by AQIM and allies in terrorism and trafficking across the Sahara/Sahel region, including Libya, Mali, Mauritania, and Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria. In a chapter on W. Sahara, Boukhars writes the unresolved conflict has "negatively impacted trans-Saharan security. The undergoverned areas abutting the W. Sahara, especially N. Mauritania and the Polisario-administered camps in SW Algeria, are becoming major hubs for drug trafficking, the smuggling of contraband, and the circulation of weapons." Boukhars further notes, "There is growing evidence to suggest dangerous connections between criminal organizations, AQIM, and the Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf."20
April 16, 2013

AFP reports that jihadists fleeing French and African forces are trying to seek refuge and reorganize in Mali and neighboring countries, including Algerian camps of the Polisario Front. According to an African soldier quoted by AFP, MUJWA members had fled to the Algerian camps of the Polisario. The source further noted, "Recently, when the highest UN authorities have expressed their concern and called for urgent settlement of the Western Sahara problem, it is because of the risk of terrorists turning the refugee camps into a new home for jihadists."21

April 9, 2013

UN leader Ban Ki-Moon calls for urgent international efforts to end the Western Sahara conflict because of fears the Mali war will spill over into the territory. In a report to the Security Council, Ban argued, "The rise of instability and insecurity in and around the Sahel requires an urgent settlement of this long-standing dispute." The report added, "All governments consulted raised serious concerns over the risk that the fighting in Mali could spill over into neighboring countries and contribute to radicalizing the Western Saharan refugee camps," with one government leader in the region calling the Western Sahara camps "a ticking time bomb," according to the report.22

This information has been produced by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP).
www.moroccoonthemove.com

MACP is a registered agent of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C. 4

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iOnupKvBuc8I_WTR3J5BnNCFnmEw?docId=CNG.566cbe22180951c72bc8d9c6ad66fd9d1.d1>


March 16, 2013

The Foreign Minister of Mali, Tieman Coulibaly, confirms that Polisario fighters were among the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups in his country. "Polisario elements from the Tindouf camps have been identified with MUJAO fighters operating in northern Mali," Coulibaly said, adding that Polisario militia members had been recruited to fight as mercenaries and paid monthly "salaries ranging from 200 to 600 Euros." 23

March 1, 2013

Le Figaro reports that a fighter from the Polisario was among seven militants taken prisoner after a fierce battle between French/Chadian forces and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali. The battle in the mountains of northern Mali reportedly killed key al-Qaeda leader Abou Zeid and 42 other jihadists. 24

February 27, 2013

The Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies publishes a new report on terrorism, "Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications," which notes that al-Qaeda has "established links with Latin cartels for 'drugs-for-arms' smuggling into Europe with terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario Front." The report recommends that the international community take a "closer look at the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria: in order to reduce the flow of recruits to terrorist and criminal groups." 25

February 4, 2013

Malian foreign minister Tiéman Coulibaly confirms the presence of Polisario fighters among terrorist groups in Mali. In an AtlasInfo interview he notes, "In the beginning, they were only 500 insurgents. Now they are between 5,500 to 7,000 terrorists in N. Mali who were joined by lost youths, including young Sahrawis from the camps." 26

January 29, 2013

Al-Arabiya reports that 300 fighters from the Polisario are fighting as part of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Northern Mali. 27

December 2012

A CNA Strategic Studies' report, "Security Challenges in Libya and the Sahel," warns "there is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, as well as indications that Sahrawi from the camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali." The report stresses that this development poses "immediate concerns for the security of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria." 28
Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin notes that jihadists have been flooding into Mali, arguing that "AQIM is on the rise throughout the Maghreb, opportunistically teaming up with other groups (like the violent, separatist Polisario) and setting up shop wherever the central government is in disarray."29

October 28, 2012

Jeune Afrique publishes an article, "Mali: Polisario connection" on reports that recruits from the Polisario-run camps and Sahel have joined jihadists in N. Mali. It cites French intelligence reports that groups of 40-60 men, up to 300 volunteers, arrived in Timbuktu and Gao in October, "many of whom express themselves in Hassaniya, the Arabic dialect used by Moors and Sahrawis." Jeune Afrique says Sahrawis with military training in the Polisario camps have been implicated in other terrorist incidents and notes neither the Polisario nor Algerians have been able to stop the "Salafist virus" in the Tindouf camps, and have been even less able to prevent "desperados" leaving the camps to join jihadist movements. While Algerian and Polisario security now police together, the extremist appeal remains strong and "no roadblock, no patrol, no minefield will prevent [them] from taking the path to Timbuktu." 30


October 22, 2012

Agence France Presse reports that hundreds of jihadist fighters have poured into Mali to support the Islamists of AQIM and MUJAO that have controlled the northern part of the country for seven months. Quoting a Malian security official, the article notes, "in the Timbuktu region and around Gao, hundreds of jihadists, mostly Sudanese and Sahrawi, have arrived as reinforcements to face an offensive by Malian forces and their allies." The article also cites one of MUJAO's top leaders, Habib Ould Issouf, who said that recruits were coming from the camps of Tindouf Algeria, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and elsewhere.31

Jeune Afrique publishes an editorial citing reports by European/Maghreb intelligences sources that hundreds of recruits are joining al-Qaeda-linked extremist groups in northern Mali from the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria and from across the region. The editorial argues that young Sahrawis have increasingly joined AQIM and MUJAO because of their lack of hope for a future - "trained in weapons, indoctrinated by Salafist imams who openly advocate in the camps for the creation of an Islamic State in the Western Sahara, these fighters are welcomed with open arms by their Algerian brothers."32

September 2012

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes a report written by Wolfram Lacher, "Organized Crime in the Sahara-Sahel region" examining the growing impact of organized crime in the region and the involvement of both state and militant groups in such crime. Lacher implicates Sahrawi networks with close ties to the Polisario in the drug and aid trafficking that accounts for much of the organized crime in the region: "In the triangle between Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria, Sahrawi networks-often with the direct involvement of officials in the Polisario movement, which seeks independence for Western Sahara-trade subsidized Algerian goods and humanitarian aid southward and cigarettes northward to Algeria and Morocco." Lacher further notes, "In some cases, Sahrawi cannabis resin smugglers with close ties to the Polisario have been known to take cocaine to Morocco on their way back from Mali."33

August 9, 2012

Jeune Afrique reports dozens of youth from the refugee camps near Tindouf have joined MUJAO, the AQIM splinter group whose current spokesman, Abou Walid Saharoui, is a former member of the Polisario Front. 34

July 28, 2012

Spain evacuates all its aid workers, as well as three other foreign nationals, from camps in Tindouf, Algeria, citing "well-founded evidence of a serious increase in insecurity in the region" and "serious risks of new kidnappings."35 6


36 "Mali Islamists rebels say $18.4 million ransom paid, prisoners released to free 3 European." Associated Press, July 20, 2012,


40 Pham, J. Peter. "J. Peter Pham Discusses Western Sahara at Council on Foreign Relations - 'The Western Sahara Crisis: Why U.S. Leadership is Needed Now'." Atlantic Council, April 3, 2012,


July 20, 2012

The three Spanish aid workers kidnapped from a refugee camp near Tindouf, Algeria in October 2011 and held in northern Mali are released, allegedly for an $18.4 million ransom.36

June 27, 2012

Soufan Group issues an intelligence brief warning of fallout of the Libya conflict and unintended benefits for AQIM: "buoyed by the flow of arms and fighters out of Libya, the group initiated skirmishes with government forces in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger during the last months of 2011." It notes, "More ominously, AQIM also increased its linkages with other rebel forces in the Sahel, including the Polisario Front... In late October, three aid workers-Italian & 2 Spaniards-were seized by AQIM militants (aided by Sahrawi sympathizers) inside a camp administered by the Polisario separatists near the Algerian town of Tindouf. The connection was not surprising given that the large numbers of idle young Polisario fighters with no prospects present the terrorist group with a ready pool of potential recruits, both for its military operations as well as the drug smuggling and other criminal activities." 37

April 6, 2012

Malian separatists declare independence in N. Mali in what experts fear may be a "rogue state" in the Sahara.38 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad is backed by militant Islamic group Ansar Dine, AQIM, and AQIM splinter, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, in seizing Gao & Timbuktu, creating "a security nightmare." Experts warn that along with AQIM, "the Polisario will gain more power" from the crisis in Mali.39 Africa expert Dr. J. Peter Pham cites the importance of resolving the W. Sahara. "It is like before 9/11, when we might have asked ourselves: 'Who cares about Afghanistan?' But jihadists ultimately need a place to operate and what we are now seeing is the creation of a safe haven for terrorists and extremists who are being squeezed out elsewhere."40

March 12, 2012

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes a paper citing the "disturbing reality" that rising numbers of disenchanted Polisario youth and fighters are recruited by AQIM and a "vast network" of traffickers. The paper, by Anouar Boukhars, cites the Oct. 23 kidnapping of Western aid workers in the Polisario camps as confirmation that "deteriorating social & political conditions in the camps in Tindouf
represent a tinderbox waiting to explode." It also notes that AQIM-Polisario member links pose "a major security threat to the Maghreb and the Sahel."41

February 21, 2012

Experts testify to UN Security Council that drug cartels and smugglers now traffic almost $1 billion in cocaine a year from Latin America into Africa's Sahel, and traffickers are forming alliances with AQIM and other militants, in a region flooded by Libyan weapons. Sec. General Ban Ki-moon warns leaders: "inaction could be catastrophic."42

February 2, 2012

ICTS releases a study reporting the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria have become "a recruiting ground for terrorists, traffickers, and other criminal enterprises," recommending Western refugee aid "prioritize permanent resettlement." Noting expanding AQIM ties to Polisario members, S. American cartels, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and Libyan weapons, the study cites a 500% rise in terrorism in the region since 9/11. It argues AQIM seeks to extend an "arc of instability" across Africa to exploit Arab Spring turbulence and destabilize the region. 43 7

January 11, 2012

Algerian and Mauritanian security agencies reportedly break up major trafficking and money laundering rings. Officials say the rings are believed linked with groups such as al-Qaeda, which is working with the Polisario to traffic arms and drugs from Mauritania to northern neighbors. Mali reportedly steps up efforts against AQIM and what is believed its latest offshoot, "Al Qaida in Polisario Camps." 44


49 Ibid

50 "'Al-Qaeda splinter group' claims kidnap of Westerners." Agence France Presse, December 10, 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hJQYCSJBL5a0NCGjPMlyCS8SryfQ?docId=CNG.4df034a80725d0c44da18538105d6420.dd1>.
January 3, 2012

Security expert Dr. J. Peter Pham, Atlantic Council, reports that economic and political reforms in Africa are "threatened by the spread of violent extremism" and "increasing links" between AQIM and other militants in the Sahel, recently "buoyed by the flow of arms and fighters" from Libya. "More ominously, AQIM has increased its linkages with the Polisario," evident in AQIM's October 23 kidnappings near Tindouf, which were "aided by Polisario sympathizers" inside the Polisario's camps. The camps offer "a ready pool of potential recruits" from "large numbers of idle young fighters." 45

December 27, 2011

Mali reportedly distances itself from the Polisario, accusing it of kidnapping, drug trafficking, and suspected collusion with a Sahrawi branch of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. A source close to the government says Mali is "angry" with the Polisario, and Malian officials say the October 23 kidnapping was done in collusion with the 'Sahrawi link' of AQIM. 46

December 24, 2011

Mali refuses entry to "eight young Sahrawis" coming from Niger. "They had no papers. There are laws to be respected in Mali especially when it comes to dubious propaganda," said Malian police. 47

December 17, 2011

Mali warns the Polisario, "our country is not the Wild West where they can come to kill and kidnap people." Bamako will "no longer accept the violation of its territorial integrity by the Polisario Front," says a Malian Minister. A local official adds, "everybody here knows who AQIM's accomplices are, they even assisted in abducting the Europeans in Tindouf. His name is Omar al Sahraoui, but neither Mali, nor Algeria, nor the Polisario are doing anything to capture him." In 2010, al Sahraoui, reportedly a Polisario veteran, was sentenced to 12 years for kidnapping Spanish aid workers for AQIM, according to Mauritanian court papers. He was later released in a trade for the aid workers. 48

December 15, 2011

Members of the Polisario launch an armed incursion into northern Mali, killing one and abducting three others, ostensibly looking for the kidnappers of three Western aid workers taken October 23 from the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf, Algeria. 49

December 10, 2011

A splinter group of AQIM confirms it is holding three aid workers kidnapped October 23 near the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. The group, linked by some to al Sahraoui, calls itself "Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa." 50

November 30, 2011
The US House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism & Intelligence hears testimony that AQIM is expanding its ties in the Sahel with the Polisario, as well as militant Nigerian group Boko Haram and Somalia-based al-Shabaab.

November 28, 2011

UK Foreign Secretary William Hague says AQIM's expanding terrorist ties to other militant groups in the Sahel could have a "profoundly destabilizing" effect on a region already rocked by the Arab Spring.


56 Kidnappers of three European aid workers benefited from polisario security apparatus' support: Spanish paper says." Morocco World News, October 26, 2011,


58 "Three Qaeda hostages seized last week alive: mediator." Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gfsKPTigBS_lQzBQK_R-Fdj-zOA?docId=CNG.fb5674e8c48dbb7ef3f59c256d4c3f07.531>.


November 24, 2011

AQIM kidnaps two French tourists from their hotel at night in eastern Mali, claiming they are spies. Officials later report that the abductions were coordinated with the Polisario.53

November 7, 2011

Algerian Chief of Staff General Qaid Saleh reportedly reprimands Polisario chief Mohammed Abdul Aziz for allowing an al-Qaeda presence inside the Polisario-controlled camps in Tindouf.54

November 6, 2011

Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin cites alarm at AQIM kidnappings in the Polisario camps. "This is a catastrophe waiting to happen. The need to empty the camps, deprive AQIM of a supply of victims and accomplices, and restore order has never been greater."55

October 26, 2011

Spanish daily El Pais reports on the Tindouf abductions, noting that, "to cross the checkpoints of the Algerian army and Polisario, kidnappers benefited from support of Polisario's military."56

October 25, 2011

Spain requests a UN security mission to the Polisario-run camps. "We've asked the UN to send a mission to Algeria to assess the security situation in the camps of Tindouf" - Foreign Minister Trinidad Jimenez.57

October 23, 2011

An AQIM splinter group kidnaps three Western aid workers from the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, reportedly with Polisario-insider help. "Unarmed AQIM militants entered the Sahrawi refugee camp in Tindouf, western Algeria, where sympathizers of the Polisario Front gave them weapons and helped them seek out the hostages."58

September 29, 2011

Mauritanian President reports that AQIM has acquired Libyan arms, including surface-to-air missiles. 59

September 20, 2011

US terrorism expert Yonah Alexander, International Center for Terrorism Studies, says the "Polisario is intensifying activities to transport and smuggle illegal drugs in both North Africa and Europe. The Polisario is working with Al Qaida in both the drug and weapons trade."60
Malian security forces hunt for rival gangs of drug smugglers from Mali, Niger, and the Polisario, after a desert gun battle over ton of cocaine and hashish leaves four dead, according to a Malian army official.61


Analysts say that Libyan dictator Qaddafi's fall seriously weakens the Polisario in its dispute with Morocco on the Western Sahara, after widespread reports that Polisario mercenaries sided with Qaddafi. 62


65 Couglin, Con. "Libya: Col Gaddafi 'has spent £2.1m on mercenaries'." The Telegraph, April 21, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8464254/Libya-Col-Gaddafi-has-spent-2.1m-on-mercenaries.html>.


70 "Key members of Sahara drug ring captured are from Polisario." Middle East Online, December 21, 2010, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=43149>.

September 15, 2011

Analysts say that Libyan dictator Qaddafi’s fall seriously weakens the Polisario in its dispute with Morocco on the Western Sahara, after widespread reports that Polisario mercenaries sided with Qaddafi. 62
May 29, 2011

US Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart urges colleagues in Congress to give "serious attention" to evidence that Polisario members are "participating as mercenaries in Colonel Qaddafi's murderous campaign."63

May 20, 2011

The US Administration expresses concern to Algeria that "credible sources report" that Polisario mercenaries are being paid by Qaddafi "to fight NATO-led forces and kill Libyan protesters and rebels."64

April 21, 2011

The London Telegraph reports that senior NATO officials have received information that Col. Qaddafi is hiring 450 Polisario mercenaries for $10,000 each to fight Libyan rebels and prop up his regime.65

January 16, 2011

Former Polisario Chief Police Inspector, Mustapha Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud says "the situation is grave for the youth who are marginalized" in Polisario-run camps in Algeria. "The camps are fertile grounds for Islamic fundamentalist groups and drug traffickers."66

January 6, 2011

Terrorism cell and arms cache broken up in W. Sahara suggest "links between AQIM and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front."67 Washington Post columnist J. Rubin writes, "there is ample evidence the Polisario Front... is in league with al-Qaeda."68

January 3, 2010

US DEA former Director of Operations, Michael Braun, calls conditions 'dismal for Saharans living in the Polisario-run camps,' which have become a "breeding-ground for potential future AQIM recruits." 69

December 21, 2010

Leaders arrested in one of the Sahel's largest drug-smuggling rings are purported to have close ties to the Polisario Front. Nigerien officials call it, "one of the major drug trafficking networks" in the Sahara. It is known as "Polisario" because 90% of its members come from camps of the Polisario Front.70 10

December 9, 2010

Experts cite growing concern about violence instigated by pro-Polisario militants in Laayoune, W. Sahara. "Situation is becoming more dangerous, because of the violence and because al-Qaeda is now present." - Analyst T. Tarik.71


Three Qaeda hostages seized last week alive: mediator. Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011, [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gfsKPTlgBS_lQzBQK_R-Fdj-_z0A?docId=CNG.fb5674e8c48dbb7ef3f59c256d4c3f07.531].


Three Qaeda hostages seized last week alive: mediator. Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011, [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gfsKPTlgBS_lQzBQK_R-Fdj-_z0A?docId=CNG.fb5674e8c48dbb7ef3f59c256d4c3f07.531].


Al-Qaeda 'behind' Mauritania raid. BBC, June 6, 2005, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afrika/4613107.stm].

Algeria reports "Cocaine that comes from Brazil, Peru, and Colombia supports the nucleus of al-Qaeda in the region" - Algerian head of the National Office for Combating Drugs & Addiction, Abdelmalek Sayeh.

November 10, 2010

October 18, 2010
Drug ring linked to AQIM is dismantled in Morocco. VOA cites experts, evidence from Mauritania, Mali indicating AQIM has worked in the last two years "to recruit Sahrawis who are trained fighters to carry out their operations."  

August 23, 2010

AQIM frees three Spanish kidnapping victims after Mauritania agrees to release the perpetrator, Omar Sahraoui, who is "believed to have been a senior commander of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara."  

July 2010

Mauritania sentences reported Polisario veteran, Omar al Sahraoui, to 12 years for the 2009 kidnapping of Spanish aid workers. Mauritanian court papers document that he was paid by AQIM along with at least three other Polisario veterans to organize and carry out the crime.  

April 12, 2010

Security expert calls the Western Sahara conflict a "vicious cycle" that terrorists can exploit; cites "evidence that members of the military arm of the Polisario Front have been involved in illicit activities."  

February 2010

Polisario veteran Omar le Sahraoui arrested in Mali, extradited to Mauritania for kidnapping Spanish aid workers.  

December 30, 2009

Armed assailants from AQIM katibat Tarek Ibn Zaid attacked Telemeses, Niger, killing one civilian and three soldiers. The Tarek Ibn Zaid katibat is largely comprised of Sahrawis.  

November 29, 2009

AQIM claims responsibility for kidnapping three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania. Mauritanian security services later discover that AQIM had hired Omar al Sahraoui-who was reportedly a member of the Polisario's hierarchy-and at least three other Polisario veterans to organize and carry out the abductions.  

June 4, 2005

Two GSPC katibas, including the katiba Tarek Ibn Ziad, comprised primarily of Sahrawis, attack an army base in Lembgeity, Mauritania, killed 15 Mauritanian soldiers and injuring 17.  

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.  
President and CEO  
The Gabriel Company, LLC  
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411  
Washington DC, 20005  
Phone: +1 202.887.1113  
Fax: +1 202.887.1115  
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

CONTACT:
Garth Neuffer
202.470.2055
gneuffer@moroccanamericancenter.com

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Tuesday, October 29, 2013
Dear Ambassador,

We are pleased to announce that the Fall 2013 issue of *The Ambassadors REVIEW* will be released on November 12, 2013. All members will receive their copies in the mail.

Also, please note that all articles from the journal will be posted on the [Council’s website](http://thegabrielco.com) following the Council’s Fall conference.

Articles in the Fall issue deal with a variety of timely subjects, including:

**India:** Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer discusses the strategic relationship between the United States and India.

**Syria:** Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel argues that the United States has a strategic and humanitarian interest in Syria.

**Mexico:** Ambassador Antonio O. Garza, Jr. discusses Mexico’s growing energy sector.

**Africa:** Ambassador David Bruce Wharton reflects on Zimbabwe’s failed presidential elections. Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman discusses developments in South Sudan.

**EU-US Trade:** His Excellency João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United States, discusses current Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations between the United States and the European Union.

**National Security:** Acting Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller explains how the State Department contributes to national security through the work of the “T Family” Bureaus.
The complete table of contents from the Fall 2013 issue follows.

Best regards,
Stephanie

***

The United States and India: A Vital Strategic Partnership by Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer

The United States Has a Strategic and Humanitarian Interest in Syria by Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel

Zimbabwe’s 2013 Elections: Opportunity Lost by Ambassador David Bruce Wharton

The United States and South Sudan: A Relationship Under Pressure by Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman

EU-US Trade Deal to Strengthen the Transatlantic Relationship by Ambassador João Vale de Almeida

Latvia: Out of the Crisis, Coming into its Own by Ambassador Mark A. Pekala

Council of American Ambassadors’ 30th Anniversary: Honoring our Founders’ Legacy by Ambassador Abelardo L. Valdez

National Security and the State Department “T Bureaus” by Acting Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller

Creating Change in a Changing World: Building a DARPA for Democracy by Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State Tomicah Tillemann


The United States and the Caribbean Community: Building on Forty Years of Partnership by Ambassador D. Brent Hardt

The Liberation of Rome, 1944: Did Hitler Know? by Ambassador Thomas Patrick Melady

Stephanie Harley
International Program Associate
Council of American Ambassadors
888 17th Street, NW
Suite 306
Washington, DC 20006-3312
Phone: 202.296.3757
Fax: 202.296.0926
Email: ipa@americanambassadors.org
Attached is a letter to President Obama from all 9 living US Ambassadors to Morocco, delivered electronically directly to the Chief of Staff to President Obama, the Deputy National Security Adviser, and Assistant Secretary for the NEA. Please make sure we get maximum press coverage. Thanks Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

Ambassador Beth Jones – assistant is Sandy Grigola, grigolast2@state.gov

Attaching the PDF again. Use this version.

Thank you!

Yes, Mike should email PDFs to the following three addresses. Mike do not pass these contacts on please:
McDonough, Denis: Denis_R_McDonough@who.eop.gov
Tony Blinken: Blinken, Anthony: Antony_J_Blinken@who.eop.gov
Plus the assistant to the A/S for NEA. Kristen will supply that one. Ed
Not in that WH.....No messengers work with copies for NSC etc.?

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Kristen Kouttab  
To: Michael Ussery ; Edward Gabriel  
Cc: Jordan Paul  
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2013 12:13 PM  
Subject: RE: Former Ambassadors Letter PDF  

With edits.

I called the WH. They say that they no longer have a fax machine and that we should send it by regular mail. Do either of you have a personal contact inside the WH that could handle this for us?

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Michael Ussery  
To: Kristen Kouttab ; Edward Gabriel  
Cc:  
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2013 11:46 AM  
Subject: Re: Former Ambassadors Letter PDF  

I am not a good proof-reader and someone else with fresh eyes should do that, but looks good to me if the date, address heading and Dear Mr. President are spaced right. Mike

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Kristen Kouttab  
To: Edward Gabriel ; Ambassador Michael Ussery (meussery@earthlink.net)  
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2013 11:35 AM  
Subject: Former Ambassadors Letter PDF  

Please see the attached PDF and let me know if there's anything further that needs to be done.

Thank you.
November 18, 2013

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As former US Ambassadors to Morocco who have served over the past 32 years, appointed by five Presidents, we want to express our support and encouragement for your invitation to His Majesty, King Mohammed VI of Morocco, to come to Washington for an official meeting on November 22\textsuperscript{nd}. We hope that this meeting will strengthen our strategic partnership with a country in the MENA region that genuinely shares our values and vision for the region’s future.

For too long, Morocco has often been overlooked by US policy makers because it is not a “problem country.” There have been missed opportunities to help Morocco as a country in finding solutions for the region. We urge you to seize this opportunity, especially in these times of tumult and instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel.

Morocco has been steadfast in its alliance with the US, and now is the time to support Morocco’s efforts to achieve our shared goals for the region. Despite instability in the region, King Mohammed VI has demonstrated a continuing commitment to guiding the country in the meaningful growth of democratic practice and the rule of law. Morocco weathered the chaos of the Arab Spring by further advancing its own reforms and making significant progress on human rights.

Morocco continues to hold firm on its own reformist path, and needs US political and resource assistance to consolidate its own reformist agenda and contribute to stabilizing the threatening situations in North Africa. That help should begin with US efforts to support Morocco’s common sense and legitimate effort to resolve the problem in Western Sahara by granting the territory broad autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. It is time for the US to make clear in the UN Security Council and elsewhere that this is the only realistic way to resolve this issue so that the international community can move on to more urgently needed solutions to the more pressing problems in the region. It is also a crucial time for the US to assist Morocco with the implementation of its ambitious regionalization plan, which devolves substantial political power to democratically elected local officials and implements programs that will make it a model for others in the region.

It was 50 years ago that His Majesty’s father, King Hassan II, visited President Kennedy and stated, “My people are hopeful, also, that this visit will prove to be a means for further understanding and closer relations between them and the people of the United States. And that it may usher in a new era of stronger ties, in the field of true and honest and unselfish cooperation in their mutual interests, as well as in the interest of the cause of freedom, peace, and human dignity throughout the world.”

__________________
These words ring so true today and echo the words of George Washington, in a December 1, 1789 letter to King Mohammed VI’s ancestor, Sultan Mohammed III, when he wrote to the King, “We flatter ourselves that one day we will be useful to our friends.”

The moment is right for you, Mr. President, to clearly declare the importance of the strategic relationship with Morocco and to partner with it on its path towards economic, democratic, political, and human rights reforms.

Sincerely,

Samuel L. Kaplan
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Thomas Riley
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Margaret D. Tutwiler
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Edward M. Gabriel
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Marc Ginsburg
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Frederick Vreeland
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Michael Ussery
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Thomas Nassif
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco

Joseph Verner Reed, Jr.
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco
Good news: The Atlantic Council event is full; all new acceptances are being put on a waiting list.
Political Trends

- Following the FLN’s endorsement of Bouteflika as its champion in next spring’s presidential election, it seems that the usual machinery is being set in motion to promote the election of Bouteflika as the regime’s candidate.
- Bouteflika’s schedule remains limited to occasional photo opportunities with members of the government and a very few visiting foreign dignitaries.
- There are signs that PM Sellal and FLN leader Amar Saïdani may be engaged in a thinly disguised battle for the position of vice-presidential candidate.
- Press reports that the DRS has been instructed to cease surveillance of political parties are likely to prove incorrect.

Foreign Relations

- A large part of Algeria’s military might remains oriented towards a perceived “Moroccan threat”, limiting the forces that are available for deployment to the far more troubled eastern and southern borders.
- Foreign Minister Lamamra has begun to speak of the “liberation” of northern Mali by French forces, reflecting Algiers’ tacit, tactical alliance with France against jihadist groups in the Sahara.
- Nonetheless, fear and suspicion of the activities of “imperialist” powers on Algeria’s borders still run deep within the Algerian establishment, as evidenced by remarks made in private by Algerian officers to the leader of Tunisia’s ruling party concerning US drones operating along the Algerian-Tunisian border.

Security

- Judging by accounts in the Algerian media, political violence may have reached a historic low in November, although a news blackout may still be in effect in certain areas such as the Tunisian border.
- There have been a number of incidents along the eastern and southern borders. Some – including the alleged arrest of an AQMI liaison officer with armed groups in Tunisia’s Djebel Chaambi – seem to offer confirmation that the Algerian security forces now operate beyond the country’s borders.
- Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s right-hand man has reportedly been killed by French forces in northern Mali, and there have been unconfirmed reports that his organisation is grooming suicide bombers for operations in Algeria and Tunisia.
- A propaganda video released by AQMI’s Saharan units at the end of October shows for the first time one of its fighters wielding a SA-7 MANPADS.
- There is circumstantial evidence to suggest that while Belmokhtar’s Al-Mourabitoun is gravitating to the east (Niger, Mali and perhaps Libya), AQMI’s Saharan units may be gravitating to the west (Mauritania).

Political Trends

When President Bouteflika told his government ministers, assembled at the end of September for the first Council of Ministers meeting in nine months, to take “all necessary measures and steps to enable our country to move towards the forthcoming elections in the best possible conditions”, he effectively put an end to speculation that the constitution might be rewritten specially to extend the President’s term of office and so spare him the burden of having to run for re-election next spring. Since then, FLN General Secretary Amar Saïdani has thrown himself enthusiastically into the role of cheerleader for Bouteflika’s fourth successive term. Having, as noted in our last report, proclaimed his own belief in the President in a succession of party
opposed until it became a fait of northern Mali, which had been dominated by terrorist French have been the first to voice it so clearly, a substantive change of Watan described as a

With other endorsements during the month from the RND’s General Secretary Abdelkader Bensalah and its politburo, Abdelmadjid Sidi-Saïd of the UGTA[1] and the Coordinating Committee of Children of Independence War Martyrs (CNEC) – which went one step further, passing a resolution imploring Bouteflika to stand for re-election for a fourth term “or as President for life” – it would seem that the usual machinery is being set in motion for the re-election of Bouteflika as the regime’s candidate.

Bouteflika’s own level of activity, however, remains extremely modest. Absent from the official ceremonies marking the anniversary of the beginning of Algeria’s independence war on Nov. 1, the President was nonetheless pictured by official news agency APS receiving formal greetings for the occasion from the most senior government ministers and the speakers of both houses of parliament. There have been a handful of other photo opportunities throughout the month – the President with his young nephews, the President receiving veteran Algerian diplomat and UN envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi, audiences with the leader of Tunisia’s ruling Ennahda party Rached Ghannouchi and, towards the end of the month, the Socialist mayor of Paris Bertrand Delanoë – but there have been no further meetings of the Council of Ministers or other official engagements, and the Algerian public has still not heard the President’s voice.

It is expected that the long-awaited constitutional amendments, when finally unveiled, will include the creation of a position of Vice President, who in addition to standing ready to take over the Presidency in case of the President’s death or incapacitation might be called upon to carry out many of the day-to-day tasks of the President should Bouteflika’s condition fail to improve enough for him to resume a full schedule. Furthermore, the creation of a vice-presidential slot before the 2014 poll would allow Bouteflika to designate a running mate who, as well as being his chosen successor, would be able to take care of most of the actual election campaigning. Consequently there are some signs of a tussle for the vice-presidential nomination. Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, who had seemed like a strong contender, has over the past few weeks been subject to a campaign of denigration (centring notably on his poor mastery of classical Arabic) and of heckling and harassment during his visits to the provinces, and it is suspected that the FLN may be behind this, perhaps in order to boost Saïdani’s chances. Saïdani himself has been openly disparaging of Sellal’s political skills, dismissively suggesting that the Prime Minister should concentrate on the technicalities of running the administration rather than getting involved in political campaigning to which he is not suited. Saïdani, for his part, has been attacked in the media for speaking out of turn – and even for “attacking state institutions” – in his interview to Reuters in October, in which he predicted that the constitutional amendments would redefine the roles of the DRS and the army in such a way that the security and intelligence service “will no longer get involved in politics, including in the political parties, media and justice.”

Intriguingly, reports have now begun to appear in the Algerian media[2] claiming that the Ministry of Defence – of which, as Saïdani pointed out in his Reuters interview, the DRS is formally a department – has instructed the DRS to cease all “investigations into political parties, surveillance of rallies and public meetings and surveillance of members of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia”, handing these tasks over to the Renseignements Généraux (intelligence branch) of the police force. A source with many years experience of the operations of the DRS and the Algerian state generally argues, however, that such reports should be treated with the utmost scepticism – even suggesting that they might be a “smoke screen” deliberately generated by the DRS itself.

Foreign Relations

In an interesting, yet largely unnoticed, semantic shift, Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra referred to the “liberation of northern Mali, which had been dominated by terrorist groups” in a speech in the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott on October 24. This is a far more positive characterisation of the French military intervention in Mali – the very idea of which Algiers had opposed until it became a fait accompli – than had previously been heard from any Algerian official. But while Lamamra may have been the first to voice it so clearly, a substantive change of policy does indeed seem to have taken place. As report by a French parliamentary delegation that visited Algeria in May of this year notes:

Algeria used to refuse categorically to accept that any foreign power – especially Western – might intervene on
its southern flank. This concerned France in particular, both because of the weight of history and because of its supposed “hidden agenda”.

[However, the Algerian authorities were swift to] adapt to the new situation created by Operation Serval [granting permission for overflight by French aircraft]. They also contributed by supplying fuel to our troops and this assistance was really very valuable when our soldiers were fighting under difficult conditions near the Algerian-Malian border.

[This] quite remarkable opening towards our country, in the form of facilitating military operations against terrorist movements in Mali [would have been] unimaginable just a few weeks previously, and was probably made possible by the warming of relations between France and Algeria. [...] There are now good chances for bilateral military cooperation to get under way, and the Franco-Algerian agreement in this field, which came into force in February, if implemented with resolve, opens up promising perspectives in this important sector.

At the same time, however, the French parliamentary delegation found it “striking that the Algerian military machine, by far the largest in the region, was entirely oriented towards the Moroccan ‘threat’ and not towards the southern border”. This strategic preoccupation with Morocco – confirmed to us independently by a source close to the DRS, according to whom Algeria’s military and political leadership have thus far shied away from shifting forces away from the western borders for fear that the Moroccans might “take advantage” of their weakened vigilance – puts a serious drain on the manpower and resources of the Algerian military machine and is a potentially serious handicap as it struggles to confront the new challenges thrown up by turmoil not only in Mali but also in Tunisia and Libya.

The French parliamentarians also pick out another self-imposed weakness in Algeria’s ability to confront the challenges of its environment:

> There is no doubt that Algeria is a regional power. [...] This power, however, has no direct diplomatic expression because, in foreign policy, Algeria remains true to its founding principles dating back to the moment of its independence [including a refusal to intervene in other countries]. The defence of the founding principles of independent Algeria remains a reality today and seems to be preventing the country from developing an active and enterprising diplomacy.

This may now be changing, however, as Algeria is progressively sucked into the complex situations in Libya and Tunisia. As we have suggested in earlier reports, the ban on over-the-border military operations seems to have been ended (see also below – Security), and as it gets more and more deeply involved in combatting jihadists on the Algerian-Tunisian border, Algiers seems to be becoming increasingly involved in Tunisian politics, too. Having already travelled to Algiers for consultations with President Bouteflika and other officials in September, Rached Ghannouchi of Tunisia’s ruling Ennahda Movement and opposition leader Béji Caïd Essebsi were back in the Algerian capital for further conversations with Bouteflika et al in mid-November, as the Tunisian “national dialogue” process floundered.\[3\]

Officially, little if anything of what was discussed with the Tunisian politicians has been made public. Speaking to us after Ghannouchi’s return, however, a member of Ennahda’s Shoura Council (central committee) shed some interesting light on the exchanges, and in particular on the concerns of the Algerians:

> Rached Ghannouchi went to Algeria to attend the congress of the Algerian Ennahda Party.\[4\] While he was there he asked to meet Algerian officials, who were also keen to meet him. The Algerians, including President Bouteflika and Prime Minister Sellal, told him that Algeria supports Tunisia’s democratic process and national dialogue. During his visit, Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi also met – at his request – with Algerian officers in charge of security on the border between the two countries, in order to reassure them that Tunisia intends to cooperate fully with them in the fight against terrorism. A number of Algerian officers told him firmly that Tunisia would be well advised to avoid calling on any foreign power to assist it in settling its internal problems, including the fight against terrorism. Tunisia, they told him, should limit itself to respecting international conventions. We in Ennahda’s leadership understood this to mean that the Algerians are not happy to see drones controlled by foreigners operating from Tunisian soil just a few kilometres from their borders.

This is clearly an allusion to the UAVs recently loaned to Tunisia by the United States for use in counter-terrorism operations, which operate out of a small airport, formerly mainly used by oil companies, at El Borma in southern Tunisia, close to the border with Algeria. Notwithstanding Algiers’ tacit, tactical alliance with France in northern Mali, it would seem that there are still powerful elements within the Algerian state apparatus who remain very wary indeed of any encroachment by ‘imperialist’ powers on the country’s borders.
Security

Jihadist activity in Algeria, as reported in open sources, fell to what may be the lowest levels ever this past month: only nine armed engagements or other incidents of violence were recorded up to November 26, only two of which were at the initiative of AQMI or other jihadist/armed groups. Even the troubled border areas appeared to be calmer, with perhaps as few as five violent incidents in November (down from nine in October). This ostensibly sharp fall could be a reflection of the cyclical nature of AQMI activity, especially with the onset of winter in northern Algeria, but it may also reflect restrictions on reporting, in particular in the border areas – it is of note, for example, that not a single incident was reported on the border with Tunisia in the Algerian media throughout the month.[5]

ALGIERS and its environs remained quiet, and just two confirmed violent incidents were recorded in AQMI’s heartland in KABYLIA. There were no reports in the Algerian media of jihadist activity in the OIL & GAS PRODUCING AREAS.[6] A number of revealing incidents were reported along the country’s southern and south-eastern borders, however.

Close to the SOUTH-EASTERN BORDER with Libya, the security forces arrested a national of Niger carrying two machine guns and several rounds of ammunition in early November near In Amenas (wilaya of Illizi). Under interrogation he said he had bought the weapons in Ghadames, Libya, for 600 Libyan dinars[7] a piece and was carrying them to Mali. Similarly, the security forces arrested a Malian national trying to cross into Algeria on foot near Debdeb (just to the north of In Amenas) on November 15; he was also reportedly found to be carrying two machine guns. On November 11, again near Debdeb, the security forces foiled an attempt by an armed group to attack a fuel tanker: the truck had crossed into Algeria from Ghadames and was heading for Stah, in the wilaya of Tébessa, when it was attacked by a “heavily armed group of masked men”; the Algerian army intervened, killing five of the attackers and arresting a sixth, who was seriously wounded. Algerian daily Wakt el-Djazair (13/11) reported that the armed men are believed to be “Tuaregs from Sebha, Libya”.[8]

A potentially far more significant incident is reported to have occurred on Nov. 15, when Algerian Special Forces apprehended a Libyan jihadist by the name of Riyad El Touﬁ “on the road between the Libyian town of Daraj and the village of Tin Alkoum, near Djanet” in the far south of the wilaya of Illizi,[9] according to Algerian Arabic-language dailies Wakt Al-Djazair and Al-Mihwar, quoting “high-level security sources”. If confirmed, their partial account of Riyad El Touﬁ’s career provides some novel insights into interrelations between the various jihadist groups operating in northern Mali, Niger, southern Libya and western Tunisia. El Touﬁ, who is said to have broken away from MUJAO at the end of last year to join AQMI, is purported to be one of the founding members of the Katiba Oqba Ibn Nafi, the AQMI-linked jihadist group that has been fighting the Tunisian security forces in the Djebel Chaambi region close to the Algerian border since late 2012. El Touﬁ, it is claimed, had been tasked by AQMI’s southern commander Djamel Okacha, a.k.a. Yahia Abou El Hammam, with recruiting other jihadists who had broken away from MUJAO, Ansar Dine, Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group or other islamist outfits in the Sahara to fight in the ranks of Katiba Oqba Ibn Nafi, and is suspected of taking some 21 fighters to Djebel Chaambi in August. According to Al-Mihwar, El Touﬁ has survived at least three attempts on his life – at least one of them in Ghat, Libya – since Belmokhtar ordered one of his men to eliminate him.

There have also been a number of incidents along the SOUTHERN BORDER with Mali.[10] On November 9 security forces, reportedly acting on a tip-off, ambushed and arrested two jihadists in Bordj Baji Mokhtar, wilaya of Adrar, and a little over a week later an operation was launched to search for weapons caches in the environs; several were found according to Algerian daily El-Watan (23/11). Further to the south-east, security forces found an abandoned offroader loaded with weapons near Tin Zaouatine, wilaya of Tamanrasset, at the beginning of November. It is believed the smugglers had abandoned the vehicle and fled when they realised they were being tracked by the security forces. On November 10-11 not far from Tin Zaouatine, security forces backed up by helicopters intercepted and arrested three jihadists, none of them of Algerian nationality, wounding one seriously. The incident took place to the north of Timiaouine, wilaya of Adrar, just across the border from the northern Malian town of Tessalit.

There have also been reports (El-Khabar 29/10) that an Algerian army unit “intercepted a group of armed jihadists that had approached the Algeria-Mali border” on October 27. The jihadists, in a convoy of ten offroaders, had attacked a camp of the MNLA in northern Mali, 20 km south of the Algerian border; in the “heavy fighting” that ensued, several MNLA fighters were wounded, who were transported to Algeria for treatment. Some hours later the jihadist group “approached the Algerian border where it was intercepted by an army unit manning an advanced position not far from Timiaouine”; the clash left two jihadists dead and others wounded. This appears to be a clear admission that Algerian troops cross into Malian territory to confront the jihadists, and would therefore seem to confirm press reports in September to the effect that the Algerian army is now authorised
to hunt down jihadists beyond the country’s borders, in a breach with Algeria’s official doctrine since independence.\[11\]

Meanwhile, AQMI’s Sahara units have released a recruitment video entitled “France and the Hunt for the Mirage”, appealing to the “Muslim youth” of the world to “join the jihad against France in northern Mali”. Posted to YouTube on October 29, the half-hour film is the first video produced by the “new Sahara branch” of Al-Andalus Organisation, AQMI’s propaganda arm, and is also remarkable in a number of ways:

- In one short, three-second scene, a fighter identified as Abou Layth Al-Maghribi (i.e. ‘the Moroccan’) is pictured carrying what appears to be a Strela-2 manpads (also known as the SA-7, a Russian made surface-air missile believed to have been stockpiled in large quantities by the Qaddafi regime in Libya), which he calls his “gift” to the French. This seems to be the first confirmation by AQMI that it has such weapons in its possession (although elsewhere in the same video other fighters brag about how they “confront French helicopters armed with nothing but machine guns”).\[12\]
- Sophisticated as some of the group’s weaponry may be, the video itself is distinctly amateurish, especially compared with the slick propaganda film Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group released in September. Whereas the latter was very professionally put together and showed a group of well-organised men undertaking serious preparations for major operations, the AQMI video is mainly made up of footage, which appears largely to have been shot on mobile telephone cameras, of rank-and-file jihadists larking around in the desert, with no mention of any specific operations. AQMI’s southern emir, Yahia Abou El Hammam, appears fleetingly in one sequence, but does not speak.
- In designating the organisation’s enemies, the video focuses exclusively on France. The call to attack France, French interests and French nationals, including civilians, whenever and wherever the opportunity arises, is driven home by several of the fighters who speak to the camera, with Franco-Algerian “lone wolf” Mohamed Merah\[13\] held up as an example by one. Consulates and schools are explicitly mentioned as possible targets. In this sense, the video is at variants with recent statements by Al-Qaeda’s international leader Ayman Zawahiri, on which we commented in earlier reports, calling on his followers not to kill non-combattants and generally to eschew the ultra-violence and sectarianism that have come to be associated with the Al-Qaeda label. While greetings are sent to Zawahiri at the end of the video, fighters also invoke the memory of “our sheikh, emir and leader Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi”, the Jordanian-born founder of Al-Qaeda in Iraq who championed the most brutal forms of urban terrorism.\[14\]

Finally it is worth noting that only one of the fighters who appear in the video is Algerian, and only two of them Malian. By contrast, there are no fewer than five Moroccans and three Mauritanians (plus a sprinkling of Tunisians, Egyptians and Sudanese). The three Mauritanians explicitly recommend launching attacks on French nationals and/or interests in Mauritania, specifically in Nouakchott and in the towns of Kaedi and Seilibaby. This seems to suggest that under pressure from the French-led military campaign in northern Mali, the Saharan branch of AQMI, may be gravitating towards the west, and in particular Mauritania (its reported connections to the jihadist group fighting in Tunisia’s Djebel Chaambi notwithstanding), while Belmokhtar’s Al-Mourabitoun gravitates broadly speaking towards the east.

---

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

\[11\] The main trade union federation, which was de facto a wing of the FLN under the single-party regime.
Prompting no little grumbling in the Tunisian media, which, noting that Ghanouchi seems always to pay a visit to the US Ambassador in Tunis before his trips to Algiers, has expressed indignation that a solution to Tunisia’s domestic political crisis seems to be being cooked up abroad.

A small, moderate islamist opposition party which, although similarly named, has no organic links to Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement.

On the other hand, Tunisian Arabic-language daily *Al-Sarih* (28/11) claimed to have been told by “Algerian security sources” that the Algerian security forces had recently arrested two members of Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Al-Mourabitoun near the southern part of the border with Tunisia. The two men are said to have told their interrogators that the organisation was preparing some 13 volunteers for suicide operations in Tunisia and Algeria.

The security forces are however reported to have arrested two jihadists on November 17 as they drove into the town of Djemaa (wilaya of El-Oued) which lies north of Touggourt (wilaya of Ouargla) on the road to Hassi Messaoud.

Approximately $475.

Which suggests that this might have been a case of apolitical banditry rather than an attack by committed jihadists, although the distinction is sometimes a fine one.

The localisation of the arrest is somewhat ambiguous. Although *Al-Mihwar* and *Wakt el-Djazair*’s headlines place it “in Illizi”, their articles merely state that it took place “on the road between Daraj and Tin Alkoum”. Tin Alkoum actually lies right on the border with Libya (it is the southermost of the three official border crossings with Libya), while Daraj (also rendered Derej or Dirj) is an oasis town east of Ghadames, several hundred kilometres to the north; the road between them, which passes through the Libyan city of Ghat before reaching Tin Alkoum, runs very close to the border with Algeria for most of its length. This very vague indication, together with *Al-Mihwar*’s claim that the operation was carried out by “elements of the Special Forces supported by two army brigades and in coordination with units of the Border Guards from the Gendarmerie’s 4th Military Region command in Ouargla”, seems to suggest that El-Toufi may have been snatched in a cross-border raid by Algerian forces.

In addition to the incidents involving the Algerian security forces, it is also worth noting an operation by French special forces in the Malian desert around 200 km west of Tessalit on Nov. 14, in which several jihadists were killed, among them Hassan Ould Khalil, a.k.a. Jouleibib, reportedly the second-in-command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group. A Mauritanian national, Ould Khalil had been the group’s de facto spokesman and reportedly took part in the planning of the attack on the Tiguentourine gas plant in January and a French-run uranium mine at Arlit, Niger, in May. Algerian daily *El Watan* claims that the French had been able to track down Ould Khalil thanks to information they had extracted from four other members of Al-Mourabitoun (Belmokhtar’s new organisation) captured by the Tuareg separatist MNLA and handed over to the French military.

This remains a highly sensitive issue, however. An incident on which we commented in our last report, in which the Algerian armed forces are alleged to have discovered a huge weapons cache “200 km from In Amenas” on Oct. 24, was recast by French news magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur* (06/11) as a cross-border raid by Algerian forces against a jihadist camp inside Libyan territory. According to the French newspaper: “On October 24, hundreds of soldiers from the Algerian army’s special forces units, backed up by jet fighters, helicopters and tanks, led a raid on a jihadist base in Libya, 200 km south of the gas site at In Amenas. […] Over the previous two months, information gathered by the Algerian intelligence services had pointed to a new attack in preparation against the [In Amenas] site. […] True to its tradition of secrecy, the Algerian Defence Ministry would not say how many were killed from either side or if any jihadists were captured.” This was angrily, if rather clumsily, denied by Algerian daily *L’Expression* (11/11), which quoted “very well-informed security sources” as suggesting that the *Nouvel Observateur* story was nothing but Moroccan-inspired disinformation. *L’Expression*’s article goes on to reaffirm Algeria’s traditional stance – namely that Algerian troops will not intervene in neighbouring countries “under any circumstances” – apparently oblivious of the fact that *L’Expression* itself was one of the sources that back in September first published reports about Algiers’ change of stance on cross-border operations (although its source at the time insisted Algerian troops would intervene outside the country’s borders “only if neighbouring countries request it”).

Or at any rate the launch tube, for the footage does not show the missile itself and there is no explicit confirmation that AQMI possesses or has used such missiles.

In March 2012, Merah, a 23 year-old petty criminal who had drifted into radical islamism, shot dead three French soldiers and seriously wounded another in a series of attacks in south-west France before attacking a Jewish school in Toulouse, killing a rabbi and three children.

Zarqawi, it is worth recalling, is said to have played an instrumental role in establishing ties between Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Struggle (GSPC) and Al-Qaeda, leading ultimately to its transformation into AQMI.
According to a leading member of a Saharawi NGO in Tindouf, the Algerian authorities have banned Saharawis from transporting, selling, buying or otherwise procuring gaz and refined products anywhere beyond the perimeters of the Saharawi refugee camps. Algerian truckers have been assigned to deliver refined products (gasoline, kerosene etc.) to the camps. As of Nov.1, the Algerian authorities began confiscating refined products transported by Saharawi truckers outside the camps. No decision has been announced, however, and the Polisario/SADR authorities have not been formally notified. The Algerian local authorities in Tindouf have indicated that the measure has been taken as part of a broader crackdown on smuggling and black-marketeering.

A group of 12 common law prisoners are reported recently to have walked out of the Chahid Abderrahman prison (also known as Al-Dhahibiya), in the Tindouf camps, illegally but without any use of violence against the prison guards. Polisario's security forces failed to apprehend them and say that they have now left the Tindouf camps altogether for an unknown destination or destinations. According to a relative of a member of the Saharawi National Council (the SADR's pseudo-parliament), this “escape” was facilitated by accomplices within the administration, and that SADR Defence Minister Mohamed Lamine Bouhali is behind it. Bouhali, claims the source, runs an extortion racket whereby prisoners and their families are offered the alternative between “escaping” (in exchange for a payment in hard currency) or staying in prison even after completing their official sentence.

[Note: SADR Justice Minister Hamada Selma told Human Rights Watch in 2008 that Al-Dhahibiya prison had been closed around the beginning of 2007. In its December 2008 report Human Rights in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf Refugee Camps, HRW commented: “There are persistent allegations that the Polisario operates secret places of detention. With respect to the period we examined – 2006 to the present – no one we interviewed, including Sahrawis who had recently worked in the Polisario security forces before resettling in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, claimed to have information about unacknowledged places of detention or of prisoners being held in secret.”]
FYI: Below please find the Fall/Winter 2013 MAC Events Bulletin, including events from September, October, November, and December (it was a busy time – sorry for the delay!). Our team compiles a list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

Happy Holidays and Best Wishes for a happy and healthy New Year!

Caitlin Dearing Scott

---

**Fall 2013 Events Bulletin**

### September 16
**Egypt’s Impact on Maghreb Political Dynamics**

### September 27
**Roundtable on Morocco after the Arab Uprisings: Evolution rather than Revolution**

### October 1
**Roundtable on the Cultural Heritage of Morocco**

### October 10
**Why Moroccan Protests Failed**

### October 11
**Morocco’s New Geo-Economics**

### October 22
Egypt’s Impact on Maghreb Political Dynamics

Date: September 16, 2013

1. Title: "Egypt’s Impact on Maghreb Political Dynamics"
Hosted by CSIS Middle East Program

**Participants:**
- Ellen Lust: Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale
- William Lawrence: former Director, North Africa Project, International Crisis Group

**Opening Remarks:**
- Jon Alterman: Director, CSIS Middle East Program
- **Moderator:** Haim Malka: Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS Middle East Program

2. Overview

As part of the Middle East program’s coverage of the Arab Spring, this event brought together a political scientist, Lust, and a North Africa expert, Lawrence, to examine the question of how the people of North Africa interpret the events of the past year in Egypt. This question was the starting point for the examination of the national characters of the Maghreb countries and their people, including what they do and do not want in government and also their own identities.

3. Summary

Alterman was brief in his introductions, and set out the topic question very straightforwardly: how do people in North Africa interpret what is happening in Egypt?

Lust focused exclusively on Libya and Tunisia, and then laid out the argument that whether transition is seen optimistically or pessimistically depends on whether the observer has had positive or negative examples of consequences of change in the past. Her reasoning in using Libya and Tunisia was that the two countries are at the same point in their transitions, which have followed a process of initial euphoria, followed by political bickering, and now general frustration. The difference between the two countries is that while Tunisians are primarily divided in their opinions of the relationship between religion and the state, Libyans are divided by regionalism. Another
difference is one of relative strength. In Libya, because no one group of actors has an overwhelming majority, they make up for this shortcoming through the use of arms. This, combined with a lack of institutional authority, leads to the inability of any one group to act unilaterally, as was the case in Egypt. In Tunisia, the Assembly has stayed in session, but has been unable to provide services for the people, leading radicals to fill gaps left by the state. In both countries, a key lesson from Egypt is for actors to stop and take stock of the situation and act deliberately, rather than pressing ahead recklessly, as the Egyptians did.

Lawrence prefaced his extensive remarks by pointing out that there is a disconnect between how Egyptians see Egypt and how the rest of MENA does. Egypt is generally seen through the filter of Islamism: if observers have negative feelings about Islamism, then they have a nuanced position; if positive, then they are more pro-Morsi. Lawrence also pointed out that analysts of the Arab Spring are often too focused on the revolutionary aspect, and not enough on its effect of attempting to overcome old dichotomies, such as religious/secular, socialist/capitalist, etc. Another frequent misinterpretation is that the most recent Egyptian revolution was primarily in opposition to Morsi, while it was in truth more economically motivated.

Lawrence argued that Tunisia is closest to Egypt, but that there are important differences between the former's Constitutional Democratic Rally and the latter's National Democratic Party. He also believes that the Tunisian constitutional experiment is potentially most threatened by events in Egypt. Like in Egypt, the ruling party, Ennahda, has aligned itself with Salafists. However, Tunisia still has the potential for the best outcome.

Lawrence discussed Algeria, but only briefly. He mentioned that in Algeria, any discussions of transition are filtered through past conflicts with Islamism. He estimated that Morocco is more similar to Egypt than Algeria, but not as similar as Tunisia. His evidence for this is twofold. Firstly, the PJD has experience ruling through coalition. Secondly, a powerful elite keep the economy under control, in Egypt the military, in Morocco the Makhzen. This arrangement is “keeping things on track in Morocco.” The Makhzen used the PJD to survive the Arab Spring, and so Morocco has remained relatively stable. There are however rumors that reforms were enacted too quickly, and that perhaps too much was ceded to the people.

Finally, in Libya’s case, the federalists and secularists are emboldened by events in Egypt. Libyans are highly secular, votes for Islamist parties are consistently low, and the salafists are out of the political arena, hence their use of arms. In summary, one thing most groups have in common is a desire to avoid what is happening in Egypt presently.

4. Q & A

Malka asked about the nature of centrist and reformist movements in the region. Lawrence responded that in Morocco cleavages tend to be generational, with al Adl wal Ihsane coming out to support the 20th February Movement, but not participate in it. As in the other Arab Spring countries, he sees this as an example of the youth believing that they can build a better future. Lust believes that while there is a public demand for centrist movements, political parties are increasingly polarizing, and thereby not making grassroots gains. Lawrence agreed and said that this is why there is a disconnect between the youth and organized parties.

Q: (David Mack, Middle East Institute) To what extent do Islamist and secular elites in the Maghreb look to Turkey in the past two decades or Egypt in the past 2 years?
A: (Lawrence) The Erdogan model is dying. The countries are looking for other models.
(Lust) Tunisia had been pro Erdogan, but less so now that he has become more authoritarian.

Q: (Zack Gold, Brookings Institution) To what extent are jihadi or salafist calls to be active in Egypt influencing North Africa?
A: (Lawrence) What do you mean by salafists? The scientific salafists are growing, but the political salafists are not making any gains, and then there are the jihadi salafists. There’s also a blurring between what jihadi means in the US and what it means in North Africa. Our categories block us from understanding. They are useful only as ideal types. And jihadis are often jihadis more due to their personal lives than to politics; they have bad breakups with their girlfriends and then go fight in Syria.

Q: (Dan Sisnoi, Tel Aviv University) You mentioned how Nahda the party is involved in the transition. What about the voters?
A: (Lawrence) Well, like in Algeria in 1991, you vote for the group you fear less. There were young, idealistic supporters, beautiful young people who wanted to un-corrupt Tunisia. 1.5 million people voted for Nahda, 1/3 of the total votes. Some voted for them because they had family reasons, some because they thought it was the least corrupt party, but Nahda’s popularity has decreased by half.
Even in comparison to its supporters, to the general public, Nahda is more for a close relationship between religion and the state than the public. The public wanted to make sure the revolution succeeded, and thought that Nahda could stop any backsliding.

Q: (Ricky Goldstein, HRW) Can Tunisia have an impact on Egypt? Are there any lessons from Tunisia in 2011 that Egyptians could learn from?

A: (Lawrence) I wrote an article on lessons from Algeria that apply to Egypt. Now Egyptians are the last to admit that they want to learn, and they are not amenable at all to learning from Tunisia. Egyptians are proud that they had a revolution, but unhappy that they came in second. But there are lessons, constitutional debates, judicial and secular reform, and so on.

(Lust) I want to note that I believe the beginning of the Egyptian coup was in June, when Parliament was disbanded. But as for lessons from Tunisia, start with the Assembly, and don’t rush reforms.

5. Observations

Around 50 people were in attendance, roughly 2/3 professionals and 1/3 students or interns. While there were disagreements on interpretation, the tone of the roundtable was cordial and informative. Lawrence in particular offered a noticeably unbiased account of events, supporting his statements with either polling data or repeating directly what he had heard from informants in the region. The event was light on Morocco-specific information, but as an analysis of the Maghreb not focused entirely on Egypt, the event covered many lesser-known and unexplored aspects of the Arab Spring.
4. Q & A

Haim Malka (CSIS), Karim Mezran (the Atlantic Council), Pauline Baker (Fund for Peace), Pilar Garcia Martinez (IMF), and others engaged in a discussion of why Morocco’s path after the Arab uprisings is different than the rest of the MENA region. In addition to the King’s role, they noted that opposition groups were quite different in Morocco than elsewhere in the region, which resulted in a reform agenda that was clearer and less confrontational than in other countries. Laramont added that there is more room for policy impact in places like Morocco, which could become a model for the rest of the region.

With regard to recommendations, participants discussed the need to promote investments across a broad range of sectors, and the need to expand education, especially for women. Reform of subsidies and banking reform was also mentioned along with creating a more proactive environment for start-ups and entrepreneurs. The group agreed that forging a better link between education and the labor market is a crucial next step to ensure continued progress in myriad areas.

Krista Hendry (Fund for Peace) added that an important factor for US involvement with reforms should be approaching Morocco on equal footing. She said that presenting a skill set, rather than offering recommendations, would go a long way towards better aid and program efficacy.

5. Observations

This event was attended by 22 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received and Fund for Peace will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of reform in Morocco.

Attendees:

Jean AbiNader: MAC
Dr. Pauline Baker: Board of Trustees, Fund for Peace
Lauren Berry: Kosmos Energy
David Bloom: MAC
Asibi Danjuma: Fund for Peace
Calvin Dark: BLJ Worldwide
Fred Enochs: TD International
Pilar Garcia Martinez: IMF
Krista Hendry: Fund for Peace
Amal Kandeel: Pioneers International
Francoise Kirby: Management Systems International
Dylan Maguire: International Republican Institute
Maren Maland: Chemonics
Haim Malka: CSIS Middle East Program
Leila Mooney: Partners for Democratic Change
Ralph Nurnberger: Georgetown University
Adrienne Ross: Strategic Communications Advisor
Fatima Taki: AFRICOM
Lara Talverdian: Atlantic Council
Meredith Wilson: Kosmos Energy

Roundtable on the Cultural Heritage of Morocco

Date: October 1, 2013

1. Title: Roundtable on the Cultural Heritage of Morocco

Hosted by the Georgetown Center for Contemporary Arab Studies

Participants:
Dr. Kenneth Honerkamp: Professor of Arabic, Islamic texts, Shar’iah (Islamic Law), North African Sufism.
2. Overview

This event, the second in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations to include recommendations for US policy actions to support Morocco, began with a review of the draft paper on the topic presented by Dr. Honerkamp. Dr. Heck and Rev. Calabria also provided input before a general discussion with attendees. The goal of the series is to encourage a number of topical papers in advance of the King’s visit to build interest in the Morocco-US relationship and existing and potential benefits of greater bilateral cooperation.

3. Summary

Dr. Honerkamp drew from his extensive experience in Morocco to explain the historical roots of Morocco’s famed cultural and religious moderation based on an embrace of diversity. Described in the discussion draft as a pragmatic yet spiritual path throughout 1400 years of Moroccan history, what began as scholarly and religious work resonated and became engrained in the culture.

The key tenants of the Moroccan values of moderation are largely inspired by the al-Murshid al mu‘īn text on Imām Mālik, the theological doctrine of Imām al-Ashʿarī, and the Sufism of Imām al-Junayd. Describing the effect of these influences, Dr. Honerkamp shared his experience of feeling ‘at home in a strange land’; a unique and visceral sentiment of Morocco that he believes is a common and historical one. Importantly, Dr. Honerkamp reminded the group that although these three sources are a dominant force in Moroccan culture, they have never taken on the role of attempting to define the function and means of government. The emphasis on its Islamic identity is not something expedient but a function of Morocco’s cultural heritage. Similarly, the King’s great attention to this facet of Morocco’s heritage is institutional, and the respect for the King is for that institution, not a personality cult.

Dr. Honerkamp also discussed Morocco’s role in spreading this particular evolution of Islam. He highlighted the King’s recent speech in Mali and the kinship amongst moderates that was evident. Beyond being an epicenter of learning, Morocco has recently begun to counter the Saudi influence by printing Quran texts and distributing them across the country. More could be done, he suggested, in expanding that distribution across the Islamic world.

Dr. Heck began his intervention by looking at the prominent role Morocco should play in the future. Morocco, and the form of Islam that it takes, will have a lot to say towards international harmony, he said. He described it as a feeling of nostalgia for diverse harmony in Morocco, which required a true experience of shared knowledge of the other. Reverend Calabria agreed, stating that Morocco can teach hospitality as well as its particular brand of Islam. Dr. Heck also agreed with Dr. Honerkamp that many Moroccans are very unsettled by a religiosity defined by the state, and that this goes beyond simply tolerance. On the other hand, Dr. Heck emphasized the enormous obstacles presented by a growing skepticism and resentment.

Dr. Heck emphasized that the US is a good and capable partner, but also that it should approach programs with Morocco in a different way. The US is very strong on the knowledge part, he said, but the intertwining of Security Studies and Islam is not an open and welcoming approach. Not all American involvement should have a security twist. Dr. Heck also lauded cultural, educational, and religious exchanges between the US and Morocco. It’s not scholarly tourism, he said, it’s deeper. This echoed the comments of Dr. Honerkamp.

4. Q & A

Richard McKee (State Department, Ret.) began the discussion by asking why Shiism has gained traction amongst young people. Dr. Honerkamp mentioned the financial backing of Iran as one factor, the other being that for disaffected people it is the ‘next step’ from Salafism. Daoud Casewit added that Salafism and Shiism are magnets for opposition and being beyond the cultural norms gives its adherents a political edge by being a touch traitorous.

Fulbright Administrator asked if there is a rural/urban difference in perceptions of Islamic identity, in Dr. Honerkamp’s comparison of Pakistan and Morocco. Dr. Honerkamp replied that it does exist to some extent, but not enough to consider the moderate nature of Moroccan culture a city-based phenomenon.

With regard to recommendations, participants discussed the need to continue promoting cultural, religious, and educational exchanges, and Morocco’s efforts to be a center of religion and learning. The group agreed that there is
no shortage of good ideas to doing so, but that funding is too limited to support many endeavors. Although some signs are encouraging, more must be done to quickly stem the tide of resentment and anger amongst the youth.

5. Observations

This event was attended by 24 foreign policy professionals and academics. The paper was well-received and the Georgetown Center for Contemporary Arab Studies will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of Morocco’s role as a cultural and religious leader in the Arab and Islamic world.

Why Moroccan Protests Failed: A Panel Discussion

Date: October 10, 2013

1. Title: “Why Moroccan Protests Failed: A Panel Discussion”
   Hosted by The Project on Middle East Political Science at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

   Participants:
   **Aboubakr Jamai**: Richard von Weizsacker Fellow, Bosch Foundation; Editor, French version of Lakome.com
   **Ahmed Benchemsi**: Visiting Scholar, Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University; Founder, freearabs.com
   **Adria Lawrence**: Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University
   **Marc Lynch**: Moderator: Assistant Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University

2. Overview

This event analyzed the singularity of Morocco’s lack of revolution and eventual reforms in response to Arab Spring protests. The speakers raised many important points of analysis about internal politics of Morocco and how they influenced the results of the February 20 movement in the country. Given his association with Lakome.com, Jamai was often acerbic in his comments, while Benchemsi offered a more moderate perspective. Dr. Lawrence discussed the results of her studies into individuals in the protest movement.

3. Summary

Aboubakr Jamai began his opening remarks questioning the definitiveness of the event's title, suggesting that Moroccan protests could yet result in more political change. He elaborated by reminding the audience that the protests in Morocco initially asked solely for reform, while later calls for the removal of King Mohammed VI were superficial. In response, Jamai explained, the King "scolded" the February 20th Movement, which played a central role in the protests. However, on March 9, the King shifted course and delivered a "Thomas Jefferson like speech" essentially promising reform and a transition to democracy. Jamai added that the speech only tempered the protests momentarily because on March 20, 2011 the largest number of protesters to date took to the streets demanding reform. Jamai suggested a major reason the protests "did fail" was due to the "learning curve" of the regime from the Tunisian and Egyptian examples, whereby the Government of Morocco was better able to anticipate likely responses from protestors. However, he mentioned that the regime did use some violence against protesters, but was careful to stop short of lethal violence.

Jamai pointed out that the previous King, Hassan II, allowed minimal amounts of opposition activism, which was limited to various human rights organizations that served as an "outlet" to moderate society and provide the regime with "someone to negotiate with." He suggested that the current King Mohammed VI follows a similar strategy. Next, Jamai explained the importance of understanding the internal dynamics of the popular Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD). He explained how the Justice and Charity movement appeals to the same constituency as the PJD, though the Justice and Charity movement, he argued, does not support reform within the government and instead calls for waiting for the regime to collapse under its own corruption. The PJD, on the other hand, approved of the constitutional process and supported working with the King. Jamai suggested, as a non-panarchy party, the PJD provided legitimacy to the King and moderated the protest movement. Jamai concluded by
Ahmed Benchemsi also opened his remarks questioning the title of the event. He noted that if the "cursor" was on removal of the King, than protests did fail, but he is not sure the cursor should be placed there. Benchemsi suggested that the King's March 9 speech "checked all the big democratic issues raised in the street," including a parliamentary monarchy, free press, and a new constitution. The Makhzen, he argued, manipulated the protesters by "bringing everyone to the table," which resulted in "too many recommendations to employ," leaving the Makhzen to select the issues to address. The youth, he suggested, prided themselves on being leaderless since leadership ends in either corruption or arrest. The problem, Benchemsi challenged, was the protesters had no direction or guidance. He also noted ironically that the protesters, who were asking for democratic reform, refused to establish internal voting because, they argued, it leads nowhere. Throughout, the PJD remained "one step behind" the protesters, cautious of fully embracing the movement for fear of losing support to the Justice and Charity movement. Benchemsi concluded by arguing that the regime "outfoxed" the protesters. The removal of the King failed according to Benchemsi, but he remained optimistic that the protests "planted a seed in society," which "may well prove a game changer," in the years to come.

Adria Lawrence began her remarks explaining that she conducted many interviews with core activists in the February 20th Movement. Initially, she focused on the micro level of the core protesters, suggesting most of them were previously involved in human rights organizations, children of activist parents, and children of victims of rights abuses by the state. On the macro level, Lawrence suggested that revolutionaries are always young, inexperienced, and prone to mistakes. Lawrence’s research found that the monarchy was the difference for Morocco compared to other states like Egypt and Tunisia. Moroccans, she argued, value stability and democracy, and their unique situation in the region allowed for the possibility of reform without regime change. Authoritarian regimes "cannot democratize without becoming unstable," whereas a monarchy can reform "without losing the head of state," noted Lawrence. Therefore, she explained, the choice was between the French model (forming a Republic), which could lead to instability, or the British model (an evolving constitutional monarchy), with a stable transition more likely. Though not all protesters favored this model, the division further weakened the fragmented movement.

4. Q & A

Q: (Eric Goldstein, Human Rights Watch) Why did no one cast their lot with the 20 February Movement?  
A: (Benchemsi) I disagree. Others did coalesce because they thought they could save the organization. The problem is the Support Council was unable to come up with a counteroffer and you can't engage in democracy without compromise.

Q: (Adina Friedman, George Mason University) Are the Jews and Berbers important to the movement?  
A: (Jamai) It’s important to note that it’s the Ministry of Justice, not the ministry of freedom. But there is this idea that you cannot claim to be Moroccan without also claiming the Jewishness of the Moroccan identity. Hassan II had credibility on both sides [of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict]. What we have now is a declarative, non-substantial Constitution. The price for this is freedom of conscience in the Constitution. Now, the King is Commander of the Faithful, but to be that, he needs to have “faithfuls.” Now how do Sunni Malikis see apostasy? As punishable by death. So they and other Islamists said no [to freedom of conscience in the Constitution]. (Benchemsi) There were lots of tactics used, notably lip service to minorities in order to preempt all demands, but use the groups for PR purposes.

Q: (Rachel, former Fulbright Scholar to Morocco) Did the protests leave any opening for women or socialists?  
A: (Lawrence) Well, al Adl wa Ihsane is a mysterious organization, and it’s unknown if that group is the most powerful opposition. It’s important not to lose track of the PJD. Now, they’re not clever, but there was certainly no paternalism on their part. (Benchemsi) There was a case where a reporter was sued for calling Mohammed VI “my brother.” He went to court, and offered the defense that Hassan II called himself the father of all Moroccans, so if Mohammed VI is also his son, then... The court reacted just like you did, and he was let off. The message here is that there are groups who are not saying, but thinking, “we know better,” on questions of politics, the economy, and so on. We don’t know exactly what the military thinks. As for al Adl wa Ihsane, they like to portray themselves as pious grandfathers. (Jamai) Anouzla convinced me to return to journalism a few weeks before the Arab Spring. If I had any inkling of a doubt about the nastiness of this regime, it would have been gone with news of Anouzla’s arrest. It is important to remember that Anouzla is Sahrawi as well. We need to come to terms with diverse Islamist parties; we need to open a debate. The problem there is that the radical left is enamored with French laïcité and aren’t open to any questions of religion. What they should do is sit down and read some Locke, because there is a place for religion in a
5. Observations

This event was attended by about 35 people, approximately half being students. The conversation was largely negative, focusing on flaws in the protest movement and perceived stratagem on the part of the Moroccan government to mitigate reform. Speakers agreed that the existence of the monarchy is primarily responsible for Morocco’s stability pre- and post-Arab Spring. They also agreed that there does not seem to be a widespread initiative to unseat the king; however, there is all-around disappointment with the governing bodies and the pace of reform.

The speakers raised many points of analysis about King Mohammed VI’s relationship with the government and society. First, it was widely acknowledged that the existence of the monarchy is primarily reason for Morocco’s stability. Second, there does not seem to be a widespread initiative to unseat the King; however, there is all-around disappointment with the governing bodies and with the fact that the King has not relinquished more executive powers to create a more open government that is able to address the demands of its citizens autonomously [i.e. Adria Lawrence’s suggestion of the British model for the monarchy]. Lastly, Morocco’s public image seems to follow the pattern of “one step forward, two steps back” when presented in international media and among scholars in these types of forums. For example, in 2013 positive and optimistic periods of reforms, such as the King’s August 20th speech or his decision to regularize immigrants residency status, were followed by some indication of repressive human rights and civil liberties, the “Daniel-gate” protests and Ali Anouzla’s arrest.

Morocco’s New Geo-Economics

Date: October 11, 2013

1. Title: Morocco’s New Geo-Economics
   Hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States

   Participants:
   **Ian Lesser: Moderator:** Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, GMFUS

2. Overview

   This event, the third in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors to include recommendations for US policy actions to support Morocco, began with a brief review of the topics presented in the draft paper which had been circulated in advance of the event. Dr. Lesser then passed the discussion to Dr. Dadush, who spoke about the latest economic indicators in Morocco and how they related to the discussion. The roundtable discussion was the bulk of the event, as the group was well-informed and able to address a range of issues and recommendations.

3. Summary

   Dr. Dadush’s analysis of Morocco was that many economic fundamentals remain strong – especially on relative terms in the MENA context. He described Morocco as one of the few reasonably diversified economies, featuring stability and strong connections with both Europe and the US. Morocco probably deserves more attention than it receives, he said, with strong growth, inflation under control, and continuous positive reforms giving more weight to the government.

   The centerpiece of the event was the group discussion. Despite the encouraging signs, the group agreed, much more can and must be done to encourage growth in Morocco and take advantage of the free trade arrangement with the US. Adding to the stakes are Morocco’s core economic dependence on exports and the unyielding pressure that
unemployment puts on political stability.

The group questioned the emphasis that US officials and commentators should put into establishing a true economic union in the Maghreb. Though it remains the obvious choice for economic development – it was mentioned that it could result in an estimated 4% GDP growth for Morocco alone - and clearly deserving of continued support, many in the room agreed that true regional integration in North Africa is unlikely in this lifetime.

In terms of policy recommendations, the discussion indicated that more emphasis should be placed on fostering partnerships and knowledge-sharing by the private sector across the region. Several suggestions were made to give the private sector more tools to take advantage of the free trade apparatus. For example, there is presidential discretion to act without Congressional action, for example, providing technical assistance such as Department of Commerce programs, working with multilateral organizations such as The World Bank and IMF to provide technical assistance and funding for governance reforms, and initiate more economic diplomacy with the EU to support Morocco’s transition to a stronger market economy.

Among other interesting recommendations was that more focus should be put on the US enabling Morocco to do more in Africa rather than promoting the Morocco-US economic relationship. To do this, the US should adopt a Japanese method of triangular aid to help Morocco expand trade into new African markets, using known strengths in electrification, manufacturing, value added services, pharmaceuticals, and banking. A focus on encouraging South-South trade will help Morocco expand and diversify its economy where it has the competitive advantage in Greater Africa as well as Latin America and Southern Asia.

The US could also engage more on economic diplomacy with Europe with a similar triangular method. The US could also pay more attention to the GCC and work to become a 3rd partner to those investments. More technical assistance and knowledge-sharing should be provided, perhaps in a field such as cell-phone manufacturing, which in Africa is a booming end-user market that contributes zero manufacturing market share.

Lastly, the US should help Morocco invest in young professionals. The US is a bastion of risk capital mentality, whereas Morocco lacks it, resulting in more of a trading culture and less entrepreneurship, venture capital, and industrialization. Promoting this mentality could go a long way in maximizing the rewards of policy frameworks which are already in place. Morocco could perhaps restructure subsidy money to further benefit SMEs. US-Morocco trade could also benefit from more widespread teaching and use of English, to stem the tide of an old-guard bias towards French and Arabic-speaking countries.

4. Observations

This event was attended by 23 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received and GMF will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of economic development and growth opportunities in Morocco.

Attendees:
Jean AbiNader: MAC
Neyla Arnas: National Defense University
Bradley Bosserman: NDN
David Bloom: MAC
Jean-François Dauphin: IMF
Barrie Freeman: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Kelsey Guyette: GMF
Geoffrey Kemp: Center for the National Interest
Ian Lesser: GMF
Carol Castiel: Voice of America
Odeh Aburdene: OAI Advisors
Uri Dadush: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
LouElin Dwyer: National Defense University
Eric Goldstein: Human Rights Watch
Haim Malka: CSIS Middle East Program
Simon Henderson: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Mohsin Khan: The Atlantic Council of the United States
Kerry McNamara: OCP Group
J.E. Rash: Legacy International
Vish Sakthivel: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Morocco’s Role in Regional Security and Development

Date: October 22, 2013

1. Title: “Morocco’s Role in Regional Security and Development”

Hosted by the Atlantic Council

Participants:

Dr. J. Peter Pham: Moderator: Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council
Christopher Leins: Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Department of Defense

2. Overview

This event, the fourth in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors that include recommendations for US policy actions in support of Morocco, began with a brief review of the topics presented in the draft paper which had been circulated in advance of the event. Dr. Pham gave an overview of Morocco’s role in regional security and the merits of their counterterrorism strategy, while highlighting opportunities and recommendations for changes in US policy. The group discussion focused on Morocco’s growing role as a regional leader in regional security, and how their economic influence has increased their regional, and potentially their global, security influence. The group also evaluated and expanded the paper’s recommendations.

3. Summary

Dr. Pham began by discussing an increasing recognition of Morocco’s role in African security, which is further enhanced by Morocco’s economic and cultural ties on the continent. Despite this, he said, the US takes Morocco for granted. A prime example of this was the “unfortunate drop-in” during the latest MINURSO renewal, which resulted in the cancellation of the bilateral US-Moroccan African Lion security exercises in the spring. In a region where government fragility is “par for the course”, he said, Morocco is stable and its interests are often aligned with those of the US. As a regional economic leader, notably in the financial sector, Morocco is expanding its networks throughout Africa, which could help pave the way for increased security cooperation.

There are lessons to be learned from Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy, which is both aggressive and comprehensive. The three main tenants are a law-and-order approach to security, a targeting of terrorists through their financial networks, and an economic development approach to marginalize the enabling causes of radicalism. Specific Moroccan programs, including religious training exchanges, as well as the security forces training in places such as Mali, are not adequately lauded or supported. The holistic approach taken by Morocco stands out in the field of counterterrorism, one with certain replicable parts. From a US policy perspective, there is great opportunity for triangulation; scaling up effective programs carried out by a leader in regional security of increasing geopolitical ‘heft’.

One main stumbling block to Morocco’s growing role in regional security is the Western Sahara. The dispute is no longer ‘frozen,’ Dr. Pham said. The legally dubious inclusion of the Western Sahara - officially recognized by only nine member countries in the African Union (AU) effectively holds the other members hostage. At present, there is no defined mechanism for the removal of an AU member, so the issue would have to be resolved by other means. Until this happens, the regionalization of security cooperation is more piecemeal and difficult to scale-up, facilitating an environment that has proven to be ideal for global terrorist networks.

Group discussion began with the assertion that current US policy does not do enough to encourage regional economic integration in Africa. The US should insist on a regional dimension to programs and investments, it was recommended. US aid should follow this guideline, focusing on initiatives such as the Trans-African Highway Network. Good security cooperation is based on good economic cooperation, one participant said.
The US should also support Moroccan efforts towards security regionalization, supporting existing programs and forums that Morocco has led. US Military efforts, including the African Lion exercises, have gradually aimed to become more regional, though the process is a slow one. Joint military exercises can pay real dividends, in terms of both training and relations. It’s hard to understated how the US-Morocco relationship improved after 1999, one participant said, when both US and UN exercises were performed with Morocco.

More regional-based security efforts are inhibited in part because, it was said, “Algeria gets in the way of everything”. The US is somewhat of an enabler to Algerian intransigence, it was suggested, by not calling them to account for misdeeds in Libya and Mali, and by not making the improvement of Moroccan-Algerian relations a diplomatic priority. The US can help by supporting programs that already exist “below the political noise level” as a foundation for improving Moroccan-Algerian relations. Again, economics can be a strong facilitator of improved relations. The US can leverage its free trade agreement with Morocco by supporting value-added chains that encourage cross-border economic activity. The North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) could also be re-tooled to support better relations across North Africa.

Morocco is expanding ties not only throughout Africa, but also across the Atlantic basin into South America. This not only carries economic implications but also potential US policy opportunities. Just as Morocco’s influence in Africa can be leveraged into high-impact policy outcomes, the same could potentially done as Morocco becomes a leader in the broader South-South context. triangulation and the scaling-up of Moroccan initiatives are excellent ways to have low-input, high-impact policy outcomes, and their scope could potentially increase as the Moroccan economic influence expands globally. US policy should further emphasize its strategic partnership with Morocco with a focus on triangulation in order to achieve shared goals.

4. Observations

This event was attended by more than 20 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received, as the commentary indicated, and the Atlantic Council will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of and expanding Morocco’s leadership efforts in regional security.

Attendees:
- Jean AbiNader: Executive Director, Moroccan American Trade & Investment Center
- Sean McFate: Professor, National Defense University
- Bradley Bosserman: Director, MENA Initiative, New Democrat Network
- David Bloom: Research Associate, Moroccan American Center
- Fouad Arif: Bureau Chief, Moroccan News Agency
- Mahfoud Bahbouhi: Counselor, Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco
- Majida Bargach: Interim Director, Center for International Relations, University of Virginia
- Carol Castiel: Director, Current Affairs Programming, Voice of America News
- Bronwyn Bruton: Deputy Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council
- Anne Moisan: Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University
- Edward Gabriel: Former US Ambassador to Morocco
- Francoise Kirby: Public Relations Director, Management Systems International
- Alan Larson: Senior International Policy Advisor, Covington & Burling LLP
- Scott Mastic: Regional Director, Middle East & North Africa, International Republican Institute
- Karim Mezran: Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
- Laura Talverdian: Assistant Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
- Lawrence Velte: Associate Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Morocco’s Strategic Engagement in Africa

Date: October 25, 2013

1. Title: Morocco’s Strategic Engagement in Africa
   Hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
2. Overview

This event, the fifth and final event in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors that include recommendations for US policy actions in support of Morocco, began with a review of the topics presented in the draft paper which had been circulated in advance of the event. Haim Malka gave an overview of Morocco’s increasing economic and diplomatic emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa and analyzed the implications and opportunities of this policy shift. The group discussion focused on Morocco’s comparative advantages in a South-South approach to economic and diplomatic policy, as well as the role the United States can play in promoting these efforts to mutual benefit.

3. Summary

Haim Malka began the event by describing how Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be central to Morocco’s attempts to grow and diversify its economy, and ultimately increase its international influence. The driving force behind this policy decision appears to be the urgent need to diversify Morocco’s economic base and trade partners to deal with growing socio-economic pressures. It was a lesson made painfully evident as the slump in European demand had a dramatic effect on Morocco – Europe being the source of more than 60% of its trade, as well as the main source of Morocco’s tourism industry and remittances.

Some of the seemingly low-hanging fruit for Moroccan trade hasn’t panned out as hoped. Regional integration in the Maghreb is unlikely without a political solution to Western Sahara. The “reality we all know is; this is stuck,” Malka stated. On the other side of the Atlantic, Morocco has a free trade agreement with the US that went into effect in 2006 and the US market offers an opportunity for boosting Moroccan exports. However, the results of the FTA have been underwhelming and it’s clear that the FTA hasn’t been a game-changer for Morocco.

The pivot towards Sub-Saharan Africa offers competitive advantages for Morocco that match up nicely with high-growth sectors in Africa, especially in banking and agriculture. Outward foreign direct investment has reflected this trend, as 90% of investment from Morocco stays on the continent. Morocco also took initiative during the financial crisis in Europe, picking up investments dropped by more risk-averse Europeans, notably in banking. Moroccan banks are now in 22 African countries and are some of the biggest on the continent. Morocco’s phosphates are already a strategic asset for increasing output from Sub-Saharan Africa’s farms, with the potential for developing a downstream fertilizer sector and a research and development hub. Morocco also has the second largest pharmaceutical industry in Africa, so the economy is well-positioned to take advantage of the maturation of the Sub-Saharan African market.

Morocco also continues to position itself as a manufacturing and outsourcing base for European companies. Companies such as Renault, Bombardier, Boeing, GE, and Dassault have moved manufacturing to Morocco, where labor costs remain competitive. Malka stressed that the need now is to develop a manufacturing ecosystem, with training and expertise that could fuel Africa-centric spinoff ventures that further diversify Morocco’s manufacturing base.

The success of Morocco’s attempts at diversifying its economy and increasing its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa will depend largely on policy choices. As the discussants noted, there is much that the US can do to help this process along for mutual benefit. The US can use existing funding to support triangular programs that take advantage of Morocco’s existing networks and competencies. Power Africa is a prime example, where the US could rely on Morocco’s experience with rural electrification to boost the efficacy and efficiency of the program.

The US should also take the pivot to Sub-Saharan Africa as a good reason to leave behind the “artificial seam” that separates North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in the eyes of US policymakers. Many companies now look at Morocco as a hub for Africa; the US should do the same. Adjusting rules of origin regulations in the FTA could also help encourage Morocco as a business hub and expand trade links with Sub-Saharan Africa. The US should also support more regional and continental infrastructure projects. Morocco is already a leader in air and port transportation links, but road and rail networks should be improved. As one participant said, “the traffickers are showing us the way” in terms of potential South-South trade.
4. Observations

This event was attended by more than 30 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received, as the commentary indicated, and CSIS will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of and expanding Morocco’s leadership efforts to expand programs and networks into Sub-Saharan Africa.

Attendees:

Jon B. Alterman: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Alexis Arieff: Congressional Research Service
Carolyn Barnett: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Alexandre Bilodeau: US Department of State
David Bloom: Moroccan American Center
Mary Ellen Connell: Center for Naval Analysis
Jennifer Cooke: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Richard Downie: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Alice Friend: US Department of Defense
Martin Kessler: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Mohsin Khan: Atlantic Council
Christopher Kisco: US Agency for International Development
William Lawrence: George Washington University
Haim Malka: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Peggy McKean: US Department of Defense
Karim Mezran Atlantic Council
Marina Ottaway: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Milena Sanchez de Boado: American Bar Association
Carrie Schenkel: International Republican Institute
Fatima Taki: US Department of Defense
Susan C. Tuttle: IBM
Bruno Versailles: International Monetary Fund
Maja Volk: US Department of Defense
Kathleen Walsh: The Stimson Center

Resolving Regional Conflicts: The Western Sahara and the Quest for a Durable Solution

Date: November 6, 2013

1. Title: “Resolving Regional Conflicts: The Western Sahara and the Quest for a Durable Solution”
Hosted by The Middle East Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center

Participants:

Bernabe Lopez-Garcia: Professor of Contemporary History of Islam, Autónoma University of Madrid
Anna Theofilopoulou: Independent political analyst, and writer; Former UN official and member of James Baker's negotiating team covering the Western Sahara conflict (1994-2006)
Marina Ottaway: Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
Haleh Esfandiari: Moderator: Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center

2. Overview

This panel discussion was the first in a series on the Western Sahara, as announced at the event, taking place on the 38th anniversary of the Green March. The panel discussed their observations of the Western Sahara dispute and the possibility of resolution scenarios for the conflict, including the autonomy plan introduced by Morocco.

3. Summary
Bernabe Lopez-Garcia began the session with a frank statement on the Western Sahara conflict; “we see no way to resolve it,” he said. His talk, in Spanish and translated into English for the audience, focused on the historical, legal and political development of the dispute. Lopez-Garcia spent much of his time on the Moroccan approach to the issue, associating it with an “ambiguous approach,” that suffers from a lack of open national debate, in turn stifled by an ongoing “taboo” on Western Sahara dialogue. Further, Lopez-Garcia frequently mentioned that misinformation and “demonizing”, admittedly from both sides, but with his comments focused on the Moroccan side, are reinforcing ideological entrenchment that makes resolution impossible. He added that Morocco “insists obsessively on an Algeria focus” on the issue, and that despite the obvious linkage, the Polisario has its own voice. The result is that the Western Sahara issues remains unresolved despite various diplomatic efforts, leaving a serious humanitarian crisis of “40,000-150,000” refugees in camps near Tindouf, Algeria.

Lopez-Garcia also spoke about Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan and recent political reforms, linking them both as signs of change deemed disingenuous by the Polisario. He noted that there has been no real progress on the negotiations and that human rights violations continue in the territory, undermining Morocco’s credibility on issues of governance and providing the Polisario with the opportunity to make human rights the basis of its international strategy (which it has done), an issues Morocco deems an affront to its sovereignty. Lopez-Garcia did state that the 2007 plan proposed some novel aspects, such as elections, broad legislative powers and an important amnesty provision, but argued that it did not sufficiently address the question of self-determination. He postulated that the 2011 reform of the Constitution would have been an opportune time to debate this idea of autonomy and offer something to the other side, described it as a “missed opportunity” because the Western Sahara was not mentioned, even though one small step was made with regard to Hassania culture being recognized in the Constitution. Lopez-Garcia was dire in his current assessment of the region and the rise of AQIM, but the geopolitics of the region have greatly changed, with the Arab Spring and the rise of AQIM, but the UN has not become more active in response, “refusing to take firm positions and push both parties,” by claiming that the conflict falls under Chapter 6 rather than Chapter 7 (with the latter allowing the UN to force a resolution,

Lopez-Garcia was more even-handed in his prescription for resolution, although he was pessimistic about the many obstacles inhibiting a resolution. First, there is misinformation on both sides about the nature of the problem. For example, Sahrawis feel that their voices have been marginalized, and northerners living in the territory believe that the Sahrawis have privileges and feel ill-will towards them. Timid steps, such as the CNDH, have been taken to mitigate this, but the local CNDH branches have not been very active. Second, Lopez-Garcia reiterated that Moroccan demonization of the Polisario also presents a serious obstacle, adding that the Polisario must likewise stop efforts to demonize the other side and remove its strict ideological control over the refugee population. Third, the role of Algeria – and whether or not the Polisario is truly independent of it – presents additional hurdles. Finally, there is no climate of confidence between the two parties – something that is essential for finding a solution to the conflict. He hinted that time might suddenly be an encouraging factor for change, given the emergence of a security threat in the Sahel that is causing greater desire on the part of Western Powers to have final resolution for the sake of border integrity and the fight against global terrorism. Additionally, both sides have suffered and made sacrifices and a mutual recognition of this could go some way in creating a shared understanding between the two parties.

In terms of moving forward, Lopez-Garcia argued that there was to be some type of referendum for the Sahrawis to express themselves independently of both the Polisario and Morocco, a requirement the 2007 autonomy plan acknowledges. If the details of such a referendum could be figured out, a negotiated political solution could be achieved. For the moment, however, the Polisario is not willing to play that game. Lopez-Garcia argued that maybe if Morocco acknowledged some of these issues and demonstrated true democracy in the Sahara, the Polisario may come to the table. However, he also added that the Polisario must “take a decisive step forward” in negotiations. Perhaps relaxing his initial despondency towards the outlook on a resolution, Lopez-Garcia said that “we (do) have formulas for Sahrawi democracy linked with Morocco,” which could help to end the conflict in a scenario that doesn’t create ‘winners and losers.’

Continuing on Lopez-Garcia’s mention of ‘winners and losers’ in a potential resolution, Anna Theofilopoulou began her comments by saying that the conflict is still in the same position as it was in 2004, when the UN weakened its support for the peace plan and shifted to achieving a mutually acceptable political solution. She reflected back to that time, stating that the UN plan was misguided because it presented a plan that didn’t offer a face-saving solution for both sides. She added that the UN allowed the parties to block the process, with the Polisario being the more obstructive of the two. Theofilopoulou suggested that the UN process was flawed from the beginning because it was more interested in resolution than the parties themselves, and the lack of real solutions was a symptom of this root problem.

Since 2004, the geopolitics of the region have greatly changed, with the Arab Spring and the rise of AQIM, but the UN has not become more active in response, “refusing to take firm positions and push both parties,” by claiming that the conflict falls under Chapter 6 rather than Chapter 7 (with the latter allowing the UN to force a resolution,
rather than mediate between the two parties). As a result, Morocco maintains its position in favor of negotiations on the basis of autonomy/sovereignty with a referendum on the final autonomy statute, and the Polisario maintains its insistence on a referendum with three options: integration, independence, and autonomy. Four rounds of formal and ten rounds of informal negotiations have thus achieved nothing.

So where to things stand now? Theofilopoulou argued that international civil society supports the Polisario based on legal arguments, but ignores political realities; the Polisario has a legal case and Morocco has a political case. Theofilopoulou reminded the audience that legal issues don’t offer much help towards resolution, saying that if the Western Sahara dispute was to be resolved by legal grounds, it would have been done so already, implicitly stating that a political resolution is the only feasible solution. Theofilopoulou’s description of the UN’s role in the process was one of an ‘enabler,’ providing cover for each side as they pursued inherently incompatible goals. She added that neither Morocco’s Polisario bashing nor the Polisario’s insistence on discussing the issue solely in terms of legality serves any practical purpose. Theofilopoulou stated that a resolution mainly requires the aforementioned ‘face-saving’ for both sides. She suggested that a return to the initial terms of the Baker Plan with an extended 10-year option for a vote on autonomy (rumored to be a CORCAS plan) as one of several options would provide sufficient political ‘cover’ for both sides to make a deal.

Marina Ottaway spoke mainly about how the Moroccan proposal for Western Sahara was essentially an “advanced regionalization” plan, which happened to include the disputed territory as one of the regions comprising Morocco, arguing that “it’s time to recognize that the autonomy plan isn’t all it’s cracked up to be.” “It is worth going back to the King’s speech” in the wake of the Arab Spring, she said, noting that the proposed decentralization was mentioned more prominently than the new constitution was, even though that was what people paid attention to at the time. She stressed that the only thing special for the Sahara is that it will be the first region to be decentralized. Ottaway expressed her dismay at this, noting, “I have nothing against decentralization, but this is not an autonomy plan.” She also argued that both sides are even less willing to compromise than before and the same goes for Algeria, although she expressed optimism that the “CORCAS plan” references by Theofilopoulou could work if there was a push from the UN.

Ottaway also addressed what she referred to as the new prevalence of “nebulous conflicts” in the world – intractable conflicts that are far beyond a solution based on legality and that require some alternative arrangement. Ottaway compared the Western Sahara dispute to similar autonomy conflicts in Kirkuk (Iraq) and Somaliland (Somalia), saying that these kinds of disputes are increasingly common. In these instances there is no real way to determine the “real, original inhabitants” and thus who has the legal right to vote. Ottaway predicted that more ambiguous solutions, such as de facto independence over time while under existing sovereignty or de facto annexation, will be increasingly common in similar conflicts. These solutions with avoid legal and political issues in favor of “facts on the ground” without legal recognition.

4. Q & A

Q: What is the validity of reports of terrorist recruitment and infiltration of the Polisario camps by AQIM?
A: (Theofilopoulou) There are no credible reports about AQIM activity in Western Sahara proper, but there is always the possibility of young, frustrated people resorting to terrorism.

(Ottaway) The intricacies of terrorist networks operating in the region are beyond our understanding, but there is no evidence of AQIM recruiting in the Tindouf camps, nor is there evidence that it isn’t. It is all too likely sooner or later.

(Lopez-Garcia) These reports are the result Morocco’s efforts to demonize the Polisario – this is what I have been consistently referring to. There is always the possibility of steps towards fundamentalism in the camps.

Q: (Nadine Hoffman, International Women’s Media Foundation) Could you discuss the role of lobbying in the conflict? Is it primarily obstructive to a resolution of the conflict?
A: (Ottaway) Of course...but what exactly can we do about it?

(Theofilopoulou) Lobbyists contribute to the hardening of position on both sides, because they can both say they have people on their sides.

(Lopez-Garcia) There is a saying “I’d rather talk to a radical than a lobbyist.”

Q: (David Ottaway, The Wilson Center) Could you clarify your earlier remark estimating the refugee population at 40,000 to 150,000 refugees?
A: (Lopez-Garcia) There is no census that would allow us to know – the UN doesn’t dare wade into the issue.

(Theofilopoulou) It is the Polisario and Algeria who do not allow the census. I am skeptical that 150,000 is a legitimate number. If the Spanish census was around 75,000 and half left, we are looking at around 35,000 and
then of course some expansion with families. The UN conclusion in 1999 was that there were around 100,000, but
“nobody really knows.”

Q: (Mohamed Yeslem Bissat) (Bissat was interrupted early in his comment with an insistence that he actually pose a
succinct question, as requested by the moderator. The exchange was back and forth, with Bissat demonstrating an
attitude with feigned politeness) Is it possible to have autonomy in a dictatorship?
A: (Lopez-Garcia) Of course not. Morocco is not currently a democratic regime, and the missed opportunity for
reform shows a country in stagnation or even regression in this regard.
(Ottaway) I don’t agree. It is indeed possible to have autonomy despite a lesser degree of democracy.

Q: (Eric Goldstein, Human Rights Watch) So should we just abandon the idea of a referendum on self-determination?
A: (Ottaway) Determining in practice who exactly should vote is not likely possible.

Q: (Gare Smith, Foley Hoag (did not identify himself as a lobbyist for Algeria)) Should the US just really set aside the
rule of law in dealing with the issue?
A: (Theofilopoulou) It is simply a question of political reality. Lip service will be paid, however, to certain principles.
(Lopez-Garcia) Morocco must be a country where the rule of law is respected first and foremost.

Q: (I. William Zartman, Johns Hopkins University) Can Spain’s experience with decentralization can help inform the
process in Morocco?
A: (Lopez-Garcia) The process is Spain is flawed and does not provide a lot of valuable lessons for this issue.

5. Observations

Approximately 80 scholars, experts, and advocates on both sides attended the event. Notably, UN Envoy Chris Ross
was in attendance, highlighting that the Wilson Center has a large draw with high-profile figures. Nadine Hoffman of
IWMF was also in attendance – a likely indication of IWMF engagement on this issue in the future. Overall, the
speakers were neutral on the issue and with regard to Morocco, though they primarily spoke about Morocco’s
alleged human rights violations and made little mention of those of the Polisario. Lopez-Garcia was largely critical of
Morocco’s role in the dispute, though he did take a few opportunities to blame both sides for certain malfeasance
and intransigence. The other two panelists approached the subject more dispassionately, with a comparative and
realist approach. Remarkably, Theofilopoulou’s positions on a referendum (and on Morocco’s position) seem to have
evolved toward a more practical, rather than legal, assessment of the conflict. Unfortunately, Ottaway’s views of the
autonomy plan have likewise evolved, and her pronouncements on the matter were wholly unhelpful. All panelists
held a similar lack of optimism towards the potential for resolution, yet they did have similar outlines for how a
potential settlement deal could be shaped and made feasible, mostly by moving forward based on political realities,
rather than legality. The audience was very eager to ask questions, though most panelist answers were repetitions
of their earlier comments. This was especially true in the case of the Bissat and Smith questions, which weren’t
received as entirely serious additions to the conversation. The behavior of pro-Polisario people at these events is a
continual validation of how not to act – the moderator and the panel expressed real annoyance with the Polisario
representative and did not appear to take him very seriously. By staying above the fray, Morocco will be taken more
seriously by experts working on these issues. It will be interesting to follow the Wilson series as it develops, and
while there is certainly room for improvement, there is also an opportunity for realistic, if not positive messaging on
Morocco’s position on the issue.

(Back to top)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Charting Morocco’s Reform Strategy

Date: November 20, 2013

1. Title: “Charting Morocco’s Reform Strategy”
   Hosted by the German Marshall Fund

   Participants:
   Mustafa el Khalifi: Minister of Communications, Morocco
   Nizar Baraka: President of CESE, Morocco
   Driss el Yazami: President of CNDH, Morocco
2. Overview

In the context of the King’s meeting with President Obama, several high level Moroccan officials presented their work on Morocco’s reform process. The speakers gave an overview of Morocco’s current situation and steps being taken to move forward. The 2011 Constitution was a common point of reference in all speakers’ presentations.

3. Summary

Minister El Khalfi began by saying that Morocco is currently facing two challenges, democratization and stability. In his opinion, Morocco is a model of engaging in reforms, succeeding in democracy, and providing strength and stability. The reason Morocco is able to do this is because it is following the “third path” between outright revolution and maintaining the status quo, which allows the country to enact reforms while preserving stability. There are three factors specific to Morocco that allow it to follow this third path. First, the King’s leadership, as seen in the 2011 speech and the 2011 election of a new government, which remains in power two years later. Second, the strength of civil society and political parties. There are many groups represented in the reform process and increased participation has led to the acceleration of reforms. Third, Morocco has a “culture of consensus,” which is to say there is a focus on finding common solutions to challenges.

Minister El Khalfi said that the new constitution represents the driving force for democratization, and that it has several obligations to implement, including making the courts more responsible and under less government oversight, reforming the press code, and increasing access to information. Another priority is increasing regionalization, including allowing the local population in the Western Sahara to manage its own affairs. There is also a need to increase protection of human rights and open the country to UN rapporteurs. Finally, freedom of the press is a priority. Minister El Khalfi claimed that there are “no journalists jailed” currently in Morocco and that “no website has been blocked by the government,” given that Lakome.com had been blocked at its owner’s request. He directed curious parties to examine Freedom House’s report on the internet, and said that most of the media is private in Morocco, with the government providing only “20% of all reports.” He closed with prospects for the future, namely broadening support for the above initiatives.

Nizar Baraka spoke on democracy and reforms. He also mentioned the need to improve independence of the judiciary and listed the reforms called for in the 2011 Constitution. He then turned to his own organization, the CESE, saying that it provides advice to the government on the basis of its 99 members, who represent unions, NGOs, and citizens. He described the CESE report on the Sahara, which took the form of a one year survey, as one built on consensus and neutral assessments. The report calls for the application of orderly law and notes that the GDP of Western Sahara actually beats the national average by 50%. This is deceptive, however, as the economy needs to be made more sustainable, and 30% of the GDP goes to administrative costs. He noted that unemployment is only 5% in Western Sahara, whereas the rest of the country has 9% unemployment. He took these figures as evidence that the development model has reached its limit, and that there needs to be a new model, designed by and for the local population, taking the form of regional councils elected on the principle of universal suffrage. A civil forum would then be held in each region, and the results would be applied to the development model. Baraka stated that CESE’s current goals are to spend $17 billion over the next 10 years to create 120,000 jobs, provide efficient social services, and promote the sustainable use of natural resources. To this end, there is a development fund to finance SMEs and a social fund to provide a safety net for those who need it. CESE also aims to improve skills and health care in the region. He closed by saying that these goals are “ambitious, realistic, and sustainable.”

Driss El Yazami then posed the rhetorical question as to whether Arabs can build democracy and improve human rights by themselves. In Morocco’s case, he noted that the path to democratization began in the mid 1990’s. The family code was released in 2004, the Royal Berber Institute was created in 2003, and there were public reconciliation hearings. El Yazami also referenced the 2011 Constitution and its requirements to increase human rights protections nationally. He closed by saying that justice reform is necessary and that the country is working hard to do so, but changing laws alone is insufficient.

Ambassador Serge Berdugo introduced himself as an Ambassador at Large and the President of the Jewish Committee. He spoke of the Moroccan exception, which he defined as equilibrium between cultures. He believes Morocco handled the Arab Spring in a “peaceful and responsible way,” thanks to Moroccan’s deeply rooted sense of identity. The next steps, in his opinion, are to build democracy and a market economy without radical solutions and to transform society without disturbing societal harmony. He made reference to Morocco’s strong civil society, citing
45 NGOs spending 8.8 billion dirhams with 1 million volunteers. He also praised the 2011 Constitution for establishing protection for Moroccan identities. Ambassador Berdugo closed by discussing religion, the King’s position as the religious authority, specifically in the Sunni Maliki rite, and the work he has done on behalf of the Jewish community, restoring synagogues and cemeteries. He also said the Moroccan Jewish community enjoys full civil rights and is an important part in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

4. Q&A

Q: (Diane Pollack, WINEP) Could you tell us more about the demonstrators? Who are they, what do they want, are there any patterns, and what have been your responses?
A: (Minister El Khalfi) 95% of it was social issues - employment, housing, health, and education. Morocco has 36 unions and a strong civil society. There are only 40-50 demonstrators each day. This is a social dialogue and it reflects Moroccan democracy.

(El Yazami) The number of protests was a high figure before the Arab Spring. They are asking for their rights, they want to negotiate. NGOs need to be more active.

Q: Can you say something on the integration of the Berber community? Has there been a backlash from Arab nationalists? What are the effects of the Berber reform?
A: (Minister El Khalfi) Berbers are not a minority group; they are a component of the Moroccan identity. We also have the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture, we are criminalizing discrimination, and we offer classes in Amazigh. The first Amazigh website started this year. We are also going to increase state aid by 20%. There is also the use of the Amazigh language in courts; we are aiming at full integration - political, economic, and cultural. So this is not a political issue.

(El Yazami) If you want more information, you can read the 2004 UNDP report on Morocco. We are having a public debate, and now educate people in three languages.

(Note: The moderator then took a round of questions, to which the speakers responded at choice.)

Q: (Eric Goldstein, Human Rights Watch) You mentioned Morocco’s model for Human Rights monitors, as well as reform of the press code and the penal code. Will you achieve those goals, and if not, why?
A: (Minister El Khalfi) We have had successes in education, the problem is of quality. Children get financial aid. We had a debate on the national language. As I said, we are criminalizing discrimination. The press code reform is my personal priority. We established a commission and received more than 100 recommendations; we are going to hold another on online media. We have started implementation of press reform: there is now legal recognition of online media. Then there is the issue of decriminalizing article 27. Article 28 says that “freedom of the press is guaranteed.” By the end of 2013, the first draft will be up for public debate. The Constitution says that Jews are a source of identity. We had public coverage for Yom Kippur. We are also training Malian imams to fight extremism. We also hosted a conference with UNESCO on the internet.

(Ambassador Berdugo) Morocco is on a quest for tolerance. We host 10 to 15 events promoting tolerance. People don’t know, but one of Morocco’s big exports is rabbis; there are Moroccan rabbis all around the world. Morocco is also a pioneer in the Middle East peace process to promote a peace that recognizes the rights of the Palestinians to a viable, dignified state. Morocco is not an actor, per se, but is certainly directing things from the pit.

Q: (Alexis Arieff, Congressional Research Service) My question is for Mr. Baraka. How does your proposal for Western Sahara differ from decentralization?
A: (Baraka) Our proposal is for autonomy. The other party prefers the status quo, but it is important not to leave the citizens waiting. In his speech on the 6th of November, 2012, the King said that it is time for a new development model and to implement regionalization throughout the country, but more so in Western Sahara. The Sahrawi people will have to be involved in government for three reasons. We need to develop a participative democracy. We
need agreement on what the regions need. Governance is insufficient; we need a development model to create an attractive economy. So we are targeting safety nets, valuing development over security, and working on long-term goals over short-term ones. This is an integrated strategy, based on human development, win ambition for a better future.

Q: (Ralph Nurnberger) What is the Human Rights situation in Western Sahara, and Tindouf?
A: (El Yazami) As for Tindouf and Human Rights commissions, there is one in Tantan, and despite the population being the same, international reporters focus on the Sahara, but less so on Tindouf because there is no access. We are working on these issues, though we still have problems. There is a national mechanism against torture, for example. The international community needs to monitor Tindouf on the same basis as Morocco. The RFK Center report is biased, as they spent two weeks in Western Sahara but only a few days in Tindouf.

(Minister El Khalfi) Look to the work of our conciliation commission. Morocco is open. Morocco is ready to deal with civil society, ready to work with the UN, but within our sovereignty. Dissenting opinions are tolerated. The government has even decided to financially support an opposition paper, because “democracy obliges us.” Algeria refuses to implement a UN census of the Tindouf camps. The Polisario is a one party system, based on ignoring human rights. NGO’s should examine the Polisario as well as Morocco.

5. Observations

The event was attended by approximately 50 foreign policy professionals. The presentations focused on Morocco’s reform efforts and centered on the 2011 Constitution. Each speaker elaborated on their personal areas of expertise, but given the large number of speakers and limited time allotted, comments were broader as compared to smaller events during the delegation. The reform strategy outlined was one of vision, consultation, deliberation, and ongoing action, stressing the accelerating pace and number of reforms as well as an honest self-assessment of areas for continued improvement.

Revolution and Political Transitions in North Africa

Date: November 21, 2013

1. Title: "Revolution and Political Transitions in North Africa"
   Hosted by Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) and the Maghreb Center

   Participants:
   **Osama Abi-Mershed**: Director, CCAS, Georgetown
   **Lahouari Addi**: Carnegie Centennial Fellow, Georgetown
   **Amira Aleya-Sghaier**: Professor, University of Tunis
   **Nejib Ayachi**: Founder and President, the Maghreb Center
   **Michael Hudson**: Director, Middle East Institute
   **Noureddine Jebnoun**: Adjunct Professor, CCAS, Georgetown
   **Ricardo René Laramont**: Professor, SUNY-Binghamton
   **Azzedine Layachi**: Professor, St. John’s University
   **Joseph Sassoon**: Visiting Professor, CCAS, Georgetown
   **Emad El-Din Shahin**: Professor, AUC

2. Overview

   This event was broken into three separate discussions, each with a question and answer session. The first focused on the army and police in transitions to democracy; the second on constitutions, elections, and their sequencing; and the third on youth and their interactions with secular and religious parties. The overarching theme of the discussions was the process of political transition and factors currently impeding it. Understandably, the roundtable focused on countries going through a transition, namely Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. A large portion of the first panel was also dedicated to Algeria.

3. Summary

   **Roundtable 1: Power: The Army and the Police in Transitions to Democracy**
Noureddine Jebnoun addressed political transformations in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia with a focus on the three main reasons that security services can hold up democratic transitions. First, limited institutionalization of the military creates political challenges. Ideally, the military would be a professional force. However, the situation in North Africa is not ideal. Factors limiting institutionalization include tribal/regional alliances, as in Libya; an imbalance between the regular army and intelligence services, as in Egypt; and the army as a social welfare system rather than a fighting force, as in Egypt. In Libya, following Gaddafi’s rise to power, the military was almost entirely composed of members of the Warfala tribe, until he passed leadership on to his son. In Egypt, the Global War on Terror has blurred the line between standard security services and counterterrorism, leading to confusion in leadership. Additionally, the Egyptian army has 2 million members, and what is essentially its own private economy.

The second reason is a changing concept of security. Over the past 50 years, there has been a transition in many countries from state-based security, i.e. making sure the country is not invaded, to human-based security, i.e. making sure citizens are free from want, fear, etc. In Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, the human-centric approach is missing, and the military is thereby preparing for attacks that most likely will not happen.

The third reason is misinterpretation of the meaning of civilian oversight. For example, Rachid Ghannouchi claimed that Ennahda had almost achieved Salafi control of the military. The military should not be “controlled” by a political party, but rather managed. Problems here include the military not trusting politicians, politicians using the military as a patronage system, and a lack of understanding of civilian control on the part of the military.

Jebnoun concluded by addressing specific issues in Egypt. He argued that these all fall under the heading of politicization of the security sector. He provided several examples to highlight this phenomenon. First, heads of police units were sacked by Morsi, leaving the police opposed to him and contributing to his ouster. Second, the judiciary is politicized, as is the new constitution which accords supremacy to the military (specifically articles 170-175). Third, corruption is a perennial problem, as is competition between the army and the police. Finally, the military co-opts popular movements, as evidenced in Morsi’s removal.

Layachi contextualized the Arab Spring as a response of the military to the street and focused his remarks on Algeria. In Algeria, the military is not only a security force, but “transformist,” implementing socialist policy on the economy and dominating political life. The presence of the military leads back to the War of Independence and military leadership of the country to the 1965 coup, although its position was significantly strengthened – and reformists tendencies weakened – after the failed “Algerian Spring” and subsequent civil war in the early 1990s. Layachi argued that Bouteflika has stayed in power not through his own will, but because he embodies civilian-military relations. The real leadership is, and has been, the intelligence services (DRS) and the question now is whether or not the DRS will allow Bouteflika a fourth term.

Addi further analyzed Algeria’s lack of an Arab Spring. According to his analysis, Algeria is currently post-Arab Spring, as that country had a failed popular uprising 20 years ago. He noted several factors that limit Algeria’s current transition to democracy. First, the failure of efforts to do so in 1992. Second, the fact that rising oil prices over the last decade have allowed the regime to buy off the populace. Third, since Boumedienne, the president has had no power; Bouteflika remains in power because he has given up trying to change things. Again, the DRS is in control, and it doesn’t matter if he lives or dies. Addi thus argued that democratic transition is unlikely because the people have firsthand experience what happens when civilians challenge the military. He ended with a quote from an Algerian author: “All states have an Army; Algeria is an Army that has a State.”

**Roundtable 2: Process: Constitutions, Elections, and their Sequencing in Transitions to Democracy**

**Participants:** Shahin, Hudson, Sassoon, Larémont (Moderator)

Larémont gave an opening statement by posing five framing issues for the discussion. 1) To what degree is an elite consensus required to create a democratic state? This happened in Spain and South Africa, but as of yet not in Libya or Tunisia. 2) Does the sequence of events, of elections, matter? They can be harmful, when held for their own sake. 3) Besides courts, are there effective institutions in the state? Effective legislatures? 4) The military must be subordinate. This is probable in Tunisia, impossible in Algeria, and difficult in Egypt. 5) Can the world system sustain the implosion of critical Arab States, by which I mean Egypt?

Shahin, who was at AUC during the revolutions, spoke on the process of democratic transitions with Egypt. In the old state, institutions were very strong, but as recent events have shown, now external actors can thwart transitions. The hope is the country will be able to move from moderate vs. radical to a free state where everyone can speak...
freely. However, there is little agreement on a prototypical democratic transition. Shahin outlined five essential characteristics for such a transition. First, there must be boundaries of the political system. Essential questions for such a system include: Will it define identity, will it be simply a state, will it have civil-military relations, and will it define religion? Second, there must be skilled and trained agents to guide the transition, or it will fall to old state institutions. Third, the economic conditions must be right. Fourth, there must be a process for the Constitution and a decision about whether the state will be presidential or parliamentary. Fifth, projects must be consistent. In Egypt, the rules have kept changing. Shanin concluded by making some pronouncements about the future. Assuming the roadmap continues, there will be instability until al-Sisi comes to power. If he doesn’t run, on the other hand, things will stabilize. However, if there is no dominant power, repression will continue. Shanin lastly speculated that it was possible that there may be an actual revolution or a restoration of the Muslim Brotherhood. At this point, anything is possible in Egypt.

Sassoon addressed the question of the role of the Army, saying that durability of institutions is not particular to the Arab Spring, but is applicable worldwide. In Egypt, the security apparatus has been durable pre and post-revolt, with no changed economic or business structures. However, the new regimes have not addressed the people’s grievances, namely 1) economic inequality and cronyism, and 2) youth unemployment. ther countries inherited weak institutions from colonial powers, and in the case of Libya, Gaddafi destroyed what institutions were left, leading to the current situation. Finally, Sassoon noted that elections do not solve problems, citing Iraq. Transitions are only successful with a middle class, and less government patronage, unemployment, and corruption.

Hudson warned not to concentrate on the process, as it can distract from the reality. As in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the saying is “all process, no peace.” Hudson also stressed the need to keep an eye on who is proposing the constitutions. In Egypt, elections were held first, but in Tunisia, there is a constitutional assembly that is effectively governing. It is also important to remember that not all groups see democracy as the goal. What the goal is may vary, but it will likely include a national identity, a central authority, and political capability in some political system. Democracy may be the second or third choice of some of the groups, but if everyone loses a little, then democracy will be left as there will be “no better alternative.“ The problem is, in Egypt at least, one side thinks it can have it all, without having to lose a little. The “winners” have missed out on the question of civil society; as they are in charge, they are wondering why there needs to be a transition at all. The fight between elites and counter-elites is a serious problem.

Roundtable 3: Moving Forward: Youth and their Interactions with Religious and Secular Parties
Participants: Larémont, Ayachi, Aleya-Sghaier, Abi-Mershed (Moderator)

Abi-Mershed gave some opening remarks, stating that North African youth are stuck in a pre-adult state, due to unemployment and other factors. He presented two framing questions for the discussion: Can there then be a political transition with the youth stuck as they are? Can the youth play any role beyond street protests?

Ayachi qualified the Arab Spring as a primarily peaceful youth movement - not anti-West, not anti-Israel, not pro-Islam, but largely non-ideological. The demands were for more transparency and less authority, as well as an acknowledgement of the youth. Now, what do the Islamists propose in return? More authority. At present, there is thus a clash of values with the young protesters calling for freedom and the Islamist responding with authority. The Islamists have also not made any consistent political or economic proposals and have no answer to the question of unemployment. They say they value justice, but there has been no reform of the judiciary in Tunisia, in Egypt, or elsewhere. Ayachi concluded by noting that where Islamists are in power, they keep the same government structure and refuse to reform.

Aleya-Sghaier argued that the Arab Spring uprisings were revolts, not revolutions – a revolution involves someone new coming to power. He then turned to the topic of youth in Tunisia. The youth made up the Tunisian revolution, but those in power today are older (of the 217 representatives, only 10 are youth). Some people even miss Ben Ali, because under him economic conditions were better. The Tunisian youth are now facing having to leave the country for work. This is a sign of the complete failure of those in power in Tunisia. However, they insist on staying in power despite their failures. In closing, Aleya-Sghaier lamented about the sad state of the revolution.

4. Q&A

Roundtable 1

Q: Can you comment on the military in Libya and Tunisia, or do those states have a lack of security services?
A: (Jebnoun) The Libyan uprising was not national, but a collection of local uprisings. Without the NATO no-fly zone,
Gaddhafi would still be in power. There are something like 225 militias in Libya. The problem there is that there is no army, but thousands of colonels, leaders without units! We speak of the DDR process: demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate. This is what will have to happen in Libya, but what we have now are incompetent rebels who believe they liberated the country from Gaddhafi! In Tunisia, on the other hand, there is an army, but it is currently marginalized, as it is apolitical and professional.

(Addi) That is an asset in Tunisia, the apolitical army.

(Layachi) In contrast, in Algeria, the Army controls the state.

Q: (Michael Hudson) Is Egypt replicating the Algerian events of 1992, or will it perhaps follow the Turkish model?
A: (Addi) Unfortunately, Egypt is taking the same path. I foresee no democratic elections for the next 2-3 years, and it is still possible there will be an Islamist victory. In Egypt, you have the same groups, the army, urbanites, and Islamists.

(Layachi) There is less of a taste for violence in Egypt than there was in Algeria. Remember, in the FIS, we had “Afghans” (jihadis returning from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan) mobilized and ready to fight, but in Egypt there is a strong resistance to violence. The best case is Egypt looks at Algerian history, and says no. I agree it will take 2-3 years, but I foresee the Turkish model.

Q: (Ex-member, FIS) The Algerian army confiscated, didn’t create, the state. It is a myth that the army was liberators. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
A: (Addi) We could have an endless debate on the nature of the Algerian army; but in 1962 it was divided. In any case, the state was created by violence against the colonial power.

(Layachi) In Algeria, the problem is that we don’t know where the buck stops. The Algerian army needs open leadership for people to know who decides what. In short, the Army needs institutionalization.

(Addi) In Egypt,, the intelligence services belong to the Army. In Algeria, the DRS is the most powerful and controls the rest of the military.

Roundtable 2

Q: Do you see fair elections or continued resistance in Egypt?
A: (Shahin) Egyptians have to sit down and talk. There is no other way. The only other option is violent confrontations and economic collapse. One side thinks that they’re winning, but in order to move forward, they have to negotiate an inclusive, pluralistic system. Right now the military is “insisting to be on the wrong side of history.”

Q: Will the military negotiate with the Muslim Brotherhood? Are the Brotherhood ready to make concessions?
A: (Shahin) Well, Egyptian media sees it the other way around. The Muslim Brotherhood is making concessions! The Brotherhood is willing to negotiate, but at what price? Their money has been confiscated, their leadership has been jailed, and they have been banned as a party. So you see the position from which they have to negotiate.

Roundtable 3

Q: (Ex-member, FIS) You must not stereotype Islamists!
A: (Larémont) We are not trying to define any group, but look at the ideological fracturing of society. There has been a decline in support for Islamist groups. That is not to say there is no support for Islamists, they still do have some significant support, but it is not unanimous. Finally, “there is no way forward from chaos other than compromise.” All groups need to realize that they have to work together.

Q: Are there any other ways of speaking of “the youth?” Is it possible to see the youth as stakeholders rather than just a demographic group?
A: (Aleya-Sghaier) In response to the first question, the Islamists in Tunisia took power through elections, but out of a population of 8 million, there were only 1 million votes, so you cannot say they have overwhelming support. In response to the second question, it doesn’t matter how old someone is; it’s not people between 18 and 35, it’s people who are out campaigning for transparency and a better future.

5. Observations

When the roundtable began, there were around 35 participants; latecomers increased the number to around 50. Due to the length of the event, the number had dwindled to around 20 by the end. There was a rough mixture of half students and academia and half community members and professionals. The event was quite disjointed. Several of the participants appeared unaware of the event’s format; a roundtable is generally intended for unprepared discussion, whereas certain participants gave extensive prepared remarks. This necessitated restructuring on the
part of the moderators, with later speakers’ time cut short to provide time for Q&A. The Q&A was similarly unruly; individuals did not announce themselves, and certain among them acted as though they were participating in the roundtable.

The discussions were interesting, but several strayed from their purported topics. Speakers tended to analyze events from their country of expertise, making conversation difficult. Understandably, there was no mention of Morocco. The analysis of Algeria was very thorough, and one of the few points of fruitful discussion among panelists.

Advancing the New US-Morocco Strategic Partnership

Date: November 21, 2013

1. Title: “Advancing the New US-Morocco Strategic Partnership”
   Hosted by the Atlantic Council Africa Center

   Participants:
   Fred Kempe: President and CEO, Atlantic Council
   Stuart Eizenstat: Executive Committee Member, Atlantic Council
   Salaheddine Mezouar: Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Morocco
   Nizar Baraka: President of CESE, Morocco
   Miriem Bensalah Chaqroun: President, General Federation of Moroccan Enterprises
   Mohamed Salah Tamek: Chief of Staff, Minister of the Interior, Morocco
   Ahmed Abbadi: Secretary General, Muhammadan League of Scholars
   Assia Bensalah Alaoui: Ambassador at Large, Morocco
   Peter Pham: Moderator: Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council

2. Overview

   This event was held in the context of King Mohammed VI’s meeting with President Obama. The discussion largely focused on specific Moroccan attributes and activities that make that country a beneficial partner to the United States, along with a positive outlook for the ongoing Strategic Dialogue. Eizenstat praised Morocco for its commitment to being a good partner, while Minister Mezouar noted the steps that need to be taken for Morocco to ensure stability in North Africa. The question and answer session was brief and reflected the positive tone of the speakers.

3. Summary

   Dr. Peter Pham opened with a description of the Africa Center’s aims, notably informing decision makers of Africa’s strategic importance. He welcomed Foreign Minister Mezouar and the delegation and complimented Morocco’s management of regional security and development challenges. He ceded the floor to Fred Kempe.

   Fred Kempe re-emphasized the Atlantic Council’s mission, saying that it is more important now than ever, due to the increased pace of political change, to expand the Atlantic group and for the US to understand the strategic importance of Morocco. He hoped the King’s visit would be held in the spirit of intelligent collaboration. Kempe noted that The Africa Center has always had a link to Morocco, because it is “a unique place between Europe, America, and Africa.” He then introduced Eizenstat, who launched the US-North Africa Economic Partnership, also known as the Eizenstat Initiative.

   Stuart Eizenstat underscored the exceptional nature of the King’s visit, and expressed his personal commitment to Morocco and developing economic connections with that country, including his work with Ambassador Gabriel. While frequently “the Maghreb falls between the political cracks,” Eizenstat believes the US-Morocco relationship is now more important than ever due to tensions in the Middle East. Eizenstat recounted the shared values between the US and Morocco, including diversity and religious tolerance, and the willingness to work on societal problems. He praised Morocco’s commitment to improving growth and expanding democracy, as well as supporting human rights. Eizenstat called Morocco an isle of stability in the arc of instability that actively works to promote a better world. He listed many US companies with ties to Morocco as an example of Morocco’s outward reaching policy to “reinforce peace, stability, and shared growth.”
He then gave a partial list of reforms, including the new Constitution, free and fair elections, the creation of the CNDH, education and employment initiatives, and the protection of women's rights. He noted that Morocco is one of the largest recipients of an MCC grant. He cited the Southern Provinces Development report as a sign that Morocco is a willing partner for reform. He closed with a list of strategic areas that would benefit from US-Morocco cooperation, including the need to tackle AQIM, monitor Iran, end the Syrian conflict, promote rule of law in the Maghreb, including an end to closed borders and unproductive divisions, support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and bolster regional stability. As for the US, Eizenstat expressed his hope to see increased economic exchange in the context of the Free Trade Agreement. Eizenstat noted that the shared values and common purpose of the US and Morocco will help to confront these aforementioned strategic challenges.

Minister Mezouar thanked the council for their welcome and their objective, sincere descriptions of Morocco, which he believes reflect Morocco’s choice to make an open, democratic state in a changing world. He described Morocco as a country with clear leadership that guarantees stability, as well as a country of institutions working to reinforce liberties. In his analysis, Morocco weathered the Arab Spring through turning to development, reform, and openness, in addition to the intelligence and mutual respect of the Moroccan people. He then turned to analyzing Islam and democracy, stating that in Morocco, “a party ran, it came first in the elections, and it now rules.” Minister Mezouar said that Moroccan Islam in particular values moderation and balance, and is therefore compatible with democracy, and that the Moroccan example proves it is possible to have democracy and religious belief.

Minister Mezouar next addressed the Morocco-US relationship, stating that those two countries have shared convictions, interests, and strategic visions. In his opinion, the Strategic Dialogue is a means for the countries to improve their relationship. On a personal note, Minister Mezouar said that this was his first official visit to the United States, and it made him realize just how sincere the relationship between the countries is. He underscored that United States judges countries based on their actions, and Morocco is a country that acts. Minister Mezouar said that “when His Majesty makes an engagement, he respects it. When Morocco decides to do something, it does it.”

Minister Mezouar continued with the topic security and Morocco’s foreign policy. He discussed Libya, as stabilizing that country is of interest to the United States as well as Morocco, recounted Morocco’s promotion of dialogue to resolve the Syrian Civil War and support of Russo-American diplomacy in Syria; and mentioned Morocco’s efforts to stabilize the Sahel, specifically in Mali. He summed up Morocco’s worldview as a country that “acts where it is necessary, in Africa and the Middle East, to help friends and overcome challenges. Morocco has the goal of being a strong regional actor that values democratic values. We want to share this effort for stability and development in Africa with the US.” Minister Mezouar then summarized a list of means Morocco uses to achieve these ends, including human development, foreign investment, and economic support, in addition to security. Minister Mezouar closed by saying that he was certain the meeting between King Mohammed and President Obama would confirm all these things, and that Strategic Dialogue is the way forward. Minister Mezouar then introduced the other members of the delegation.

Nizar Baraka spoke on the economic relationship between Morocco and the US. He noted that while Morocco-US trade has doubled over the past 10 years, it only represents 10% of Moroccan trade, adding that US investments in Morocco were only 5% of the total. Looking forward, Baraka said that Morocco is positioned to be an industrial exporter and is a favorable environment for investment. He cited an IMF figure that expects 5% growth over the next year, which would be highest in the MENA region. Baraka mentioned the potential for green energy in Morocco, including the Ouarzazate solar plant, and that Morocco aims to cover half of its energy needs domestically with renewables by 2020. He then echoed Minister Mezouar’s comments on how Morocco stabilizes neighboring countries, citing the fact that Morocco is the top African investor in Central and West Africa. Baraka closed by saying that Morocco is strategically positioned as a bridge between the United States and African and MENA countries.

Miriem Bensalah Chaqroun, discussed business development in Morocco. After expressing her optimism for the King’s meeting with Obama, Chaqroun gave a few examples of the delegation’s private sector activity, including signing an MOU with the US Chamber of Congress and planning to host two meetings in Morocco for the American business community. She praised the speed of developing business relationships between US and Morocco. She also described the successes of Moroccan entrepreneurship, especially in Africa. Maroc Telecom, for example, is doing very well. In terms of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, Morocco is second only to South Africa. Chaqroun said that the reasons for Morocco’s business success are not only that the country has good infrastructure and everything necessary to do business, but also that Morocco is always improving, in business, democracy, human rights, and security.

Dr. Mohamed Salah Tamek began by thanking Kempe and Minister Mezouar for their speeches, and not leaving him
anything to say, except to praise Morocco for its ability to convert intellectuals into security people. Dr. Tamek went in to more depth explaining the commonalities between Moroccan and American objectives, saying that they are made up of three components: promoting democratic change, providing economic opportunity, and ensuring regional security. Looking forward, the broader goal is enhancing the chance that moderates will shape the future of the region rather than extremists. There is also a common set of values between the US and Morocco, including respect for rule of law, peaceful inclusivity, protecting fundamental rights, a focus on building democratic institutions, and vibrant civil society.

Dr. Tamek then listed some current challenges in North Africa, including the Northern Malian insurgency, the persistence of terrorist threats, AQIM terrorist networks operating across the Sahel, and the emergence of al-Mourabitoun. In Dr. Tamek’s analysis, Belmokhtar is trying to create a new Islamic state from Morocco to Egypt. Boko Haram is also a significant threat, trained and guided by AQIM. Another is Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The possibility that geographically distant, yet ideologically similar groups could create a network of mutual support is a real threat. Dr. Tamek echoed Minister Mezouar’s position on Syria, recalling that Morocco hosted a Friends of Syria meeting and can play a role in resolving that crisis. He also recounted that when Eric Holder was in Morocco a few weeks earlier, they discussed training and tracking programs to confront international jihadists. He closed by saying that Eizenstat's recommendations are good ones to take.

Ahmed Abbadi noted that certain political analysts believed the primary focus of international relations was to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but the fact remains that the DNA for solutions to current problems lays in the Atlantic region. Abbadi again made reference to Morocco’s unique geographic position as the door to the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. He said that the reason Morocco is so open was the choice of following the Maliki rite 1200 years ago, as well as the fact that Moroccan Sufism is practiced throughout Africa, which gives Morocco and other African countries the opportunity to work together to counteract extremism. Abbadi urged Morocco and the US to cooperate on education, since culture is the content to give alternatives to hate.

Assiah Bensalah Alaoui who introduced herself as Ambassador at Large for the Kingdom of Morocco. She expressed her belief that the King is anxious to offer a better future not only to Moroccans, but also to Africa and beyond. She agreed with Minister Mezouar in stating that Morocco is the perfect partner for the US in addressing security in North Africa. Alaouli recognized that the road to realizing the reform goals set out in the 2011 Constitution would be a long one. Looking forward, she said that in addition to being a historical ally of the United States, Morocco can be the loyal partner to developing the future of the region. Morocco will succeed thanks to its vibrant civil society, determined women, and determined, loyal youth who recognize the power of Moroccan leadership. She highlighted that Morocco is a valuable partner at this point in time, with the ambition to go beyond bilateral relations, as presently European and US influence are declining in Africa, with China is rising. Economically and politically, Morocco is “punching above its weight” and has the potential to help mend the transatlantic relationship.

4. Q&A

Q: (Gen. William Ward, former head of AFRICOM) It’s easy for me to understand why the US and Morocco have been great partners. Could you offer some prescription for Morocco to achieve regional successes? We know the US cannot do it all, but with partners, those goals are achievable. How does Morocco see its role in the region for accomplishing the goals you laid out?

A: (Dr. Tamek) You are right to raise the point of cooperation, things the US cannot do alone, and these are things we have been working on since the last meeting of the Strategic Dialogue. The Moroccan approach is multifaceted. Other methods of dealing with terrorism include economic development, education in the Maliki rite, developing education, human development, rights for minorities and women, and including people of all faiths. You cannot face these things in binaries between good and evil, this is what we are telling our friends in Mali, so that this region will not be a bastion for terrorism, but might be a bastion for peace. (Minister Mezouar) To give concrete examples on Morocco’s approach, I’ll take up Mali. In Mali, there is a problem called the North. Morocco naturally has good relations with the democratically elected government, the president, but also with the movement in the North. Morocco is working to maintain dialogue between the two groups. It is fundamental to preserve the dialogue to preserve national unity. Morocco is also working in the humanitarian sector because the conflict touches the average Malian. Morocco is also working in the spiritual sector, bringing 500 Malian imams to Morocco for religious instruction. Morocco transfers its expertise in human development. Morocco also has agricultural expertise it is sharing with Mali. Morocco gives its competence and aids cultural development, both for traditional and modern cultures. I give these examples to say it is possible, and that the problems Mali is facing are common: how to transform society? How to help immigration? How to implement strategic development? How to reassure security? Many countries have resources and expertise, but the reality and results are not ideal. What is needed is an approach tailored to the specificities of Africa. For example, most commerce is conducted in traditional markets. If
we want to reassure, stabilize, and make an inclusive dialogue, we have to include the population - to work with the population is the only guarantee of stabilization. Because there are those who exploit misery and transform it into a threat. Securing the country is important and urgent. Morocco is training the security workers in Libya, but this approach is of a different dimension. What is necessary is to approach the reality of the people and reassure the population with community engagement.

Q: (Charles Dahan, VP World Federation of Moroccan Jews) We should work on the exchange of education between the US and Morocco. It is important we have a transmission of knowledge between the US and Morocco to advance higher education. That will transform the economy. Investment, building new factories, and creating jobs in Morocco will be essential, and in order to build good investment, you have to build a good knowledge base.

A: (Minister Mezouar) I agree. In the field of training, Morocco has something like 10,000 places for training, in universities and schools, of which 7,000 are funded by the Moroccan government. There is also professional development and administration training, like customs, finance. Each sector participates in training in its own program. This is equally supported by the Moroccan private sector. This is a fundamental dimension, and as noted in many countries, those that have adopted Morocco’s path are in what is called “the economic emergence.” And since we have gone through this experience we can put in place a strategy to identify needs in competencies. So we oriented training to the needs of the market of today and the market of tomorrow. So we provide our expertise to obtain concrete results. But Africa has changed. It has exceptional elites at every level. It has great competence, affirmed by private sector success. But there is a new generation, economic and political, and stereotypes have closed the world’s eyes to this transformation or development. One must have confidence in Africa and Africans that we will put in place good mechanisms, because success must come from within, it cannot be imposed from without. We must let society produce the elements of development.

5. Observations

This event was attended by approximate 90 foreign policy professionals and members of both the American and Moroccan media, who conducted interviews in the hallway before and after the event. It was one of the major events of the delegation, which took on a tone of celebrating the past and future of the US-Morocco relationship. Given the namesake of the host think-tank, the speakers aimed to bring about more awareness of Morocco as a keystone of the transatlantic relationship. Speakers lauded the leadership in Morocco that has led to a serious commitment to reform and to improving security and human development across the region and the continent. The question and answer session was brief (two questions) and reflected the positive tone of the speakers.

Video of the event is available here.

A Strategy for American Engagement in the Middle East with Rep. Adam Smith

Date: December 5, 2013

1. Title: A Strategy for American Engagement in the Middle East with Rep. Adam Smith
   Hosted by NDN

   Participants:
   Rep. Adam Smith: Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee
   Simon Rosenberg: Moderator: President & Founder, NDN

2. Overview

This event invited a leading voice on US foreign policy in Congress to discuss the future of US policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Rep. Smith serves on the House Armed Services Committee and is very well versed in foreign affairs, security, and the MENA region. He spoke on current affairs such as Syria and Egypt, as well as more broadly on how the US could improve its prospects for policy outcomes in the region. There were several questions asked and answered before the Congressman had to leave.

3. Summary
After a brief introduction of the guest of honor, Rep. Smith began detailing priorities for US policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Dealing with the “youth bulge” and the economics of creating employment and upward mobility are paramount for US goals in the region, he said. There is equal threat and promise inherent in a young population. He added that the US needs to work with companies to encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to create economic opportunity. Rep. Smith concluded that policymakers lose sight of that a bit when the focus is fixated on politics and security. Despite some assertions that poverty doesn’t lead to extremism, Rep. Smith stated that he believes strongly in this connection, and that it should be a priority for foreign policy.

It has been suggested that growing pessimism amongst policymakers and the American public regarding foreign policy outcomes will result in a significant de-emphasis of the MENA region in US policy. Rep. Smith stated that the US must continue to be engaged, but that expectations must be tempered with the knowledge that a limited role will be most effective. No country can magically fix another country with a policy, he said. In addition, there is a persistent mistrust of the US in the region. Policymakers should thus be realistic, though optimistic, about expected outcomes.

Most of all, US policy needs more clarity. Focusing on economic opportunity, political freedom, stability, and discouraging extremism, the US needs to be honest and open about its balance of principles and priorities in the region – much more so than it has, Rep. Smith said. “We need to help our friends in the region more than we have.” He added that the US cannot afford to neglect MENA nor be unclear as to what our policies are.

4. Q&A

Q: What are your short-term concerns with current US policy?
A: The manner in which we interact with our allies in the region, characterized by a lack of clarity, concerns me most. There isn’t really any “perfect way” to handle foreign policy, and in the case of Syria’s chemical weapons, the US “stumbled into an okay place.” There is still much room for improvement.

Q: (Ed Kutler, Managing Director at Mercury) Is withholding military aid an effective policy tool?
A: Military aid is a good way to build and maintain relationships between countries, but what recourses are available when countries don’t meet policy standards? Policymakers need to be aware of multiple priorities and the unlikelihood of direct outcomes from such actions.

Q: (Nelson Cunningham, Chair of the Latin America Policy Initiative at NDN) Is there a possibility of shifting priorities from military aid to economic aid with regard to US aid to Egypt?
A: US emphasis here has been generally unbalanced in that regard. Much of the aid ends up going towards the purchase of American weaponry, resulting in a credible industrial consideration that can’t be ignored.

Q: Could you please address obstructionism in Congress against certain foreign policy goals, notably the threat of new sanctions against Iran?
A: The case for aid needs to be made better, especially in Congress. There is also an ideological dimension at play, given that investment at home has continued to decrease as well. Increasing sanctions against Iran would be a huge mistake, despite my personal belief that Iran will never be a good actor on the international scene.

Q: Does US aid have any real impact?
A: Credibility is paramount to foreign policy and aid and help during crisis does actually play a role in increasing that credibility.

5. Observation

This event was attended by approximately 30 foreign policy professionals. NDN is looking to raise the profile of its relatively new MENA initiative, using political connections to bring in policymakers and help shape the conversation. Questions seemed to reflect similar ideologies for improving US policy as those of Rep. Smith. The event was also open to the press and streamed online on the NDN website.
Fall 2013 Events Bulletin

September 16
Egypt’s Impact on Maghreb Political Dynamics

September 27
Roundtable on Morocco after the Arab Uprisings: Evolution rather than Revolution

October 1
Roundtable on the Cultural Heritage of Morocco

October 10
Why Moroccan Protests Failed

October 11
Morocco’s New Geo-Economics

October 22
Morocco’s Role in Regional Security and Development

October 25
Morocco’s Strategic Engagement in Africa

November 6
Resolving Regional Conflicts: The Western Sahara and the Quest for a Durable Solution

November 20
Charting Morocco's Reform Strategy

November 21
Revolution and Political Transitions in North Africa

November 21
Advancing the New US-Morocco Strategic Partnership

December 5
A Strategy for American Engagement in the Middle East with Rep. Adam Smith
Egypt’s Impact on Maghreb Political Dynamics

Date: September 16, 2013

1. Title: “Egypt’s Impact on Maghreb Political Dynamics”
   Hosted by CSIS Middle East Program

   Participants:
   Ellen Lust: Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale
   William Lawrence: former Director, North Africa Project, International Crisis Group

   Opening Remarks:
   Jon Alterman: Director, CSIS Middle East Program

   Moderator:
   Haim Malka: Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS Middle East Program

2. Overview

   As part of the Middle East program’s coverage of the Arab Spring, this event brought together a political scientist, Lust, and a North Africa expert, Lawrence, to examine the question of how the people of North Africa interpret the events of the past year in Egypt. This question was the starting point for the examination of the national characters of the Maghreb countries and their people, including what they do and do not want in government and also their own identities.

3. Summary

   Alterman was brief in his introductions, and set out the topic question very straightforwardly: how do people in North Africa interpret what is happening in Egypt?

   Lust focused exclusively on Libya and Tunisia, and then laid out the argument that whether transition is seen optimistically or pessimistically depends on whether the observer has had positive or negative examples of consequences of change in the past. Her reasoning in using Libya and Tunisia was that the two countries are at the same point in their transitions, which have followed a process of initial euphoria, followed by political bickering, and now general frustration. The difference between the two countries is that while Tunisians are primarily divided in their opinions of the relationship between religion and the state, Libyans are divided by regionalism. Another difference is one of relative strength. In Libya, because no one group of actors has an overwhelming majority, they make up for this shortcoming through the use of arms. This, combined with a lack of institutional authority, leads to the inability of any one group to act unilaterally, as was the case in Egypt. In Tunisia, the Assembly has stayed in session, but has been unable to provide services for the people, leading radicals to fill gaps left by the state. In both countries, a key lesson from Egypt is for actors to stop and take stock of the situation and act deliberately, rather than pressing ahead recklessly, as the Egyptians did.

   Lawrence prefaced his extensive remarks by pointing out that there is a disconnect between how Egyptians see Egypt and how the rest of MENA does. Egypt is generally seen through the filter of Islamism: if observers have negative feelings about Islamism, then they have a nuanced position; if positive, then they are more pro-Morsi. Lawrence also pointed out that analysts of the Arab Spring are often too focused on the revolutionary aspect, and not enough on its effect of attempting to overcome old dichotomies, such as religious/secular, socialist/capitalist, etc. Another frequent misinterpretation is that the most recent Egyptian
revolution was primarily in opposition to Morsi, while it was in truth more economically motivated.

Lawrence argued that Tunisia is closest to Egypt, but that there are important differences between the former’s Constitutional Democratic Rally and the latter’s National Democratic Party. He also believes that the Tunisian constitutional experiment is potentially most threatened by events in Egypt. Like in Egypt, the ruling party, Ennahda, has aligned itself with Salafists. However, Tunisia still has the potential for the best outcome.

Lawrence discussed Algeria, but only briefly. He mentioned that in Algeria, any discussions of transition are filtered through past conflicts with Islamism. He estimated that Morocco is more similar to Egypt than Algeria, but not as similar as Tunisia. His evidence for this is twofold. Firstly, the PJD has experience ruling through coalition. Secondly, a powerful elite keep the economy under control, in Egypt the military, in Morocco the Makhzen. This arrangement is “keeping things on track in Morocco.” The Makhzen used the PJD to survive the Arab Spring, and so Morocco has remained relatively stable. There are however rumors that reforms were enacted too quickly, and that perhaps too much was ceded to the people.

Finally, in Libya’s case, the federalists and secularists are emboldened by events in Egypt. Libyans are highly secular, votes for Islamist parties are consistently low, and the salafists are out of the political arena, hence their use of arms. In summary, one thing most groups have in common is a desire to avoid what is happening in Egypt presently.

4. Q & A

Malka asked about the nature of centrist and reformist movements in the region. Lawrence responded that in Morocco cleavages tend to be generational, with al Adl wal Ihssane coming out to support the 20th February Movement, but not participate in it. As in the other Arab Spring countries, he sees this as an example of the youth believing that they can build a better future. Lust believes that while there is a public demand for centrist movements, political parties are increasingly polarizing, and thereby not making grassroots gains. Lawrence agreed and said that this is why there is a disconnect between the youth and organized parties.

Q: (David Mack, Middle East Institute) To what extent do Islamist and secular elites in the Maghreb look to Turkey in the past two decades or Egypt in the past 2 years?
A: (Lawrence) The Erdogan model is dying. The countries are looking for other models. (Lust) Tunisia had been pro Erdogan, but less so now that he has become more authoritarian.

Q: (Zack Gold, Brookings Institution) To what extent are jihadi or salafist calls to be active in Egypt influencing North Africa?
A: (Lawrence) What do you mean by salafists? The scientific salafists are growing, but the political salafists are not making any gains, and then there are the jihadi salafists. There’s also a blurring between what jihadi means in the US and what it means in North Africa. Our categories block us from understanding. They are useful only as ideal types. And jihadi are often jihadi more due to their personal lives than to politics; they have bad breakups with their girlfriends and then go fight in Syria.

Q: (Dan Sisnoi, Tel Aviv University) You mentioned how Nahda the party is involved in the transition. What about the voters?
A: (Lawrence) Well, like in Algeria in 1991, you vote for the group you fear less. There were young, idealistic supporters, beautiful young people who wanted to un-corrupt Tunisia. 1.5 million people voted for Nahda, 1/3 of the total votes. Some voted for them because they
had family reasons, some because they thought it was the least corrupt party, but Nahda’s popularity has decreased by half.
(Lust) Even in comparison to its supporters, to the general public, Nahda is more for a close relationship between religion and the state than the public. The public wanted to make sure the revolution succeeded, and thought that Nahda could stop any backsliding.

**Q:** (Ricky Goldstein, HRW) Can Tunisia have an impact on Egypt? Are there any lessons from Tunisia in 2011 that Egyptians could learn from?

**A:** (Lawrence) I wrote an article on lessons from Algeria that apply to Egypt. Now Egyptians are the last to admit that they want to learn, and they are not amenable at all to learning from Tunisia. Egyptians are proud that they had a revolution, but unhappy that they came in second. But there are lessons, constitutional debates, judicial and secular reform, and so on.

(Lust) I want to note that I believe the beginning of the Egyptian coup was in June, when Parliament was disbanded. But as for lessons from Tunisia, start with the Assembly, and don’t rush reforms.

5. **Observations**

Around 50 people were in attendance, roughly 2/3 professionals and 1/3 students or interns. While there were disagreements on interpretation, the tone of the roundtable was cordial and informative. Lawrence in particular offered a noticeably unbiased account of events, supporting his statements with either polling data or repeating directly what he had heard from informants in the region. The event was light on Morocco-specific information, but as an analysis of the Maghreb not focused entirely on Egypt, the event covered many lesser-known and unexplored aspects of the Arab Spring.

(Back to top)

---

**Roundtable on Morocco after the Arab Uprisings: Evolution rather than Revolution**

Date: September 27, 2013

**1. Title:** “Roundtable on Morocco after the Arab Uprisings: Evolution rather than Revolution”

Hosted by the Fund for Peace

**Participants:**

**Professor Ricardo René Larémont:** Professor of Political Science, Binghamton State University of New York

**J.J. Messner:** Moderator: Senior Associate, the Fund for Peace

**2. Overview**

This event, the first in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors to include recommendations for US policy actions to support Morocco, began with a review of the draft paper on the topic presented by Professor Larémont and was then open to general discussion. The goal of the series is to encourage a number of topical papers in advance of the King’s visit to build interest in the Morocco-US relationship and existing and potential benefits of greater bilateral cooperation.
3. Summary

As an academic and an analyst, Larémont is most comfortable in presenting a historical and comparative framework for viewing the transitions ongoing in the Arab world. When addressing this topic, he looked for common threads among countries in transition. He was quite complimentary of how King Mohammed VI, in his ability to understand the needs of the Moroccan people, responded so quickly to the initial demonstrations, continuing a process that he began early in his reign. The central core of his argument was that monarchies with religious legitimacy have more “symbolic capital” over time than republican regimes, which eventually lose support because they do not respond effectively to rising expectations.

In comparing Morocco and Spain, Larémont noted the importance of an alliance between a progressive monarch and liberal elites who support reforms. He believes that the US foreign policy is experiencing dissonance because of the push back from Iraq and Afghanistan, where good intentions did not make effective policy. Larémont also noted, based on youth surveys he has done in Morocco, that there is great confidence in the King among young people, but very low expectations when it comes to the results of reforms as a result of political parties.

4. Q & A

Haim Malka (CSIS), Karim Mezran (the Atlantic Council), Pauline Baker (Fund for Peace), Pilar Garcia Martinez (IMF), and others engaged in a discussion of why Morocco’s path after the Arab uprisings is different than the rest of the MENA region. In addition to the King’s role, they noted that opposition groups were quite different in Morocco than elsewhere in the region, which resulted in a reform agenda that was clearer and less confrontational that in other countries. Larémont added that there is more room for policy impact in places like Morocco, which could become a model for the rest of the region.

With regard to recommendations, participants discussed the need to promote investments across a broad range of sectors, and the need to expand education, especially for women. Reform of subsidies and banking reform was also mentioned along with creating a more proactive environment for start-ups and entrepreneurs. The group agreed that forging a better link between education and the labor market is a crucial next step to ensure continued progress in myriad areas.

Krista Hendry (Fund for Peace) added that an important factor for US involvement with reforms should be approaching Morocco on equal footing. She said that presenting a skill set, rather than offering recommendations, would go a long way towards better aid and program efficacy.

5. Observations

This event was attended by 22 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received and Fund for Peace will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of reform in Morocco.

Attendees:
Jean AbiNader: MAC
Dr. Pauline Baker: Board of Trustees, Fund for Peace
Lauren Berry: Kosmos Energy
**Roundtable on the Cultural Heritage of Morocco**

**Date:** October 1, 2013

1. **Title:** Roundtable on the Cultural Heritage of Morocco
   Hosted by the Georgetown Center for Contemporary Arab Studies

   **Participants:**
   
   Dr. Kenneth Honerkamp: Professor of Arabic, Islamic texts, Shar‘iah (Islamic Law), North African Sufism. University of Georgia
   Dr. Paul Heck: Discussant: Associate Professor, Georgetown University
   Rev. Michael Calabria: Discussant: Georgetown University

2. **Overview**

   This event, the second in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations to include recommendations for US policy actions to support Morocco, began with a review of the draft paper on the topic presented by Dr. Honerkamp. Dr. Heck and Rev. Calabria also provided input before a general discussion with attendees. The goal of the series is to encourage a number of topical papers in advance of the King’s visit to build interest in the Morocco-US relationship and existing and potential benefits of greater bilateral cooperation.

3. **Summary**

   Dr. Honerkamp drew from his extensive experience in Morocco to explain the historical roots of Morocco’s famed cultural and religious moderation based on an embrace of diversity. Described in the discussion draft as a pragmatic yet spiritual path throughout 1400 years of Moroccan history, what began as scholarly and religious work resonated and became engrained in the culture.
The key tenants of the Moroccan values of moderation are largely inspired by the al-Murshid al mu'īn text on Imām Mālik, the theological doctrine of Imām al-Ash'āri, and the Sufism of Imām al-Junayd. Describing the effect of these influences, Dr. Honerkamp shared his experience of feeling ‘at home in a strange land’; a unique and visceral sentiment of Morocco that he believes is a common and historical one. Importantly, Dr. Honerkamp reminded the group that although these three sources are a dominant force in Moroccan culture, they have never taken on the role of attempting to define the function and means of government. The emphasis on its Islamic identity is not something expedient but a function of Morocco’s cultural heritage. Similarly, the King’s great attention to this facet of Morocco’s heritage is institutional, and the respect for the King is for that institution, not a personality cult.

Dr. Honerkamp also discussed Morocco’s role in spreading this particular evolution of Islam. He highlighted the King’s recent speech in Mali and the kinship amongst moderates that was evident. Beyond being an epicenter of learning, Morocco has recently begun to counter the Saudi influence by printing Quran texts and distributing them across the country. More could be done, he suggested, in expanding that distribution across the Islamic world.

Dr. Heck began his intervention by looking at the prominent role Morocco should play in the future. Morocco, and the form of Islam that it takes, will have a lot to say towards international harmony, he said. He described it as a feeling of nostalgia for diverse harmony in Morocco, which required a true experience of shared knowledge of the other. Reverend Calabria agreed, stating that Morocco can teach hospitality as well as its particular brand of Islam. Dr. Heck also agreed with Dr. Honerkamp that many Moroccans are very unsettled by a religiosity defined by the state, and that this goes beyond simply tolerance. On the other hand, Dr. Heck emphasized the enormous obstacles presented by a growing skepticism and resentment.

Dr. Heck emphasized that the US is a good and capable partner, but also that it should approach programs with Morocco in a different way. The US is very strong on the knowledge part, he said, but the intertwining of Security Studies and Islam is not an open and welcoming approach. Not all American involvement should have a security twist. Dr. Heck also lauded cultural, educational, and religious exchanges between the US and Morocco. It’s not scholarly tourism, he said, it’s deeper. This echoed the comments of Dr. Honerkamp.

4. Q & A

Richard McKee (State Department, Ret.) began the discussion by asking why Shiism has gained traction amongst young people. Dr. Honerkamp mentioned the financial backing of Iran as one factor, the other being that for disaffected people it is the ‘next step’ from Salafism. Daoud Casewit added that Salafism and Shiism are magnets for opposition and being beyond the cultural norms gives its adherents a political edge by being a touch traitorous.

Fulbright Administrator asked if there is a rural/urban difference in perceptions of Islamic identity, in Dr. Honerkamp’s comparison of Pakistan and Morocco. Dr. Honerkamp replied that it does exist to some extent, but not enough to consider the moderate nature of Moroccan culture a city-based phenomenon.

With regard to recommendations, participants discussed the need to continue promoting cultural, religious, and educational exchanges, and Morocco’s efforts to be a center of religion and learning. The group agreed that there is no shortage of good ideas to doing so, but that funding is too limited to support many endeavors. Although some signs are
encouraging, more must be done to quickly stem the tide of resentment and anger amongst the youth.

5. Observations

This event was attended by 24 foreign policy professionals and academics. The paper was well-received and the Georgetown Center for Contemporary Arab Studies will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of Morocco’s role as a cultural and religious leader in the Arab and Islamic world.

Why Moroccan Protests Failed: A Panel Discussion

Date: October 10, 2013

1. Title: “Why Moroccan Protests Failed: A Panel Discussion”
   Hosted by The Project on Middle East Political Science at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

   Participants:
   **Aboubakr Jamai**: Richard von Weizsacker Fellow, Bosch Foundation; Editor, French version of Lakome.com
   **Ahmed Benchems**: Visiting Scholar, Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University; Founder, freearabs.com a
   **Adria Lawrence**: Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University
   **Marc Lynch**: Moderator: Assistant Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University

2. Overview

   This event analyzed the singularity of Morocco’s lack of revolution and eventual reforms in response to Arab Spring protests. The speakers raised many important points of analysis about internal politics of Morocco and how they influenced the results of the February 20 movement in the country. Given his association with Lakome.com, Jamai was often acerbic in his comments, while Benchems offered a more moderate perspective. Dr. Lawrence discussed the results of her studies into individuals in the protest movement.

3. Summary

   Aboubakr Jamai began his opening remarks questioning the definitiveness of the event’s title, suggesting that Moroccan protests could yet result in more political change. He elaborated by reminding the audience that the protests in Morocco initially asked solely for reform, while later calls for the removal of King Mohammed VI were superficial. In response, Jamai explained, the King "scolded" the February 20th Movement, which played a central role in the protests. However, on March 9, the King shifted course and delivered a "Thomas Jefferson like speech" essentially promising reform and a transition to democracy. Jamai added that the speech only tempered the protests momentarily because on March 20, 2011 the largest number of protesters to date took to the streets demanding reform. Jamai suggested a major reason the protests "did fail" was due to the "learning curve" of the
regime from the Tunisian and Egyptian examples, whereby the Government of Morocco was better able to anticipate likely responses from protestors. However, he mentioned that the regime did use some violence against protestors, but was careful to stop short of lethal violence.

Jamai pointed out that the previous King, Hassan II, allowed minimal amounts of opposition activism, which was limited to various human rights organizations that served as an "outlet" to moderate society and provide the regime with "someone to negotiate with." He suggested that the current King Mohammed VI follows a similar strategy. Next, Jamai explained the importance of understanding the internal dynamics of the popular Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD). He explained how the Justice and Charity movement appeals to the same constituency as the PJD, though the Justice and Charity movement, he argued, does not support reform within the government and instead calls for waiting for the regime to collapse under its own corruption. The PJD, on the other hand, approved of the constitutional process and supported working with the King. Jamai suggested, as a non-pro-monarchy party, the PJD provided legitimacy to the King and moderated the protest movement. Jamai concluded by explaining that societal values (particularly Islamism versus secularism) and subsidy programs are the two issues of the Arab Spring in need of resolution.

Ahmed Benchemsi also opened his remarks questioning the title of the event. He noted that if the "cursor" was on removal of the King, than protests did fail, but he is not sure the cursor should be placed there. Benchemsi suggested that the King's March 9 speech "checked all the big democratic issues raised in the street," including a parliamentary monarchy, free press, and a new constitution. The Makhzen, he argued, manipulated the protesters by "bringing everyone to the table," which resulted in "too many recommendations to employ," leaving the Makhzen to select the issues to address. The youth, he suggested, prided themselves on being leaderless since leadership ends in either corruption or arrest. The problem, Benchemsi challenged, was the protesters had no direction or guidance. He also noted ironically that the protesters, who were asking for democratic reform, refused to establish internal voting because, they argued, it leads nowhere. Throughout, the PJD remained "one step behind" the protesters, cautious of fully embracing the movement for fear of losing support to the Justice and Charity movement. Benchemsi concluded by arguing that the regime "outfoxed" the protesters. The removal of the King failed according to Benchemsi, but he remained optimistic that the protests "planted a seed in society," which "may well prove a game changer," in the years to come.

Adria Lawrence began her remarks explaining that she conducted many interviews with core activists in the February 20th Movement. Initially, she focused on the micro level of the core protesters, suggesting most of them were previously involved in human rights organizations, children of activist parents, and children of victims of rights abuses by the state. On the macro level, Lawrence suggested that revolutionaries are almost always young, inexperienced, and prone to mistakes. Lawrence’s research found that the monarchy was the difference for Morocco compared to other states like Egypt and Tunisia. Moroccans, she argued, value stability and democracy, and their unique situation in the region allowed for the possibility of reform without regime change. Authoritarian regimes "cannot democratize without becoming unstable," whereas a monarchy can reform "without losing the head of state," noted Lawrence. Therefore, she explained, the choice was between the French model (forming a Republic), which could lead to instability, or the British model (an evolving constitutional monarchy), with a stable transition more likely. Though not all protesters favored this model, the division further weakened the fragmented movement.

4. Q & A
Q: (Eric Goldstein, Human Rights Watch) Why did no one cast their lot with the 20 February Movement?
A: (Benchemsi) I disagree. Others did coalesce because they thought they could save the organization. The problem is the Support Council was unable to come up with a counteroffer and you can't engage in democracy without compromise.

Q: (Adina Friedman, George Mason University) Are the Jews and Berbers important to the movement?
A: (Jamai) It's important to note that it's the Ministry of Justice, not the ministry of freedom. But there is this idea that you cannot claim to be Moroccan without also claiming the Jewishness of the Moroccan identity. Hassan II had credibility on both sides [of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict]. What we have now is a declarative, non-substantial Constitution. The price for this is freedom of conscience in the Constitution. Now, the King is Commander of the Faithful, but to be that, he needs to have "faithfuls." Now how do Sunni Malikis see apostasy? As punishable by death. So they and other Islamists said no [to freedom of conscience in the Constitution].
(Benchemsi) There were lots of tactics used, notably lip service to minorities in order to preempt all demands, but use the groups for PR purposes.

Q: (Rachel, former Fulbright Scholar to Morocco) Did the protests leave any opening for women or socialists?
A: (Lawrence) Well, al Adl wa Ihsane is a mysterious organization, and it's unknown if that group is the most powerful opposition. It's important not to lose track of the PJD. Now, they’re not clever, but there was certainly no paternalism on their part.
(Benchemsi) There was a case where a reporter was sued for calling Mohammed VI "my brother." He went to court, and offered the defense that Hassan II called himself the father of all Moroccans, so if Mohammed VI is also his son, then... The court reacted just like you did, and he was let off. The message here is that there are groups who are not saying, but thinking, "we know better," on questions of politics, the economy, and so on. We don't know exactly what the military thinks. As for al Adl wa Ihsane, they like to portray themselves as pious grandfathers.
(Jamai) Anouzla convinced me to return to journalism a few weeks before the Arab Spring. If I had any inkling of a doubt about the nastiness of this regime, it would have been gone with news of Anouzla’s arrest. It is important to remember that Anouzla is Sahrawi as well. We need to come to terms with diverse Islamist parties; we need to open a debate. The problem there is that the radical left is enamored with French laïcité and aren’t open to any questions of religion. What they should do is sit down and read some Locke, because there is a place for religion in a democracy.

5. Observations

This event was attended by about 35 people, approximately half being students. The conversation was largely negative, focusing on flaws in the protest movement and perceived stratagem on the part of the Moroccan government to mitigate reform. Speakers agreed that the existence of the monarchy is primarily responsible for Morocco’s stability pre- and post-Arab Spring. They also agreed that there does not seem to be a widespread initiative to unseat the king; however, there is all-around disappointment with the governing bodies and the pace of reform.

The speakers raised many points of analysis about King Mohammed VI’s relationship with the government and society. First, it was widely acknowledged that the existence of the monarchy is primarily reason for Morocco’s stability. Second, there does not seem to be a
widespread initiative to unseat the King; however, there is all-around disappointment with
the governing bodies and with the fact that the King has not relinquished more executive
powers to create a more open government that is able to address the demands of its
citizens autonomously [i.e. Adria Lawrence’s suggestion of the British model for the
monarchy]. Lastly, Morocco’s public image seems to follow the pattern of “one step forward,
two steps back” when presented in international media and among scholars in these types
of forums. For example, in 2013 positive and optimistic periods of reforms, such as the
King’s August 20th speech or his decision to regularize immigrants residency status, were
followed by some indication of repressive human rights and civil liberties, the “Daniel-gate”
protests and Ali Anouzla’s arrest.

Morocco’s New Geo-Economics

Date: October 11, 2013

1. Title: Morocco’s New Geo-Economics
   Hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States
   
   Participants:
   **Ian Lesser:** Moderator: Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, GMFUS
   **Uri Dadush:** Senior Associate, International Economics Program, The Carnegie
   Endowment for International Peace.

2. Overview

   This event, the third in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors
to include recommendations for US policy actions to support Morocco, began with a brief
review of the topics presented in the draft paper which had been circulated in advance of
the event. Dr. Lesser then passed the discussion to Dr. Dadush, who spoke about the latest
economic indicators in Morocco and how they related to the discussion. The roundtable
discussion was the bulk of the event, as the group was well-informed and able to address a
range of issues and recommendations.

3. Summary

   Dr. Dadush’s analysis of Morocco was that many economic fundamentals remain strong –
especially on relative terms in the MENA context. He described Morocco as one of the few
reasonably diversified economies, featuring stability and strong connections with both
Europe and the US. Morocco probably deserves more attention than it receives, he said,
with strong growth, inflation under control, and continuous positive reforms giving more
weight to the government.

   The centerpiece of the event was the group discussion. Despite the encouraging signs, the
group agreed, much more can and must be done to encourage growth in Morocco and take
advantage of the free trade arrangement with the US. Adding to the stakes are Morocco’s
core economic dependence on exports and the unyielding pressure that unemployment puts
on political stability.
The group questioned the emphasis that US officials and commentators should put into establishing a true economic union in the Maghreb. Though it remains the obvious choice for economic development – it was mentioned that it could result in an estimated 4% GDP growth for Morocco alone - and clearly deserving of continued support, many in the room agreed that true regional integration in North Africa is unlikely in this lifetime.

In terms of policy recommendations, the discussion indicated that more emphasis should be placed on fostering partnerships and knowledge-sharing by the private sector across the region. Several suggestions were made to give the private sector more tools to take advantage of the free trade apparatus. For example, there is presidential discretion to act without Congressional action, for example, providing technical assistance such as Department of Commerce programs, working with multilateral organizations such as The World Bank and IMF to provide technical assistance and funding for governance reforms, and initiate more economic diplomacy with the EU to support Morocco’s transition to a stronger market economy.

Among other interesting recommendations was that more focus should be put on the US enabling Morocco to do more in Africa rather than promoting the Morocco-US economic relationship. To do this, the US should adopt a Japanese method of triangular aid to help Morocco expand trade into new African markets, using known strengths in electrification, manufacturing, value added services, pharmaceuticals, and banking. A focus on encouraging South-South trade will help Morocco expand and diversify its economy where it has the competitive advantage in Greater Africa as well as Latin America and Southern Asia.

The US could also engage more on economic diplomacy with Europe with a similar triangular method. The US could also pay more attention to the GCC and work to become a 3rd partner to those investments. More technical assistance and knowledge-sharing should be provided, perhaps in a field such as cell-phone manufacturing, which in Africa is a booming end-user market that contributes zero manufacturing market share.

Lastly, the US should help Morocco invest in young professionals. The US is a bastion of risk capital mentality, whereas Morocco lacks it, resulting in more of a trading culture and less entrepreneurship, venture capital, and industrialization. Promoting this mentality could go a long way in maximizing the rewards of policy frameworks which are already in place. Morocco could perhaps restructure subsidy money to further benefit SMEs. US-Morocco trade could also benefit from more widespread teaching and use of English, to stem the tide of an old-guard bias towards French and Arabic-speaking countries.

4. Observations

This event was attended by 23 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received and GMF will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of economic development and growth opportunities in Morocco.

Attendees:
Jean AbiNader: MAC
Neyla Arnas: National Defense University
Bradley Bosserman: NDN
David Bloom: MAC
Jean-François Dauphin: IMF
Barrie Freeman: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Kelsey Guyette: GMF
Morocco’s Role in Regional Security and Development

Date: October 22, 2013

1. Title: “Morocco’s Role in Regional Security and Development”

Hosted by the Atlantic Council

Participants:
- Dr. J. Peter Pham: Moderator: Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council
- Christopher Leins: Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Department of Defense

2. Overview

This event, the fourth in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors that include recommendations for US policy actions in support of Morocco, began with a brief review of the topics presented in the draft paper which had been circulated in advance of the event. Dr. Pham gave an overview of Morocco’s role in regional security and the merits of their counterterrorism strategy, while highlighting opportunities and recommendations for changes in US policy. The group discussion focused on Morocco’s growing role as a regional leader in regional security, and how their economic influence has increased their regional, and potentially their global, security influence. The group also evaluated and expanded the paper’s recommendations.

3. Summary

Dr. Pham began by discussing an increasing recognition of Morocco’s role in African security, which is further enhanced by Morocco’s economic and cultural ties on the continent. Despite this, he said, the US takes Morocco for granted. A prime example of this was the “unfortunate drop-in” during the latest MINURSO renewal, which resulted in the cancellation of the bilateral US-Moroccan African Lion security exercises in the spring. In a region where government fragility is “par for the course”, he said, Morocco is stable and its
interests are often aligned with those of the US. As a regional economic leader, notably in the financial sector, Morocco is expanding its networks throughout Africa, which could help pave the way for increased security cooperation.

There are lessons to be learned from Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy, which is both aggressive and comprehensive. The three main tenants are a law-and-order approach to security, a targeting of terrorists through their financial networks, and an economic development approach to marginalize the enabling causes of radicalism. Specific Moroccan programs, including religious training exchanges, as well as the security forces training in places such as Mali, are not adequately lauded or supported. The holistic approach taken by Morocco stands out in the field of counterterrorism, one with certain replicable parts. From a US policy perspective, there is great opportunity for triangulation; scaling up effective programs carried out by a leader in regional security of increasing geopolitical ‘heft’.

One main stumbling block to Morocco’s growing role in regional security is the Western Sahara. The dispute is no longer ‘frozen,’ Dr. Pham said. The legally dubious inclusion of the Western Sahara - officially recognized by only nine member countries in the African Union (AU) effectively holds the other members hostage. At present, there is no defined mechanism for the removal of an AU member, so the issue would have to be resolved by other means. Until this happens, the regionalization of security cooperation is more piecemeal and difficult to scale-up, facilitating an environment that has proven to be ideal for global terrorist networks.

Group discussion began with the assertion that current US policy does not do enough to encourage regional economic integration in Africa. The US should insist on a regional dimension to programs and investments, it was recommended. US aid should follow this guideline, focusing on initiatives such as the Trans-African Highway Network. Good security cooperation is based on good economic cooperation, one participant said.

The US should also support Moroccan efforts towards security regionalization, supporting existing programs and forums that Morocco has led. US Military efforts, including the African Lion exercises, have gradually aimed to become more regional, though the process is a slow one. Joint military exercises can pay real dividends, in terms of both training and relations. It’s hard to understate how the US-Morocco relationship improved after 1999, one participant said, when both US and UN exercises were performed with Morocco.

More regional-based security efforts are inhibited in part because, it was said, “Algeria gets in the way of everything”. The US is somewhat of an enabler to Algerian intransigence, it was suggested, by not calling them to account for misdeeds in Libya and Mali, and by not making the improvement of Moroccan-Algerian relations a diplomatic priority. The US can help by supporting programs that already exist “below the political noise level” as a foundation for improving Moroccan-Algerian relations. Again, economics can be a strong facilitator of improved relations. The US can leverage its free trade agreement with Morocco by supporting value-added chains that encourage cross-border economic activity. The North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) could also be re-tooled to support better relations across North Africa.

Morocco is expanding ties not only throughout Africa, but also across the Atlantic basin into South America. This not only carries economic implications but also potential US policy opportunities. Just as Morocco’s influence in Africa can be leveraged into high-impact policy outcomes, the same could potentially done as Morocco becomes a leader in the broader South-South context. Triangulation and the scaling-up of Moroccan initiatives are excellent ways to have low-input, high-impact policy outcomes, and their scope could potentially
increase as the Moroccan economic influence expands globally. US policy should further emphasize its strategic partnership with Morocco with a focus on triangulation in order to achieve shared goals.

4. Observations

This event was attended by more than 20 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received, as the commentary indicated, and the Atlantic Council will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of and expanding Morocco’s leadership efforts in regional security.

Attendees:
Jean AbiNader: Executive Director, Moroccan American Trade & Investment Center
Sean McFate: Professor, National Defense University
Bradley Bosserman: Director, MENA Initiative, New Democrat Network
David Bloom: Research Associate, Moroccan American Center
Fouad Arif: Bureau Chief, Moroccan News Agency
Mahfoud Bahbouhi: Counselor, Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco
Majida Bargach: Interim Director, Center for International Relations, University of Virginia
Carol Castiel: Director, Current Affairs Programming, Voice of America News
Bronwyn Bruton: Deputy Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council
Anne Moisan: Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Edward Gabriel: Former US Ambassador to Morocco
Francoise Kirby: Public Relations Director, Management Systems International
Alan Larson: Senior International Policy Advisor, Covington & Burling LLP
Scott Mastic: Regional Director, Middle East & North Africa, International Republican Institute
Karim Mezran: Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Laura Talverdian: Assistant Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Lawrence Velte: Associate Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Morocco’s Strategic Engagement in Africa

Date: October 25, 2013

1. Title: Morocco’s Strategic Engagement in Africa
   Hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies

   Participants:
   Haim Malka: Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, CSIS
   Jon B. Alterman: Moderator: Director, Middle East Program, CSIS

2. Overview

This event, the fifth and final event in a series on the strategic value of Morocco-US relations in key sectors that include recommendations for US policy actions in support of
Morocco, began with a review of the topics presented in the draft paper which had been circulated in advance of the event. Haim Malka gave an overview of Morocco’s increasing economic and diplomatic emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa and analyzed the implications and opportunities of this policy shift. The group discussion focused on Morocco’s comparative advantages in a South-South approach to economic and diplomatic policy, as well as the role the United States can play in promoting these efforts to mutual benefit.

3. Summary

Haim Malka began the event by describing how Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be central to Morocco’s attempts to grow and diversify its economy, and ultimately increase its international influence. The driving force behind this policy decision appears to be the urgent need to diversify Morocco’s economic base and trade partners to deal with growing socio-economic pressures. It was a lesson made painfully evident as the slump in European demand had a dramatic effect on Morocco – Europe being the source of more than 60% of its trade, as well as the main source of Morocco’s tourism industry and remittances.

Some of the seemingly low-hanging fruit for Moroccan trade hasn’t panned out as hoped. Regional integration in the Maghreb is unlikely without a political solution to Western Sahara. The “reality we all know is; this is stuck,” Malka stated. On the other side of the Atlantic, Morocco has a free trade agreement with the US that went into effect in 2006 and the US market offers an opportunity for boosting Moroccan exports. However, the results of the FTA have been underwhelming and it’s clear that the FTA hasn’t been a game-changer for Morocco.

The pivot towards Sub-Saharan Africa offers competitive advantages for Morocco that match up nicely with high-growth sectors in Africa, especially in banking and agriculture. Outward foreign direct investment has reflected this trend, as 90% of investment from Morocco stays on the continent. Morocco also took initiative during the financial crisis in Europe, picking up investments dropped by more risk-averse Europeans, notably in banking. Moroccan banks are now in 22 African countries and are some of the biggest on the continent. Morocco’s phosphates are already a strategic asset for increasing output from Sub-Saharan Africa’s farms, with the potential for developing a downstream fertilizer sector and a research and development hub. Morocco also has the second largest pharmaceutical industry in Africa, so the economy is well-positioned to take advantage of the maturation of the Sub-Saharan African market.

Morocco also continues to position itself as a manufacturing and outsourcing base for European companies. Companies such as Renault, Bombardier, Boeing, GE, and Dassault have moved manufacturing to Morocco, where labor costs remain competitive. Malka stressed that the need now is to develop a manufacturing ecosystem, with training and expertise that could fuel Africa-centric spinoff ventures that further diversify Morocco’s manufacturing base.

The success of Morocco’s attempts at diversifying its economy and increasing its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa will depend largely on policy choices. As the discussants noted, there is much that the US can do to help this process along for mutual benefit. The US can use existing funding to support triangular programs that take advantage of Morocco’s existing networks and competencies. Power Africa is a prime example, where the US could rely on Morocco’s experience with rural electrification to boost the efficacy and efficiency of the program.
The US should also take the pivot to Sub-Saharan Africa as a good reason to leave behind the “artificial seam” that separates North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in the eyes of US policymakers. Many companies now look at Morocco as a hub for Africa; the US should do the same. Adjusting rules of origin regulations in the FTA could also help encourage Morocco as a business hub and expand trade links with Sub-Saharan Africa. The US should also support more regional and continental infrastructure projects. Morocco is already a leader in air and port transportation links, but road and rail networks should be improved. As one participant said, “the traffickers are showing us the way” in terms of potential South-South trade.

4. Observations

This event was attended by more than 30 foreign policy professionals. The paper was well-received, as the commentary indicated, and CSIS will publish a final paper, without attribution, that has a strong section on recommendations for US actions in support of and expanding Morocco's leadership efforts to expand programs and networks into Sub-Saharan Africa.

Attendees:

**Jon B. Alterman**: Center for Strategic and International Studies
**Alexis Arieff**: Congressional Research Service
**Carolyn Barnett**: Center for Strategic and International Studies
**Alexandre Bilodeau**: US Department of State
**David Bloom**: Moroccan American Center
**Mary Ellen Connell**: Center for Naval Analysis
**Jennifer Cooke**: Center for Strategic and International Studies
**Richard Downie**: Center for Strategic and International Studies
**Alice Friend**: US Department of Defense
**Martin Kessler**: Peterson Institute for International Economics
**Mohsin Khan**: Atlantic Council
**Christopher Kisco**: US Agency for International Development
**William Lawrence**: George Washington University
**Haim Malka**: Center for Strategic and International Studies
**Peggy Mckean**: US Department of Defense
**Karim Mezran**: Atlantic Council
**Marina Ottaway**: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
**Milena Sanchez de Boado**: American Bar Association
**Carrie Schenkel**: International Republican Institute
**Fatima Taki**: US Department of Defense
**Susan C. Tuttle**: IBM
**Bruno Versailles**: International Monetary Fund
**Maja Volk**: US Department of Defense
**Kathleen Walsh**: The Stimson Center

(Back to top)
1. Title: “Resolving Regional Conflicts: The Western Sahara and the Quest for a Durable Solution”
   Hosted by The Middle East Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center

   Participants:
   **Bernabe Lopez-Garcia**: Professor of Contemporary History of Islam, Autónoma University of Madrid
   **Anna Theofilopoulou**: Independent political analyst, and writer; Former UN official and member of James Baker’s negotiating team covering the Western Sahara conflict (1994-2006)
   **Marina Ottaway**: Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
   **Haleh Esfandiari**: Moderator: Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center

2. Overview

   This panel discussion was the first in a series on the Western Sahara, as announced at the event, taking place on the 38th anniversary of the Green March. The panel discussed their observations of the Western Sahara dispute and the possibility of resolution scenarios for the conflict, including the autonomy plan introduced by Morocco.

3. Summary

   Bernabe Lopez-Garcia began the session with a frank statement on the Western Sahara conflict: “we see no way to resolve it,” he said. His talk, in Spanish and translated into English for the audience, focused on the historical, legal and political development of the dispute. Lopez-Garcia spent much of his time on the Moroccan approach to the issue, associating it with an “ambiguous approach,” that suffers from a lack of open national debate, in turn stifled by an ongoing “taboo” on Western Sahara dialogue. Further, Lopez-Garcia frequently mentioned that misinformation and “demonizing”, admittedly from both sides, but with his comments focused on the Moroccan side, are reinforcing ideological entrenchment that makes resolution impossible. He added that Morocco “insists obsessively on an Algeria focus” on the issue, and that despite the obvious linkage, the Polisario has its own voice. The result is that the Western Sahara issues remains unresolved despite various diplomatic efforts, leaving a serious humanitarian crisis of “40,000-150,000” refugees in camps near Tindouf, Algeria.

   Lopez-Garcia also spoke about Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan and recent political reforms, linking them both as signs of change deemed disingenuous by the Polisario. He noted that there has been no real progress on the negotiations and that human rights violations continue in the territory, undermining Morocco’s credibility on issues of governance and providing the Polisario with the opportunity to make human rights the basis of its international strategy (which it has done), an issues Morocco deems an affront to its sovereignty. Lopez-Garcia did state that the 2007 plan proposed some novel aspects, such as elections, broad legislative powers and an important amnesty provision, but argued that it did not sufficiently address the question of self-determination. He postulated that the 2011 reform of the Constitution would have been an opportune time to debate this idea of autonomy and offer something to the other side, described it as a “missed opportunity” because the Western Sahara was not mentioned, even though one small step was made with regard to Hassania culture being recognized in the Constitution. Lopez-Garcia was dire in his current assessment of the region and cited serious problems of infighting and violence between people living in the territories.
Lopez-Garcia was more even-handed in his prescription for resolution, although he was pessimistic about the many obstacles inhibiting a resolution. First, there is misinformation on both sides about the nature of the problem. For example, Sahrawis feel that their voices have been marginalized, and northerners living in the territory believe that the Sahrawis have privileges and feel ill-will towards them. Timid steps, such as the CNDH, have been taken to mitigate this, but the local CNDH branches have not been very active. Second, Lopez-Garcia reiterated that Moroccan demonization of the Polisario also presents a serious obstacle, adding that the Polisario must likewise stop efforts to demonize the other side and remove its strict ideological control over the refugee population. Third, the role of Algeria – and whether or not the Polisario is truly independent of it – presents additional hurdles. Finally, there is no climate of confidence between the two parties – something that is essential for finding a solution to the conflict. He hinted that time might suddenly be an encouraging factor for change, given the emergence of a security threat in the Sahel that is causing greater desire on the part of Western Powers to have final resolution for the sake of border integrity and the fight against global terrorism. Additionally, both sides have suffered and made sacrifices and a mutual recognition of this could go some way in creating a shared understanding between the two parties.

In terms of moving forward, Lopez-Garcia argued that there was to be some type of referendum for the Sahrawis to express themselves independently of both the Polisario and Morocco, a requirement the 2007 autonomy plan acknowledges. If the details of such a referendum could be figured out, a negotiated political solution could be achieved. For the moment, however, the Polisario is not willing to play that game. Lopez-Garcia argued that maybe if Morocco acknowledged some of these issues and demonstrated true democracy in the Sahara, the Polisario may come to the table. However, he also added that the Polisario must “take a decisive step forward” in negotiations. Perhaps relaxing his initial despondency towards the outlook on a resolution, Lopez-Garcia said that “we (do) have formulas for Sahrawi democracy linked with Morocco,” which could help to end the conflict in a scenario that doesn’t create ‘winners and losers.’

Continuing on Lopez-Garcia’s mention of ‘winners and losers’ in a potential resolution, Anna Theofilopoulou began her comments by saying that the conflict is still in the same position as it was in 2004, when the UN weakened its support for the peace plan and shifted to achieving a mutually acceptable political solution. She reflected back to that time, stating that the UN plan was misguided because it presented a plan that didn’t offer a face-saving solution for both sides. She added that the UN allowed the parties to block the process, with the Polisario being the more obstructive of the two. Theofilopoulou suggested that the UN process was flawed from the beginning because it was more interested in resolution than the parties themselves, and the lack of real solutions was a symptom of this root problem.

Since 2004, the geopolitics of the region have greatly changed, with the Arab Spring and the rise of AQIM, but the UN has not become more active in response, “refusing to take firm positions and push both parties,” by claiming that the conflict falls under Chapter 7 (with the latter allowing the UN to force a resolution, rather than mediate between the two parties). As a result, Morocco maintains its position in favor of negotiations on the basis of autonomy/sovereignty with a referendum on the final autonomy statute, and the Polisario maintains its insistence on a referendum with three options: integration, independence, and autonomy. Four rounds of formal and ten rounds of informal negotiations have thus achieved nothing.

So where to things stand now? Theofilopoulou argued that international civil society supports the Polisario based on legal arguments, but ignores political realities; the Polisario has a legal case and Morocco has a political case. Theofilopoulou reminded the audience
that legal issues don’t offer much help towards resolution, saying that if the Western Sahara dispute was to be resolved by legal grounds, it would have been done so already, implicitly stating that a political resolution is the only feasible solution. Theofilopoulou’s description of the UN’s role in the process was one of an ‘enabler,’ providing cover for each side as they pursued inherently incompatible goals. She added that neither Morocco’s Polisario bashing nor the Polisario’s insistence on discussing the issue solely in terms of legality serves any practical purpose. Theofilopoulou stated that a resolution mainly requires the aforementioned ‘face-saving’ for both sides. She suggested that a return to the initial terms of the Baker Plan with an extended 10-year option for a vote on autonomy (rumored to be a CORCAS plan) as one of several options would provide sufficient political ‘cover’ for both sides to make a deal.

Marina Ottaway spoke mainly about how the Moroccan proposal for Western Sahara was essentially an “advanced regionalization” plan, which happened to include the disputed territory as one of the regions comprising Morocco, arguing that “it’s time to recognize that the autonomy plan isn’t all it’s cracked up to be.” “It is worth going back to the King’s speech” in the wake of the Arab Spring, she said, noting that the proposed decentralization was mentioned more prominently than the new constitution was, even though that was what people paid attention to at the time. She stressed that the only thing special for the Sahara is that it will be the first region to be decentralized. Ottaway expressed her dismay at this, noting, “I have nothing against decentralization, but this is not an autonomy plan.” She also argued that both sides are even less willing to compromise than before and the same goes for Algeria, although she expressed optimism that the “CORCAS plan” references by Theofilopoulou could work if there was a push from the UN.

Ottaway also addressed what she referred to as the new prevalence of “nebulous conflicts” in the world – intractable conflicts that are far beyond a solution based on legality and that require some alternative arrangement. Ottaway compared the Western Sahara dispute to similar autonomy conflicts in Kirkuk (Iraq) and Somaliland (Somalia), saying that these kinds of disputes are increasingly common. In these instances there is no real way to determine the “real, original inhabitants” and thus who has the legal right to vote. Ottaway predicted that more ambiguous solutions, such as de facto independence over time while under existing sovereignty or de facto annexation, will be increasingly common in similar conflicts. These solutions with avoid legal and political issues in favor of “facts on the ground” without legal recognition.

4. Q & A

**Q:** What is the validity of reports of terrorist recruitment and infiltration of the Polisario camps by AQIM?

**A:** (Theofilopoulou) There are no credible reports about AQIM activity in Western Sahara proper, but there is always the possibility of young, frustrated people resorting to terrorism. (Ottaway) The intricacies of terrorist networks operating in the region are beyond our understanding, but there is no evidence of AQIM recruiting in the Tindouf camps, nor is their evidence that it isn’t. It is all too likely sooner or later. (Lopez-Garcia) These reports are the result Morocco’s efforts to demonize the Polisario – this is what I have been consistently referring to. There is always the possibility of steps towards fundamentalism in the camps.

**Q:** (Nadine Hoffman, International Women’s Media Foundation) Could you discuss the role of lobbying in the conflict? Is it primarily obstructive to a resolution of the conflict?

**A:** (Ottaway) Of course...but what exactly can we do about it?
Lobbyists contribute to the hardening of position on both sides, because they can both say they have people on their sides.

There is a saying “I’d rather talk to a radical than a lobbyist.”

Q: Could you clarify your earlier remark estimating the refugee population at 40,000 to 150,000 refugees?
A: There is no census that would allow us to know – the UN doesn’t dare wade into the issue.

It is the Polisario and Algeria who do not allow the census. I am sceptical that 150,000 is a legitimate number. If the Spanish census was around 75,000 and half left, we are looking at around 35,000 and then of course some expansion with families. The UN conclusion in 1999 was that there were around 100,000, but “nobody really knows.”

Q: (Mohamed Yeslem Bissat) Is it possible to have autonomy in a dictatorship?
A: Of course not. Morocco is not currently a democratic regime, and the missed opportunity for reform shows a country in stagnation or even regression in this regard.

Q: So should we just abandon the idea of a referendum on self-determination?
A: Determining in practice who exactly should vote is not likely possible.

Q: Should the US just really set aside the rule of law in dealing with the issue?
A: It is simply a question of political reality. Lip service will be paid, however, to certain principles.

Morocco must be a country where the rule of law is respected first and foremost.

Q: Can Spain’s experience with decentralization help inform the process in Morocco?
A: The process is Spain is flawed and does not provide a lot of valuable lessons for this issue.

5. Observations

Approximately 80 scholars, experts, and advocates on both sides attended the event. Notably, UN Envoy Chris Ross was in attendance, highlighting that the Wilson Center has a large draw with high-profile figures. Nadine Hoffman of IWMF was also in attendance – a likely indication of IWMF engagement on this issue in the future. Overall, the speakers were neutral on the issue and with regard to Morocco, though they primarily spoke about Morocco’s alleged human rights violations and made little mention of those of the Polisario. Lopez-Garcia was largely critical of Morocco’s role in the dispute, though he did take a few opportunities to blame both sides for certain malfeasance and intransigence. The other two panelists approached the subject more dispassionately, with a comparative and realist approach. Remarkably, Theofilopoulou’s positions on a referendum (and on Morocco’s position) seem to have evolved toward a more practical, rather than legal, assessment of the conflict. Unfortunately, Ottaway’s views of the autonomy plan have likewise evolved,
and her pronouncements on the matter were wholly unhelpful. All panelists held a similar lack of optimism towards the potential for resolution, yet they did have similar outlines for how a potential settlement deal could be shaped and made feasible, mostly by moving forward based on political realities, rather than legality. The audience was very eager to ask questions, though most panelist answers were repetitions of their earlier comments. This was especially true in the case of the Bissat and Smith questions, which weren’t received as entirely serious additions to the conversation. The behavior of pro-Polisario people at these events is a continual validation of how not to act – the moderator and the panel expressed real annoyance with the Polisario representative and did not appear to take him very seriously. By staying above the fray, Morocco will be taken more seriously by experts working on these issues. It will be interesting to follow the Wilson series as it develops, and while there is certainly room for improvement, there is also an opportunity for realistic, if not positive messaging on Morocco’s position on the issue.

(Back to top)

Charting Morocco’s Reform Strategy

Date: November 20, 2013

1. Title: “Charting Morocco’s Reform Strategy”
   Hosted by the German Marshall Fund

   Participants:
   **Mustafa el Khalfi:** Minister of Communications, Morocco  
   **Nizar Baraka:** President of CESE, Morocco  
   **Driess el Yazami:** President of CNDH, Morocco  
   **Serge Berdugo:** Ambassador at Large, Morocco  
   **Ivan Vejvoda:** Moderator: Vice President of Programs, GMF

2. Overview

   In the context of the King’s meeting with President Obama, several high level Moroccan officials presented their work on Morocco’s reform process. The speakers gave an overview of Morocco’s current situation and steps being taken to move forward. The 2011 Constitution was a common point of reference in all speakers’ presentations.

3. Summary

   Minister El Khalfi began by saying that Morocco is currently facing two challenges, democratization and stability. In his opinion, Morocco is a model of engaging in reforms, succeeding in democracy, and providing strength and stability. The reason Morocco is able to do this is because it is following the “third path” between outright revolution and maintaining the status quo, which allows the country to enact reforms while preserving stability. There are three factors specific to Morocco that allow it to follow this third path. First, the King’s leadership, as seen in the 2011 speech and the 2011 election of a new government, which remains in power two years later. Second, the strength of civil society and political parties. There are many groups represented in the reform process and increased participation has led to the acceleration of reforms. Third, Morocco has a “culture of consensus,” which is to say there is a focus on finding common solutions to challenges.
Minister El Khalfi said that the new constitution represents the driving force for democratization, and that it has several obligations to implement, including making the courts more responsible and under less government oversight, reforming the press code, and increasing access to information. Another priority is increasing regionalization, including allowing the local population in the Western Sahara to manage its own affairs. There is also a need to increase protection of human rights and open the country to UN rapporteurs. Finally, freedom of the press is a priority. Minister El Khalfi claimed that there are “no journalists jailed” currently in Morocco and that “no website has been blocked by the government,” given that Lakome.com had been blocked at its owner’s request. He directed curious parties to examine Freedom House’s report on the internet, and said that most of the media is private in Morocco, with the government providing only “20% of all reports.” He closed with prospects for the future, namely broadening support for the above initiatives.

Nizar Baraka spoke on democracy and reforms. He also mentioned the need to improve independence of the judiciary and listed the reforms called for in the 2011 Constitution. He then turned to his own organization, the CESE, saying that it provides advice to the government on the basis of its 99 members, who represent unions, NGOs, and citizens. He described the CESE report on the Sahara, which took the form of a one year survey, as one built on consensus and neutral assessments. The report calls for the application of orderly law and notes that the GDP of Western Sahara actually beats the national average by 50%. This is deceptive, however, as the economy needs to be made more sustainable, and 30% of the GDP goes to administrative costs. He noted that unemployment is only 5% in Western Sahara, whereas the rest of the country has 9% unemployment. He took these figures as evidence that the development model has reached its limit, and that there needs to be a new model, designed by and for the local population, taking the form of regional councils elected on the principle of universal suffrage. A civil forum would then be held in each region, and the results would be applied to the development model. Baraka stated that CESE’s current goals are to spend $17 billion over the next 10 years to create 120,000 jobs, provide efficient social services, and promote the sustainable use of natural resources. To this end, there is a development fund to finance SMEs and a social fund to provide a safety net for those who need it. CESE also aims to improve skills and health care in the region. He closed by saying that these goals are “ambitious, realistic, and sustainable.”

Driess El Yazami then posed the rhetorical question as to whether Arabs can build democracy and improve human rights by themselves. In Morocco’s case, he noted that the path to democratization began in the mid 1990’s. The family code was released in 2004, the Royal Berber Institute was created in 2003, and there were public reconciliation hearings. El Yazami also referenced the 2011 Constitution and its requirements to increase human rights protections nationally. He closed by saying that justice reform is necessary and that the country is working hard to do so, but changing laws alone is insufficient.

Ambassador Serge Berdugo introduced himself as an Ambassador at Large and the President of the Jewish Committee. He spoke of the Moroccan exception, which he defined as equilibrium between cultures. He believes Morocco handled the Arab Spring in a “peaceful and responsible way,” thanks to Moroccan’s deeply rooted sense of identity. The next steps, in his opinion, are to build democracy and a market economy without radical solutions and to transform society without disturbing societal harmony. He made reference to Morocco’s strong civil society, citing 45 NGOs spending 8.8 billion dirhams with 1 million volunteers. He also praised the 2011 Constitution for establishing protection for Moroccan identities. Ambassador Berdugo closed by discussing religion, the King’s position as the religious authority, specifically in the Sunni Maliki rite, and the work he has done on behalf of the Jewish community, restoring synagogues and cemeteries. He also said the Moroccan
Jewish community enjoys full civil rights and is an important part in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

4. Q&A

Q: (Diane Pollack, WINEP) Could you tell us more about the demonstrators? Who are they, what do they want, are there any patterns, and what have been your responses?

A: (Minister El Khalfi) 95% of it was social issues - employment, housing, health, and education. Morocco has 36 unions and a strong civil society. There are only 40-50 demonstrators each day. This is a social dialogue and it reflects Moroccan democracy. (El Yazami) The number of protests was a high figure before the Arab Spring. They are asking for their rights, they want to negotiate. NGOs need to be more active.

Q: Can you say something on the integration of the Berber community? Has there been a backlash from Arab nationalists? What are the effects of the Berber reform?

A: (Minister El Khalfi) Berbers are not a minority group; they are a component of the Moroccan identity. We also have the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture, we are criminalizing discrimination, and we offer classes in Amazigh. The first Amazigh website started this year. We are also going to increase state aid by 20%. There is also the use of the Amazigh language in courts; we are aiming at full integration - political, economic, and cultural. So this is not a political issue. (El Yazami) If you want more information, you can read the 2004 UNDP report on Morocco. We are having a public debate, and now educate people in three languages.

(Note: The moderator then took a round of questions, to which the speakers responded at choice.)

Q: (Eric Goldstein, Human Rights Watch) You mentioned Morocco’s model for Human Rights monitors, as well as reform of the press code and the penal code. Will you achieve those goals, and if not, why?

Q: (Charles Dahan, Vice President for Moroccan Jewry) There were recently a group of Moroccan politicians who refused to go to Israel for a meeting of the Mediterranean Group. There are also 1 million Israeli Moroccans. Is it time to look seriously at Morocco-Israel relations?

Q: Where does Morocco fit in the larger religious discourse? What are Morocco’s positions on current issues in the Levant?

Q: (JE Rash, Legacy International) Could you say more about young professionals in Morocco? What is the state of public health?

A: (Minister El Khalfi) We have had successes in education, the problem is of quality. Children get financial aid. We had a debate on the national language. As I said, we are criminalizing discrimination. The press code reform is my personal priority. We established a commission and received more than 100 recommendations; we are going to hold another on online media. We have started implementation of press reform: there is now legal recognition of online media. Then there is the issue of decriminalizing article 27. Article 28 says that “freedom of the press is guaranteed.” By the end of 2013, the first draft will be up for public debate. The Constitution says that Jews are a source of identity. We had public coverage for Yom Kippur. We are also training Malian imams to fight extremism. We also hosted a conference with UNESCO on the internet.
(Ambassador Berdugo) Morocco is on a quest for tolerance. We host 10 to 15 events promoting tolerance. People don’t know, but one of Morocco’s big exports is rabbis; there are Moroccan rabbis all around the world. Morocco is also a pioneer in the Middle East peace process to promote a peace that recognizes the rights of the Palestinians to a viable, dignified state. Morocco is not an actor, per se, but is certainly directing things from the pit.

Q: (Alexis Arieff, Congressional Research Service) My question is for Mr. Baraka. How does your proposal for Western Sahara differ from decentralization?
A: (Baraka) Our proposal is for autonomy. The other party prefers the status quo, but it is important not to leave the citizens waiting. In his speech on the 6th of November, 2012, the King said that it is time for a new development model and to implement regionalization throughout the country, but more so in Western Sahara. The Sahrawi people will have to be involved in government for three reasons. We need to develop a participative democracy. We need agreement on what the regions need. Governance is insufficient; we need a development model to create an attractive economy. So we are targeting safety nets, valuing development over security, and working on long-term goals over short-term ones. This is an integrated strategy, based on human development, win ambition for a better future.

Q: (Ralph Nurnberger) What is the Human Rights situation in Western Sahara, and Tindouf?
A: (El Yazami) As for Tindouf and Human Rights commissions, there is one in Tantan, and despite the population being the same, international reporters focus on the Sahara, but less so on Tindouf because there is no access. We are working on these issues, though we still have problems. There is a national mechanism against torture, for example. The international community needs to monitor Tindouf on the same basis as Morocco. The RFK Center report is biased, as they spent two weeks in Western Sahara but only a few days in Tindouf.

(Minister El Khalfi) Look to the work of our conciliation commission. Morocco is open. Morocco is ready to deal with civil society, ready to work with the UN, but within our sovereignty. Dissenting opinions are tolerated. The government has even decided to financially support an opposition paper, because “democracy obliges us.” Algeria refuses to implement a UN census of the Tindouf camps. The Polisario is a one party system, based on ignoring human rights. NGO’s should examine the Polisario as well as Morocco.

5. Observations

The event was attended by approximately 50 foreign policy professionals. The presentations focused on Morocco’s reform efforts and centered on the 2011 Constitution. Each speaker elaborated on their personal areas of expertise, but given the large number of speakers and limited time allotted, comments were broader as compared to smaller events during the delegation. The reform strategy outlined was one of vision, consultation, deliberation, and ongoing action, stressing the accelerating pace and number of reforms as well as an honest self-assessment of areas for continued improvement.
Hosted by Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) and the Maghreb Center

Participants:
**Osama Abi-Mershed**: Director, CCAS, Georgetown
**Lahouari Addi**: Carnegie Centennial Fellow, Georgetown
**Amira Aleya-Sghaier**: Professor, University of Tunis
**Nejib Ayachi**: Founder and President, the Maghreb Center
**Michael Hudson**: Director, Middle East Institute
**Noureddine Jebnoun**: Adjunct Professor, CCAS, Georgetown
**Ricardo René Larémont**: Professor, SUNY-Binghamton
**Azzedine Layachi**: Professor, St. John’s University
**Joseph Sassoon**: Visiting Professor, CCAS, Georgetown
**Emad El-Din Shahin**: Professor, AUC

2. Overview

This event was broken into three separate discussions, each with a question and answer session. The first focused on the army and police in transitions to democracy; the second on constitutions, elections, and their sequencing; and the third on youth and their interactions with secular and religious parties. The overarching theme of the discussions was the process of political transition and factors currently impeding it. Understandably, the roundtable focused on countries going through a transition, namely Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. A large portion of the first panel was also dedicated to Algeria.

3. Summary

Roundtable 1: Power: The Army and the Police in Transitions to Democracy
Participants: Layachi, Addi, Jebnoun, Ayachi (Moderator)

Noureddine Jebnoun addressed political transformations in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia with a focus on the three main reasons that security services can hold up democratic transitions. First, limited institutionalization of the military creates political challenges. Ideally, the military would be a professional force. However, the situation in North Africa is not ideal. Factors limiting institutionalization include tribal/regional alliances, as in Libya; an imbalance between the regular army and intelligence services, as in Egypt; and the army as a social welfare system rather than a fighting force, as in Egypt. In Libya, following Gaddhafi’s rise to power, the military was almost entirely composed of members of the Warfala tribe, until he passed leadership on to his son. In Egypt, the Global War on Terror has blurred the line between standard security services and counterterrorism, leading to confusion in leadership. Additionally, the Egyptian army has 2 million members, and what is essentially its own private economy.

The second reason is a changing concept of security. Over the past 50 years, there has been a transition in many countries from state-based security, i.e. making sure the country is not invaded, to human-based security, i.e. making sure citizens are free from want, fear, etc. In Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, the human-centric approach is missing, and the military is thereby preparing for attacks that most likely will not happen.

The third reason is misinterpretation of the meaning of civilian oversight. For example, Rachid Ghannouchi claimed that Ennahda had almost achieved Salafi control of the military. The military should not be "controlled" by a political party, but rather managed. Problems
here include the military not trusting politicians, politicians using the military as a patronage system, and a lack of understanding of civilian control on the part of the military.

Jebnoun concluded by addressing specific issues in Egypt. He argued that these all fall under the heading of politicization of the security sector. He provided several examples to highlight this phenomenon. First, heads of police units were sacked by Morsi, leaving the police opposed to him and contributing to his ouster. Second, the judiciary is politicized, as is the new constitution which accords supremacy to the military (specifically articles 170-175). Third, corruption is a perennial problem, as is competition between the army and the police. Finally, the military co-opts popular movements, as evidenced in Morsi’s removal.

Layachi contextualized the Arab Spring as a response of the military to the street and focused his remarks on Algeria. In Algeria, the military is not only a security force, but “transformist,” implementing socialist policy on the economy and dominating political life. The presence of the military leads back to the War of Independence and military leadership of the country to the 1965 coup, although its position was significantly strengthened – and reformists tendencies weakened - after the failed “Algerian Spring” and subsequent civil war in the early 1990s. Layachi argued that Bouteflika has stayed in power not through his own will, but because he embodies civilian-military relations. The real leadership is, and has been, the intelligence services (DRS) and the question now is whether or not the DRS will allow Bouteflika a fourth term.

Addi further analyzed Algeria’s lack of an Arab Spring. According to his analysis, Algeria is currently post-Arab Spring, as that country had a failed popular uprising 20 years ago. He noted several factors that limit Algeria’s current transition to democracy. First, the failure of efforts to do so in 1992. Second, the fact that rising oil prices over the last decade have allowed the regime to buy off the populace. Third, since Boumedienne, the president has had no power; Bouteflika remains in power because he has given up trying to change things. Again, the DRS is in control, and it doesn’t matter if he lives or dies. Addi thus argued that democratic transition is unlikely because the people have firsthand experience what happens when civilians challenge the military. He ended with a quote from an Algerian author: “All states have an Army; Algeria is an Army that has a State.”

Roundtable 2: Process: Constitutions, Elections, and their Sequencing in Transitions to Democracy
Participants: Shahin, Hudson, Sassoon, Larémont (Moderator)

Larémont gave an opening statement by posing five framing issues for the discussion. 1) To what degree is an elite consensus required to create a democratic state? This happened in Spain and South Africa, but as of yet not in Libya or Tunisia. 2) Does the sequence of events, of elections, matter? They can be harmful, when held for their own sake. 3) Besides courts, are there effective institutions in the state? Effective legislatures? 4) The military must be subordinate. This is probable in Tunisia, impossible in Algeria, and difficult in Egypt. 5) Can the world system sustain the implosion of critical Arab States, by which I mean Egypt?

Shahin, who was at AUC during the revolutions, spoke on the process of democratic transitions with Egypt. In the old state, institutions were very strong, but as recent events have shown, now external actors can thwart transitions. The hope is the country will be able to move from moderate vs. radical to a free state where everyone can speak freely. However, there is little agreement on a prototypical democratic transition. Shahin outlined five essential characteristics for such a transition. First, there must be boundaries of the political system. Essential questions for such a system include: Will it define identity, will it
be simply a state, will it have civil-military relations, and will it define religion?  Second, there must be skilled and trained agents to guide the transition, or it will fall to old state institutions. Third, the economic conditions must be right. Fourth, there must be a process for the Constitution and a decision about whether the state will be presidential or parliamentary. Fifth, projects must be consistent. In Egypt, the rules have kept changing. Shanin concluded by making some pronouncements about the future. Assuming the roadmap continues, there will be instability until al-Sisi comes to power. If he doesn't run, on the other hand, things will stabilize. However, if there is no dominant power, repression will continue. Shanin lastly speculated that it was possible that there may be an actual revolution or a restoration of the Muslim Brotherhood. At this point, anything is possible in Egypt.

Sassoon addressed the question of the role of the Army, saying that durability of institutions is not particular to the Arab Spring, but is applicable worldwide. In Egypt, the security apparatus has been durable pre and post-revolt, with no changed economic or business structures. However, the new regimes have not addressed the people's grievances, namely 1) economic inequality and cronyism, and 2) youth unemployment. Ther countries inherited weak institutions from colonial powers, and in the case of Libya, Gaddafi destroyed what institutions were left, leading to the current situation. Finally, Sassoon noted that elections do not solve problems, citing Iraq. Transitions are only successful with a middle class, and less government patronage, unemployment, and corruption.

Hudson warned not to concentrate on the process, as it can distract from the reality. As in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the saying is “all process, no peace.” Hudson also stressed the need to keep an eye on who is proposing the constitutions. In Egypt, elections were held first, but in Tunisia, there is a constitutional assembly that is effectively governing. It is also important to remember that not all groups see democracy as the goal. What the goal is may vary, but it will likely include a national identity, a central authority, and political capability in some political system. Democracy may be the second or third choice of some of the groups, but if everyone loses a little, then democracy will be left as there will be “no better alternative.” The problem is, in Egypt at least, one side thinks it can have it all, without having to lose a little. The “winners” have missed out on the question of civil society: as they are in charge, they are wondering why there needs to be a transition at all. The fight between elites and counter-elites is a serious problem.

Roundtable3: Moving Forward: Youth and their Interactions with Religious and Secular Parties
Participants: Larémont, Ayachi, Aleya-Sghaier, Abi-Mershed (Moderator)

Abi-Mershed gave some opening remarks, stating that North African youth are stuck in a pre-adult state, due to unemployment and other factors. He presented two framing questions for the discussion: Can there then be a political transition with the youth stuck as they are? Can the youth play any role beyond street protests?

Ayachi qualified the Arab Spring as a primarily peaceful youth movement - not anti-West, not anti-Israel, not pro-Islam, but largely non-ideological. The demands were for more transparency and less authority, as well as an acknowledgement of the youth. Now, what do the Islamists propose in return? More authority. At present, there is thus a clash of values with the young protesters calling for freedom and the Islamist responding with authority. The Islamists have also not made any consistent political or economic proposals and have no answer to the question of unemployment. They say they value justice, but there has been no reform of the judiciary in Tunisia, in Egypt, or elsewhere. Ayachi concluded by
noting that where Islamists are in power, they keep the same government structure and refuse to reform.

Aleya-Sghaier argued that the Arab Spring uprisings were revolts, not revolutions – a revolution involves someone new coming to power. He then turned to the topic of youth in Tunisia. The youth made up the Tunisian revolution, but those in power today are older (of the 217 representatives, only 10 are youth). Some people even miss Ben Ali, because under him economic conditions were better. The Tunisian youth are now facing having to leave the country for work. This is a sign of the complete failure of those in power in Tunisia. However, they insist on staying in power despite their failures. In closing, Aleya-Sghaier lamented about the sad state of the revolution.

4. Q&A

Roundtable 1

Q: Can you comment on the military in Libya and Tunisia, or do those states have a lack of security services?
A: (Jebnoun) The Libyan uprising was not national, but a collection of local uprisings. Without the NATO no-fly zone, Gaddafi would still be in power. There are something like 225 militias in Libya. The problem there is that there is no army, but thousands of colonels, leaders without units! We speak of the DDR process: demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate. This is what will have to happen in Libya, but what we have now are incompetent rebels who believe they liberated the country from Gaddafi! In Tunisia, on the other hand, there is an army, but it is currently marginalized, as it is apolitical and professional.
(Aldi) That is an asset in Tunisia, the apolitical army.
(Layachi) In contrast, in Algeria, the Army controls the state.

Q: (Michael Hudson) Is Egypt replicating the Algerian events of 1992, or will it perhaps follow the Turkish model?
A: (Addi) Unfortunately, Egypt is taking the same path. I foresee no democratic elections for the next 2-3 years, and it is still possible there will be an Islamist victory. In Egypt, you have the same groups, the army, urbanites, and Islamists.
(Layachi) There is less of a taste for violence in Egypt than there was in Algeria. Remember, in the FIS, we had “Afghans” (jihadis returning from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan) mobilized and ready to fight, but in Egypt there is a strong resistance to violence. The best case is Egypt looks at Algerian history, and says no. I agree it will take 2-3 years, but I foresee the Turkish model.

Q: (Ex-member, FIS) The Algerian army confiscated, didn’t create, the state. It is a myth that the army was liberators. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
A: (Addi) We could have an endless debate on the nature of the Algerian army; but in 1962 it was divided. In any case, the state was created by violence against the colonial power.
(Layachi) In Algeria, the problem is that we don’t know where the buck stops. The Algerian army needs open leadership for people to know who decides what. In short, the Army needs institutionalization.
(Addi) In Egypt, the intelligence services belong to the Army. In Algeria, the DRS is the most powerful and controls the rest of the military.

Roundtable 2

Q: Do you see fair elections or continued resistance in Egypt?
A: (Shahin) Egyptians have to sit down and talk. There is no other way. The only other option is violent confrontations and economic collapse. One side thinks that they’re winning, but in order to move forward, they have to negotiate an inclusive, pluralistic system. Right now the military is “insisting to be on the wrong side of history.”

Q: Will the military negotiate with the Muslim Brotherhood? Are the Brotherhood ready to make concessions?
A: (Shahin) Well, Egyptian media sees it the other way around. The Muslim Brotherhood is making concessions! The Brotherhood is willing to negotiate, but at what price? Their money has been confiscated, their leadership has been jailed, and they have been banned as a party. So you see the position from which they have to negotiate.

Roundtable 3

Q: (Ex-member, FIS) You must not stereotype Islamists!
A: (Larémont) We are not trying to define any group, but look at the ideological fracturing of society. There has been a decline in support for Islamist groups. That is not to say there is no support for Islamists, they still do have some significant support, but it is not unanimous. Finally, “there is no way forward from chaos other than compromise.” All groups need to realize that they have to work together.

Q: Are there any other ways of speaking of “the youth?” Is it possible to see the youth as stakeholders rather than just a demographic group?
A: (Aleya-Sghaier) In response to the first question, the Islamists in Tunisia took power through elections, but out of a population of 8 million, there were only 1 million votes, so you cannot say they have overwhelming support. In response to the second question, it doesn’t matter how old someone is; it’s not people between 18 and 35, it’s people who are out campaigning for transparency and a better future.

5. Observations

When the roundtable began, there were around 35 participants; latecomers increased the number to around 50. Due to the length of the event, the number had dwindled to around 20 by the end. There was a rough mixture of half students and academia and half community members and professionals. The event was quite disjointed. Several of the participants appeared unaware of the event’s format; a roundtable is generally intended for unprepared discussion, whereas certain participants gave extensive prepared remarks. This necessitated restructuring on the part of the moderators, with later speakers’ time cut short to provide time for Q&A. The Q&A was similarly unruly; individuals did not announce themselves, and certain among them acted as though they were participating in the roundtable.

The discussions were interesting, but several strayed from their purported topics. Speakers tended to analyze events from their country of expertise, making conversation difficult. Understandably, there was no mention of Morocco. The analysis of Algeria was very thorough, and one of the few points of fruitful discussion among panelists.

(Back to top)
Date: November 21, 2013

1. Title: “Advancing the New US-Morocco Strategic Partnership”
   Hosted by the Atlantic Council Africa Center

Participants:
- **Fred Kempe**: President and CEO, Atlantic Council
- **Stuart Eizenstat**: Executive Committee Member, Atlantic Council
- **Salaheddine Mezouar**: Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Morocco
- **Nizar Baraka**: President of CESE, Morocco
- **Miriem Bensalah Chaqroun**: President, General Federation of Moroccan Enterprises
- **Mohamed Salah Tamek**: Chief of Staff, Minister of the Interior, Morocco
- **Ahmed Abbadi**: Secretary General, Muhammadan League of Scholars
- **Assiah Bensalah Alaoui**: Ambassador at Large, Morocco

**Peter Pham**: Moderator: Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council

2. Overview

This event was held in the context of King Mohammed VI’s meeting with President Obama. The discussion largely focused on specific Moroccan attributes and activities that make that country a beneficial partner to the United States, along with a positive outlook for the ongoing Strategic Dialogue. Eizenstat praised Morocco for its commitment to being a good partner, while Minister Mezouar noted the steps that need to be taken for Morocco to ensure stability in North Africa. The question and answer session was brief and reflected the positive tone of the speakers.

3. Summary

Dr. Peter Pham opened with a description of the Africa Center’s aims, notably informing decision makers of Africa’s strategic importance. He welcomed Foreign Minister Mezouar and the delegation and complimented Morocco’s management of regional security and development challenges. He ceded the floor to Fred Kempe.

Fred Kempe re-emphasized the Atlantic Council’s mission, saying that it is more important now than ever, due to the increased pace of political change, to expand the Atlantic group and for the US to understand the strategic importance of Morocco. He hoped the King’s visit would be held in the spirit of intelligent collaboration. Kempe noted that The Africa Center has always had a link to Morocco, because it is “a unique place between Europe, America, and Africa.” He then introduced Eizenstat, who launched the US-North Africa Economic Partnership, also known as the Eizenstat Initiative.

Stuart Eizenstat underscored the exceptional nature of the King’s visit, and expressed his personal commitment to Morocco and developing economic connections with that country, including his work with Ambassador Gabriel. While frequently “the Maghreb falls between the political cracks,” Eizenstat believes the US-Morocco relationship is now more important than ever due to tensions in the Middle East. Eizenstat recounted the shared values between the US and Morocco, including diversity and religious tolerance, and the willingness to work on societal problems. He praised Morocco’s commitment to improving growth and expanding democracy, as well as supporting human rights. Eizenstat called Morocco an isle of stability in the arc of instability that actively works to promote a better world. He listed many US companies with ties to Morocco as an example of Morocco’s outward reaching policy to “reinforce peace, stability, and shared growth.”
He then gave a partial list of reforms, including the new Constitution, free and fair elections, the creation of the CNDH, education and employment initiatives, and the protection of women’s rights. He noted that Morocco is one of the largest recipients of an MCC grant. He cited the Southern Provinces Development report as a sign that Morocco is a willing partner for reform. He closed with a list of strategic areas that would benefit from US-Morocco cooperation, including the need to tackle AQIM, monitor Iran, end the Syrian conflict, promote rule of law in the Maghreb, including an end to closed borders and unproductive divisions, support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and bolster regional stability. As for the US, Eizenstat expressed his hope to see increased economic exchange in the context of the Free Trade Agreement. Eizenstat noted that the shared values and common purpose of the US and Morocco will help to confront these aforementioned strategic challenges.

Minister Mezouar thanked the council for their welcome and their objective, sincere descriptions of Morocco, which he believes reflect Morocco’s choice to make an open, democratic state in a changing world. He described Morocco as a country with clear leadership that guarantees stability, as well as a country of institutions working to reinforce liberties. In his analysis, Morocco weathered the Arab Spring through turning to development, reform, and openness, in addition to the intelligence and mutual respect of the Moroccan people. He then turned to analyzing Islam and democracy, stating that in Morocco, “a party ran, it came first in the elections, and it now rules.” Minister Mezouar said that Moroccan Islam in particular values moderation and balance, and is therefore compatible with democracy, and that the Moroccan example proves it is possible to have democracy and religious belief.

Minister Mezouar next addressed the Morocco-US relationship, stating that those two countries have shared convictions, interests, and strategic visions. In his opinion, the Strategic Dialogue is a means for the countries to improve their relationship. On a personal note, Minister Mezouar said that this was his first official visit to the United States, and it made him realize just how sincere the relationship between the countries is. He underscored that United States judges countries based on their actions, and Morocco is a country that acts. Minister Mezouar said that “when His Majesty makes an engagement, he respects it. When Morocco decides to do something, it does it.”

Minister Mezouar continued with the topic security and Morocco’s foreign policy. He discussed Libya, as stabilizing that country is of interest to the United States as well as Morocco, recounted Morocco’s promotion of dialogue to resolve the Syrian Civil War and support of Russo-American diplomacy in Syria; and mentioned Morocco’s efforts to stabilize the Sahel, specifically in Mali. He summed up Morocco’s worldview as a country that “acts where it is necessary, in Africa and the Middle East, to help friends and overcome challenges. Morocco has the goal of being a strong regional actor that values democratic values. We want to share this effort for stability and development in Africa with the US.” Minister Mezouar then summarized a list of means Morocco uses to achieve these ends, including human development, foreign investment, and economic support, in addition to security. Minister Mezouar closed by saying that he was certain the meeting between King Mohammed and President Obama would confirm all these things, and that Strategic Dialogue is the way forward. Minister Mezouar then introduced the other members of the delegation.

Nizar Baraka spoke on the economic relationship between Morocco and the US. He noted that while Morocco-US trade has doubled over the past 10 years, it only represents 10% of Moroccan trade, adding that US investments in Morocco were only 5% of the total. Looking forward, Baraka said that Morocco is positioned to be an industrial exporter and is a favorable environment for investment. He cited an IMF figure that expects 5% growth over
the next year, which would be highest in the MENA region. Baraka mentioned the potential for green energy in Morocco, including the Ouarzazate solar plant, and that Morocco aims to cover half of its energy needs domestically with renewables by 2020. He then echoed Minister Mezouar’s comments on how Morocco stabilizes neighboring countries, citing the fact that Morocco is the top African investor in Central and West Africa. Baraka closed by saying that Morocco is strategically positioned as a bridge between the United States and African and MENA countries.

Miriem Bensalah Chaqroun, discussed business development in Morocco. After expressing her optimism for the King’s meeting with Obama, Chaqroun gave a few examples of the delegation’s private sector activity, including signing an MOU with the US Chamber of Congress and planning to host two meetings in Morocco for the American business community. She praised the speed of developing business relationships between US and Morocco. She also described the successes of Moroccan entrepreneurship, especially in Africa. Maroc Telecom, for example, is doing very well. In terms of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, Morocco is second only to South Africa. Chaqroun said that the reasons for Morocco’s business success are not only that the country has good infrastructure and everything necessary to do business, but also that Morocco is always improving, in business, democracy, human rights, and security.

Dr. Mohamed Salah Tamek began by thanking Kempe and Minister Mezouar for their speeches, and not leaving him anything to say, except to praise Morocco for its ability to convert intellectuals into security people. Dr. Tamek went in to more depth explaining the commonalities between Moroccan and American objectives, saying that they are made up of three components: promoting democratic change, providing economic opportunity, and ensuring regional security. Looking forward, the broader goal is enhancing the chance that moderates will shape the future of the region rather than extremists. There is also a common set of values between the US and Morocco, including respect for rule of law, peaceful inclusivity, protecting fundamental rights, a focus on building democratic institutions, and vibrant civil society.

Dr. Tamek then listed some current challenges in North Africa, including the Northern Malian insurgency, the persistence of terrorist threats, AQIM terrorist networks operating across the Sahel, and the emergence of al-Mourabitoun. In Dr. Tamek’s analysis, Belmokhtar is trying to create a new Islamic state from Morocco to Egypt. Boko Haram is also a significant threat, trained and guided by AQIM. Another is Al-Shabab in Somalia. The possibility that geographically distant, yet ideologically similar groups could create a network of mutual support is a real threat. Dr. Tamek echoed Minister Mezouar’s position on Syria, recalling that Morocco hosted a Friends of Syria meeting and can play a role in resolving that crisis. He also recounted that when Eric Holder was in Morocco a few weeks earlier, they discussed training and tracking programs to confront international jihadists. He closed by saying that Eizenstat's recommendations are good ones to take.

Ahmed Abbadi noted that certain political analysts believed the primary focus of international relations was to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but the fact remains that the DNA for solutions to current problems lays in the Atlantic region. Abbadi again made reference to Morocco’s unique geographic position as the door to the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. He said that the reason Morocco is so open was the choice of following the Maliki rite 1200 years ago, as well as the fact that Moroccan Sufism is practiced throughout Africa, which gives Morocco and other African countries the opportunity to work together to counteract extremism. Abbadi urged Morocco and the US to cooperate on education, since culture is the content to give alternatives to hate.
Assiah Bensalah Alaoui who introduced herself as Ambassador at Large for the Kingdom of Morocco. She expressed her belief that the King is anxious to offer a better future not only to Moroccans, but also to Africa and beyond. She agreed with Minister Mezouar in stating that Morocco is the perfect partner for the US in addressing security in North Africa. Alaoui recognized that the road to realizing the reform goals set out in the 2011 Constitution would be a long one. Looking forward, she said that in addition to being a historical ally of the United States, Morocco can be the loyal partner to developing the future of the region. Morocco will succeed thanks to its vibrant civil society, determined women, and determined, loyal youth who recognize the power of Moroccan leadership. She highlighted that Morocco is a valuable partner at this point in time, with the ambition to go beyond bilateral relations, as presently European and US influence are declining in Africa, with China is rising. Economically and politically, Morocco is “punching above its weight” and has the potential to help mend the transatlantic relationship.

4. Q&A

Q: (Gen. William Ward, former head of AFRICOM) It’s easy for me to understand why the US and Morocco have been great partners. Could you offer some prescription for Morocco to achieve regional successes? We know the US cannot do it all, but with partners, those goals are achievable. How does Morocco see its role in the region for accomplishing the goals you laid out?

A: (Dr. Tamek) You are right to raise the point of cooperation, things the US cannot do alone, and these are things we have been working on since the last meeting of the Strategic Dialogue. The Moroccan approach is multifaceted. Other methods of dealing with terrorism include economic development, education in the Maliki rite, developing education, human development, rights for minorities and women, and including people of all faiths. You cannot face these things in binaries between good and evil, this is what we are telling our friends in Mali, so that this region will not be a bastion for terrorism, but might be a bastion for peace.

(Minister Mezouar) To give concrete examples on Morocco’s approach, I’ll take up Mali. In Mali, there is a problem called the North. Morocco naturally has good relations with the democratically elected government, the president, but also with the movement in the North. Morocco is working to maintain dialogue between the two groups. It is fundamental to preserve the dialogue to preserve national unity. Morocco is also working in the humanitarian sector because the conflict touches the average Malian. Morocco is also working in the spiritual sector, bringing 500 Malian imams to Morocco for religious instruction. Morocco transfers its expertise in human development. Morocco also has agricultural expertise it is sharing with Mali. Morocco gives its competence and aids cultural development, both for traditional and modern cultures. I give these examples to say it is possible, and that the problems Mali is facing are common: how to transform society? How to help immigration? How to implement strategic development? How to reassure security? Many countries have resources and expertise, but the reality and results are not ideal. What is needed is an approach tailored to the specificities of Africa. For example, most commerce is conducted in traditional markets. If we want to reassure, stabilize, and make an inclusive dialogue, we have to include the population - to work with the population is the only guarantee of stabilization. Because there are those who exploit misery and transform it into a threat. Securing the country is important and urgent. Morocco is training the security workers in Libya, but this approach is of a different dimension. What is necessary is to approach the reality of the people and reassure the population with community engagement.

Q: (Charles Dahan, VP World Federation of Moroccan Jews) We should work on the exchange of education between the US and Morocco. It is important we have a transmission of knowledge between the US and Morocco to advance higher education. That will transform
the economy. Investment, building new factories, and creating jobs in Morocco will be essential, and in order to build good investment, you have to build a good knowledge base. **A:** (Minister Mezouar) I agree. In the field of training, Morocco has something like 10,000 places for training, in universities and schools, of which 7,000 are funded by the Moroccan government. There is also professional development and administration training, like customs, finance. Each sector participates in training in its own program. This is equally supported by the Moroccan private sector. This is a fundamental dimension, and as noted in many countries, those that have adopted Morocco’s path are in what is called “the economic emergence.” And since we have gone through this experience we can put in place a strategy to identify needs in competencies. So we oriented training to the needs of the market of today and the market of tomorrow. So we provide our expertise to obtain concrete results. But Africa has changed. It has exceptional elites at every level. It has great competence, affirmed by private sector success. But there is a new generation, economic and political, and stereotypes have closed the world’s eyes to this transformation or development. One must have confidence in Africa and Africans that we will put in place good mechanisms, because success must come from within, it cannot be imposed from without. We must let society produce the elements of development.

5. **Observations**

This event was attended by approximate 90 foreign policy professionals and members of both the American and Moroccan media, who conducted interviews in the hallway before and after the event. It was one of the major events of the delegation, which took on a tone of celebrating the past and future of the US-Morocco relationship. Given the namesake of the host think-tank, the speakers aimed to bring about more awareness of Morocco as a keystone of the transatlantic relationship. Speakers lauded the leadership in Morocco that has led to a serious commitment to reform and to improving security and human development across the region and the continent. The question and answer session was brief (two questions) and reflected the positive tone of the speakers.

Video of the event is available [here](#).

(Back to top)
US policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Rep. Smith serves on the House Armed Services Committee and is very well versed in foreign affairs, security, and the MENA region. He spoke on current affairs such as Syria and Egypt, as well as more broadly on how the US could improve its prospects for policy outcomes in the region. There were several questions asked and answered before the Congressman had to leave.

3. Summary

After a brief introduction of the guest of honor, Rep. Smith began detailing priorities for US policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Dealing with the “youth bulge” and the economics of creating employment and upward mobility are paramount for US goals in the region, he said. There is equal threat and promise inherent in a young population. He added that the US needs to work with companies to encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to create economic opportunity. Rep. Smith concluded that policymakers lose sight of that a bit when the focus is fixated on politics and security. Despite some assertions that poverty doesn’t lead to extremism, Rep. Smith stated that he believes strongly in this connection, and that it should be a priority for foreign policy.

It has been suggested that growing pessimism amongst policymakers and the American public regarding foreign policy outcomes will result in a significant de-emphasis of the MENA region in US policy. Rep. Smith stated that the US must continue to be engaged, but that expectations must be tempered with the knowledge that a limited role will be most effective. No country can magically fix another country with a policy, he said. In addition, there is a persistent mistrust of the US in the region. Policymakers should thus be realistic, though optimistic, about expected outcomes.

Most of all, US policy needs more clarity. Focusing on economic opportunity, political freedom, stability, and discouraging extremism, the US needs to be honest and open about its balance of principles and priorities in the region – much more so than it has, Rep. Smith said. “We need to help our friends in the region more than we have.” He added that the US cannot afford to neglect MENA nor be unclear as to what our policies are.

4. Q&A

Q: What are your short-term concerns with current US policy?
A: The manner in which we interact with our allies in the region, characterized by a lack of clarity, concerns me most. There isn’t really any “perfect way” to handle foreign policy, and in the case of Syria’s chemical weapons, the US “stumbled into an okay place.” There is still much room for improvement.

Q: (Ed Kutler, Managing Director at Mercury) Is withholding military aid an effective policy tool?
A: Military aid is a good way to build and maintain relationships between countries, but what recourses are available when countries don’t meet policy standards? Policymakers need to be aware of multiple priorities and the unlikelihood of direct outcomes from such actions.

Q: (Nelson Cunningham, Chair of the Latin America Policy Initiative at NDN) Is there a possibility of shifting priorities from military aid to economic aid with regard to US aid to Egypt?
A: US emphasis here has been generally unbalanced in that regard. Much of the aid ends up going towards the purchase of American weaponry, resulting in a credible industrial consideration that can’t be ignored.
Q: Could you please address obstructionism in Congress against certain foreign policy goals, notably the threat of new sanctions against Iran?
A: The case for aid needs to be made better, especially in Congress. There is also an ideological dimension at play, given that investment at home has continued to decrease as well. Increasing sanctions against Iran would be a huge mistake, despite my personal belief that Iran will never be a good actor on the international scene.

Q: Does US aid have any real impact?
A: Credibility is paramount to foreign policy and aid and help during crisis does actually play a role in increasing that credibility.

5. Observation

This event was attended by approximately 30 foreign policy professionals. NDN is looking to raise the profile of its relatively new MENA initiative, using political connections to bring in policymakers and help shape the conversation. Questions seemed to reflect similar ideologies for improving US policy as those of Rep. Smith. The event was also open to the press and streamed online on the NDN website.
The information contained in this report is from public and private sources; and has not been corroborated by other sources as to its accuracy.

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

January 24, 2014

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- President Bouteflika has again confounded rumours of his demise by returning from Paris, where he had been undergoing medical tests, just in time to sign the decree calling the presidential election, which is to be held on April 17.
- Although he seems physically badly diminished in his rare public appearances and his speech has been impaired, a usually reliable source close to Bouteflika's inner circle insists that he intends to stand for re-election in April, and that his health is strong enough to permit it.
- The new Special Security Commission has met for the first time, under the chairmanship of CoS Gaid Saleh, to approve a number of measures including early retirement for several senior DRS officers, giving the appearance that the military has the upper hand over the intelligence services and, indeed, the civilian wing of the state.
- On the other hand, Bouteflika's special security advisor, who is a lieutenant-colonel in the DRS, has been appointed secretary of the High Security Council, suggesting that there is still life in the Bouteflika-Tewfik tandem.

Foreign Relations

- Algerian defence spending shows an increase of over 15% in the 2014 budget, accounting for a fifth of total government expenditure, while Morocco has approved a four-year plan to increase defence spending by 18.5%.
- Talk of an all-out arms race between the two countries appears to be overblown, however, with Algeria launching big-ticket programmes that had been postponed during the years of civil war while Morocco has to spend increasing amounts on repairing and upgrading second-hand equipment acquired from its Western allies.
- There is no noticeable change in Algerian military doctrine, which seems to be built around the concept of “advanced defence”.

Security

- Algiers remains calm, and there have been a scant few reports of incidents in the oil and gas producing areas.
- AQMI has announced that the small Defenders of Salafi Preaching group, based in north-west Algeria, has finally decided to join forces with it in a united organisation.
- Three suspected members of the Sons of the Sahara movement – which has reportedly merged with a hitherto unknown Tuareg group – have been arrested on suspicion of serving as guides for jihadists between south-west Libya and northern Mali.
- Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Al-Mourabitoun group has issued a report on its operations in 2013 suggesting a strong focus on fighting French forces in northern Mali.
- Sources at Sonatrach indicate that the military is moving to establish direct control over Sonatrach's own security operations and that plans to establish a security subsidiary seem to have been put on hold until after the presidential election.
- The military is said to have agreed in principle to allow IOCs to hire foreign private security firms to secure facilities in southern Algeria, although this has not been made public.
Political Trends

On Jan. 13, official government news agency APS unexpectedly announced that President Bouteflika had flown to France that day for medical tests at the military-run Val de Grâce hospital in central Paris. Although this was, according to APS, all part of the scheduled follow-up treatment after the stroke he suffered in April of last year, the announcement inevitably sparked a new, fevered bout of rumour and speculation: Bouteflika had been medevacked again after a sudden deterioration in his condition, it was widely assumed; some news sites reported that the President's family were in Paris to accompany him, lodging at the de luxe George V hotel, while Algerian daily El Watan claimed that the military's High Command had met in urgent session to take stock of the situation; and pretty soon social media and certain news outlets (Radio France Maghreb and Israeli French-language website Jerusalem Plus, for example) were reporting that Bouteflika had passed away.

The suggestion that the President had been flown to Paris for emergency treatment after a decline in his health rather than for a “routine check-up” appeared all the more plausible in light of his last public appearance, just a fortnight previously: Bouteflika had seemed shockingly diminished in TV footage of the signing of the 2014 Finance Law at a meeting of the Council of Ministers convened for that purpose alone on Dec. 30 (just 24 hours short of the legal deadline). Furthermore, the President had suddenly left the country, with no date initially set for his return, just before another crucial deadline: the constitution requires the head of state to issue a decree formally convening a presidential election at the latest 90 days before the expiry of the current presidential term of office[1], which in this instance meant that the President had to put his signature to the decree by Jan. 19 at the latest. A separate APS dispatch, issued after Bouteflika had been admitted to Val de Grâce, announcing the forthcoming decree “except in case of force majeure and nonobstant the provisions of article 88 of the constitution[2],” only added to the suspicion that the President's absence at this crucial juncture was anything but “routine”.

Bouteflika at least put paid to the rumours of his death[3] by returning to Algiers in the afternoon of Jan. 16, and the following day he duly signed the decree convening the presidential election for April 17. As expected, his old rival Ali Benflis was the first out of the starting blocks, officially announcing his candidacy as of Jan. 19. Bouteflika has made no such declaration himself — although this has not stopped a fresh wave of speculation concerning the supposed launch of his campaign for re-election for a fourth consecutive term, however weak his health might be (with at least one Algerian journalist claiming that the President's influential brother and advisor Saïd had contacted the editors of several newspapers and other media as of the evening of Jan. 17 to instruct them to begin campaigning for the re-election of the President)[4].

In the midst of all this, a trusted source at the Presidency assured us, during the afternoon of Jan. 16, that Bouteflika had indeed been in Paris for a routine check-up, would be back in Algiers later that same day “or on Jan. 17 at the latest”, and would be running for a fourth term; the President was in a reasonable condition, the source insisted, admitting that his speech is impaired but claiming that this is not the consequence of his April 2013 stroke but rather of an operation on his oesophagus “three or four years ago”. This account may appear in
many respects counter-intuitive, but it is noteworthy that the source – who has almost always proved reliable in the past – was correct about Bouteflika's return at a time when most commentators were busily writing the President off as moribund, suggesting continued close proximity with the head of state's inner circle. On balance, it would in our view be unwise to dismiss the possibility that Bouteflika will indeed attempt to run for a fourth term of office, despite his apparent physical frailty (although if he does, it seems increasingly likely that it will be without the prop of a formal vice-presidential candidate, since there would no longer seem to be time to amend the constitution prior to the election).

The same source at the Presidency also confirmed that a high-level military meeting had taken place on Jan. 13, but insisted that it had nothing to do with Bouteflika's condition but rather was a “routine” meeting to decide on various retirements and appointments within the military and security apparatus. This appears to be borne out by a report dated Jan. 13 by news portal Tout Sur l'Algérie (which seems to have been used as a conduit for information relating to changes within the security services on numerous occasions over the past year) indicating that a meeting had been held earlier in the day under the chairmanship of Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd Saleh to formally approve the retirement of a number of high-ranking DRS officers: the ex-head of the Direction Centrale de la Sécurité de l'Armée Maj-Gen. Mhenna Djebbar, the former head of the media management department Col. Fawzi, and the former commander of the DRS' special intervention force Col. Hassen. TSA indicated that this was the first meeting of the Special Security Commission – a body that was reportedly set up by presidential order late last year to vet and approve decisions of the General Staff relating to all promotions, retirements, procurement etc. (see previous report). Intriguingly, initial reports in the Algerian media in early December had suggested that the Special Security Commission was to be chaired by PM Sellal and as such was intended to signify the submission of the military and security apparatus to the elected, civilian executive branch. In the event, however, it would seem that it is chaired by the Chief-of-Staff, thus symbolising quite the opposite: the relative autonomy of the military and security apparatus, at least at the present juncture.

Furthermore, the fact that it is the CoS who chairs meetings of the body that officially approves personnel changes at the DRS would seem, on the surface of things, to signify the submission of the DRS to the regular military. Appearances can be deceptive, however, and it may be premature to conclude that Lt-Gen. Gaid Saleh – who is close to retirement himself and reportedly despised by many of his own colleagues within the regular army as well as being on bad terms with various senior DRS officers – is really lording it over both the civilian branch of the regime and the powerful intelligence and security service. In this connection, it may be worth noting a small item, tucked away at the bottom of a page in the Journal Officiel (the Algerian government gazette) in mid-December, officialising the appointment of Djamel Eddine Bouzghaia as secretary of the High Security Council – a body made up of top military officers and senior ministers which meets irregularly under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, whom it is supposed to advise on matters relating to national security. Lt-Col. Bouzghaia, who hails from western Algeria and has a doctorate from a French university in international relations and energy cooperation, has been President Bouteflika's special security advisor since around 2010, with particular responsibility for issues relating to the Sahara and the Sahel. Significantly, he is a
DRS officer, who is understood to have made his career in the Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Extérieur (foreign intelligence branch), and for years served as the head of the Institut Supérieur des Etudes de Sécurité, a research centre run by the DRS. This would seem to suggest that there may be still life left in the partnership between Bouteflika and DRS chief Lt-Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène that has dominated the power structure for almost a decade.

Foreign Relations

Ratified and signed into law on Dec. 30, the Algerian government's budget for 2014 has been criticised by some members of parliament and journalists for the remarkably high levels of spending devoted to defence and security: with a total of $19bn (DA 1,496,635bn) the Ministries of Defence and the Interior take up no less than 31.75% of the government's budget for this year[9]. The $12.132b (DA 955,926bn) earmarked for the Ministry of National Defence alone represents just over 20% of total state expenditure, and is up some 15.75% on last year. At the same time, Morocco's government has approved a staggered increase in defence spending of 18.5% over four years (rising from $3.8bn in 2014 to $4.5bn in 2018). Do these figures signify an arms race between the two countries, as some media have suggested?

The first observation that needs to be made is that, while the 15.75% increase in Algeria's defence budget that has drawn so much attention is undeniably a hefty increase, it is by no means exceptional: one has to go as far back as 2007 to find a year-on-year increase in military expenditure of less than 10%, with figures in the 20s being fairly typical[10]. Moroccan defence spending has also been growing constantly since at least 2003, but at significantly lower rates (only in 2008 did year-on-year growth exceed 10%), and it is since the mid-2000s that the gap between levels of defence spending in Algeria and Morocco really began to open up[11].

It has been suggested[12] that the increase in Algerian defence spending reflects “the renewal of military equipment, which fell ten years behind because of the embargo of the 1990s and the stoppage of the Russian defence industry”. There is a grain of truth in this, but only a grain. It is certainly the case that Russia's military production was subject to disruption in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union (traditionally Algeria's leading supplier), and there was some reticence on the part of certain Western countries about selling weapons systems to Algeria during this period due to concerns about human rights. But the “embargo” (about which Algerian politicians and media love to complain) was never a formal one, and certainly never total – Algiers continued to buy weapons systems and other materiel throughout the conflict, notably from suppliers such as South Africa but even, on occasion, from Western countries including the United States. But Algerian defence spending through the 1990s – a period when resources were stretched due to low oil prices and the high cost of lending for the then decidedly unbankable Algerian state – was obviously mainly focussed on winning the civil war. Spending began to balloon as of the mid-2000s, with the pressure of the civil war receding and oil prices on the rise[13], as Algeria turned back massively to Russia for big-ticket projects, for the air force and land forces in particular, that seem to have been postponed during the 1990s[14]. Attention has since been
The latest increases in defence spending can be seen as a continuation of that trend. But it is very much worth noting that these new – or rather postponed – acquisitions do not seem to correspond with any significant change in Algeria's military doctrine. The Algerian armed forces' orientation remains essentially defensive, with no investment in weapons systems that could be said clearly to be designed for major, long-term operations beyond the country's borders; recent acquisitions seem intended in part to build the capability to sanctuarise Algeria's territory while maintaining the possibility of launching limited strikes beyond its borders in case of war[15] - an orientation that has been described as “advanced defence”. Other acquisitions – such as the three planned squadrons of Mi28 heavy attack helicopters – remain focussed on counter-insurgency operations.

Meanwhile, Morocco's four-year defence expenditure plans – which represent an average annual increase of only 4.5% – seem to have less to do with a race to catch up with Algeria than with the need to maintain and/or modernise existing equipment. Rabat has for some time had a strategy of buying used equipment from the surplus stocks of the United States and other NATO countries, including France, at cut-rate prices – for example the 200 Abrams M1A1 main battle tanks, which had served in the Gulf War, acquired from the US in 2011, and in recent weeks three Harfang drones that had been used by French forces in Afghanistan – while on occasion persuading friendly and far wealthier Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, to finance certain big-ticket acquisitions (over recent years, the more expensive and more advanced systems have tended to be for the air force and the navy, which had been lagging behind Morocco's land forces). This strategy has turned out to have hidden costs, however. The second-hand weapons systems that have fleshed out the land forces' inventory have frequently required repairs and upgrades to make them fully operational – reportedly costing as much a $1bn in the case of the Abrams MBTs. The newer and more advanced systems that Rabat has acquired, meanwhile, may turn out to be prohibitively costly to use: the Moroccan air force's 22 new F-16 fighters, of which the last three were delivered in mid-2012, reportedly rarely leave the tarmac at Ben Guerir air base, at least in part for budgetary reasons. Thus, while in certain areas the Moroccan military may arguably have the qualitative edge over Algeria thanks to occasional acquisitions of high-quality Western weaponry, it remains a moot point whether its personnel have been able to acquire the training and practice needed to operate some of its more advanced systems.

Security

By the end of December, the monthly level of political violence nationwide was slightly lower than average of previous months, with 13 incidents over all, of which six were at the initiative of AQMI (or other jihadist groups). So far January appears to be on a par for the number of incidents (nine up to Jan. 19), but not in terms of AQMI operations, of which only two have been recorded so far.

ALGIERS and its immediate environs have remained quiet. The most significant development in the north of the country over the past month came on Dec. 22, when AQMI issued a brief statement[16] announcing “the good news” that “our brothers of the Defenders of Salafi Preaching group have decided to join Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb to join one united group”. The Defenders of Salafi Preaching, also known by the Arabic acronym, is a small jihadist group of a few dozen fighters at most that has been active on and off in northwestern Algeria under this name since 1998. Like AQMI's ancestor the GSPC, HDS is a split-off from the former GIA, but it had until the latest announcement steadfastly rejected merger suggestions from the GSPC/AQMI. The fact that HDS has at last decided to join forces with AQMI may be a sign that it is under pressure and increasingly unable to recruit, as would-be jihadists prefer to go Syria or other, more active theatres (a consideration which seems also to apply to AQMI itself).

There have been scant reports of jihadist activity in the OIL & GAS PRODUCING REGIONS:

- Algerian security sources told Chinese news agency Xinhua that the Algerian army, using helicopter gunships, on January 14 intercepted and killed three jihadists in the Grand Erg Occidental some 700 km south of Algiers. The jihadists were travelling on an offroader and were “aiming to infiltrate the gas-producing zone of Hassi Rmel in the wilaya of Laghouat”. Their car was destroyed. El-Khabar (16/01) reported that 50,000 soldiers were mobilised across eight wilayas in the Algerian south and the eastern and southern borders after the operation (a deployment it claimed was related to “intelligence reports” suggesting that jihadist groups were planning a big operation against oil and gas sites to mark the first anniversary of the In Amenas attack).
- In a somewhat garbled report, Algerian daily Echourouk (15/12/13) claimed that three smugglers were captured by the Army and the Gendarmerie in an area it referred to as “Takalguemine” south of In Salah, wilaya of Tamanrasset, on Dec. 14. The smugglers were said to have been travelling in an offroader believed to have been stolen from “the American company Global”, operating at “Khechiba” (Krechba?) oil field. They were reportedly carrying a number of machine guns and a large sum in cash, and are believed to have been on their way to rendez-vous at In Amguel (wilaya of Tamanrasset) with a group of “new Libyan recruits to AQMI” arriving from Bordj El Haoues (wilaya of Illizi).

In addition, mirroring the HDS-AQMI merger in the north of the country, El-Khabar reported on Jan. 8 that the Sons of the Sahara Movement for Islamic Justice had announced in a video statement its merger with a hitherto unknown group calling itself the Free Tuareg Group and pledged to “keep fighting the Algerian army until their demands are met”.

The EASTERN BORDERS were, ostensibly at least, unusually calm. Just one incident was reported near the border with Libya or Tunisia (at least on the Algerian side[171]):
- El-Khabar on January 12 said security forces had arrested in Djanet, wilaya of Illizi, three people suspected of belonging to the Sons of the Sahara Movement for Islamic Justice during the first week of January. They are suspected of having worked as guides for jihadist groups along the desert tracks from Sebha in Libya to Khelil in northern Mali.

The SOUTHERN BORDERS, too, were relatively quiet, with only three incidents reported:
- The security services on January 3 led a series of raids on smugglers in the areas between Tinzaouatine and Timiaouine in the areas between the wilayas of Tamanrasset and Adrar, near the Malian border. After a brief clash with smugglers in one of the raids, four smugglers were arrested, 16 trucks seized and five weapons recovered. Fuel and foodstuffs made up most of the smuggled goods.
- A similar operation was carried out in the Bordj Baji Mokhtar sector on January 8, resulting in the seizure of four machine guns, ammunition, and more than seven trucks carrying mostly foodstuffs. Seventeen people were arrested.
- El-Khabar also reported that a jihadist belonging to the hitherto unknown “Preaching and Jihad Brigades”
surrendered to the security forces in the wilaya of Adrar on January 12, and quoted security sources as saying he had “taken part in 22 operations in the area of Bordj Baji Mokhtar and Tinzaouatine”. He is also reported to have confessed to having been involved in the Tiguentourine operation a year ago, being “in charge of supplies”.

Beyond Algeria’s borders, Mauritanian press agency ANI on January 4 said it had received a statement from Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Al-Mourabitoun group giving an account of operations in 2013 (those conducted by its two components, MUJAO and Belmokhtar’s own Katiba Al-Moulathamin up to August 2013, and those by the merged group thereafter). Although the list began with the In Amenas attack of January 2013, all other operations were in Mali and consisted mainly of roadside bombs or small attacks against French forces, and indeed the group's statement, as described by ANI, was a long diatribe against France, promising the French forces in Mali “a Soviet fate” and “punishment for the French people for their aggression”.

Meantime, one year on from the In Amenas attack, private sources at Sonatrach have shed new light on how security for the oil and gas sector is being reorganised. According to a security manager within Sonatrach’s HSE department, speaking to us at the end of the first week of January:

The Ministry of Defence tells us that oil and gas sites in the south have been secured by the army, using its own manpower and resources. Sonatrach’s own security structures have been marginalised, playing an occasional role only, providing the army with intelligence. The Ministry of Defence is trying to establish full control over all security-related matters, including Sonatrach’s internal security and Sonatrach’s own security personnel.

It is clear now that the Sonatrach security subsidiary will not see the light of day before the Ministry of Defence has completed its purge and take-over of security at the national oil company. And this will take several months. The worst thing about all this, from the point of view of Sonatrach’s security personnel, is that discussions are now under way between the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Defence and IOCs operating in Algeria with a view to setting up a system to finance security provisions at oil and gas facilities whereby IOCs will be granted significant reductions in taxes and other charges so that they can pay for their own security. This principle has been agreed on, and the discussions are currently focussing on the size of these reductions. But this financial question may end up sparking protests by Sonatrach security personnel, including staff on permanent contracts as well as security guards with short-term contracts.

A few days later, a source at Sonatrach’s legal department gave a slightly different appreciation of developments:

All questions relating to the security of oil and gas installations have been put on hold pending the presidential election. Some measures have already been taken, however, including two decisions that were taken at the recent meeting of the Special Security Commission at the Ministry of Defence. Firstly, responsibility for security at oil and gas installations is to remain in the hands of Sonatrach and the army. Secondly, and more importantly, it was decided that IOCs will be allowed to employ the services of foreign private security companies, subject to certain conditions – notably that Sonatrach must be involved in managing and recruiting foreign security personnel, on the strength of individual dossiers that will first have to be validated by the Defence Ministry’s Special Security Commission. Applications to operate in Algeria have already been submitted for a number of foreign private security companies that only employ foreign personnel, such as the Dubai-based Olive for example. This decision to allow the use of foreign private security companies has not been made public[18].

An earlier decision, applied as of Dec. 25, has to do with Sonatrach’s own internal security staff: security officials at Sonatrach headquarters and within other administrative units of the national oil company will no longer belong to the DRS but to the Ministry of Defence. Their transfers are under way currently.

Plans for a security subsidiary at Sonatrach have not been abandoned, but they have been put off until a later date – probably until after April 2014. The managers in charge of setting up the subsidiary are still working on it and say they have made a lot of headway, and are now waiting for the Defence Ministry’s green light to begin setting up
To be more precise, the constitution stipulates that a presidential election must be held “within the month preceding the expiry of the president's term of office” and that the electorate must be formally convened 90 days before the chosen date of the election. Bouteflika was sworn in for his present term on April 19, 2009.

Which allows for the impeachment of the President should “serious and lasting illness” render him incapable of discharging his duties.

The most alarmist rumours appear to have been propagated by media and websites such as Algérie Express that are close to the RCD, a mainly Kabyle secularist party.

Technically he has up to 45 days as of the decree convening the election in which to do so – meaning that an announcement could be pushed back as late as March 2 or 3.

Indeed, the source's assertion that Bouteflika's speech has been impaired for several years is demonstrably inaccurate: in his last public address, the now famous Setif speech of May 8, 2012, the President read clearly and fluently from a prepared text for some 40 minutes.

When the DCSA was transferred to the General Staff of the armed forces in September of last year, Maj-Gen. Djebbar was reported to have stayed at the DRS, taking over as head of the security and intelligence service's Bureau d'Organisation. One source, with many years experience of the inner workings of Algerian intelligence, at the time tipped him as a strong contender to succeed Lt-Gen. Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène as head of the DRS. The same source now argues that taking retirement does not in any way preclude returning at a later stage to take up higher responsibilities (pointing to the example of Bachir Tartag, who formally retired in 1999 but was later brought back to head the Direction de la Sécurité Intérieure for over two and a half years) and suggests that Djebbar – whose relations with CoS Gaïd Saleh are said to be very poor – may still be in line for the top job at the DRS.

This was later confirmed to us by a well-informed source at Sonatrach's legal department, quoted at length below (Security).

While the constitution defines in broad terms the responsibilities of the High Security Council, it does not stipulate who its members should be, this being left to the legislator to define. Although constitutionally it is an advisory body, the High Security Council played a decisive role in suspending the electoral process, ousting President Chadli Bendjedid and designating a new collective presidency in January 1992.

Listed as operating budget. The Finance Law does not list capital expenditure for the defence and internal security sectors separately.

2012 saw an exceptionally large hike of 40%, due largely to pay increases for military personnel that were rushed through in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring.

In absolute terms, Morocco consistently outstripped Algeria in military spending in the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, with Algeria only overtaking its western neighbour as of 1997, after five years of very hefty increases as the civil war flared.

Algerian defence specialist Akram Kharief, quoted in El Watan, 30/12/13.

Oil prices had fallen to historic lows at the end of 1998, just before Bouteflika came to power, but had more than doubled by the end of his first term of office in April 2004 and the upward trend has by and large continued since (to the exclusion of the drastic but ultimately short-lived correction in the second half of 2008, after a particularly dramatic spike in the first half).

In 2006, Algiers and Moscow signed a massive arms transfer deal worth an estimated $7.5bn, which included 28 Su-30MKA fighter aircraft, 36 Mig-29SMT fighter aircraft, 16 Yak-130 advanced training aircraft; 8 battalions of S-300 PMU-2 SAM systems, a number of Pantsir-S1
(SA-22) air defence missile systems, and a number of T-90S Main Battle Tanks. It also involved the write-off of the residual Algerian military debt to Moscow inherited from Soviet times.

Hence for example reported plans to buy between four and six Airbus 330 MRTTs to replace the air force's existing fleet of Ilyushin Il-78 in-flight refuelling tanker aircraft, and a likely order for Su34 long-range bombers.

Unusually, the statement made no mention of HDS fighters swearing allegiance to the emir of AQMI — and in fact made no mention at all of the emir of AQMI, Abdelmalek Droukdel.

The Tunisian press did however report that a group of armed young men, described as “bandits” attacked the frontier post of Bouchebka, near the Tunisian wilaya of Kassrine, on January 8. An 18-year-old man was killed on the attack and a Tunisian border guard was wounded and transferred to Tébessa, Algeria, for treatment.

There do however appear to have been some echoes in the media. On Jan. 16 – three days after the Security Commission meeting – El Watan ran an article entitled “Tiguentourine: the oil majors' Trojan horse” reprising a guest column by former Sonatrach Vice President Hocine Malti published by the same daily on Dec. 23, 2013. In his op-ed, ostensibly celebrating Sonatrach’s 50th anniversary, Malti argued that the recent changes in the DRS and the military had in fact been imposed on Algeria by BP, Statoil and other Western oil companies, together with the British and American intelligence services in response to the perceived security and intelligence failures that led to the In Amenas attack. He continued:

“BP is looking to entrust protection of the Tiguentourine and In Salah sites to private security companies. If BP manages to impose this choice – and everything suggests that it will […] - other foreign oil companies operating in Algeria will follow suit. And what does Sonatrach have to say by way of a reply, after its outraged protestations that security is a question of national sovereignty? That BP can employ consultants; in other words, security specialists, foreign ones of course, who will tell the Algerian security forces what they have to do. Where is the sovereignty of the state in that set-up?

“BP and Statoil will of course play the lead parts, but they will not be the only ones demanding changes. All IOCs are now demanding new modifications to the Hydrocarbons Law because, they say, security-related costs have gone up 15%. In other words, what they want is a reduction in the taxes they pay in Algeria.

“All in all, the IOCs want to set the security standards for Algerian oil installations themselves, privatise the fight against terrorism by employing mercenaries to protect those very installations, and impose their own financial terms for their operations in Algeria.”

Malti (and the El Watan journalist who summarised his op-ed on Jan. 16) also referenced an article in Le Soir d’Algérie (29/10/13) reporting that “Stirling, BP's British security contractor, has just signed a strategic partnership with Olive, another British company based in the UAE which is renowned for using armed mercenaries to provide security for the sites and personalities with which it is entrusted.”
Executive Summary in FRENCH

ALGÉRIE : RAPPORT DE SITUATION MENSUEL

26 février 2014

Résumé

Les Tendances politiques
- PM Sellal a confirmé que le Président Bouteflika se présenterait aux élections en avril.
- Secrétaire Général du FLN Amar Saadani a fait une attaque franche sur le DRS et son commandant, Lieutenant-Général ‘Tewfik’ Médièn, déclenchant une guerre de mots acharnée dans les médias et encourageant la spéculation fiévreuse sur scissions au sommet de la structure du pouvoir.
- Le Président Bouteflika a cherché à mettre fin à cette controverse de plus en plus préjudiciable dans un long et anormalement franc discours lu en son nom à la télévision nationale, dans lequel il a réaffirmé sa confiance dans le DRS comme une partie intégrante et fidèle des forces armées.
- Il semble y avoir un froid dans les relations entre Tewfik et Bouteflika, datant de retour de Bouteflika de son hospitalisation prolongée en France juillet dernier, mais des sources concordantes indiquent que Tewfik ne s'oppose pas à la réélection de Bouteflika.
- Le discours de Bouteflika a également fait référence à une ordonnance de 2006 sur le statut du personnel militaire qui fixe des limites d'âge maximum pour les officiers supérieurs, et il semble qu'elle sera maintenant appliquée, ce qui augure un changement de génération au sein de l'armée et du DRS desquels Tewfik et chef d’état majeur Gaïd Saleh pourrait finalement se retirer.
- Des sources ont laissé entendre une nouvelle restructuration - et selon toute vraisemblance, un changement de nom - à la DRS, comme le service tente de se distancer de l'image désagréable qu'il a acquise dans les années 1990. Une source suggère que Washington pourrait avoir une carte à jouer dans ce domaine.

Relations étrangères
- Bien que les relations entre les deux pays restent très glaciales, l'attitude publique des hauts responsables algériens envers le Maroc a en gros été remarquablement restreinte par rapport à la guerre de mots vicieuse qui a éclaté l'automne dernier.
- Toutefois, l'Algérie et le Maroc sont enfermés dans une lutte d'influence dans la cour de l'Algérie dans le Sahel, comme le Rabat cherche à combler le vide de leadership dans le groupe de pays CEN-SAD.
- La rivalité algéro-marocaine en ce moment focalise essentiellement sur le Mali, où les deux pays sont candidats pour le poste de «courtier honnête» entre le gouvernement central et les groupes rebelles du Nord.
- Après avoir suggéré que Rabat aide Washington dans l’établissement d’une zone de libre-échange américano-africain quand il a rencontré le Président Obama en novembre, le Roi Mohammed VI a entrepris une tournée africaine qui met en lumière les questions commerciales et économiques.

La Sécurité
- Bien qu’Alger reste calme, les zones de production pétrolières et gazières ont vu une poignée d'incidents - dont
deux dans les environs d’In Amenas- la plupart du temps liés à la contrebande.

- La frontière de l'Algérie avec la Tunisie, en particulier son secteur nord, a vu une forte activité sur les deux côtés au cours des dernières semaines.
- Il y a des rapports que l'armée algérienne a bombardé des positions du Mouvement des Fils du Sahara dans le sud de la wilaya d’Illizi.
- Une « feuille de route » pour le succursale saharien de l'AQMI a refait surface sur les forums djihadistes ; il appelle à concentrer les attaques sur la France, l'Algérie et les intérêts occidentaux.
- Le groupe de Belmokhtar est dit d’avoir 20 kamikazes formés et prêt à frapper contre la France et ses alliés dans la région.
- Les plans pour une filiale Sonatrach totalement dédié à la sécurité semblent d’avoir été reportés, mais les employés de sociétés privées de sécurité exigent que leur situation soit traitée rapidement.
Political Trends

On Feb. 22 during a visit to Oran, Prime Minister Sellal finally broke the suspense and confirmed that President Bouteflika will be standing for re-election on April 17. Two days later, footage of the President receiving an envoy of the Emir of Kuwait was broadcast on state TV, in which he appeared somewhat livelier than in his previous TV appearance at the end of last year. But there was still no sound, and his message to mark the double anniversary of the founding of the UGTA trade union confederation and the nationalisation of Algeria's oil and gas industry on Feb. 24 was distributed in text form by official news agency APS rather than being delivered as a speech by the head of state in person.

Sellal's announcement of Bouteflika's candidacy broke a suspense that had been growing, in a very real sense, unbearable for the regime itself, the tensions it had generated having given rise to an unprecedented round of public infighting between figures associated with different clans within the power structure. A close look at this extended episode is highly instructive.

Marking National Martyrs' Day on Feb. 18, Veterans' Affairs Minister Mohamed Cherif Abbas delivered a speech in the name President Bouteflika, the full text of which was subsequently issued by official news agency APS and, later, read out in toto during the evening news bulletin on state TV. Lasting a good 15 minutes, the President's address paid only the briefest hommage to those who fell in the war of independence before launching into a long, stern and remarkably forthright appeal for an end to attacks in the media on the military and, in particular, the DRS, the powerful intelligence and security service headed by Lt-Gen. Mohamed "Tewfik" Médiène. To get a sense of its extraordinary tenor, the speech is worth quoting at some length:

Thoughtless statements made by certain public figures, which have been amplified by commentary from all quarters, have provided the domestic and foreign media with grounds for comments and speculation that are detrimental to the unity of the National People's Army. Our adversaries, be they hidden or out in the open, have seized on this prejudicial situation to try to impose the idea that there is an internal conflict within the National People's Army, casting the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) as a structure that acts in violation of the rules governing its duties and responsibilities. [...]

The DRS must continue to perform its duties and responsibilities under the law. As part of the National People's Army, the DRS carries out its tasks under the law and in accordance with the laws governing its activities. The point of these reminders is to reaffirm clearly that, contrary to the allegations and speculation reported by the press that are detrimental to the stability of the state and the National People's Army, the DRS, like all other components of the National People's Army, remains fully mobilized to fulfill its missions. Given the tangible threats that Algeria now faces, in light of the current security situation on its borders, I ask all the officials concerned to take all necessary measures to restore the right degree of consultation and healthy cooperation at all levels and to ensure that every official and every structure should act in accordance with the regulations governing their activities, in the best interests of the nation. [...]

Stirring up fictitious conflicts between the structures of the National People's Army is part of a process of destabilization that has been carefully prepared by those who are inconvenienced by Algeria's influential position and its role in the region. [...]

Faced with this danger, which is quite perceptible, all officials must listen to their patriotic conscience and act to reduce all forms of tension that might arise between them. It is a question of the very future of the state, of its defence and security. The political and social context as the presidential election draws near – marked as it is by the confusion that has begun to spread throughout the media and the political scene, causing alarm among our fellow citizens under the influence of internal and external disinformation campaigns citing the supposed existence of conflicts between the highest institutions of the country, with serious consequences for Algeria's security and stability – compels me to speak out and say what I have to say in order to put things in their proper perspective. [...]

I ask all citizens, and especially those citizens who hold positions within the state, be they civilian or military, to realise what is at stake and to take action, each in his own position, in favour of consolidating stability and peace,
which are the common property of all Algerians. Citizens who have the honor of serving the people, through the positions they hold, have a duty to rise to the level of responsibility that is required by the defence of the general interest.

[...] The citizens should know that the national security apparatus, about which all kinds of remarks are being made, is governed by regulations that clearly define its tasks and responsibilities, both at the level of the state and within the Ministry of Defence. In all countries, [the military] may be restructured when the need arises, as a matter of course. It is in this spirit that I decided, in 2006, to restructure the national security apparatus. When implemented in other countries, restructuring does not give rise to any alarmist and subjective commentary. In Algeria, some people, with their subjective and malicious reading of the facts, try to present such restructuring as proof that there is a crisis within the state or within the Ministry of Defence.

While the evocation of foreign plots against Algeria may be a hackneyed trope, the rest of Bouteflika's speech is highly unusual, not to say unprecedented, in its direct and explicit allusions to the DRS and its grave warnings to “civilian and military officials” to cease and desist from infighting that risks putting in jeopardy the unity and stability of the state.

This extraordinary speech comes in response to an equally extraordinary exchange of salvoes over the past months, which has escalated alarmingly in recent weeks:

- The escalation appears to have been sparked by Amar Saadani, a controversial figure ever since he took over as General Secretary of the FLN at the beginning of September[1] and, especially, since his Reuters interview the following month in which he claimed that Bouteflika, of whom he is an ardent supporter, was planning to introduce reforms once re-elected that would put an end to interference by the DRS in politics. On Feb. 3, Saadani gave an interview to Franco-Algerian news portal TSA, in which he returned to the same theme with a vengeance: attempts by his opponents within the FLN to unseat him were being piloted by the DRS under direct orders from Tewfik, he claimed, adding that Tewfik “ought to have resigned” long ago, given the intelligence and security service's record of “failures”[2]; the DRS was also responsible, he claimed, for spreading “rumours and lies” about the involvement of figures such as President Bouteflika's brother and advisor Saïd or former Energy Minister Chakib Khelil in corruption, warning darkly that “if something bad happens to me, it will be Tewfik's doing”.

- Saadani's remarks immediately drew an astounding barrage of criticism, with most Algerian newspapers rushing to defend Tewfik and many not hesitating to attack Saadani personally: the most lurid example being Le Jeune Indépendent, which ran photos of the FLN General Secretary and the DRS commander side by side on its front page, under the banner headline “When A Homo Attacks A Man”[3]. Former Justice Minister Mohamed Cherfaoui, for his part, penned a lengthy open letter to Saadani published by El Watan, taking him to task for casting aspersions on the probity of the armed forces, the DRS and the criminal justice system, and revealing that Saadani himself had approached him when he was still Justice Minister to ask him “as a friend” to see to it that the courts would not bother Chakib Khelil when looking into the “Sonatrach II” corruption scandal.

- Meanwhile, leading Arabic-language daily El Khabar claimed to have learnt from unnamed security sources that Bouteflika was preparing to push Tewfik into retirement, along with at least 100 other officers belong to the DRS and various branches of the military. Although El Khabar did not labour the point, other media were swift to conclude that this was because Tewfik had (as Saadani had insinuated) opposed the idea of Bouteflika standing for a fourth consecutive term of office. Within days, media of all stripes were reporting that Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Gaïd Saleh had deliberately snubbed Tewfik at the mid-January meeting of the Special Security Commission that approved the retirement of as many as 83 officers, including up to 50 from the DRS alone – among them, it would seem, the head of the DRS's Groupe
d'Intervention Spéciale, Gen. Hacène. On Feb. 8, the story broke that Gen. Hacène had been placed under judicial supervision or even arrested, with each newspaper and website advancing its own version of the reasons – retention of sensitive documents after leaving his post, the mishandling of the Tiguentourine siege, or even (in the most alarmist version published by Algérie Express[4]) hoarding weapons and establishing “an armed organisation”.

- In the midst of all this, former DRS agent and newspaper editor Hicham Aboud, who stirred controversy last year by publishing a series of “scoops” on President Bouteflika's state of health and prospects for recovery during his hospitalisation in France, penned a letter to Saïd Bouteflika accusing him at length and in detail of being involved in various cases of corruption[5]. Aboud's letter, supposedly sent to the President's brother as part of a “fact-checking” exercise in preparation for a book on the Bouteflika clan, was published in facsimile by TSA on Feb. 9. Barely had Saïd Bouteflika had the time to state his intention of suing Aboud for libel when he came under attack from another quarter: on Feb. 11, El Watan and Al-Khabar simultaneously published, respectively in French and in Arabic, an interview with Gen. Hocine Benhadid (rtd.)[6] accusing Saïd of “running the country by telephone from the Presidency”, with the DRS as his “sole adversary”. Tewfik, Gen. Benhadid argued, is “Algeria's last rampart, without whom the country will go under”. Claiming to speak on behalf of many serving officers who are unable to speak out publicly, Benhadid reserved most of his venom for Chief of Staff Gaïd Saleh, who, he argued, “completely lacks credibility and is liked by nobody within the army” and was responsible for needlessly “provoking” Tewfik. Amar Saadani and others who have attacked Tewfik and the DRS, Benhadid insinuated, had been put up to it by Saïd Bouteflika and/or Gaïd Saleh.

- In a first effort to call time-out, a letter from Bouteflika to Gaïd Saleh presenting condolences after the crash of an Algerian Air Force aircraft carrying the families of servicemen based in the far south of the country, was read on national television on Feb. 11: “Accustomed as we may have become to excesses from some quarters at the approach of each election, this time the vicious attacks have reached a level that our country has never seen since independence, going as far as to try to undermine the unity of the Army [...] No one, irrespective of his responsibilities, is entitled to attack the National People's Army or other constitutional institutions,” warned the President. The following day, Abdulmadjid Sidi-Saïd, General Secretary of the UGTA (the powerful official trade union confederation), issued a communiqué condemning Amar Saadani’s attacks on the DRS – conveniently forgetting that Saadani, himself a former trade unionist, had been decorated by the UGTA last October shortly after he had taken over at the head of the FLN.

For those with long memories, this outpouring is in some respects reminiscent of the period preceding the presidential election of 2004, when the Algerian independent press was awash with negative reporting – some of it fabrication, some of it grounded in the truth – on the behind-the-scenes activities of the Bouteflika clan (with Saïd Bouteflika's name already cropping up in relation to stifled corruption scandals). This extremely ugly press campaign was conducted mainly by journalists close to or manipulated by sections of the military and the DRS, as the army chiefs led by then Chief of Staff Lt-Gen Mohamed Lamari sought to get rid of Bouteflika, with whom they had grown exasperated, through the ballot box[7]. But whereas in 2004 the brickbats were hurled in one direction alone, with Bouteflika unable or unwilling to hit back at the military chiefs via the media, this time round there has been an unprecedented multidirectional free-fire shoot-out. Members of one and the same camp have been taking pot-shots at one another (Saadani and Sidi Saïd, for example, are both vocal supporters of a fourth term for Bouteflika) and, more importantly, the core institutions of the state – the DRS and the Army – have begun to take hits.
What lies behind this unedifying spectacle? The testimony of three private sources, each with differing perspectives and differing degrees of access to the Presidency and the DRS, seems to suggest that there has indeed been at least a partial breakdown in relations between key players at the top of the state, albeit not in the dramatic form claimed by some of the more alarmist press reports:

- A civil servant at the Presidency argues that Amar Saadani's declarations “should not be taken seriously”. Saadani was “acting on orders from Saïd Bouteflika”, and the aim of the whole episode was to send a message to the FLN dissidents, led by Abderrahmane Belayat, “to the effect that Saadani and his mentor, Saïd Bouteflika, were not afraid of the DRS,” to which Belayat had appealed for support. Saïd, continues the same source, “is bent on keeping his brother on as President, even if he is confined to a hospital bed. It is Saïd who has done everything to minimise the effects and consequences of the two Sonatrach corruption scandals. One of his friends told him at the end of January that the DRS would not drop the cases until it has shown him to be up to his neck in corruption at Sonatrach. Saïd, who was drunk at the time, launched into a tirade of insults and threats against Tewfik, attaching obscenities to his name every time he was mentioned”. As for Bouteflika's letter to Gaïd Saleh[8], responding to Saadani's attacks on Tewfik, it was intended to show that the President is not an adversary of Tewfik or the DRS and that the changes that were made at the DRS last September were necessary and carried out with Gen. Tewfik's consent.

- On the other hand, a source who is close to the middle ranks of the DRS and has many years' experience of the way in which the Algerian military and intelligence services operate, claims that Saadani “is being used by Gaïd Saleh against Tewfik”. In the same way, Gaïd Saleh has also instrumentalised the case of Gen. Hacène in order to damage Tewfik. This, the source argues, has occurred in the context of a tug-of-war between the clans, over whether Bouteflika should stand for a fourth term or whether the power structure should find an alternative candidate. There would have been consensus, in the name of stability and continuity, in favour of Bouteflika standing again had he not suffered his stroke in April of last year, but “now the army is split in two, between those who support Gaïd Saleh and a fourth term of office for Bouteflika, and those who are opposed to both. The DRS is for the most part opposed to a fourth term, but not Tewfik. Tewfik's big mistake was to enter into contact with Ali Benflis and other potential replacement candidates[9] while Bouteflika was in hospital in France”. The source suggests that what is really at stake in the tug-of-war between competing factions is the nature and extent of the guarantees that can be given to those who have acquired wealth and power under Bouteflika, and even what guarantees can be given with regard to Bouteflika's place in history.

- Speaking to us on the day of Saadani's fateful TSA interview, a presidential staffer close to Bouteflika claimed that the FLN General Secretary had lashed out at Tewfik because he knew he was about to be ditched and his predecessor Abdelaziz Belkhadem brought back to replace him. “Saadani thinks Tewfik is behind this, but in fact it is what Bouteflika wants,” claimed the source, who a week later, as the polemics raged in the press, assured us blithely that “nothing serious” was going on – “only belly dancing”. However, the same source had slightly earlier shed interesting light on the state of relations at the top. After Bouteflika's return from his hospitalisation in Paris last September, the head of the national police force Gen. Abdelghani Hamel “maliciously” told the President that Tewfik had been making disparaging remarks about him in his absence, claims the source, leading to a cooling in relations between Bouteflika and Tewfik that lasts to this day. This should not affect Bouteflika's plans to run for a fourth term, argues the source, who suggested that Tewfik would not attempt to stand in his way, preferring to continue to act as a “faithful servant of the state”. Gaïd Saleh, meanwhile is totally subservient to Bouteflika. The President will go ahead and run for a fourth term, and is physically up to it[10]. The “only problem is Saïd, who filters everything, so everything the President hears comes via his brother”.

While the sources – all of whom spoke to us before Sellal confirmed Bouteflika's candidacy – may differ in their evaluation of the President's present state of health and readiness to run for re-election, the overall picture which emerges is that the brain haemorrhage that he suffered in April of last year did provoke doubts and misunderstandings, at least for a time, and ultimately caused damage to the trust between Bouteflika and Tewfik. Nonetheless, the DRS chief himself does not seem to be opposed to Bouteflika's re-election (and indeed the presidential staffer seemed to suggest that the rift between the two may ultimately prove repairable). However, the President's stroke also seems to have led to a situation in which the influence of his brother Saïd has grown considerably, while Chief of Staff Gaïd Saleh appears to have drawn very close to Bouteflika, and this situation appears to be making the situation even more difficult for Tewfik.

Beyond this, it is also worth dwelling on Bouteflika's somewhat obscure reference in his Martyrs' Day speech to a “restructuring of the national security apparatus” he supposedly ordered “in 2006”. This appears to refer to a document signed into law by Bouteflika in early 2006, Ordinance 06-02 of Feb. 28 2006 on the general status of military personnel, which, amongst other things, sets maximum age limits and maximum numbers of years of service for various ranks (the top age limit for a lieutenant-general, the highest rank in the military, held by both Tewfik and Gaïd Saleh, is in principle 64; for a major-general, 60; and for a general, 56). The ordinance does go on to stipulate that “a waiver of [the maximum] age [limit] may be granted by the President of the Republic to generals and senior officers occupying senior positions in the military hierarchy”, and it would seem that this has been fairly extensively used over the past few years (both Gaïd Saleh and Tewfik, to name but them, are 74 years old), but reports of a wave of retirements being approved at the January meeting of the Special Security Commission suggest that this may no longer be the case. This conclusion is borne out by the source close to the middle ranks of the DRS quoted above, who tells us that “there are big changes ahead in the DRS and the armed forces, if only for 'biological' reasons, because like Bouteflika, Tewfik and Gaïd Saleh are getting old and will have to go soon”[11].

But in addition to this generational shift – which itself is likely to extend farther than just the two most senior officers in the military and security services – further restructuring of the DRS would appear to be in the works. Both the source close to mid-ranking DRS officers and the presidential staffer have intimated that, at very least, the intelligence and security service is likely to be renamed in the not-too-distant future, and may possibly undergo additional, more substantive organisational changes as well. The former suggests that such changes are being made because Tewfik and the DRS as a whole want to turn the page on the legacy of the 1990s, when the intelligence and security service was “over-exposed”, while the latter claims that the reorganisation of the DRS comes at least partly in response to pressure from US – two visions which need not, in fact, be considered antinomical.

**Foreign Relations**

Despite the latent tension that persists in Algerian-Moroccan relations, senior Algerian officials, no doubt preoccupied by more pressing dangers to the east and south, have by and large shown a surprising degree of restraint vis-à-vis their western neighbour over the past two to three months – especially when set against the virulent war of words that flared, after months of steady deterioration in relations, in October and November of last year.

To be sure, Prime Minister Sellal – never the most careful of speakers – did lash out in mid-December during a public meeting in Tlemcen, claiming that the Algerian authorities had “irrefutable proof” that Moroccan drug
money was being used to finance terrorist cells in Tunisia. But this aside, Algerian government representatives have generally tended to ignore or downplay potential occasions for a new flare-up: Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesmen reacted philosophically to reports in December that Morocco was to build a barbed-wire fence along the border, from Saïdia in the north to Figuig, arguing that that would be Morocco's business as long as construction was limited to uncontested Moroccan territory; the very lenient treatment by the Moroccan courts of the 'Royalist Youth' member who tore down the Algerian flag at Algeria's consulate in Casablanca on Nov. 1 drew no official comment whatsoever; a group of Syrian refugees that the Moroccan authorities had reportedly attempted to expel via the closed border with Algeria at the end of January were refused access by Algerian border guards, but there was no attempt to make political capital out of the incident; revelations in the French media that Rabat bought two French-made Pléiade spy satellites in 2013 at a cost of €500m passed without comment from Algiers; and even a potentially serious incident on Feb. 17, when according to Rabat Algerian soldiers fired shots towards a Moroccan border observation post at Aït Jomrane near Figuig, seems to have fizzled out after a brief exchange of self-righteous communiqués.

There is no denying, however, that relations remain extremely frosty. Bilateral political contacts appear to be effectively frozen, and by some accounts Algiers has resolved to boycott all international gatherings in Morocco as well. Furthermore, the two neighbours are increasingly deeply involved in a battle for influence in sub-Saharan Africa generally, and in Algeria's backyard in the Sahel in particular. Since 2012, Morocco has quietly been trying to fill the leadership vacuum in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) left by the overthrow of Libya's Col. Qaddafi, hosting a summit of the regional grouping in October of last year. More recently, Morocco's Assistant Foreign Minister Mbarka Bouaida (who happens to be of Saharawi origin) held fresh talks with the General Secretary of CEN-SAD during the last week of January in Addis Abeba, where she had been sent to conduct informal meetings with delegations attending the 22nd summit of the African Union (of which, of course, Morocco is not a member).

Mbarka Bouaida's highest-level contact while in Addis Abeba, however, was with Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The Malian head of state is now being actively courted by both Morocco and Algeria – he was received by President Bouteflika in Algiers on Jan. 19 – as they compete for the role of mediator in the north Mali conflict. In this, Algiers' efforts appear to be floundering of late: Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra's attempts to reconcile Tuareg, Arab and other factions of northern Mali as a prelude to talks between the Malian government and northern rebel movements that are supposed to be held under the terms of the Ouagadougou agreement of June 2013 effectively collapsed in January, with the Tuareg MNLA refusing to send a delegation to a round table that was planned in Algiers and most other groups changing their minds at the last minute. Morocco, on the other hand, has been making noticeable headway: the MNLA has officially requested King Mohamed VI's good offices in the quest for a lasting solution in northern Mali, and sent its General Secretary Bilal Ag Cherif to Marrakesh for an audience with the Moroccan monarch on Jan. 31. In response, Algeria is reported to have unceremoniously bundled another leading member of the MNLA, Akli Iknan Ag Suleiman, who was in Algiers for medical treatment onto a plane for Ouagadougou.

Driving home Morocco's advantage, Mohamed VI this month embarked on another tour of French-speaking countries of sub-Saharan Africa, taking him first to Mali and then on to Guinée, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. Chiming with the Moroccan King's suggestion during his meeting with President Obama in Washington last November that the United States and Morocco work together towards creating a new US-Africa free-trade zone, the focus of his latest African tour was essentially economic: no fewer than 17 bilateral economic cooperation
agreements were signed while he was in Bamako, and similar initiatives were expected in the other capitals on his schedule.

As noted in earlier reports, career diplomat Ramtane Lamamra appears to have been chosen as Foreign Minister when the government was reshuffled last September largely because of his years of experience as an Africa specialist (and as it happens, on Feb. 19, even as Mohamed VI began his latest African tour, Lamamra was on his way to Niger). But even with the savvy Lamamra at the helm, it is beginning to look uncertain that Algerian diplomacy in Africa will be able to match Rabat's all-out efforts south of the Sahara – not least because President Bouteflika would appear to be physically unable to devote the kind of personal attention King Mohamed VI has been giving to courting African governments.

Security

Taking the month as a whole, the level of jihadist activity in January was comparable to that in December, with 14 reported incidents over all (against 13 in December), though the number of operations initiated by AQMI or other jihadist groups dropped from six in December to only three in January. So far in February (up to Feb. 19) three jihadist operations were recorded out of a total of six security incidents (which include jihadist operations plus security forces operations).

ALGIERS and its surrounding area were quiet. AQMI's stronghold in Kabylia and the western parts of the wilaya of Bouira was also largely quiet over this reporting period (Jan. 19-Feb. 19), with only one operation reported: a remote controlled bomb that killed one soldier and wounded three civilians in the town on Bordj Menaiel, wilaya of Boumerdès, on February 3.

It was the EASTERN BORDERS, and in particular the border with Tunisia, that saw the heaviest action:

- Algerian Arabic-language daily *Echorouk* (22/01) and others quoted security sources as saying the commander of the 5th military region was in the eastern border zone to oversee a search and destroy mission in the Beni Salah mountains, wilaya of El Tarf, looking for 16 jihadists who were believed to have sneaked in from Tunisia’s Djebel Chaambi region. TSA (20/01) said the operation was launched after a Tunisian national, believed to belong to the group, was arrested in the neighbouring wilaya of Guelma a few days earlier. Later press reports indicated that the army engaged the 16-strong jihadist group from Tunisia near Ain Karma, wilaya of El-Tarf, on Jan. 23-26, killing seven of them.

- *Echorouk* (10/02) reported that the army had killed another two jihadists in the wilaya of El Tarf “in the areas near the border with Tunisia” on February 8.

- On February 14 security forces arrested two jihadists, believed to have come from Tunisia, in the area between the wilayas of El Tarf and Guelma.

- The Tunisian press reported Feb. 3 that Algerian and Tunisian security forces had “foiled a terrorist plot to attack vital public interests in Tunisia and security positions on both sides of the border area with Algeria”.

- On February 16, a group of four armed men, wearing Tunisian security forces uniforms, attacked a Tunisian security patrol near the town of Djendouba, close to the border with Algeria, killing two soldiers and two civilians and wounding others. Witnesses said two of the attackers “spoke with an Algerian accent”. As the Tunisian press was swift to point out, their tactic of setting up a fake checkpoint is a classic technique of AQMI and other jihadist groups in Algeria.
Two incidents were reported on the SOUTHERN BORDERS:

- The Algerian Defence Ministry announced on February 7 that security forces in the Bordj Baji Mokhtar area had “captured a major consignment of weapons near the town on February 5”. The seizure included “a machine gun, a Kalashnikov assault rifle, two Simonov semi-automatic rifles, and a significant load of ammunition of different calibres.” There was no indication as to how, or exactly where, the weapons were seized.

- The army, acting on information, ambushed a jihadist group near Bordj Baji Mokhtar, on the border with Mali, around February 10-11. The jihadists were travelling on five offroaders when the army forces intercepted them and chased them for three hours, killing six. The rest fled towards Khelil, in Mali.

Three incidents were reported in the OIL & GAS PRODUCING REGIONS of the south, two of them close to In Amenas:

- News portal Algérie 1 quoted local security sources as saying that an attempted attack on an ENAGEO worksite “between In Amenas and Illizi, not far from the Libyan border” was repulsed by the “elements in charge of securing the site” on January 20. The assailants, who were believed to be linked to “criminal networks” (as opposed to any openly jihadist organisation), are reported to have taken a number of 4WD vehicles and lorries before disappearing into the desert. No deaths or serious injuries were reported.

- On February 7, according to El Khabar (Feb. 8) a convoy of security forces vehicles “came under heavy machine gun fire” from an armed group near In Amenas. The soldiers riposted and repelled the attackers, suffering no losses. It is believed the assailants were a group of smugglers that wanted to seize the soldiers’ offroaders.

- Security forces on January 18 “seized a major arsenal” in a cache near In Amguel, just south of In Salah, wilaya of Tamanrasset, including “20 machine guns, more than 15 RPGs and 10 anti-aircraft missiles”. It is believed the weapons were hidden there by smugglers.

Also in the far south, the Sons of the Sahara Movement for Islamic Justice (which in early January announced its merger with a hitherto unknown group calling itself the Free Tuareg Group and pledged to “keep fighting the Algerian army until their demands are met”) issued another statement around January 20 claiming its positions in the Tassili n’Ajjer mountains, wilaya of Illizi, had been bombed by Algerian warplanes in what it described as “the beginning of military operations against the Movement”. The statement went on to affirm that “our weapons are only to defend ourselves and are not directed against anyone” and that the movement would continue its “struggle for justice and full and equal citizenship rights for the Algerian south”. This statement appeared on social media and blogs, and the incident itself was not reported in any mainstream media, although on January 26 the elbark.com website reported that the Sons of the Sahara Movement “had broken the truce it reached with the Algerian authorities and taken up arms, claiming that its demands — justice for the Algerian south — have not been met”. El Watan (07/02) reported on a demonstration by a few dozen people in Djanet, wilaya of Illizi, on February 2 calling for “an immediate end to military operations in Tassili n’Ajjer” and for dialogue with Abdessalam Tarmoune, the movement's leader[17].

Meanwhile, beyond Algeria's borders, a purported “roadmap” of AQMI in the Sahara, supposedly “issued between November and January”, has been circulating on jihadist forums, detailing the strategy of priorities of Yahia Abou El Hamam (Djamel Okacha), emir of AQMI’s Sahara branch. The document suggests that the group intends to focus its attacks chiefly on “the most dangerous foes”, namely the French and “their Algerian allies”, with the Malian army and its local allies in second place. UN and African forces, seen as weak and ineffective, are not considered a priority target. While escalating attacks against the French “at the time when the French decided to withdraw”, the group is also said to be plotting a big operation “to shake Bamako”, targeting,
if possible, Western interests, including embassies. At the same time, the document talks of the need to “broaden the scope” of its operations to including Western interests in Algeria and Tunisia and other countries in the region.

At the same time, the Tamanrasset-based CEMOC (Comité d'état-major opérationnel — joint military committee of Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania) is reported to have issued an alert concerning Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Al Mourabitoun organisation, naming some 20 individuals of various nationalities[18] who have allegedly been trained and prepared for suicide operations. According to Algerian daily *El Watan*, “interrogations of terrorists arrested in Algeria and information gathered by Algerian, Malian and French intelligence agencies in northern Mali” revealed that Al Mourabitoun is planning to deploy the “group of martyrs” for a large-scale attack against the interests of France or its allies in one of the four CEMOC countries, to be dubbed “Operation Vengeance for the Martyrs Abderrahmane El Nigiri[19] and Abou Zeïd[20]”.

As for plans to establish a Sonatrach subsidiary wholly focussed on security for the oil and gas industry, a source at the Presidency, speaking to us in mid-February, confirms these have been postponed:

Discussions about the creation of a subsidiary for Sonatrach's security arrangements have been suspended at the Presidency, and that is also the case at the Ministry of Energy and Sonatrach. The decision to suspend discussions, which is provisional, has been taken because there are more important priorities: securing the borders with Tunisia and Libya, which is drawing heavily on army, gendarmerie and DRS personnel; the presidential election in April, etc. However, there are certain pressure groups, within the UGTA and Sonatrach, that are campaigning for a shorter timetable for the creation of this security subsidiary. The demonstrations by employees of private security companies in Oran on Feb. 9 and 10[21] are part of this, and oil industry trade unionists have handed out leaflets on the subject in Hassi Messaoud.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

From: Peter Cross [mailto:peter.cross@tacticalstudies.eu]
Sent: Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:25 AM
To: Edward Gabriel; Fatima Kurtz; Jean AbiNader; Bob Holley; Jordan Paul
Subject: AMSR etc

Our latest AMSR attached.
Notwithstanding our observation in this month's AMSR that Algerian government officials have been relatively restrained in their comments re Morocco over the past couple of months, there is a spot of unpleasantness brewing as a result of Rabat's current spat with France, with suggestions in the Moroccan press that the whole affair (and in particular the serving of writs for torture against DGST commander Abdellatif Hammouchi while in France) is the result of dirty tricks by a supposed 'Algerian lobby' in France.
You may also be interested in the following, from Moroccan newsmagazine Tel Quel, summarising Eliza Barlcay and Kirsten Chick's piece published by Foreign Policy earlier this week.
Les secrets du lobbying marocain aux Etats Unis dévoilés

Tel Quel
27/02/14

Le site américain spécialisé en relations internationales, Foreign Policy (FP), a publié, le mercredi 26 février, un article dans lequel une analyse du lobbying marocain aux Etats-Unis est effectuée. De grandes sommes ont été dépensées par le royaume en vue de s'assurer le soutien des Etats-Unis sur le dossier du Sahara. Un lobbying qui se révèle être efficace.

Le Maroc a dépensé plus de 20 millions de dollars en lobbying

20 millions de dollars ont été dépensés par le royaume depuis 2007 pour faire du lobbying si l'on en croit les données du gouvernement américain. Le Maroc aurait d'ailleurs employé les services de plus de neuf compagnies de lobbying durant cette période. En 2009, le royaume a dépensé plus d'argent que tous les pays arabes, et deux fois plus que l'Egypte.

La firme Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) est la plus sollicitée, 13,7 millions de dollars lui ont été versés par le Maroc. Les diplomates américains, passés par le Maroc, sont également sollicités. Exemple, la firme de l’ancien ambassadeur américain au royaume, Edward Gabriel, a reçu plus de 3,7 millions de dollars depuis 2002.

Le Maroc domine la guerre du lobbying

Le Maroc domine largement l’Algérie, principal soutien au Polisario, en termes de lobbying. Depuis 2007, celle-ci a dépensé « 2,4 millions de dollars pour le lobbying ». Une maigre somme comparée aux 20 millions dépensés par le royaume durant la même période. Le front Polisario a, quant à lui, dépensé 42 433 dollars dans ce domaine depuis 2009.

Le lobbying marocain semble être plutôt efficace. En effet, une proposition de loi a été soumise au congrès américain, qui stipule que le département d'état américain (ndlr : l'équivalent du ministère des affaires étrangères) « doit établir un projet en vue de résoudre cette longue dispute avec le Sahara Occidental basé sur le plan d'autonomie sous souveraineté »

Autre illustration de l'efficacité du lobbying marocain, l'annulation du projet américain d'ajout de la composante des droits de l'homme a la MINURSO et celle de l'opération militaire conjointe Desert Lion. La rencontre entre Obama et Mohammed VI, en novembre dernier, est également mentionnée. A l'issue de celle-ci, le président Obama avait qualifié la solution marocaine au conflit de « sérieuse, réaliste et crédible ».

____________________________

Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast! est active.

[1] His opponents within the FLN, led by Abderrahmane Belayat, claim to have mustered the support of the two thirds of the members of the party's central committee necessary for a meeting of the party's ruling body to be convened without the General Secretary's consent, in an effort
Saadani listed the assassination of President Bouazza in 1992, the abduction and murder of seven French monks from the Tibehrine monastery in 1996, the assassination of UGTA General Secretary Abdelhak Benhamouda in 1997, the suicide bombings against the Palais du Gouvernement and other targets in central Algiers in 2007, the failed assassination attempt against President Bouteflika in Batna later the same year, and the Tignentourine attack in Jan. 2013.

A reference to scurrilous rumours spread by another daily, Algérie Patriotique, which is co-owned by the sons of Tewfik and former Defence Minister and Chief of Staff Gen. Khaled Nezzar, to the effect that Saadani had in his youth worked as a transvestite belly dancer.

A news portal close to the opposition RCD party.

Taking a page out of Algérie Patriotique's book, Aboud also invites Saïd Bouteflika to confirm that he is homosexual.

Former commander of the Algerian army's 9th armoured brigade and then of the 3rd military region, Benhadid was a protégé of President Lamine Zeroual and his powerful security advisor Mohamed Betchine in the 1990s. Having already taken retirement, Benhadid openly supported the candidacy of Ali Benflis against Bouteflika in the 2004 presidential election.

A plan that was scuppered by a last minute deal between Bouteflika and Tewfik, enabling the President and his Interior Minister, Yazid Zerhouni, to orchestrate a landslide victory. Humiliated by the experience, CoS Lamari subsequently resigned, and the most harmful press attacks on Bouteflika and his 'clan' largely ceased.

The source was speaking before Bouteflika's Martyrs' Day speech.

Former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia was summoned for an audience with Tewfik in July, the day after Bouteflika's return from his extended stay in France. The news was duly leaked by Algérie Patriotique (of which Tewfik's own son is co-owner), in what one usually astute source suggested at the time was a deliberate hint that the head of the DRS had bestowed his blessing on the former PM. At the same time, there were suggestions that Ali Benflis was waiting for the nod from the top brass, although there were no reports in the media of any meetings between him and Tewfik.

A leader of a Tunisian political party, who visited Bouteflika in Algiers at the beginning of February, was also very upbeat about his health, reporting that he greeted him standing up, showed no sign of any particular deterioration in his physical condition and appeared as mentally alert as ever. The source came away from the meeting “convinced that Bouteflika will run for a fourth term – which suits Tunisia and Libya very well, even if the Moroccans would rather see someone more flexible”. Note however that the source is a personal friend of Bouteflika's of many years standing, a factor which might conceivably affect his testimony.

The source suggests Gaid Saleh will be the first to go, perhaps as early as June of this year.

Echoing SADR Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Oumar, who alleged in a speech on Dec. 8 that “the SADR has evidence of Morocco's support for terrorism and criminal groups in the region in order to destabilize and thus hinder the process of solving the Saharawi question in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations on decolonization. [The SADR's army, gendarmerie and police] are mobilized to fight against all forms of terrorism and crime supported by Morocco, including the trafficking of narcotics produced in the Kingdom of Morocco.”

La Tribune, 03/02/14: 'Armement : la France a vendu deux satellites espions au Maroc en 2013'

The allegations were first made in a Moroccan Interior Ministry communiqué on Feb. 17, followed by a Foreign Ministry statement announcing that Morocco's ambassador in Algiers had “entered into contact with the competent authorities” to protest. The following day, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Beliani denied that there had been any communication from the Moroccan ambassador and wondered out loud about the “motives behind the mediatisation of démarches that never took place”. Beliani stopped short of denying outright that any shooting had occurred, however, while Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra, questioned at a press conference, seemed to imply that the Algerian forces may have opened fire on “drug traffickers, smugglers or illegal migrants”.

Furthermore, Morocco's official news agency MAP was swift to detect Algiers' hand in the decision prevent a Moroccan delegation from taking part in a three-day workshop jointly organised by the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (of which Morocco is a member) and the African Union’s Center on the Study and Research on Terrorism (CSRT) in Algiers as of February 4. The Algerian Foreign Ministry denied any hand in the matter, insisting that the decision was made by the CSRT on the grounds that Morocco is not a member of the AU.

Qaddafi was instrumental in establishing CEN-SAD in the late 1990s, and provided the bulk of its funding. Irked by Qaddafi's hegemonic tendencies, Algeria – alone among the states of the region – stayed out, but Morocco joined as of 2001. In June 2012, Rabat hosted a meeting of CEN-SAD aimed at reviving the recently orphaned organisation.

Tarmoune is reported to have taken over the leadership of the Sons of the Sahara, which has contacts with Belmokhtar's Al-Mourabitoun, after the death of Lamine Bencheneb in the In Amenas attack in January, and to be seconded by the latter's brother, Youssef Bencheneb. In September, there were hints in the press that the DRS had been negotiating with Illizi notables and local youth who were in contact with the group to persuade the Sons of the Sahara to lay down their arms.

Nine Malians, four Mauritians, three Algerians, two Tunisians, one Egyptian and one Nigerian.

Killed in the raid on the Tignentourine gas facility in January 2013.

The former leader of AQMI's Saharan branch, killed by French forces in northern Mali in February 2013.

Security guards working for 2SP security firm held a sit-in before Sonatrach Downstream headquarters in Oran on February 9, calling for pay
and conditions on a par their colleagues working for Sonatrach itself, according to reports in the Algerian press. Their representatives threatened to hold further protests every Sunday if their demands were not addressed, and the movement appears to be continuing: around 100 2SP personnel held another sit-in in front of the Sonatrach Downstream HQ on Feb. 16, according to *Le Quotidien d’Oran* (February 17).
INTERESTING, FYI, Ed

Subject: The massive ambassadorial backlog, explained in 2 charts, including Dwight Bush.

I thought you might be interested in these recent articles on the Sahara from IHS – both on resources. This is a subscription-only service, and I am not sure how wide the distribution is, but likely read by quite a few companies.

Thanks, Ed
Saharan squabble - Morocco and Algeria row over untapped resources

The possibility of finding oil off the disputed territory of the Western Sahara has led to a deterioration in relations between Morocco and Algeria. Nigel Wilson examines the long-running disagreement and its effect on stemming insurgent activity in the region.

Key Points

• The stagnant conflict over the Western Sahara looks set to escalate in 2014 as Morocco places more emphasis on resource exploitation in the region.
• Instability in the Sahel region is compounded by some refugees from Polisario refugee camps and Al-Qaeda affiliates apparently colluding on drug and arms smuggling.
• With Polisario losing momentum, the dispute between Morocco and Algeria could escalate if a significant oil discovery is made off Western Sahara.

Morocco's brief recall of its ambassador from Algeria in October 2013 marked a major escalation in the neighbours' bitter and long-running disagreement over the Western Sahara.

Since Rabat first awarded oil permits for blocks off the Western Sahara in 2002, the decades-old dispute over the territory has simmered with increasing ferocity. Moroccan moves to encourage more investment in resource exploitation in Western Sahara have strained diplomatic relations between Morocco and Algeria further.

Western Sahara is considered a Non-Self-Governing Territory by the United Nations, while Morocco has assumed control of most of the territory, which it refers to as its "southern provinces". Moroccan hegemony is contested by the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, an indigenous Sahrawi group based in Algeria. It claims independence in the territory, which it calls the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
Morocco-Algeria relations

The animosity between Algeria and Morocco goes back decades, and a significant discovery of hydrocarbons in the Western Sahara would probably provide a catalyst for both sides to step up their diplomatic battle for a share of potential revenues.

The two governments regularly spar over the sovereignty of the territory, which has been largely controlled by Morocco since the withdrawal of Spanish troops in 1975. Following years of war between Polisario and Morocco in the disputed territory, and a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, Algeria has maintained diplomatic pressure by calling for a referendum on the governance of the territory as set out in the terms of the ceasefire.

For its part, Morocco has proposed wide-ranging autonomy for the territory, but under its control. Along with the UN, the two sides have failed to reach an agreement on who would be eligible to vote in a referendum on independence in the territory and a vote is not imminent.

In October 2013, Algeria called for international human rights monitors to be allowed into the Western Sahara to investigate reports of abuses by Moroccan security forces. Rabat responded by recalling its ambassador from Algiers. Although he returned to his post within a week, it marked a significant escalation in the diplomatic battle.
With both onshore and offshore energy potential being assertively pursued by Morocco in the Western Sahara, a discovery would be most likely to lead to a hardening of both sides' current positions.

Moreover, the long-running Morocco-Algeria feud is a cause of concern for Western governments aiming to combat the spread of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates throughout the region. The land border between the countries remains closed, with no sign of its reopening in the near future. Following a bombing at a cafe in Marrakech in April 2011, Rabat accused Algeria of assisting the attackers. Algeria staunchly denied the accusations. A continuing lack of co-operation on security between the neighbours would make it easier for Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups to conduct operations across the Sahara and Sahel and pose a security risk for the whole region.

The Polisario-controlled refugee camps at Tindouf in Algeria have allegedly been targeted by recruiters from AQIM, whose members are able to move unchecked between the largely ungoverned Algerian-Malian border, close to the Polisario camps. Residents at the camps are denied citizenship and refugee status by Algeria, leaving tens of thousands of marginalised Sahrawi who could be ripe for radicalisation. In a report to the UN Security Council in April 2013, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reported the concerns of regional governments that fighting in Mali could "spill into neighbouring countries and contribute to radicalising the Western Sahara refugee camps".

Refugees from the Polisario camps have colluded with AQIM on lucrative drug and arms smuggling routes throughout the Sahara and Sahel. In the same Security Council report, Ban argued, “The rise of instability and insecurity in and around the Sahel requires an urgent settlement of this long-standing dispute." Although the alleged links between Polisario and AQIM have not resulted in attacks in the Western Sahara itself, collaboration could pose an immediate threat to Algeria, Morocco, and the wider region.

**Offshore exploration**

Morocco meets approximately 95% of its energy needs through imported supplies, according to figures from the World Bank. Rabat began issuing oil and gas exploration licences for blocks off the Western Sahara coastline in 2002 in a bid for increased energy self-sufficiency. Wariness of the territorial dispute and Morocco's poor track record of viable oilfield finds resulted in the licences attracting modest attention from international firms, because investing in the Western Sahara remains legally ambiguous for international companies. Under UN guidelines, deals struck in the Non-Self-Governed Territory should benefit the indigenous population.

However, since 2013, a number of oil majors have been attracted to Morocco, despite the unresolved conflict. A flurry of offshore activity is expected to take place later in the year. Additional investor interest is most likely a result of the declining stability in the Eastern Maghreb region and increased confidence because of geological surveys suggesting the disputed waters off the Western Sahara are rich in hydrocarbons.

However, if a discovery is made there, Algeria is likely to push harder for a referendum in the Western Sahara, while Morocco will probably try to assert its control over the territory and its resources.

**Fisheries and solar**

The presence of two other natural resources complicates the Western Sahara issue: fisheries and renewable energy.

Moroccan hegemony in the disputed waters off the coast of the Western Sahara received a boost in December 2013, when the European Union signed a four-year fisheries accord with the Moroccan government, allowing European boats to fish in Moroccan and Western Saharan waters.

The EU had balked at renewing the accord in 2012, amid concern in Brussels that such a deal could strengthen Morocco's claim to Western Sahara. Upon its completion, Moroccan media portrayed the December deal as a political victory, while Polisario strongly
denounced the agreement and small-scale protests were held across the territory.

Elsewhere, when Morocco drew up plans for a huge solar and wind power project spanning five plants in 2009, two of the sites earmarked as locations fell within the disputed territory, at Foum el Oued and close to Boujdour.

Morocco hoped the USD9 billion project would generate up to 4 gigawatts (GW) of power upon its completion in 2020. However, almost five years after Rabat announced the project, the sites within and bordering the disputed region remain undeveloped. International backers have stayed away, deterred by the legal uncertainties.

Progress on the project has been limited to a 160 MW solar plant site at Ouarzazate in Morocco. Rabat intends to launch tenders for two more solar plants close to the partly finished plant at Ouarzazate this year, and will probably seek investment from the Gulf region for its projects in the Western Sahara if it fails to court other investors.

Although Gulf state actors have poured money into energy investments across North Africa, they are yet to show any appetite for the onshore solar projects within the Western Sahara. With no long-term solution to the territorial dispute on the cards, Gulf state actors will be attracted by less risky opportunities in the region.

**Outlook**

The ongoing political uncertainty over the future of the Western Sahara shows no sign of being resolved in the near future. Moroccan-led resource exploration and extraction in the disputed territory looks set to escalate in 2014, following the securing of the fishing and oil deals.

However, the situation remains precariously poised. The dispute between Morocco and Algeria could escalate with increased Moroccan energy investment in the Western Sahara, particularly if oil is found.

Meanwhile, Polisario is losing ground on the global diplomatic stage, as Mauritius became the fourth country in less than four months to withdraw recognition of the SADR. The decision, on 16 January, followed similar moves by Haiti, Panama, and Paraguay, which no longer recognise Polisario. Moreover, strengthening ties between Polisario and AQIM could further destabilise regional security and pose an immediate and long-term risk to resource exploitation in the Western Sahara.

Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2014
Firms partnering Moroccan state in Western Sahara face higher legal and reputational risks than security concerns

**EVENT**

Energy firms Total and Kosmos issued declarations made in partnership with the Moroccan government on 5 February, assuring investors that exploration off Western Sahara would be in compliance with international law.

**Key Points**

- Development of renewable energy projects and hydrocarbons in Western Sahara is key to Morocco's bid to reduce its 95% energy import dependency and meet 42% of its electricity needs from renewables by 2020.
- Morocco probably calculates that Algeria, the main backer of Sahrawi independence movement Polisario, is too occupied with preserving internal stability to pose any serious threat to Moroccan plans in Western Sahara.
- Overwhelming security force capability to suppress protests means that violent risks to Western Saharan projects are only moderate. However, legal and reputational risks are presented by the vague wording of UN legal opinion on resource exploitation, a pro-Sahrawi lobbying campaign, and rival exploration licences issued by the Sahrawi government-in-exile.

Western Sahara is considered a Non-Self-Governing Territory by the United Nations, which has never recognised Morocco's annexation of the territory after 1975. Following a guerrilla war by the secular leftist Algeria-backed Sahrawi Polisario Front against Morocco, a UN-brokered ceasefire was agreed in 1991 and Polisario's armed forces withdrew to Algeria and a small strip of Polisario-controlled territory adjoining Morocco-controlled Western Sahara. However, a promised referendum on self-determination has never materialised due to disputes over who is eligible to vote.

In the meantime, Morocco has attempted to secure its rights to Western Sahara through a combination of encouraging Moroccan migration to the territory, and heavily subsidising aid and welfare in the region in order to foster loyalty to the state.
Morocco’s development plans

Morocco sees resource exploitation in Western Sahara as key to helping reduce its 95% energy import dependency. Morocco granted the first licences for oil reconnaissance activities offshore Western Sahara in 2001. Following promising studies, Kosmos Energy, which holds 55% of the Cap Boujdour block along with Cairn Energy (20%) and Morocco’s Office National des Hydrocarbures et Mines (ONHYM), plans to start drilling an exploration well (Gargaa 1) in the second half of 2014. France’s Total is due to announce the result of its own reconnaissance studies in the Anzarane Offshore block towards the end of 2014. Onshore, reconnaissance studies led by Longreach and San Leon in partnership with ONHYM are occurring in two main areas: Tarfaya, where there are oil prospects overlapping the border between Morocco and Western Sahara, and Zag, near the Western Saharan capital of Laayoune, which has gas prospects and is located towards the north of the territory.

Meanwhile, Morocco is aiming for 42% of its electricity to be provided from renewable sources by 2020. Nareva Holdings, the energy arm of the Moroccan king’s holding company Société Nationale d’Investissements (SNI), has entered into a joint project with GDF Suez and Siemens to construct and operate the largest wind farm site in Africa with a capacity of 300MW, also at Tarfaya; another is under construction at Fourn El Oued south of Laayoune. Morocco is hoping to attract foreign investment for further wind farm sites with a further 300MW capacity at Tiskrad near Laayoune, and 100MW at Boujdour around 100km southwards down the coast. Solar projects are also planned for the Tarfaya area, at Sabkhat Tah.
Legal and reputational risks

However, there are reputational and legal risks surrounding all of these projects. The United Nations Legal Counsel assessed in 2002 that exploration and exploitation of resources in the territory was only legal if it took into account "the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara". The legality of any contract hinges on the question of how this should be judged. The UN opinion as originally issued in relation to mineral resources, but has also been used by the European Commission to justify a fishing agreement with Morocco in Western Saharan waters. As such, any future dispute on the legality of wind and solar projects is also likely to hinge on this opinion. Kosmos's planned drilling in the second half of 2014 will be an important test case in this regard, as it would be the first drilling in Western Saharan territory since the 1970s. The outcome of any legal challenge by the Polisario to either the fisheries agreement (which it said in January 2014 that it would contest via the European Court) or the Kosmos drilling will set an important precedent for other contracts granted by Morocco in the territory.

A further potential problem is raised by the fact that the SADR government-in-exile in Algeria's Tindouf province has granted its own exploration contracts for some blocks overlapping those granted by Morocco. Companies who have entered into contracts with the SADR are small operators, including Ophir and Tower Resources, who have likely acquired the blocks at a knock-down price. Although very unlikely in the next few years, any resolution of the Western Saharan question in the SADR's favour would put these firms at an advantage over the larger operators that signed with Morocco.

Meanwhile, project operators in Western Sahara remain unable to access financing from the World Bank or European Investment Bank, and it is questionable whether they will be able to obtain Clean Development Mechanism emission credits, administered under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Reputational risk due to pro-Sahrawi lobbying is a further factor, with four Swedish pension funds, for instance, divesting from firms with connections to Western Sahara in October 2013.

The Algerian position

Morocco likely calculates that despite the legal grey areas, the long deadlock over the referendum works in its favour, and the prospects of commercial benefit from Western Sahara will increase international support for Morocco's proposal of an autonomous Western Saharan region within a Moroccan state rather than a referendum on self-determination.

Despite deteriorating Moroccan relations with Algeria, the Polisario's main backer is focused on maintaining internal stability ahead of presidential succession in April 2014 and is unlikely to devote much attention in the next year to disrupting Western Saharan resource development. Any such attempts would in any case take the form of political lobbying on the international stage, rather than backing for attacks on projects or a return to insurgency. Algeria's appetite to interfere in renewable power project development plans is probably also reduced by the fact that these pose no competitive threat to its own hydrocarbon export-dominated economy.

Security risks

Protest risks relating to grievances over Moroccan exploitation of Western Saharan resources are likely to be centred in Western Sahara's main towns of Laayoune and Dakhla. A heavy Moroccan security force presence means that such protests are very unlikely to cause disruption to power or energy projects. In May 2013, Laayoune witnessed its largest protests since 2010, sparked by the failure to ensure a human rights remit for the renewed UN peacekeeping force mandate. Yet even then, they attracted no more than 2,000 people, and did not affect commercial operations in the area. Sites closer to Laayoune (for example Foum El Oued) are more likely to experience protests than those further from main urban centres, for example at Boujdour or Tarfaya. However, road blockades of more than a few hours, or damage to property at project sites, are unlikely.

FORECAST
Morocco's aim appears to be to convince international investors and bodies that its international legal obligations to protect Sahrawi interests are fulfilled via the channelling of energy revenues to fund development aid for the region. Already, around half of Morocco's national aid budget goes to Western Sahara. Yet this is not matched by genuine political representation for Sahrawis, with Morocco's Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs appointed by the king rather than elected, and meeting only infrequently. However, the failure of the Polisario and SADR to make any political progress on behalf of Sahrawis is also harming Sahrawi loyalty to their leadership.

As a result, although protest risks are still containable, there is a risk of protests erupting against the Polisario leadership itself in the next few years. This would probably happen first in Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria's Tindouf area, but with a risk of spreading to Western Saharan towns. This disillusionment with Polisario is also likely to lead some to turn to jihadist ideology, although the limitations on capability imposed by the Moroccan security presence in the region means that these Sahrawis are more likely to travel for jihad elsewhere, for instance in Mali.
The information contained in this report are from public and private sources, and none of information contained herein has been corroborated by third parties.

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
March 21, 2014

Executive Summary

Political Trends

- Still unable to stand and struggling to speak clearly, President Bouteflika has formally submitted his candidacy papers for the April 17 presidential election.
- Demonstrations against a fourth term for Bouteflika have mostly been fairly small so far, but show some signs of coalescing with other protest movements over socio-economic issues.
- Several important civil society organisations which backed Bouteflika's earlier presidential campaigns as a matter of course have proved reluctant to support him this time round, which seems to reflect a lack of full consensus within the power structure itself.
- DRS chief Tewfik appears to have thrown his weight behind the fourth term option, and is likely to have been instrumental in installing former PM Ahmed Ouyahia, who is known to be close to the DRS, as Bouteflika's chief of staff, in order to counterbalance the overbearing influence of the President's brother and 'grand chamberlain' Saïd.
- Abdelmalek Sellal, who has handed over the premiership to Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi in order to take on the job of Bouteflika's campaign manager, has further complicated matters by making disparaging comments about the Berber-speaking Chaoui community of the northeastern Aurès region, home to the core of Algeria's military elite.

Foreign Relations

- Fighting jihadist groups in northern Mali that are able to move with ease to and from their rear base in southern Libya, France’s military is reorganising its deployment across the Sahel states.
- Coordination between the French military and intelligence services and their US counterparts in the Sahel and the Maghreb appears to be flourishing.
- On the other hand, a degree of mistrust persists between France and Algeria in the Sahara-Sahel region. The situation is not helped by Algerian maneuvering in northern Mali, partly aimed at countering growing Moroccan influence.
- The French redeployment and the growing US presence across the zone have fuelled alarmist reporting in the Algerian media about supposed plots against Algeria, in which Morocco is depicted as assisting Western powers in their efforts to to destabilise and carve up the country.
- Such reporting seems however to be largely driven by domestic political imperatives, and may quieten down once the presidential election is past.

Security

- Despite unconfirmed reports of a lone terrorist from the south of the country planning attacks against Western embassies in the Algerian capital, Algiers has remained calm.
- There have been several incidents along Algeria's eastern borders with Tunisia and Libya, including one in which a haul of smuggled MANPADS was reportedly captured.
- The Algerian security forces appear to be getting better at gathering operational intelligence on the Libyan side of the border, enabling them to intercept at least two incursions by armed groups.
Political Trends

On Feb. 22 during a visit to Oran, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal finally broke the suspense and confirmed that President Bouteflika will be standing for re-election on April 17. Two days later, footage of the President receiving an envoy of the Emir of Kuwait was broadcast on state TV, in which he appeared slightly livelier than in his previous, catastrophic TV appearance at the end of last year, but once again without sound; on March 3 the TV news broadcast showed Bouteflika submitting the sponsorship signatures and other paperwork necessary to formalise his candidacy to the Constitutional Council and even included a very short sequence[1] in which he was heard speaking briefly, in a shaky and barely audible voice – the first words ordinary Algerians had heard from the head of state since his Setif speech of May 8, 2012. A fortnight later, Sellal stepped down as Prime Minister in order to take up the job of Bouteflika's campaign manager (a role he filled in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections), with Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi taking over from him as Premier. At the same time, former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia was named Boueflika's chief of staff (directeur de cabinet) and Abdelaziz Belkhadem returned to his old position as Minister of State and Personal Representative of the President; both are understood to be part of Bouteflika's campaign team.

No matter how widely expected it had been, Sellal’s confirmation that Bouteflika was standing for re-election was met with dismay in many quarters. Three of the other contenders – former Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour, retired general Mohand Tahar Yala, and Soufiane Djilali of the Jil Jadid party – instantly cried foul and announced their withdrawal from the presidential contest (although Ali Benflis, arguably the most serious challenger, has opted to remain in the race and has stated his belief that the army “will remain neutral”). A new group calling itself Barakat! ('Enough!'[2]), which does not seem to have connections to any established political party, has been set up by civil society activists to protest Bouteflika's bid for a fourth term, and while its repeated attempts to hold demonstrations in Algiers have mostly been quashed unceremoniously by the security forces[3], it has successfully inspired a growing number of (mostly small) protests in other towns and cities. Students at the universities of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaïa have also demonstrated in their hundreds against Bouteflika's re-election bid, and the same slogans have been taken up by demonstrations of the unemployed in the southern city of Ouargla and by the ongoing movement of disaffected former members of the Garde Communale.

Meanwhile, the “mass organisations” and civil society bodies that rushed to back Bouteflika during his previous presidential campaigns seem by and large far less eager to do so this time round. Although the UGTA (Algeria's official trade union federation) and the Coordinating Committee of Children of Independence War Martyrs (CNEC) did speak out in favour of a fourth term well before Bouteflika's candidacy had been publicly confirmed, it is striking that the Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine (national organisation of independence war veterans – historically the centrepiece of the so-called “revolutionary family”, which has in the past consistently supported the regime’s candidate) initially failed to come out with a clear endorsement of Bouteflika. In a statement issued on March 12, the ONM merely called on the electorate “to fulfil its national duty and choose the person who is best suited to lead the country towards a socio-economic and cultural transition”;
commenting on the statement, ONM chairman Said Abadou told Arabic-language daily *El Khabar* that “what matters to us is that this election should be held in the best possible conditions. As for the rest, whoever wins, we will welcome him”. It would seem that the ONM was swiftly called to account, however, since the following day official news agency APS quoted the organisation's spokesman as explaining that “[our] support for Bouteflika is a question that has been settled” (although even this formulation could be said to be somewhat ambiguous). Similarly, Mahmoud Chaâlal, head of the Union Nationale des Zaouias d'Algérie (one of two national federations of Sufi lodges, which enthusiastically supported Bouteflika in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections[4]) told reporters on March 7 that “our movement will adopt a position of neutrality and will not support any one candidate” in the presidential election, only to be disavowed, after unspecified “pressure” was reportedly brought to bear, by a communiqué issued in the name of the UNZA on March 18 calling on “all followers of the zaouias and Sufi currents to turn out in force on polling day to elect the servant of the Holy Quran, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, so as to enable him to complete his political programme”. As for the Fédération des Chefs d'Entreprise, Algeria's leading employers' organisation, a general meeting convened on March 13 – after two failed attempts to reach an agreement among members on the matter – finally resolved to throw the organisation’s weight behind Bouteflika, but without the required quorum in attendance for the show-of-hands vote.

Such tergiversations are symptomatic of deep divisions within these organisations as to the wisdom of granting Bouteflika a fourth successive term. A source close to the middle ranks of the DRS and with many years of experience of the modus operandi of the Algerian regime argues that these divisions reflect similar splits within each of the wings of the power structure – the army, the DRS, perhaps even at the Presidency itself. The fourth term option has been steamrollered through in the absence of any consensus among the various clans and interest groups on an alternative candidate, argues the source. The fact that organisations such as the ONM and the UNZA are being whipped into line suggests that the DRS as an institution is backing Bouteflika's re-election, which would be coherent with earlier reports from well informed sources that DRS commander Lt-Gen. Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène has lined up behind the fourth term option. The appointment of Ahmed Ouyahia – who is known to be Tewfik's man – as chief of staff to the President would also seem to be indicative of Tewfik's active participation, and may be intended to build greater consensus within the power structure by introducing a counterweight to, if not actively sidelining, the President's widely mistrusted brother Said Bouteflika (earlier said by separate source at the Presidency to have taken on the role of grand chamberlain, controlling access to the President and the President's access to information). There have even been suggestions – which the source close to mid-ranking DRS officers describes as credible – that Ouyahia is being pre-positioned by Tewfik to take on the yet-to-be-created post of Vice President after the election, and thus to succeed Bouteflika when he dies.

But this does not mean that the misgivings of all elements within the DRS and other wings of the power structure have been dispelled, argues the same source, pointing to the case of independent TV channel Atlas TV, effectively forced to close down after a squad of uniformed and plainclothes Gendarmes entered its premises and confiscated cameras and other broadcasting equipment on March 11, apparently in response to its coverage of Barakat! protests and the alleged sympathies of its director of programming Hafnaoui Ghoul[5] for Ali Benflis. Atlas TV, explains the the source, is effectively owned[6] by Maj-Gen. Mhenna Djebbar, the former
head of the Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Armées when it was still part of the DRS who was reportedly pushed into retirement in January, and who is understood to be strongly opposed to a fourth term for Bouteflika.

It is not entirely unclear whether such efforts to contain dissent from within the power structure itself will prove effective. If they are not, dissenter such as Djebbar may continue to exploit and encourage dissent in the population at large, with a heightened risk of things slipping out of control in the month that remains before the presidential election. Decisions by the authorities over the past few days[7] to allow Barakat! to go hold a small protest in Algiers unmolested and to authorise a public meeting by political groups calling for a boycott of the presidential election in the capital on March 21 would seem to denote a degree of confidence on the part of the regime that it has the situation under control. But heightened vigilence would seem to be in order over the coming days and weeks, especially if public protests against Bouteflika's candidacy begin to snowball and merge with socio-economic protests.

The situation is further complicated by an ugly flare-up in sectarian and regionalist violence. In the town of Ghardaïa and outlying areas in the southern Mzab valley, communal tensions between the local Sunni Arab and Berber-speaking Ibadite communities have been running very high since the beginning of the year, and flared again in mid-March into extremely violent rioting in which at least three people were killed and countless shops in central Ghardaïa torched. This sparked impromptu demonstrations by Ibadites living in Algiers, calling for the army to be sent in to restore peace. On March 16, interim Prime Minister Youcef Yousfi, Interior Minister Taïeb Belaïz and Gendarmerie commander Maj-Gen. Ahmed Bousteïla flew to Ghardaïa in an effort to show that the government was taking the situation seriously – only to find themselves compelled to make a stop-over in the north-eastern city of Batna on the way back to Algiers the following day in response to angry demonstrations and rioting by members of the Berber-speaking Chaoui minority, enraged by unguarded remarks made by Abdelmalek Sellal on national TV in which he appeared to insult their community[8]. Sellal being Bouteflika's campaign manager, anger at his gaffe has naturally merged into opposition to Bouteflika's fourth term, provoking the creation of a new grouping calling itself B'zayed ('Enough' in the local dialect) in opposition to both. Given the recent tensions within the power structure, the incident is all the more damaging politically in light of the fact that the Chaouis, unlike other Berber speakers in Kabylia and the Mzab, have historically provided a large part of the post-independence military elite.

Foreign Relations

Painfully aware of the trans-national nature of the armed groups it has been pitted against in northern Mali since the beginning of Operation Serval in January 2013, and increasingly concerned about the security vaccuum in southern Libya, the French military quietly embarked on a reorganisation of its forces in northern Africa late last year. Described as a “regionalisation of the Sahel strip”, this move is largely driven by the need to take account of the fact that jihadist groups active in northern Mali have been able to move to and from rear bases in southern Libya via a corridor that passes through the territory of both Niger and Algeria.
Unable to intervene openly in southern Libya itself and with still less possibility of crossing the border into Algeria, the French military is now looking at a single theatre of operations stretching across the three states in the region which are ready to cooperate: Mali, Niger and Chad. French forces will henceforth have four main bases in the zone: N'Djamena (Rafale and Mirage 2000 combat aircraft, supported by tankers and ground forces – plus the general staff controlling operations across the Sahel), Niamey (intelligence assets, including two new Reaper drones and Atlantique 2 patrol aircraft, together with combat aircraft), Gao (land forces, plus a large helicopter detachment) and Ouagadougou (the discreet rear base for France's Sabre special forces). In addition to these four main bases, the French army is establishing forward bases further north, closer to the areas where jihadist groups are likely to be engaged: at Tessalit, in the far north of Mali very close to the Algerian border, at Faya-Largeau in northern Chad, and a third in north-eastern Niger. These forward bases are to serve as dropping-off points to which light combat vehicle and other matériel can be airlifted, as well as centres for the collection of human and/or electronic intelligence. Overall, this deployment in the Sahel will mobilise some 3,000 French troops permanently, supported by around thirty aircraft.

French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Washington in January, partly in order to explain this redeployment to the US administration, and it would seem that cooperation between US and French forces in the region is flourishing. A geographical and technical division of labour seems to have emerged, with the US focussing on the northern half of Libya and collection of satellite and other technical intelligence, while the French cover the more southerly regions and provide more human intelligence (informed by local knowledge of their former colonies in the Sahel). A lengthy report in French daily Le Monde (12/03/14), largely based on conversations with French military and intelligence officers, highlighted this cooperation, noting that there are daily consultations between representatives of the CIA, NSA, and France's DGSE (foreign intelligence) and DRM (military intelligence). Chief of General Staff Admiral Edouard Guillaud is even quoted as saying that “when it comes to confronting Al-Qaeda, we are in almost hourly contact with our American interlocutors at AFRICOM and the Special Operations Command (SOC)”. The US military collaborates with the French in operating drone surveillance missions out of Niamey, and Le Monde suggests that the SOC is working together with French special operations forces based in Ouagadougou.

On the other hand, Le Monde's article concludes with a note of regret with regard to Algeria's role:

Paris has not managed to get the European countries involved as much as it would have liked in southern Libya, where military intervention is ruled out. Better to rely on Libya's neighbours [...]. But for regional action to be effective, the major player that is Algeria is still missing. In early 2013, Algeria did close its border with Mali and support Serval in the Adrar des Ifoghas by supplying fuel, signs that Paris felt were very positive. But in the end [even] the In Amenas attack did not change Algeria's traditional line, which rejects any foreign scrutiny of its handling of terrorism.

Le Monde's military and intelligence sources seem to stop just short of wondering out loud whether Algiers is part of the solution or part of the problem in the Sahel. Similarly, the usually well informed French blog Secret Défense regrets that “on paper, Algiers and Paris are fighting the same jihadist groups, but realities on the ground and sensitivities on both sides mean that this has not led to close and trusting cooperation. Algeria may therefore remain the blind spot of France's 'regionalisation of the Sahel'.”
More specifically, *Le Monde* quotes a French MoD official as complaining that Algiers has brought Iyad Ag Ghali, head of the Tuareg Islamist faction Ansar Dine and until recently an ally of AQMI in northern Mali, “back into the game”, further complicating regional counter-terrorism cooperation. Before embarking on his short-lived alliance with AQMI in 2012, Ag Ghali had a long history of contacts with Algeria's DRS. Since the fall of the jihadi statelet in northern Mali under the hammer blows of Operation Serval, he appears to have resumed contacts with Algiers, and has reportedly relocated with his family to the village of Tinzaouten, on the Algerian side of the border, with the blessing of the DRS. Algiers' efforts to re-establish its influence in the complex situation in northern Mali, and to counter growing Moroccan involvement in its “back yard”, have also led it to back the creation of a new breakaway group by Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, formerly a leading member of the Tuareg separatist MNLA. The new group, calling itself Conseil du Peuple pour l'Azawad, was formally established at Hassi Labyad in the desert of northern Mali on March 18 at a ceremony attended by some 700 people, including members of other ethnic groups according to Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh. The new movement's leader has explicitly stated MNLA leader Bilal Ag Acherif's rapprochement with Morocco as one of the main reasons for the split, telling Paris-based newsmagazine *Jeune Afrique* that he opposed Bilal Ag Acherif:

> Trying to put the legitimate struggle of the people of Azawad at the service of other ends, notably those of certain states, which do not correspond with ours. [...] I am speaking in particular of the conflict between Rabat and Algiers, in which we should not get involved [...]. It is not so much that he is too close to Rabat. We share a border with Algeria. If it wasn't for French colonization, there wouldn't even be a border between Azawad and Algeria. Our people is present on either side of this line. But we don't exist at all in Morocco. [...] He asked the King of Morocco to mediate. Instead of soliciting this new mediation [...] we should be accepting Algeria's.

Moroccan involvement in the Sahara-Sahel zone – real or imagined – has been linked to a supposed Western plot against Algeria in a slew of articles in the Algerian press. French language daily *L'Expression* has been particularly virulent on this subject, running no fewer than three highly alarmist articles – under the headlines 'L'Algérie est-elle réellement en danger?', 'Moscou alerte Alger' and 'Les dessous d'un plan de déstabilisation de l'Algérie' – in the space of less than a fortnight. The overall tone is distinctly paranoiac:

> France is going to establish a military base in northern Mali, near the Algerian border. It is already present in force in Mauritania. The US Marines have chosen southern Tunisia, Italy and Spain to establish their bases in order to intervene in North Africa in case of force majeure. And there is such a good excuse! The fight against terrorism [...] is a cover for the West's true objective: to besiege Algeria, a major producer of oil and natural gas. It would be naive not to believe in a strategic and geopolitical conspiracy against the only state that has not been subject to the vagaries of the Arab Spring. [...] The contours of a Machiavellian plot against Algeria are becoming clearer. Moscow, in the person its Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, has taken the trouble of alerting the Algerian authorities. [...] During a brief visit to Tunisia a few days ago, the Russian Foreign Minister argued that “foreign parties” are marketing an “Algerian spring” with the real aim of laying waste to Algeria. Without naming them, the Russian diplomat added that these same parties “have opened several fronts near the Algerian borders, in Libya, Tunisia and Mali.” [...] The Russian Foreign Minister directly incriminated those who lay behind the upheavals that were deliberately stirred up in Tunisia, Libya and Mali, whence comes the biggest threat against Algeria. He believes that the conspirators of the new world order draw up their their plans based on a policy of influence, focusing on minority...
groups and terrorist networks. Even Morocco is a party. Does not [King Mohamed VI's] recent trip to Mali point to a predetermined agenda? The hand of the Makhzen is no stranger to what is going on in Ghardaia, where revolts among local people have broken out again. Drug barons and members of MUJAO are behind this, according to very well informed sources. The goal, obviously, being to create an unsettled environment in order to destabilise the country.

To achieve his objectives, Uncle Sam first praises Algeria, portraying it as a pivotal country in the fight against terrorism in North Africa, a leader. While flattering Algeria's skills and military power, [Washington] is in the process of gathering together all the necessary ingredients. Even if the US puts forward coordinating the fight against terrorism as a pretext for its mobilization in Africa, it is hard to believe that the US has no interest in an area of Algeria that is rich in shale gas, conventional gas and other minerals such as uranium. Complicit local clans are already on the ground, ready to fire up the engine of destabilisation.

On the surface of things, such analyses – which pass without comment in a mainstream Algerian daily newspaper – do not bode at all well for the future of Algerian security cooperation with France and the United States. However, while L'Expression's articles might be said to express a siege mentality that does seem to exist within sections of Algeria's power structure, it is worth noting that the particularly overblown rhetoric appears to be generated at least as much by the present domestic political situation as by developments beyond Algeria's borders. Dark references to “complicit clans” acting in cahoots with Algeria's enemies speaks to the lingering rivalry between antagonistic factions within and around the power structure, while the scarecrows of destabilisation and “foreign plots” (which of course had pride of place in the speech read on behalf of Bouteflika by Veterans' Affairs Minister Mohamed Cherif Abbas on Feb. 18, warning against criticism of the DRS) have become central to the regime's arguments against those who dare to protest against the fourth term option. Viewed in this context, it would therefore seem likely – if the regime manages successfully to weather the next few, crucial weeks without any serious outbreak of unrest – that such rhetoric will fade once the presidential election is past.

Security

Levels of violence in February were broadly on a par with previous months, with 11 security-related incidents overall including five jihadist operations. Levels of activity rose sharply in the last week of February, however, and have remained high so far in March, with 17 security related incidents, including four jihadist operations, up until March 19.

ALGIERS and surrounding areas were quiet, although there were claims in the Tunisian media on March 11 that the Algerian security forces were hunting for a “terrorist”, apparently from the southern town of Djelfa, who was said to be planning an attack against the US or Canadian embassies in Algiers. Although this report was not corroborated by any other sources, it does call to mind the document, attributed to AQMI's leader in the Sahara Djamel Okacha (a.k.a. Abou Yahia El Hamam), that has been circulating in jihadist internet forums since the beginning of the year, promising terror attacks against Western interests, including embassies, in Algeria, Tunisia and other countries of the region.
Immediately to the east of the capital, Kabylia has seen heavy activity these past few weeks, mostly army operations. The security forces led two major search and destroy missions, one in the Sidi Ali Bounab area between the wilayas of Boumerdès and Tizi Ouzou in late February-early March, and the other in the area of Azeffoun-Ifliissen-Aghrib in the north of the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou starting from March 11 and still ongoing. Each resulted in a number of clashes with jihadists leaving 14 of them dead.

There have been several incidents along both the northern and southern stretches of Algeria's EASTERN BORDERS:

- A total of 40 missiles were seized by the Algerian army near the border with Libya, a security source told Chinese news agency Xinhua on February 26. The weapons were reportedly being transported by “members of Al-QMI” heading to northern Mali, who were intercepted by Algerian army in the locality of Djanet in the province of Illizi. Some 40 Katyusha missiles and a number of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles were seized, according to Xinhua's source. During this operation, the army forces managed to arrest two of the members of the group, one of whom was seriously injured, while an undetermined number fled to neighbouring Libya. Although Xinhua did not say exactly when the operation took place, Algerian Arabic-language daily *Echorouk* said it was around February 24, and claimed that the smugglers were “probably” members Abdessalam Tarmoune's Sons of the South for Islamic Justice movement. Algerian Arabic-language daily *El-Khabar* reported that the vehicles had been detected before crossing the border, while in the vicinity of the Libyan town of Ghat.

- *El-Khabar* said on March 12 that security forces in the first week of March dismantled a terrorist cell in the area of Tarat, wilaya of Illizi, on the border with Libya. The group of four to six men was led by a certain Abou Tareq Mehdi, half-brother of Ahmad Tlemci, “leader of MUJAO”, who was working to create a jihadist-smuggling outfit of local Tuareg to oversee the smuggling routes between Libya and Niger “in partnership with militias in Libya”.

- The Algerian army on March 18 reportedly intercepted and killed “five Libyan militiamen” south of Deb Deb, wilaya of Illizi, on the border with Libya. Four kalashnikovs and one heavy machine gun were recovered in the operation. As with the interception of the missile shipment near Djanet, press reports suggested that the group had been detected by an Algerian surveillance aircraft before crossing into Algeria from Ghadames, Libya.

- Further to the north, on the border with Tunisia, security forces on March 13 foiled an attempt by a jihadist group to set up a fake check point on the RN-10 road in the wilaya of Tébessa, near the Bouchebka border post. Soldiers spotted the jihadist group and moved in their direction, prompting them to flee, leaving behind two cars. The army launched a search and destroy mission in the area.

- The next day, March 14, the army is reported to have intercepted and killed seven jihadists in the same area around Bouchebka, wilaya of Tébessa. Some press reports said two other jihadists were arrested and two soldiers were wounded in the operation. The group had reportedly crossed into Algeria from Tunisia. Three days later, Tunisian police shot and killed three suspected jihadists near Jendbouba, on the other side of the border; it is not clear whether there is a direct link between the two incidents.

One incident was reported on the SOUTHERN BORDERS, in which the security forces ambushed and detained a “dangerous jihadist” in the town of Timiaouine, wilaya of Adrar, near the border with Mali on March 12.
Elsewhere in the SOUTH of the country:

- On February 25, according to *El-Khabar*, the Algerian army discovered an explosives cache in the desert near Reggane wilaya of Adrar, containing “1,420 explosive canisters ready for use.” Three men were arrested “after a long chase”.

- Algerian military aviation on March 8 bombarded a jihadist group in the area between the wilayas of Ouargla and Illizi, destroying an offroader and killing three people on board.

END

---

[1] French TV channel Canal +, which had caused a stir in December of last year when it analysed Algerian state TV footage of Bouteflika's meeting with French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and demonstrated that it had been doctored to make the President appear far more lively than he actually was, again picked apart the footage of Bouteflika's appearance at the Constitutional Council, arguing that two takes seemed to have been necessary simply to splice together 15 seconds of the President's voice.

[2] To the outside observer at least, the name is reminiscent of Egypt's Kefaya ('Enough') movement, which campaigned against Hosni Mubarak's presidency in the years preceding the 2011 uprising. But in the Algerian context it is a more direct reference to the slogan (*sbaâ snin barakat!* - 'seven years [of war] are enough!') of the spontaneous movement in Algeria's cities against the internecine fighting that broke out immediately after independence in 1962 between the civilian leadership of the FLN (backed by part of the revolutionary army of the interior) and the Morocco-based *Armée des Frontières* headed by Houari Boumedienne – and from which the original “Oujda clan” emerged victorious.

[3] Demonstrations have been banned in the capital since the massive march on Algiers organised by the *aârouch* (traditional tribal councils) of Kabylia in June 2001.

[4] Just two years ago, Mahmoud Chaâlal was still boasting that “in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was returned thanks to us. Which we are delighted about. What is more, the President is a sufi.”


[6] Technically, the company is understood to be in the name of Djebbar's son-in-law.

[7] Apparently in response to the French government's public call for the right to peaceful protest to be respected

[8] “You know what we say in Constantine? The Chaoui, *hasha rizk rabbi*” - a virtually untranslatable colloquialism that expresses regret for having mentioned something obscene. Sellal's subsequent insistence that he was only joking and that some of his best friends are Chaouis has, predictably enough, done little to calm things.

[9] Supported by three larger rear bases in West Africa: Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) and Libreville (Gabon).

[10] Referencing a number of far more serious articles that have appeared recently in the American mainstream and specialist press, notably: 'US Military Presence in Africa Growing in Small Ways', Los Angeles Times 07/03/14; 'U.S. Takes Training Role in Africa as Threats Grow and Budgets Shrink', New York Times, 05/03/14; and 'The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest', CTC
No trace of the remarks attributed to Lavrov while in Tunisia is to be found elsewhere than in the Algerian media.

A report by a UN panel of experts on arms transfers concerning Libya dated February 19 states that it has documented the presence of “Libyan SA-7b” MANPADS in “Chad, Mali, Tunisia, Lebanon and potentially in the Central African Republic”. Algeria did not feature on the list – perhaps because Algiers would not allow the panel of experts to inspect seized weapons reportedly smuggled from Libya. According to the same report: “Several media articles in 2013 and 2014 reported seizures by Algeria of materiel originating from Libya. Security sources in Libya, Tunisia and the Niger have indicated that transfers are still occurring from Libya to Algeria, sometimes through Tunisia, to groups based in Algeria and Mali. [...] The Panel sent several letters to Algeria following its mission to Algiers in 2012. It also met with the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations in New York in May 2013 to request a visit and to gain access to the seized materiel. The Committee [overseeing the panel of experts] wrote to Algeria in September 2013 in that regard, and again in January 2014, when it suggested the week of 4 March 2014 for the visit. No response has been conveyed to the Committee or the Panel.”
Dear Team,

Below please find the January-February 2014 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

January-February 2014 Events Bulletin

January 24
Restoring Peace in Africa, Revitalizing European Defense, and Renewing NATO: The View from Paris

January 24
International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2013 and Outlook for 2014

January 30
The Geopolitics of North African Energy Trends

January 31
Arab Spring or Arab Autumn? Women's Political Participation in the Uprisings and Beyond: Implications for International Donor Policy

February 5
Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition

February 10
Crisis Response in the Mediterranean and Africa

February 18
Political Islam: Revival, Retreat, or Adaptation

February 28
Regional Solutions to Challenges in Africa

Restoring Peace in Africa, Revitalizing European Defense, and Renewing NATO: The View from Paris

Date: January 24, 2014
2. Overview

At this event, the French Minister of Defense, H.E. Jean-Yves Le Drian, discussed the importance of French military intervention in Africa for regional and global stability with particular emphasis on the recent French defense operations in Mali and The Central African Republic (CAR). He also discussed his vision for the future of French military activity in Africa.

3. Summary

Le Drian posited that French military intervention in Africa is of major importance for global security. He argued that the recent examples of interventions in Mali and The Central African Republic (CAR) serve as evidence that without a French military presence in the region, many more people would have died and Mali and CAR would have plunged into deeper chaos. He stated that the defense operation in Mali prevented its government from falling into the hands of terrorists. This prevention maintained regional stability and global security. Meanwhile, in CAR, the French and CAR forces seized over 250 tons of weapons from terrorists and other criminals. This, he noted, is just one example of what the French and African forces can accomplish together when combating terrorist threats in the region.

He stated that in the future, France seeks to continue to have a military presence in Africa to maintain stability. He went on to say that the actions in Mali and in CAR are not sufficient to maintain that stability. The neighboring countries around Mali and CAR are growing concerns, particularly Libya. He stated that Africa stands out as a continent with more failed states than any other region. Therefore, France will adapt itself in Africa by reorganizing its military response capabilities to ensure security. The goal is for military leaders to be able to make quicker decisions when a crisis strikes.

He claimed that France’s commitment to stabilizing Africa is part of its responsibility as a protector of global security and its fight against terrorism. Without France, the Minister argued, Africa would have fallen into complete chaos and become a haven for terrorists and spread its instability around the world.

4. Q & A

Q. (Josh Rögn, Daily Beast) What is your stance on Iran’s decision to continue to enrich Uranium?
A. I agree with our Western allies. We are committed to preventing Iran from continuing to enrich Uranium.

Q. (Stanly Roth, Boeing Co.) How are France’s military expeditionary units being affected by the sluggish European economies?
A. I am not worried about France’s capacity to act in this regard. Furthermore, I am not worried about the capacity to mobilize France’s allies in a pulling effort since these interventions in Africa are for the sake of international security.

Q. (Leo Michel, National Defense University) Do you see opportunities for increased military to military cooperation in the Asia Pacific region?
A. I see France as a Pacific nation as it has territories in the region. Thus, we want to participate in all of the international security initiatives throughout the Pacific.

Q. (Michael Mossettig, PBS Online Newshour) How will the new cuts to the French national defense budget will affect the military?
A. I have no particular concern with the recent cuts. They would not significantly affect the military’s capabilities.

Q. (Stanislas Moussa-Kembe, Ambassador of CAR to the US) What is the role of the CAR military in the efforts to rid the country of jihadist mercenaries and disarm the terrorists?
A. The mercenaries must go. And the concern of the collective security in Africa is to avoid pockets of mercenaries in neighboring states. Regarding disarmament, greater efforts must be made and must be lead by the president of CAR. The CAR military must be rebuilt in order for it to play a role in securing the region.

5. Observation

The Minister spoke to a packed room. Among the crowd, there were military officers from Guatemala, The Central African Republic, the United States and other countries. There were also a number of journalists and foreign diplomats, including the ambassador of The Central African Republic to the United States. While no mention was made of Morocco, directly or indirectly, the Minister asserted that France will maintain a military presence in Africa and it sounds like this role will expand as instability continues and spreads across the region. Throughout the talk, the Minister repeatedly mentioned that France has spent a great deal of blood and treasure in Africa for the sake of global stability. This repetition, coupled with hints at an expanding role in Africa, underscored a strong and aggressive message to the world that France has and will continue to fight and serve a custodian for regional and global stability. At one point this message was softened with the acknowledgement that there should be a civilian role in stabilizing the region focused on humanitarian efforts. However, this was mentioned as an afterthought. The talk was vague, but the message is clear: France will, for the foreseeable future, maintain a strong and expanding military presence in Africa and act as a safeguard for global peace and security.
1. Title: International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2013 and Outlook for 2014

Hosted by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies at the National Press Club

Participants:

Michael Swetnam: CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
General (ret.) Alfred Gray: 29th Commandant of the USMC; Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
Ambassador Mohamed M. Tawfik: Ambassador of the Arab republic of Egypt to the US
Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal: Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the US
Ambassador (ret.) Al Maamoun Baba Lamine Keita: Embassy of the Republic of Mali
Dr. Edward Luttwak: Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Prof. Don Wallace, Jr.: Chairman, International Law Institute; Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center
Dr. Yonah Alexander: Moderator: Director of Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies; Senior Fellow, and Member, Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

2. Overview

This event marked the 16th annual review of international terrorism hosted by the Potomac Institute and launched their 5th annual report on terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel. The panelists provided a bleak assessment of terrorism in 2013, given the significant increase of terrorism in the region as noted in the report. The discussion then largely focused on prospects and strategies available to fight terrorism in the years to come. Participants agreed that a deeper understanding of cultural and religious motivators on a case-by-case basis is absolutely necessary for those looking to stem the tide of extremist violence in the region.

3. Summary

Michael Swetnam opened with a description of the report, focusing on the alarming spread of terrorist violence in the Sahel-Sahara and beyond. This "scourge of our society" is increasing in both frequency and lethality, he said, despite the vast increase of international security cooperation, which he claimed was the "silver lining" of the situation. Dr. Yonah Alexander noted that the numbers represented a 605% increase in incidents since he began tracking after 9/11, for a total of around 230 for the year of 2013. The area deserves much more attention, he said.

General Alfred Gray provided recommendations for better fighting terrorism, though he began by saying that "we are making progress, generally." Terrorism has been a big concern of the US military since Vietnam, which he considered to be an early terror conflict. "What's really needed is a total global effort," he said, involving each government, where no one country has a "corner of the market." This would create an environment conducive to a series of comprehensive strategies, with a dynamic focus oriented towards local, regional, and global initiatives. "Start with what you want the world to look like and work backwards," he added. General Gray said that the role for military force is limited. Working towards consensus, on the other hand, is essential. Keeping the high moral ground every step of the way is essential to containing the appeal of violent fundamentalism. General Gray stressed that the US must educate everyone on what it is up against and have a disciplined media that keeps higher goals of society in mind regarding the overall narrative. General Gray said that there are many challenges, but believes that they are solvable.

Ambassador Mohamed Tawfik elucidated three tenets to keep in mind in the fight against terrorism. First, terrorism is culturally universal and not endemic to one group or another. Second, incidents of terrorism are a nebulus culmination of a network: propaganda, financing, training, logistics, etc. Thirdly, states cannot deal with the threat alone. He cited the attack that occurred in Egypt that day as an example – a result of an ongoing political process. He stressed that the Egyptian people would not succumb to these efforts, as turnout for the referendum vote was very high despite attacks and intimidation. Ambassador Tawfik added that Egypt could see more terrorism due to questionable pardons issued under former president Muhammad Morsi. He mentioned a "bizarre" statement in which Morsi essentially tied the hands of the Army by valuing the lives of terrorist kidnappers equally with their victims. Tawfik added that the new government has undertaken many efforts to reverse the trend under Morsi, notably by closing 80 percent of smuggling tunnels in Gaza. He agreed that targeting development and marginalization are a big part of the fight against terrorism, adding that Egypt has a plan to do the same. Egypt is also sending scholars to the Sahel region to combat fundamentalist ideology, among other efforts.

Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal stated that Morocco is well aware of the scope and phenomenon of terrorism, a manifestation of violent political ideology that exploits religion for political purposes. The solution to this, he said, is a structured and methodological framework that features a proactive approach and solidarity development. Morocco continues to promote moderate Islam and build state capacity in countries where terrorism is spreading. A sustained regional and international system of cooperation would help expand Morocco's efforts. Morocco’s mandate as United Nations Security Council President focused on the elevation of cooperation in the region for that purpose. Morocco has worked to draft a common vision in the fight against terrorism, echoing previous comments. Ambassador Bouhlal cited Morocco’s migration policy reform as a positive example of the proactive approach, working to combat a real threat to peace and stability. Morocco has also demonstrated its commitment to security throughout the Mali crisis, and the training of 500 Malian Imams is again part of the comprehensive approach to stamp out terror threat.

Ambassador Al Maamoun Baba Lamine Keita agreed that terrorism in the region has become more lethal and more dispersed geographically, as the successive reports by the Potomac Institute have shown. He predicted that al-Qaeda and similar organizations would again expand in 2014, as the mode of attacks moves from sporadic to serial in many countries. Terrorists, he added, are becoming more entrepreneurial and disparate, gaining experience and networks from fighting in Syria. "The Sahel has become a hideout" for terrorists and transnational
organized crime, Ambassador Keita added. Promoting competencies and increasing cooperation among African governments is necessary to solve the problem, he concluded.

Dr. Edward Luttwak wrapped up the individual comments by stating that US foreign policy cannot address the problems until it acquires a more nuanced perception of the factors at play on the ground. The US national security structure is meant to deal with “high-contrast targets,” he said, but ever since the end of the Cold War, it has faced mostly low-contrast targets. This, he added, requires much more situational awareness. Citing State Department reports on Turkey that incorrectly identify religious sects there, Luttwak stated that the inability to correctly analyze religious factors behind conflicts is an enormous problem among US officials. In Egypt, for example, he said that loyalty in many sects is to God and not to the people, so it’s no surprise that public sentiment is deemed irrelevant. In light of this, how can democracy be directly applied to Muslim countries? The US needs to better evaluate groups based on core religious philosophy and the extent to which they are devoted to that philosophy and tolerant of others. Luttwak cited the example of the US having labor attachés in countries where there are no trade unions. Yet, there are no religious attachés from the US. If you are going to engage, he said, you need better situational awareness.

4. Q & A

Q: (Lawrence Freeman, Director, Africa Desk at Executive Intelligence Review magazine) With the increasingly apparent involvement in terrorist activities on the part of Saudi Arabia, why isn’t the country more subject to scrutiny? And regarding Africa, what we really need is a massive Marshall Plan strategy to eradicate terrorism.

A: (Dr. Edward Luttwak) Saudi Arabia is a self-styled Salafist-like country, though al-Qaeda turned against them at some point. The country doesn’t support terrorism, except maybe indirectly by way of schools they established in places like Pakistan, but not directly as a state. The best thing we can do is stop them from teaching across the world.

(Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal) You are right about economic development as an important goal for Africa. It is a challenge for domestic and international cooperation. It is also part of why Morocco undertakes reforms such as with migration policy, which seeks to promote opportunity for youthful populations.

(Ambassador Mohamed Tawfik) I agree with Morocco’s focus on economic development. There are two types of Islamist organizations: those with extreme views espoused peacefully, and those with extreme or even moderate views which are expressed violently. People have a right to express their views, but we should end links between violent extremists and parallel political organizations.

Concluding Remarks

Prof. Don Wallace Jr. agreed with the other panelists and said that terrorism represented a “sea of troubles” for the entire world. He added that it appears as though 2014 will again bring more acts of terrorism and expansion of violent extremist groups. It is “a growth industry in the Sahel,” he said.

5. Observation

This event was attended by around 40 foreign policy professionals. The panelists had a similar assessment of the outlook for terrorism in the Sahel/Sahara region as well as a common prescription for eradicating violent extremists: a comprehensive, international effort with well-informed stakeholders that addresses economic opportunity and capacity building to be executed locally, regionally, and globally. Although the solution demands a lot of a great number of stakeholders and the short-term outlook is for more violence in the coming year, the panelists seemed confident that the causes of terrorism can be successfully addressed by the global community.

For a complete video of the event, please visit:
Leonardo Bellodi discussed Eni’s work in the region. Eni is the biggest oil and gas operator in Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. The circumstances surrounding the production of oil and gas in each country are unique, though it is globally acknowledged that North Africa is a difficult place to work in because of the political instability of the region. However, those invested in the region must continue to be optimistic. Of course, security of facilities and personnel is a major concern, but Bellodi is confident that their assets are secure.

Bellodi discussed circumstances on the ground in each country and how they affect companies like Eni. If the country becomes either a failed state or the security situation further deteriorates, as it has in previous months with the assassinations of persons in political power, companies such as Eni will have to take action. Egypt is running out of money to pay international companies who are there extracting gas and oil. Egypt is also having issues exporting fossil fuels, as they must fulfill domestic needs first, which in turn causes great concern to companies deeply invested in gas and oil facilities as the domestic economy in Egypt is unstable.

And then there is Algeria, a country that appears more stable than Libya or Egypt for energy companies. Algeria is the second biggest exporter of gas to Europe and although there have been some setbacks last year, terrorism or instability in the country has been less pervasive. However, the upcoming presidential election in April is something Eni is paying close attention to. These issues aren’t a priority for the US because, as Bellodi stated, the United States has the luxury of choosing its energy partners, which means the oil production and the political stability in Libya is not a priority for the US. Italy, however, is much closer and experiences the effects vastly different than those in the United States.

Daoud began his comments by asking, “how are energy trends shaping government policy?” He claimed that the most important factor in government policy affecting energy is crisis management. If a government can demonstrate an ability to manage and control instability, they will be able to grow their energy industries. Daoud stated that there are a lot of constraints on the industry in North Africa, mainly other countries producing oil and gas within a more politically stable environment. Some of the other main constraints include the reality that the US is a tier 1 producer, meaning that it is a direct supplier of oil to original equipment manufacturers who sell the final product, and is thus a competitor, as are Iran and Iraq. Additionally, the Chinese economy is beginning to slow down and therefore investing less into North African oil and gas reserves. Non-producing countries are in a good place right now because oil and gas prices are beginning to fall.

Daoud discussed the industry in Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia more specifically. With Libya’s continued political crisis, its oil revenue came out 20% lower than projected and its economy may even get worse as instability continues. Daoud nevertheless predicts a 50% increase in oil and gas production in Libya in the next 10 years. As for Tunisia, it is trying to be pro-active and reduce the impact of oil and gas imports on the economy. For countries that are non-producers, like Morocco for example, it is perfect time to distance themselves from oil subsidies. This heightens popular discontent, which the Moroccan government is partly countering by increasing the minimum wage. Morocco has been looking for a balanced source of energy, including nuclear, solar, hydroelectric, natural gas, wind, solar, and off shore drilling. Not relying on a single source puts them in a comfortable position. Daoud concluded by noting that the evolution of the oil market is important as social balance and domestic politics tend to outweigh regular economic logic.

4. Q & A

Q: (Malka) The oil and gas companies in the Maghreb region need international companies’ capital for investment and growth, however investing in this region is risky, what are some of their incentives?
A: (Ballodi) US oil companies are going home because they have options, notably on US soil. There are still a lot of companies investing in the North African region because of their proximity to the region. European countries cannot count on North American oil as it is far too expensive. They must instead look to the Mediterranean countries, North Africa, and Russia.

(Q) Political security is a reality. The cost of security has increased immensely in the months following the Arab Spring. Algeria is investing in terrorism security, which may increase the price of oil and gas production, adding another element. Companies such as BP continue to be skeptical of investing in Algeria and are looking for safer, cheaper places to land.

Q: (Frank Verrastro, CSIS) If the Algerian government continues to manage conflict and remain stable resulting in oil and gas companies to remain active in the country, how do you expand production with fewer investors?
A: (Bellodi) With regards to Algeria, In Amenas was a terrible accident, but it is not a constant concern. Algeria is keen to attract international investment. There are many international gas and oil companies that want to get into Algeria. If they can find a way to pay international companies they will stay in a good place. As for Libya, there are no major problems.

(Daoud) Algeria is the wild card. Their president is old, and their policies swing back and forth between being liberal and conservative. However, they usually end somewhere in the middle of that spectrum.

Q: (Raton, Congressional Research Service) What milestones will you look for, as your company decides to continue investing or leave the North African region entirely?
A: (Bellodi) We are drafting our business plan for the next four years and that is difficult because we are unsure of the next few months. Security is our biggest risk in the region. If the situation gets worse in each country, we’ll have to pull our company out. If we look at the biggest issue, it is the price of oil and gas. They have what we need for a cheap price. If you would have asked me three years ago about the Libya situation, I would have said it was completely fine, but now we are in a different era.

5. Observation

Around 50 people attended this roundtable; nearly all attendees were foreign policy professionals with students or interns. The tone of the roundtable was explanatory and cordial. Bellodi seemed to have somewhat of an optimistic bias towards the region because of the business he has there with Eni. The event was light on specific information relating to Morocco, but what was stated about the country was positive and optimistic, as the country was mentioned as the most stable of the region and a country where many are looking for investment opportunities.
Arab Spring or Arab Autumn? Women’s Political Participation in the Uprisings and Beyond: Implications for International Donor Policy

Date: January 31, 2014

1. Title: Arab Spring or Arab Autumn? Women’s Political Participation in the Uprisings and Beyond: Implications for International Donor Policy
   Hosted by The Wilson Center and CARE
   Participants:
   **Stephanie Foster**: Senior Policy Advisor, State Department’s Office of Global Women’s Issues
   **Maryam Jamshidi**: Founder, Mufah.org
   **Sherine Ibrahim**: Senior Regional Management in the Middle East and Asia, CARE
   **Haleh Esfandiari**: Moderator: Director of the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars

2. Overview:

As part of their efforts to support and expand women’s political participation in the Middle East, CARE and the Woodrow Wilson Center brought together three speakers who serve as leaders in the fight for women’s rights around the world. They spoke on the state of women’s rights organizations focused on the Middle East at the informal, formal, grassroots, and institutional levels. They identified the issues and the problems that these organizations face and hypothesized on what can be done to fix these issues.

3. Summary:

Sherine Ibrahim provided an overview of the state of women’s rights movements in the Middle East and what can be done to improve them. She started out by declaring that people around the world need to regain the sense of hope and urgency for the fate of women and their place in the political decision making process that was lost soon after the Arab Spring ended. She recalled a quote from a woman that had taken part in a few protests associated with the Arab Spring which she thought embodied this spirit of hope: “To join the protests on Friday mornings and pray Al Juma’a with other women, I had to take shortcut routes through the rugged mountains every Thursday night. After what I had done, no force on earth dares neglect me.” Ibrahim referenced a 2012 study that rated women’s political representation in the Middle East and North Africa as the lowest in the world in order to illustrate that the euphoria of the revolutions has been lost. This euphoria, she went on, has been lost at a critical time—the immediate aftermath of the revolutions. At a time when real political decisions are set to determine the fate of the region, the media’s and the international community’s focus has shifted from human rights and social and gender justice to counterterrorism.

In order to refocus the spotlight on social issues, particularly when it comes to the roles of women in politics, Ibrahim suggested that the issue of fragmentation within the women’s rights movement needs to be solved. She said that within the movement there are divides on a geographical, gender, ideological, and institutional level that need to be addressed. Once those are solved, the movement will be able to put forth a clear articulation of its goals and start making real progress. One of the biggest examples of these divides, she said, was the divide between more religiously conservative Muslim women seeking equal footing with men in the political realm and secular Western women. Ibrahim said that Muslim women often see their secular Western counterparts as “intolerant liberals.” The secular Western segment of the movement, she said, often don’t realize that many Muslim women from Arab countries interpret their roles in government and society through Islam. She said something needs to be done about this divide so that these women can meet on unified ground.

Another challenge that the movement needs to overcome, stated Ibrahim, was its over-reliance on technology. She acknowledged that technology, particularly social media, plays a big role in the movement. Still, it is important to realize that not all of the key populations like the rural impoverished women who need to be involved in the movement, have access to this technology. Doing work on the ground to spread the message, moving away from social media, she said, would lend itself to creating true and more representative collective identity among the men and women in the movement. The leaders in the movement need to find alternative ways of engaging those who are not in the conversation due to the over-reliance on technology. She said that the case she has put forth shows that fragmentation is the most detrimental part of the movement.

Maryam Jamshidi started by saying that she was going to push back some on Ibrahim’s comments. She then asked, “Was the Arab Spring a revolution?” She went through what she thought were the standards for a revolution. She said that revolutions are usually regarded as a positive thing with clear goals in mind and that they usually happen quickly. She said that the Arab Spring was neither of these. However, she qualified the Arab Spring as a series of slow and unclear revolutions which are still ongoing in some regards. She said that the revolutions encouraged people toward civil entrepreneurship. In other words, more and more people in the MENA region since the revolution have taken to working for the public good. She said that after the Arab Spring, this type of activity continued which left the public arena open for people to meet and collaborate.

Unlike Ibrahim, Jamshidi thinks that collaboration within the movement during and after the Arab Spring has been thriving and that it’s more dynamic than ever across the sectors. This type of dynamic interaction, she claimed, created an open public sector and has since maintained it. Furthermore, the Arab Spring gave young women involved in the struggle in the region and around the world on-the-job leadership training for the future. She said that the role of women in the Arab Spring is history repeating itself in the region. Much like the Arab Spring, women in the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1900s in the Middle East played a large role. And as soon as the violence of the revolutions was over and the decision making process was about to begin, the women were turned away. Women, she said, have always been used in revolutions as their presence is charged and does a lot to further these uprisings. Their presence is charged as they are often targets of physical violence. Now that the violence of the revolutions has diminished, she continued, it is important to keep the public arena as open as possible. She said that if the movement were to be reorganized and regulated on an institutional level, the flexibility that is necessary to maintain the public arena would disappear.

Foster began by reiterating a few of the ideas brought up by the other speakers. She agreed that the spotlight needs to shift back to social...
issues and that she has seen that the State Department is just now beginning to make that shift. This work includes trying to institutionalize women’s issues by working to put women in decision-making positions in every level of politics and government. Furthermore, she said that the more established segments of the women’s movement need to provide public spaces to address social issues to ensure that networks of women within the movement can learn from each other.

After Foster’s remarks, Esfandiari told the audience that when she was imprisoned in Iran for social activism, she noticed that there were so many women who were in her same situation for fighting for women’s rights. This, to her surprise, showed her just how active that women’s movement had always been. Women, she said, were put into the movement all around the Middle East and North Africa because of the existing family laws. They need to be revised, she said.

Jamshidi added that revising these laws doesn’t mean getting rid of religion. She said that people have to understand that there are many women in the region who want equal rights, but also interpret their place in society through Islam.

Foster then ended by noting that Moroccan and Jordanian governments are the only two countries in the region who are part of the Equal Futures pact, an agreement to revise family laws to work toward creating equality between men and women in their countries. She hopes that in the near future, more countries in the region will follow Morocco and Jordan’s examples and join the pact.

4. Q & A

Q. (Timur Mahmud, International Law and Policy Group) What are your reactions to my claim that women play a very large role in the economic sector? Their contribution is stronger than people think.
A. (Ibrahim) I don’t know where you got your information from, but the participation levels of women are very low. Women’s participation levels in the informal sectors of the economies are astonishingly high. Therefore, it is important that the world recognizes women’s contribution in the informal economies and that they be integrated into the formal sectors.

(Jamshidi) While women’s participation in politics and the formal economies are low, they are highly educated in the region. Still, they are knowledgeable, but don’t have any opportunities to use what they have learned.

Q. (Habib Khan, USAID) What mechanisms exist to encourage women to want to participate in politics?
A. (Jamshidi) Women themselves are doing the outreach. They are learning on the job. This process has not yet been institutionalized.

Q. (Virginia Austin Schubert, Coaching Network) To what degree do female political leaders around the world inspire repressed women in the Middle East?
A. (Jamshidi) They are indeed inspirational and one should not forget the inspirational power that grassroots leaders have too.

(Ibrahim) The power for women leaders to inspire will be even greater once the media culture changes from highlighting what women leaders wear and how they look to what they actually do and what their policies are.

5. Observation

There were around fifty people in attendance. This discussion underscores the two prisms from which the American government and the media view the Middle East and North Africa region—those of social issues and counterterrorism. Although the forum focused on bridging the divides within the women’s rights movement, there was also a sense that once the movement makes a comeback, the next divide to fix is the one between the social and counterterrorism agendas. Morocco was not a focal point of the discussion, but was mentioned, along with Jordan, as a model for dealing with this debate.
have updated this book since this geopolitical shift has taken place in Africa to provide insight into the shale gas and oil revolution, newly found energy resources in deep-water regions and the Arctic, the safety concerns that go along with this sector, energy poverty, and modernizing infrastructure, and climate concerns. The forum was treated as a conversation and each speaker did not have an allotted time to speak, the moderator initiated with questions which then the other speakers would respond depending on their expertise.

Kalicki stated that energy and poverty are strongly correlated. There are 1.4 billion people without access to electricity, due principally to corruption and wasted energy. United States foreign policy plays a big role, according to Kalicki. The United States needs to create a more coherent policy on managing foreign energy sources. One of the biggest shifts in the last nine years has been that the biggest consumers of oil and gas, like the United States, have become the biggest producers, which helps level the playing field. This will result in opening up the oil and gas markets which will decrease monopoly prices. The United States no longer depends on foreign reserves for oil and gas which eliminates the demand from countries that are less politically and socially stable, which creates a more stable market for US citizens.

Ebinger discussed the idea that limited access of electricity to 2 billion people causes instability and hinders development. The next big thing to watch for is Asia selecting its type of fuel and where to begin exploration and importation. The United States has become less of a factor in the oil and gas sector as it is producing from domestic reserves, therefore international attention has been placed more on Asia, another large consumer.

McPherson stated that transparency in a government creates stability. The political elite of developing countries do not feel accountable to anyone, especially not to the general population. Therefore, the political elite dictate from whom sources of energy are secured and to whom it is sold. Transparency is the cornerstone of a government that is trusted by the general population. It also would improve access to financial records and distribution of wealth among the general population. Energy investors working in countries struggling with internal political stability and corruption need to require better policy frameworks, including, but not limited to better fiscal regimes, re-organizing roles, revenue management, expenditure policies, and social and environmental guidelines. NGOs are lobbying to require proof of financial records for foreign governments in which the US works with, like the “publish what you pay” act, which is a positive trend.

McPherson noted the challenges in achieving this kind of accountability. As many host countries manipulate follow-up data given to US investors and policymakers, how can we succeed in receiving accurate follow-up records from them? He argued that the US needs grassroots pressure and high standards for their companies working abroad, especially in the energy business.

Van Niekerk added that Africa produces only 9% of the world’s oil and gas; however, because the markets inside the continent are a lot smaller than others, it is a large part of their economies. Countries that lie inside the Rift Valley are oil producers, as well as countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Not only are large companies such as BP, Shell, Exxon, and Chevron investing in these regions, but also smaller indigenous companies as well. The US is no longer buying oil and gas from these parts of the world, but they are still investing in the infrastructure. The role of the US in oil and gas production in Africa and the Middle East has changed drastically after producing shale gas in North Dakota, which replaced demand from Nigeria. Countries such as China, which receive oil and gas from Sudan or Angola, continue to stay out of the political and social crisis in these countries, and have no desire to become involved.

Van Niekerk stated that although the international community is aware of political and economic corruption in Africa, the window of fighting corruption has narrowed in the last 10 years. FCPA, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, has had a major impact on this issue, as it sets up standards on the ground level where corruption in a country begins. There are cases, for example Angola, where international businesses must form a partnership with indigenous corporations, which are tied to the government ruling class, therefore continuing the growth of corruption. The oil and gas revenue should be for all of its citizens, not just the elite. The growth of democracy will aid in spreading the wealth to the general population.

McPherson discussed the importance of having basic electricity and access to running water. An example he used was that in Pakistan, having a single water pump creates a chain of affects on its general population: women and children not having to haul water back and forth to their homes throughout the day, which frees them to receive basic education and improves their status of life. Having access to a radio, a television, or internet gives people access to the outside world allowing them to access news and knowledge they may have never been exposed to. IEA estimates a 90 percent growth in energy demand in 2035. Having access to basic energy and water needs can change a nation.

4. Q & A

Q: (Lisa Friedman, Climate Wire) What do you think of the United Nations call to end energy poverty by 2030? Is it possible to bring energy to 1.3 billion people without raising emissions?
A: (McPherson) India has made great progress with off grid energy resources, however we need a greater energy production. We need NGOs to invest their time and energy and government investing in order to accomplish this task. (Ebinger) Gas is cheap for the US and coal rivals gas prices, especially overseas. Coal mining and production is the biggest generator of employment. We cannot stop producing coal as this would affect the stability of developing countries.

Q: (Reba Coruth, Georgetown University) There needs to be achievable goals for basic infrastructure growth in certain places in Africa. Africa must also engage in industrial countries such as the US, Japan, and Germany to invest in their growing energy industry.
A: (Kalicki) The private sector holds the power to meet or fall short of infrastructure goals. There must be microfinance and entrepreneurship. No single resource or institution can accomplish these tasks alone. It must be a top down effort. There must be goals set and guidelines to achieving them.
(McPherson) There must be something done at the top level of governance and there must be domestic-political incentives. The political motivations need to be sustainable. There should be a structure of external pressure from international institutions and internal will from governments and the general public.

Q: (Rose, Hope for Tomorrow) Rural areas of Africa are where the majority of Africans live. You cannot leave this problem to the Africans alone. Rural Africans needs energy in their villages, we cannot function without it. There are clinics, schools, and small businesses that have the need for energy.
A: (van Niekerk) Africa is a great place to develop electrification in rural areas. Most of Africa does live in the villages. Pre-paid electric meters are being tested in urban areas and might work in rural as well. This is one way to begin the process of providing power to rural areas.

5. Observation

About 100 people attended this discussion on energy and security, around a third of which were students and the remaining were foreign policy professionals. The tone of the discussion was very exploratory. The event was extremely light on specific information relating to Morocco, but it did describe the change in relationship between post-colonial countries and more powerful nations. Finding solutions to the security and energy crisis in Africa will definitely assist Morocco’s own development and economic progress.

Crisis Response in the Mediterranean and Africa

Date: February 10, 2014

1. Crisis Response in the Mediterranean and Africa
Hosted by the Atlantic Council

Participants:
**Col. Scott Benedict:** Commander, Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response, US Marine Corps
**Steven Grundman:** Moderator: George Lund Fellow, Emerging Defense Challenges, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council

2. Overview

Col. Scott Benedict addressed the recent strategic changes that the US Marine Corps is making in its approach to crisis response in Africa and the Mediterranean as a result of ongoing instability in the broader region. He emphasized the return to the small-war types of operations that went away during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing non-operational relationships with other militaries like those of Spain and France.

3. Summary

Col. Benedict started off with a brief lesson on the basic functions of the unit he was assigned to command, the Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response (SP-MAGTAF) and how creation of this special-purpose unit and the types of tactics it employs is indicative of a grander strategic shift. He said that the purpose of the unit is to defuse dangerous and volatile situations before they reach critical boiling points. Backing up Marine embassy security during a siege is one example of these missions. One of the most significant changes is the use of the V-22 Osprey in Africa. This aircraft is the combination of a fighter jet and a helicopter. The V-22 can travel at the speeds that operations in the region demand and can go into smaller spaces because of its vertical landing and takeoff capabilities. This gives his unit much greater reach into the interior of Africa.

These tactics were put into live operational use on January 3, 2014 in South Sudan when the Marines, backed up by the Army, evacuated American personnel from the embassy in South Sudan. It was during this mission that the V-22 was introduced for the first time in South Sudan. These types of missions, said Col. Benedict, have changed the training of these Marines. The US Marines have teamed up with the French Foreign Legion and Spanish Marines and the Spanish Army for evacuation and crisis response training. Both of these forces, said Col. Benedict, are compatible with the Marine Corps style of training and its capabilities. Furthermore, he said, it provides the Marines with a chance to exchange ideas and start friendships with their international counterparts. Although, he said, these relationships with foreign forces are, for the moment, non-operational.

Col. Benedict then went on to say that all of these changes in tactics, strategy, training, and missions are due to the “new normal” paradigm. In this model, the world has macro-stability which is in direct contrast to the international climate during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In those wars, under the old paradigm, terrorism threatened the stability of the whole world. Now that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been scaled down, there are no major wars to manage. The “new normal” will feature small wars and small crisis situations that require fast responses and the capabilities and training to defuse situations. He underscored that this “new normal” is actually a return to the way things were before the outbreak of the War on Terror. The US Marine Corps has traditionally performed small-ops - it was its original function.

4. Q & A

**Q. (Steven Grundman)** Was the moment of rupture that led to the creation to the SP-MAGTAF, Benghazi?
**A.** Bengahzi is just one of many examples of the “new normal” which called for the creation of the SP-MAGTAF.

**Q. (Joe Tabet, Alhurra)** Does SP-MAGTAF inform the local authorities of a given area of their missions? Do the Marines and the local authorities coordinate with one another?
**A.** We do inform and work with the local authorities depending on the mission.

**Q. (Tod Lindberg, Hoover Institution)** Is SP-MAGTAF equipped and trained to handle mass atrocities like genocide?
**A.** Handling mass atrocities does not fall under the purview of the SP-MAGTAF.
Political Islam: Revival, Retreat, or Adaptation

Date: February 18, 2014

1. Title: Political Islam: Revival, Retreat, or Adaptation
   Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

   Participants:
   Wael Haddara: Advisor to former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi
   Mustapha el Khalifi: Minister of Communications, Kingdom of Morocco
   Marwan Muasher: Moderator: Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

2. Overview

The panel addressed the status and future of political Islam with two Islamists from the region, who discussed the different trajectories of their respective governments as a result of Islamist ascensions to power. Wael Haddara, adviser to former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, and Mustapha el Khalifi, Minister of Communications for Morocco and a member of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, considered the very different paths of Islamic parties in Egypt and Morocco and the outlook for the future. They discussed the process of what happened in their respective countries after Islamic parties took control in their governments. Haddara explained what went wrong while the Islamist party held power in Egypt before being ousted and el Khalifi discussed what the Moroccan Islamist Party has done to prevent political upheaval.

3. Summary

Muasher began by stating that there has been a genuine loss of support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt due to poor performance while in office, which precipitated the intervention by the military. Muasher asked if the Muslim Brotherhood did the right thing or not? What will they do in the future?

Haddara stated that he has never been a part of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). He has nevertheless become the point person for all questions regarding the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in office because the principals cannot field these questions for themselves. His described his observations of the last year in a simple sentence, "Every way of not describing," adding that there are many questions, but no one wants to give answers in Egypt. Haddara noted that because there were only two parties, it created a vacuum of power because it did not create a 'winner takes all' government. Although there were fundamental errors in what the FJP did, Haddara argued that Morsi regime was set up for failure, as there was no infrastructure to enact their ideas and they were instead forced to undertake the slow and arduous task of rebuilding state institutions. After the Revolution, Egypt needed a new kind of political skills and spirit and the FJP did not move fast enough. During the first assembly as a new government, nothing was accomplished until the second, when articles were agreed upon. Haddara argued that all government leaders make mistakes and when a country is unstable, one mistake can mean a failed government.

El Khalifi explained that what is happening in Morocco is a totally different situation. Morocco was able to make reforms without the same instability in the government that Egypt experienced. This is largely due to Morocco's political system. In the 1980s and 1990s, the government of Morocco developed an idea that the role of the Monarchy is necessary for keeping the stability of the government. Toward this end, the Monarchy was and continues to be the driver of reform. In July 2011, Morocco adopted a new Constitution and the Monarchy
and the Parliament created a road map of reforms before the election, which is a huge difference from what happened in Egypt. The PJD, which won the 2011 elections and formed a coalition government, also has a longstanding legacy of being involved in elections. It practices and believes in pluralism. El Khalfi stressed this, noting that there is no Islamist party rule, but rather a coalition government.

The role of the Monarchy in Moroccan politics nevertheless pushed the Islamist government to focus on economic and social issues. This was also the priority of the Islamist government because society was looking to see if the political reforms would have an impact on their daily lives. El Khalfi underscored that economic reform and growth improves the efficacy of other social reforms and makes more substantial impact on people’s lives. The focus was thus on job creation, health care reform, education reform, and economic stability.

Three years after the new constitution, Moroccan officials are working on judicial reform, with a focus on achieving judicial independence, eliminating the practice of civilians being tried in military courts, and decriminalization of press codes. Moroccan officials are working on a process for the decentralization of power to regions. According to El Khalfi, the biggest challenge Morocco will have in the future is job creation and good governance. It is not a top down project, or vice versa, it is everything together.

4. Q & A

Q: Why did the Muslim Brotherhood fail? Is there a clear strategy for the Muslim Brotherhood for future voting against the military being in power? Islamists have experience governing in Yemen and Morocco since 1993. The Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen told the one in Egypt not to assume power or work in a coalition, why? And why did the Morsi Administration not learn faster from their mistakes?

A: (Haddara) I am not an economic advisor, so my knowledge is limited to what I have been told. Statements of President Morsi and his economic advisors indicated that economic policies of the past decade lead to an exclusive economic system. It needed to be changed. The hardest questions were how to implement and sequence it. The approach was to attract foreign direct investment, target small and medium companies to create employment, and reform subsidy policy. That was a focus for the Morsi Administration. The first step did not happen because strong administrative support from the government was needed and that was just not there. There needed to be systems set in place because there were no standing systems to utilize. From the beginning of the Presidency, everyone was living in crisis management mode just trying to control demonstrations, which made anything more than that extremely difficult.

Q: Can you clarify about social justice reforms? Will there be better control over the elite? What is holding the elite accountable?

A: (El Khalfi) The main problem is to keep the priority of politics on serving the public. There are issues of subsidies and that less than 10% of the budget goes to poor people in Morocco. Reforms are still difficult and this is why it is our number one goal of 2014. We have raised the amount of scholarships for students, aid to divorced mothers, minimum wage, and retirement funds. The goal of this next year is to really fight corruption and to continue with reforms.

5. Observation

This discussion was held via webcast. The dialogue was very explanatory and both participants spoke from their experiences. The highlight was the comparative discussion between the Islamists in Egypt and in Morocco. Morocco was portrayed as the country that is succeeding with an Islamist lead government and possibly a model for countries such as Egypt to follow. Only time will tell if El Khalfi’s prognosis on his government’s priorities will be successful.

(Back to top)

Regional Solutions to Challenges in Africa

Date: February 28, 2014

1. Title: Regional Solutions to Challenges in Africa

   Hosted by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco

   Participants:
   - H.E. Ambassador Michael Moussa-Adamo: Ambassador of the Gabonese Republic to the US
   - H.E. Ambassador Rachad Bouhlafl: Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the US
   - Dr. J. Peter Pham: Director, Atlantic Council’s Africa Center
   - Joseph K. Grieboski: Moderator: Chairman, Institute on Religion and Public Policy

2. Overview

   In light of King Mohammad VI of Morocco’s African tour to Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry, and Gabon, the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco in Washington, D.C. brought together ambassadors, US government representatives, and scholars to discuss the challenges that the nations of Africa face and the need for regional political and economic partnerships.

3. Summary

   Joseph Grieboski’s set the framework for the conversation by saying that the rest of Africa should prioritize political and economic regional partnerships. King Mohammad VI’s tour through Africa sets a precedent for African leaders to begin to reach out to their neighbors in this way.

   Dr. J. Peter Pham began by stating that today Africa is abundant with natural resources such as phosphates, arable land, and minerals. Along with these resources, Africa’s population growth means that soon one in every four workers on the planet will be African. The continent, he continued, also has an emerging tech market with sophisticated mobile telephone networks. Today, he said, Africa is seeing
Ambassador Moussa-Adamo focused on the challenges that Africa faces as it moves toward building these regional partnerships. He said that while cell phone technology has done a lot to bring Africans closer together, physical infrastructure still keeps Africans apart. The success in Africa, he said, is too theoretical and abstract. The continent needs to see concrete physical changes starting with building up its transportation infrastructure. This lack of infrastructure has made it easier for an African nation to trade with Europe than with its own African neighbors. Along with this change, Ambassador Moussa-Adamo also stated that African nations need to deal with the problem of terrorists and bandits. Confronting the latter would help attract foreign investors. African nations, he said, should look to foreign investors to help build the infrastructure. This continental infrastructure would result in stronger economic regional partnerships.

Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal spoke about how King Mohammad VI sees Africa as a key issue for Morocco. He sees a lot of potential in the continent. To date, the King has cancelled the debts of the poorest nations in Africa and built social housing for the poor in Mali and the Ivory Coast. These are the kind of changes, said the Ambassador, that Africa needs - human and social development from within Africa, not humanitarian aid from external agents.

Ambassador Bisa Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, started the roundtable discussion by noting that one of the abundant resources in Africa that had been underplayed during the opening remarks from the panelists was the abundance of human resources. She said that African leaders need to look to their own people, particularly impoverished farmers, as assets. After all, she continued, 60 percent of the arable land in Africa is not being cultivated. People always ask, how are we going to feed everyone in Africa? The reality is that Africa has the potential to feed the world. Tapping into its human resources and having people from the United States come in to provide assistance would help boost the economies of Africa. Furthermore, the United States can also provide technical assistance on infrastructure. Infrastructure and land cultivation are intertwined. Ultimately, the combination of these two goals would provide food security.

The Ambassador from the Ivory Coast to the United States, Daouda Diabate said that what King Mohammad VI of Morocco is doing in Africa to strengthen and create regional partnerships is from the legacy of his father. The attachment that King Mohammad VI has to Africa and his efforts to develop the region is key for the continent's success.

Ambassador Michael Battle, Senior Advisor for the US-Africa Leaders Summit, stated that Morocco’s leadership in this development “is showing the way within the framework of an approach that doesn’t recognize artificial differences between North and Sub-Saharan Africa.” “The truth,” he continued, “is Morocco is Africa and Africa is Morocco, just as Egypt is Africa.” He then went on to say that the human race has its original genetic links in Africa. Since all the world is connected to Africa in this way, the problems in the continent should not be seen as solely an African problem, but a problem for the world.

Anne Pence, formerly of the US Department of State, agreed with Bisa Williams’ point on the importance of treating people as assets to ensure food security.

Charles Dahan, a Moroccan-American, spoke up about how Morocco is a leader in Africa not just on the business front but on many fronts. Morocco, he said, was the first country to give legality to illegal immigrants, for example. The United States, he said, should look to Morocco and pay more attention to what is going on in West Africa. The biggest challenge, he continued, is transportation infrastructure. The United States needs to pay more attention to this region and start recognizing its economic potential.

Said Temsamani, senior fellow at the Meridian International Center said that Moroccan diplomacy has done a lot to advance the regional partnerships in Africa. Morocco, he said, is a critical partner in the region.

Anne Pence took the floor again to address a few issues she thought the ambassadors were ignoring—leadership and corruption. She said that all of these partnerships and goals could only be advanced if African nations dealt, in a serious way, with corrupt leadership. She also added that many African countries have started centralizing their control and bring large portions of their populations to major cities. This, she said, leaves the rural areas vulnerable to terrorist takeovers.

Bisa Williams stated that the perception that the United States is biased toward Asia in investment of resources is false. She went on to say that this perception is proof that government alone cannot aid in the construction of infrastructure. The US government, she said, is working to encourage the American private sector to invest in Africa.

Michael Battle reiterated Williams’ statement that efforts are being made to bring private US wealth to Africa. He also underscored the importance of using existing African mechanisms to advance African solutions to African problems. He noted that there are three pan-African organizations on the continent and stressed that there needs to be a very intentional effort to unify these three pan-African organizations - the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the African Development Bank. He underscored, “when you look at these three organizations, coupled with what Morocco has the capacity to do on the continent, it is clearly the case that African solutions to African problems can be found on, in, and within the continent.”

Battle also called on Algeria to do more, noting, “Algeria has so much money invested in Europe banks. If just a part of that were utilized in African Development Bank projects, the African Development Bank can fund almost every project in the African program for infrastructure development.” He concluded by praising Morocco and reiterating his point about using existing African mechanisms, stating, “Morocco is setting the pace by showing how African countries which are prosperous can be responsive to African countries, which are in the process of becoming prosperous. So in that regard I applaud you, but I also want to emphasize that unless we look at these three pan-African organizations and unleash their potential, the continental will struggle. So I challenge all of us to use these three pan-African organizations.”
5. Observation

The forum brought together African ambassadors and representatives of the US State Department to discuss the future of inter-African partnerships. Approximately 30 people were in attendance. The discussion focused around the future of African business and economic development. It is important to note however, that this type of development is being based off of the Moroccan model. The visiting ambassadors and US State Department officials alike praised Morocco throughout the discussions for setting a healthy and constructive foundation from which to base this economic and business development and for taking on a leadership role in the continent. Morocco has set the tone for Africa helping Africa and using outside agents as supplementary tools for success, not as the main purveyors of change.
January-February 2014 Events Bulletin

January 24
Restoring Peace in Africa, Revitalizing European Defense, and Renewing NATO: The View from Paris

January 24
International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2013 and Outlook for 2014

January 30
The Geopolitics of North African Energy Trends

January 31
Arab Spring or Arab Autumn? Women's Political Participation in the Uprisings and Beyond: Implications for International Donor Policy

February 5
Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition

February 10
Crisis Response in the Mediterranean and Africa

February 18
Political Islam: Revival, Retreat, or Adaptation

February 28
Regional Solutions to Challenges in Africa

Restoring Peace in Africa, Revitalizing European Defense, and Renewing NATO: The View from Paris

Date: January 24, 2014

1. Title: Restoring Peace in Africa, Revitalizing European Defense, and Renewing NATO: The View from Paris
   Hosted By CSIS Statesmen Forum

   Participants:
   H.E. Jean-Yves le Drian: Minister of Defense, The Republic of France
   Dr. John J. Hamre: President, CEO and Pritzker Chair, CSIS
   Heather A. Conley: Moderator: Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS Europe Program
2. Overview

At this event, the French Minister of Defense, H.E. Jean-Yves Le Drian, discussed the importance of French military intervention in Africa for regional and global stability with particular emphasis on the recent French defense operations in Mali and The Central African Republic (CAR). He also discussed his vision for the future of French military activity in Africa.

3. Summary

Le Drian posited that French military intervention in Africa is of major importance for global security. He argued that the recent examples of interventions in Mali and The Central African Republic (CAR) serve as evidence that without a French military presence in the region, many more people would have died and Mali and CAR would have plunged into deeper chaos. He stated that the defense operation in Mali prevented its government from falling into the hands of terrorists. This prevention maintained regional stability and global security. Meanwhile, in CAR, the French and CAR forces seized over 250 tons of weapons from terrorists and other criminals. This, he noted, is just one example of what the French and African forces can accomplish together when combating terrorist threats in the region.

He stated that in the future, France seeks to continue to have a military presence in Africa to maintain stability. He went on to say that the actions in Mali and in CAR are not sufficient to maintain that stability. The neighboring countries around Mali and CAR are growing concerns, particularly Libya. He stated that Africa stands out as a continent with more failed states than any other region. Therefore, France will adapt itself in Africa by reorganizing its military response capabilities to ensure security. The goal is for military leaders to be able to make quicker decisions when a crisis strikes.

He claimed that France’s commitment to stabilizing Africa is part of its responsibility as a protector of global security and its fight against terrorism. Without France, the Minister argued, Africa would have fallen into complete chaos and become a haven for terrorists and spread its instability around the world.

4. Q & A

Q. (Josh Rogin, Daily Beast) What is your stance on Iran’s decision to continue to enrich Uranium?
A. I agree with our Western allies. We are committed to preventing Iran from continuing to enrich Uranium.

Q. (Stanly Roth, Boeing Co.) How are France’s military expeditionary units being affected by the sluggish European economies?
A. I am not worried about France’s capacity to act in this regard. Furthermore, I am not worried about the capacity to mobilize France’s allies in a pulling effort since these interventions in Africa are for the sake of international security.

Q. (Leo Michel, National Defense University) Do you see opportunities for increased military to military cooperation in the Asia Pacific region?
A. I see France as a Pacific nation as it has territories in the region. Thus, we want to participate in all of the international security initiatives throughout the Pacific.
Q. (Michael Mossettig, PBS Online Newshour) How will the new cuts to the French national defense budget affect the military?
A. I have no particular concern with the recent cuts. They would not significantly affect the military’s capabilities.

Q. (Stanislas Moussa-Kembe, Ambassador of CAR to the US) What is the role of the CAR military in the efforts to rid the country of jihadist mercenaries and disarm the terrorists?
A. The mercenaries must go. And the concern of the collective security in Africa is to avoid pockets of mercenaries in neighboring states. Regarding disarmament, greater efforts must be made and must be lead by the president of CAR. The CAR military must be rebuilt in order for it to play a role in securing the region.

5. Observation

The Minister spoke to a packed room. Among the crowd, there were military officers from Guatemala, The Central African Republic, the United States and other countries. There were also a number of journalists and foreign diplomats, including the ambassador of The Central African Republic to the United States. While no mention was made of Morocco, directly or indirectly, the Minister asserted that France will maintain a military presence in Africa and it sounds like this role will expand as instability continues and spreads across the region. Throughout the talk, the Minister repeatedly mentioned that France has spent a great deal of blood and treasure in Africa for the sake of global stability. This repetition, coupled with hints at an expanding role in Africa, underscored a strong and aggressive message to the world that France has and will continue to fight and serve a custodian for regional and global stability. At one point this message was softened with the acknowledgement that there should be a civilian role in stabilizing the region focused on humanitarian efforts. However, this was mentioned as an afterthought. The talk was vague, but the message is clear: France will, for the foreseeable future, maintain a strong and expanding military presence in Africa and act as a safeguard for global peace and security.

International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2013 and Outlook for 2014

Date: January 24, 2014

1. Title: International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2013 and Outlook for 2014
   Hosted by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies at the National Press Club

Participants:
Michael Swetnam: CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
General (ret.) Alfred Gray: 29th Commandant of the USMC; Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
Ambassador Mohamed M. Tawfik: Ambassador of the Arab republic of Egypt to the US
Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal: Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the US
Ambassador (ret.) Al Maamoun Baba Lamine Keita: Embassy of the Republic of Mali
2. Overview

This event marked the 16th annual review of international terrorism hosted by the Potomac Institute and launched their 5th annual report on terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel. The panelists provided a bleak assessment of terrorism in 2013, given the significant increase of terrorism in the region as noted in the report. The discussion then largely focused on prospects and strategies available to fight terrorism in the years to come. Participants agreed that a deeper understanding of cultural and religious motivators on a case-by-case basis is absolutely necessary for those looking to stem the tide of extremist violence in the region.

3. Summary

Michael Swetnam opened with a description of the report, focusing on the alarming spread of terrorist violence in the Sahel-Sahara and beyond. This “scourge of our society” is increasing in both frequency and lethality, he said, despite the vast increase of international security cooperation, which he claimed was the “silver lining” of the situation. Dr. Yonah Alexander noted that the numbers represented a 605% increase in incidents since he began tracking after 9/11, for a total of around 230 for the year of 2013. The area deserves much more attention, he said.

General Alfred Gray provided recommendations for better fighting terrorism, though he began by saying that “we are making progress, generally.” Terrorism has been a big concern of the US military since Vietnam, which he considered to be an early terror conflict. “What’s really needed is a total global effort,” he said, involving each government, where no one country has a “corner of the market.” This would create an environment conducive to a series of comprehensive strategies, with a dynamic focus oriented towards local, regional, and global initiatives. “Start with what you want the world to look like and work backwards,” he added. General Gray said that the role for military force is limited. Working towards consensus, on the other hand, is essential. Keeping the high moral ground every step of the way is essential to containing the appeal of violent fundamentalism. General Gray stressed that the US must educate everyone on what it is up against and have a disciplined media that keeps higher goals of society in mind regarding the overall narrative. General Gray said that there are many challenges, but believes that they are solvable.

Ambassador Mohamed Tawfik elucidated three tenets to keep in mind in the fight against terrorism. First, terrorism is culturally universal and not endemic to one group or another. Second, incidents of terrorism are a nebulous culmination of a network: propaganda, financing, training, logistics, etc. Thirdly, states cannot deal with the threat alone. He cited the attack that occurred in Egypt that day as an example – a result of an ongoing political process. He stressed that the Egyptian people would not succumb to these efforts, as turnout for the referendum vote was very high despite attacks and intimidation. Ambassador Tawfik added that Egypt could see more terrorism due to questionable pardons issued under former president Muhammad Morsi. He mentioned a “bizarre” statement in which Morsi essentially tied the hands of the Army by valuing the lives of terrorist
kidnappers equally with their victims. Tawfik added that the new government has undertaken many efforts to reverse the trend under Morsi, notably by closing 80 percent of smuggling tunnels in Gaza. He agreed that targeting development and marginalization are a big part of the fight against terrorism, adding that Egypt has a plan to do the same. Egypt is also sending scholars to the Sahel region to combat fundamentalist ideology, among other efforts.

Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal stated that Morocco is well aware of the scope and phenomenon of terrorism, a manifestation of violent political ideology that exploits religion for political purposes. The solution to this, he said, is a structured and methodological framework that features a proactive approach and solidarity development. Morocco continues to promote moderate Islam and build state capacity in countries where terrorism is spreading. A sustained regional and international system of cooperation would help expand Morocco’s efforts. Morocco’s mandate as United Nations Security Council President focused on the elevation of cooperation in the region for that purpose. Morocco has worked to draft a common vision in the fight against terrorism, echoing previous comments. Ambassador Bouhlal cited Morocco’s migration policy reform as a positive example of the proactive approach, working to combat a real threat to peace and stability. Morocco has also demonstrated its commitment to security throughout the Mali crisis, and the training of 500 Malian Imams is again part of the comprehensive approach to stamp out terror there.

Ambassador Al Maamoun Baba Lamine Keita agreed that terrorism in the region has become more lethal and more dispersed geographically, as the successive reports by the Potomac Institute have shown. He predicted that al-Qaeda and similar organizations would again expand in 2014, as the mode of attacks moves from sporadic to serial in many countries. Terrorists, he added, are becoming more entrepreneurial and disparate, gaining experience and networks from fighting in Syria. “The Sahel has become a hideout” for terrorists and transnational organized crime, Ambassador Keita added. Promoting competencies and increasing cooperation among African governments is necessary to solve the problem, he concluded.

Dr. Edward Luttwak wrapped up the individual comments by stating that US foreign policy cannot address the problems until it acquires a more nuanced perception of the factors at play on the ground. The US national security structure is meant to deal with “high-contrast targets,” he said, but ever since the end of the Cold War, it has faced mostly low-contrast targets. This, he added, requires much more situational awareness. Citing State Department reports on Turkey that incorrectly identify religious sects there, Luttwak stated that the inability to correctly analyze religious factors behind conflicts is an enormous problem among US officials. In Egypt, for example, he said that loyalty in many sects is to God and not to the people, so it’s no surprise that public sentiment is deemed irrelevant. In light of this, how can democracy be directly applied to Muslim countries? The US needs to better evaluate groups based on core religious philosophy and the extent to which they are devoted to that philosophy and tolerant of others. Luttwak cited the example of the US having labor attachés in countries where there are no trade unions. Yet, there are no religious attachés from the US. If you are going to engage, he said, you need better situational awareness.

4. Q & A

Q: (Lawrence Freeman, Director, Africa Desk at Executive Intelligence Review magazine)
With the increasingly apparent involvement in terrorist activities on the part of Saudi Arabia, why isn’t the country more subject to scrutiny? And regarding Africa, what we really need is a massive Marshall Plan strategy to eradicate terrorism.
A: (Dr. Edward Luttwak) Saudi Arabia is a self-styled Salafist-like country, though al-Qaeda turned against them at some point. The country doesn’t support terrorism, except maybe indirectly by way of schools they established in places like Pakistan, but not directly as a state. The best thing we can do is stop them from teaching across the world.

(Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal) You are right about economic development as an important goal for Africa. It is a challenge for domestic and international cooperation. It is also part of why Morocco undertakes reforms such as with migration policy, which seeks to promote opportunity for youthful populations.

(Ambassador Mohamed Tawfik) I agree with Morocco’s focus on economic development. There are two types of Islamist organizations: those with extreme views espoused peacefully, and those with extreme or even moderate views which are expressed violently. People have a right to express their views, but we should end links between violent extremists and parallel political organizations.

Concluding Remarks

Prof. Don Wallace Jr. agreed with the other panelists and said that terrorism represented a “sea of troubles” for the entire world. He added that it appears as though 2014 will again bring more acts of terrorism and expansion of violent extremist groups. It is “a growth industry in the Sahel,” he said.

5. Observation

This event was attended by around 40 foreign policy professionals. The panelists had a similar assessment of the outlook for terrorism in the Sahel/Sahara region as well as a common prescription for eradicating violent extremists: a comprehensive, international effort with well-informed stakeholders that addresses economic opportunity and capacity building to be executed locally, regionally, and globally. Although the solution demands a lot of a great number of stakeholders and the short-term outlook is for more violence in the coming year, the panelists seemed confident that the causes of terrorism can be successfully addressed by the global community.

For a complete video of the event, please visit: http://www.potomacinstitute.org/past-events/2616-16th-annual-event-international-cooperation-in-combating-terrorism.

(Back to top)
2. Overview

To discuss the state of energy production in North Africa and its impact on geopolitics, this event brought together North African expert, Arezki Daoud and the VP of Eni, Leonardo Balladi, to examine the issues of insecurity, domestic consumption, and new sources of hydrocarbons in North Africa. They also discussed exploration plans to develop renewable energy sources in the Maghreb.

3. Summary

Malka briefly introduced the topic, noting that North African energy environment is shifting, particularly as a result of instability in the region.

Leonaro Bellodi discussed Eni’s work in the region. Eni is the biggest oil and gas operator in Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. The circumstances surrounding the production of oil and gas in each country gas are unique, though it is globally acknowledged that North Africa is a difficult place to work in because of the political instability of the region. However, those invested in the region must continue to be optimistic. Of course, security of facilities and personnel is a major concern, but Ballodi is confident that their assets are secure.

Ballodi discussed circumstances on the ground in each country and how they affect companies like Eni. If the country becomes either a failed state or the security situation further deteriorates, as it has in previous months with the assassinations of persons in political power, companies such as Eni will have to take action. Egypt is running out of money to pay international companies who are there extracting gas and oil. Egypt is also having issues exporting fossil fuels, as they must fulfill domestic needs first, which in turn causes great concern to companies deeply invested in gas and oil facilities as the domestic economy in Egypt is unstable.

And then there is Algeria, a country that appears more stable than Libya or Egypt for energy companies. Algeria is the 2nd biggest exporter of gas to Europe and although there have been some setbacks last year, terrorism or instability in the country has been less pervasive. However, the upcoming presidential election in April is something Eni is paying close attention to. These issues aren’t a priority for the US because, as Ballodi stated, the United States has the luxury of choosing its energy partners, which means the oil production and the political stability in Libya is not a priority for the US. Italy, however, is much closer and experiences the effects vastly different than those in the United States.

Daoud began his comments by asking, “how are energy trends shaping government policy?” He claimed that the most important factor in government policy affecting energy is crisis management. If a government can demonstrate an ability to manage and control instability, they will be able to grow their energy industries. Daoud stated that there are a lot of constraints on the industry in North Africa, mainly other countries producing oil and gas within a more politically stable environment. Some of the other main constraints include the reality that the US is a tier 1 producer, meaning that it is a direct supplier of oil to original equipment manufacturers who sell the final product, and is thus a competitor, as are Iran and Iraq. Additionally, the Chinese economy is beginning to slow down and therefore investing less into North African oil and gas reserves. Non-producing countries are in a good place right now because oil and gas prices are beginning to fall.

Daoud discussed the industry in Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia more specifically. With Libya’s continued political crisis, its oil revenue came out 20% lower than projected and its economy may even get worse as instability continues. Daoud nevertheless predicts a 50%
increase in oil and gas production in Libya in the next 10 years. As for Tunisia, it is trying to be pro-active and reduce the impact of oil and gas imports on the economy. For countries that are non-producers, like Morocco for example, it is perfect time to distance themselves from oil subsidies. This heightens popular discontent, which the Moroccan government is partly countering by increasing the minimum wage. Morocco has been looking for a balanced source of energy, including nuclear, solar, hydroelectric, natural gas, wind, solar, and off shore drilling. Not relying on a single source puts them in a comfortable position. Daoud concluded by noting that the evolution of the oil market is important as social balance and domestic politics tend to outweigh regular economic logic.

4. Q & A

Q: (Malka) The oil and gas companies in the Maghreb region need international companies’ capital for investment and growth, however investing in this region is risky, what are some of their incentives?
A: (Ballodi) US oil companies are going home because they have options, notably on US soil. There are still a lot of companies investing in the North African region because of their proximity to the region. European countries cannot count on North American oil as it is far too expensive. They must instead look to the Mediterranean countries, North Africa, and Russia.
(Daoud) Political security is a reality. The cost of security has increased immensely in the months following the Arab Spring. Algeria is investing in terrorism security, which may increase the price of oil and gas production, adding another element. Companies such as BP continue to be skeptical of investing in Algeria and are looking for safer, cheaper places to land.

Q: (Frank Verrastro, CSIS) If the Algerian government continues to manage conflict and remain stable resulting in oil and gas companies to remain active in the country, how do you expand production with fewer investors?
A: (Bellodi) With regards to Algeria, In Amenas was a terrible accident, but it is not a constant concern. Algeria is keen to attract international investment. There are many international gas and oil companies that want to get into Algeria. If they can find a way to pay international companies they will stay in a good place. As for Libya, there are no major problems.
(Daoud) Algeria is the wild card. Their president is old, and their policies swing back and forth between being liberal and conservative. However, they usually end somewhere in the middle of that spectrum.

Q: (Raton, Congressional Research Service) What milestones will you look for, as your company decides to continue investing or leave the North African region entirely?
A: (Bellodi) We are drafting our business plan for the next four years and that is difficult because we are unsure of the next few months. Security is our biggest risk in the region. If the situation gets worse in each country, we’ll have to pull our company out. If we look at the biggest issue, it is the price of oil and gas. They have what we need for a cheap price. If you would have asked me three years ago about the Libya situation, I would have said it was completely fine, but now we are in a different era.

5. Observation

Around 50 people attended this round table; nearly all attendees were foreign policy professionals with students or interns. The tone of the roundtable was explanatory and cordial. Bellodi seemed to have somewhat of an optimistic bias towards the region because of the business he has there with Eni. The event was light on specific information relating to
Morocco, but what was stated about the country was positive and optimistic, as the country was mentioned as the most stable of the region and a country where many are looking for investment opportunities.

Arab Spring or Arab Autumn? Women’s Political Participation in the Uprisings and Beyond: Implications for International Donor Policy

Date: January 31, 2014

1. Title: Arab Spring or Arab Autumn? Women’s Political Participation in the Uprisings and Beyond: Implications for International Donor Policy
   Hosted by The Wilson Center and CARE
   Participants:
   Stephanie Foster: Senior Policy Advisor, State Department’s Office of Global Women’s Issues
   Maryam Jamshidi: Founder, Muftah.org
   Sherine Ibrahim: Senior Regional Management in the Middle East and Asia, CARE
   Haleh Esfandiari: Moderator: Director of the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars

2. Overview:

As part of their efforts to support and expand women’s political participation in the Middle East, CARE and the Woodrow Wilson Center brought together three speakers who serve as leaders in the fight for women’s rights around the world. They spoke on the state of women’s rights organizations focused on the Middle East at the informal, formal, grassroots, and institutional levels. They identified the issues and the problems that these organizations face and hypothesized on what can be done to fix these issues.

3. Summary:

Sherine Ibrahim provided an overview of the state of women’s rights movements in the Middle East and what can be done to improve them. She started out by declaring that people around the world need to regain the sense of hope and urgency for the fate of women and their place in the political decision making process that was lost soon after the Arab Spring ended. She recalled a quote from a woman that had taken part in a few protests associated with the Arab Spring which she thought embodied this spirit of hope: “To join the protests on Friday mornings and pray Al Juma’a with other women, I had to take shortcut routes through the rugged mountains every Thursday night. After what I had done, no force on earth dares neglect me.” Ibrahim referenced a 2012 study that rated women’s political representation in the Middle East and North Africa as the lowest in the world in order to illustrate that the euphoria of the revolutions has been lost. This euphoria, she went on, has been lost at a critical time—the immediate aftermath of the revolutions. At a time when real political decisions are set to determine the fate of the region, the media’s and the international community’s focus has shifted from human rights and social and gender justice to counterterrorism.

In order to refocus the spotlight on social issues, particularly when it comes to the roles of women in politics, Ibrahim suggested that the issue of fragmentation within the women’s
rights movement needs to be solved. She said that within the movement there are divides on a geographical, gender, ideological, and institutional level that need to be addressed. Once those are solved, the movement will be able to put forth a clear articulation of its goals and start making real progress. One of the biggest examples of these divides, she said, was the divide between more religiously conservative Muslim women seeking equal footing with men in the political realm and secular Western women. Ibrahim said that Muslim women often see their secular Western counterparts as “intolerant liberals.” The secular Western segment of the movement, she said, often don’t realize that many Muslim women from Arab countries interpret their roles in government and society through Islam. She said something needs to be done about this divide so that these women can meet on unified ground.

Another challenge that the movement needs to overcome, stated Ibrahim, was its over-reliance on technology. She acknowledged that technology, particularly social media, plays a big role in the movement. Still, it is important to realize that not all of the key populations like the rural impoverished women who need to be involved in the movement, have access to this technology. Doing work on the ground to spread the message, moving away from social media, she said, would lend itself to creating true and more representative collective identity among the men and women in the movement. The leaders in the movement need to find alternative ways of engaging those who are not in the conversation due to the over-reliance on technology. She said that the case she has put forth shows that fragmentation is the most detrimental part of the movement.

Maryam Jamshidi started by saying that she was going to push back some on Ibrahim’s comments. She then asked, “Was the Arab Spring a revolution?” She went through what she thought were the standards for a revolution. She said that revolutions are usually regarded as a positive thing with clear goals in mind and that they usually happen quickly. She said that the Arab Spring was neither of these. However, she qualified the Arab Spring as a series of slow and unclear revolutions which are still ongoing in some regards. She said that the revolutions encouraged people toward civil entrepreneurship. In other words, more and more people in the MENA region since the revolution have taken to working for the public good. She said that after the Arab Spring, this type of activity continued which left the public arena open for people to meet and collaborate.

Unlike Ibrahim, Jamshidi thinks that collaboration within the movement during and after the Arab Spring has been thriving and that it’s more dynamic than ever across the sectors. This type of dynamic interaction, she claimed, created an open public sector and has since maintained it. Furthermore, the Arab Spring gave young women involved in the struggle in the region and around the world on-the-job leadership training for the future. She said that the role of women in the Arab Spring is history repeating itself in the region. Much like the Arab Spring, women in the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1900s in the Middle East played a large role. And as soon as the violence of the revolutions was over and the decision making process was about to begin, the women were turned away. Women, she said, have always been used in revolutions as their presence is charged and does a lot to further these uprisings. Their presence is charged as they are often targets of physical violence. Now that the violence of the revolutions has diminished, she continued, it is important to keep the public arena as open as possible. She said that if the movement were to be reorganized and regulated on an institutional level, the flexibility that is necessary to maintain the public arena would disappear.

Foster began by reiterating a few of the ideas brought up by the other speakers. She agreed that the spotlight needs to shift back to social issues and that she has seen that the State Department is just now beginning to make that shift. This work includes trying to
institutionalize women’s issues by working to put women in decision-making positions in every level of politics and government. Furthermore, she said that the more established segments of the women’s movement need to provide public spaces to address social issues to ensure that networks of women within the movement can learn from each other.

After Foster’s remarks, Esfandiari told the audience that when she was imprisoned in Iran for social activism, she noticed that there were so many women who were in her same situation for fighting for women’s rights. This, to her surprise, showed her just how active that women’s movement had always been. Women, she said, were put into the movement all around the Middle East and North Africa because of the existing family laws. They need to be revised, she said.

Jamshidi added that revising these laws doesn’t mean getting rid of religion. She said that people have to understand that there are many women in the region who want equal rights, but also interpret their place in society through Islam.

Foster then ended by noting that Moroccan and Jordanian governments are the only two countries in the region who are part of the Equal Futures pact, an agreement to revise family laws to work toward creating equality between men and women in their countries. She hopes that in the near future, more countries in the region will follow Morocco and Jordan’s examples and join the pact.

4. Q & A

Q. (Timur Mahmud, International Law and Policy Group) What are your reactions to my claim that women play a very large role in the economic sector? Their contribution is stronger than people think.
A. (Ibrahim) I don’t know where you got your information from, but the participation levels of women are very low. Women’s participation levels in the informal sectors of the economies are astonishingly high. Therefore, it is important that the world recognizes women’s contribution in the informal economies and that they be integrated into the formal sectors.
(Jamshidi) While women’s participation in politics and the formal economies are low, they are highly educated in the region. Still, they are knowledgeable, but don’t have any opportunities to use what they have learned.

Q. (Habib Khan, USAID) What mechanisms exist to encourage women to want to participate in politics?
A. (Jamshidi) Women themselves are doing the outreach. They are learning on the job. This process has not yet been institutionalized.

Q. (Virginia Austin Schubert, Coaching Network) To what degree do female political leaders around the world inspire repressed women in the Middle East?
A. (Jamshidi) They are indeed inspirational and one should not forget the inspirational power that grassroots leaders have too.
(Ibrahim) The power for women leaders to inspire will be even greater once the media culture changes from highlighting what women leaders wear and how they look to what they actually do and what their policies are.

5. Observation

There were around fifty people in attendance. This discussion underscores the two prisms from which the American government and the media view the Middle East and North Africa region—those of social issues and counterterrorism. Although the forum focused on bridging
the divides within the women’s rights movement, there was also a sense that once the movement makes a comeback, the next divide to fix is the one between the social and counterterrorism agendas. Morocco was not a focal point of the discussion, but was mentioned, along with Jordan, as a model for dealing with this debate.

(Back to top)

Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition

Date: February 5, 2014

1. Title: Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition
   Hosted by the Brookings Institution

   Participants:
   - **David Goldwyn**: President of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC
   - **Jan Kalicki**: Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
   - **Philip van Niekerk**: President and Managing Partner, Calabar Africa
   - **Charles McPherson**: Global Faculty, University of Dundee, Scotland
   - **Charles Ebinger**: Moderator: Senior Fellow and Director, Energy Security Initiative

2. Overview


3. Summary

   Ebinger gave a brief on the original book, *Energy and Security*, and stated that since the book was launched there have been drastic changes in the energy landscape due to new tensions in the Middle East and the global expansion of oil and gas production. The editors have updated this book since this geopolitical shift has taken place in Africa to provide insight into the shale gas and oil revolution, newly found energy resources in deep-water regions and the Arctic, the safety concerns that go along with this sector, energy poverty, and modernizing infrastructure, and climate concerns. The forum was treated as a conversation and each speaker did not have an allotted time to speak, the moderator initiated with questions which then the other speakers would respond depending on their expertise.

   Kalicki stated that energy and poverty are strongly correlated. There are 1.4 billion people without access to electricity, due principally to corruption and wasted energy. United States foreign policy plays a big role, according to Kalicki. The United States needs to create a more coherent policy on managing foreign energy sources. One of the biggest shifts in the last nine years has been that the biggest consumers of oil and gas, like the United States, have become the biggest producers, which helps level the playing field. This will result in opening up the oil and gas markets which will decrease monopoly prices. The United States no longer depends on foreign reserves for oil and gas which eliminates the demand from
countries that are less politically and socially stable, which creates a more stable market for US citizens.

Ebinger discussed the idea that limited access of electricity to 2 billion people causes instability and hinders development. The next big thing to watch for is Asia selecting its type of fuel and where to begin exploration and importation. The United States has become less of a factor in the oil and gas sector as it is producing from domestic reserves, therefore international attention has been placed more on Asia, another large consumer.

McPherson stated that transparency in a government creates stability. The political elite of developing countries do not feel accountable to anyone, especially not to the general population. Therefore, the political elite dictate from whom sources of energy are secured and to whom it is sold. Transparency is the cornerstone to a good government that is trusted by the general population. It would also improve access to financial records and distribution of wealth among the general population. Energy investors working in countries struggling with internal political stability and corruption need to require better policy frameworks, including, but not limited to better fiscal regimes, re-organizing roles, revenue management, expenditure policies, and social and environmental guidelines. NGOs are lobbying to require proof of financial records for foreign governments in which the US works with, like the “publish what you pay” act, which is a positive trend.

McPherson noted the challenges in achieving this kind of accountability. As many host countries manipulate follow-up data given to US investors and policymakers, how can we succeed in receiving accurate follow-up records from them? He argued that the US needs grassroots pressure and high standards for their companies working abroad, especially in the energy business.

Van Niekerk added that Africa produces only 9% of the world’s oil and gas; however, because the markets inside the continent are a lot smaller than others, it is a large part of their economies. Countries that lie inside the Rift Valley are oil producers, as well as countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Not only are large companies such as BP, Shell, Exxon, and Chevron investing in these regions, but also smaller indigenous companies as well. The US is no longer buying oil and gas from these parts of the world, but they are still investing in the infrastructure. The role of the US in oil and gas production in Africa and the Middle East has changed drastically after producing shale gas in North Dakota, which replaced demand from Nigeria. Countries such as China, which receive oil and gas from Sudan or Angola, continue to stay out of the political and social crisis in these countries, and have no desire to become involved.

Van Niekerk stated that although the international community is aware of political and economic corruption in Africa, the window of fighting corruption has narrowed in the last 10 years. FCPA, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, has had a major impact on this issue, as it sets up standards on the ground level where corruption in a country begins. There are cases, for example Angola, where international businesses must form a partnership with indigenous corporations, which are tied to the government ruling class, therefore continuing the growth of corruption. The oil and gas revenue should be for all of its citizens, not just the elite. The growth of democracy will aid in spreading the wealth to the general population.

McPherson discussed the importance of having basic electricity and access to running water. An example he used was that in Pakistan, having a single water pump creates a chain of affects on its general population: women and children not having to haul water back and forth to their homes throughout the day, which frees them to receive basic education and
improves their status of life. Having access to a radio, a television, or internet gives people access to the outside world allowing them to access news and knowledge they may have never been exposed to. IEA estimates a 90 percent growth in energy demand in 2035. Having access to basic energy and water needs can change a nation.

4. Q & A

Q: (Lisa Friedman, Climate Wire) What do you think of the United Nations call to end energy poverty by 2030? Is it possible to bring energy to 1.3 billion people without raising emissions?
A: (McPherson) India has made great progress with off grid energy resources, however we need a greater energy production. We need NGOs to invest their time and energy and government investing in order to accomplish this task.
(Ebinger) Gas is cheap for the US and coal rivals gas prices, especially overseas. Coal mining and production is the biggest generator of employment. We cannot stop producing coal as this would affect the stability of developing countries.

Q: (Reba Coruth, Georgetown University) There needs to be achievable goals for basic infrastructure growth in certain places in Africa. Africa must also engage in industrial countries such as the US, Japan, and Germany to invest in their growing energy industry.
A: (Kalicki) The private sector holds the power to meet or fall short of infrastructure goals. There must be microfinance and entrepreneurship. No single resource or institution can accomplish these tasks alone. It must be a top down effort. There must be goals set and guidelines to achieving them.
(McPherson) There must be something done at the top level of governance and there must be domestic-political incentives. The political motivations need to be sustainable. There should be a structure of external pressure from international institutions and internal will from governments and the general public.

Q: (Rose, Hope for Tomorrow) Rural areas of Africa are where the majority of Africans live. You cannot leave this problem to the Africans alone. Rural Africans needs energy in their villages, we cannot function without it. There are clinics, schools, and small businesses that have the need for energy.
A: (van Niekerk) Africa is a great place to develop electrification in rural areas. Most of Africa does live in the villages. Pre-paid electric meters are being tested in urban areas and might work in rural as well. This is one way to begin the process of providing power to rural areas.

5. Observation

About 100 people attended this discussion on energy and security, around a third of which were students and the remaining were foreign policy professionals. The tone of the discussion was very exploratory. The event was extremely light on specific information relating to Morocco, but it did describe the change in relationship between post-colonial countries and more powerful nations. Finding solutions to the security and energy crisis in Africa will definitely assist Morocco’s own development and economic progress.

(Back to top)
1. **Crisis Response in the Mediterranean and Africa**
   Hosted by the Atlantic Council

Participants:

**Col. Scott Benedict:** Commander, Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response, US Marine Corps

**Steven Grundman:** Moderator: George Lund Fellow, Emerging Defense Challenges, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council

2. **Overview**

Col. Scott Benedict addressed the recent strategic changes that the US Marine Corps is making in its approach to crisis response in Africa and the Mediterranean as a result of ongoing instability in the broader region. He emphasized the return to the small-war types of operations that went away during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing non-operational relationships with other militaries like those of Spain and France.

3. **Summary**

Col. Benedict started off with a brief lesson on the basic functions of the unit he was assigned to command, the Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response (SP-MAGTAF) and how creation of this special-purpose unit and the types of tactics it employs is indicative of a grander strategic shift. He said that the purpose of the unit is to defuse dangerous and volatile situations before they reach critical boiling points. Backing up Marine embassy security during a siege is one example of these missions. One of the most significant changes is the use of the V-22 Osprey in Africa. This aircraft is the combination of a fighter jet and a helicopter. The V-22 can travel at the speeds that operations in the region demand and can go into smaller spaces because of its vertical landing and takeoff capabilities. This gives his unit much greater reach into the interior of Africa.

These tactics were put into live operational use on January 3, 2014 in South Sudan when the Marines, backed up by the Army, evacuated American personnel from the embassy in South Sudan. It was during this mission that the V-22 was introduced for the first time in South Sudan. These types of missions, said Col. Benedict, have changed the training of these Marines. The US Marines have teamed up with the French Foreign Legion and Spanish Marines and the Spanish Army for evacuation and crisis response training. Both of these forces, said Col. Benedict, are compatible with the Marine Corps style of training and its capabilities. Furthermore, he said, it provides the Marines with a chance to exchange ideas and start friendships with their international counterparts. Although, he said, these relationships with foreign forces are, for the moment, non-operational.

Col. Benedict then went on to say that all of these changes in tactics, strategy, training, and missions are due to the "new normal" paradigm. In this model, the world has macro-stability which is in direct contrast to the international climate during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In those wars, under the old paradigm, terrorism threatened the stability of the whole world. Now that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been scaled down, there are no major wars to manage. The "new normal" will feature small wars and small crisis situations that require fast responses and the capabilities and training to defuse situations. He underscored that this "new normal" is actually a return to the way things were before the outbreak of the War on Terror. The US Marine Corps has traditionally performed small-ops - it was its original function.
4. Q & A

Q. (Steven Grundman) Was the moment of rupture that led to the creation to the SP-MAGTAF, Benghazi?
A. Benghazi is just one of many examples of the “new normal” which called for the creation of the SP-MAGTAF.

Q. (Joe Tabet, Alhurra) Does SP-MAGTAF inform the local authorities of a given area of their missions? Do the Marines and the local authorities coordinate with one another?
A. We do inform and work with the local authorities depending on the mission.

Q. (Tod Lindberg, Hoover Institution) Is SP-MAGTAF equipped and trained to handle mass atrocities like genocide?
A. Handling mass atrocities does not fall under the purview of the SP-MAGTAF.

Q. (Julia Marvin, US Global Leadership Coalition) What is cooperation like between the Marine Corps and USAID and the State Department.
A. There are working relationship between the Marine Corps and USAID and cooperation between the Marine Corps and the State Department is great. The Marines allow for American diplomats around the world to take risks and know that they’re all protected.

Q. (Eric Schmitt, New York Times) How does the Marine Corps assess the threat level on the ground in this “new norm?”
A. Just as any other unit in the Marine Corps, the SP-MAGTAF is equipped and trained to defend itself from threats on the ground.

Q. (Paul Shinkman, US News and World Report) What has Marine Corps learned from Benghazi?
A. Events like the one in Benghazi are part of the ”new norm.”

Q. (Steven Grundman) What is the reception of the Marines like in Africa?
A. One should not make the mistake of talking about Africa as if it is one place and that everyone’s interests are the same. The SP-MAGTAF has received a positive reception from the local populations that they have interacted with.

5. Observation

Col. Benedict spoke to a room of approximately 40 military officers, university students, journalists and representatives from a diverse cross-section of foreign embassies from Jordan to Serbia to Denmark. Most of the talk was focused on the Marine Corps’ adaptation to the “new norm” in Africa and the revival of the Marine Corps strategy and tactics from before the War on Terrorism. However, the audience and the moderator seemed interested in knowing what the Colonel’s thoughts were on Benghazi. In each of those instances, the Colonel deliberately evaded addressing the issue directly. Still, Col Benedict said that Benghazi is one of many recent examples that falls under the category of the “new norm.” The politicization and media attention explains why the incident repeatedly came up during the talk. The message here was to say that these changes in tactics and strategy came about because of the change in the global paradigm and not because of the ever-changing political fads in Washington.
Political Islam: Revival, Retreat, or Adaptation

Date: February 18, 2014

1. Title: Political Islam: Revival, Retreat, or Adaptation
   Hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

   Participants:
   - Wael Haddara: Advisor to former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi
   - Mustapha el Khalfi: Minister of Communications, Kingdom of Morocco
   - Marwan Muasher: Moderator: Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

2. Overview

The panel addressed the status and future of political Islam with two Islamists from the region, who discussed the different trajectories of their respective governments as a result of Islamist ascensions to power. Wael Haddara, adviser to former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, and Mustapha el Khalfi, Minister of Communications for Morocco and a member of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, considered the very different paths of Islamic parties in Egypt and Morocco and the outlook for the future. They discussed the process of what happened in their respective countries after Islamic parties took control in their governments. Haddara explained what went wrong while the Islamist party held power in Egypt before being ousted and el Khalfi discussed what the Moroccan Islamist Party has done to prevent political upheaval.

3. Summary

Muasher began by stating that there has been a genuine loss of support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt due to poor performance while in office, which precipitated the intervention by the military. Muasher asked if the Muslim Brotherhood did the right thing or not? What will they do in the future?

Haddara stated that he has never been a part of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). He has nevertheless become the point person for all questions regarding the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in office because the principals cannot field these questions for themselves. His described his observations of the last year in a simple sentence, “Every way of not describing, is a way of describing,” adding that there are many questions, but no one wants to give answers in Egypt. Haddara noted that because there were only two parties, it created a vacuum of power because it did not create a ‘winner takes all’ government. Although there were fundamental errors in what the FJP did, Haddara argued that Morsi regime was set up for failure, as there was no infrastructure to enact their ideas and they were instead forced to undertake the slow and arduous task of rebuilding state institutions. After the Revolution, Egypt needed a new kind of political skills and spirit and the FJP did not move fast enough. During the first assembly as a new government, nothing was accomplished until the second, when articles were agreed upon. Haddara argued that all government leaders make mistakes and when a country is stable, it is rarely felt by the citizens, but when a country is unstable, one mistake can mean a failed government.
El Khalfi explained that what is happening in Morocco is a totally different situation. Morocco was able to make reforms without the same instability in the government that Egypt experienced. This is largely due to Morocco’s political system. In the 1980s and 1990s, the government of Morocco developed an idea that the role of the Monarchy is necessary for keeping the stability of the government. Toward this end, the Monarchy was and continues to be the driver of reform. In July 2011, Morocco adopted a new Constitution and the Monarchy and the Parliament created a road map of reforms before the election, which is a huge difference from what happened in Egypt. The PJD, which won the 2011 elections and formed a coalition government, also has a longstanding legacy of being involved in elections. It practices and believes in pluralism. El Khalfi stressed this, noting that there is no Islamist party rule, but rather a coalition government.

The role of the Monarchy in Moroccan politics nevertheless pushed the Islamist government to focus on economic and social issues. This was also the priority of the Islamist government because society was looking to see if the political reforms would have an impact on their daily lives. El Khalfi underscored that economic reform and growth improves the efficacy of other social reforms and makes more substantial impact on people’s lives. The focus was thus on job creation, health care reform, education reform, and economic stability.

Three years after the new constitution, Moroccan officials are working on judicial reform, with a focus on achieving judicial independence, eliminating the practice of civilians being tried in military courts, and decriminalization of press codes. Moroccan officials are working on a process for the decentralization of power to regions. According to El Khalfi, the biggest challenge Morocco will have in the future is job creation and good governance. It is not a top down project, or vice versa, it is everything together.

4. Q & A

**Q:** Why did the Muslim Brotherhood fail? Is there a clear strategy for the Muslim Brotherhood for future voting against the military being in power? Islamists have experience governing in Yemen and Morocco since 1993. The Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen told the one in Egypt to not assume power or work in a coalition, why? And why did the Morsi Administration not learn faster from their mistakes?

**A:** (Haddara) I am not an economic advisor, so my knowledge is limited to what I have been told. Statements of President Morsi and his economic advisors indicated that economic policies of the past decade lead to an exclusive economic system. It needed to be changed. The hardest questions were how to implement and sequence it. The approach was to attract foreign direct investment, target small and medium companies to create employment, and reform subsidy policy. That was a focus for the Morsi Administration. The first step did not happen because strong administrative support from the government was needed and that was just not there. There needed to be systems set in place because there were no standing systems to utilize. From the beginning of the Presidency, everyone was living in crisis management mode just trying to control demonstrations, which made anything more than that extremely difficult.

**Q:** Can you clarify about social justice reforms? Will there be better control over the elite? What is holding the elite accountable?

**A:** (El Khalfi) The main problem is to keep the priority of politics on serving the public. There are issues of subsidies and that less than 10% of the budget goes to poor people in Morocco. Reforms are still difficult and this is why it is our number one goal of 2014. We have raised the amount of scholarships for students, aid to divorced mothers, minimum
wage, and retirement funds. The goal of this next year is to really fight corruption and to continue with reforms.

5. Observation

This discussion was held via webcast. The dialogue was very explanatory and both participants spoke from their experiences. The highlight was the comparative discussion between the Islamists in Egypt and in Morocco. Morocco was portrayed as the country that is succeeding with an Islamist lead government and possibly a model for countries such as Egypt to follow. Only time will tell if El Khalfi’s prognosis on his government’s priorities will be successful.
tour through Africa, after all, is made up in large part by Moroccan business representatives. Dr. Pham said that Morocco’s banks were among the largest in Africa. All of this success in Morocco, coupled with the abundant resources throughout Africa, said Dr. Pham, should be used to advance the regional partnerships throughout Africa.

Ambassador Moussa-Adamo focused on the challenges that Africa faces as it moves toward building these regional partnerships. He said that while cell phone technology has done a lot to bring Africans closer together, physical infrastructure still keeps Africans apart. The success in Africa, he said, is too theoretical and abstract. The continent needs to see concrete physical changes starting with building up its transportation infrastructure. This lack of infrastructure has made it easier for an African nation to trade with Europe than with its own African neighbors. Along with this change, Ambassador Moussa-Adamo also stated that African nations need to deal with the problem of terrorists and bandits. Confronting the latter would help attract foreign investors. African nations, he said, should look to foreign investors to help build the infrastructure. This continental infrastructure would result in stronger economic regional partnerships.

Ambassador Rachad Bouhlal spoke about how King Mohammad VI sees Africa as a key issue for Morocco. He sees a lot of potential in the continent. To date, the King has cancelled the debts of the poorest nations in Africa and built social housing for the poor in Mali and the Ivory Coast. These are the kind of changes, said the Ambassador, that Africa needs - human and social development from within Africa, not humanitarian aid from external agents.

Ambassador Bisa Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, started the roundtable discussion by noting that one of the abundant resources in Africa that had been underplayed during the opening remarks from the panelists was the abundance of human resources. She said that African leaders need to look to their own people, particularly impoverished farmers, as assets. After all, she continued, 60 percent of the arable land in Africa is not being cultivated. People always ask, how are we going to feed everyone in Africa? The reality is that Africa has the potential to feed the world. Tapping into its human resources and having people from the United States come in to provide assistance would help boost the economies of Africa. Furthermore, the United States can also provide technical assistance on infrastructure. Infrastructure and land cultivation are intertwined. Ultimately, the combination of these two goals would provide food security.

The Ambassador from the Ivory Coast to the United States, Daouda Diabate said that what King Mohammad VI of Morocco is doing in Africa to strengthen and create regional partnerships is from the legacy of his father. The attachment that King Mohammad VI has to Africa and his efforts to develop the region is key for the continent’s success.

Ambassador Michael Battle, Senior Advisor for the US-Africa Leaders Summit, stated that Morocco’s leadership in this development “is showing the way within the framework of an approach that doesn’t recognize artificial differences between North and Sub-Saharan Africa.” “The truth,” he continued, “is Morocco is Africa and Africa is Morocco, just as Egypt is Africa.” He then went on to say that the human race has its original genetic links in Africa. Since all the world is connected to Africa in this way, the problems in the continent should not be seen as solely an African problem, but a problem for the world.

Anne Pence, formerly of the US Department of State, agreed with Bisa Williams’ point on the importance of treating people as assets to ensure food security.
Charles Dahan, a Moroccan-American, spoke up about how Morocco is a leader in Africa not just on the business front but on many fronts. Morocco, he said, was the first country to give legality to illegal immigrants, for example. The United States, he said, should look to Morocco and pay more attention to what is going on in West Africa. The biggest challenge, he continued, is transportation infrastructure. The United States needs to pay more attention to this region and start recognizing its economic potential.

Said Temsamani, senior fellow at the Meridian International Center said that Moroccan diplomacy has done a lot to advance the regional partnerships in Africa. Morocco, he said, is a critical partner in the region.

Anne Pence took the floor again to address a few issues she thought the ambassadors were ignoring—leadership and corruption. She said that all of these partnerships and goals could only be advanced if African nations dealt, in a serious way, with corrupt leadership. She also added that many African countries have started centralizing their control and bring large portions of their populations to major cities. This, she said, leaves the rural areas vulnerable to terrorist takeovers.

Bisa Williams stated that the perception that the United States is biased toward Asia in investment of resources is false. She went on to say that this perception is proof that government alone cannot aid in the construction of infrastructure. The US government, she said, is working to encourage the American private sector to invest in Africa.

Michael Battle reiterated Williams’ statement that efforts are being made to bring private US wealth to Africa. He also underscored the importance of using existing African mechanisms to advance African solutions to African problems. He noted that there are three pan-African organizations on the continent and stressed that there needs to be a very intentional effort to unify these three pan-African organizations - the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the African Development Bank. He underscored, “when you look at these three organizations, coupled with what Morocco has the capacity to do on the continent, it is clearly the case that African solutions to African problems can be found on, in, and within the continent.”

Battle also called on Algeria to do more, noting, “Algeria has so much money invested in European banks. If just a part of that were utilized in African Development Bank projects, the African Development Bank can fund almost every project in the African program for infrastructure development.” He concluded by praising Morocco and reiterating his point about using existing African mechanisms, stating, “Morocco is setting the pace by showing how African countries which are prosperous can be responsive to African countries, which are in the process of becoming prosperous. So in that regard I applaud you, but I also want to emphasize that unless we look at these three pan-African organizations and unleash their potential, the continental will struggle. So I challenge all of us to use these three pan-African organizations.”

5. Observation

The forum brought together African ambassadors and representatives of the US State Department to discuss the future of inter-African partnerships. Approximately 30 people were in attendance. The discussion focused around the future of African business and economic development. It is important to note however, that this type of development is being based off of the Moroccan model. The visiting ambassadors and US State Department officials alike praised Morocco throughout the discussions for setting a healthy and constructive foundation from which to base this economic and business development and for
taking on a leadership role in the continent. Morocco has set the tone for Africa helping Africa and using outside agents as supplementary tools for success, not as the main purveyors of change.
FYI, email to policy makers today with news of the strategic dialogue.
Having trouble viewing this email? Click here
to Visit Rabat This Week

Sec. of State John Kerry and Moroccan Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar.

Kerry to co-chair 2nd meeting of Strategic Dialogue with Moroccan Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar, discuss range of bilateral and regional issues with senior Moroccon officials

March 31, 2014

WASHINGTON, DC (AFP, State Dept, MOTM) -- John Kerry will visit Morocco for the first time as Secretary of State later this week, on the final stop of an April 1-5 tour to Brussels, Algiers, and Rabat, the State Department announced last week. While in Rabat, Secretary Kerry will co-chair the second meeting of the Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue with Moroccan Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar, and also will meet with senior Moroccan officials to discuss a range of bilateral and regional issues.

The Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue -- the first for the US with a Maghreb nation -- underscores America's "close
cooperation with Morocco and will focus on political affairs, economic and security cooperation, and educational and cultural issues," said the State Department.

Kerry's visit to Rabat comes as Morocco continues to move forward with its agenda of leadership for peaceful reform and progress in the region, including revisions to its military justice system to exclude civilians from military trial, providing greater protections for the rights of migrants, strengthening civil society and the ability to form associations, and a new model for development and local empowerment in Morocco's Saharan provinces.

Earlier this month, King Mohammed VI also completed his four-nation Africa trip, during which more than 80 agreements were signed to advance economic development, food security, trade, and religious cooperation to limit the spread of Islamic extremism in the region. In January, the King chaired the al-Quds Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to bolster the recent US initiative to rebuild momentum in the Middle East peace process.

The Morocco-US Strategic Dialogue was first launched on September 13, 2012 in Washington, DC, where then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that "the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model" in a region where America needs a strong, reliable, and influential ally. "King Mohammed [VI] deserves great credit," said
Clinton, for Morocco's strong record of reforms and commitment to change, highlighted by the 2011 Constitution.


"But we're not satisfied with simply having a friendship that is longstanding," Clinton said. "We want one that is dynamic, growing, looking toward the future," she said, calling the Dialogue an important tool to further strengthen relations and implement the shared Morocco-US vision for Africa and the Middle East.

Building on achievements over the past decade -- including the Morocco-US Free Trade Agreement, Millennium Challenge Compact, and Morocco's designation as a major non-NATO ally -- the Strategic Dialogue established a high-level forum to continue advancing common interests on political, economic, security, and educational and cultural affairs, which Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Mezouar are expected to address in Rabat.

Last November, when King Mohammed VI met with President Obama at the
White House, the President lauded the King's leadership in "deepening democracy and promoting economic progress and human development during the past decade." The two leaders reaffirmed the strength of the US-Morocco strategic alliance, which dates back to 1777 when Morocco was the first nation to recognize the US.

The King and President Obama stressed the importance of mapping out "a new and ambitious plan for the strategic partnership" and pledged to advance their shared priorities for a secure, stable, and prosperous Maghreb, Africa, and Middle East, working to promote human and economic development, counter the spread of terrorism and extremism, and support democratic reforms and human rights. They called attention to the upcoming Strategic Dialogue meeting in Rabat, pledging "to continue on a path of increased cooperation that will strengthen the US-Morocco strategic partnership."

As AFP reported, Kerry planned to visit Morocco and Algeria late last year, but had to change his schedule at the last minute. This trip follows a week-long visit to Europe and Saudi Arabia, during which Kerry made a surprise visit to Amman to meet with Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas to keep Middle East peace talks on track, and is also addressing developments in Ukraine and Crimea. When Kerry arrives in Algiers, he will also co-chair the US-Algeria Strategic Dialogue, launched in October 2012. His Algeria visit comes just two weeks before that country's presidential elections, where 77-year-old Abdelaziz Bouteflika is seeking a fourth term.

Kerry's visit to Morocco, considered an important US ally in combating radical Islamist ideology, said AFP, takes place less than a month before the Security Council's annual vote on renewing the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in Western Sahara.
Senior officials from Morocco and the US at the first meeting to the two country's Strategic Dialogue in Washington, DC on Sept. 13, 2012. Photo: CNN

During the King's meeting at the White House, President Obama reiterated the long-held US support for Morocco's autonomy plan in its Sahara provinces as "serious, realistic, and credible." The two leaders also "affirmed their shared commitment to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Western Sahara," as well as to continuing to "protect and promote human rights."

****

For more on Morocco and the region, visit www.moroccoonthemove.com
Follow us on Twitter - @MorocOnTheMove
Like us on Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/MoroccoOnTheMove

The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) is a non-profit organization whose principal mission is to inform opinion makers, government officials, and interested publics in the United States about political and social developments in Morocco and the role being played by the Kingdom of Morocco in broader strategic developments in North Africa, the
Rachad, I got your message via Jordan. What a mistake on my part. I asked and thought I saw the entire table come up to you to say hello. It was a mistake on my part. I'm very sorry. I thought it happened. Do you want him to pay a courtesy call to you on Monday/tuesday? Again sorry for this slight. Ed

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Jordan Paul" <jpaul@moroccanamericanpolicy.com>
Date: March 30, 2014 at 11:46:55 AM EDT
To: "Edward Gabriel" <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Subject: Fw: Meeting with A/S Richards

See below. Thanks

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.

From: Mouaad Ibriz
Sent: Sunday, March 30, 2014 11:04 AM
To: Jordan Paul
Subject: Meeting with A/S Richards

Dear Jordan

The Ambassador was trying to send this email to Ed, but I think there is a server/email issue that prevents him from getting this email.

Please pass it on to Ed.

Thanks a lot

Mouaad

Begin forwarded message:

From: Rachad Bouhlal <rachadbouhlal@yahoo.com>
Date: March 30, 2014 at 8:45:42 AM EDT
To: Mouaad Ibriz <ibriz.mouaad@gmail.com>

Ed,
It was my pleasure to attend last night's event and thank you for inviting me.
I am glad to hear that A/S Richards and Mhamed Charif were introduced and there is a possibility for them to meet.
Your suggestion makes sense. The Embassy will handle the meeting request Monday morning and they will coordinate with your team.
The DCM and Mouad will accompany Charif to this meeting.

PS: I never met Charif and wish I was introduced to him at the event.
Rachad Bouhlal
Summary in French below. Full report in English attached.

ALGÉRIE : RAPPORT DE SITUATION MENSUEL
22 avril 2014

Résumé

Les Tendances Politiques
* Après une campagne électorale très tendue, le Président Bouteflika a été réélu avec plus de 80% des voix sur un taux de participation de 51% - selon les chiffres officiels, qui sont violemment contestés par l'opposant principal de Bouteflika, Ali Benflis, ainsi que ceux qui ont appelé à un boycott d'une élection qu'ils considèrent comme truqué à l'avance.
* Benflis, qui prétend d'être le véritable vainqueur de l'élection présidentielle, appelle à un mouvement de masse pacifique pour le changement démocratique, et envisage de créer un nouveau parti politique à cette fin. Il ne semble pas y avoir, cependant, une vague de fond de l'opposition active à la suite de l'élection comparable au « mouvement vert » qui s'est développé après l'élection présidentielle iranienne en 2009.
* Avec Bouteflika visiblement très mal diminué par les effets de son accident vasculaire cérébral, des sources concordantes indiquent que son frère et conseiller Saïd assume de plus en plus le rôle de régent.
* Dans ces conditions, la question de la succession, apparemment réglé lorsque l'option d'un quatrième mandat pour Bouteflika a été approuvée avec force, pourrait être posée à nouveau très bientôt, et le plus grand danger pour le système semble de provenir de ses propres contradictions internes.

Les Relations Etrangères
* La visite de John Kerry en Algérie au début d'avril a été l'occasion pour l'une des rares apparitions publiques de Bouteflika durant la campagne électorale, mais le Secrétaire d'État des États-Unis n'a pas montré beaucoup d'enthousiasme pour la réélection imminente du Président, préférant dîner avec un critique virulent de Bouteflika plutôt qu'avec son homologue le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
* Kerry était à Alger pour le Dialogue Stratégique Etats-Unis-Algérie, auquel une place de choix a été accordée à la coopération en matière de sécurité, notamment dans la région du Sahara-Sahel. Le Secrétaire d'État a également souligné la coopération énergétique, tant en termes de débouchés pour les entreprises des États-Unis dans le secteur du pétrole et du gaz de l'Algérie et de coopération algérien pour compenser pour les réductions possibles de livraisons de gaz russe vers l'Europe à la suite de la crise en Ukraine.
* Bien que les Européens puissent également frapper à sa porte pour plus de gaz, selon certaines sources, Alger est réticent à s'engager pour fournir des volumes supplémentaires pour compenser les baisses possibles des livraisons russes. Ses raisons pourraient avoir autant à voir avec des considérations commerciales et géopolitiques qu'avec un manque de capacité adéquate.

La Sécurité
* Bien que la situation de la sécurité nationale dans la première moitié de Avril ait été remarquablement calme par rapport aux périodes pré-électorales précédentes, AQMI a démontré qu'il est toujours capable d'arracher des attaques spectaculaires occasionnelles en faisant une embuscade
contre un convoi de l'armée en Kabylie peu après les élections, tuant jusqu'à 16 soldats.

* Bien que les sources de sécurité régionales citées par l'AFP affirment que Mokhtar Belmokhtar prévoit des opérations dans la région à partir d'une base arrière dans le sud de la Libye, il y a eu très peu de rapports d'incidents tout le long des frontières de l'Algérie avec la Libye ou le Mali.

* Selon certaines sources, les autorités ont commencé à renforcer des mesures de sécurité relatives au transport de substances diverses utilisées par l'industrie du pétrole et du gaz dans le sud Algérie qui pourraient être d'intérêt pour les groupes terroristes.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
Executive Summary

Political Trends

- After a very tense election campaign, President Bouteflika has been re-elected with over 80% of the votes on a 51% turnout – according to official figures, which are vehemently disputed by Bouteflika's main challenger, Ali Benflis, as well as those who called for a boycott of an election they saw as rigged in advance.
- Benflis, who claims to be the real victor in the presidential poll, is calling for a peaceful mass movement for democratic change, and plans to set up a new political party to this end. There does not however seem to be a major groundswell of active opposition to the election result comparable to the 'Green Movement' that developed after Iran's 2009 presidential election.
- With Bouteflika visibly very badly diminished by the effects of his stroke, concordant sources indicate that his brother and advisor Said is increasingly taking on the role of regent.
- In these circumstances, the question of the succession, ostensibly settled when the option of a fourth term for Bouteflika was steamrollered through, may be posed again very soon, and the greatest danger to the system seems likely to come from its own internal contradictions.

Foreign Relations

- John Kerry's visit to Algeria at the beginning of April provided the occasion for one of Bouteflika's very few public appearances during the election campaign, but the US Secretary of State showed no great enthusiasm for the President's impending re-election, preferring to dine with an outspoken critic of Bouteflika rather than with his Foreign Minister.
- Kerry was in Algiers for the US-Algeria Strategic Dialogue, at which pride of place was given to security cooperation, notably in the Sahara-Sahel region.
- The Secretary of State also highlighted energy cooperation, in terms both of opportunities for US companies in Algeria's oil and gas sector and of Algerian cooperation in making up for possible cuts in Russian gas supplies to Europe as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis.
- Although the Europeans may also be knocking at its door for more gas, Algiers is reportedly reluctant to commit to supplying extra volumes to compensate for any cuts in Russian deliveries. Its reasons may have as much to do with commercial and geopolitical considerations as with a lack of adequate capacity.

Security

- While the security situation nationwide in the first half of April was remarkably calm compared to previous pre-electoral periods, AQMI demonstrated that it is still capable of pulling off occasional spectacular attacks by ambushing an army convoy in Kabylia shortly after the election, killing up to 16 soldiers.
- Although regional security sources quoted by AFP allege that Mokhtar Belmokhtar is planning operations across the region from a rear base in southern Libya, there have been very few reports of incidents along Algeria's borders with either Libya or Mali.
- The authorities are reported to have begun stepping up security measures relating to the transport various substances used by the oil and gas industry in southern Algeria that could be of interest to terrorist groups.
Political Trends

In the afternoon of April 18, Interior Minister Taïeb Belaïz announced the official preliminary results (minus the votes of Algerians living abroad) for the previous day's presidential election. With 51.70% of registered voters having turned out on the day, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika had won 81.53% of the vote, with his nearest challenger, Ali Benflis scoring 12.18% and the remaining four candidates totaling less than 6% between them. Benflis, who had condemned “massive fraud” even before the official figures were announced, rushed to proclaim his refusal to recognise the result, denouncing a “confiscation of the people's will”. There is of course ample precedent for the doctoring of electoral results in Algeria (as one Wikileaks' famous US Embassy cables dating from 2009 observed, that year's presidential elections were “carefully choreographed and heavily controlled”, with the official turnout figure “exaggerated” by at least 45%), and it is entirely plausible that, if nothing else, the turnout was artificially inflated this time as well.

The election followed an unusually tense campaign. Abdelmalek Sellal, Ahmed Ouyahia, Amar Saadani and other dignitaries campaigning on behalf of Bouteflika were regularly greeted by rowdy protests, some organised by the recently created Barakat! movement, others spontaneous. While the largest and most militant demonstrations were mostly in the traditionally rebellious region of Kabylie, the Sellal was booed in the southern town of Ouargla (a hotbed of protests by the unemployed) and pelted with eggs in Ghaida (which has been plagued by violent clashes between Berber-speaking Ibadites and Arabic-speaking Sunnis for several months). There were also sizeable demonstrations in the towns of the Aurès region, the heartland of the Chaoui minority. Enraged by an insensitive quip by Sellal as the campaign got under way, the Chaouis were further encouraged to take a stand against Bouteflika's fourth term bid by an open letter published by former President Liamine Zeroual (who, like Ali Benflis, hails from the Chaoui 'capital', Batna) in late March. In a rare television appearance on April 13 in the company of visiting Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Garcia-Margallo, Bouteflika himself contributed to the tension by falsely accusing Benflis of inciting violence: “When a candidate comes to threaten prefects and the authorities, telling them to pay attention to their families and their children in the event of fraud, what does that tell you? This is terrorism via television”. The privately owned, pro-Bouteflika Ennahar TV station, meanwhile, launched a virulent campaign against Barakat! and other proponents of a boycott, accusing them of complicity with sundry foreign governments and agencies.

In the last few days before the poll, amid dire warnings from some commentators of chaos and violence immediately after election day, there were reports of panic buying of groceries and fuel in several cities. Speaking off the record, Industry Minister Amara Ben Younes voiced concern that Benflis might score well or even come first in the east of the country thanks to the support he was gathering among the Chaouis, with the risk that this might fuel a resurgence of Algeria's historic east-west divide.

1  Abdelaziz Belaid (Future Front) 3.036 %; Louisa Hanoun (Workers Party) 1.37 %; Ali Fawzi Rebaine (Ahd 54) 0.99%; Moussa Touati (Algerian National Front) 0.56%.
2  Apparently a reference to a statement made by Benflis on April 9 about the risks of electoral fraud and appealing to local government officials to refuse to be complicit in it: "Fraud is haram [religiously forbidden]. Forgery and the use of forgery is haram. I say this to prefects and leaders of dairas: you have family, think about them".
In striking counterpoint to the last minute worries of Amara Ben Younes, a staffer at the Presidency to whom we spoke in the hours before the official results were announced totally discounted the possibility that Benflis might represent any sort threat. Bouteflika was in the lead nationwide and had come first even in Batna, the staffer claimed, arguing that Benflis had alienated some potential supporters by championing the rehabilitation of the FIS. Asked whether there was a risk that Benflis might seek to prolong the battle by creating a new party of his own after the election, the presidential aide scoffed at the idea, suggesting scornfully that the unlucky challenger would “probably go off to live in France”.

Benflis began the press conference he held immediately after the official results were announced by pointedly stating that he was not going anywhere, and that this time, unlike 2004 when he faded rapidly into the background, he had every intention of continuing the struggle. Benflis outlined his “four essential convictions: the Algerian political system has led the country to a complete impasse; it has once again irrefutably proven its inability to reform itself; change can only come from outside this system; and the democratic alternative must be consensus-based, orderly and peaceful”. On this basis, he called for mass action in favour of democratic change, and pledged to provide “an organised political framework” for such a campaign – promising, in short, to set up a political party. Benflis and the 25 small political groupings that supported his candidacy are understood to be holding consultations to that end, with an announcement promised for the coming days. There have also reportedly been some exploratory contacts between the Benflis campaign and the so-called “boycott front”, made up of five somewhat more substantial parties (including the moderate islamist MSP and the mainly Kabyle, secularist RCD) and another former Prime Minister, Ahmed Benbitour.

It remains to be seen how successful Benflis – who has since explicitly claimed to have won more than 50% of the “real” national vote – will be in rallying and mobilising opposition to Bouteflika and the system as a whole. While the Benflis campaign did noticeably gather momentum as election day approached, drawing behind it at least some of those who might otherwise have chosen to boycott the poll, he has not so far inspired anything like the enthusiasm that was seen, say, for Mir Hussein Mussavi in Iran's 2009 presidential election, and the emergence of mass protests of the scale and determination of the so-called 'Green Movement' that developed in response to the shock of Mussavi's defeat does not seem to be the most likely perspective as things now stand. With no serious provocations by either camp in the 48 hours following the election, the moment of greatest danger may now have passed.

The extent to which Benflis is able to make good on his promise to develop and lead a movement for democratic change “outside the system” will of course need to be monitored over the coming weeks and months. But as things stand now, arguably the greatest danger to the system comes from within.

As we suggested in our last report, the fourth term option appears to have been steamrollered through in the absence of any consensus on an alternative candidate among

---

3 Benbitour, who fell out with Bouteflika as early as 2000, hails from the troubled Wilaya of Ghardaïa.
4 Although angry demonstrations continue to be violently repressed in Kabylia, they are now chiefly focused on the commemoration of the Berber Spring of 1980, and are highly unlikely in and of themselves to mobilise protesters in other parts of the country.
the clans and interest groups that make up the power structure, and with the election out of the way the rifts between the various factions, and within them, seem likely to come to the surface\(^5\). For while the re-election of Bouteflika may have settled the immediate question of the succession, it is likely to be posed anew very quickly, since there are to say the least serious doubts as to whether he will be able to complete his fourth term of office.

Bouteflika is visibly diminished. In live television coverage of him casting his vote, he had to be assisted in every stage of the process, down to being instructed by the doctor who was pushing his wheelchair to get out his voter ID, and then being accompanied into the polling booth by an aide; the President's influential brother and advisor Saïd was alongside him throughout and appeared to be directing the operation\(^6\).

This almost brazen appearance by Saïd Bouteflika – who has hitherto preferred to keep to the shadows – looked like a calculated show of confidence, but he may soon find that he is becoming dangerously overexposed. Earlier this year, a source at the Presidency intimated to us that Saïd was acting as grand chamberlain or gatekeeper to his brother; in the days immediately before the election other sources indicated that he is going beyond this and is in effect taking on the role of regent. Less than a week before the poll, one civil servant working at the Presidency told us:

> The climate at the Presidency, as elsewhere, has gone from lethargy to stagnation. No decisions are being taken pending Bouteflika's fourth term, during which it will be Saïd Bouteflika who really wields power. He already takes part in decision-making meetings, including in the field of security, on behalf of his brother, who hardly ever leaves his home and cannot participate in this sort of meeting. Saïd and his friends are waiting until the election is out of the way before they show their hand. The real test is what will happen after the election. They fear a violent and potentially destabilising reaction [to the election result]. They are on the alert for any sign of destabilisation, or of opposition from within the system, against Bouteflika's fourth term. All government departments are just taking care of day-to-day administration for now, nothing more than that. The first indications of what Saïd and his friends intend to do should be expected in a month or so.

A separate source has confirmed that Saïd has begun to interfere in even in oil and gas sector security – a situation that does not bode well for the future of the alliance between the presidential clan, DRS chief Lt-Gen. Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène and Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaid Saleh to which Bouteflika owes his re-election.

### Foreign Relations

On April 2, US Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Algiers for a two-day visit as part of

---

5 Some, indeed, remained in full sight even as the election campaign was unfolding. In late March, FLN General Secretary Amar Saadani spoke defiantly of his dissatisfaction with the continued presence of “eradicators” (a rather dated term referring to proponents of the total eradication, by all means necessary, of the armed islamist groups and the FIS) within the army and of their animosity towards him. In the closing days of the campaign, Saadani was the target of a carefully planted leak to the French media concerning his real estate and financial assets in France, allegedly the fruit of extensive embezzlement.

6 The initial, live broadcast of the event by ENTV (Algerian state television), Saïd was seen entering the polling booth after Bouteflika had been wheeled out, retrieving the discarded voting slips from the waste bin and checking them (in Algerian elections, there is one slip per candidate, each voter putting the slip for the candidate of his or her choice in an envelop that is then put into the ballot box and discarding the others). Replays later in the day had this and other potentially embarrassing details edited out, but the initial, full sequence was reused, with much relish, by France's Canal+, which has made something of a speciality out of exposing ENTV's manipulation of its footage of the President to enhance his image.
a mini-tour of North Africa that had been postponed from November, when he was forced to
cancel at the last minute due to the demands of multilateral negotiations towards a deal with
Iran on its nuclear programme. Shortly before his arrival, there was a flurry of speculation
in the Algerian press that the Secretary of State might cancel again, to avoid being seen as
taking sides in the presidential election contest.

If the fact that Kerry turned up regardless of such considerations was an endorsement of
Bouteflika, it was a half-hearted one at best. With Libya imploding and Mali still teetering
on the brink, Washington badly needs a stable partner in north-west Africa, and to this
extent at least favours stability and continuity in Algeria?; the Algerian regime having
plumped for a fourth term for Bouteflika as the 'least worst' means of ensuring its own
stability, the US administration has little choice for now but to play along with that. But
there were no signs of enthusiasm about this option. At his press conference marking the
beginning of the second round of the US-Algeria Strategic Dialogue on April 3, Kerry
tiptoed around the issue of the upcoming election with a deliberately ambiguous formula:

We look forward to elections that are transparent and in line with international standards, and
the United States will work with the president that the people of Algeria choose. And that is a
future where citizens can enjoy the free exercise of their civil, political, and human rights, and
where global companies, businesses, are confident in being able to invest for the long haul.

The previous evening, the Secretary of State is reported to have surprised his hosts by
skipping the formal dinner with his opposite number Ramtane Lamamra that had been
scheduled for him in favour of a private dinner at the Hotel Aurassi8 with his old friend,
former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali – who happens to be an outspoken critic of
Bouteflika.

Unwittingly, however, Kerry did play a part in Bouteflika's re-election bid, in the sense that
his visit provided one of very few occasions during the campaign on which the President
appeared in person on national television. Unusually, the footage of his meeting with the
Secretary of State was broadcast with the sound. Earlier, mainly silent images of the ailing
President having led many to conclude that Bouteflika had lost the faculty of speech
altogether, this time a short exchange was broadcast in which the head of state was heard –
albeit with some difficulty – enjoining his visitor to see to improve the level of electronic
intelligence sharing: “You have technology, you have intelligence that we do not have. What
we would like to have is the intelligence in real time – in the Sahara, in the Sahel region”.

An identical point was made by Foreign Minister Lamamra at the opening of the Strategic
Dialogue, in which security issues clearly had pride of place. But economic cooperation also
featured heavily on the agenda for the Strategic Dialogue. It was clear from Kerry's public

7 This was laid out very clearly by Kerry at his Algiers press conference: “First and foremost […]: the United States
will absolutely continue to stand with Algeria to fight the scourge of terrorism […]. And we will continue to work
with you through the Global Counterterrorism Forum in order to combat drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom,
both of which fund terrorism in North and West Africa. We will look to increase our security assistance to Algeria.
We really want to work in a cooperative way, and we want to do this so that Algerian security services have the tools
and the training needed in order to defeat al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. And we will work to address the
instability that has spread throughout the Maghreb and Sahel. We are grateful, very grateful, for Algeria’s efforts in
Mali and Niger which underscore Algeria's constructive role in regional stability not only in the east, but to the south
also. In the years to come, the United States hopes to partner with Algeria to build a more robust defense
relationship based on mutual respect, and obviously, what I mentioned earlier, our shared interests. Together, we can
help other nations in the region secure their borders, strengthen rule of law, and build stable democratic institutions.”

8 Kerry is also reported to have stayed the night at the Aurassi, eschewing the accommodation that had been laid on for
him at the Algerian government's Djenane El Mithaq residence for visiting VIPs.
comments that “economic cooperation” is still largely conceived of in terms of openings for US companies in Algeria's hydrocarbons sector. But Kerry is also understood to have quizzed his hosts on the question of whether Algeria would be able to channel additional volumes of natural gas to Europe as a substitute for Russian gas, should Russian supplies be diminished as a result of the crisis in Ukraine – currently emerging as one of Washington's most important foreign policy challenges.

The Europeans have themselves begun looking to Algerian gas as a possible substitute for Russian supplies. As it mulls sanctions against Moscow in relation to the Ukraine crisis, the European Commission has been preparing a review Europe's options for reducing its energy dependence on Russia to be submitted to EU heads of government when they meet in June. These options undoubtedly include increasing imports from Norway and Algeria. ENI's outgoing CEO Paolo Scaroni has said he expects a “gigantic” diversification effort should the EU and the United States fail to reach an accommodation with Vladimir Putin, while Sedigas, the Spanish gas industry association, is claiming that Spain could provide almost half the gas that currently flows to Europe through Ukraine. Spain buys all its gas from non-Russian sources, and while it has been investing heavily in expanding its LNG regasification capacity, Algeria still supplies 45% of Spanish natural gas imports via the Medgas and Maghreb-Europe pipelines, and would appear to be an obvious choice for additional volumes if and when they are needed. In comments to reporters upon his arrival in Algiers on a two-day visit on April 13, Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo seemed to imply that he would be discussing just such a possibility.

However, according to one source close to the DRS, Kerry's Algerian interlocutors refused to commit to providing additional volumes of natural gas to make up for any cut in Russian supplies. According to the source, this was due to Algiers' fears that it simply may not have enough gas to meet additional European demand. There may be some truth in this: Algeria's natural gas production has been in decline, partly as a result of underinvestment, while a sharp and sustained rise in domestic energy consumption is increasingly putting the squeeze on volumes available for export. But other factors may be at play.

Whereas Chakib Khelil during most of his tenure as Energy Minister opposed any moves towards duopolistic cooperation with Russia in European gas markets, Ali Hached (former Sonatrach Vice President for gas marketing, removed by Khelil in 2006) is understood to have favoured closer collaboration with the Russians – and Hached, since the fall of Khelil, has emerged as the chief advisor to his successor Youcef Yousfi (now interim Prime Minister as well as Energy Minister). At the same time, Russia remains the Algerian military's leading supplier of armaments, and Moscow's general stance as a bulwark against the supposedly hegemonic ambitions of the West (including its opposition to the forcible overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in Libya and ongoing support for Bashar Al-Assad in Syria) plays well with Algiers. Thus, regardless of whether or not it has sufficient available

---

9 In this respect it is worth noting that US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz is to be the guest of honor at this year's Algeria International Trade Fair in June.
10 CoS Gaid Saleh made a week-long visit to Russia last October, taking in trips to a number of arms production facilities, and received the head of Russia's Federal Military and Technical Cooperation Service in Algiers in January of this year.
natural gas production capacity, Algiers may be reluctant to spring to the assistance of the Americans and Europeans in their efforts to counter Russia's moves in Ukraine, for both commercial and geopolitical reasons.

Security

With a total of 20 incidents recorded – up from 11 in February and 14 in January – March saw the highest levels of political violence since August 2013. In terms of operations initiated by AQMI, however, the number was level with previous months: five jihadist operations were recorded in March, against three in February and six in January. With just eight incidents overall, of which three were initiated by the jihadists, violence in April has been largely on a par with levels observed in February and January.

The relative calm that characterised the first half of April, although in keeping with the general pattern since last August, is nonetheless remarkable insofar as jihadist groups in Algeria generally try to take advantage of election periods, when the security forces are busy securing rallies and preparations for voting, to go on the offensive. The run-up to the parliamentary elections of May 2012, for example, saw a significant spike of jihadist operations. The fact that no such upsurge occurred this time would seem to be indicative of a gradual decline in AQMI’s capability inside Algeria itself.

ALGIERS and its immediate environs were entirely calm over the past month, and AQMI's traditional heartland in KABYLIA was mostly quiet in the run-up to the election. Shortly after polling day, however, the region witnessed one spectacular jihadist operation: in the evening of April 19, a 30-strong armed group ambushed a small army convoy near the village of Tiguemounine, 40 km south of Tizi Ouzou, killing 11 soldiers and wounding five others (some accounts put the toll as high as 16 dead and nine wounded). The convoy was targeted as it was on its way to a nearby army outpost, as part of the regular rotation of troops. Dwindling though its forces may be, AQMI is still apparently capable of mounting occasional spectacular attacks, especially when it is able to take advantage of lapses in vigilance on the part of army field commanders (as seems to be the case in this instance, according to retired General Abderrezzak Maïza, former chief-of-staff of the 1st Military Region where the attack took place).

Although little is known about AQMI's internal structures, according to reports dating back to 2008 Tiguemounine and the entire Wilaya of Tizi Ouzou (along with the Wilayas of Boumerdes, Bouira, Bejaia, M'sila and Djelfa) lie within AQMI's Central Region. In an unusual development a statement ostensibly signed by the leaders of the Central Region surfaced in jihadist forums around March 22, declared their support for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the ultra-hardline jihadist group currently battling against rival rebel organisations in Syria. The document has been seen by some commentators as a sign that a "dissident wing" emerging inside the Algerian jihadist organisation. However, the

---

11 Some 186,000 policemen and gendarmes were mobilised to secure the presidential poll this year.
12 Three incidents between March 19 and April 17: two ambushes organised by the security forces and one roadside bomb.
13 The statement exhorted ISIS fighters to stand firm and "obey the Commander of the Believers Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al-Quraishi", ISIS's emir. Although ISIS started off as Al-Qaeda’s arm in Iraq, before expanding into Syria in late 2013-early 2014, Al-Baghdadi was effectively disowned by Al-Qaeda's international head Ayman Al-
document is difficult if not impossible to authenticate, and it is worth bearing in mind that the DRS is well versed in the arts of generating suspicions, divisions and splits within Islamist guerrilla groups.

Looking southwards, Algerian Arabic-language daily *El-Khabar* reported (March 24) that the armed forces had launched a “major search and destroy mission” along Algeria’s Eastern & Southern Borders, “mobilising more than 15,000 soldiers” to prevent jihadists crossing. The results of this operation, which was expected to last a week, were not reported in the media. The Defence Ministry did however announce that an army unit had discovered a small cache of arms (five AK-47s, two submachine guns, one heavy machine gun and 1,005 rounds of ammunition) near Bordj Badji Mokhtar on the southern border with Mali on April 8. In a separate statement a week later, the Algerian Defence Ministry indicated that security forces had intercepted an offroader that was carrying a “considerable quantity” of weapons and ammunition “at a point 230 km northeast of Bordj Baji Mokhtar” on April 15; two Algerian nationals were arrested and two machine guns, two RPGs and one “rocket launcher” were seized. One minor incident was also reported on the country’s eastern border with Libya: on April 12 the security forces found an offroader loaded with weapons abandoned not far from Deb Deb; the vehicle had Libyan number plates and is believed to have been left there by smugglers after a failed attempt to cross the border.

The apparent calm on the border with Libya (which may be partly due to under-reporting) should not be allowed to obscure the continued importance of this zone for Algeria’s national security, and for the security of the oil and gas industry in particular. This fact was underlined by an AFP report dated April 13 quoting unnamed “Malian security sources” as saying that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the Al-Mourabitoun group, has “for some time” been hiding in Libya, “from where he plans to mastermind terrorist attacks across Africa’s Sahel region”. Belmokhtar’s presence in southern Libya was confirmed to AFP by a Nigerian security source, and another source close to MINUSMA, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali.

As regards Oil & Gas Sector security, Algerian Arabic-language daily *Echorouk* (March 22) reported that the “authorities in charge of oil company security” are acting “in cooperation with the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Energy” to tighten up security around the transport of 20 types of “dangerous chemicals” in the south of the country “after reports revealed the presence of criminal gangs that steal those substances and sell them on to jihadist groups for bomb-making purposes”. Gendarmerie investigators “recently seized 50 kg of stolen mercury and 800 kg of copper at a warehouse in Hassi Messaoud”.

END

---

14 This would in fact situate the incident approximately half way between Bordj Badji Mokhtar, on the Malian border, and the town of Tamanrasset.
Dear Team,

Below please find the March-April 2014 MAC Events Bulletin. Our team compiles a list of reports based on our attendance of events that focus on Morocco, the Maghreb, and/or MENA. Clicking on any event below will link you to that specific report. We hope that this exercise will provide you with a value-added MAC perspective on policy events and help to keep you up-to-date on events that you do not have the time to attend.

Please do not forward this bulletin.

March-April 2014 Events Bulletin

March 11
A Mixed Picture: The Political and Economic Future of the Arab Transitions

March 18
Should the United States give up on Arab Democracy?

April 7
Human Rights Perspectives in Morocco

April 8
Beyond the Arab Spring: U.S. Engagement in a Changing Middle East

April 9
House Subcommittee Hearing: U.S. Policy Toward Morocco

April 9
A Mixed Picture: The Political and Economic Future of the Arab Transitions

Date: March 11, 2014

1. Title: “A Mixed Picture: The Political and Economic Future of the Arab Transitions”
Hosted by the Atlantic Council

Participants:
Yasser El Shimy: Teaching Fellow, Boston University
Ellen Laipson: President and CEO, Stimson Center
Mohsin Khan: Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Mirette F. Mabrouk: Moderator: Deputy Director for Regional Programs, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

2. Overview

The forum, considered the future of the Arab Spring countries as they emerge from political transitions. The panelists discussed their political and economic expectations for countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen which overthrew their autocratic regimes. They also mentioned countries such as Morocco and Jordan, which went through similar political transitions, yet maintained longstanding elements of their political structures, notably their monarchies. The Arab Spring had many economic and political consequences, which each country responded to in different ways. Three years into the transition, the panelists sought to address the progress of these countries in becoming more politically and economically stable.

3. Summary

Mabrouk noted that since the Arab Spring, the world has been watching to see how the countries in transition react to the aftermath. Some of these countries have progressed and others have regressed in terms of political stability, resulting in uneven progress among the Arab Spring countries.

Laipson began by saying foreign policy professionals need to move on from what happened during the Arab Spring and look to the future of this region. Revolutions do not change a country overnight; it takes years to reform a government, an economic system, and the political mindset of a country. Laipson continued by giving the example of Ukraine’s democratic progression, which took ten years to resemble a democratic state after their revolution. It took Tunisia three years of confusion and struggle before things began to be sorted out. The international community needs to be sensitive and patient because it has taken decades for countries like the US, France, and others to transform into democracies. The Arab revolts happened so suddenly and the younger generations wanted individual freedoms, but did not think of the implications on a larger scale. Creating and reforming institutions will take many years if the Arab Spring countries want to have individual freedoms as well as a stable democratic government.

El Shimy added that throughout the Arab Spring, most of those societies have only seen democracy in a negative light, as it brought down standards of living in the region – in contrast to relative stability under authoritarian
leadership. The usage of the term ‘Arab Spring’ presumes that there will be an optimistic outcome, however most likely there will not be democracy at the end of this long road ahead for these people. The future of political Islam may be decided in countries like Morocco. Morocco is not using the zero-sum method in government like Egypt is, and this is why it is continuing to be a stable state. The pattern in most Arab Spring countries is to jump into elections and the winner takes all of the power, which is obviously not working. El Shamy also added that in order to foster hope for the Arab Spring countries, states must decentralize powers and increase the involvement of rural communities in the political sector, which will build competencies, confidence, and encourage investment.

Khan began by stating the world economy and price of oil is going down; it is a perfect atmosphere for a storm to take place in oil producing countries. Something that is rarely seen in the developing world is an economic depression which Yemen and Tunisia had in 2011. Traditionally, Arab governments tried to adjust their economies by avoiding recession and dependence on imports from other countries. What the Arab Spring countries suffered after the uprisings was the lack of any coherent economic plan, mostly because the new leaders focused on national security and installing a new political regime. There was no cohesive economic model, therefore the governments catered to immediate and more populist needs, expanding subsidies and increasing government jobs at the expense of long-term economic growth. Looking to the future, the Arab region needs to get growth going. A long term plan needs to include international investment and the short term plan needs to start with useful spending of existing capital, concurrently as economic reforms are being made. Khan added that he does not share the optimism of the other panelists; he argued that these country’s economies are in fact further deteriorating. Assuming the economic climate will improve, it would be a good sign for democratization.

4. Q & A

Q: (Khalil Al Anani, Johns Hopkins) What can other Arab countries do to help those undergoing Arab Spring transitions?
A: (Laipson) Inter-Arab politics are interesting. Some Arab countries want to distance themselves from being clumped into a homogeneous region and create individualized plans and names for themselves. The countries of the Arab peninsula deter other Arab countries from going down the democratic path. They do this not only with their words but with investments.
(El Shamy) Egypt is ungovernable right now. There are 90 million people who are mostly living in extreme poverty, unemployment is high, and 60% of Egypt is under the age of 35. Tourism is down by 35% and it was once 10% of Egypt’s GDP. The changes that are occurring in Egypt are unsustainable, which is why the people turn to violence. The Army will not be under civilian control anytime soon, as it is the only way to maintain any national security.

Q: (Lily Lousada, Center for American Progress) There is a great need of institutional development, what role can the United States play?
A: (Laipson) A period of retrenchment and reflection is needed from the United States. The Egyptian people are not supportive of US aid in the ongoing internal political conflicts. It shows that the people of Egypt are not always supportive of actual common good for their society, since they should be accepting help from the United States. What are the parameters of civil society engagement? The international community needs to see this as a period of adjustment in US foreign policy.

Q: (Danya Greenfield, Atlantic Council) The IMF will come in again to try to help. If the macro-economic status seems to be improving, why is everyday life deteriorating?
A: (Khan) The IMF will create reform and investment structure, and there will be growth along with IMF programs because of the financing that comes with it. The Gulf countries have promised a lot of money that will also act as a fiscal stimulus. I am optimistic about this; this has the ability to kick-start the economies, if it will be sustainable, though depends on the country.
(El Shamy) The money that the Gulf states are putting into the Arab Spring countries has gone towards energy, food subsidies, stabilizing the currency, and preventing bankruptcy, but these policies have had no effect on the actual economy.
(Laipson) Reform will happen at different rates; however local leadership and ownership must happen. Democracy would be great, but security comes first. In order to make any reforms there must be day to day security available to the general population.

Q: (Christopher Jarvis, IMF) Egypt’s IMF assistance has shown improvement towards democracy and addressing fundamental economic problems, but it seems that the future of democracy in Egypt is dark.
A: (Khan) The issue that I am concerned with Egypt’s economy is El-Sisi and the new government. The military is the only way to maintain stability and it has returned once again.
(El Shamy) Egypt is at a point of no return. The legitimacy of whoever remains in power is questionable. Also, the
5. Observation

The forum was attended by around 100 people from varying backgrounds, including foreign policy professionals, members of the think tank community, members of the IMF and USAID, and students. The tone of the forum seemed a bit pessimistic of the current state of the Middle East and countries that were involved in the Arab Spring. El Shimy had been in Egypt for the last three years and had an extremely pessimistic point of view on the status of Egypt, though he mentioned Morocco as a possible source of inspiration to the region.

Should the United States give up on Arab Democracy?

Date: March 18, 2014

1. Title: “Should the United States give up on Arab Democracy?”
   Hosted by SFS Program for Jewish Civilization

Participants:
Elliot Abrams: Senior Fellow, Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

2. Overview

The Program for Jewish Civilization hosted a lecture by Elliot Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Abrams pushed back against the common consensus that because of the unhappy aftermath of the Arab Spring, the United States should by and large give up on supporting democracy in the Middle East. At the event, he deconstructed and debunked this popular attitude and put forth an alternative of his own.

3. Summary

Elliot Abrams began by answering the question, what is the Arab Spring? He stated that the Arab Spring, as it is popularly described, was not a series of revolutions, but instead a series of uprisings against illegitimate authoritarian governments. The only consensus among the participants of these revolts was that the status quo had to change. There was no agreement about what that change would be. He said that democracy didn't prevail in the aftermath of these revolts because the ousted governments had left no mechanisms which would serve as the basis for a democracy. Furthermore, there are no Middle Eastern Arab models of democracy to serve as a basis either.

While the authoritarian governments were in power, all democratic organizations had been completely crushed. The champions of democracy in the Middle East during the Arab Spring had to start from scratch.

Abrams then listed some of the popular theories about the failure of creating a democracy in the Arab World. He said that some attribute the failure of democracy to Arab culture and Islam. There is this idea, he said, that Islam and Arab culture is simply incompatible with democracy. Another theory is that Arabs are too suspicious of the West and any attempt by the West to provide assistance. The final theory Abrams listed was the idea that Ottoman and colonial models of governance have put democracy in the Middle East at a disadvantage. These theories, he said, are inadequate. They do not, for example, explain the Tunisian case, where democracy might have a fighting chance. Furthermore, he stated that when there is a vacuum of power in the Middle East as we saw during the Arab Spring, Islamist takeovers are not inevitable as the common consensus portrays.

The Middle East has seen Islamist takeovers because the ousted dictatorships had kept them intact. They were organized after the Arab Spring in Egypt and in Gaza. These Islamist movements were intact and organized under the dictatorships, but they were not in power. The perception was that the dictatorships did not look out for the best interest of their populations and that the Islamist movements were the ones who provided aid, food, and medical care to the poor. However, once an Islamist group gets into power, just like the dictatorships, they fall for the same temptations and the populations no longer continue to perceive them as populist agents. They see them as unfit to rule.

Time and time again, Abrams stated, the Islamists take power because under the authoritarian regimes, democrats had no chance of organizing to develop the same positive reputation that the Islamists made as altruists. This
means that the transition to democracy in the Middle East needs to happen slowly in order to allow Arab democrats the time and resources they need to organize. Furthermore, the aforementioned idea that Arabs are too suspicious to trust democrats is not based in reality. A study, said Abrams, written by Arab intellectuals attribute the “freedom deficit” to all of the underdevelopment in the Middle East. It does not, as the “suspicion” theory suggests, blame colonialism or Zionism. The mindset a culture needs to create a successful democracy is present in the Middle East, it just needs to be given the time and US support that it has been lacking.

The United States, said Abrams, should stop cozying up to authoritarian leaders in the name of stability and start openly or clandestinely supporting Arab democrats. The idea in foreign policy that on one hand there is one set of issues called “the real” issues of business, security, and economy and on the other hand there are the secondary “fake issues” of human rights is false. The human rights issue is just as important for US national interests. For example, in Egypt the US has a case of an oppressive authoritarian government it supported for the sake of stability and to the detriment of human rights. The government of Egypt was friendly toward the US, but now, because of that relationship, the population is hostile toward the US. Meanwhile, in Iran, the US has a case of a government that it openly denounces with a population that for the most part is supportive of the US. Abrams said that the US policy in the Middle East should be to seek out, protect, and endorse Arab democrats. Furthermore, the US should speak out against Middle Eastern governments that make democrats suffer. It is in the moral and national interest of the United States to do so.

4. Q & A

Q: If you were the president of the United States, what would you do about Syria?
A: Well, Syria is a proxy war. The US mishandled this. The top advisors to President Obama told him that he should have sought out and provided support to Syrian democrats. It was a missed opportunity. This lack of support has given the jihadis most of the power. They are a danger to Israel today and the rest of the world tomorrow. There was no US willpower to support the democrats. If I were the president, I would have ramped up military support for non-jihadi rebels.

Q: (Stewart Sloane, American Jewish International Relations) Talk a little about why the US didn’t support the 2009 Green movement in Iran.
A: The US should have been more vocal in their support of the Iranian people and more vocal in their complaints against the Iranian government.

Q: (Yasmin, student at the School of Foreign Service) How does the US save face to authoritarian governments with which it has relations with and reach out to democrats under that authoritarian governments’ rule?
A: It is difficult. There is no question about that. The US must be willing to take that kind of trouble from authoritarian governments. A presidential administration could also hide behind Congress so as not to run the risk of breaking up its relations.

Q: (Ann Zigna, no stated affiliation) What role does Facebook play in revolutions in the Middle East?
A: It makes news and ideas more difficult to block by the authoritarian governments.

5. Observation

There were approximately 40 people in attendance, among them there were professors, graduate students, and academics. While Morocco was not mentioned specifically, the topic at hand is relevant. These are the types of US policy changes the Moroccan government should be aware of as it is one of the most important strategic allies in the North Africa and Middle East region.

--------------

Human Rights Perspectives in Morocco

Date: April 7, 2014

1. Title: Human Rights Perspectives in Morocco
   Hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
2. Overview

This event focused on the activities of the CNDH as well as the general state of human rights in Morocco. Mr. El Yazami described the activities of the CNDH under the 2011 Constitution, its priorities, its challenges, and its evolving role in Morocco and the region.

3. Summary

Mr. El Yazami posed the key question about human rights, in his perspective: Can an Arab country build a democracy and protect human rights peacefully, rapidly, without foreign intervention? He reiterated several times that what Morocco is trying to do in a relatively short period of time took decades if not generations in other countries. In addition, there are new players – youth and Islamists, who may not agree on the definition of universal human values. He feels strongly that a democracy is centered on the ability to discuss issues and respect differences.

Morocco is building a democracy and human rights regime step by step, by themselves, through extensive public discussion. Three important events in that process: the family code, the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (recognizing diversity and the country’s cultural pluralism), and the IER – Morocco’s version of transitional justice which is now informing similar projects in other countries.

Morocco has taken a different path to democracy in its new constitution, in which 60 of 180 sections include human rights. Key reforms that are upcoming include two dealing with the judiciary, violence against women, child labor, military tribunals, migration/asylum. He gave several examples of how much has to be done: 60 percent of women surveyed said that they have experienced domestic violence in the previous 12 months; 100,000 children are working illegally. Migration today is predominately south to south, which has its own unique challenges.

4. Q & A

Q: (Alterman) The pace of change seems very slow. There are expectations raised, then nothing seems to happen. Is this good or bad?
A: It is good because what is happening is that people are staying on board, they are involved in a national public discussion among many different points of view. There is a need to train people on how to promote and embrace reform. According to the most recent detailed study, there are 45,000 NGOs in Morocco; 30 percent have a budget less than $500, 37 percent don’t have an office. They need training on the fundamentals of organizing and operating an NGO. Also, 52 NGOs do not have licenses from the Ministry of Interior. They should be allowed to register. That’s guaranteed in the Constitution. The HCP has prepared a report on Civil Society that was released last week. In five months, it will become legislation. We are still waiting for a law on decentralization. We need to create educational materials for use in the schools on Sahrawis. We have three offices in the Sahara and held 20 seminars over the past two years on building a human rights culture. All this takes time.

Q: (HRW) What about freedom of assembly, of association?
A: NGOs should use the courts to get registered – the HPC report will generate new laws on this issue.

Q: (CSIS) What about human rights training for police and other officials?
A: Programs are moving ahead but they are difficult to do since you need three elements: the conditions such as salary, equipment, and resources have to be in place; You have to build a human rights culture through education. CNDH is hoping to be commissioned as the “national mechanism against torture” responsible for monitoring without restraint torture charges.

Q: (Independent Diplomat) What about people convicted previously under the military tribunals?
A: The sentences are being appealed to the Court of Cessation, which can move the cases to civil courts if it rules that the procedures/processes were incorrect or insufficient.

Q: (Congressional Research Service) How does one differentiate between what is the purview of the Palace and that of the Parliament?
A: Under the new constitution, the Palace does not draft legislation. It can request legislation be drafted by the
Parliament. The reform process is an interaction among the Palace, civil society, international actors, and local leadership. The challenge is how to learn the new roles/powers and enhance Parliament’s efforts given that they have no staff and a democracy needs an active Parliament.

Q: (Moroccan community member) Do you think that human rights issues are sometimes manipulated by outside parties for political purposes?
A: Moroccans want human rights; from the 60s until now people have been fighting for human rights. It is both a national and an international agenda and it is a national and international responsibility. Morocco signed international conventions because it wanted to, not because it was forced to. Outside reporting helps Morocco, which will host the Global Human Rights Summit November 27-29.

Q: (Western Sahara representative) Why is Morocco afraid of human rights monitoring included in MINURSO?
A: Morocco doesn’t need external parties. The challenge for Muslims is how to implement human rights in each country. Morocco is doing that and is doing it well.

Q: (William Lawrence, GW/POMED) What is your opinion about Salafists and jihadists and how they should be treated?
A: They should be integrated into the national dialogue. We need to have the peaceful inclusion of diverse opinions. Also, we need to deal with the issue on integrating Muslims into other societies.

Q: (Moroccan Association for Relief and Development) What can the media do to promote human rights education?
A: Morocco must do much more to use the media in schools to promote a human rights culture.

5. Observation

This event was attended by about 30 people from think tanks, the Embassy, Moroccan community, and other organizations. El Yazami was quite forthright; answering difficult questions; exhibiting a very deep commitment to CNDH’s work; and consistent in framing his analysis in terms of human rights, not political posturing. MACP should continue to integrate the work of CNDH into its materials and include them in delegation visits.

Beyond the Arab Spring: U.S. Engagement in a Changing Middle East

Date: April 8, 2014

1. Title: “Beyond the Arab Spring: U.S. Engagement in a Changing Middle East”
   Hosted by The Wilson Center and USIP

   Participants:
   - Daniel Brumberg: Senior Adviser, USIP
   - Danya Greenfield: Acting Director, The Atlantic Council
   - Steven Heydemann: Vice President, USIP
   - Haleh Esfandiari: Moderator: Director, The Wilson Center

2. Overview

The Wilson Center and the United States Institute of Peace brought together three area studies scholars on the Middle East and North Africa to discuss their assessments of the state of authoritarianism and democracy in the Middle East three years after the Arab Spring, and how US policy should adapt to changing dynamics in the region.

3. Summary

Steven Heydemann began with what he described as his “bleak” outlook on the state of democracy and freedom in the post-Arab Spring Middle East with regards to local and national governance. He said that when the first protests of the movement began, scholars and politicians wrongfully characterized Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes as brittle. However, he continued, three years down the line it appears that the Arab Spring has yielded an increase in exclusionary and centralized governments. He said that these authoritarian regimes upgraded their tactics to survive the Arab Spring with a renewed commitment to clamp down on and control the media, contain and demobilize civil
society, and buy off the public. Morocco, he said, has shown one of the biggest increases in public spending in order to buy off the public. Along with these measures, Morocco has started to shift its diplomacy and economy away from the west in order to evade the accompanying pressure it receives regarding human rights and democratization. He said that his prediction is grim for building and sustaining an international coalition to fight authoritarianism.

Daniel Brumberg said that he agreed with Steve Heydemann’s assessment of the region in the wake of the Arab Spring, adding that the situation is worse than he or anyone ever predicted. He stated that he foresees increasing antagonism toward the west emanating from the North Africa and the Middle East. The Arab Spring has created a challenging new landscape for the US and its interests. Russia, Iran, and China are in competition with the US for influence in the region. Syria and Egypt especially have opened up new opportunities for Russia to make regional dynamics fall in their favor.

Danya Greenfield began by saying that for the US to gain more influence in the Middle East and North Africa over Russia, Iran, and China, the government needs to be clear about what it wants to achieve. She said that the US has been unclear with what its goals are with Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The US hasn’t shown any core interest in democratization in the Middle East since the Arab Spring. Lastly, she recommended that the US and the EU coordinate their interests in the region to gain more influence and offset Iran, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, who have been gaining greater leverage in the region lately.

4. Q & A

Q: (Dana Dauda, Jordanian Embassy) Is three years after the Arab Spring enough time to start making assessments about the state of the Middle East? Jordan for example has shown a lot of commitment to reform. We have a road map to democracy. We have milestones set.

A: (Greenfield) When we evaluate the reforms of authoritarian regimes, we determine whether these reforms are meaningful or cosmetic.
(Steven Heydemann) It is true. Jordan is the regional leader of reform.
(Daniel Brumberg) Although Morocco insists that it’s leader in the region.
(Steven Heydemann) Are they real reforms? There is some degree of commitment but it’s not adequate. It’s also not useful to compare these nations in the Middle East to one another. There are countries that are worse off than others but it’s not to say that the better off countries are on the right trajectory.

5. Observation

There were about one hundred scholars, students and members of the press in attendance. The speakers showed great pessimism with regards to the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The entire panel showed a lot of skepticism toward all the governments in the Arab World and a lot of pessimism about the development of democracy there. The panel viewed most reforms and expansions of power in the region as disingenuous and as authoritarian tactics to demobilize would-be protestors. The overall skepticism of the panel and crowd were made even more clear after comment on Morocco ‘insisting’ that it is the regional leader in reform, whereby many in attendance laughed. This kind of perception is neither rare nor common, and is something that should be addressed carefully.

(Back to top)
2. Overview

This hearing allowed Members of Congress and the public the opportunity to hear more about what the Administration is doing to assist Morocco and what US strategic goals and objectives are in Morocco as well as the greater region. The hearing took place in the context of an imminent report from the Department of State required by Congress in the latest Appropriations Bill, as well as the recent visit for Secretary Kerry to Rabat for the US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue. Members of the Subcommittee gave statements and offered questions to the attending representatives of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), making known their priorities for the future of the bilateral relationship.

3. Observation

The hearing was attended by eight members of the Subcommittee as well as Rep. Grimm, who also attended but is not a member of the actual Subcommittee. The opening statements, as well as the questions and replies, yielded many positive remarks about Morocco and the commitment of the US to the bilateral relationship, addressing security, economic development, and political and social reforms. The vast majority of comments were very positive and focused on the constructive friendship between the two countries, the positive trajectory of Morocco, and the welcome role of Morocco as a model for other countries undergoing the process of reform. Mr. Roebuck gave some indication of what to expect in the upcoming report, and reiterated the Department’s support for the Moroccan autonomy plan.

4. Opening Statements

Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen opened the hearing by welcoming the committee and guests and reading an opening statement. With all the upheaval, instability, and social unrest caused by the Arab Spring, Morocco is designated as a Major Non-Nato Ally and is working towards a political transition and instituting democratic reforms. Three years ago, the King proposed constitutional reforms that would push the country towards democracy and reform, shifting some power that was centralized from the monarchy, to the people. Parliamentary elections followed later with a new Prime Minister from an opposition party with a mandate to have more power to govern. She added that “of course the political situation in Morocco is still not perfect, but it is important for us to recognize the positive steps forward.”

On the issue of the Western Sahara, Ros-Lehtinen noted, “longstanding US policy, which I support, advocates for a solution based on a formula of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.” The kingdom has made advancements in human rights, but “certainly more can still be done,” she continued. The chairwoman quoted a State Department report which cited restrictions on civil liberties for pro-independence advocates as among Morocco’s most pressing human rights challenges. On the other hand, she noted, “Morocco has made strides in expanding women’s rights,” and created the CNDH to evaluate human rights issues. She added that “as allies, we should work together to accelerate their plans to implement the constitutional reforms that urged gender equality and parity.”

Ros-Lehtinen continued by underscoring that Morocco and the US have shared a longstanding strategic bilateral relationship, “which has continued to strengthen over the past few years,” and continues to do so with Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent trip to Rabat. The Chairwoman cited the Free Trade Agreement and added that more can be done to get US businesses invested in Morocco. She mentioned the conclusion of the 5-year Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, which helped Morocco increase productivity, employment prospects, investments, and economic growth. The “MCC concluded that the results were impressive,” especially in regards to literacy programs, despite complications, she noted. The political transition towards democracy is being paralleled by Morocco’s economic transition, which is also underway.

Ros-Lehtinen next addressed the topic of security, noting that the US and Morocco collaborate closely on the issue; she argued, “where the rest of the region struggles to cope with radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism, Morocco is looking to foster and spread a more moderate form of Islam.” Morocco does this partly though efforts such as the focus on training women in Islamic theology right alongside their male counterparts. This idea would not only be taboo in many other countries, or likely even illegal. The kingdom has not been immune from the threat of homegrown extremism; as Ros-Lehtinen noted, “Morocco is on the frontlines of fighting terrorism throughout the region,” and “Morocco has proven to be an important ally.” The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Program is an important project that Morocco and the US can work closely together on. She concluded by saying that “the administration must continue to see Morocco as the potential for what other North African transitional countries can
Rep. Deutch began his opening statement by reminding the audience that Morocco was the first country to recognize US independence. He added that Morocco is a “critical partner” in improving security in the Maghreb and Sahel. This is evidenced by its status as a Major Non-NATO ally, as a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and by the recently-begun African Lion exercise involving 350 American service members and 150 Moroccan armed services members. This level of cooperation is “paramount” to fighting terrorism, arms, and narcotics trafficking in the region. Deutch underscored that, “It’s clear that Morocco is committed to taking substantial action,” to improve security and stability in the region. Rep. Deutch commended Morocco on its Imam training and other bilateral programs with Mali, which he called “a welcome approach.”

Turning to the economy, Rep. Deutch said that Morocco’s struggles were due to stagnation in Europe, and that increased government spending and high unemployment are serious issues, which he is happy to see are being addressed by USAID programs. He added that political reforms have met success and should be encouraged. Rep. Deutch commended Morocco’s performance with the conclusion of the first MCC compact and its $698 million investment in the country.

Rep. Deutch also commended Morocco’s good work with the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), and its leadership in the al-Quds committee, which plays a great role in working towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. “We look to Morocco to play a positive role,” he said. Rep. Deutch reminded the audience that Morocco has had a longstanding commitment to this conflict, as Hassan II “took the bold step” of inviting Simon Peres to meet publicly in Morocco for peace talks. He expressed concerns about recent news related potential anti-Israeli laws in Morocco. Rep. Deutch affirmed his support for the US policy of supporting Morocco’s plan for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for the Western Sahara, adding that it continues to receive strong bipartisan support in Congress. Lastly, Rep. Deutch said that in the wake of the Kerry visit to Rabat, he values the future of the bilateral relationship.

Rep. Chabot (R-OH) also added a short opening statement, beginning by reminding the audience that Morocco has been a source of calm in a chaotic region. He added that he looks forward to an update from the State Department on the status of the bilateral relationship following the recent visit of Secretary Kerry for the Strategic Dialogue meetings. He mentioned the promise of the 2011 constitution, and asked how that reform is carried out. He also asked for a comment on the success of the PJD in the most recent elections.

Rep. Grimm (R-NY) opened by saying that Morocco is historically one of America’s strongest allies, and has been a “strong partner in combatting terrorism throughout North Africa.” He mentioned that “King Mohammed successfully weathered the Arab Spring mostly by listening to the Moroccan people and making appropriate reforms, and for this, I think, he should be commended.” Rep. Grimm reiterated his support for Morocco’s plan for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, saying that “I believe the United States Congress has a responsibility to assist Morocco in achieving this resolution.”

Mr. Roebuck began his opening statement by saying that Morocco is “an important and longstanding ally,” and that “we continue to enjoy a strong bilateral relationship.” He said that the relationship is “focused on promoting regional stability, supporting democratic reform efforts, countering violent extremism, and strengthening trade and cultural ties.” The recent visit of the King and the recent Strategic Dialogue meetings provided an opportunity to affirm the relationship, he added.

Regarding democratic reforms, under King Mohammed VI, “the Moroccan political system has gradually liberalized,” Roebuck noted, and that the country “moved forward in 2013” with “calibrated but steady” political and economic reforms. “We have a robust dialogue” with Morocco on human rights and ongoing political reform, he added. The US and Morocco are fully engaged on ensuring peace and security in the region. Roebuck expressed approval that USAID’s new country strategy for Morocco is focusing on human rights, political reforms, and UN supported economic reforms. “The US and Morocco are focused on ensuring peace and security in the region,” he added. Roebuck reiterated support for UN Envoy Ross and his efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the Western Sahara question.” US policy “has remained consistent for many years,” he added. Roebuck reiterated support for UN Envoy Ross and his efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution.
Lastly, the US and Morocco have a longstanding history of people-to-people ties, Roebuck said, citing Morocco’s generous support for the J. Christopher Stephens virtual exchange initiative.

Romanowski began her opening statement by talking about the 56-year partnership between Morocco and USAID. She referred to it as a “strong relationship that focuses on growth, improving educational opportunities, and strengthening the effectiveness of civil society.” USAID has also worked on improving maternal health, constructing dams, convering land for agricultural use, and helping Morocco’s microfinance sector.

A new 5-year country development strategy was developed in consultation with the Moroccan government and civil society, and private sector, aiming to increase youth employment, enhancing civic participation in governance, and increasing enrollment in primary schools. Alliances with key regional allies and public-private partnerships with companies like Microsoft, Volvo, and Chevron, will help to control costs.

Romanowski stressed that targeting youth unemployment is crucial, as young people account for 30% of the population, and graduates can’t find jobs while employers cite a lack of necessary skills. Without a change, “Morocco cannot generate sufficient prosperity through private sector growth,” she stated. Toward that end, Romanowski underscored that USAID is launching the Youth Employability Project, which will “facilitate partnerships between government ministries, Moroccan universities, and technical institutes, as well as local NGOs and the private sector, to create workforce development services for a broad range of youth.” She mentioned current work with 40 Moroccan startups.

USAID is also helping Morocco’s push to promote civil society by working with 80 local governments to create platforms for dialogue, especially for youth and women. USAID is also focused on primary education, especially for rural girls. From 2000 to 2004, attendance rates for girls improved from 62% to 83%, though the overall literacy rate remains 55%. Early grad reading is also being boosting in conjunction with Moroccan reforms. These development projects will also help to combat violent extremism by giving at-risk Moroccan youth a voice and opportunity.

5. Q & A

Q: (Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)) In the omnibus bill passed in January, Congress authorized that funds could also be used in the Western Sahara and that a report would be issued on the subject – can you describe what the report will entail and if it will be delivered on time? With the extremism threat on the rise in the region, how would you describe the cooperation with Morocco on counterterrorism? And lastly, what was the result of the recent meeting for the Strategic Dialogue with Secretary Kerry?

A: (Roebuck) The Strategic Dialogue was a great success. The focus is on three areas: political security, economic and political cooperation, and education and cultural cooperation. I think we made steps forward in all three areas. There was a robust discussion on the topic of Morocco’s domestic reforms, counterterrorism, and regional economic integration. They were also focused on strengthening Morocco’s end of the Free Trade Agreement, interfaith dialogue, the aforementioned Chris Stephens project, and cultural exchange programs such as the Fulbright program. On counterterrorism, this has been a decade-long development, fed by developments in Mali and Libya and the wider Sahel. We work very closely with Morocco on counterterrorism, and our partnership is quite strong. We are working together to improve law enforcement and criminal justice system strengthening in support of counterterrorism.

Q: (Rep. Deutch (D-FL)) Clearly, security cooperation is a critical part of the relationship. The amount of youth unemployment is a staggering figure, and we share concerns with Morocco that this population could be vulnerable to extremism – the porous borders in North Africa make the proposition of recruitment in conflict like Syria easier. What is being done to address this specific issue?

A: (Roebuck) The US and Morocco work closely on this. There is “a need for a multifaceted approach to this - and a counterterrorism approach in general - and this is what Morocco has in place.” Morocco’s “vigilant security efforts” include a “soft-side” counteracting through education and socio-economic assistance as part of a broad, focused policy, which we’re very supportive of.

Q: (Rep. Deutch (D-FL)) I was pleased to see USAID is focused on youth unemployment. Now that Morocco announced ambitious plans to increase industry and employment, how will USAID programs realign?

A: (Romanowski) We have already realigned with this in mind. Focusing on bringing universities, vocational students, the private sector, and the government, centers together.

Q: (Rep. Deutch (D-FL)): Morocco focuses on increasing civic participation among women, with the 60-seat quota for
women in Parliament. What trend lines are you seeing for women in politics?

A. (Romanowski) I think the trend lines for women in Morocco are positive. In my last several visits I’ve met women parliamentarians and politicians and others active in politics, and through our programs we are making sure that young men and women are getting more active participation.

Q: (Rep. Chabot (R-OH)) Morocco has been supportive of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, though recently an anti-Israeli group has worked to end ties between Morocco and Israel. Is this group a cause for concern?

A: (Roebuck) Morocco and Israel have a long history of positive relations. These anti-Israel efforts have stalled and we believe that broader values of religious dialogue will triumph. The King and government have worked hard to foster religious tolerance and interfaith understanding in the country.

Q: (Rep. Chabot (R-OH)) We know there are a lot of bad actors in the region and Morocco has taken a proactive approach to counterterrorism, can you comment on some of the successful elements?

A: (Roebuck) The Moroccans have been very effective counterterrorism partners due to broad proven elements. They are very good at developing programs to promote tolerant, moderate Islam. Efforts to train imams in neighboring countries are effective. They’ve also been very active as regional interactive partner in counterterrorism. They’ve hosted a border conference in Libya and other things on a wide range of fronts.

(Romanowski) I would point to our civic participation programs that focus on marginalized urban youth. We’ve targeted the areas of Tangiers and Tetouan neighborhoods to bring out the voices and bring confidence by youth in politics.

Q: (Rep. Chabot (R-OH)) Some argue that the US-Morocco trade agreement limits greater regional economic integration. Would you agree with that and do you believe both sides have benefitted and what is the future of trade between Morocco and the US?

A: (Roebuck) It’s been a huge benefit to both sides. The US somewhat more in the initial years but I don’t believe it’s been a hindrance to Morocco. They have a bright future as a hub for Europe and Africa.

Q: (Rep. Frankel (D-FL)) The 2011 constitution guaranteed gender equality, but I’m told it is still not where Moroccan women would like it to be. Judges still allow marriage under the supposed new age limit and there are inheritance laws that still favor men. What is your opinion of the status of women in Morocco? What measures of effectiveness in counterterrorism measures have there been? What is the strategic importance of Morocco in their relationship to neighboring countries?

A: (Roebuck) On the issue of reform and women’s society, I would say that it’s a work in progress in Morocco. Moroccans underwent major reforms in 2003 and 2004 that benefitted women through family code reform and inheritance and child custody. The 2011 constitution strengthened further some of those reforms and made constitutionally clear gender equality. Some of those issues remain a problem – the Moroccan government is aware of it. “Our sense is that they are reform-oriented, they want to make improvements, they are continuing to do this, and what we’ve seen in the last decade really is a steady move of progress. One of the human rights people in 2012 noted an emerging culture of human rights in Morocco.” On the strategic importance of Morocco, we have a strategic relationship with Morocco because it is such an important country in the region – its geographic location is very important, it is involved in one of the major conflict areas in the Western Sahara, which is important, and it is creating some issue with Algeria. It is also a critical partner in fighting extremism, trade, and promoting moderate Islam. It is a very important strategic partner for the United States.

A: (Romanowski) On the issue of monitoring effectiveness, the new 5-year country strategy afforded us that opportunity to evaluate programs. This caused our shift to focus on workforce development.

Q: (Rep. Grimm (R-NY)) The Chairwoman before mentioned the report on Western Sahara funds. Is it on schedule?

A: (Roebuck) Yes sir, we are preparing the report and it will be delivered in compliance with the law.

Q: (Rep. Grimm (R-NY)) Can you provide some idea of what to expect?

A: (Roebuck) “I think the report will describe our efforts to provide assistance to Morocco, and it will outline some of the areas where we have provided that assistance, addressing the particular areas that the legislation wants to see more information on. It will make the point that with regard to assistance for Morocco that would be used in the Western Sahara; our policy is that we should not take any actions that would be perceived as undermining our support for the UN-led mediation process, and that’s a pillar of our policy, and the report would include that point.”

Q: (Rep. Grimm (R-NY)) Changing gears a little bit, I’m very happy to see that Morocco is becoming a destination for many US companies, not just as an export market but also as a platform for exports into Africa, Europe, and the broader Middle East. Casablanca Finance City is poised to become one of the central economic hubs for international companies on the continent. Can you tell us about how companies are looking at Morocco as a gateway market?
A: (Roebuck) The primary way that American companies work in Morocco so far is to use the vehicle of the FTA, which gives companies an ability to invest in Morocco and invest there. We also signed a trade facilitation agreement to shore up those efforts.

(Romanowski) In my most recent conversations with Moroccan businessmen, it was very clear that they were looking to our programs to build networks into the US and were looking forward to further development.

Q: (Rep. Connolly (D-VA)) What is the impact of the crackdown and political repression in Egypt of the Moroccan government and public opinion?

A: (Roebuck) It is difficult for me to say directly, but people in the region are looking closely. In Tunisia, some of the political parties watched and it probably made them more flexible in their national dialogue. Morocco was in a different situation with no approaching elections. I suspect people in Morocco are concerned and it may be causing some changed perception of the Arab Spring and democratic evolution and the side effects of turmoil.

Q: (Rep. Connolly (D-VA)) Hopefully Morocco looks at that and says, that’s not where we want to go. Where is the Polisario right now? What is their appeal and political standing? Are they stronger or weaker? Has Morocco exercised sovereignty in a meaningful way that is recognized?

A: (Roebuck) The Polisario is the political organization that advocates for independence in the Western Sahara. “I’d say that their influence has been somewhat circumscribed in the last decade.” It is an area that has remained in conflict. There are two parties to it – those parties have to reach a mutually agreed-upon solution. "I think probably over the past decade or so they’ve gotten weaker.” They remain a key party in that conflict, weaker or not. On sovereignty, “the territory of Western Sahara is considered by the UN as a non-self-governing territory, and Morocco exercises as sort of an administrator for its part of the territory, but it’s not recognized by the UN as an official administrating power for the Western Sahara.”

Q: (Rep. Connolly (D-VA)) Does anybody think Western Sahara could actually function as an independent functioning state viably?

A: (Roebuck) We don’t reach that level of inquiry, we focus on the process of resolving the conflict and haven’t reached any decision about the viability of Western Sahara as a state. “The Moroccans have put forward a proposal which is autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as their solution to that conflict – we believe that’s a serious, realistic, and credible proposal. It’s a potential approach to address the concerns of the people of Western Sahara and to help them to live their lives in justice and dignity, so we think it’s a potential approach.” But in the end we don’t think you can impose it.

Q: (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) Morocco receives substantial US development aid and bilateral assistance that has increased following a 2006 Free Trade Agreement. How much has our trade increased as a result of that?

A: (Roebuck) Our trade has increased about 400% - it’s a big increase on both sides. Its about 400% on the US side and between 150% and 200% on the Moroccan side. So its been a big benefit for both, a little more for US exports. We are working with the Moroccans though our commercial development programs, through USAID, and through the MCC to even that out and improve competitiveness so that Moroccans can equally benefit.

Q: (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) I saw that Morocco recently concluded a $697 million MCC compact which focuses on alleviating poverty. Was it successful?

A: (Roebuck) I think it was very successful. It focused on sustainable tourism, sustainable fisheries, and agriculture. It educated with basic literacy about 40,000 poor people in those fields. 80% of those people were women. It helped build a tourist infrastructure in Fez medina and focused to a limited degree on financial services. Morocco was re-selected for a second compact – I think many people were impressed by the way it engaged with its institutions and its enthusiasm. And we are moving forward with shaping a further compact for Morocco.

Q: (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) With regard to the improvement of women’s rights with the passage of the 2004 family code that aimed to improve women’s socioeconomic rights – has that been successful? Can you give me a status update?

A: (Romanowski) We ensure that all of our USAID programs are supportive of women and include women, particularly when it comes to our democracy and governance. We are making sure that women who want to get into politics have the training and skills, and have the advantage. This is also the case in our economic and workforce development program. There is a lot more work to do – that is true across the region – but I think Morocco actually stands out as making some great strides.

Q: (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) I have read that there is some concern that the Western Sahara will actually become a training ground for terrorists and even that some of those potential terrorists had been training in Western Europe. Is that right?
A: (Roebuck) I am not aware of that report. Our general assessment of the Western Sahara is as follows: it is a large space and we don't think that it's good for a space that big to be an ungoverned space. That is why we support the UN being there with MINURSO organization. In terms of what you are talking about with ties between and people in the Western Sahara, to our knowledge we are not aware of significant terrorist activity in the Western Sahara and we are not aware of links between the Polisario, for example, and terrorist organizations like the ones you cited.

Q: (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) Morocco and the Polisario both have advocates who regularly appeal to Congress to support their positions on the Western Sahara, Many members of Congress support Morocco’s support Morocco’s position of sovereignty over the territory. How many members of Congress support that position? Do you know?
A: (Roebuck) I don’t know. Our view is that the issue of sovereignty is something that should be resolved through negotiations with the parties. Both sides have put forward proposals. We think that the Moroccan proposal is very serious, credible, and realistic. But in the end we can’t impose it.

Full video of the hearing as well as opening statements can be found here: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-us-policy-towards-morocco

Youth Inclusion in Morocco: A Discussion With Minister Mohamed Ouzzine

Date: April 9, 2014

1. Title: “Youth Inclusion in Morocco: A Discussion With Minister Mohamed Ouzzine”
   Hosted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

   Participants:
   Mohamed Ouzzine: Minister for Youth and Sports, The Kingdom of Morocco
   Gloria La Cava: Co-coordinator, the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region youth program

2. Overview

Moroccan Minister of Youth and Sports Mohamed Ouzzine discussed the challenges facing young people in Morocco, including the high unemployment rate and corresponding lack of economic opportunities. Gloria La Cava provided a perspective from the World Bank on recent developments in response to the minister.

3. Summary

Mohamed Ouzzine began by stating the importance of the youth in Morocco during the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The majority of Morocco’s population is made of young people and he stressed that it is the responsibility of the government to provide the youth with opportunities and inspiration. People have asked if the youth of North Africa benefitted from the Arab Spring. He said that Morocco is a special case. The government, he said, had taken an interest in the country’s youth long before the Arab Spring. The reforms that the King launched during the Arab Spring were a result of this interest. The youth in Morocco displayed the same demands of its government that everyone did during the Arab Spring. The King of Morocco anticipated these demands, listening to the youth and reacting to their demands in a constructive way. In Tunisia, for example, they did it the other way around.

The subsequent Constitutional reform process in Morocco involved consultation with the Moroccan youth - they had a say in the process. Ouzzine underscored that the Moroccan monarchy wants young people to be involved in the policymaking process and that the government is providing youth a chance to create their own vision of the country. He noted, “the policies made are their own policies,” because Morocco has an integrated strategy of political reform - all the government departments are involved. No more does the Moroccan government approach these issues in a unilateral way. Each department plays an important role as one team. This is the new approach that Morocco has invested in.

Gloria La Cava started by talking about how the Moroccan government has pushed the World Bank to think outside the box with regards to youth inclusion issues. The World Bank has learned a lot of lessons from Morocco. There is
hope for the future, but expectations must be grounded in realism. La Cava stressed that the focus on unemployed graduates is necessary because they are an important group. However, in terms of numbers, they are a very small segment of the population - the majority of the youth population is made up of non-graduates. These young people are out of work and out of school. The World Bank noted these demographics and started designing youth inclusion programs in response. La Cava stated that it has provided Morocco with some assistance with some strategies, but Morocco has done the bulk of the work. La Cava concluded that the World Bank is there when needed, but Morocco is truly driving the process.

4. Q & A
Q. (Julian Sutzker, Human Rights Watch) Is there a human rights component to this youth plan? What does it entail?
A. (Ouzzine) We are offering a wide range of services to young people. The human rights component is something that is good and we encourage.

Q. (Nancy Taggert, Education Development Center) Give some details about the economic development plan regarding youth in Morocco.
A. (La Cava) This program is new. It targets young women in particular. In terms of the design features of this strategy there are some programs that will be implemented that will be integrated with the ministry of labor. We will be introducing a lot of innovations.
A. (Ouzzine) The North Africa and the Middle East is characterized by a mismatch of demography and economic structure. The point now is to target the underprivileged youth.

5. Observation
This event highlighted Morocco’s exceptionalism in the region with regards to human rights, youth unemployment, and dialogue between the people and the government. Ouzzine underscored that Morocco was reacting and planning its innovative plan to engage the youth of the country long before the Arab Spring. These reforms and changes are not necessarily a response to the Arab Spring; the King had anticipated this unrest and had already began to listen and react in a constructive way.

Governance, Rule of Law, and the International Development Agenda

Date: April 9, 2014

1. Title: “Governance, Rule of Law, and the International Development Agenda”
   Hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
   Participants:
   **Ambassador Jan Eliasson:** Deputy Secretary-General, United Nations
   **Henrietta Holsman-Fore:** Chairman and CEO, Holsman International, CSIS Trustee
   **Daniel Runde:** Moderator: Director, Project on Prosperity and Development, CSIS

2. Overview
This event focused on the evolving international development landscape, predominantly on ways to incorporate better governance and rule of law initiatives in the post-2015 development plan for the UN. Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson offered his viewpoint on how to continue to build on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as ways that the UN is adapting its priorities to meet the current development challenges.

3. Summary
Ambassador Eliasson opened his presentation with a question: is good governance an appropriate ambition for the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) challenge? Promoting good governance and rule of law is a priority in the eyes of the UN. To explain, he cited a quote: “There is no peace without development, there is no development without peace, there is no development or peace without the respect of human rights.” He argued that today he would add rule of law and underscored that peace and security, development, and human rights are one. These things all need to be developed at the same time because if one of the elements is weak, then the whole structure is weak. Thus it is important for development goals to incorporate good governance objectives. The UN, other
international organizations, and national governments must see problems in a horizontal matter from all perspectives in order to ensure that the whole structure is strong. This of course requires partnerships – between international organizations, national governments, civil society, and the private sector, among others - and resources.

Eliasson continued by stating that the MDGs have provided an important planning instrument that has helped promote positive development in the last 15 years. The percentage of extreme poverty has gone down, Africa’s GDP growth of around 5-7% per year, and gender equality in education has also improved immensely. However, maternal health and sanitation continue to be huge problems and the biggest disappointments to the UN. Confronting these challenges is especially important since they have a multiplier effect on other issues. Water and sanitation are closely linked to health, health is closely linked to education performance, and education performance is linked to improving gender inequality. MDGs for post-2015 will thus most likely focus on three core areas: eradicating poverty by means of job creation, gender equality, industrialization, and the use of natural resources; environmental sustainability; and creating institutions in order to enhance rule of law. The later is particularly important as it protects human rights. And human rights violations are at the root of most modern conflicts, particularly civil wars; if the international community can confront these issues at the start, through institutions and rule of law, it would go a long way toward preventing mass atrocities.

4. Q & A

Q: (Daniel Runde, CSIS) Many Americans are skeptical of the UN, what is in it for the United States for the reconsideration of the MDGs?
A: It is not only the right thing to do morally and ethically, it is also good for all countries to help create equal development which continues to bring about global peace and prosperity. If one country thrives, its neighbors will then thrive. That is how global development works.

Q: (Daniel Runde, CSIS) Can you talk about the developments between now and December 2015 when the new MDGs will be made?
A: The General Assembly will most likely create clusters of problems and issues by this July. Then they will begin the search for finances and people to solve and create plans for these problems. MDGs will not become a reality unless there are financial resources to pull from, so that is also a priority. The question most important in our current world is 'how'. All international policy professionals know 'what' needs to happen, but they need to create a plan of action. There needs to be a holistic approach, not squeezing problems into already created institutions, but rather creating institutions around problems.

Q: (Will Davis, United Nations Development Programme) Is there anyone arguing against the rule of law? What are their arguments?
A: The people who are arguing against the rule of law are the governments that are being challenged to abide by this. Their biggest arguments against this matter are issues of sovereignty and why international organizations, like the UN, feel the right to get involved in their internal politics.

Q: (Tony Carroll, CSIS) What is the realistic UN dialogue concerning the natural resources in Africa, considering the misappropriation of funds?
A: Everyone working in the UN is fully aware of the corruption in Africa. The scariest part is organized crime that develops from corruption and how the undermine structures and governments. Organized crime is the biggest contributor to terrorism which becomes an international issue.

5. Observation

There were nearly 100 foreign policy professionals and about 10 students in attendance at this event. This event was of great importance for anyone working in international development - Ambassador Eliasson remarks provided insight into the 2015 UN Millennium Development Goals. While not directly relevant to Morocco or broader US policy, Morocco is a stakeholder in the MDGs and may well be invested in the second round of them, having committed to the previous round of MDGs and looking set to achieve them.
1. Title: “Islamists in Government: Do They Moderate Once in Power?”
Hosted by the Washington Institute

Participants:
Eric Trager: Esther K. Wagner Fellow, the Washington Institute
Haroon Ullah: Member, Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff
Vish Sakthivel: Next Generation Fellow, the Washington Institute

2. Overview
The Washington Institute brought together three scholars to discuss issues of governance in the Middle East and the trajectory of recent Arab uprisings. They discussed what lessons could – and could not – be drawn from the Islamist political experience in Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, and other countries. The panelists suggested that the answer to the question of whether Islamists moderate once in power may be “no,” and concluded that some groups have become even more hard-line under the climate of the Arab Spring.

3. Summary
Eric Trager provided his assessment of The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and their development throughout history, with particular emphasis on the changes within the Brotherhood in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring. In assessing whether or not it moderated once in power, Trager first tried to debunk certain characterizations about the Brotherhood. He argued that one can’t see the Brotherhood as just a political party as this ignores the other things that it has done in its history such as its violent activity and social services. Similarly, one cannot make the mistake of seeing the Brotherhood as a broad social movement either. This wrongly assumes that the Brotherhood is a social movement. He argued that these descriptions wrongly characterized the Brotherhood as a democratic party with an Islamist ideology, rather than what it actually is: a hierarchical vanguard whose raison d’etre is achieving societal support and political power to resist Western political and cultural influences in Egypt. This rigid internal structure affected its behavior in power far more than its Islamist ideology.

What this means is that while the Brotherhood is in fact an Islamist group, it’s not what dictates its behavior. The hierarchical vanguard structure is what dictates its behavior and as a result it did not moderate once in power for three reasons. First, it feared losing the internal cohesion on which vanguards depend, so its priority was appeasing a rank-and-file that wanted the Brotherhood to consolidate power quickly, rather than governing inclusively. Second, its intolerance toward outsiders -- another characteristic of insular vanguards -- further encouraged its exclusivist governing style. Muhammad Morsi’s November 2012 constitutional declaration, through which he asserted unchecked executive authority, is the best example of this. Third, the Brotherhood faced its most serious political challenge from hardline Salafists, and this compelled it to embrace a far more theocratic constitution than it otherwise might have. Of these three reasons, only this last one has anything to do with the Brotherhood's Islamist ideology.

Given that the Brotherhood is primarily a hierarchical vanguard and an Islamist group only secondarily, its failure to moderate in power does not necessarily teach us much about how Islamists in general will behave in power. However, Trager argued that their experiences nevertheless illustrates that Islamists’ organizational culture frequently determines their political behavior far more than their ideological pronouncements, particularly when those pronouncements are tailored for a Western audience.

Haroon Ullah started his segment by defining extremism. One can identify an extremist party by looking for several signs. Firstly, does the party seek power through extra-electoral means? In other words, do they use violence or the threat of violence? The second dimension in looking at extremism is seeing if a political entity adopts exclusionary policies toward certain groups based on their moral edicts. The third sign of extremism is incendiary rhetoric and symbolism in their campaigns for power.

He then went on to talk about Pakistan. He said the way to understand extremists in the Arab Spring is by understanding Pakistan because Islamists have the longest track record in Pakistan. The entire evolution of Islamism has already been played out in Pakistan and we may see the same pattern in the Arab world in the years to come. Ullah drew five lessons from the Islamist experience in Pakistan that can help enhance understanding of their rule.

First, the violence carried out or supported by Islamist parties in Pakistan is not indiscriminate or gratuitous, but
targeted and strategic. Through connections with extremist groups, Islamists leverage political violence to push their agenda and maximize votes. Second, Pakistan proves that democracy does not necessarily moderate Islamist party platforms and ideologies. While Islamists can become more moderate through repeated electoral competition, they are just as likely to become more extreme if it serves their interests. Third, Islamist parties are not monolithic. In Pakistan, they are diverse and compete hardest against one another. To increase their appeal to the electorate, each party claims to be the most authentically religious, creating significant animosity between them. Fourth, the idea that poverty drives militancy -- which is often assumed when formulating US policy in the Middle East and South Asia -- is largely mistaken. In Pakistan, the key constituencies for Islamists hail from the thin middle class and urban areas; this and other factors may help explain why Islamist parties do better in provincial, regional, and local elections than at the national level. In order to be more effective on the ground, the United States should align its programs based on this rethinking of what drives militancy. Fifth, Islamist parties want more than just a seat at the table. They also want to shape the debate around morality.

As for their views of foreign actors, Ullah argued that Islamist political parties in Pakistan are not inherently anti-Western, though they frequently use religion to mobilize voters and have helped create a toxic environment in the country. Going forward, Washington could influence such groups through public diplomacy and faith-based engagement. For example, by interacting with figures who hold sway among Islamists -- such as imams who are increasingly bearing the cost of violence -- the United States could greatly improve its credibility. After all, most Islamists are like other political parties: they are pragmatists, not staunch ideologues.

Vish Sakthivel addressed the situation of Islamists in Morocco and argued their experiences, most prominently the governing Justice and Development Party (PJD), show the different levels of moderation that can apply once they are in power. There is moderation in signaling: for example, an Islamist group can send a message to constituents or authorities that it does not pose a threat. There is also moderation in behavior, which may actually be a shift in the group's ethos. And lastly, there is moderation in ideology, which yields a more fundamental change in mission. Factors that can push a group to moderate include the presence of a grand arbiter or some other power-sharing imperative.

Sakthivel then assessed the PJD's moderation within the Moroccan political system. To start, the PJD had to moderate when it came to power because of the unique religious situation in Morocco: that of the King having a monopoly on Islam as Commander of the Faithful. As Morocco's version of Islam is moderate -- and perpetuated by a popular King, the country has branded itself as an example of moderate and tolerant Islam. This branding serves as a counter weight against the Salafi and Wahabi ideologies. This structure has resulted in the PJD evolving from an underground extremist movement into a more accommodating political party in Morocco -- and of course moderating in the process. It had to moderate in order to operate in Morocco and has thus moderated its policies and approach to legislation.

Its resultant political pragmatism and moderation, which were originally meant to demonstrate loyalty, have crippled its ability to effect change on various issues. Despite this trajectory, the PJD has not abandoned its ideology. It is still an Islamist group and still believes that Islam should not only inform policy, but also form the basis of Moroccan law. Yet this lack of ideological moderation is largely inconsequential in the Moroccan context because it does not have immediate political consequences. At the end of the day, the King reigns supreme, and any turn toward extremism would cause the PJD to lose the royal patronage for which all political parties in Morocco are vying. At this point, political expediency is just as important as ideology to the PJD, if not more so.

Since Morocco's political circumstances are regionally unique, the PJD's moderation -- in policy, behavior, and internal processes -- cannot be extrapolated to answer questions about Islamist groups in other countries. In addition, Sakthivel stressed that one cannot extrapolate from the Egyptian and Tunisian Islamist aftermath to understand how the PJD would operate if truly in power -- that is, in the absence of a greater powerbroker. When analyzing such groups, one must situate their behavior in the contexts in which they operate. Ignoring those sociopolitical contexts would result in purely speculative analysis. Finally, if political immoderation is defined as the penchant for exclusionary rhetoric and power grabbing versus a more pluralistic approach, then it is not limited to Islamists alone.

4. Q & A

Q: (Zach Gold, Brookings) What can countries put in place to curb extremism and force moderation instead of a King like in Morocco?
A: (Vish Sakthivel) Power sharing is an important component.
Q: (Manar Ghueen, Middle East News Egypt) Do you think the Muslim Brotherhood is moderating?
A: (Eric Trager) They do absolutely use the Quran in a fundamentalist way. But it’s not what defines their behavior. Islamism in the Brotherhood is just the flavoring. It’s not irrelevant. It’s part of the reason for why people join. It’s the vanguard that dictates their behavior.

5. Observation

There were around 50 people in attendance. Most were university researchers and journalists. Vish Sakthivel’s comments on the relationship between Islamists and the Moroccan monarchy revealed a sustainable system of government that forces the moderation, cooperation, and integration of Islamists groups. Along with this structure, the gradual democratization of governments like the Moroccan government would further moderate any threats from Islamists political parties.


---

**Morocco in a Post-Arab Spring World: Addressing the challenges of reform, regionalization and resource management**

Date: April 30, 2014

1. Title: Morocco in a Post-Arab Spring World: Addressing the challenges of reform, regionalization and resource management
   Hosted by Kosmos Energy

   Participants:
   
   **Jean AbiNader**: Executive Director, Moroccan American Trade and Investment Center
   **Dr. William Lawrence**: Visiting Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School, George Washington University
   **Davide Furceri**: Economist, International Monetary Fund
   **Krista Hendry**: Moderator: Executive Director, The Fund for Peace

2. Overview

Kosmos Energy hosted this experts’ roundtable on Morocco designed to provide a lively discussion of current events in Morocco and the broader Maghreb region. The event was meant to be an educational tool geared towards a primary audience of legislative assistants, senior foreign policy analysts, and homeland security staffers to Members of the US House and Senate. Discussion focused on economic development, political and social reform, and Morocco’s unique experience of the Arab Spring.

3. Summary

Krista Hendry introduced Morocco by highlighting its “evolutionary change,“ which offers a stark contrast from its more revolutionary neighbors. The hallmark of Morocco’s experience from the past several years is one of a positive, yet slow trend towards sustainable social and political progress, especially given the immense regional and domestic pressures it has faced. She added that despite this, “expectations, which are almost always too high, were not met.”

In the international community, “it becomes easy to overlook countries like this,“ Hendry added. Morocco needs continued support to develop its economy and infrastructure to maintain stability and an environment conducive to reform. The need for this external support is increasingly urgent as combatants in Syria enter North Africa and threaten even more instability.

Dr. Lawrence reminded the audience that during the Arab Spring 18 countries experienced political upheaval, of which Morocco was "the last but not the least.” Somewhere between 120,000 and 1 million Moroccans demonstrated at some point over a number of weeks against the government in political protest, resulting in 27 deaths and 20
self-immolations – which was a relatively small number compared to the total of 400 in the rest of the countries that experienced the Arab Spring. In comparison, this uprising was small, he said. Despite that, the February 20 movement has a profound and still pending impact on internal dynamics in the country. Moroccan Prime Minister Benkirane even called the movement ‘successful‘ as a result.

Looking back, Morocco demonstrated a commitment to reform well before the Arab Spring. A dramatic page was turned in 1999 for Moroccan civil society, allowing it to develop more maturity than was possible in other neighboring countries. This development was a strong influence on the relatively moderate nature of the February 20 movement, as Lawrence described, “the protesters’ choice was a deliberate one.”

Today, youth unemployment is the looming threat to society. 49% of youth in the country is neither employed nor in school. Even worse, unemployed graduates suffer an unemployment rate four times higher than the rest of the population. Although overall employment figures have shown significant improvement due to wise investments, the economy simply “hasn’t caught up yet,” and Morocco has a youth bubble like most other Middle East and North African countries. The youth unemployment figure will be a bellwether for the future stability of the country.

Regarding reforms, Lawrence described the 2011 constitution as “remarkable,” noting that certain elements of Morocco’s new constitution were incorporated into Tunisia’s. In the US, Islamist involvement in the new government was ‘the story,’ yet the truly noteworthy element for Morocco was the occurrence of a free and fair election. The “extraordinary concessions in executive power” were remarkable, but not everything desired from the reforms has happened yet, he added. Voting issues did persist, however, as “spoiled ballots” we so numerous that their tally amounted to a second place finish in the 2011 election. Despite the criticism, the effort amounted to “significant progress.”

Regarding human rights, Lawrence repeated a phrase he had heard, observing Morocco’s “emerging culture of human rights.” Protestors, he added, are aware of a “larger space” in which they can operate. Morocco is “investing hugely and had significant gains” in policing, investigations, crowd control, and other human rights issues. Lawrence noted recent reforms which included institutionalized civil society dialogue and new laws on civilian trials and immigration. The King is focused on the ‘youth issue,’ he added, and young people in the country reciprocate and maintain positive feelings towards the monarch.

Despite concerns in the US about press freedom in the country, Lawrence said that there was vast change after 1999 that resulted in much more openness, which journalists continue to ‘test‘ in terms of changing boundaries for their reporting. The increase in this ‘testing’ behavior is a positive sign of continued opening of press freedoms.

Lawrence specifically mentioned the work being done by Nizar Baraka and Morocco’s Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE) as exemplary. He described the process as being done in an “inclusive and intelligent way; you couldn’t be envisioning a better way to go about this.”

Lawrence concluded in saying that as Morocco democratizes, a lot of these other problems will have a chance to be resolved. He paraphrased the State Department testimony at the recent Congressional hearing on Morocco in saying that the country effectively “uses the tools in its toolkit.” Morocco is also deeply invested in developing its neighbors in Libya and Mali, trying to play the regional role that has long been asked of it.

Davide Furceri began his talk by saying that Morocco is an exceptional case for the region, describing its recent economic performance as “almost stellar.” This is despite suffering major internal and external shocks such as instability associated with the Arab Spring, rising costs from subsidies, and dampened demand from its main trading and investment partners in the EU. Performance has indeed weakened as a result of these shocks, resulting in a widened current account deficit that remains burdensome. However, Morocco was better placed than most to face these issues, as it enjoys high and sustained Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Growth has remained relatively strong, though not strong enough to make impactful change in unemployment, which increases the urgency for further reforms. Tariffs, credit access, SME development, capital flows, labor markets, and business environment reforms, are all priorities for potential reforms. Furceri estimated that Moroccan GDP growth could increase from 4% to 7% if these are successfully implemented.

Furceri echoed the concern about youth unemployment, adding that it has actually worsened over the last three years. Despite having a relatively good education system, those with diplomas have a hard time finding jobs. A rigid labor market, emphasis on the public sector over the private sector for jobs and development, and a mismatch between education and the true labor market remain barriers. Students don’t study engineering, a sector that has
been a point of emphasis for investment and development, but students instead study social sciences in hopes of securing government work, Furceri stated. As a result, some international investors bring laborers along with them when the local labor pool isn't qualified for high-tech manufacturing.

Morocco can do more for its economy. Although it has been quite successful in reducing poverty in the country, inequality has increased. The lack of effective social programs and access to public services impose economic limitations. Furceri was, on the other hand, encouraged by recent reforms to subsidies, which generally have a greater benefit to the top quintile of the population. The savings should be reinvested in basic services such as healthcare and infrastructure, he said.

Jean AbiNader added his thoughts on Morocco as a business partner, particularly in the Western Sahara. Morocco knows what it needs to do to attract business, focusing on best practices because its trade partners in the US and EU have high standards. Morocco’s focus is not only business, he added, but impact investing. For investors, “it’s about the money, but it’s also about being a partner in the long term,” he said.

Regarding resources in the Sahara, he said, the serious interest here is new, “despite what you hear,” because a massive investment in infrastructure is needed to support substantial resource extraction. One of the weaknesses of the last MCC compact with Morocco was that it didn’t focus on this kind of infrastructure in the south.

AbiNader stated that the Western Sahara issue has generally been ignored by the global community; that is, until the political costs started to change with the Arab Spring, as Polisario trafficking routes and lack of effective government in their areas of authority extending into the Sahara and Sahel, provide a ready-made network which is being used by “forces that include jihadists, militants, criminals and terrorists.” He added that “Africa does not need, nor can support, another vague territory known as a state.”

Political steps towards resolution via negotiated political solution (rather than by referendum) caused a shifting reality that has increased interest by international businesses in the Western Sahara. Companies are aware of the spotlight which will serve to enforce the need to conduct their business sensitively and responsibly. Morocco has worked to do its part by promoting expanded rights and investing towards economic development in the territory.

AbiNader spoke of the King’s leadership in development; “he gets it,” demonstrated by the use of inclusive processes to address problems credibly, realistically, and seriously. The King “is deadly serious about getting the political system to mature,” AbiNader added, towards a full parliamentary democracy. AbiNader described how the King declined to get involved when the parliamentary coalition fell apart, essentially empowering the parties by forcing them to resolve the issue themselves and without the King’s intervention. Five month later, the parties themselves emerged with a new coalition. This demonstrated the King’s desire to fill the political space created by the new constitution, and establish a mature political system.

AbiNader agreed with Dr. Lawrence’s assessment of the CESE, lauding the deliberate process of its yearlong consultation with civil society and experts in drafting its recommendations for improving social and economic development in Morocco. The honest assessment of past policy will lead to better development results. The commitment to better understand and engage with local stakeholders is already being reflected in the recent EU fisheries agreement. Altogether, $18 billion will be invested in the Western Sahara in the next ten years, whether or not gas or oil are found in commercial quantities.

In conclusion, AbiNader speculated that the discovery of resources in Western Sahara might actually encourage the process towards a political resolution, as all sides could realize that participating in an autonomous Sahara would be the best option for ending the humanitarian crisis in Tindouf and maximizing benefits to the local population.

4. Q & A

Q: What has been the impact of the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA)? How is that in balance?
A. (AbiNader) Morocco has been able to export less to the US, but the reason is that only 22% of its economy is manufactured goods, so what are they able to offer? The key to balancing the bilateral trade relationship, on the other hand, is encouraging US investments in Morocco. Those companies can then address needs in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, where Morocco has a competitive advantage in doing business.

(Furceri) Morocco was not really well-placed at the time of the FTA implementation, with relatively high unit labor costs, and it is still held back by its fixed exchange rate regime.

Q: (Hendry) Does Morocco have an emerging culture of entrepreneurialism?
A: (AbiNader) Entrepreneurs operate in an ecosystem, and Morocco has done a lot to build this ecosystem with the support of the US. Arabs have proven themselves all over the world to be strong entrepreneurs. (Lawrence) I agree that Arabs don't need help being entrepreneurial. There is actually no real lack of capital, given the massive informal economy. On the other hand, early investors are lacking at funding stages that occur well before venture capital usually likes to operate. Morocco should develop venture capital infrastructure and better match capital with the real need.

Q: Is there anything being done on the university level to promote public private partnerships (PPP)?
A: (Furceri) Aeronautics has been expanding a lot in Morocco because of investment in these kinds of efforts, for example. (AbiNader) There’s a number of broad programs aimed at that. The biggest problem is the inhibition caused by the French language. People want American universities and colleges, and the University of New England’s new campus in Morocco is an example of this starting to happen. Regarding PPPs, the Aeronautic and Automotive sectors have joint councils with the Government to design curriculums that lead to skills which are in demand. The problem is that this that the government needs more external money to scale up programs to have sufficient impact on the labor market. (Lawrence) I agree with Jean that Morocco has great ideas but it has to scale up to meet the massive demand.

Q: Regarding unemployment, how can we fix the public job entitlement that the youth seem to have?
A: (Lawrence) Moroccan families invest a lot in university graduates. In their view, the state is rich and should give them jobs to share the investment. Morocco needs to find private sector jobs in the short, medium, and long term.

Q: What role are remittances playing in the economy and entrepreneurship?
A: (Lawrence) Infrastructure for remittances is ubiquitous in the country, so it’s clear that it plays a large role. However, it’s used more for consumption rather than investment. On the other hand, ex-pats do often return to Morocco and invest. (Furceri) It should also be noted that remittances have a negative impact on the labor market.

5. Observation

The event was attended by about 60 people, mostly comprised of staff members for Members of Congress and other US Government officials, as well as lobbyists and other foreign policy professionals. The discussion was a largely positive evaluation of Morocco’s economy and reforms, and the audience was very interested in the speakers’ insights and inside perspectives on Morocco.
March-April 2014 Events Bulletin

March 11
A Mixed Picture: The Political and Economic Future of the Arab Transitions

March 18
Should the United States give up on Arab Democracy?

April 7
Human Rights Perspectives in Morocco

April 8
Beyond the Arab Spring: U.S. Engagement in a Changing Middle East

April 9
House Subcommittee Hearing: U.S. Policy Toward Morocco

April 9
Youth Inclusion in Morocco: A Discussion With Minister Mohamed Ouzzine

April 9
Governance, Rule of Law, and the International Development Agenda

April 25
Islamists in Government: Do They Moderate Once in Power?

April 30
Morocco in a Post-Arab Spring World: Addressing the challenges of reform, regionalization and resource management

-------------------------

A Mixed Picture: The Political and Economic Future of the Arab Transitions

Date: March 11, 2014
1. Title: “A Mixed Picture: The Political and Economic Future of the Arab Transitions”
   Hosted by the Atlantic Council

   Participants:
   Yasser El Shimy: Teaching Fellow, Boston University
   Ellen Laipson: President and CEO, Stimson Center
   Mohsin Khan: Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
   Mirette F. Mabrouk: Moderator: Deputy Director for Regional Programs, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

2. Overview

   The forum, considered the future of the Arab Spring countries as they emerge from political transitions. The panelists discussed their political and economic expectations for countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen which overthrew their autocratic regimes. They also mentioned countries such as Morocco and Jordan, which went through similar political transitions, yet maintained longstanding elements of their political structures, notably their monarchies. The Arab Spring had many economic and political consequences, which each country responded to in different ways. Three years into the transition, the panelists sought to address the progress of these countries in becoming more politically and economically stable.

3. Summary

   Mabrouk noted that since the Arab Spring, the world has been watching to see how the countries in transition react to the aftermath. Some of these countries have progressed and others have regressed in terms of political stability, resulting in uneven progress among the Arab Spring countries.

   Laipson began by saying foreign policy professionals need to move on from what happened during the Arab Spring and look to the future of this region. Revolutions do not change a country overnight; it takes years to reform a government, an economic system, and the political mindset of a country. Laipson continued by giving the example of Ukraine’s democratic progression, which took ten years to resemble a democratic state after their revolution. It took Tunisia three years of confusion and struggle before things began to be sorted out. The international community needs to be sensitive and patient because it has taken decades for countries like the US, France, and others to transform into democracies. The Arab revolts happened so suddenly and the younger generations wanted individual freedoms, but did not think of the implications on a larger scale. Creating and reforming institutions will take many years if the Arab Spring countries want to have individual freedoms as well as a stable democratic government.

   El Shimy added that throughout the Arab Spring, most of those societies have only seen democracy in a negative light, as it brought down standards of living in the region – in contrast to relative stability under authoritarian leadership. The usage of the term ‘Arab Spring’ presumes that there will be an optimistic outcome, however most likely there will not be democracy at the end of this long road ahead for these people. The future of political Islam may be decided in countries like Morocco. Morocco is not using the zero-sum method in government like Egypt is, and this is why it is continuing to be a stable state. The pattern in most Arab Spring countries is to jump into elections and the winner takes all of the power, which is obviously not working. El Shimy also added that in order to foster hope for the Arab Spring countries, states must decentralize powers and increase the involvement of
rural communities in the political sector, which will build competencies, confidence, and encourage investment.

Khan began by stating the world economy and price of oil is going down; it is a perfect atmosphere for a storm to take place in oil producing countries. Something that is rarely seen in the developing world is an economic depression which Yemen and Tunisia had in 2011. Traditionally, Arab governments tried to adjust their economies by avoiding recession and dependence on imports from other countries. What the Arab Spring countries suffered after the uprisings was the lack of any coherent economic plan, mostly because the new leaders focused on national security and installing a new political regime. There was no cohesive economic model, therefore the governments catered to immediate and more populist needs, expanding subsidies and increasing government jobs at the expense of long-term economic growth. Looking to the future, the Arab region needs to get growth going. A long term plan needs to include international investment and the short term plan needs to start with useful spending of existing capital, concurrently as economic reforms are being made. Khan added that he does not share the optimism of the other panelists; he argued that these country’s economies are in fact further deteriorating. Assuming the economic climate will improve, it would be a good sign for democratization.

4. Q & A

Q: (Khalil Al Anani, Johns Hopkins) What can other Arab countries do to help those undergoing Arab Spring transitions?
A: (Laipson) Inter-Arab politics are interesting. Some Arab countries want to distance themselves from being clumped into a homogeneous region and create individualized plans and names for themselves. The countries of the Arab peninsula deter other Arab countries from going down the democratic path. They do this not only with their words but with investments.

(El Shimy) Egypt is ungovernable right now. There are 90 million people who are mostly living in extreme poverty, unemployment is high, and 60% of Egypt is under the age of 35. Tourism is down by 35% and it was once 10% of Egypt’s GDP. The changes that are occurring in Egypt are unsustainable, which is why the people turn to violence. The Army will not be under civilian control anytime soon, as it is the only way to maintain any national security.

Q: (Lily Lousada, Center for American Progress) There is a great need of institutional development, what role can the United States play?
A: (Laipson) A period of retrenchment and reflection is needed from the United States. The Egyptian people are not supportive of US aid in the ongoing internal political conflicts. It shows that the people of Egypt are not always supportive of actual common good for their society, since they should be accepting help from the United States. What are the parameters of civil society engagement? The international community needs to see this as a period of adjustment in US foreign policy.

Q: (Danya Greenfield, Atlantic Council) The IMF will come in again to try to help. If the macro-economic status seems to be improving, why is everyday life deteriorating?
A: (Khan) The IMF will create reform and investment structure, and there will be growth along with IMF programs because of the financing that comes with it. The Gulf countries have promised a lot of money that will also act as a fiscal stimulus. I am optimistic about this; this has the ability to kick-start the economies, if it will be sustainable, though depends on the country.
(El Shimy) The money that the Gulf states are putting into the Arab Spring countries has gone towards energy, food subsidies, stabilizing the currency, and preventing bankruptcy, but these policies have had no effect on the actual economy.

(Laipson) Reform will happen at different rates; however local leadership and ownership must happen. Democracy would be great, but security comes first. In order to make any reforms there must be day to day security available to the general population.

Q: (Christopher Jarvis, IMF) Egypt’s IMF assistance has shown improvement towards democracy and addressing fundamental economic problems, but it seems that the future of democracy in Egypt is dark.

A: (Khan) The issue that I am concerned with Egypt’s economy is El-Sisi and the new government. The military is the only way to maintain stability and it has returned once again.

(El Shimy) Egypt is at a point of no return. The legitimacy of whoever remains in power is questionable. Also, the extreme polarization of society in Egypt makes it difficult for any government to run it.

5. Observation

The forum was attended by around 100 people from varying backgrounds, including foreign policy professionals, members of the think tank community, members of the IMF and USAID, and students. The tone of the forum seemed a bit pessimistic of the current state of the Middle East and countries that were involved in the Arab Spring. El Shimy had been in Egypt for the last three years and had an extremely pessimistic point of view on the status of Egypt, though he mentioned Morocco as a possible source of inspiration to the region.

Should the United States give up on Arab Democracy?

Date: March 18, 2014

1. Title: “Should the United States give up on Arab Democracy?”

Hosted by SFS Program for Jewish Civilization

Participants:
Elliot Abrams: Senior Fellow, Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

2. Overview

The Program for Jewish Civilization hosted a lecture by Elliot Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Abrams pushed back against the common consensus that because of the unhappy aftermath of the Arab Spring, the United States should by and large give up on supporting democracy in the Middle East. At the event, he deconstructed and debunked this popular attitude and put forth an alternative of his own.

3. Summary
Elliot Abrams began by answering the question, what is the Arab Spring? He stated that the Arab Spring, as it is popularly described, was not a series of revolutions, but instead a series of uprisings against illegitimate authoritarian governments. The only consensus among the participants of these revolts was that the status quo had to change. There was no agreement about what that change would be. He said that democracy didn’t prevail in the aftermath of these revolts because the ousted governments had left no mechanisms which would serve as the basis for a democracy. Furthermore, there are no Middle Eastern Arab models of democracy to serve as a basis either. While the authoritarian governments were in power, all democratic organizations had been completely crushed. The champions of democracy in the Middle East during the Arab Spring had to start from scratch.

Abrams then listed some of the popular theories about the failure of creating a democracy in the Arab World. He said that some attribute the failure of democracy to Arab culture and Islam. There is this idea, he said, that Islam and Arab culture is simply incompatible with democracy. Another theory is that Arabs are too suspicious of the West and any attempt by the West to provide assistance. The final theory Abrams listed was the idea that Ottoman and colonial models of governance have put democracy in the Middle East at a disadvantage. These theories, he said, are inadequate. They do not, for example, explain the Tunisian case, where democracy might have a fighting chance. Furthermore, he stated that when there is a vacuum of power in the Middle East as we saw during the Arab Spring, Islamist takeovers are not inevitable as the common consensus portrays.

The Middle East has seen Islamist takeovers because the ousted dictatorships had kept them intact. They were organized after the Arab Spring in Egypt and in Gaza. These Islamist movements were intact and organized under the dictatorships, but they were not in power. The perception was that the dictatorships did not look out for the best interest of their populations and that the Islamist movements were the ones who provided aid, food, and medical care to the poor. However, once an Islamist group gets into power, just like the dictatorships, they fall for the same temptations and the populations no longer continue to perceive them as populist agents. They see them as unfit to rule.

Time and time again, Abrams stated, the Islamists take power because under the authoritarian regimes, democrats had no chance of organizing to develop the same positive reputation that the Islamists made as altruists. This means that the transition to democracy in the Middle East needs to happen slowly in order to allow Arab democrats the time and resources they need to organize. Furthermore, the aforementioned idea that Arabs are too suspicious to trust democrats is not based in reality. A study, said Abrams, written by Arab intellectuals attribute the “freedom deficit” to all of the underdevelopment in the Middle East. It does not, as the “suspicion” theory suggests, blame colonialism or Zionism. The mindset a culture needs to create a successful democracy is present in the Middle East, it just needs to be given the time and US support that it has been lacking.

The United States, said Abrams, should stop cozying up to authoritarian leaders in the name of stability and start openly or clandestinely supporting Arab democrats. The idea in foreign policy that on one hand there is one set of issues called “the real” issues of business, security, and economy and on the other hand there are the secondary “fake issues” of human rights is false. The human rights issue is just as important for US national interests. For example, in Egypt the US has a case of an oppressive authoritarian government it supported for the sake of stability and to the detriment of human rights. The government of Egypt was friendly toward the US, but now, because of that relationship, the population is hostile toward the US. Meanwhile, in Iran, the US has a case of a government that it openly denounces with a population that for the most part is supportive of the US. Abrams said that the US policy in the Middle East should be to seek out, protect, and endorse Arab
democrats. Furthermore, the US should speak out against Middle Eastern governments that make democrats suffer. It is in the moral and national interest of the United States to do so.

4. Q & A

Q: If you were the president of the United States, what would you do about Syria?
A: Well, Syria is a proxy war. The US mishandled this. The top advisors to President Obama told him that he should have sought out and provided support to Syrian democrats. It was a missed opportunity. This lack of support has given the jihadis most of the power. They are a danger to Israel today and the rest of the world tomorrow. There was no US willpower to support the democrats. If I were the president, I would have ramped up military support for non-jihadi rebels.

Q: (Stewart Sloane, American Jewish International Relations) Talk a little about why the US didn’t support the 2009 Green movement in Iran.
A: The US should have been more vocal in their support of the Iranian people and more vocal in their complaints against the Iranian government.

Q: (Yasmin, student at the School of Foreign Service) How does the US save face to authoritarian governments with which it has relations with and reach out to democrats under that authoritarian governments’ rule?
A: It is difficult. There is no question about that. The US must be willing to take that kind of trouble from authoritarian governments. A presidential administration could also hide behind Congress so as not to run the risk of breaking up its relations.

Q: (Ann Zigna, no stated affiliation) What role does Facebook play in revolutions in the Middle East?
A: It makes news and ideas more difficult to block by the authoritarian governments.

5. Observation

There were approximately 40 people in attendance, among them there were professors, graduate students, and academics. While Morocco was not mentioned specifically, the topic at hand is relevant. These are the types of US policy changes the Moroccan government should be aware of as it is one of the most important strategic allies in the North Africa and Middle East region.
This event focused on the activities of the CNDH as well as the general state of human rights in Morocco. Mr. El Yazami described the activities of the CNDH under the 2011 Constitution, its priorities, its challenges, and its evolving role in Morocco and the region.

3. Summary

Mr. El Yazami posed the key question about human rights, in his perspective: Can an Arab country build a democracy and protect human rights peacefully, rapidly, without foreign intervention? He reiterated several times that what Morocco is trying to do in a relatively short period of time took decades if not generations in other countries. In addition, there are new players – youth and Islamists, who may not agree on the definition of universal human values. He feels strongly that a democracy is centered on the ability to discuss issues and respect differences.

Morocco is building a democracy and human rights regime step by step, by themselves, through extensive public discussion. Three important events in that process: the family code, the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (recognizing diversity and the country’s cultural pluralism), and the IER – Morocco’s version of transitional justice which is now informing similar projects in other countries.

Morocco has taken a different path to democracy in its new constitution, in which 60 of 180 sections include human rights. Key reforms that are upcoming include two dealing with the judiciary, violence against women, child labor, military tribunals, migration/asylum. He gave several examples of how much has to be done: 60 percent of women surveyed said that they have experienced domestic violence in the previous 12 months; 100,000 children are working illegally. Migration today is predominately south to south, which has its own unique challenges.

4. Q & A

Q: (Alterman) The pace of change seems very slow. There are expectations raised, then nothing seems to happen. Is this good or bad?
A: It is good because what is happening is that people are staying on board, they are involved in a national public discussion among many different points of view. There is a need to train people on how to promote and embrace reform. According to the most recent detailed study, there are 45,000 NGOs in Morocco; 30 percent have a budget less than $500, 37 percent don’t have an office. They need training on the fundamentals of organizing and operating an NGO. Also, 52 NGOs do not have licenses from the Ministry of Interior. They should be allowed to register. That’s guaranteed in the Constitution. The HCP has prepared a report on Civil Society that was released last week. In five months, it will become legislation. We are still waiting for a law on decentralization. We need to create educational materials for use in the schools on Sahrawis. We have three offices in the Sahara and held 20 seminars over the past two years on building a human rights culture. All this takes time.

Q: (HRW) What about freedom of assembly, of association?
A: NGOs should use the courts to get registered – the HPC report will generate new laws on this issue.

Q: (CSIS) What about human rights training for police and other officials?
A: Programs are moving ahead but they are difficult to do since you need three elements: the conditions such as salary, equipment, and resources have to be in place; You have to
build a human rights culture through education. CNDH is hoping to be commissioned as the “national mechanism against torture” responsible for monitoring without restraint torture charges.

Q: (Independent Diplomat) What about people convicted previously under the military tribunals?
A: The sentences are being appealed to the Court of Cessation, which can move the cases to civil courts if it rules that the procedures/processes were incorrect or insufficient.

Q: (Congressional Research Service) How does one differentiate between what is the purview of the Palace and that of the Parliament?
A: Under the new constitution, the Palace does not draft legislation. It can request legislation be drafted by the Parliament. The reform process is an interaction among the Palace, civil society, international actors, and local leadership. The challenge is how to learn the new roles/powers and enhance Parliament’s efforts given that they have no staff and a democracy needs an active Parliament.

Q: (Moroccan community member) Do you think that human rights issues are sometimes manipulated by outside parties for political purposes?
A: Moroccans want human rights; from the 60s until now people have been fighting for human rights. It is both a national and an international agenda and it is a national and international responsibility. Morocco signed international conventions because it wanted to, not because it was forced to. Outside reporting helps Morocco, which will host the Global Human Rights Summit November 27-29.

Q: (Western Sahara representative) Why is Morocco afraid of human rights monitoring included in MINURSO?
A: Morocco doesn’t need external parties. The challenge for Muslims is how to implement human rights in each country. Morocco is doing that and is doing it well.

Q: (William Lawrence, GW/POMED) What is your opinion about Salafists and jihadists and how they should be treated?
A: They should be integrated into the national dialogue. We need to have the peaceful inclusion of diverse opinions. Also, we need to deal with the issue on integrating Muslims into other societies.

Q: (Moroccan Association for Relief and Development) What can the media do to promote human rights education?
A: Morocco must do much more to use the media in schools to promote a human rights culture.

5. Observation

This event was attended by about 30 people from think tanks, the Embassy, Moroccan community, and other organizations. El Yazami was quite forthright; answering difficult questions; exhibiting a very deep commitment to CNDH’s work; and consistent in framing his analysis in terms of human rights, not political posturing. MACP should continue to integrate the work of CNDH into its materials and include them in delegation visits.

(Back to top)
Beyond the Arab Spring: U.S. Engagement in a Changing Middle East

Date: April 8, 2014

1. Title: “Beyond the Arab Spring: U.S. Engagement in a Changing Middle East”
   Hosted by The Wilson Center and USIP

   Participants:
   Daniel Brumberg: Senior Adviser, USIP
   Danya Greenfield: Acting Director, The Atlantic Council
   Steven Heydemann: Vice President, USIP
   Haleh Esfandiari: Moderator: Director, The Wilson Center

2. Overview

   The Wilson Center and the United States Institute of Peace brought together three area studies scholars on the Middle East and North Africa to discuss their assessments of the state of authoritarianism and democracy in the Middle East three years after the Arab Spring, and how US policy should adapt to changing dynamics in the region.

3. Summary

   Steven Heydemann began with what he described as his “bleak” outlook on the state of democracy and freedom in the post-Arab Spring Middle East with regards to local and national governance. He said that when the first protests of the movement began, scholars and politicians wrongfully characterized Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes as brittle. However, he continued, three years down the line it appears that the Arab Spring has yielded an increase in exclusionary and centralized governments. He said that these authoritarian regimes upgraded their tactics to survive the Arab Spring with a renewed commitment to clamp down on and control the media, contain and demobilize civil society, and buy off the public. Morocco, he said, has shown one of the biggest increases in public spending in order to buy off the public. Along with these measures, Morocco has started to shift its diplomacy and economy away from the west in order to evade the accompanying pressure it receives regarding human rights and democratization. He said that his prediction is grim for building and sustaining an international coalition to fight authoritarianism.

   Daniel Brumberg said that he agreed with Steve Heydemann’s assessment of the region in the wake of the Arab Spring, adding that the situation is worse than he or anyone ever predicted. He stated that he foresees increasing antagonism toward the west emanating from the North Africa and the Middle East. The Arab Spring has created a challenging new landscape for the US and its interests. Russia, Iran, and China are in competition with the US for influence in the region. Syria and Egypt especially have opened up new opportunities for Russia to make regional dynamics fall in their favor.

   Danya Greenfield began by saying that for the US to gain more influence in the Middle East and North Africa over Russia, Iran, and China, the government needs to be clear about what it wants to achieve. She said that the US has been unclear with what its goals are with Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The US hasn’t shown any core interest in democratization in the Middle East since the Arab Spring. Lastly, she recommended that the US and the EU coordinate their interests in the region to gain more influence and offset Iran, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, who have been gaining greater leverage in the region lately.
4. Q & A

**Q:** (Dana Dauda, Jordanian Embassy) Is three years after the Arab Spring enough time to start making assessments about the state of the Middle East? Jordan for example has shown a lot of commitment to reform. We have a road map to democracy. We have milestones set.

**A:** (Greenfield) When we evaluate the reforms of authoritarian regimes, we determine whether these reforms are meaningful or cosmetic.

(Steven Heydemann) It is true. Jordan is the regional leader of reform.

(Daniel Brumberg) Although Morocco insists that it’s leader in the region.

(Steven Heydemann) Are they real reforms? There is some degree of commitment but it’s not adequate. It’s also not useful to compare these nations in the Middle East to one another. There are countries that are worse off than others but it’s not to say that the better off countries are on the right trajectory.

5. Observation

There were about one hundred scholars, students and members of the press in attendance. The speakers showed great pessimism with regards to the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The entire panel showed a lot of skepticism toward all the governments in the Arab World and a lot of pessimism about the development of democracy there. The panel viewed most reforms and expansions of power in the region as disingenuous and as authoritarian tactics to demobilize would-be protestors. The overall skepticism of the panel and crowd were made even more clear after comment on Morocco ‘insisting’ that it is the regional leader in reform, whereby many in attendance laughed. This kind of perception is neither rare nor common, and is something that should be addressed carefully.

(Back to top)
context of an imminent report from the Department of State required by Congress in the latest Appropriations Bill, as well as the recent visit for Secretary Kerry to Rabat for the US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue. Members of the Subcommittee gave statements and offered questions to the attending representatives of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), making known their priorities for the future of the bilateral relationship.

3. Observation

The hearing was attended by eight members of the Subcommittee as well as Rep. Grimm, who also attended but is not a member of the actual Subcommittee. The opening statements, as well as the questions and replies, yielded many positive remarks about Morocco and the commitment of the US to the bilateral relationship, addressing security, economic development, and political and social reforms. The vast majority of comments were very positive and focused on the constructive friendship between the two countries, the positive trajectory of Morocco, and the welcome role of Morocco as a model for other countries undergoing the process of reform. Mr. Roebuck gave some indication of what to expect in the upcoming report, and reiterated the Department’s support for the Moroccan autonomy plan.

4. Opening Statements

Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen opened the hearing by welcoming the committee and guests and reading an opening statement. With all the upheaval, instability, and social unrest caused by the Arab Spring, Morocco is designated as a Major Non-Nato Ally and is working towards a political transition and instituting democratic reforms. Three years ago, the King proposed constitutional reforms that would push the country towards democracy and reform, shifting some power that was centralized from the monarchy, to the people. Parliamentary elections followed later with a new Prime Minister from an opposition party with a mandate to have more power to govern. She added that “of course the political situation in Morocco is still not perfect, but it is important for us to recognize the positive steps forward.”

On the issue of the Western Sahara, Ros-Lehtinen noted, “longstanding US policy, which I support, advocates for a solution based on a formula of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.” The kingdom has made advancements in human rights, but “certainly more can still be done,” she continued. The chairwoman quoted a State Department report which cited restrictions on civil liberties for pro-independence advocates as among Morocco’s most pressing human rights challenges. On the other hand, she noted, “Morocco has made strides in expanding women’s rights,” and created the CNDH to evaluate human rights issues. She added that “as allies, we should work together to accelerate their plans to implement the constitutional reforms that urged gender equality and parity.”

Ros-Lehtinen continued by underscoring that Morocco and the US have shared a longstanding strategic bilateral relationship, “which has continued to strengthen over the past few years,” and continues to do so with Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent trip to Rabat. The Chairwoman cited the Free Trade Agreement and added that more can be done to get US businesses invested in Morocco. She mentioned the conclusion of the 5-year Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, which helped Morocco increase productivity, employment prospects, investments, and economic growth. The “MCC concluded that the results were impressive,” especially in regards to literacy programs, despite complications, she noted. The political transition towards democracy is being paralleled by Morocco’s economic transition, which is also underway.
Ros-Lehtinen next addressed the topic of security, noting that the US and Morocco collaborate closely on the issue; she argued, “where the rest of the region struggles to cope with radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism, Morocco is looking to foster and spread a more moderate form of Islam.” Morocco does this partly through efforts such as the focus on training women in Islamic theology right alongside their male counterparts. This idea would not only be taboo in many other countries, or likely even illegal. The kingdom has not been immune from the threat of homegrown extremism; as Ros-Lehtinen noted, “Morocco is on the frontlines of fighting terrorism throughout the region,” and “Morocco has proven to be an important ally.” The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Program is an important project that Morocco and the US can work closely together on. She concluded by saying that “the administration must continue to see Morocco as the potential for what other North African transitional countries can do, and we must look to glean the best practices from its approach and see how it can be implemented in neighboring countries as well.”

Rep. Deutch began his opening statement by reminding the audience that Morocco was the first country to recognize US independence. He added that Morocco is a “critical partner” in improving security in the Maghreb and Sahel. This is evidenced by its status as a Major Non-NATO ally, as a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and by the recently begun African Lion exercise involving 350 American service members and 150 Moroccan armed services members. This level of cooperation is “paramount” to fighting terrorism, arms, and narcotics trafficking in the region. Deutch underscored that, “It’s clear that Morocco is committed to taking substantial action,” to improve security and stability in the region. Rep. Deutch commended Morocco on its Imam training and other bilateral programs with Mali, which he called “a welcome approach.”

Turning to the economy, Rep. Deutch said that Morocco’s struggles were due to stagnation in Europe, and that increased government spending and high unemployment are serious issues, which he is happy to see are being addressed by USAID programs. He added that political reforms have met success and should be encouraged. Rep. Deutch commended Morocco’s performance with the conclusion of the first MCC compact and its $698 million investment in the country.

Rep. Deutch also commended Morocco’s good work with the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), and its leadership in the al-Quds committee, which plays a great role in working towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. “We look to Morocco to play a positive role,” he said. Rep. Deutch reminded the audience that Morocco has had a longstanding commitment to this conflict, as Hassan II “took the bold step” of inviting Simon Peres to meet publicly in Morocco for peace talks. He expressed concerns about recent news related potential anti-Israeli laws in Morocco. Rep. Deutch affirmed his support for the US policy of supporting Morocco’s plan for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for the Western Sahara, adding that it continues to receive strong bipartisan support in Congress. Lastly, Rep. Deutch said that in the wake of the Kerry visit to Rabat, he values the future of the bilateral relationship.

Rep. Chabot (R-OH) also added a short opening statement, beginning by reminding the audience that Morocco has been a source of calm in a chaotic region. He added that he looks forward to an update from the State Department on the status of the bilateral relationship following the recent visit of Secretary Kerry for the Strategic Dialogue meetings. He mentioned the promise of the 2011 constitution, and asked how that reform is carried out. He also asked for a comment on the success of the PJD in the most recent elections.

Rep. Grimm (R-NY) opened by saying that Morocco is historically one of America’s strongest allies, and has been a “strong partner in combatting terrorism throughout North Africa.” He mentioned that “King Mohammed successfully weathered the Arab Spring mostly by
listening to the Moroccan people and making appropriate reforms, and for this, I think, he should be commended.” Rep. Grimm reiterated his support for Morocco’s plan for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, saying that “I believe the United States Congress has a responsibility to assist Morocco in achieving this resolution.”

Mr. Roebuck began his opening statement by saying that Morocco is “an important and longstanding ally,” and that “we continue to enjoy a strong bilateral relationship.” He said that the relationship is “focused on promoting regional stability, supporting democratic reform efforts, countering violent extremism, and strengthening trade and cultural ties.” The recent visit of the King and the recent Strategic Dialogue meetings provided an opportunity to affirm the relationship, he added.

Regarding democratic reforms, under King Mohammed VI, “the Moroccan political system has gradually liberalized,” Roebuck noted, and that the country “moved forward in 2013” with “calibrated but steady” political and economic reforms. “We have a robust dialogue” with Morocco on human rights and ongoing political reform, he added. The US and Morocco are fully engaged on ensuring peace and security in the region. Roebuck expressed approval that USAID’s new country strategy directly addresses the issue of youth employment. He also mentioned the recent US Business Development Conference, which had 58 American businesses participating.

Regarding security cooperation, “Morocco is one of our closest security partners,” he said, mentioning the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership as well as the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Regarding the Sahara, Roebuck said that “the United States supports the United Nations-led process, designed to bring about a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually acceptable solution to the Western Sahara question.” US policy “has remained consistent for many years,” he added. Roebuck reiterated support for UN Envoy Ross and his efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution.

Lastly, the US and Morocco have a longstanding history of people-to-people ties, Roebuck said, citing Morocco’s generous support for the J. Christopher Stephens virtual exchange initiative.

Romanowski began her opening statement by talking about the 56-year partnership between Morocco and USAID. She referred to it as a “strong relationship that focuses on growth, improving educational opportunities, and strengthening the effectiveness of civil society.” USAID has also worked on improving maternal health, constructing dams, converting land for agricultural use, and helping Morocco’s microfinance sector.

A new 5-year country development strategy was developed in consultation with the Moroccan government and civil society, and private sector, aiming to increase youth employment, enhancing civic participation in governance, and increasing enrollment in primary schools. Alliances with key regional allies and public-private partnerships with companies like Microsoft, Volvo, and Chevron, will help to control costs.

Romanowski stressed that targeting youth unemployment is crucial, as young people account for 30% of the population, and graduates can’t find jobs while employers cite a lack of necessary skills. Without a change, “Morocco cannot generate sufficient prosperity through private sector growth,” she stated. Toward that end, Romanowski underscored that USAID is launching the Youth Employability Project, which will “facilitate partnerships between government ministries, Moroccan universities, and technical institutes, as well as local NGOs and the private sector, to create workforce development services for a broad range of youth.” She mentioned current work with 40 Moroccan startups.
USAID is also helping Morocco’s push to promote civil society by working with 80 local governments to create platforms for dialogue, especially for youth and women. USAID is also focused on primary education, especially for rural girls. From 2000 to 2004, attendance rates for girls improved from 62% to 83%, though the overall literacy rate remains 55%. Early grade reading is also being boosted in conjunction with Moroccan reforms. These development projects will also help to combat violent extremism by giving at-risk Moroccan youth a voice and opportunity.

5. Q & A

Q: (Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)) In the omnibus bill passed in January, Congress authorized that funds could also be used in the Western Sahara and that a report would be issued on the subject – can you describe what the report will entail and if it will be delivered on time? With the extremism threat on the rise in the region, how would you describe the cooperation with Morocco on counterterrorism? And lastly, what was the result of the recent meeting for the Strategic Dialogue with Secretary Kerry?
A: (Roebuck) The Strategic Dialogue was a great success. The focus is on three areas: political security, economic and political cooperation, and education and cultural cooperation. I think we made steps forward in all three areas. There was a robust discussion on the topic of Morocco’s domestic reforms, counterterrorism, and regional economic integration. They were also focused on strengthening Morocco’s end of the Free Trade Agreement, interfaith dialogue, the aforementioned Chris Stephens project, and cultural exchange programs such as the Fulbright program. On counterterrorism, this has been a decade-long development, fed by developments in Mali and Libya and the wider Sahel. We work very closely with Morocco on counterterrorism, and our partnership is quite strong. We are working together to improve law enforcement and criminal justice system strengthening in support of counterterrorism.

Q: (Rep. Deutch (D-FL)) Clearly, security cooperation is a critical part of the relationship. The amount of youth unemployment is a staggering figure, and we share concerns with Morocco that this population could be vulnerable to extremism – the porous borders in North Africa make the proposition of recruitment in conflict like Syria easier. What is being done to address this specific issue?
A: (Roebuck) The US and Morocco work closely on this. There is “a need for a multifaceted approach to this - and a counterterrorism approach in general - and this is what Morocco has in place.” Morocco’s “vigilant security efforts” include a “soft-side” countering through education and socio-economic assistance as part of a broad, focused policy, which we’re very supportive of.

Q: (Rep. Deutch (D-FL)) I was pleased to see USAID is focused on youth unemployment. Now that Morocco announced ambitious plans to increase industry and employment, how will USAID programs realign?
A: (Romanowski) We have already realigned with this in mind. Focusing on bringing universities, vocational students, the private sector, and the government, centers together.

Q. (Rep. Deutch (D-FL)): Morocco focuses on increasing civic participation among women, with the 60-seat quota for women in Parliament. What trend lines are you seeing for women in politics?
A. (Romanowski) I think the trend lines for women in Morocco are positive. In my last several visits I’ve met women parliamentarians and politicians and others active in politics, and through our programs we are making sure that young men and women are getting more active participation.
Q: (Rep. Chabot (R-OH)) Morocco has been supportive of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, though recently an anti-Israeli group has worked to end ties between Morocco and Israel. Is this group a cause for concern?
A: (Roebuck) Morocco and Israel have a long history of positive relations. These anti-Israel efforts have stalled and we believe that broader values of religious dialogue will triumph. The King and government have worked hard to foster religious tolerance and interfaith understanding in the country.

Q: (Rep. Chabot (R-OH)) We know there are a lot of bad actors in the region and Morocco has taken a proactive approach to counterterrorism, can you comment on some of the successful elements?
A: (Roebuck) The Moroccans have been very effective counterterrorism partners due to broad proven elements. They are very good at developing programs to promote tolerant, moderate Islam. Efforts to train imams in neighboring countries are effective. They’ve also been very active as regional interactive partner in counterterrorism. They’ve hosted a border conference in Libya and other things on a wide range of fronts.
(Romanowski) I would point to our civic participation programs that focus on marginalized urban youth. We’ve targeted the areas of Tangiers and Tetouan neighborhoods to bring out the voices and bring confidence by youth in politics.

Q: (Rep. Chabot (R-OH)) Some argue that the US-Morocco trade agreement limits greater regional economic integration. Would you agree with that and do you believe both sides have benefitted and what is the future of trade between Morocco and the US?
A: (Roebuck) It’s been a huge benefit to both sides. The US somewhat more in the initial years but I don’t believe it’s been a hindrance to Morocco. They have a bright future as a hub for Europe and Africa.

Q: (Rep. Frankel (D-FL)) The 2011 constitution guaranteed gender equality, but I’m told it is still not where Moroccan women would like it to be. Judges still allow marriage under the supposed new age limit and there are inheritance laws that still favor men. What is your opinion of the status of women in Morocco? What measures of effectiveness in counterterrorism measures have there been? What is the strategic importance of Morocco in their relationship to neighboring countries?
A: (Roebuck) On the issue of reform and women’s society, I would say that it’s a work in progress in Morocco. Moroccans underwent major reforms in 2003 and 2004 that benefitted women through family code reform and inheritance and child custody. The 2011 constitution strengthened further some of those reforms and made constitutionally clear gender equality. Some of those issues remain a problem – the Moroccan government is aware of it. “Our sense is that they are reform-oriented, they want to make improvements, they are continuing to do this, and what we’ve seen in the last decade really is a steady move of progress. One of the human rights people in 2012 noted an emerging culture of human rights in Morocco.” On the strategic importance of Morocco, we have a strategic relationship with Morocco because it is such an important country in the region – its geographic location is very important, it is involved in one of the major conflict areas in the Western Sahara, which is important, and it is creating some issue with Algeria. It is also a critical partner in fighting extremism, trade, and promoting moderate Islam. It is a very important strategic partner for the United States.
A: (Romanowski) On the issue of monitoring effectiveness, the new 5-year country strategy afforded us that opportunity to evaluate programs. This caused our shift to focus on workforce development.
Q: (Rep. Grimm (R-NY)) The Chairwoman before mentioned the report on Western Sahara funds. Is it on schedule?
A: (Roebuck) Yes sir, we are preparing the report and it will be delivered in compliance with the law.

Q: (Rep. Grimm (R-NY)) Can you provide some idea of what to expect?
A: (Roebuck) "I think the report will describe our efforts to provide assistance to Morocco, and it will outline some of the areas where we have provided that assistance, addressing the particular areas that the legislation wants to see more information on. It will make the point that with regard to assistance for Morocco that would be used in the Western Sahara; our policy is that we should not take any actions that would be perceived as undermining our support for the UN-led mediation process, and that’s a pillar of our policy, and the report would include that point."

Q: (Rep. Grimm (R-NY)) Changing gears a little bit, I’m very happy to see that Morocco is becoming a destination for many US companies, not just as an export market but also as a platform for exports into Africa, Europe, and the broader Middle East. Casablanca Finance City is poised to become one of the central economic hubs for international companies on the continent. Can you tell us about how companies are looking at Morocco as a gateway market?
A: (Roebuck) The primary way that American companies work in Morocco so far is to use the vehicle of the FTA, which gives companies an ability to invest in Morocco and invest there. We also signed a trade facilitation agreement to shore up those efforts.
(Romanowski) In my most recent conversations with Moroccan businessmen, it was very clear that they were looking to our programs to build networks into the US and were looking forward to further development.

Q: (Rep. Connolly (D-VA)) What is the impact of the crackdown and political repression in Egypt of the Moroccan government and public opinion?
A: (Roebuck) It is difficult for me to say directly, but people in the region are looking closely. In Tunisia, some of the political parties watched and it probably made them more flexible in their national dialogue. Morocco was in a different situation with no approaching elections. I suspect people in Morocco are concerned and it may be causing some changed perception of the Arab Spring and democratic evolution and the side effects of turmoil.

Q: (Rep. Connolly (D-VA)) Hopefully Morocco looks at that and says, that’s not where we want to go. Where is the Polisario right now? What is their appeal and political standing? Are they stronger or weaker? Has Morocco exercised sovereignty in a meaningful way that is recognized?
A: (Roebuck) The Polisario is the political organization that advocates for independence in the Western Sahara. “I’d say that their influence has been somewhat circumscribed in the last decade.” It is an area that has remained in conflict. There are two parties to it – those parties have to reach a mutually agreed-upon solution. “I think probably over the past decade or so they’ve gotten weaker.” They remain a key party in that conflict, weaker or not. On sovereignty, “the territory of Western Sahara is considered by the UN as a non-self-governing territory, and Morocco exercises as sort of an administrator for its part of the territory, but it’s not recognized by the UN as an official administrating power for the Western Sahara.”

Q: (Rep. Connolly (D-VA)) Does anybody think Western Sahara could actually function as an independent functioning state viably?
A: (Roebuck) We don’t reach that level of inquiry, we focus on the process of resolving the conflict and haven’t reached any decision about the viability of Western Sahara as a state.
“The Moroccans have put forward a proposal which is autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as their solution to that conflict – we believe that’s a serious, realistic, and credible proposal. It’s a potential approach to address the concerns of the people of Western Sahara and to help them to live their lives in justice and dignity, so we think it’s a potential approach.” But in the end we don’t think you can impose it.

**Q:** (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) Morocco receives substantial US development aid and bilateral assistance that has increased following a 2006 Free Trade Agreement. How much has our trade increased as a result of that?

**A:** (Roebuck) Our trade has increased about 400% - it’s a big increase on both sides. Its about 400% on the US side and between 150% and 200% on the Moroccan side. So its been a big benefit for both, a little more for US exports. We are working with the Moroccans though our commercial development programs, through USAID, and through the MCC to even that out and improve competitiveness so that Moroccans can equally benefit.

**Q:** (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) I saw that Morocco recently concluded a $697 million MCC compact which focuses on alleviating poverty. Was it successful?

**A:** (Roebuck) I think it was very successful. It focused on sustainable tourism, sustainable fisheries, and agriculture. It educated with basic literacy about 40,000 poor people in those fields. 80% of those people were women. It helped build a tourist infrastructure in Fez medina and focused to a limited degree on financial services. Morocco was re-selected for a second compact – I think many people were impressed by the way it engaged with its institutions and its enthusiasm. And we are moving forward with shaping a further compact for Morocco.

**Q:** (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) With regard to the improvement of women’s rights with the passage of the 2004 family code that aimed to improve women’s socioeconomic rights – has that been successful? Can you give me a status update?

**A:** (Romanowski) We ensure that all of our USAID programs are supportive of women and include women, particularly when it comes to our democracy and governance. We are making sure that women who want to get into politics have the training and skills, and have the advantage. This is also the case in our economic and workforce development program. There is a lot more work to do – that is true across the region – but I think Morocco actually stands out as making some great strides.

**Q:** (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) I have read that there is some concern that the Western Sahara will actually become a training ground for terrorists and even that some of those potential terrorists had been training in Western Europe. Is that right?

**A:** (Roebuck) I am not aware of that report. Our general assessment of the Western Sahara is as follows: it is a large space and we don’t think that it’s good for a space that big to be an ungoverned space. That is why we support the UN being there with MINURSO organization. In terms of what you are talking about with ties between and people in the Western Sahara, to our knowledge we are not aware of significant terrorist activity in the Western Sahara and we are not aware of links between the Polisario, for example, and terrorist organizations like the ones you cited.

**Q:** (Representative Randy Weber (R-TX)) Morocco and the Polisario both have advocates who regularly appeal to Congress to support their positions on the Western Sahara. Many members of Congress support Morocco’s support Morocco’s position of sovereignty over the territory. How many members of Congress support that position? Do you know?

**A:** (Roebuck) I don’t know. Our view is that the issue of sovereignty is something that should be resolved through negotiations with the parties. Both sides have put forward
proposals. We think that the Moroccan proposal is very serious, credible, and realistic. But in the end we can't impose it.

Full video of the hearing as well as opening statements can be found here: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-us-policy-towards-morocco

Youth Inclusion in Morocco: A Discussion With Minister Mohamed Ouzzine

Date: April 9, 2014

1. Title: “Youth Inclusion in Morocco: A Discussion With Minister Mohamed Ouzzine”
   Hosted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

   Participants:
   - **Mohamed Ouzzine**: Minister for Youth and Sports, The Kingdom of Morocco
   - **Gloria La Cava**: Co-coordinator, the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region youth program

2. Overview

   Moroccan Minister of Youth and Sports Mohamed Ouzzine discussed the challenges facing young people in Morocco, including the high unemployment rate and corresponding lack of economic opportunities. Gloria La Cava provided a perspective from the World Bank on recent developments in response to the minister.

3. Summary

   Mohamed Ouzzine began by stating the importance of the youth in Morocco during the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The majority of Morocco’s population is made of young people and he stressed that it is the responsibility of the government to provide the youth with opportunities and inspiration. People have asked if the youth of North Africa benefitted from the Arab Spring. He said that Morocco is a special case. The government, he said, had taken an interest in the country’s youth long before the Arab Spring. The reforms that the King launched during the Arab Spring were a result of this interest. The youth in Morocco displayed the same demands of its government that everyone did during the Arab Spring. The King of Morocco anticipated these demands, listening to the youth and reacting to their demands in a constructive way. In Tunisia, for example, they did it the other way around.

   The subsequent Constitutional reform process in Morocco involved consultation with the Moroccan youth - they had a say in the process. Ouzzine underscored that the Moroccan monarchy wants young people to be involved in the policymaking process and that the government is providing youth a chance to create their own vision of the country. He noted, “the policies made are their own policies,” because Morocco has an integrated strategy of political reform - all the government departments are involved. No more does the Moroccan
government approach these issues in a unilateral way. Each department plays an important role as one team. This is the new approach that Morocco has invested in.

Gloria La Cava started by talking about how the Moroccan government has pushed the World Bank to think outside the box with regards to youth inclusion issues. The World Bank has learned a lot of lessons from Morocco. There is hope for the future, but expectations must be grounded in realism. La Cava stressed that the focus on unemployed graduates is necessary because they are an important group. However, in terms of numbers, they are a very small segment of the population - the majority of the youth population is made up of non-graduates. These young people are out of work and out of school. The World Bank noted these demographics and started designing youth inclusion programs in response. La Cava stated that it has provided Morocco with some assistance with some strategies, but Morocco has done the bulk of the work. La Cava concluded that the World Bank is there when needed, but Morocco is truly driving the process.

4. Q & A
Q. (Julian Sutzker, Human Rights Watch) Is there a human rights component to this youth plan? What does it entail?
A. (Ouzzine) We are offering a wide range of services to young people. The human rights component is something that is good and we encourage.

Q. (Nancy Taggart, Education Development Center) Give some details about the economic development plan regarding youth in Morocco.
A. (La Cava) This program is new. It targets young women in particular. In terms of the design features of this strategy there are some programs that will be implemented that will be integrated with the ministry of labor. We will be introducing a lot of innovations.
A. (Ouzzine) The North Africa and the Middle East is characterized by a mismatch of demography and economic structure. The point now is to target the underprivileged youth.

5. Observation

This event highlighted Morocco’s exceptionalism in the region with regards to human rights, youth unemployment, and dialogue between the people and the government. Ouzzine underscored that Morocco was reacting and planning its innovative plan to engage the youth of the country long before the Arab Spring. These reforms and changes are not necessarily a response to the Arab Spring; the King had anticipated this unrest and had already began to listen and react in a constructive way.
2. Overview

This event focused on the evolving international development landscape, predominantly on ways to incorporate better governance and rule of law initiatives in the post-2015 development plan for the UN. Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson offered his viewpoint on how to continue to build on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as ways that the UN is adapting its priorities to meet the current development challenges.

3. Summary

Ambassador Eliasson opened his presentation with a question: is good governance an appropriate ambition for the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) challenge? Promoting good governance and rule of law is a priority in the eyes of the UN. To explain, he cited a quote: “There is no peace without development, there is no development without peace, there is no development or peace without the respect of human rights.” He argued that today he would add rule of law and underscored that peace and security, development, and human rights are one. These things all need to be developed at the same time because if one of the elements is weak, then the whole structure is weak. Thus it is important for development goals to incorporate good governance objectives. The UN, other international organizations, and national governments must see problems in a horizontal matter from all perspectives in order to ensure that the whole structure is strong. This of course requires partnerships – between international organizations, national governments, civil society, and the private sector, among others - and resources.

Eliasson continued by stating that the MDGs have provided an important planning instrument that has helped promote positive development in the last 15 years. The percentage of extreme poverty has gone down, Africa’s GDP growth of around 5-7% per year, and gender equality in education has also improved immensely. However, maternal health and sanitation continue to be huge problems and the biggest disappointments to the UN. Confronting these challenges is especially important since they have a multiplier effect on other issues. Water and sanitation are closely linked to health, health is closely linked to education performance, and education performance is linked to improving gender inequality. MDGs for post-2015 will thus most likely focus on three core areas: eradicating poverty by means of job creation, gender equality, industrialization, and the use of natural resources; environmental sustainability; and creating institutions in order to enhance rule of law. The later is particularly important as it protects human rights. And human rights violations are at the root of most modern conflicts, particularly civil wars; if the international community can confront these issues at the start, through institutions and rule of law, it would go a long way toward preventing mass atrocities.

4. Q & A

Q: (Daniel Runde, CSIS) Many Americans are skeptical of the UN, what is in it for the United States for the reconsideration of the MDGs?
A: It is not only the right thing to do morally and ethically, it is also good for all countries to help create equal development which continues to bring about global peace and prosperity. If one country thrives, its neighbors will then thrive. That is how global development works.

Q: (Daniel Runde, CSIS) Can you talk about the developments between now and December 2015 when the new MDGs will be made?
The General Assembly will most likely create clusters of problems and issues by this July. Then they will begin the search for finances and people to solve and create plans for these problems. MDGs will not become a reality unless there are financial resources to pull from, so that is also a priority. The question most important in our current world is ‘how’. All international policy professionals know ‘what’ needs to happen, but they need to create a plan of action. There needs to be a holistic approach, not squeezing problems into already created institutions, but rather creating institutions around problems.

Q: (Will Davis, United Nations Development Programme) Is there anyone arguing against the rule of law? What are their arguments?
A: The people who are arguing against the rule of law are the governments that are being challenged to abide by this. Their biggest arguments against this matter are issues of sovereignty and why international organizations, like the UN, feel the right to get involved in their internal politics.

Q: (Tony Caroll, CSIS) What is the realistic UN dialogue concerning the natural resources in Africa, considering the misappropriation of funds?
A: Everyone working in the UN is fully aware of the corruption in Africa. The scariest part is organized crime that develops from corruption and how the undermine structures and governments. Organized crime is the biggest contributor to terrorism which becomes an international issue.

5. Observation

There were nearly 100 foreign policy professionals and about 10 students in attendance at this event. This event was of great importance for anyone working in international development - Ambassador Eliasson remarks provided insight into the 2015 UN Millennium Development Goals. While not directly relevant to Morocco or broader US policy, Morocco is a stakeholder in the MDGs and may well be invested in the second round of them, having committed to the previous round of MDGs and looking set to achieve them.
whether Islamists moderate once in power may be "no," and concluded that some groups have become even more hard-line under the climate of the Arab Spring.

3. Summary

Eric Trager provided his assessment of The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and their development throughout history, with particular emphasis on the changes within the Brotherhood in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring. In assessing whether or not it moderated once in power, Trager first tried to debunk certain characterizations about the Brotherhood. He argued that one can't see the Brotherhood as just a political party as this ignores the other things that it has done in its history such as its violent activity and social services. Similarly, one cannot make the mistake of seeing the Brotherhood as a broad social movement either. This wrongly assumes that the Brotherhood is a social movement. He argued that these descriptions wrongly characterized the Brotherhood as a democratic party with an Islamist ideology, rather than what it actually is: a hierarchical vanguard whose raison d'être is achieving societal support and political power to resist Western political and cultural influences in Egypt. This rigid internal structure affected its behavior in power far more than its Islamist ideology.

What this means is that while the Brotherhood is in fact an Islamist group, it's not what dictates its behavior. The hierarchical vanguard structure is what dictates its behavior and as a result it did not moderate once in power for three reasons. First, it feared losing the internal cohesion on which vanguards depend, so its priority was appeasing a rank-and-file that wanted the Brotherhood to consolidate power quickly, rather than governing inclusively. Second, its intolerance toward outsiders -- another characteristic of insular vanguards -- further encouraged its exclusivist governing style. Muhammad Morsi's November 2012 constitutional declaration, through which he asserted unchecked executive authority, is the best example of this. Third, the Brotherhood faced its most serious political challenge from hardline Salafists, and this compelled it to embrace a far more theocratic constitution than it otherwise might have. Of these three reasons, only this last one has anything to do with the Brotherhood's Islamist ideology.

Given that the Brotherhood is primarily a hierarchical vanguard and an Islamist group only secondarily, its failure to moderate in power does not necessarily teach us much about how Islamists in general will behave in power. However, Trager argued that their experiences nevertheless illustrates that Islamists' organizational culture frequently determines their political behavior far more than their ideological pronouncements, particularly when those pronouncements are tailored for a Western audience.

Haroon Ullah started his segment by defining extremism. One can identify an extremist party by looking for several signs. Firstly, does the party seek power through extra-electoral means? In other words, do they use violence or the threat of violence? The second dimension in looking at extremism is seeing if a political entity adopts exclusionary policies toward certain groups based on their moral edicts. The third sign of extremism is incendiary rhetoric and symbolism in their campaigns for power.

He then went on to talk about Pakistan. He said the way to understand extremists in the Arab Spring is by understanding Pakistan because Islamists have the longest track record in Pakistan. The entire evolution of Islamism has already been played out in Pakistan and we may see the same pattern in the Arab world in the years to come. Ullah drew five lessons from the Islamist experience in Pakistan that can help enhance understanding of their rule.
First, the violence carried out or supported by Islamist parties in Pakistan is not indiscriminate or gratuitous, but targeted and strategic. Through connections with extremist groups, Islamists leverage political violence to push their agenda and maximize votes. Second, Pakistan proves that democracy does not necessarily moderate Islamist party platforms and ideologies. While Islamists can become more moderate through repeated electoral competition, they are just as likely to become more extreme if it serves their interests. Third, Islamist parties are not monolithic. In Pakistan, they are diverse and compete hardest against one another. To increase their appeal to the electorate, each party claims to be the most authentically religious, creating significant animosity between them. Fourth, the idea that poverty drives militancy -- which is often assumed when formulating US policy in the Middle East and South Asia -- is largely mistaken. In Pakistan, the key constituencies for Islamists hail from the thin middle class and urban areas; this and other factors may help explain why Islamist parties do better in provincial, regional, and local elections than at the national level. In order to be more effective on the ground, the United States should align its programs based on this rethinking of what drives militancy. Fifth, Islamist parties want more than just a seat at the table. They also want to shape the debate around morality.

As for their views of foreign actors, Ullah argued that Islamist political parties in Pakistan are not inherently anti-Western, though they frequently use religion to mobilize voters and have helped create a toxic environment in the country. Going forward, Washington could influence such groups through public diplomacy and faith-based engagement. For example, by interacting with figures who hold sway among Islamists -- such as imams who are increasingly bearing the cost of violence -- the United States could greatly improve its credibility. After all, most Islamists are like other political parties: they are pragmatists, not staunch ideologues.

Vish Sakthivel addressed the situation of Islamists in Morocco and argued their experiences, most prominently the governing Justice and Development Party (PJD), show the different levels of moderation that can apply once they are in power. There is moderation in signaling: for example, an Islamist group can send a message to constituents or authorities that it does not pose a threat. There is also moderation in behavior, which may actually be a shift in the group's ethos. And lastly, there is moderation in ideology, which yields a more fundamental change in mission. Factors that can push a group to moderate include the presence of a grand arbiter or some other power-sharing imperative.

Sakthivel then assessed the PJD’s moderation within the Moroccan political system. To start, the PJD had to moderate when it came to power because of the unique religious situation in Morocco: that of the King having a monopoly on Islam as Commander of the Faithful. As Morocco’s version of Islam is moderate -- and perpetuated by a popular King, the country has branded itself as an example of moderate and tolerant Islam. This branding serves as a counter weight against the Salafi and Wahabi ideologies. This structure has resulted in the PJD evolving from an underground extremist movement into a more accommodating political party in Morocco -- and of course moderating in the process. It had to moderate in order to operate in Morocco and has thus moderated its policies and approach to legislation.

Its resultant political pragmatism and moderation, which were originally meant to demonstrate loyalty, have crippled its ability to effect change on various issues. Despite this trajectory, the PJD has not abandoned its ideology. It is still an Islamist group and still believes that Islam should not only inform policy, but also form the basis of Moroccan law. Yet this lack of ideological moderation is largely inconsequential in the Moroccan context because it does not have immediate political consequences. At the end of the day, the King reigns supreme, and any turn toward extremism would cause the PJD to lose the royal
patronage for which all political parties in Morocco are vying. At this point, political expediency is just as important as ideology to the PJD, if not more so.

Since Morocco's political circumstances are regionally unique, the PJD's moderation -- in policy, behavior, and internal processes -- cannot be extrapolated to answer questions about Islamist groups in other countries. In addition, Sakthivel stressed that one cannot extrapolate from the Egyptian and Tunisian Islamist aftermath to understand how the PJD would operate if truly in power -- that is, in the absence of a greater powerbroker. When analyzing such groups, one must situate their behavior in the contexts in which they operate. Ignoring those sociopolitical contexts would result in purely speculative analysis. Finally, if political immoderation is defined as the penchant for exclusionary rhetoric and power grabbing versus a more pluralistic approach, then it is not limited to Islamists alone.

4. Q & A

Q: (Zach Gold, Brookings) What can countries put in place to curb extremism and force moderation instead of a King like in Morocco?
A: (Vish Sakthivel) Power sharing is an important component.

Q: (Manar Ghueen, Middle East News Egypt) Do you think the Muslim Brotherhood is moderating?
A: (Eric Trager) They do absolutely use the Quran in a fundamentalist way. But it’s not what defines their behavior. Islamism in the Brotherhood is just the flavoring. It’s not irrelevant. It’s part of the reason for why people join. It’s the vanguard that dictates their behavior.

5. Observation

There were around 50 people in attendance. Most were university researchers and journalists. Vish Sakthivel’s comments on the relationship between Islamists and the Moroccan monarchy revealed a sustainable system of government that forces the moderation, cooperation, and integration of Islamists groups. Along with this structure, the gradual democratization of governments like the Moroccan government would further moderate any threats from Islamists political parties.


Morocco in a Post-Arab Spring World: Addressing the challenges of reform, regionalization and resource management

Date: April 30, 2014

1. Title: Morocco in a Post-Arab Spring World: Addressing the challenges of reform, regionalization and resource management

       Hosted by Kosmos Energy

       Participants:
Jean AbiNader: Executive Director, Moroccan American Trade and Investment Center
Dr. William Lawrence: Visiting Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School, George Washington University
Davide Fucerri: Economist, International Monetary Fund
Krista Hendry: Moderator: Executive Director, The Fund for Peace

2. Overview

Kosmos Energy hosted this experts’ roundtable on Morocco designed to provide a lively discussion of current events in Morocco and the broader Maghreb region. The event was meant to be an educational tool geared towards a primary audience of legislative assistants, senior foreign policy analysts, and homeland security staffers to Members of the US House and Senate. Discussion focused on economic development, political and social reform, and Morocco’s unique experience of the Arab Spring.

3. Summary

Krista Hendry introduced Morocco by highlighting its “evolutionary change,” which offers a stark contrast from its more revolutionary neighbors. The hallmark of Morocco’s experience from the past several years is one of a positive, yet slow trend towards sustainable social and political progress, especially given the immense regional and domestic pressures it has faced. She added that despite this, “expectations, which are almost always too high, were not met.”

In the international community, “it becomes easy to overlook countries like this,” Hendry added. Morocco needs continued support to develop its economy and infrastructure to maintain stability and an environment conducive to reform. The need for this external support is increasingly urgent as combatants in Syria enter North Africa and threaten even more instability.

Dr. Lawrence reminded the audience that during the Arab Spring 18 countries experienced political upheaval, of which Morocco was “the last but not the least.” Somewhere between 120,000 and 1 million Moroccans demonstrated at some point over a number of weeks against the government in political protest, resulting in 27 deaths and 20 self-immolations – which was a relatively small number compared to the total of 400 in the rest of the countries that experienced the Arab Spring. In comparison, this uprising was small, he said. Despite that, the February 20 movement has a profound and still pending impact on internal dynamics in the country. Moroccan Prime Minister Benkirane even called the movement ‘successful’ as a result.

Looking back, Morocco demonstrated a commitment to reform well before the Arab Spring. A dramatic page was turned in 1999 for Moroccan civil society, allowing it to develop more maturity than was possible in other neighboring countries. This development was a strong influence on the relatively moderate nature of the February 20 movement, as Lawrence described, “the protesters’ choice was a deliberate one.”

Today, youth unemployment is the looming threat to society. 49% of youth in the country is neither employed nor in school. Even worse, unemployed graduates suffer an unemployment rate four times higher than the rest of the population. Although overall employment figures have shown significant improvement due to wise investments, the economy simply "hasn't caught up yet," and Morocco has a youth bubble like most other
Middle East and North African countries. The youth unemployment figure will be a bellwether for the future stability of the country.

Regarding reforms, Lawrence described the 2011 constitution as “remarkable,” noting that certain elements of Morocco’s new constitution were incorporated into Tunisia’s. In the US, Islamist involvement in the new government was ‘the story,’ yet the truly noteworthy element for Morocco was the occurrence of a free and fair election. The “extraordinary concessions in executive power” were remarkable, but not everything desired from the reforms has happened yet, he added. Voting issues did persist, however, as “spoiled ballots” we so numerous that their tally amounted to a second place finish in the 2011 election. Despite the criticism, the effort amounted to “significant progress.”

Regarding human rights, Lawrence repeated a phrase he had heard, observing Morocco’s “emerging culture of human rights.” Protestors, he added, are aware of a “larger space” in which they can operate. Morocco is “investing hugely and had significant gains” in policing, investigations, crowd control, and other human rights issues. Lawrence noted recent reforms which included institutionalized civil society dialogue and new laws on civilian trials and immigration. The King is focused on the ‘youth issue,’ he added, and young people in the country reciprocate and maintain positive feelings towards the monarch.

Despite concerns in the US about press freedom in the country, Lawrence said that there was vast change after 1999 that resulted in much more openness, which journalists continue to ‘test’ in terms of changing boundaries for their reporting. The increase in this ‘testing’ behavior is a positive sign of continued opening of press freedoms.

Lawrence specifically mentioned the work being done by Nizar Baraka and Morocco’s Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE) as exemplary. He described the process as being done in an “inclusive and intelligent way; you couldn’t be envisioning a better way to go about this.”

Lawrence concluded in saying that as Morocco democratizes, a lot of these other problems will have a chance to be resolved. He paraphrased the State Department testimony at the recent Congressional hearing on Morocco in saying that the country effectively “uses the tools in its toolkit.” Morocco is also deeply invested in developing its neighbors in Libya and Mali, trying to play the regional role that has long been asked of it.

Davide Furceri began his talk by saying that Morocco is an exceptional case for the region, describing its recent economic performance as “almost stellar.” This is despite suffering major internal and external shocks such as instability associated with the Arab Spring, rising costs from subsidies, and dampened demand from its main trading and investment partners in the EU. Performance has indeed weakened as a result of these shocks, resulting in a widened current account deficit that remains burdensome. However, Morocco was better placed than most to face these issues, as it enjoys high and sustained Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Growth has remained relatively strong, though not strong enough to make impactful change in unemployment, which increases the urgency for further reforms. Tariffs, credit access, SME development, capital flows, labor markets, and business environment reforms, are all priorities for potential reforms. Furceri estimated that Moroccan GDP growth could increase from 4% to 7% if these are successfully implemented.

Furceri echoed the concern about youth unemployment, adding that it has actually worsened over the last three years. Despite having a relatively good education system,
those with diplomas have a hard time finding jobs. A rigid labor market, emphasis on the public sector over the private sector for jobs and development, and a mismatch between education and the true labor market remain barriers. Students don’t study engineering, a sector that has been a point of emphasis for investment and development, but students instead study social sciences in hopes of securing government work, Furceri stated. As a result, some international investors bring laborers along with them when the local labor pool isn’t qualified for high-tech manufacturing.

Morocco can do more for its economy. Although it has been quite successful in reducing poverty in the country, inequality has increased. The lack of effective social programs and access to public services impose economic limitations. Furceri was, on the other hand, encouraged by recent reforms to subsidies, which generally have a greater benefit to the top quintile of the population. The savings should be reinvested in basic services such as healthcare and infrastructure, he said.

Jean AbiNader added his thoughts on Morocco as a business partner, particularly in the Western Sahara. Morocco knows what it needs to do to attract business, focusing on best practices because its trade partners in the US and EU have high standards. Morocco’s focus is not only business, he added, but impact investing. For investors, “it’s about the money, but it’s also about being a partner in the long term,” he said.

Regarding resources in the Sahara, he said, the serious interest here is new, “despite what you hear,” because a massive investment in infrastructure is needed to support substantial resource extraction. One of the weaknesses of the last MCC compact with Morocco was that it didn’t focus on this kind of infrastructure in the south.

AbiNader stated that the Western Sahara issue has generally been ignored by the global community; that is, until the political costs started to change with the Arab Spring, as Polisario trafficking routes and lack of effective government in their areas of authority extending into the Sahara and Sahel, provide a ready-made network which is being used by “forces that include jihadists, militants, criminals and terrorists.” He added that “Africa does not need, nor can support, another vague territory known as a state.”

Political steps towards resolution via negotiated political solution (rather than by referendum) caused a shifting reality that has increased interest by international businesses in the Western Sahara. Companies are aware of the spotlight which will serve to enforce the need to conduct their business sensitively and responsibly. Morocco has worked to do its part by promoting expanded rights and investing towards economic development in the territory.

AbiNader spoke of the King’s leadership in development; “he gets it,” demonstrated by the use of inclusive processes to address problems credibly, realistically, and seriously. The King “is deadly serious about getting the political system to mature,” AbiNader added, towards a full parliamentary democracy. AbiNader described how the King declined to get involved when the parliamentary coalition fell apart, essentially empowering the parties by forcing them to resolve the issue themselves and without the King’s intervention. Five month later, the parties themselves emerged with a new coalition. This demonstrated the King’s desire to fill the political space created by the new constitution, and establish a mature political system.

AbiNader agreed with Dr. Lawrence’s assessment of the CESE, lauding the deliberate process of its yearlong consultation with civil society and experts in drafting its recommendations for improving social and economic development in Morocco. The honest
assessment of past policy will lead to better development results. The commitment to better understand and engage with local stakeholders is already being reflected in the recent EU fisheries agreement. Altogether, $18 billion will be invested in the Western Sahara in the next ten years, whether or not gas or oil are found in commercial quantities.

In conclusion, AbiNader speculated that the discovery of resources in Western Sahara might actually encourage the process towards a political resolution, as all sides could realize that participating in an autonomous Sahara would be the best option for ending the humanitarian crisis in Tindouf and maximizing benefits to the local population.

4. Q & A

Q: What has been the impact of the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA)? How is that in balance?
A. (AbiNader) Morocco has been able to export less to the US, but the reason is that only 22% of its economy is manufactured goods, so what are they able to offer? The key to balancing the bilateral trade relationship, on the other hand, is encouraging US investments in Morocco. Those companies can then address needs in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, where Morocco has a competitive advantage in doing business.
(Furceri) Morocco was not really well-placed at the time of the FTA implementation, with relatively high unit labor costs, and it is still held back by its fixed exchange rate regime.

Q: (Hendry) Does Morocco have an emerging culture of entrepreneurialism?
A: (AbiNader) Entrepreneurs operate in an ecosystem, and Morocco has done a lot to build this ecosystem with the support of the US. Arabs have proven themselves all over the world to be strong entrepreneurs.
(Lawrence) I agree that Arabs don’t need help being entrepreneurial. There is actually no real lack of capital, given the massive informal economy. On the other hand, early investors are lacking at funding stages that occur well before venture capital usually likes to operate. Morocco should develop venture capital infrastructure and better match capital with the real need.

Q: Is there anything being done on the university level to promote public private partnerships (PPP)?
A: (Furceri) Aeronautics has been expanding a lot in Morocco because of investment in these kinds of efforts, for example.
(AbiNader) There’s a number of broad programs aimed at that. The biggest problem is the inhibition caused by the French language. People want American universities and colleges, and the University of New England’s new campus in Morocco is an example of this starting to happen. Regarding PPPs, the Aeronautical and Automotive sectors have joint councils with the Government to design curriculums that lead to skills which are in demand. The problem is that this that the government needs more external money to scale up programs to have sufficient impact on the labor market.
(Lawrence) I agree with Jean that Morocco has great ideas but it has to scale up to meet the massive demand.

Q: Regarding unemployment, how can we fix the public job entitlement that the youth seem to have?
A: (Lawrence) Moroccan families invest a lot in university graduates. In their view, the state is rich and should give them jobs to share the investment. Morocco needs to find private sector jobs in the short, medium, and long term.

Q: What role are remittances playing in the economy and entrepreneurship?
A: (Lawrence) Infrastructure for remittances is ubiquitous in the country, so it’s clear that it plays a large role. However, it’s used more for consumption rather than investment. On the other hand, ex-pats do often return to Morocco and invest.
(Furceri) It should also be noted that remittances have a negative impact on the labor market.

5. Observation

The event was attended by about 60 people, mostly comprised of staff members for Members of Congress and other US Government officials, as well as lobbyists and other foreign policy professionals. The discussion was a largely positive evaluation of Morocco’s economy and reforms, and the audience was very interested in the speakers’ insights and inside perspectives on Morocco.
Rachad,

Thank you for lunch today and a very relaxed and thoughtful conversation. I look forward to another session soon. Attached is the EU list we discussed, translated into English. Talk with you soon. Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

From: Jordan Paul [mailto:jpaul@moroccanamericanpolicy.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2014 12:22 PM
To: Robert M. Holley; Edward Gabriel; Fatima Kurtz; Caitlin Dearing
Subject: Fw: EU Projects List

Here is the translated version of the pdf we received from the Embassy on projects funded in the South by the EU/UN/other.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.

From: David Bloom
Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2014 12:18 PM
To: Jordan Paul
Cc: Caitlin Dearing
Subject: RE: EU Projects List

Here’s the translated spreadsheet. I went ahead and added two columns with a formula for converting MAD to USD – Caitlin said this wasn’t necessary, but two of the amounts were listed in dollars already so it was a bit confusing. I took the exchange rate from Bloomberg and can modify easily if need be. Let me know if you’d like me to change the formatting in any way.

From: Jordan Paul
Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2014 9:26 AM
To: David Bloom
Subject: Re: EU Projects List

Thanks!

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.

From: David Bloom
Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2014 9:18 AM
To: Jordan Paul

Subject:
Not a problem. Will get started on this shortly.

---

From: Jordan Paul  
Sent: Friday, May 23, 2014 12:35 PM  
To: David Bloom  
Subject: FW: EU Projects List

Can we translate this and put it into a similar excel type document on Tuesday? Thanks!

---

From: RobertMHolley@aol.com  
Sent: Friday, May 23, 2014 9:08 AM  
To: Jordan Paul; Caitlin Dearing  
Cc: Fatima Kurtz; Edward Gabriel  
Subject: EU Projects List

Jordan, Caitlin,

Excellent list and useful tool in our effort to show both Congress and the Executive that others in the international community, in this case the EU, are already engaged in providing various assistance projects in Western Sahara.

I wonder if other bilateral donors aren't also doing this already in their own national assistance programs with Morocco.

If the European Union is not concerned about such useful assistance programs that promote and support social and political reform efforts, as well as basic quality of life issues, undermining the UN effort to find a political solution to the issue there, why should we be?

A quick review of the projects seems to indicate that many are oriented to the same kinds of social and political development issues that we would want the USG to support in the region as well.

I think we need to get this chart translated and make wide use of it in the appropriate offices on the Hill and ensure that it gets in the right hands at State -- probably from those in Congress as they push back on State's report to Congress "explaining" why they do not intend to provide assistance in Western Sahara.

Bob

---

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>2,560,000.00</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>960,000.00</td>
<td>1,600,000.00</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagouira Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1,250,000.00</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>600,000.00</td>
<td>650,000.00</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>3,925,905.44</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>2,332,300.00</td>
<td>1,593,605.44</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1,377,564.49</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>527,564.49</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>3,925,905.44</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>2,332,300.00</td>
<td>1,593,605.44</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1,377,564.49</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>527,564.49</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>3,925,905.44</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>2,332,300.00</td>
<td>1,593,605.44</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1,377,564.49</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>527,564.49</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>3,925,905.44</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>2,332,300.00</td>
<td>1,593,605.44</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1,377,564.49</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>527,564.49</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>3,925,905.44</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>2,332,300.00</td>
<td>1,593,605.44</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1,377,564.49</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>527,564.49</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>3,925,905.44</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>2,332,300.00</td>
<td>1,593,605.44</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smara Donation</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1,377,564.49</td>
<td>Guelmim</td>
<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>527,564.49</td>
<td>UE/ONG/0120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ces informations nous parviennent d'une source fiable. Elles n'ont pas été corroborées par des sources tierces.

SAHARA OCCIDENTAL/RAPPORT DE SITUATION
16/05/14

Le Front Polisario a célébré son 41e anniversaire le 10 mai, suite à des mois turbulents durant lesquels il paraît avoir eu un espoir remarquable concernant l’élargissement du mandat de MINURSO pour inclure les droits humains seulement pour les voir ruinés lors de la réunion annuelle du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU fin avril. Le Polisario était aussi angoisse à cause de l’élection présidentielle en Algérie. Maintenant Comme, il semble s’orienter vers une nouvelle stratégie.

Suite à la visite du Roi Mohammed VI à Washington en automne 2013, un membre du Secrétariat National du Polisario avait prévu avec confiance que « lorsque le mois d’avril arrivera, [une composante de droits humains pour la mission de la MINURSO] sera inclue dans la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité, ainsi que la question des ressources naturelles dans les territoires administrés par le Maroc, » et avait aussi constaté « d’avoir reçu des promesses fermes a cet égard des membres du Congrès. » Plus tard, le même fonctionnaire semblait optimiste que la France « adopterait une position neutre » à la réunion du Conseil de Sécurité et s’abstiendrait d’utiliser son pouvoir de veto pour bloquer une résolution avec le monitoring des droits humains comme partie du mandat de la MINURSO.[1]

Cet optimisme était encouragé encore plus par la crise soudaine dans les relations franco marocaines fin février. Le 20 février, des policiers français se sont rendu a la résidence de l’ambassadeur marocain à Paris pour informer Abdellatif Hamouche, chef de l’agence marocaine de renseignements domestiques (DGST), qui était en France avec le Ministre de l’Intérieur, d’une convocation devant un juge d’enquête en connexion avec deux procès civils déposés par une ONG l’accusant de « complicité dans la torture. » Pour ajouter l’insulte à l’injure, le même jour acteur espagnol Javier Bardem (défenseur de la cause de l’autodétermination pour les sahraouis) a été cité par les médias français constatant que l’ambassadeur de la France aux Etats-Unis François Delattre, lui aurait affirmé que le Maroc était « une maîtresse avec laquelle on (la France) dort toutes les nuits, dont on n'est pas particulièrement amoureux mais qu'on doit défendre. » Le double incident a provoqué les protestations de Rabat, qui a suspendu sa convention de coopération judiciable avec la France et a rappelé le diplomate chargé de son application, poussant Président François Hollande à téléphoner au Roi Mohammed VI directement pour résoudre le problème.

En parlant a ce même fonctionnaire du Polisario peu après cet incident, il l’a caractérisé de « signal de réveil » pour les autorités françaises concernant « la situation des droits humains au Maroc, » démontrant que la France devrait « mettre la défense des droits humains et l’abolition de la torture au Maroc en première ligne des relations entre les deux pays. » Pour sa part, un ancien fonctionnaire au Palais Royal marocain a constaté que les Français « n’étaient pas assez vigilants » en ce que concerne les tentatives « pour déstabiliser les relations entre Paris et Rabat, » dans lesquelles « les Algériens ont surtout joué un rôle». Cette même source a constaté que la réaction forte du Roi à l’incident (perçue comme disproportionnée, il a constaté, même par des fonctionnaires marocains) avait en fait
l'intention d'envoyer un message non seulement aux Français, mais aussi aux Algériens.

Comme la réunion au Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU se rapprochait, les fonctionnaires du Polisario ont continué à exprimer leur optimisme. En leur parlant en mi-avril, un membre de haut niveau du leadership du Polisario qui est conseiller du Secrétaire Général Mohamed Abdelaziz a même suggéré que la cause de l'indépendance sahraouie est maintenant « au deuxième tournant important dans son histoire après l'accord de cessez-le-feu de 1991. » La communauté internationale, la source a constaté, prend conscience de la nécessité de finalement mener à bon fin le conflit du Sahara Occidental, avec une conclusion acceptable et durable qui assurera les droits des sahraouis à l'autodétermination. Selon le membre, un indice de cette nouvelle situation est « la panique visible au plus haut de la structure de pouvoir marocaine, » comme démontré par l’appel du Roi Mohammed au Secrétaire Générale de l’ONU Ban Ki-moon quand le Conseil de Sécurité a commencé ses consultations avant la réunion annuelle sur MINURSO[2], entre autres. Selon la source, la délégation du Polisario à l’ONU « a reçu des promesses que la protection des civils dans les territoires administrés par le Maroc sera prise en compte » par le Conseil (elle n’a cependant pas indique qui a fait de telles promesses.). La source a poursuivi :

Les leaders du Polisario sont, sans exception, convaincus que la communauté internationale a perdu patience. Nous nous dirigeons vers une résolution qui fixera une date limite pour le Maroc pour revenir aux principes de cessez-le-feu, qui incluent les négociations pour une solution viable au conflit, c.-à-d. un referendum sur l’autodétermination. A la réunion des cadres du Polisario le 10 avril, Mohamed Abdelaziz était très claire : Le Polisario doit déclarer son empreintes de négocier directement avec le Maroc et doit renouveler sa confiance en l’Envoyé Spécial du Secrétaire Générale Christopher Ross quand nécessaire, mais en même temps le Polisario doit déclarer clairement que, pour être utile, toute négociation futur devrait focaliser sur le referendum et les questions des droits humains.

Ayant organisé sa propre campagne de lobbying du Conseil de Sécurité pour inclure le monitoring des droits humains dans le mandat de la MINURSO, avec 115 « organisations de société civils, » issues de 21 pays le soutenant, le Polisario aurait été encouragé encore plus par les messages explicites de soutien pour l’idée par Human Rights Watch et Amnesty International à l’approche de la réunion. Le représentant du Front à New York Ahmed Boukhari a ajouté sa voix au sens général des attentes le 11 avril, en commentant sur le rapport de Ban Ki-Moon : la question du Sahara Occidental pourrait entrer dans « une phase décisive » en 2015, il a dit, avec le Secrétaire Générale de l’ONU suggérant que le Conseil de Sécurité devrait entreprendre une revue complète du processus de négociations entre le Front Polisario et le Maroc s’il aucun progrès n’est fait avant avril 2015. Ceci, Boukhari a constaté, signifie que « le Conseil de Sécurité assumera une responsabilité lourde, soit d’avancer et résoudre définitivement la question sahraouie, soit de jeter l’éponge et par conséquent ouvrir les portes à l’inconnu. »

Le rapport de Ban Ki-moon a appelé pour une surveillance des droits humains « souteneur, indépendante et impartiale » dans le territoire contesté, sans explicitement recommander que ceci soit confié à la MINURSO. Cependant, il a en même temps donné une note positive d’encouragement sur l’intention de Rabat, récemment annoncée, d’améliorer le Conseil Nationale des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH) et mettre fin à la pratique de juger les civils dans les tribunaux militaires. Selon les diplomates du Conseil de Sécurité cités par Reuters (19/04/14), les versions initiales du rapport de Ban Ki-moon ont en fait inclus un appel pour « un mécanisme de surveillance » des droits humains, mais ont été révisées deux fois dans un période de quelques heures et l’idée d’un « mécanisme » a été remplacée avec un appel pour une « surveillance » non spécifiée. Même si l’Ambassadeur de France à l’ONU a nié avoir fait pression sur le Secrétariat pour modifier le rapport de Ban Ki-moon, Paris a rapidement bien fait comprendre ce qu’il a considéré comme acceptable : lors d’une conférence de presse le 11 avril, le porte-parole du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Romain Nadal a loué « les efforts majeurs » du Maroc et a constaté que « les efforts pour protéger les droits humains dans cette région » devraient continuer dans le contexte de « la coopération par le Maroc avec les procédures
spéciales de l'OHCHR et du Haut Commissaire Navi Pillay, » sans un nécessité de charger la MINURSO de la question. Quand la délégation américaine à l'ONU a circulé une résolution initiale quelques jours plus tard, celle-ci n’a inclus aucune référence à un rôle des droits humains pour la MINURSO. L'Ambassadeur français à Gérard Araud a rapidement nié (via Twitter) que la France avait menacé d’utiliser son veto contre l’inclusion du monitoring des droits humains, mais le point a été un peu académique.

La résolution 2152 adoptée le 29 avril, n’a inclus aucune innovation substantive, soit en termes de la surveillance des droits humains, les limitations sur l’exploitation de ressources naturelles, ou les dates limites ou ultimatums pour un accord négocié, et a effectivement renouvelé le mandat de la MINURSO pour un an avec des exhortations normales au Maroc et au Front Polisario de « continuer les négociations sous les auspices du Secrétaire Général sans les conditions préalables et en bonne esprit. » La réaction du représentant du Polisario Ahmed Boukhari était sans éclat, exprimant sa « satisfaction avec l’engagement du Conseil de Sécurité en faveur d’une solution politique au conflit du Sahara Occidental basée sur le droit inaliénable des Sahraouis à l’auto-détermination » et son regret que la MINURSO reste la seule opération de maintien de la paix sans un mécanisme de surveillance des droits humains.

Les réactions en privé, avec les responsables du Polisario avons qui nous avons eu l'occasion de parler, étaient un peu plus révélatrices. Un membre du Conseil national sahraoui (pseudo parlement de la RASD) a parlé le lendemain de l'adoption et a qualifié les déclarations de Boukhari applaudissant la résolution No.2152 comme une façade diplomatique, car en réalité la résolution a marqué « une régression pour la cause sahraouie. » Le Maroc et de ses amis, la source a ajouté:

ont élaboré un plan pour enterrer la cause sahraouie le 30 Avril 2015. Les Marocains disent déjà que la résolution 2152 sera la dernière avant que l'ONU ne reconnaisse le plan d'autonomie comme la meilleure solution au conflit. Parallèlement, les dirigeants du Polisario n'ont même pas levé le petit doigt lorsque le roi du Maroc a visité le Sahara avec sa femme et ses enfants[3] pour défiler dans les rues de ses villes et montrer au monde qu'il se sentait comme chez lui et que les gens du Sahara lui doivent allégeance. Les dirigeants du Polisario étaient plus préoccupés par la politique interne de l'Algérie que par la direction que la question du Sahara pourrait prendre résultant d'une résolution favorable au Maroc comme celle qui vient d'être adoptée. Le président de la RASD et ses principaux lieutenants passaient la plupart de leur temps à analyser l'élection présidentielle algérienne et son impact, au lieu de répondre aux initiatives du Maroc telles que la visite du roi au Sahara et son lobbying du Secrétaire général de l'ONU.

S'adressant à nous, presque une quinzaine de jours plus tard, le conseiller de Mohamed Abdelaziz cité ci-dessus a donné une évaluation de la situation qui, bien que plus mesurée dans le ton, était tout aussi sombre que la réaction du membre du Conseil national sahraoui. Suite à la Résolution 2152, le conseiller a fait valoir que le Polisario se trouve à un tournant pour lequel il n'était pas préparé. La résolution appelle à des progrès vers une solution mutuellement acceptable, mais les positions des deux parties restent divergentes et, en effet, irréconciliables. Le Polisario continuera à insister qu'il ne puisse y avoir une solution autre que celle basée sur un référendum qui offre plus d'une option, dont l'une doit être l'indépendance totale. La source a continué:

Le problème est que, contrairement à la situation des années précédentes, le Polisario est mal placé pour imposer cette solution. La situation a changé, et elle est de plus en plus défavorable pour Polisario. L'Algérie est dans une phase de stagnation, où la prise de décision est très lente. À l'heure actuelle, l'Algérie est complètement prise avec ses propres problèmes et préoccupations, beaucoup plus que ce qu'il était le cas même au cours de sa décennie de guerre contre le terrorisme islamiste. Donc, le meilleur qu'Alger peut offrir est de maintenir sa position historique et son aide traditionnelle au Polisario, choses qu'elle ne peut vraiment changer de toute façon. Les Algériens sont inquiets au sujet de la succession présidentielle, qui est de plus en plus risquée. Il est devenu clair lors de la campagne de l'élection présidentielle que les Algériens ont peur de l'avenir. Nous n'avons pas besoin de cette stagnation en Algérie au moment où la population des camps des réfugiés augmente de plus en plus, et nos besoins matériels augmentent également. En plus de cela, il y a un sentiment palpable de fatigue de la part des partisans internationaux du Polisario, qui envoient de l'aide...
alimentaire et écoutent poliment les envoyés du Polisario, mais ils murmurent sur la question du Sahara afin de ne pas perturber le Maroc ou ses alliés. L'Afrique du Sud est un exemple. La dernière visite en Espagne par le Premier Ministre Abdelkader Taleb Oumar en est un autre. Celle-ci s'est déroulée presque en silence, alors que dans le passé, cela aurait été un événement important pour les médias espagnols et la société civile.

Il semble, d'autre part, que la direction du Polisario a eu le temps de tirer quelques conclusions pratiques de cette évaluation sombre de la situation. Selon la même source:

Pour toute leur expérience, tirée d’années d’activisme, les représentants du Polisario et de la RASD à l’étranger ont besoin d’un nouvel élan. Le Polisario doit prendre les leçons appropriées et se préparer pour ce tournant stratégique. Les campagnes de défense des droits humains qui n’ont pas le soutien massif d’autres acteurs ne peuvent réussir. Le Polisario ne peut pas imposer un référendum sur l’indépendance seulement en organisant des comités pour défendre les prisonniers politiques. Nous avons besoin d’une nouvelle stratégie. C’est le message que le président Mohamed Abdelaziz a transmis lors de la dernière réunion du Secrétariat national juste avant les célébrations du 41e anniversaire du Polisario. En outre, il a donné quelques indications sur ce que pourrait être la stratégie. Par exemple, le Polisario doit prendre l’initiative pour trouver l’appui à sa demande pour une solution basée sur un référendum de la part partis politiques marocains et des associations professionnelles. Mohamed Abdelaziz a posé une question légitime: pourquoi faut-il que les Sahraouis se sentent obligés de négocier exclusivement avec l’État marocain? Ils ont besoin de créer un mouvement au Maroc, et même au sein de l’établissement marocain, qui est sympathique avec et en faveur de leur cause. Et quand certains membres du Secrétariat national ont évoqué la possibilité que les Algériens pourraient avoir des réserves sur une telle stratégie, Mohammed Abdelaziz avait de la difficulté à rassurer les participants quant à la position de l’Algérie. L’Algérie, il a dit, n’a pas de réserves quant à cette orientation, et elle n’a pas l’intention d’intervenir.

TEXTE EN ANGLAIS

WESTERN SAHARA / SITUATION REPORT
16/05/14

The Polisario Front celebrated its 41st anniversary on May 10, after a roller-coaster couple of months during which it appears to have built up remarkably high hopes regarding the extension of MINURSO’s mandate to cover defence of human rights only to see them dashed at the UN Security Council’s annual meeting on the subject at the end of April,
while simultaneously living through a bout of anxiety over the Algerian presidential election. As it takes stock, the Front now seems to be turning towards a new strategy.

In the wake of King Mohamed VI's visit to Washington last autumn, it will be recalled, a member of Polisario's National Secretariat had confidently forecast that “when April comes around, [a human rights component for MINURSO's mission] will be included in the UN Security Council resolution, as will the question of the natural resources in the Moroccan-administered territories,” and claimed to have “have received firm promises in this regard from members of Congress”. The same Polisario official later appeared optimistic that France would “adopt a neutral position” at the UNSC meeting in April and would refrain from using its veto power to block a resolution making human rights monitoring part of MINURSO's mandate[4].

Such optimism was further encouraged by a sudden squall in Franco-Moroccan relations in late February. On February 20, French police officers visited the Moroccan ambassador's residence in Paris to inform Abdellatif Hammouchi, the head of Morocco’s domestic intelligence agency (DGST), who was at the time accompanying the Interior Minister on a visit to France, of a summons issued by an investigating judge in connection with two civil lawsuits filed by an NGO accusing him of "complicity in torture". Adding insult to injury, on the same day Spanish actor Javier Bardem (an outspoken supporter of the cause of Saharawi self-determination) was quoted by the French media as claiming that France's ambassador to the United States François Delattre had once described Morocco to him as "a mistress who you sleep with every night, who you don't particularly love but you have to defend". The double incident provoked howls of protest from Rabat, which suspended its judicial cooperation convention with France and recalled the diplomat in charge of its application, prompting President François Hollande to call King Mohamed directly in an attempt to smooth over the problem.

Speaking to us shortly after the Hammouchi incident, the same Polisario National Secretariat member cast it as a “wake-up call” for the French authorities concerning “the human rights situation in Morocco”, arguing that it showed that France needed “to put the defence of human rights and the abolition of torture in Morocco at the forefront of relations between the two countries”. For his part, a former senior official at the Moroccan royal palace argued that the French “had not been vigilant enough” with regard to attempts to “destabilise the relationship between Paris and Rabat” in which “the Algerians certainly had a hand”; the same source argued that the King's very strong reaction to the incident (seen as disproportionate, he claimed, even by some Moroccan officials) was in fact intended to send a message not only to the French but also to the Algerians.

As the UN Security Council meeting drew nearer, Polisario officials continued to express optimism. Speaking to us in mid-April, a senior member of the Front's leadership who acts as an advisor to Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz went as far as to suggest that the cause of Saharawi independence stood before “the second most important turning point in its history, after the ceasefire agreement of 1991”. The international community, the source argued, was becoming aware of the need to bring the Western Sahara conflict at long last to an acceptable and lasting conclusion that would ensure the Saharawi people's right to self-determination. One symptom of this new situation, the Polisario official went on to argue, was the “visible panic at the very top of the Moroccan power structure”, as shown amongst other things by King Mohammed's telephone call to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as the Security Council began its consultations in the run-up to the annual meeting on MINURSO[5]. Polisario's delegation at the UN had “received assurances that the protection of civilians in the territories administered by Morocco would be taken into account” by the UNSC, claimed the source (without indicating who had given such assurances, however). The source continued:
Having mounted its own campaign to lobby the Security Council to include human rights monitoring in MINURSO's remit, with 115 sympathetic “civil society organisations” from 21 countries backing the call, Polisario will have been further encouraged by explicit messages of support for the idea from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International in the run-up to the UNSC meeting. The Front's representative at the UN in New York Ahmed Boukhari gave voice to the general sense of expectation on April 11, commenting on Ban Ki-moon's report: the Western Sahara question could enter a “decisive phase” in 2015, he argued, with the UN Secretary General suggesting that the Security Council should undertake a total review of the negotiation process between the Polisario Front and Morocco if there is no progress before April 2015. This, Boukari argued, means that “the Security Council will assume a heavy responsibility, whether to move forward and definitively solve the Sahrawi issue, or throw in the towel and consequently open the doors to the unknown.”

Ban's report called for "sustained, independent and impartial" monitoring of human rights in the disputed territory but without explicitly recommending that this be entrusted to MINURSO. At the same time, however, the Secretary General sounded a positive note of encouragement for Rabat's recently announced intention to enhance the role of the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) and put an end to the practice of trying civilians before military tribunals. According to Security Council diplomats quoted by Reuters (19/05/14), the initial drafts of Ban's report did in fact include a call for a human rights "monitoring mechanism", but the UN Secretariat revised the report twice within the space of a few hours, replacing the idea of a “mechanism” with a call for unspecified “monitoring”. Although France's UN ambassador denied having exerted pressure on the Secretariat to modify Ban's report, Paris soon made it clear what it considered acceptable: at a press conference on April 11, French Foreign Ministry spokesman Romain Nadal lauded Morocco's "major efforts” and argued that “efforts to protect human rights in this region” should continue in the context of “cooperation by Morocco with the special procedures of the OHCHR and High Commissioner Navi Pillay”, with no need to task MINURSO on the matter. When the United States delegation to the UN circulated a draft resolution a few days later, it contained no reference to a human rights role for MINURSO. French UN ambassador Gerard Araud rushed to deny (via Twitter) that France had threatened to veto the inclusion of human rights monitoring, but the point was somewhat academic.

The resulting Resolution 2152, passed on April 29, contained no substantive innovations whatsoever, be it in terms of human rights monitoring, limitations on the exploitation of natural resources, or deadlines or ultimatums for a negotiated settlement, and effectively came down to another one year renewal of MINURSO's mandate accompanied by the usual exhortations to Morocco and the Polisario Front “to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith”. The reaction of Polisario's UN representative Ahmed Boukhari was correspondingly lacklustre, expressing “satisfaction with the Security Council's commitment in favour of a political solution to the Western Sahara conflict based on Saharawis' inalienable right to self-determination,” while regretting that MINURSO remains the only United Nations peace mission without a human rights monitoring mechanism.

The reactions in private of the Polisario officials we were able to talk to were somewhat more revealing. Speaking the day after it was adopted, a member of the Saharawi National Council (the SADR's pseudo-parliament) dismissed statements such as Boukhari's welcoming Resolution 2152 as mere diplomatic window-dressing, since in reality the resolution marked “a step backwards for the Saharawi cause”. Morocco and its friends, the source went on: have drawn up a plan to bury the Saharawi cause by April 30, 2015. The Moroccans are already saying that Resolution 2152 will be the last before the UN recognises the autonomy plan as the best solution to the conflict. Meanwhile, Polisario's leaders didn't even lift a finger when the King of Morocco visited the Sahara with his wife and children in tow[6] to parade through the streets of its cities and show the world that he was completely at home there and that the people of the Sahara owe allegiance to him. Polisario's leadership was more preoccupied by the internal politics of Algeria than by the turn that the Sahara question might take with a resolution as favourable to Morocco as the one that has just been adopted. The President of the SADR and his main lieutenants were
spending most of their time analysing the Algerian presidential election and its impact, instead of responding to Morocco’s initiatives such as the King’s visit to the Sahara and his lobbying of the UN Secretary General.

Speaking to us almost a fortnight later, the advisor to Mohamed Abdelaziz quoted above gave an assessment of the situation which, while more measured in tone, was scarcely less gloomy than the reaction of the Saharawi National Council Member. Following Resolution 2152, the advisor argued, Polisario finds itself at a turning point for which it was not prepared. The resolution calls for progress towards a mutually acceptable solution, but the positions of the two parties remain divergent and, indeed, irreconcilable. Polisario will continue to insist that there can be no solution other than on the basis of a referendum that offers more than one option, one of which must be full independence. The source continued:

The problem is that, contrary to the situation in previous years, Polisario is in no position to impose such a solution. The situation has changed, and is increasingly unfavourable for Polisario. Algeria is in a phase of stagnation, in which decision-making is very slow. At present, Algeria is completely taken up with its own problems and anxieties, far more than was the case even during its decade of war against Islamist terrorism. So the best Algiers has to offer is the maintenance of its historic position and its traditional aid to Polisario, neither of which it can really alter in one way or the other. The Algerians are anxious about the presidential succession, which is turning out to be increasingly risky. It became clear during the presidential election campaign that the Algerians are afraid of what future has in store for them. This stagnation in Algeria is not what we need at a time when the population of the refugees camps is growing, and our material needs with it. On top of this, there is a palpable sense of fatigue on the part of Polisario's international supporters, who salve their consciences by sending food aid and politely listening to Polisario envoys but speak as quietly as the possibly can on the Sahara question so as not to upset Morocco or its allies. South Africa is one example. Another came with SADR Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Oumar's latest visit to Spain, which passed off almost in silence, whereas in the past it would have been an important event for the Spanish media and civil society.

It would seem, however, that the Polisario leadership has had time to draw some practical conclusions from this rather grim assessment of the situation. According to the same source:

For all their experience, drawn from years of activism, the representatives of Polisario and the SADR abroad need a new impetus. Polisario has to draw the appropriate lessons and prepare for this turning point. Human rights campaigns that do not have massive support from other actors cannot bear fruit. Polisaro cannot impose a referendum on independence just by organising committees to defend political prisoners. We need a new strategy. That is the message that President Mohammed Abdelaziz delivered at the last meeting of the National Secretariat just before the celebrations to mark Polisario's 41st anniversary. And he gave a few indications of what that strategy might be. For example, Polisario needs to take the initiative of getting Moroccan political parties and professional associations to support its demand for a solution based on a referendum. President Mohammed Abdelaziz asked a legitimate question: why should Saharawis feel compelled to negotiate exclusively with the Moroccan state? They need to create a current within Morocco, and even within the Moroccan establishment, that is sympathetic with and supports their cause. And when certain members of the National Secretariat raised the possibility that the Algerians might have reservations about such a strategy, Mohammed Abdelaziz was at pains to reassure the participants about Algeria's position. Algeria, he said, has no reservations about this orientation, and has no intention of intervening.
Le Polisario pourrait être encouragé à le croire étant donné l'expérience de la période qui a précédé la dernière réunion de UNSC sur le Sahara occidental en 2013, au cours de laquelle la France aurait indiqué qu'il ne utiliserait pas son veto pour bloquer une proposition initialement présentée par la délégation des États-Unis d'inclure la surveillance des droits humains dans la mission de MINURSO, selon des diplomates proches du Groupe des Amis du Sahara Occidental cité par Reuters.

Dans une conversation téléphonique avec M. Ban le 11 Avril, le Roi du Maroc a exigé que le rôle de l'ONU au Sahara occidental reste inchangé, en évitant les « approches biaisées » et « options difficiles », et a souligné la nécessité de « préserver les paramètres de négociation tel que défini par le Conseil de Sécurité. »

Le 19 avril, juste après le Conseil de Sécurité a commencé ses consultations sur le brouillon qui est devenu Résolution 2152.

Polisario may have been encouraged to believe this by the experience of the run-up to last year's UNSC meeting on Western Sahara, during which France reportedly indicated that it would not veto a proposal initially put forward by the US delegation to include human rights monitoring in MINURSO's mission, according to diplomats close to the Group of Friends on Western Sahara quoted by Reuters news agency.

In a telephone conversation with Ban on April 11, the Moroccan King called for the UN role in the Western Sahara to remain unchanged, avoiding "biased approaches" and "perilous options", and stressed the need to "preserve the parameters of negotiation as defined by the Security Council".

On April 19, just after the Security Council began its consultations on the draft that was to become Resolution 2152.
Rachad,
Per our discussion this morning. See below


Obama's High-Risk Africa Summit

The president is breaking with tradition during a meeting with more than 50 African leaders.

Is Obama's Africa Leaders Summit worth the time?

By Stephen Hayes June 9, 2014 | 11:15 a.m. EDT + More

In eight weeks, Washington, D.C., will see another historic event: the first U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. All but a few of the heads of state of the 54 nations of Africa have been invited and most are expected to attend. It will be the most heads of state to ever be in Washington at one time, likely creating traffic jams Washington has seldom seen before as the Secret Service escorts the presidents and prime ministers across town several times a day.
The purpose of the program is ostensibly to bring Africa and the United States closer together economically and politically. While it is a program also designed to strengthen the legacy of the Obama presidency, it is not without significant risks and challenges, for this summit will be like none the African leaders have ever experienced.

The summit represents a shift in strategy in the administration. In the first term, the administration was adamant that it would work with the "like-minded" nations (read, democratically elected leaders) first, receiving selected leaders in Washington either alone or in small groups of three or four. There would be no massive summits with Africa. During this period, no African head of state was given a state dinner, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Africa.

During the same period, China, Japan, India and Europe have all had African summits, respectively, with China being the first. Nearly every African head of state flew to Beijing and met Chinese leadership one-on-one and dined at a state dinner in the Great Hall. No leader of Africa was uninvited and the Chinese entertained the leaders lavishly and made commitments towards the development of most of the countries attending. A $20 billion commitment of aid to Africa was made, and that has since been supplemented by another $10 billion.

Japan followed course, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave each of 46 African leaders a 15 minute meeting over a three-day period. Japan, fearing a rising China, and also needing Africa's trade and resources for its own economy, promised $30 billion in aid among several other means of support for African development, including 10,000 business internships for African students. India and the European Union also brought the African presidents together to pledge support and cooperation. There was little choice left at the White House but to also host nearly all African heads of state, but with some interesting wrinkles to the formula.

The White House has told African ambassadors and others that no African leader will be given a one-on-one meeting with President Obama during the August summit, a fact that has caused some African leaders to ask what is the utility of the trip. This breaks all protocol tradition as the Africans know it.

Instead, the African presidents received an invitation to "an interactive dialogue" with the American president on Aug. 6. What, many ask, is an interactive dialogue? There will be a state dinner on the White House lawn for all presidents the evening before, but once the interactive dialogue is concluded the next day, so too is the summit. There is to be no final document, another break with protocol. No doubt Obama will shake the hand of each president, but there will be little substantive dialogue.

The African leaders have been asked to come to Washington for at least three days, with a Monday morning program focusing on civil society and an afternoon with Congress, organized by Sen. Chris Coons, D-Delaware, chairman of the Senate subcommittee on Africa. Currently, the White House has asked various cabinet secretaries to host African heads of state for private dinners that evening. This, too, is a very different approach to diplomacy. Cabinet secretaries and African government ministers rank below heads of state, of course, and protocol-sensitive heads of state may seriously question whether they should attend. Furthermore, who is hosted by the secretary of state or the secretary of defense will be noted by those hosted by less prestigious cabinet officers. It may be all too easy for some heads of state to take umbrage.

Economics and trade will have their day as well, as the administration plans a U.S.-Africa CEO summit, organized by the secretary of commerce and her staff. Three hundred CEOs will be invited to meet and discuss business and trade over six hours with African heads of state. The White House is strictly adhering to selected CEOs only. In some ways, this meeting may be the most critical of all to U.S.-Africa relations, as the U.S. private sector has been slow to respond to the new African market and is falling behind as an investor and trader in the world's largest emerging market. The administration is hoping that this program will spark new interest in Africa from the corporate world. To help them, the White House called upon business and political titan Michael Bloomberg to add his name as co-convener, in order to better draw corporate peers to this meeting.

The program breaks many international protocol traditions. That it is also held on President Obama's birthday has added fuel for critics who say that this more a legacy' program than a working meeting with real results. It is too early to say. An innovative program is being planned. This is a program of high risk, ultimately to be judged by the results to come. We shall hope and then we shall see.
From: Edward Gabriel <ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com>
Sent: Friday, June 27, 2014 11:20 AM
To: Edward Gabriel
Subject: Algeria situation report

The information contained in this report is compiled from public and private sources and cannot be verified for accuracy.
Thank you

ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
June 27, 2014

Executive Summary

Political Trends
- A conference in Algiers on June 10 brought together the broadest ever range of opposition parties and personalities behind the demand for a “peaceful democratic transition”. The opposition parties still have no joint platform, however, and no strategy for convincing the power structure of the need to accept change, making it easy for the PM to brush them off as irrelevant.
- The Presidency is forging ahead with consultations around its draft constitutional amendment package, while the government has met under President Bouteflika’s chairmanship to adopt the “presidential programme of action” for the next five years.
- There have been some indications that tensions persist to some degree within the establishment, despite the successful re-election of Bouteflika. Against this background, moves by CoS Gaid Saleh to push over 70 army and DRS officers into retirement have been interpreted as a purge of those who might have thrown in their lot with efforts to block Bouteflika's fourth term of office by having him impeached on grounds of ill health.
- Whether or not the proposed retirements are politically motivated, there are signs that they are meeting some resistance within the military, at a time when the army and the DRS face unprecedented challenges on the country's borders.

Foreign Relations
- Following on from the French Defence Minister's visit in mid-May, the French Gendarmerie commander and Foreign Minister have also held talks in Algiers, with potential cooperation in “pacifying” northern Mali and southern Libya high on the agenda in all cases.
- Algiers appears keen to capitalise on its continuing rapprochement with Paris by urging the French to “help” Morocco reach agreement with Polisario.
- There has been a rash of press reports of operations by the Algerian army and DRS in Libya, in contradiction with the established doctrine of not intervening militarily in other countries.
- While these reports have met with strenuous official denials, private sources confirm that Algerian forces have indeed been conducting counter-terrorism operations on Libyan territory and have established control over a buffer strip on the Libyan side of the border.
- Military intervention in foreign countries and collaboration with “imperialist” nations remain highly controversial, but with no end in sight to the operations in Libya now that they have begun, there is likely to be increasing pressure to address these issues more openly.

Security
- After relatively high levels of political violence in May, including several clashes between the security forces and arms smugglers and/or jihadists along the border with Libya, reporting has all but dried up in June, suggesting that a news blackout may have been enforced in connection with the Algerian army's controversial intervention in Libya.
The capital has remained quiet, but a network set up to send would-be fighters to Syria has been discovered in the adjacent wilaya of Blida, suggesting that AQMI still faces competition for recruits from the more 'fashionable' jihadist groups in Syria.

As the situation in Libya deteriorates, the Presidency and the General Staff are reported to have issued orders for a new operation to secure the eastern border and oil and gas production sites, which involves exclusion zones on the Algerian side of the border and intensive patrolling of the border by army helicopters.
On June 10, the long-awaited conference organised by the National Coordinating Committee for Freedoms and Democratic Transition (CNLTD) in response to the re-election of Bouteflika convened in Algiers, bringing together what was undoubtedly the broadest range of opposition parties and personalities Algeria has ever seen: in addition to the members of the CNLTD itself[1], the conference saw participation from the mainly Kabyle, social-democratic FFS, the moderate islamist El Islah, Bouteflika's main challenger in the April election Ali Benflis, veteran human rights campaigner Ali Yahia Abdenour, and former Prime Ministers Mouloud Hamrouche, Sid Ahmed Ghozali and Mokdad Sifi. However much of an achievement it was to bring together such a broad panel, in the final analysis the mountain laboured and brought forth a mouse: after a day of speeches, the conference handed the task of penning a new “platform for freedoms and democratic transition” over to a committee that has yet to be established and which seems to have no deadline for completing the job. The main slogan that emerged from the conference, around which the future platform ought theoretically to be built, was for a peaceful, negotiated transition to a more authentically democratic system. But the question of how the power structure might be induced to negotiate anything at all with the opposition does not seem to have been addressed – an omission that speaks volumes as to the opposition parties' lack of confidence in their own capacity for mass mobilisation, and their failure to connect with existing grassroots protest campaigns (such as the well organised movement of unemployed youth in the south of the country, the movement against fracking that is now also emerging in the south, the long suffering families of the 'disappeared' who appealed – apparently in vain – to the conference for help, etc.).

It is perhaps no great surprise therefore that the power structure itself has remained largely impervious to this “historic” event. Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal did allude to the opposition's initiative in a speech to parliament on June 5, but only to brush aside the very idea of a “democratic transition” as irrelevant, since “we are a democratic country [and] people have to realise that the transition is behind us”. The Presidency is pressing on regardless with the consultations around its own, very limited, constitutional reform package; some of the participants in the June 10 conference, such as the FFS, have consented to take part in the consultations while others are boycotting the whole process, which is in itself indicative of the very flimsy nature of the opposition alliance. Meanwhile, the Council of Ministers met twice in May, under the chairmanship of President Bouteflika[2], adopting the draft “Government Action Plan for the implementation of the presidential programme”.

Behind the appearance of business as usual, however, there are some indications that tensions within the power structure may not have been laid to rest by the successful re-election of Bouteflika. AlgériePatriotique.com – an online newspaper that is understood to be co-owned by the sons of DRS chief Lt-Gen. Mohamed 'Tewfik' Médiène and former Defence Minister and CoS Gen. Khaled Nezzar – has for example reported that Gen. Nezzar has declined an invitation to take part in the consultations on constitutional reform. Nezzar, once the leading light of the so-called “eradicator” faction of the army and never a fan of Bouteflika's, is said to be disgruntled that suggestions he made during the round of consultations on the constitution held in 2011 were essentially ignored and, beyond this, to be fuming about Bouteflika's stage-managed re-election this
year and, in particular, “the army’s role in this event”. AlgériePatriotique.com has also reported that Col. Fawzi, the former head of the Centre de Communication et de Diffusion (the DRS’s former media management branch), who was among the prominent DRS officers dismissed last year, has been forbidden to leave the country[3] pending prosecution – for unspecified offences – before a “specialised court”. For his part, the present CoS and Deputy Defence Minister, Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd Saleh, is reported to have convened the Haut Conseil de la Fonction Militaire[4] in the days following Bouteflika’s investiture in order to have it approve a list of 74 DRS and army officers to be put out to grass in the upcoming annual round of retirements and promotions on July 5. This list – which is said to await President Bouteflika’s signature – seems to be a modified version of the list of 80 or more names Gaïd Saleh is reported to have proposed in mid-January[5].

A source close to the middle ranks of the DRS suggests that the mooted retirements are in fact a barely disguised purge, casting them as a prolongation of the wave of changes that began last summer with the removal of Col. Fawzi and continued in the following months with the removal of Gen. M'henna Djebbar, Maj-Gen. Bachir Tartag et al. The source claims that these and other senior DRS officers are accused of having attempted to orchestrate a “coup d'Etat blanc” after Bouteflika’s stroke in April of last year, by exploiting their influence over Algeria’s media and political parties to force through the application of article 88 of the constitution (which provides for the impeachment of the President on grounds of lasting incapacitation). With his new list of 70-plus names for retirement, Gaïd Saleh is now going after their various sympathisers in the DRS and the army, the source suggests. Tewfik, it would seem, is not seen as having been in cahoots with the alleged plotters. The source adds that there have been lengthy internal discussions about who should be left on or taken off the list, since many of the officers in question have not yet reached retirement age and there is resistance within the army to dispensing with their skills when the country is virtually on a war footing because of the deteriorating situation in Libya and the Sahel.

This account, which casts the changes in the army and the intelligence service in a new light, has not as yet been either confirmed to us or denied by other sources close to the military and security establishment, although a source close to Bouteflika told us, albeit over the ‘phone, “the President has neutered ‘them’ (sic), and as long as he remains alive, none of ‘them’ will dare raise his head again.” In this connection it may be worth quoting at some length from El Watan’s article on the retirements Lt-Gen. Gaïd Saleh is said to be preparing for July 5:

Informed sources say that […] “these retirements are being imposed by leaders who themselves well past retirement age. The majority of heads of military regions and services should have retired long ago. Why have they not been concerned by the application of Article 20?[6] Is it normal for officers as young as 50 years to be retiring?” The answer, say our interlocutors, is known to all. “We are in the same situation as in 2004, when part of the army, represented by Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Mohamed Lamari had refused to endorse Bouteflika's second term, seconded by Gen. Toufik. But the late Smail Lamari and Larbi Belkheir were strong supporters of Bouteflika and eventually won over Gen. Toufik, who then sacrificed the Chief of Staff and a list of senior officers, officers and non-commissioned officers, who all retired in 2006 with another wave in 2008, under very suspicious circumstances. No one had so much as imagined Gaïd Salah could ever become Chief of Staff when he was already thought to be close to retirement in 2004. The relationship between him and the President has grown quite strong and […] he is only accountable to the President, or perhaps rather the brother of the President. He is
organising a witch-hunt for troublesome officers just when the military needs them the most because of the situation on our borders,” explain our interlocutors. They call these measures “score-settling that might make the sense of frustration in the ranks even worse and lead to demoralisation, and that is something the military could really do without, especially in these times of crisis .... .”

The article, it should be noted, appeared under the by-line of Salima Tlemçani, a veteran journalist with an established record of being used as a conduit by certain elements within the military and the security services.

Foreign Relations

On May 27, less than a week after French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian’s visit to Algiers, Gen. Denis Favier, the head of France's Gendarmerie (which answers to the Ministry of the Interior) arrived in the Algerian capital at the head of a sizeable delegation for two days of discussions with Algerian Gendarmerie commander Maj-Gen. Ahmed Boustila and his team. On June 8, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius flew in for a two-day visit, during which he was received by President Bouteflika and held talks with his opposite number Ramtane Lamamra, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and Industry Minister Abdesselam Bouchouareb. Questions of regional security, and in particular the situations in Mali and southern Libya, were central to all of these visits, which Algerian French-language daily Liberté was quick to portray as part of a broader campaign of “strong [international] pressure on Algeria to get involved militarily in the Sahel”, pointing to what it suggested were the first signs of operational collaboration in the field between Algerian and French forces[7]. At a joint press conference with his Algerian counterpart, Foreign Minister Fabius saluted Algeria’s “pacifying role” in Mali[8] and proclaimed that France and Algeria “stand side by side in the fight against terrorism”. At the same time however, he dismissed any suggestions that the two countries' armed forces might be involved in joint military operations in Libya as “allegations with no basis in reality”.

The French Foreign Minister was referring to a series of press reports, beginning with an article in London Times on May 30[9], claiming that the Algerian military had begun conducting anti-terrorist operations on Libyan soil – a breach of Algeria's official doctrine, which eschews military operations beyond the country's own borders. While the Times article limited itself to asserting that “French, American and Algerian special forces have been sent to the south of Libya to attack terrorist networks” and did not elaborate further with regard to the alleged Algerian involvement, Algerian daily El Watan soon picked up the story, adding a wealth of detail. In its June 6 edition, noting that “no official would talk about it,” El Watan reported that “Algerian forces have been on the offensive in Libya since May 29”. Some “3,500 Algerian paratroopers plus a 1,500-strong logistical support unit are currently deployed on the other side of the [Algeria-Libya] border,” claimed the daily, adding that “another source, a diplomat, talked of 5,000 troops on the ground and a major aerial operation”. The military's plan stresses mobility, so the troops “move aboard lightly armed off-roaders with machine guns, supported by artillery.” The real heavy firepower “comes from the Algerian military's attack helicopters”. El Watan adds that “other players joined the American-French-Algerian effort: forces from Chad and forces loyal to Libya’s Gen. Haftar”. El Watan revisited the story on June 13, reporting that the operation was “still under way, now in its second week”, covering a strip of territory about 100 km deep on the Libyan side of the border: Surveillance aircraft detect targets which are then “handled” by ground troops or attack helicopters. It should also
be noted that there are constant contacts with Libyan tribes to reassure and support them. The idea is to stabilise the west of Libya so as to make sure that isolated and vulnerable tribes do not throw in their lot with the jihadists. Another objective is to destroy the military and logistics capacity of jihadist groups and occupy space so as to prevent them from leaving Libya. The thick of the action is happening in Benghazi, where the forces of Gen. Haftar are facing stiff resistance from Islamist militias. Egyptian forces are also taking part in operations the east of Libya, whereas France, which is deploying modest forces but working with the Chadians, is taking care of Libya's south. The US deployed its helicopter carrier USS Bataan with 2,000 troops on board carrying out targeted attacks. On June 16, France's Nouvel Observateur reiterated the news: commandos from Algeria’s 4th parachute regiment, combat helicopters and men from the DRS's Special Intervention Group were said to be operating in Libya alongside America’s 317th Special Forces Squadron (sic). “They are there,” Le Nouvel Observateur claimed, “to help Gen Haftar take power”[10]. According to the French news magazine, which says its information “was not denied by Algerian security sources,” some 25,000 Algerian troops are deployed along the border with Libya. Le Nouvel Observateur did not, on the other hand, mention any French presence.

Algerian officials have repeatedly denied such reports. Even before the Times broke the story, Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra was assuring reporters on the sidelines of a ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers on May 26 that “Algeria is not ready to coordinate with” Gen. Khalifa Haftar and “will not change its policy of non-interference in the affairs of brotherly and friendly countries”[11]. After the first El Watan article, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal assured parliament that “the Algerian military will not intervene in any foreign country as long as Bouteflika is head of state”, while other dailies such as Echourouk and L'Expression ran articles quoting unnamed security sources as denying categorically that there had been or could ever be any breach of Algeria's “sacrosanct principle” of non-intervention in conflicts beyond its borders. On June 17, Algerian Defence Ministry sources were again quoted as denying the reports, especially Le Nouvel Observateur's version which was described as “a deliberate disinformation effort”.

And yet, however strenuous the denials, it would seem that there is no smoke without fire. Concordant sources have assured us that the Algerian military is indeed involved in cross-border operations to the east. A member of the staff of Sonatrach's legal department told us in mid-June:

As of May 22, elite units of the Algerian armed forces entered Libyan territory, in particular going into the area around Ghadames in order to secure the assets of Sipex, Sonatrach's subsidiary in Libya. Once the assets – drilling sites in blocks 65, 95 and 96 – had been secured, Sipex repatriated all its personnel, at the same time as the Algerian staff of other companies and Algerian diplomats who had been posted to Libya[12]. On the ground, the Algerian army controls a strip several kilometres deep on the Libyan side of the border.

Speaking to us a week earlier, a source close to a number of middle-ranking DRS officers was even more explicit:

Elements from the 4th Parachute Regiment, which is based in Ouargla, are operating over 200 km deep within Libyan territory. And they are not alone. Snipers from the DRS's Special Intervention Group have also conducted several missions in Libya. One of them resulted in the elimination of 13 influential members of terrorist groups that were planning to attack Algeria's vital oil installations at Hassi Messaoud, and another culminated in the elimination of the head of an islamist militia from Misrata. All these operations have been organised with the assistance of militiamen from the Zintan brigades[13] and members of the Warfalla tribe.

Neither source, however, mentioned any collaboration with Gen. Haftar's campaign against islamist militias in the north of the country. It is also striking that they both remained silent on the matter of cooperation with US or French forces. While it seems likely that there would be at least some information sharing with the French and the Americans[14], the idea of active collaboration with “imperialist” powers is at least as much of a taboo in
Algeria as the idea of intervening militarily in other countries in the first place, if not more so. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that nobody is shouting it from the rooftops. But having crossed the Rubicon by sending troops into Libya, Algiers finds itself involved in cross-border operations with no clear end date; as they drag on, some form of coordination with US, French and possibly other forces is likely to become increasingly unavoidable, and pressure to address these controversial issues publicly will grow correspondingly.

In the meantime, the rapprochement with France continues, with Speaker of the APN (lower house of parliament) Mohamed Larbi Ould Khalifa visiting Paris on June 18 for a follow-up visit with Laurent Fabius, during which “stability in the North Africa-Sahel region” was once again the central theme. In a statement issued after their talks, Fabius again lauded Algeria as “a key country in a troubled region” that “plays a strategic role in the consecration of security and stability”. Algeria, the French Foreign Minister added approvingly, “protects the entire region from the impact of crises in certain countries with which it shares extensive borders”.

For his part, Ould Khalifa called for coordination between Algeria and France in the fight against terrorism, stressing the importance of “preserving the stability of the region of North Africa and the Sahel” and highlighting the role and contribution of Algeria “in the settlement of internal crises in certain countries”. Neither did the Algerian parliamentary Speaker miss the occasion to slip in a reference to the Western Sahara conflict, emphasising the need to “help” the Polisario Front and Morocco “implement international resolutions on the right to self-determination”.

Security

Levels of violence in May were relatively high, with some 21 security incidents (of which eight were initiated by the jihadists themselves) making it the busiest month since August 2013. However, these levels of activity do not appear to have carried on into June, which has so far been unusually quiet, with only two operations reported by June 18 – although it is possible that this is the consequence of a media blackout that may have been imposed in connection with the Algerian army's incursions into Libya (see above) and extended to cover the whole the country. Strikingly, there has been not a single incident reported along the southern border with Mali since mid-May – which, if our assumption that a media blackout is in place, may be a measure of the political sensitivity of the question of military and intelligence cooperation with French forces operating just across the border.

ALGIERS and its suburbs were generally quiet, although the press reported that security forces in the wilaya of Blida, adjacent to Algiers, “dismantled a network that had been recruiting fighters for Syria” around June 4, arresting eight people. This is however unlikely to have had any direct connection to AQMI, which has been competing for recruits with the tug of Syria, releasing a statement in March 2013 in which it implored “the Muslim youth in the Maghreb and especially Tunisia[15]” not to leave to take part in jihad in other countries unless “the leaders of jihad in your area, judging the move to be in the interest of Islam, authorise you to go”.

KABYLIA was unusually quiet this past month, with only two operations reported (a roadside bomb in Tizi Ouzou on May 28 and an ambush of a security forces patrol near Kadiria, Bouira, on June 4).

There were a handful of incidents in the WEST of the country, including a roadside bomb on May 28 that killed one soldier and wounded a number of others aboard a supply truck on their way to a border post with Morocco, near Beni Snous in the wilaya of Tlemcen. Also of note was an incident on June 16 in which the shrine of Sidi Cheikh, in the town of the same name in the wilaya of El-Bayadh, was burnt down by persons unknown – the second attack against a Sufi shrine within a month, following the attack on the shrine in Merine, wilaya of Sidi Bel Abbès on May 13 (see previous report).
Several incidents were reported in the SOUTH EAST of the country:

- Security forces on May 19 arrested five people in In Amenas suspected of running an arms smuggling ring between Mali, Chad and Libya.
- Also on May 19, the Algerian army killed eight Libyan militiamen near the border with Libya. The armed group was reportedly preparing to set up an ambush for Algerian border patrols. *Al-Khabar*, which reported the story, gave no details on the location of the incident, except for saying that the bodies of the dead fighters were taken to Bordj Omar Driss, in the northwest of the wilaya of Illizi, which suggests the incident took place in the northern sector of the border strip between Algeria and Libya.
- The security forces on May 20 raided an arms cache near the town of El-Oued, near the border with Tunisia, and recovered at least 11 machine guns and “eight missiles” believed to have been smuggled in from Libya.
- *Al-Khabar*, May 22, quoted “informed sources” as saying that “the highest security authorities” had dispatched “117 special operations troops” to Djanet, wilaya of Illizi, to plan operations against the forces of one Zain bin Qada, a Libyan militia leader who used to serve in Qadhafi’s forces and had established a base in the Libyan town of Dirj[16]. A week later, the same newspaper reported that the Algerian General Staff had decided to send 5,000 additional troops to the border with Libya.
- *Al-Khabar* on May 25 said the Algerian army had “in the past two days” foiled an attempt by a group of seven armed Libyan militiamen to cross into Algeria “in the Djili area of the wilaya of Illizi”. Two of the armed men were killed and five arrested. Seven machine guns, one heavy machine gun and three RPG shells were seized.

END

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

[1] Three moderate Islamist parties, the MSP, the FJD and Ennahda, the mainly Kabyle secularist RCD, the smaller and more recently formed Jil Jadid, plus former Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour.

[2] In addition to chairing the two Council of Ministers meetings on May 7 and 21, President Bouteflika has begun receiving foreign visitors far
more regularly than was the case prior to the presidential election – every few days since the beginning of May, and on some occasions more than one per day – suggesting that his stamina is improving. After being received by Bouteflika on June 9, visiting French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told France Info radio station that the President had showed “great mental alacrity, but he has a problem with elocution. He speaks very softly, so he has a little microphone to talk through.”

Similarly, there were reports in the beginning of April of Gen. M'henna Djebar, the former head of the Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Armées, being informed, as he was about to board a flight at Algiers Houari Boumediene International Airport, that he was barred from leaving the country.

The HCFM, established by presidential order in February 2006, is supposed to be chaired by the Defence Minister (i.e. Bouteflika) but it would seem that this responsibility has been delegated to Gaëd Saleh in his capacity as Deputy Defence Minister. The Haut Conseil is “the institutional framework in which are discussed general issues relating to the condition and status of military personnel” and includes: the Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defence; the commanders of the army, navy, air force, air defence, gendarmerie and the Republican Guard; the commanders of the military regions; and the head of the DRS.

In its June 8 issue, Algerian daily El Watan referred to a meeting of the HCFM on January 14, noting that it was at this meeting that several high-ranking DRS officers (Col. Fawzi; ex-DCSA chief Maj-Gen. Mhenna Djebar; former special intervention force commander Gen. Abdelkader Ait Ourabi, or Ouarab, a.k.a. Hassan; and Gen. Chafik, former head of the SCPI, the investigative police branch of the DRS that was abolished last autumn) were put into retirement. At the time, however, news portal Tout Sur l'Algérie and two private sources suggested that the retirements had been discussed at a meeting on January 13 of a newly established 'Special Security Commission' rather than the HCFM.

Of the regulations governing the status of military personnel, which sets maximum age limits for various ranks of officer.

“Leaks in France have suggested that the recent neutralisation of ten AQMI terrorists by the Algerian army on the border with Mali was the result of intelligence supplied by France and after an operation in the Adrar des Ifoghas region of northern Mali by French special forces involved in Operation Serval.”

On June 9, after months of cajoling by Algerian diplomats, six northern Malian movements – the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), Coordination of the People of Azawad (CPA), Coordination of Movements of Patriotic Resistance Fronts (CM-FPR), the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) – came together in Algiers to sign two documents committing themselves to a peace process based on inclusive dialogue and respect for the territorial integrity of Mali.


Khalifa Haftar, a retired military officer who heads the self-styled “Libyan National Army”, launched a large scale air and ground offensive against powerful Islamist militias in the Benghazi area on May 16 that he described as a "correction to the path of the revolution", dubbing it Operation Dignity. Haftar's offensive did not have the approval of the central Libyan government, and on May 18 was extended into Tripoli, with the storming of the Libyan General National Congress building by militiamen from the western town of Zintan. Haftar's offensive against the Islamist militias, which is still ongoing, enjoys a good measure of popular support, but has been cast as a thinly disguised coup attempt.

Lamamra was reacting to rumours of Algerian support for Khalifa Haftar's “Operation Dignity”, which have been encouraged by Haftar's own public statements. In an interview with Egyptian daily Al-Masri Al-Yawm at the end of May, for example, Haftar indicated that he welcomed military intervention by Libya's neighbours: "Of course I support any military strike that aims to secure Egyptian borders, even if it takes place inside Libya. We would like to get rid of these groups in Derna, Benghazi, Egdabia, Sert, Tripoli, and on the Algerian borders. It is impossible for us to allow any of them to carry out any action against neighboring and friendly countries.”

The evacuation of diplomatic staff from the Libyan government, and on May 18 was extended into Tripoli, encouraged by Haftar's own public statements. In an interview with Egyptian daily Al-Masri Al-Yawm at the end of May, for example, Haftar indicated that he welcomed military intervention by Libya's neighbours: "Of course I support any military strike that aims to secure Egyptian borders, even if it takes place inside Libya. We would like to get rid of these groups in Derna, Benghazi, Egdabia, Sert, Tripoli, and on the Algerian borders. It is impossible for us to allow any of them to carry out any action against neighboring and friendly countries.”

The evacuation of diplomatic staff actually took place somewhat earlier than the source seems to be suggesting. As noted in our last report, the Algerian military carried out an emergency evacuation of the ambassador and 50-strong staff of the embassy in Tripoli on May 16, after receiving "credible information of a serious and imminent threat" against Algerian diplomats in Libya.

Some months ago there were hints that for purposes of border security the Algerian military and/or the DRS had struck up contact with the Zintan Brigades, which have been one of the major players in south-west Libya since the fall of the Qaddafi regime, although they are far from enjoying full hegemony in this ethnically heterogeneous region.

Under the telling headline “Faced with chaos in Libya, the Algerian doctrine called into question”, El Watan claimed in its May 23 edition that: “When John Kerry visited Algiers at the beginning of April, the Americans did indeed put the request [for Algeria to use its military to help stabilise Libya and/or the Sahel] to the Algerian authorities, first and foremost Bouteflika, the General Staff and the DRS. Senior Algerian and American security envoys discussed the details of a more military role for Algeria in Libya. There can be no question of adopting an aggressive policy of crossborder intervention by the Algerian army,’ a military source explains. ‘It is a matter of protecting our national territory from the outside, very close to the borders, by means of swift, ad hoc operations. A major force projection was undertaken during the last few weeks all along the border with Libya, with air support also being prepared at the same time.’”

On June 1, AQMI underlined its growing orientation towards Tunisia with a statement claiming responsibility for an attack on the house of Tunisian Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou in Kasserine, Tunisia, on May 28 – the first time the organisation has explicitly laid claim to an operation on Tunisian soil. The statement lists the military operations “against the lions of Islam in Chaambi Mountains” the “oppression of Ansar al-Sharia, placed by the criminals who rule Tunisia on the list of terrorist organisations in the hope this will earn them sympathy from the head of the infidels, America, and the corrupt generals in Algeria”. AQMI’s message goes on to deny involvement in “any targeting of civilians in Tunisian towns and villages,” claiming that “any such operations are the dirty work of the authorities who then blame them on the mujahideen to tarnish their image and isolate them from their popular base, following the example of the criminal generals of Algeria”. It would seem that the group that carried out the Kasserine attack, which left four policemen dead, was made up of a mix of Tunisians and Algerians – Tunisian security said three of the five jihadists where Algerian nationals.

Note however that Dirj is located to the east of Ghadames, way to the north of the Djayet segment of the border.
“AQMI Central Region” swears allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi

In an eight-minute audio message posted on YouTube on June 26, Abou Abdallah El Âssemi[1], who is presented as “Qadi [religious judge] of AQMI-Central Region”, delivered a long paean of praise for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qaeda splinter group which together with an alliance of Iraqi Sunni forces took the cities of Mosul and Tikrit in mid-June. Three days later, on June 29 – also the first day of the holy month of Ramadan – ISIS itself issued a statement proclaiming the “restoration” of the Islamic Caliphate and demanding the allegiance (bay’a) of all Muslims to its leader, Ibrahim Al-Badri a.k.a. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, as the new “Caliph Ibrahim”. This was followed, in the early hours of the morning of June 30, by what is purported to be a short written communiqué from the Shura Council of the Central Region, signed by all its members[2], formally declaring the group's allegiance to “the venerable sheikh and servant of God, Ibrahim Bin Awad Al-Quraishi Al-Baghdadi Abu Bakr, the Caliph of the Muslims”. These developments may have serious implications for the jihadist movement in Algeria.

Already in March of this year, a written communiqué had been published in the name of AQMI-Central Region[3] that declared support for ISIS and exhorted its fighters to stand firm and “obey the Commander of the Believers Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al-Quraishi”. This came at a time when Al-Baghdadi had effectively been disowned by Al-Qaeda's international leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri after clashes between ISIS and another Al-Qaeda affiliate, the Nusra Front, in Syria. Insofar as the AQMI-Central Region statement took ISIS's defence, it could be seen as siding with Baghdadi against Zawahiri and, by extension, against AQMI's own national leadership, which owes allegiance to Zawahiri. Noting that the document is difficult if not impossible to authenticate, we raised the possibility at the time that it might be a DRS fabrication. This can still not be entirely ruled out: AQMI is known to have been having trouble competing for recruits with the more “fashionable” jihad in Syria for some time, issuing a statement in March 2013 in which it implored “the Muslim youth in the Maghreb” not to leave to take part in jihad in other countries without authorisation from “the leaders of jihad in your area”, and it might be argued that from this point of view it would make sense for the Algerian authorities to amplify the successes of ISIS in order to divert Algerian would-be jihadis away from AQMI. And whether or not the DRS has had any hand in talking up ISIS, there is some recent evidence that Algerian networks, presumably without any connection to AQMI's leadership, have indeed continued to recruit fighters for Syria.

And yet there are some grounds to believe that the various “Central Region” statements may indeed be genuine. While the DRS is undoubtedly well versed in the dark arts of false-flag operations, it is also well acquainted with the problem of “blowback”: returnees from the conflict in Afghanistan formed the backbone of the GIA and other armed Islamist groups in the early 1990s and similar patterns have been repeated in numerous other countries ever since, to the point where the negative cost/benefit ratio of sending wannabe jihadis overseas has become a central tenet of counter-terrorism lore. Furthermore, it is perhaps significant that AQMI's national leadership does not seem to have issued any statement condemning the messages attributed to its Central Region as DRS fabrications (as it might have been expected to do, preventively, if it had reason to believe that they were fakes cooked up with hostile intent). On the other hand, AQMI's leadership has implicitly recognised the existence of sharp controversies over ISIS and its roles in Syria and Iraq and in the global jihadist movement in a slightly earlier communiqué (dated June 22) welcoming ISIS's victories in Iraq but calling on it and rival jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq to put aside their differences and cooperate with one another and begging all “supporters of the mujahidin to cease their campaigns of carping and denigration in online forums and social media”.

There are also some indications that, although there are no known independent communications from the “Central Region” prior to March of this year, the structure itself is not imaginary. Back in February 2008, European intelligence sources suggested that, as it morphed into AQMI the previous year, the former GSPC had overhauled its internal structures, paring them down to just two zones, one covering the whole of northern Algeria and another covering a vast area extending south from roughly Biskra and taking in virtually the whole of the Algerian Sahara and part of northern Mali. At the same time, however, the European intelligence sources conceded that the AQMI fighters still seemed to be observing the old organisational forms – which suggests that the overhaul may have remained to a large extent a dead letter in practice. Subsequent (more or less well informed) reports in the Algerian media referred to a four-region structure, with the hard core of AQMI's fighters concentrated in its Central Region. This was various reported to comprise the Wilayas of Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdès, Bouira, Béjaïa, M'sila and Djelfa (Le Soir d'Algérie, May 2008), or Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdès, Bouira and Béjaïa (L'Expression, March 2009), or just Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdès and Bouira (Al-Akhbar Alaan TV, 2012) – a shrinking footprint that would seem to be coherent with losses sustained by the organisation under the pressure of the security forces in the mid-to-late 2000s.

By Al-Akhbar Alaan's account, furthermore, the Central Region was made up of three djounds (brigades or regiments): Djound El I'tissam, Djound El Ahouel and Djound El Ançar. Djound El I’tissam is mentioned in reports dating from 2003 on the known structure and development of the GSPC in the Wilaya of Boumerdès, which indicate that it was at some point in the late 1990s or early 2000s headed by a certain Omar Chaouch, a.k.a. Abou Khaled. By 2006, the same Omar Chaouch/Abou Khaled was said to be commanding Djound El Ahouel in the Khemis El Khechna area of the Wilaya of Boumerdès; the same reports claimed that the national Emir of the GSPC, Abdelmalek Droudkal a.k.a. Abou Mossaâb Abdelouadoud had placed one Abou Houraïra (real name unknown) in charge of a brigade operating “to the west” (no further detail). Jihadist noms de guerre are very much a mix-and-match affair, with the same elements frequently reused by various individuals, which makes identification on the basis of a konya alone something of a hazardous undertaking. It is nonetheless worth noting that signatories of both the March 2014 communiqué and the June 30 statement of allegiance to the Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi include an Abou Khaled Abderrahmane and an Abou Houraïra Thabet. Although fragmentary, these details do seem to suggest that there may be a degree of continuity between the Central Region of the GSPC/AQMI as it was in the mid-2000s and the group that began issuing statements in the name of the Central Region in March of this year.

While not altogether unheard of, appending a list of several signatories to a communiqué rather than just the name of the group's emir or simply the name of the organisation has not been the usual practice in the Algerian jihadist movement. The inclusion of such lists at the end of both the March communiqué and the June 30 statement of allegiance may perhaps be indicative of the seriousness of the controversy over what attitude to take towards ISIS: assuming that at least some of the noms de guerre are known within the broader jihadist movement (as they might be expected to be if, as we have postulated, some are “historic” figures of the GSPC/AQMI), citing them would in itself be a sort of argumentum ad verecundiam. The slight differences between the list of signatories on the March communiqué and that on the June 30 statement of allegiance may also be significant. Four names included in the former are absent from the latter: Abou Souheib Oussama (identified in March as the group’s Emir), Sheikh Ahmed (its treasurer), Abou Fadl Oussama (its media manager) and Abou Youssef Abdelkahar (the head of its diwan, or secretariat). The implication is that they may have been unwilling to take the final leap of swearing allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, a particularly serious step insofar as it appears to have consummated the split with AQMI: in its June 30 statement, the group no longer self-identifies as AQMI–Central Region but “Islamic Maghreb – Central Region (Algerian Front).”

Iraq has had a special significance for the Algerian jihadist movement for a good decade. It was, after all, as a consequence of its direct contacts with Al-Qaeda in Iraq (probably established by Algerian volunteers fighting American forces in Iraq) that the GSCP's embattled leadership opted to join Al-Qaeda in September 2006 and formally change the group's name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in January of the following year. It is possible that Abdelmalek Droudkel chose his present konya in imitation of Al-Qaeda in Iraq's founder and leader Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi – whose own organisation, since his death in June 2006, has evolved into ISIS. But AQMI's national leadership and the Central Region are not merely at odds over a matter of sentimental attachment. Their dispute is evolving to encompass substantive differences over issues of tactics, strategy and even theology: what degree of priority to give to
which theatre of jihad (their home turf or the more dynamic and seemingly more promising struggle in Syria and Iraq); the relevance of maintaining allegiance to Al-Qaeda's international leadership; whether or not now is the opportune moment to attempt to restore the caliphate, in theory the ultimate goal of many if not all jihadist movements; and so on.

Working on the assumption that the Central Region communiqués are authentic, these differences already appear to have led to an organisational split between the two tendencies. To judge by the history of insurgencies in general and of the Algerian jihadist movement in particular, the logical next step would seem to be physical confrontation between the rival groups – a prospect that would be all the more likely if, as is generally assumed, AQMI's national leadership is still based in the organisations historic heartland in the forests and mountains of Kabylia, spread across the Wilayas of Tizi Ouzou, Bouira and Boumerdes, i.e. the Central Region’s presumed territory.

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.

[1] “El Âssemi” meaning “from the capital”, indicating that he hails from Algiers.
[2] Abou Slimane Khaled, Abou Abdallah Athmane [clearly the same individual as Abou Abdallah El Âssemi], Abou Meriem Abdallah, Abou Amama Yaacoub, Abou Houraira Thabet, Abou Oussama Laayachi, Abou Khaled Abderrahmane and Abou Abdallah Lokmane, “together with all the mujahidin”.
[3] The list of signatories is slightly longer and more detailed than for the June 30 statement of allegiance, comprising: Abou Soheïb Oussama (Emir of the Central Region), Abou Abdallah Athmane (Qadi of the Central Region), Abou Amama Yaacoub (head of the Sharia Committee), Abou Slimane Khaled (head of the Military Committee), Abou Khaled Abderrahmane (in charge of training), Abou Meriem Abdallah (in charge of arms manufacturing), Abou Houraira Thabet (in charge of communications), Sheikh Ahmed (Treasurer), Abou El Fadl Oussama (in charge of media), Abou Oussama Laayachi (head of the medical department), Abou Youssef Abdelkahar (head of the Secretariat of the Central Region).
[8] Thaghr Al-Jaza’ir – the word thaghr in Islamic jurisprudence designating a zone situated between the territory ruled by the Muslim community or state and the lands of the infidels
1) According to a member of Polisario's National Secretariat, the visit to the Canary Islands by a small Polisario delegation [including Speaker of the Saharawi National Council Khatri Addouh and Polisario's representative in Spain Bouchraya Bayoun] during the second week of July had nothing to do with the fisheries agreement between Morocco and European Union [against which Polisario has been campaigning vigorously]. The main object of the visit, the National Secretariat member said, was to sign a number of agreements providing for aid for Saharawi refugees [in the Tindouf camps] on the one hand and Canary Island regional government grants for Saharawi students studying at Spanish universities.

2) The same National Secretariat member denied reports that SADR President and Polisario General Secretary Mohamed Abdelaziz will not be invited to attend the investiture of the newly re-elected President of Mauritania. Relations between the SADR and Mauritania are “at their best”, according to the source.
Attached is a report of the Washington Institute for Near East Studies (WINEP), concerning the Islamic problems in Morocco, FYI. Thank you, Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
En critiquant les factions islamistes non violents diverses du Maroc en ligne, les membres d’ISIS/IS tentent de semer les graines de l’opposition violente enhardi dans le royaume.

L’État islamique d’Irak et al-Sham (ISIS) s’est récemment déclaré simplement « l’État islamique” (IS), annonçant un «retour au califat. » Et en dépit de sa mise au point nominale sur le Levant et du Mashreq, il a clairement se penché sur le Maghreb aussi. Dans une vidéo publiée plus tôt ce mois-ci, plusieurs membres du groupe ont dénoncé les islamistes marocains clés, en soulignant les retombées potentiellement profondes des crises en Irak et en Syrie.

QUI A ETE CIBLE, ET POURQUOI

Étonnamment, le Roi Mohammed VI, une cible constante de la rhétorique djihadiste - plus récemment par Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) - n’a pas été mentionné dans la vidéo sermon. Pourtant, les Marocains qui ont été choisis pour l’opprobre ne sont pas vraiment une surprise.

Le premier était Omar Haddouchi, anciennement du groupe marocain Salafia Jihadia. Au cours des dernières années, dans le but d’intégrer les salafistes radicaux, le roi a montré grâce aux salafistes emprisonnés impliqués dans les attentats de Casablanca en 2003, y compris Haddouchi. À leur tour, ces salafistes ont assoupli - même inversée- leur critique du monarque (pour en savoir plus sur cette tendance, voir « Y salafistes politiques du Maroc souscrites à la paix? »). Haddouchi, à la mode nouvellement monarchiste, a souvent dénoncé l’implication de jeunes marocains dans le « jihad en Syrie. » Et le 1ère juillet, pour démontrer l’illégitimité de toute allégeance faite au « calife » IS Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, il a également cité un hadith du Prophète qui dit: « toute personne prêtant allégeance à un étranger sans l'approbation de, ou en consultation avec le ensemble de la communauté musulmane, est admissible à la peine de mort. »

En réponse, la vidéo est sévèrement censuré Haddouchi pour avoir rejoint le roi à décourager les jeunes de se joindre à la lutte - en particulier lorsque la lutte contre l’extrémisme et le recrutement provenant du Maroc à la Syrie a été un sorte de problématique important pour le monarque sur la scène régionale. La vidéo a également plaint que Haddouchi préféré soutenir « ses frères démocratiques et les aider dans leur détresse" au lieu de sauvegarder «les initiatives de vrais djihadistes. » Deux autres dirigeants de Salafia Jihadia - Abou Hafs et Hassan al-Kettani - ont été choisis pour la critique ainsi.

En outre, la vidéo est e'mporta contre Parti de la Justice et Développement au Maroc (PJD), une faction opposition-monarchiste islamiste, se référant à un membre du parti et Ministre de la Justice marocain Mustafa Ramid le «ministre de l’injustice. » Cela vient trop peu surprenant - alors que le PJD a des racines dans le groupe clandesite, contestataire Shabiba Islamiyah, , ses membres ont abandonné le discours sur un «Etat islamique» et même la charia en faveur de la participation politique, sans doute sous la conviction qu’ils peuvent prendre les « petits pas » islamiques de l’intérieur. Pour sa part, Ramid - une fois une figure anti-roi virulente - a fait des décisions diverses avec le palais en tant que Ministre
de la Justice. Un exemple célèbre est venu au sommet des soulèvements de 2011 et la répression du gouvernement, quand il a cherché à dissimuler la torture par des agents du palais et avait nié publiquement l'existence de prisonniers politiques dans le pays.

Une autre cible de la vidéo est le défunt Cheikh Abdessalam Yassine, le guide suprême du groupe islamiste interdit Al-Adl wal-Ihsan (AWI, ou Justice et Bienfaisance). Ancien membre de rang du soufi marocain zawiyah (école religieuse / monastère), il a été décrit dans la vidéo comme inauthentique et comme un «polythéiste. » C'est une accusation assez commune portée contre les soufis, dont beaucoup demandent la bénédiction de saints locaux. Cette vénération des saints et les pèlerinages aux mausolées a saigné en rituel marocain ordinaire, au grand dam des salafistes et autres extrémistes locaux. Il a également fourni du carburant aux groupes islamistes transnationaux qui cherchent à discréditer l'islam marocain. Les plus importantes, les soufis marocains - y compris Yassine, qui a cherché à islamiser lentement le pays - ont généralement été antipathiques et insensibles aux approches coraniques littérales des groupes djihadistes. En tant que tel, la décision de cibler Yassine est également surprenant: bien qu'il était (et AWI reste) farouchement anti-roi, croyant que toute monarchie contrevient Islam, même cette position n'est pas suffisante pour l'IS.

MENACANT LE MAROC

Après les commentaires contre Yassine et les autres islamistes, huit membres est marocain sont apparus dans la vidéo. Parler un mélange d'arabe et le dialecte marocain (darija), ils ont averti qu'ils "ont l'intention de faire le djihad sur le sol marocain", ajoutant qu'ils sont heureux "d'être en capacité d'aider le califat" et qu'ils sont «prêts à installer ce système de règle au Maroc ».

Ces messages sont particulièrement importants pour deux raisons: (1) ils confirment l’approche d'exclusion du groupe à l'Islam et à la gouvernance islamique – AQMI a principalement passé critiques contre le souverain marocain non-Islamiste et « moderne, » ISIS /IS critique les islamistes en premier lieu, les dépeignant comme insuffisants, inauthentiques, même kuffar (infidèles); et (2) ils élaborent la menace que pose l'IS à l'Etat marocain et le Maghreb en général. Par exemple, Oumou Adam Fatiha Mejjati, une salafiste marocain bien connue femelle connue sous le nom « Black Widow d'al-Qaïda », a tweeté son serment d'allégeance à al-Baghdadi le 29 Juin, le reconnaître comme calife et lui conférant le titre d'Amir al-Mouminin (commandeur des croyants) - une étiquette réservé, au Maroc, pour le roi. D'autres salafistes locaux ont emboîté le pas. Le 9 Juillet, Mejjati a tweeté qu'elle avait déménagé en Syrie pour rejoindre ISIS - une évolution inquiétante et révélatrice. Son mari, Karim Mejjati, a été fondateur défont du Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (MICG) et a été tué en Arabie Saoudite. Les personnalités comme ceux-ci et leur capacité à influencer les autres disciples sont probablement ce qui a conduit Haddouchi, un nouveau contrepoids de palais contre les forces salafistes extrêmes, de se prononcer contre l'annonce de califat.

Alors que les Marocains ordinaires n'ont pas été visiblement émus par ISIS/IS, le groupe a couvert toutes les bases en attaquant un large éventail de personnalités islamistes locales: selon son récit, pas de type de l'Islam ou l'islamisme au Maroc est haqiqi (authentique). La vidéo a clarifié les intentions du groupe dans les pays du Maghreb et a cherché à transformer les jeunes marocains à l'écart des nombreuses options islamiques/ islamistes non-violents dans leur pays, que ce soit la dernière tendance pro-roi salafiste, l'itinéraire politique du PJD, ou la route activiste de l'AWI. Les citoyens ont déjà été recrutés dans plusieurs groupes extrémistes de défense en Syrie, y compris le bataillon majorité-marocain Harakat Sham al-Islam, le filiale d'al-Qaïda Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, et l'IS, qui compte près d'un
millier de membres marocains (pour en savoir plus sur ce type de recrutement, voir « Résistant les Ralliés Marocains de la Syrie »).

Le palais n’a pas encore publié une déclaration sur la vidéo elle-même. La réponse du roi sera révélatrice sur deux fronts: comment Rabat se positionne comme une autorité politique régionale, et s’il approfondit son utilisation des outils symboliques/ rhétoriques dans la lutte contre le recrutement et l’extrémisme chez soi. La décision récente du roi d’interdire les chefs religieux de participer à toute forme d’activité politique ou syndicale peut être indicative de ce dernier.

**CONSÉQUENCES POUR LA POLITIQUE US**

Compte tenu des tendances régionales en cours - avec la dynamique du Levant débordant souvent au Maghreb au fil du temps, et de l’instabilité qui sévit dans le Sahel - Maroc doit se préparer à la possibilité d’une opposition violente enhardi dans les années à venir. L’État islamique fonctionne de plus en plus sur l’hypothèse arrogante qu’une large bande de musulmans dans le monde soutiennent sa cause, encourageant davantage le groupe à élargir le recrutement dans le Maghreb. Les groupes extrémistes ont également creusé dans les poches des différents pays de la région, et dans les espaces non gouvernés de la grande Sahel.

Les pays du Maghreb tiennent une importance stratégique pour les États-Unis en grande partie en raison de leur relative stabilité dans une région instable, leur engagement à l’amitié avec Washington, et leur dévouement pour endiguer l’influence croissante de l’AQMI. Maroc, un allié clé à cet égard, n’est pas terribly affligé par le terrorisme domestique pour le moment, mais ses citoyens sont recrutés à des mouvements violents avec une régularité déconcertante. Le nombre de marocains en Irak et en Syrie a explosé dans la dernière année seulement.

Ainsi, alors que l’empreinte d’IS sur cette région ne peut devenir évidente aujourd’hui ou demain, les développements actuels à l’intérieur et à travers le Maroc mettent en évidence la nécessité d’une action rapide. En particulier, Washington et Rabat doivent redoubler d’efforts sur l’échange de renseignements sur le recrutement dans des groupes extrémistes armés. Les États-Unis devraient également continuer à aider les gouvernements du Maroc et d’autres maghrébins sur contre radicalisation et d’autres initiatives préventives importantes, ainsi que sur l’interrogation des arrêtées sur les facteurs qui les ont poussés à quitter le Maroc et les a traînés dans la guerre en Syrie. En outre, le palais pourrait offrir des avantages pour convaincre le nombre augmenté, mais encore gérable, de djihadistes ralliés à abandonner leur mode de vie, faisant la lutte contre les facteurs d’incitation qui ont conduit à leur départ. Enfin, comme le recrutement a lieu principalement chez les jeunes radicaux, Washington pourrait encourager le gouvernement marocain de stimuler les voix comme Haddouchi, qui pourraient être utilisés pour couvrir celles des figures telles que Mejjati.
TRADUCTION NON-OFFICIELLE

ALGÉRIE : RAPPORT DE SITUATION MENSUEL #137

18 juillet 2014

Résumé

Les Tendances Politiques

- La vie politique, et même la prise de décision de base dans le secteur public, semblent être en grande partie sur le verrouillage en attendant l’achèvement du processus de révision de la Constitution en automne.
- Avec le président Bouteflika affaibli par l’âge et la mauvaise santé, le pouvoir exécutif est apparentement géré par ses courtisans, dont les intrigues ont abouti au licenciement d’une partie des aides les plus anciens de Bouteflika. Les Sources divergent en ce qui concerne qui a la haute main à la présidence – s’il est le chef du cabinet du Président Ahmed Ouyahia ou son frère et conseiller Saïd.
- Le cycle annuel de promotions militaires pourrait vu l’onction des futurs chefs de la gendarmerie et, éventuellement, la DRS.

Les Relations Étrangères

- Les événements au Mali, en Tunisie et, en particulier, la Libye ce mois-ci confirment que l'objectif principal de la politique régionale de l'Algérie doit rester pour l'avenir prévisible, la « arc de crise » à l’est et au sud.
- Le rôle de premier plan pris par l'Algérie et l'Egypte à une réunion récente des voisins de la Libye, et la visite du Président égyptien Al-Sisi à Alger, semblent pointer vers l'émergence d'un axe algéro-égyptienne.
- Dans le même temps, il y a eu une nouvelle poussée dans la guerre des mots entre Alger et Rabat, après la décision de l’Union Africaine de nommer un envoyé spécial pour le Sahara Occidental.
- La dernière prise de bec entre l’Algérie et le Maroc est une nouvelle manifestation de la longue guerre d'usure entre les deux pays pour l'influence en Afrique.

La Sécurité

- Les niveaux d'activité djihadiste enregistrés ont été exceptionnellement faibles au cours du mois passé. Même si cela peut être dû en partie à un black-out médiatique sur les nouvelles liées à la sécurité au long des frontières orientales et méridionales, il semble également de refléter un véritable recul de l'activité dans ce qui a été longtemps considéré comme le cœur de l'AQMI en Kabylie et les approches orientales à Alger.
- La baisse de l’activité en Kabylie pourrait être liée à une scission qui s’est ouvert entre la direction nationale de l'AQMI et la Région Centrale de l’organisation sur l’attitude à adopter « le califat » proclamé au début du Ramadan par l’Etat Islamique en Irak et Syrie.
Il y a des petits signes que la controverse agitée par le nouveau «Califat» peut également provoquer des divisions au sein de l'organisation Al-Mourabitoun de Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

Le petit groupe Fils du Sud pour le Mouvement Justice Islamique a annoncé un cessez-le-feu, qui semble présager sa dissolution et une amnistie pour ses membres.

Les nouveaux bouleversements pourraient être à venir dans le cadre des enquêtes de corruption à Sonatrach, cette fois affectant les sociétés de sécurité privées qui servent l'industrie du pétrole et du gaz.

Political Trends

After a brief spurt of political activity following the April 17 presidential election, Algeria appears to be back in the doldrums once again. With a scant few exceptions – the new Minister for Religious Affair's controversial decision to allow the re-opening of synagogues in Algeria, for example – cabinet ministers appear to be reduced to sitting on their hands, unable to take any decisions of major importance or even, it has been claimed, reshuffle the heads of the departments or state-owned companies that fall under their remit. There have also been reports that Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal has been refused permission to make limited changes to his cabinet line-up[1] (which, it is true, only dates from early May). The stock response from the Presidency, according to Algerian press reports, is that everything must wait until after the constitutional amendment process has been completed – which could take another three or four months.

This state of affairs is strongly reminiscent of the gridlock that prevailed in the year prior to April 17, when decision-making throughout much of the administration was effectively put on hold pending the presidential election, against a background of sharp differences between members of the ruling elite over the wisdom of having Bouteflika run for a fourth term of office despite his stroke. We argued in May that while the re-election of Bouteflika may have settled the immediate question of the succession, it was likely to be posed anew relatively quickly, and that the rifts between the various factions, and within them, would be likely to come increasingly into the open.

Recent reports of the surprise dismissal of several long-standing presidential aides may not amount to open factional warfare, but they do suggest that the situation created by the re-election of a severely weakened president is already generating some unseemly palace intrigues. Bouteflika advisors Mohamed Meguedem, Mohamed Touati and Rachid Aïssat have all been given their marching orders, along with the President's private secretary Mohamed Rougab. Meguedem had held a variety of positions at the Presidency since the Chadli era, Aïssat and Rougab have been part of Bouteflika's inner circle since the early days of his first term of office, while Touati (a former general, once known as “the brains” of the army) rapidly became a permanent fixture at El Mouradia palace after retiring from the military and being appointed security advisor to the President in the early 2000s. In the case of Meguedem, El Watan (15/07/14) attributes his dismissal to the influence of national police chief (DGSN) Maj-Gen. Abdelghani Hamel[2], and while the daily's claim that Hamel feared Meguedem was after his job scarcely rings true, it is known that there had been deep suspicion between the two for several
months. Sources at the Presidency to whom we have been able to talk, meanwhile, give contrasting explanations of the sudden cull. One mid-ranking civil servant assured us:

The decision had been on the way ever since the presidential election campaign, when Bouteflika’s chief of staff (directeur de cabinet) Ahmed Ouyahia became infuriated by repeated interference from Mohamed Meguedem, who claimed to be acting on behalf of the President and Saïd Bouteflika. Meguedem had – or at least said he had – the support of Mohamed Touati and the President’s private secretary Mohamed Rougab, and dragged other officials at the Presidency in as well: he even took the initiative of contacting the rival candidate, Ali Benflis, using Rachid Aïssat as an intermediary, without informing Ahmed Ouyahia. All through the election campaign, Meguedem insinuated that he was acting in complete harmony with Tewfik, and on occasion even claimed to be speaking in his name, in Ouyahia’s presence. Ouyahia at one point threatened to resign if “this nonsense”, as he put it, didn't stop. After the campaign, it was actually Tewfik who carried out the operation that culminated in the decision to dismiss all those who had had a hand in this interference, notably Rougab, Meguedem, Touati and Aïssat. As a consequence, Ahmed Ouyahia is now in command, with the blessing of Tewfik and also of Saïd Bouteflika, who had no choice because Tewfik had prepared a solid dossier (including photos, witness statements and wire taps) against Meguedem’s friends.

A presidential staffer, on the other hand, dismisses the idea that Maj-Gen. Hamel or Ahmed Ouyahia could have had the clout to drive out Bouteflika’s longest serving advisors, arguing emphatically that only Saïd Bouteflika had both the power and the motive to organise such a cull. This would indeed be coherent with reports we received on more than one occasion earlier this year to the effect that Saïd was acting as grand chamberlain to his brother, filtering all information the President receives, and even growing into the role of regent – a situation, we were given to understand, that was viewed with resentment and suspicion by at least some of the President’s advisors.

Whether the dismissals were the work of Saïd or Ouyahia, however, the one thing that both accounts have in common is the lack of agency of Bouteflika himself, suggesting that the executive branch is now being run not by the President but by his courtiers. Hence, according to an executive at Sonatrach’s legal department, the crucial oil and gas sector is now being overseen by a triumvirate:

Over the past few weeks, three leading figures have been holding regular meetings to discuss matters relating to Sonatrach: Ahmed Ouyahia, Deputy Defence Minister Lt-Gen. Gaïd Saleh, and Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi. Sonatrach CEO Abdelhamid Zerguine also attends sometimes, but only when he is invited to do so by the others. A rumour that Zerguine is on the way out, which started at the end of June, is still doing the rounds.

Meanwhile, the annual round of military promotions took place as usual at the beginning of July. Curiously, the full list of promoted officers has not yet been made public, but it has been possible to glean some details from partial press reports[3] and online discussion forums for Algerian military personnel. In all, some 89 officers are reported to have received promotions, 22 of them from the Gendarmerie and 67 from the army (although the latter figure may also cover the DRS). Of these, five Gendarmerie colonels and 51 Army colonels were promoted to the rank of general. No fewer than 16 Army generals were promoted to major-general, while the Gendarmerie saw just one officer, its chief of staff Menad Nouba elevated to this rank, the second highest rank in
the Algerian armed forces. Menad Nouba appers to be in line to take over from Maj-Gen. Ahmed Boustila as Gendarmerie Commander[4]. At the same time, according to postings by Algerian military personnel in specialist online forums, the other 16 new major generals include at least three DRS officers: former DSI (internal security) chief Abdelkader Kherfi, a.k.a. “General Ahmed” (who was reported in early June to have begun working with Ahmed Ouyahia at the Presidency); Gen. Mokri, identified as the head of the DREC (the intelligence service's foreign liaison bureau); and current DSI chief Ali Bendaoud. The latter is particularly noteworthy in light of what we were told in May by a source close to the DRS, who suggested that the annual round of promotions should be watched closely for indications of who is being groomed for the top positions, adding that the promotion of Bendaoud to major general might be taken as a sign that he is on course to replace Tewfik at the head of the DRS.

Foreign Relations

Events across the region in mid-July – the outbreak of fighting between rival factions in Tripoli on July 13 that rendered the Libyan capital's international airport unusable; the killing of a French soldier in the Al-Moustarat area north of Gao by a suicide bomber belonging to Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Al-Mourabitoun organisation on July 14; the deaths of at least 14 Tunisian soldiers in a clash with armed islamists in the Djebel Chaambi area near the border with Algeria on July 16 – have provided further confirmation that the principal focus of concern for Algiers must remain, for the foreseeable future, the “arc of crisis” to the east and south, opened up by the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya.

Having unilaterally opted to take military action across the border in southern Libya as of late May, Algiers has over the last few weeks also been devoting at least some effort to the quest for a multilateral response to Libya's slow-motion collapse into a failed state. On July 14, Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra led an Algerian delegation to the 3rd ministerial conference of Libya's neighbouring countries in the Tunisian resort town of Hammamet, with Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia also attending the two-day event[5]. The meeting set up two commissions, the first of which was tasked with "examining military and security issues, including border surveillance" and is to be chaired by Algeria, while Egypt will be in charge of the second commission tasked with "contacting the political class and members of civil society in Libya" to facilitate the launching of a national dialogue. The two commissions are supposed to report back to the Tunisian foreign minister in the last week of July, ahead of the next meeting of Libya's neighbours during the first half of August. This initiative – together with Egyptian President Abdulfattah Al-Sisi's visit to Algiers on June 25, his first foreign trip since his election in May – seems to establish the premises for an Algerian-Egyptian axis of sorts. It might ultimately also provide the basis for an ex post facto legitimisation of Algeria's unannounced military intervention on Libyan territory, especially in light of a Libyan government statement issued on the eve of the Hammamet meeting in which it said it was “looking into the possibility of making an appeal for international forces on the ground to re-establish security and help the government impose its authority”.

At the same time, there has been a renewed flare-up in tension between Algeria and its western neighbour and traditional rival, Morocco. Speaking at a public hearing before a parliamentary committee in Rabat on July 10, Moroccan Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar condemned
Algeria's attitude on the question of Western Sahara as “pathetic”, causing howls of outrage in Algiers[6]. Referring to a decision by the African Union's Peace and Security Council in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, at the end of June to appoint former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano as the AU’s special envoy for Western Sahara[7], Mezouar blustered:

Algeria uses all financial and logistical means to thwart the efforts of Morocco to find a resolution [to the Western Sahara question]. The latest thing was [the appointment of] the special envoy of the African Union. [...] When we see attempts by the Algerian regime to counter our efforts, we find that the methods used are really pathetic. Our conflict today is not with Polisario but with Algeria.

The Algerian ambassador to Rabat signalled his dissatisfaction by boycotting a meeting of Arab ambassadors convened by Mezouar the next day, while Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Benali Cherif made a long statement (dutifully reproduced by the government news agency APS) condemning the Moroccan Foreign Minister’s “outrageously insulting declarations”:

The irresponsible remarks against Algeria made by senior Moroccan government officials mark a return to the Moroccan party's well-known lemming-like habits, which it revives whenever there is a step forward in the process of completing the decolonization of Western Sahara. [...] Morocco's setbacks and disappointments, which are the direct cause of these verbal excesses, obviously derive from its unilateral and unjustified demands with regard to the handling of the question of Western Sahara both at the African level and internationally. [...] Algeria, whose position on the question of Western Sahara sticks to the international consensus and the doctrine of the United Nations, can but firmly reject the false accusations made by the said Moroccan officials, and deeply regret such behavior which is in direct contradiction with the values shared by the brotherly Moroccan and Algerian peoples.

This exchange of brickbats between Rabat and Algiers is of course just the latest episode in an on-off series, against a backdrop of a diplomatic war of attrition between the two countries for influence in Africa. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this over the past few months has been the Moroccan-Algerian rivalry in Mali, where Rabat has been striving to carve out a role for itself as a mediator between the central government and the rebel groups in the north, to the detriment of Algeria, which has traditionally treated Mali as its backyard. Although Morocco did seem to be having some success in pulling the rug from under the Algerians’ feet earlier this year, hosting a couple of exploratory meetings, Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra appears to have taken back the initiative of late, embarking on another mini-African tour taking in Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana[8], in early July before chairing the initial phase of the “Malian inclusive dialogue”, bringing together Mali's central government and northern rebel movements, in Algiers as of July 16[9]. At the same time, however, there are signs of increasing activity on another front in this diplomatic war: the African Union itself. Although Morocco is not a member of the AU, having withdrawn from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, in 1984 after Polisario's Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was admitted as a member, it has of late been showing increasing interest in the organisation, for example sending Assistant Foreign Minister Mbarka Bouaida (who happens to be of Saharawi origin) to Addis Abeba in January of this year to lobby delegations attending the 22nd AU summit – the aim seeming to be to chip away at African support for the SADR and ultimately, perhaps, pave the way for its derecognition by the AU. Such is the background to Foreign Minister Mezouar's rather
undiplomatic outburst in parliament over the AU Peace and Security Council’s decision to appoint a special envoy for the Western Sahara – a decision that was adopted, according to a senior Polisario official, in spite of very active efforts by a “pro-Moroccan lobby” at the Malabo meeting to prevent it going through.

Security

The level of recorded jihadist activity in June was unusually low, with only three minor incidents reported, and this appearance of calm has continued into July, with two incidents reported so far. None of these incidents were around the country’s borders.

While it is likely that an unannounced media blackout is keeping some incidents, especially along the eastern and southern borders, out of the news[10], the apparent lack of activity on the part of AQMI in the north of the country cannot be attributed solely to government censorship, insofar as AQMI is present on social media and regularly claims responsibility for operations it carries out. The fact that AQMI has signalled only two operations over the past couple of months leads us to believe the organisation has indeed scaled back its operations[11].

ALGIERS remained quiet over the past month. The only event of note was an alert issued by the US embassy on July 4, warning American citizens to stay away from American-owned hotels for July 4-5 since “an unspecified terrorist group may have been considering attacks in Algiers, possibly in the vicinity of a US branded hotel”. No such attacks transpired, however, and the alert appears to have been essentially a rote warning ahead of the United States’ and Algeria’s respective Independence Days.

KABYLIA was also quiet this past month, with no incidents reported at all. The last AQMI operation reported in Kabylia – generally held to be the jihadist group’s heartland – dates back to May 28, and the last security forces operation took place on June 4. Further to the EAST, the army was reported by L’Expression to be conducting a “major search and destroy mission” in the wilayas of Skikda, Jijel and Annaba around July 15, including bombardment of sites where jihadists were believed to be hiding. Unusually, the bloodiest incident of the past month was in the WEST of the country: according to an official statement from the Defence Ministry, a roadside bomb killed three soldiers and four members of the Garde communale on July 12 near Sidi Chaïb, wilaya of Sidi Bel Abbès (a region that has seen only sporadic jihadist activity over recent years)[12]. The army launched a search and destroy mission in the area. On July 17, the army ambushed and killed two jihadists in Beni Mileuk, wilaya of Tipaza.

With the oil and gas producing SOUTH (ostensibly) quiet throughout the month, an executive at Sonatrach’s legal department, speaking to us in mid-July, has shed new light on the lack of progress in the much talked about plans to forge a new security structure for the oil and gas sector out of the myriad private security companies that currently exist:

The signs are that there will soon be new developments in the Sonatrach corruption cases soon. The Gendarmerie has taken over from the DRS in running the investigations. In the past few weeks there have been investigations concerning the Skikda LNG complex and one of Sonatrach Downstream’s departments in Oran. The Gendarmerie has also been running checks on oilfield
service companies and security companies in Ghardaia, Hassi Messaoud and Illizi, and we are now expecting there to be arrests, transfers of Sonatrach managers away from their present jobs and cancellations of the licences of a number of oilfield services companies and security outfits.

Meanwhile, in a video communiqué dated June 3 (but posted to YouTube on June 20) Abdessalam Tarmoune, leader of the Sons of the Sahara for Islamic Justice, announced a ceasefire. In the communiqué – in reality more of a long and rambling sermon than a structured statement – Tarmoune, after what seems to be a pro forma promise to continue the “jihad” against the corrupt regime, explicitly thanks Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal for his role in negotiating the ceasefire, and for standing up to opposition from the “eradicator wing” (his words) to including the Sons of the Sahara in the national reconciliation process – implying that the group’s members are likely to be amnestied in the near future[13]. Filmed in the Tassili n’Ajjer mountains of the far south-east, where Tarmoune’s group, believed to be about one hundred strong, has been holed up for months, the rest of the video is essentially a homily encouraging the youth of the south to devote themselves to education, marriage and work.

Leading Arabic-language daily Al Khabar (24/06) subsequently reported that negotiations with the Sons of the South began in February 2013 and were conducted initially in the greatest secret, with only PM Sellal, President Bouteflika and "a few top military and security officials" informed. According to Al-Khabar, Sellal delegated responsibility for conducting the negotiations, which had been dragging on fruitlessly, to DGSN chief Abdelghani Hamel and “certain Army officers”, among them the commander of the 4th Military Region[14]. The delay in reaching an agreement prior to that is said to have been due to the “lack of trust between Abdeslam Tarmoune and the negotiators from the DRS”, Tarmoune being considered “treacherous” by many members of the security services for having taken advantage of the national reconciliation pact and then going on to join MUJAO alongside Lamine Bencheneb[15]; Al-Khabar goes on to suggest that the negotiations with the Sons of the Sahara may have made it possible to collect a wealth of intelligence on MUJAO.

In principle, of course, MUJAO no longer exists as an independent group, having merged with Belmokhtar’s group in August 2013 to form a new organisation named Al-Mourabitoun. Strikingly, one of MUJAO's founders, Hamad bin Mohamed al-Chenguiti, who is believed to be a member of the leadership council of Al-Mourabitoun, issued a statement from northern Mali on July 13 stating his full support for the so-called “Caliphate” proclaimed on June 29 by the Al-Qaeda breakaway group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Chenguiti seemed however to be speaking in his own name rather than representing any specific group, signing simply as “the former head of Islamic courts in Gao[16]” and making no reference to either MUJAO or Al-Mourabitoun. It may be recalled that Mokhtar Belmokhtar himself issued a statement reaffirming and renewing his allegiance to Ayman Zawahiri, the emir of Al-Qaeda's international leadership, on April 30, at a time when the worldwide jihadist movement was becoming embroiled in controversy after Zawahiri had disavowed the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria due to its repeated clashes with another Al-Qaeda affiliate, the Nusra Front, in Syria. This apparent divergence between Al-Chenguiti and Belmokhtar’s statements suggests that the successes in the field of ISIS (or the Islamic State as it is now calling itself) and its proclamation of the “Caliphate” may have opened up rifts in Al-Mourabitoun.
If so, Al-Mourabitoun would by no means be alone. While the Islamic State's call on Muslims everywhere to swear allegiance to the new “Caliph”, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, may have been greeted with bewilderment by most ordinary Muslims, to jihadist groups — which take the notion of caliphate seriously and claim to be fighting to unite the “Muslim nation” into a single Islamic state — this is an extremely serious matter. ISIS’ stunning breakthrough in western Iraq in late June and Al-Baghdadi’s claim of universal dominion over Muslims have forced other jihadist groups to take position for or against the “Caliphate”, and by extension for or against Zawahiri. Al-Baghdadi’s declaration has drawn sharp criticism from some of the most respected international theorists of jihad, including Jordanian ideologues Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, who have argued that a unilateral declaration of caliphate is meaningless and that only a “council of elders” may appoint a caliph. But this has not stopped several fighting groups on the ground declaring allegiance to ISIS and its leader.

These include a group presenting itself as AQMI's Central Region[17], which on June 30, just hours after the proclamation of the Caliphate by Al-Baghdadi's group, issued a short written communiqué, signed by all the members of its Shura Council, formally declaring the group's allegiance to “the venerated sheikh and servant of God, Ibrahim Bin Awad Al-Quraishi Al-Baghdadi Abu Bakr, the Caliph of the Muslims”. This was the latest and most explicit in a series of statements from the group this year stating its admiration and support for ISIS – in apparent contradiction with the line of AQMI's national leadership, which has been more inclined to restate its allegiance to Zawahiri.

The national leadership effectively replied to the Central Region in a statement posted online around July 15 (though dated July 4):

We have kept quiet so far for fear of adding more fuel to the fire of discord, but now we feel the need to make our position clear. The caliphate is the goal of all true mujahidin. […] But declaring an Islamic caliphate is a momentous decision that requires broad consultation. How can you declare a caliphate without consulting with other jihad groups and [leading jihad theorists]? And what about Molla Omar of the Taliban? What about Sheikh Ayman Zawahiri? What about all the other branches of Al-Qaeda?… AQMI invites leading emirs and sheikhs — including Abu Mohamed al-Maqdisi, Abu al-Walid al-Ghazzi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Molla Omar, Ayman Zawahiri, Sheikh Nasser al-Wuhaishi[18], Abu al-Zubeir, Abu Mohamed al-Joulani[19], and others — to discuss the issue among themselves and come to terms; and AQMI will be the first to submit to their decision. […] Meanwhile we maintain our allegiance to Sheikh Ayman Zawahiri, for it is legally binding and we have seen nothing that would lead us to change that.

Thus the split between the national leadership and the units active in Kabylia and the eastern approaches of Algiers appears to have been consummated, after months of incipient tension – a development which may help to explain AQMI's declining effectiveness in what was long considered its heartland.

END
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT #138
August 31, 2014

Executive Summary

ALGÉRIE : RAPPORT DE SITUATION MENSUEL

31 août 2014

Résumé

Tendances Politiques

- Après avoir purgé plusieurs aides présidentielles en juillet, la présidence a sommairement rejeté Abdelaziz Belkhadem en tant que Ministre d'Etat et Conseiller Spécial auprès du président, et donné des ordres pour son expulsion du FLN, le parti qu'il a dirigé une fois.

- En tant que «islamo-conservateur» et critique virulent de la conduite de l'Egypte durant de la crise à Gaza, Belkhadem a peut-être tombé sous le coup de la nouvelle alliance entre Alger et le Caire.

- L'axe algéro-égyptien survient en grande partie en réponse à l'effondrement continu de la Libye, ce qui semble également être l'une des raisons du nouveau poids accordé à la DRS dans la structure du pouvoir.

- Habilitée par un décret présidentiel rétablissant son service des enquêtes criminelles, la DRS a également repris son rôle de surveillance à la Sonatrach. Abdelhamid Zerguine, remplacé en tant que PDG de la Sonatrach après deux ans et demi de travail, semble avoir été une victime collatérale.

Relations Etrangères

- Bien que les responsables, à commencer par le Président Bouteflika, continuent de s'accrocher publiquement à la ligne que l'Algérie ne s'ingère pas dans les affaires internes d'autres pays, sa longue doctrine de la non-intervention aurait été discrètement révisée pour permettre des opérations de sécurité transfrontalière dans la défense des frontières de l'Algérie.

- Il est prétendu que le personnel militaire et de renseignement algérien est profondément impliqué dans la Tunisie et la Libye, et il y a eu des allégations selon lesquelles l'État-major a rédigé des plans d'urgence pour les grands raids aériens contre les groupes djihadistes en Libye.

- Bien que la plupart des signes pointent dans la direction de l'Egypte et des Émirats Arabes Unis, il existe des allégations selon lesquelles l'armée de l'air algérienne a peut-être été responsable pour deux raids aériens sur des cibles à Tripoli en août.

- Alors que la conversation entre Alger et Washington sur la situation en Libye est en cours, les responsables américains ne semblent pas favoriser une intervention militaire externe à ce stade.

Sécurité

- L'activité d'AQMI en Algérie a diminué au cours des deux dernières années à des niveaux historiquement bas en raison de multiples facteurs, notamment la réduction du recrutement, l'attrition par les forces de sécurité, et, plus récemment, une scission au sein de ses rangs concernant l'attitude à adopter face à « l'État Islamique » en Irak et Syrie.

- Il y a eu un certain nombre d'incidents au long des frontières orientales et méridionales du pays, et un affrontement à proximité de champs de gaz dans la wilaya de Ghardaïa, dans lequel un groupe armé a tenté d'intercepter un convoi de la Sonatrach.
• Un groupe d'experts en sécurité de la France, du Japon, des États-Unis, et de l'Italie a visité le sud-est de l'Algérie, à la recherche d’assurances que les frontières et les installations de pétrole et de gaz sont assurées de manière adéquate.

• Il semblerait que la police nationale cherche à acquérir des drones pour la sécurisation des installations pétrolières et gazières.
Political Trends

Following on from July’s mini-purge of presidential aides, the past month has seen the surprise departure of two more senior officials. At the very end of July, after just over two and a half years in the job, Abdelhamid Zerguine was dismissed as Sonatrach CEO and replaced by Saïd Sahnoun (hitherto Vice President/Upstream). There has been no official explanation for Zerguine’s dismissal – leaving the field wide open to speculation in the press. Then, on August 26, official news agency APS dropped a political bombshell in the form of a dispatch quoting a “source at the Presidency” as announcing that:

President Bouteflika has signed a decree terminating the functions of Abdelaziz Belkhadem as Minister of State and Special Advisor to the President of the Republic, as well as all activities related to the overall structures of the state. The Secretary General of the FLN has [also] been contacted in order to take the necessary steps to terminate all Abdelaziz Belkhadem’s functions within the party and ban him from participation in any of its structures.

Again, no explanation was offered by APS or its source at the Presidency for this abrupt political death sentence, which seemed eerily reminiscent of the days of the one-party state.

Given that Belkhadem’s presidential ambitions were an open secret, his abrupt dismissal might seen as another symptom of the inward-looking palace intrigues that cost the four unfortunate presidential aides their jobs in July. Some senior FLN members have suggested that Belkhadem’s unsuccessful attempt to force entry into the June 24 Central Committee meeting, flanked by his ministerial bodyguards and claiming that he had been mandated by the President to settle the party’s festering internal crisis, had so angered the President and his closest advisors that it was decided that he had to go. But it is possible that there may be a more substantive political dimension to Belkhadem’s sudden termination.

Belkhadem has long been clearly identified as an “islamo-conservative”, or “barbe FLN” as those within the former single party who have sought to fuse Algerian nationalism with political Islam are often known. In the past, the Presidency has been happy enough to have Belkhadem on its team, as a gesture to conservative/moderate islumist opinion. But Belkhadem’s islumist-tinged nationalism has led him of late to be openly critical of the conduct of various Arab regimes, and in particular of the Egyptian authorities’ response to the Israeli offensive against Gaza. Unfortunately for Belkhadem, this comes at a time when Algiers, faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Libya, is forging a new axis with Cairo (and thus, indirectly at least, with its Saudi and Emirati backers, who have thrown their full weight behind President Abdulfattah Al-Sisi as a rampart against the Muslim Brotherhood and all its offshoots, including Hamas). In this context, Belkhadem clearly is no longer an appropriate choice as President Bouteflika’s ‘Special Advisor’ and representative.

In this respect, it is worth noting a reports that a bilateral Algerian-Egyptian security commission, made up of high-ranking intelligence officers from both countries, has been established to address the threat posed by the situation in Libya, with unnamed “security sources” quoted by Algerian daily El Watan (01/08/14) claiming that a delegation of DRS officers had been dispatched to Cairo “on orders from President Bouteflika” to establish a roadmap for strategic security cooperation on Libya. This may be a pointer to a subtle but important shift within the Algerian power structure. In earlier reports, we discussed the possibility that the DRS’s position within the power structure might have suffered in 2012 and 2013 as a consequence of the twin crises in Mali and Libya, with the army emerging as
the defender of the country’s borders and main interlocutor of the Western powers and thereby profiting at the expense of the intelligence and security agency. Paradoxically, however, the prolongation of those crises, having stretched the regular armed forces to the limit, may now have paved the way for the return to grace of the DRS, whose services cannot be so easily dispensed with. This would seem to be what a retired Algerian general (now in private business, dealing with Tunisia) was suggesting when speaking to us in mid-August:

Algeria’s national security doctrine is in the process of changing. Faced with mounting dangers in neighbouring countries, but also with foreign military interventions in those same countries, Algeria’s sacrosanct principle of refusing to intervene militarily in the territory of any foreign country is giving way to a new doctrine. This new doctrine says that national security requires that our borders be protected, and this task must be addressed on the soil of any neighbouring country that harbours a threat to Algeria. It is the DRS that is responsible for the intellectual acrobatics required to justify abandoning the old doctrine, [DRS chief Gen. Mohamed] ‘Tewfik’ [Médiène] having won over President Bouteflika. […] Bouteflika has no choice: he has to strengthen the DRS. The Army is being kept busy on the borders with Libya, Mali and Tunisia. And the domestic situation is becoming worrying, for two reasons: a return to the creation of terrorist sleeper cells to keep their struggle in neighbouring countries supplied, and a rise in the incidence of economic crimes.

Speaking to us ten days later, an official at Sonatrach’s legal department drew a picture which seems to confirm that the DRS is bouncing back after a period of somewhat diminished power:

We are going back to the situation that prevailed before the changes within the DRS. Over the past few weeks, DRS officers have been returning to Sonatrach – and not just at group headquarters. The decision to bring back the DRS was taken in application of a presidential decree dated June 14 [sic] that bestows expanded powers on the DRS. The same source at Sonatrach claims, furthermore, that the dismissal of Abdelhamid Zerguine “was one of the consequences of the return of the DRS”. The legal department official explains:

Various accumulated reasons led to his departure, but the first was his security plan for Sonatrach’s sites and buildings. In a note to the Ministry [of Energy and Mining] he had advocated various measures, including the authorities supplying weapons to Sonatrach’s security guards. After equipping Sonatrach’s own security guards with weaponry appropriate to the threat [that Sonatrach’s facilities face] in the initial phase, the measure would later be extended to include staff employed by private security companies. In writing his note, Zerguine drew on regulations dating back to the 1990s, i.e. before Bouteflika came to power. He had also adopted a stance of opposition to the government’s decision in May to authorise shale gas production (although in fact, like many other Sonatrach managers, his position was not one of rejecting of shale gas outright but suggesting that development be postponed until the impact

1 This appears to refer to a presidential decree, actually dated June 11 and published in the official gazette of the Algerian Democratic People’s Republic dated June 12, establishing a criminal investigations department (Service d’Investigation Judiciaire) within the DRS’s Internal Security Directorate (DSI), replacing the old Service de Police Judiciaire which was dissolved in September of last year. According to the terms of the decree: “The activities of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Internal Security Directorate are to be carried out under the supervision of the Public Attorney and the control of the Indictments Division of each local jurisdiction, and in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code. […] The Criminal Investigation Department of the Internal Security Directorate is tasked with handling […] the prosecution of cases in connection with: homeland security, terrorism, subversion and organized crime. […] Interventions […] initiated outside the tasks and responsibilities conferred on this structure are prohibited.”
studies have been completed). As of June, he was no longer ‘covered’ by Energy and Mining Minister Youcef Yousfi or the Prime Minister. And so, at meetings at the Presidency, he was told that his management methods were not only responsible for the security lapses [in the oil and gas sector] but also for the decline in production at Hassi Messaoud and Hassi R’mel.

It might be argued that scapegoating Zerguine in this manner for problems that are, in fact, systemic harks back, like Belkhadem’s unceremonious dismissal, to the methods of the 1970s – were it not the most frequent fate of Sonatrach CEOs even in the post-single-party era.

Foreign Relations

In a speech to mark Algeria’s Veterans Day on August 20, read on his behalf by his advisor Mohamed Ali Boughazi, President Bouteflika revisited the theme of the threats to Algeria’s stability and integrity posed by the turmoil in neighbouring states, and restated Algiers’ traditional position of non-intervention in foreign countries:

The stability our country enjoys today [stands in contrast to] a background of regional and geostrategic upheavals which have unfortunately weakened many countries, in particular because of insufficient attachment to the values of unity and sovereignty and a poor understanding of the traps laid by those who are bent on sowing discord in order to divide and rule those societies.

[...]

We have opted for dialogue and good neighbourly relations with everyone, without seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Algeria will pursue its efforts to put a stop to hegemony, bloodshed and the dismantling of regimes, because the stability and security of our country are dependent on the stability, development and prosperity of our neighbours.

Such statements of principle, however, ring increasingly hollow. Over the past months, sources have alluded on more than one occasion to an Algerian military presence in neighbouring Libya, in direct contravention of Algeria’s long-established doctrine; more recently, a retired Algerian general, who is now in business and involved in trade with Tunisia, has told us that the official doctrine has been revised to bring it into line with the new realities (see above, Political Trends). The same source adds:

The Algerian army’s involvement in Tunisia and Libya goes beyond anything one could imagine. In Tunisia, Algerian officers in plain clothes are present on the ground, with a double mission: to train Tunisian military and security personnel in counter-terrorism, and to gather intelligence. Tunisia lacks effective intelligence structures and relies on collaboration with its allies. Algeria is gathering both TECHINT, including by satellite, and human intelligence. Tunisia and Algeria signed an agreement allowing for this in May. Algeria has set up an intelligence processing and analysis centre in Skikda.

An alternative interpretation of Zerguine’s dismissal is that he was removed at the behest of public works tycoon Ali Haddad, whose plans to branch out into petrochemicals are said to have been hindered by Zerguine. Haddad is a close associate of President Bouteflika’s brother and eminence grise Said. While this version of events has mainly been propagated by Workers’ Party leader Louisa Hanoune, one usually well informed source with close knowledge of the workings of the Algerian power structure has also suggested to us that a clash with Ali Haddad and Saïd Bouteflika was at least part of the reason for Zerguine’s departure.

According to a “senior Algerian army officer” quoted by El Watan (04/08/14), who confirmed that Algerian military personnel are present in Tunisia, a secret agreement on border security was signed
focussing on the situation in Tunisia and on the borders with Tunisia. Meanwhile, Algeria, which heads the security commission of the group of Libya’s neighbours\(^4\), has been given a green light by the other member countries to take executive action in Libya. The army and the DRS are present on Libyan territory in all operational forms, with the primary objective of collecting human intelligence and building permanent intelligence-gathering channels. The Algerians have infiltrated some of the armed groups in Libya.

The foreign ministers of Libya’s neighbours met again in Cairo on August 25, adopting a statement, drafted by Egypt, stressing “respect for Libyan unity and sovereignty and rejection of any interference in the country’s internal affairs”, while calling for “all militias to lay down their arms simultaneously” and “an immediate end to all military operations, in order to support the political process and reinforce the dialogue between all parties that have renounced violence”. But as Libya descends into open warfare between a host of militias and political groups with islamist leanings on the one hand and a loose alliance of forces with generally more secularist inclinations on the other, such pious statements look increasingly like mere window dressing. The latter grouping – comprising the Zintan brigades from north-west Libya, forces in the east of the country loyal to former General Khalifa Haftar, and former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril’s National Forces Alliance – clearly enjoys Egyptian support, and there have been consistent suggestions, including from US officials quoted anonymously by the New York Times (25/08/14), that two night-time air raids against islamist militias in Tripoli, first on August 18 and again a few days later, were carried out by the Emirati air force flying from Egyptian airbases (although Cairo and Abu Dhabi have officially denied involvement). There have been similar, but less widely reported, claims\(^5\) that the air raids, which are understood to have targeted a major arms depot in the Libyan capital that had fallen under the control of an islamist militia, may have been the work of the Algerian air force. This followed earlier suggestions in the Algerian and international media that “Algeria and Egypt have decided to provide air support to forces fighting the islamist insurgents’ (Euronews, 28/07/14) and that the Algerian General Staff has been drawing up contingency plans for major bombing raids against targets in Libya should the situation deteriorate to the point of posing an imminent threat to Algerian national security\(^6\) (Al-Khabar, 14/08/14).

The situation in Libya was at the heart of American-Algerian conversations during the US-Africa Summit in Washington at the beginning of August, including talks between a delegation of high-ranking Algerian military officers who met discreetly with officials from the National Security Council. Such contacts have encouraged those media commentators on May 27 of this year, a copy of which was subsequently deposited with the United Nations. The agreement is said to provide for exchange of intelligence between the two countries and coordination of operations aimed at securing their common border.

---

\(^4\) See previous report.

\(^5\) Notably by Algerian defence specialist Akram Kharief, interviewed by Maghreb Emergent, 28/08/14.

\(^6\) According to the Arabic-language daily, the planning department of the Algerian General Staff has drawn up plans for major, but limited, air strikes against targets in Libya if (a) there are indications that a Libya-based jihadist group is planning a terrorist operation in Algerian territory, in particular against oil and gas industry targets in the south-east, or (b) if jihadists were to manage to seize power in Tripoli and attack Tunisia in support of similar groups operating in that country.
who are inclined to believe that Algiers has conducted air raids against targets in Libya to leap to the conclusion that any such action would have been undertaken with the blessing of the Western powers in general and the United States in particular. However, comments by the American officials quoted by the New York Times in the wake of the raids on Tripoli (albeit working on the assumption that they were the work of Egypt and the UAE) suggest to the contrary that Washington is not for now on the same page as Libya’s largest and most potent neighbours: the airstrikes, the “fuming” US government officials are said to have argued, risked further inflaming the Libyan conflict even as the United Nations and Western powers were trying to broker a peaceful resolution. As Algiers continues cautiously to cultivate security relations with Washington, it would seem that there is still ample scope for disagreements over questions of strategy and tactics – which may be either eased or exacerbated by developments in the field over which neither, as things now stand, has very much influence.

Security

With only six incidents reported, of which two were operations initiated by AQMI, the level of political violence in July was slightly higher than in June, but still way below the trend in previous months. The relative calm continued into August, with only seven incidents reported up to Aug. 28, of which just three were initiated by jihadists or armed smugglers.

Looking back at trends over recent years, these figures represent a new phase in what seems to be a long-term decline in AQMI’s capability to wage effective guerrilla warfare. In the two years to August 2013, AQMI averaged about 12-13 operations a month. The level of activity dropped abruptly after that to an average of about five operations a month from August 2013 to May 2014. Since late May there has been another drop, with AQMI barely mustering two or three operations a month in June, July and August. In reaction, the security forces too appear to have scaled back offensive operations inside Algeria.

There is no obvious single cause for this decline. There does not seem to have been any major offensive or series of offensives by the security forces in the summer of 2013, or the spring of 2014. Prior to this, AQMI’s forces, notably in its historic core areas in Kabylia, may have been depleted to some extent by the group’s reported decision to send reinforcements from northern Algeria to boost the forces of its Saharan units after the jihadist takeover of northern Mali as of mid-2012, and to assist in the fight against the French intervention in Mali as of early 2013. But the number of fighters involved is hard to establish and may have been rather lower than the ‘several hundred’ claimed by some Western sources. AQMI’s battle-readiness is likely to have been further damaged by the outbreak of dissident within its own ranks as of March of this year over the question of what attitude to take towards the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (since rebranded as the Islamic State), which appears to have resulted in an outright split between AQMI’s national leadership and the organisation’s “central region” (seemingly the operational units in the

---

7 This analysis comes of course with usual caveats concerning incomplete data. The Algerian authorities seem to have limited reporting of security incidents as of late summer of 2013. However, these restrictions appear mainly to have applied to activity along the southern and eastern borders and have in any case been irregularly applied.
organisation’s heartland in the Kabyle Wilayas of Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdes and Bouira). These factors aside, it is possible that the drop in recorded levels of jihadist activity as of the late summer of last year reflects a tipping point in the Algerian military’s long war of attrition against AQMI and related groups: having seemingly slowed to a trickle, recruitment of new fighters may no longer be sufficient to replace those killed in combat, resulting in a slow but steady decline in the organisation’s ability to fight.

Indeed, AQMI itself implicitly admitted that it was suffering from the effects of attrition and struggling to maintain its numbers as far back as March 2013 when it issued a statement urging “the Muslim youth in the Maghreb and especially Tunisia” not to leave to take part in jihad in other countries unless forced by circumstances to flee, in which case they “would do better to join the jihad in the Islamic Maghreb, where your brethren in northern Mali are struggling in the face of the French Crusade, or in northern Algeria, where the need for men and materiel is pressing, after two decades of war against the infidels.” That March 2013 communiqué drew attention for the first time to the possibility that AQMI might be facing competition from more ‘fashionable’ theatres of jihad, in particular Syria. There is now mounting evidence that recruitment is indeed taking place for groups active in Syria and, possibly, Libya. In June, it was reported that security forces in the Wilaya of Blida had dismantled a network that had been recruiting fighters for Syria, making a number of arrests. Speaking to us in early August, a retired senior Algerian army officer told us that there is currently “a return to the creation of terrorist sleeper cells to keep their struggle in neighbouring countries supplied” with fighters – a development which is being viewed with some concern by the Algerian military, according to the source.

Looking more closely at political violence region by region, no incidents were reported in ALGIERS, while KABYLIA saw a handful of clashes – the first since early June – including a search and destroy mission by the army, complete with “heavy aerial bombardment”, in the wooded areas between Aït Chafaâ and Zekri in the east of the Wilaya of Tizi Ouzou as of August 11.

---

8 In what appears to be an indirect response to a statement issued by AQMI’s national leadership in early July restating the group’s allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s international leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and disputing the legitimacy of the Islamic State’s proclamation of a “caliphate”, the Qadi [religious judge] of AQMI’s Central Region Abou Abdallah Othmane Al-Asemi issued a new audio statement on or around July 17, in which he invites all Muslims to “hasten to declare allegiance to the Commander of the Believers, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Quraishi”, IS leader and self-proclaimed Caliph. Abou Abdallah Al-Asemi goes on to invite jihadi fighters “not to hesitate, now that God has given you what you have been looking for”, and concludes: “Before closing, I say to the noble sheik, the Commander of the Believers Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: We are you soldiers in the land of Algeria, so go ahead to the aim that God has set for you, and we hope you will see from us what pleases your eyes.”

9 There is in fact very little recent data about AQMI recruitment. It is striking, however, that out of the 15 or more fighters that appeared in a recently released video of the gathering at which AQMI’s merger with the Defenders of Salafi Preaching group (see AMSR #131, 24/01/14), only one was clearly in his early 20s (the typical age bracket of new recruits), all the others appearing to be in their 30s and in many cases their late 40s. The video, which although it was released on August 10 appears to have been filmed in December 2013, prominently features AQMI’s national emir Abdelmalek Droukdel, a.k.a. Abou Mossaab Abdelouadoud – the first proof that he is still alive since an audio recording issued in late August 2012.

10 See AMSR #123, 19/04/13.
One incident was reported in the oil and gas producing areas of the SOUTH: on August 23, according to Arabic-language daily *Echourouk*, a Sonatrach convoy of four off-roders, heading towards the gas fields south of Métlili in the Wilaya of Ghardaïa, was intercepted by an armed group at Hadb el-Troudi, deep in the desert, 80 km from the RN-1 (main north-south highway). The eight armed assailants made away with the vehicles, GPS devices and “some other equipment”. The Sonatrach workers were later rescued by helicopter and the security forces launched a search and destroy mission in the area.

Several incidents were reported along the SOUTHERN BORDERS:
- The army is reported to have foiled an attempt to smuggle foodstuffs to north Mali through the Bordj Baji Mokhtar sector on or around July 21. The security forces tracked and seized five trucks loaded with tonnes foodstuffs and fuel.
- Security forces on July 31 ambushed and killed a jihadist near the town of Timiaouine, Wilaya of Adrar, on the border with Mali.
- A group of armed men on motorbikes on August 21 gunned down a Gendramerie major in the town of Bordj Baji Mokhtar on the border with Mali. He worked with Border Guard units against smuggling gangs who are believed to be behind the attack.

On the EASTERN BORDERS and in adjacent areas:
- *El-Khabar* (19/07/14) reported a heavy security presence in the Wilaya of Tébessa on the border with Tunisia and all the way to the boundary with the Wilaya of Khenchela, where army helicopters are said to have bombarded jihadists’ positions.
- Tunisian news sources reported that seven Algerian jihadists arrived in the Tunisian town of Souk el-Djoumaa, Jendouba, on the other side of the border from the Algerian Wilaya of El-Tarf, around August 5.
- Algerian media around August 10 reported that the Algerian army was deploying Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles on the eastern borders with Tunisia and Libya. The Algerian authorities, according to the press, seemed deeply worried that the Libyan jihadist groups that had seized control of Tripoli airport might use civilian airliners in 9/11-style attacks against Algerian targets.
- *El-Khabar* later reported that Algerian and Tunisian forces carried out joint operations against jihadists on the borders between the two countries on August 15-16. Algerian land forces and helicopters reportedly took part in the operations around the Kasserine-Tébessa sector of the border.
- On August 19, soldiers on a search and destroy mission in the areas straddling the Wilayas of Khenchela, Tébessa and El-Oued found and dismantled three roadside bombs, according to French-language daily *El-Watan*.
- Further south, in the Wilaya of Illizi, an armed group is reported to have kidnapped a 60 year-old notable of the border town of Deb Deb on July 18 and taken him to Libya, according to *Echorouk* (19/07/14).

---

11 According to a retired Algerian general who is now involved in trade with Tunisia, to whom we spoke in mid-August, “from the joint anti-terrorist operations of the past few months, it has become apparent that two thirds of the terrorists that are active in the border strip between the two countries are either Algerians or Tunisian residents of Algeria.”

12 However, it now appears that all the aircraft at Tripoli International Airport have either been destroyed or flown to safety in Malta.
Meanwhile, according to *El Watan* (23/08/14), experts from France, Japan, the United States and Italy inspected the security measures taken by Algiers in the oil areas of the south-east near the border with Libya, in mid-August. The experts, accompanied by an Algerian delegation composed of civilians and police, army and DRS officers, are reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with plans for securing oil and gas producing areas in the Wilayas of Illizi and Ouargla (including Hassi Messaoud, El Borma and In Amenas). *El Watan* quoted an unnamed military source as saying that despite the presence of some 50,000 men from the army, the gendarmerie and border guard all along the 1000 km border with Libya, the commission of foreign experts doubted the effectiveness of security measures and asked that security along the border be strengthened so as to prevent terrorist incursions from Libya. The foreign security experts were obsessed with the possibility that terrorists might infiltrate the country and target an oil and gas facility, as happened at Tiguentourine.

However, the Algerian delegation accompanying the French, Japanese, Italian and American experts are reported to have informed their foreign visitors that the issue of border control was a task for the Army alone and not a matter that foreign experts could have any say in.

The inclusion of representatives of the police (DGSN) in the delegation welcoming the foreign security experts may seem surprising, given that oil and gas sector security and border protection have traditionally been the preserve of the army, the gendarmerie (of which the border guard is part) and the DRS. However, in a further sign that the DGSN is becoming involved in the hydrocarbons sector, reports have emerged that the Interior Ministry has been in touch with Boeing lately in connection with a project to acquire a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to protect oil and gas facilities.

**END**
The attached sums up the US human rights policy. Worth a look. Ed

Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel, Ret.
President and CEO
The Gabriel Company, LLC
1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
Washington DC, 20005
Phone: +1 202.887.1113
Fax: +1 202.887.1115
Email: ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com
Website: http://thegabrielco.com

Confidentiality Notice: The information in this document is private and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the named recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and then delete this document immediately. Do not disclose the contents of this document to any other person, nor take any copies. Violation of this notice may be unlawful.
EXCUSE ME, OFFICER!
I WAS WONDERING IF YOU AND OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS WOULD BE SO KIND AS TO...
I SAY, STEP BACK!

I WAS HOPING YOU COULD HELP ME...

I AM TRYING TO CONVAINCE POLICE OFFICERS IN OTHER NATIONS...

OMG! STEP BACK!

THANK YOU FOR LISTENING

EXIT THE RECENT ACTIONS OF MILITARIZED COPS IN AMERICA...

ARE YOU LISTENING MY CASE...
1. Title: Algeria-U.S. Relations: Challenges in the Maghreb and Sahel
   Hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Participants:
H.E. Ramtane Lamamra: Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of Algeria
Jon Alterman: Moderator: Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS

2. Overview

Foreign Minister Lamamra discussed US-Algeria relations and Algeria’s role in the Maghreb and Sahel, with a special focus on security issues. He addressed at length the conflicts in Mali and Libya, and the broader terrorism threat in the region. Minister Lamamra used the platform to highlight Algeria’s contributions to the security and stability of the MENA region.

3. Summary

Minister Lamamra began by stating that he wanted to reframe the topic it in a way that reflects more of what he wanted to address – Algeria’s role in the Maghreb and Sahel regions as a security providing country. Before delving into that topic, he did briefly discuss US-Algeria relations, noting that Algeria and US share similar values of independence and self-determination. He provided several examples of collaboration between the two countries, making reference to Algeria’s role in ending the Tehran hostage crisis and JFK’s pronouncements on Algeria’s independence. Minister Lamamra also stressed that Algeria and the US share strategic interests, evidenced by its Strategic Dialogue Partnership to address international and regional issues, such as effective counterterrorism cooperation.

Turning back to Algeria’s leadership as a security providing country, Minister Lamamra noted that this leadership was based on the geographical, historical, and cultural attributes of the country. Geographically, Algeria is located at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East, and Western Europe. It has the largest territory in the continent of Africa and in the Arab world. The country is inhabited by 38 million people and is endowed with huge energy, mineral, and other natural resources. He also stated that Algeria and the inhabitants of Algeria are a peaceful people who are deeply attached to their identity, which is Arab, Berber, and Muslim. He stated that Algeria is a moderate nation that follows moderate Sunni Islamic teaching and that Algeria has resolutely adopted and practiced good neighbor diplomacy with all of its neighbors, including Europe. As a result, Algeria has played a leading role in peaceful mediation of international disputes and crises and has offered its expertise in confronting security challenges. Minister Lamamra suggested that Algeria has refuted terrorism by developing a vibrant, multi-party democracy outside of the so-called Arab Spring phenomena. He credited Algeria with having a high-quality, experienced, moderate, and forward looking leadership, and credited President Bouteflika for his vast foreign policy experience, which has helped lead Algeria in its regional endeavors.

Minister Lamamra highlighted Algeria’s particular role in the Sahel, noting that Algeria is a Sahel nation and has no bilateral problems with its neighbors. He noted, “Our relations with all of our Saharan neighbors are just excellent. We share with them similar actions; we acknowledge the closeness of people between borders, including nomadic populations, of
the same ethnic and cultural background.” Through this solidarity, Algeria has worked with its neighbors to fight drought, insecurity, organized crime, and terrorism. The overriding principle of Algerian diplomacy is nevertheless that of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring countries. However, he stated that this principle cannot translate into indifference to the internal problems of neighboring countries.

Describing Algeria as a key regional actor in the Sahel, Minister Lamamra underscored Algeria’s contribution to peace and security through the Nouakchott Process of the African Union, which works to empower regional countries to take charge of their own security. He also stated that Algeria is the current lead mediator in seeking peace in Mali and that its efforts have been successful. According to the Minister, there is now a roadmap for peace, a timeframe, and a declaration of a ceasefire. The Minister noted that he is optimistic about resolving the challenging task of peace.

After concluding his remarks on the Sahel, the Foreign Minister turned to Algeria’s “key role” in the Maghreb. It is the center of the region and is the only North African country that borders all of the other Maghreb countries. Lamamra stated that Algeria “displays strong solidarity and respect for all of the people in the region,” but he acknowledged that its neighboring countries have differing views on important issues and conflicting interests. He argued, however, that “those should not and cannot, lead to unilateral actions,” or “leaps into the unknown.” He stated that instead the region needs to cooperate in order to resolve issues between neighbors. The Arab Maghreb Union is one such tool for regional integration, but Lamamra noted that it has not fulfilled its potential. According to Lamamra, the AMU has seen few things materialize on the ground and for the people in the region, and he stated that one of the major reasons behind its failure is the conflict in Western Sahara.

On the Sahara, Lamamra argued, “This is a conflict that may be forgotten to some, but it is highly sensitive issue. It is also a test for the UN credibility, and when we say UN I refer to five members in the Security Council as well. It is test of credibility for the UN doctrine on decolonization and human rights.” He continued, “as far as Algeria is concerned, it is well known, that we have been supporting self-determination since the time when the territory was under Spanish rule. We have no change of position on that, the position of principle, and also from a humanitarian point of view, as Algeria is also home to 165,000 Sahawarian refugees. As you know, many distinguished US statesmen and diplomats have been sent to the UN, including James Baker and Ambassador Christopher Ross. He has strong support from my country.”

Lamamra touched on the rest of the countries of the Maghreb, briefly noting that Algeria has strong “brotherly solidarity” with Tunisia and that it has been working closely with the Tunisian authorities on counterterrorism measures. He stated that Algeria had a great relationship with Mauritania, and closed with extended remarks on Libya. He stated that Libya and Algeria are very close, and that Algeria has a strong interest in the political future of Libya. He underscored that he does not believe Libya qualifies as a failed country – “It’s a country with tremendous problems, but certainly not a failed country. It has vibrant actors, it has big potential to recover, and we believe that it is worthwhile to believe and help the Libyans reach their full potential.”

Lamamra stated that the, “Libya problem should be resolved by the leaders themselves through inclusive political dialogue,” but that of course some groups would be excluded if they shared a connection with international terrorist organizations. To him the objective of dialogue is to promote national reconciliation and the constitution-making process. He firmly believes that it is possible. Lamamra also made it clear that Algeria is against intervention in Libya. According to Lamamra, “Democracy, legality and legitimacy should be key” to the
reconstruction of Libya and not military actions. In conclusion, Lamamra discussed Algeria’s role in mediating the crisis, noting that it had been asked to offer its good offices to host a reconciliation process for the country - “Algeria, along with countries that border Libya, has developed a plan of action to help and assist the Libyan with finding pace and stability for their country.” He mentioned meeting between Libyan transitional government and the 5+5 group that recently took place and stated that it was helpful in creating key guiding principles and objectives to help solve the problem. He mentioned that the upcoming General Assembly in New York offered additional opportunities for discussing the crisis. He stated that as far as Algeria is concerned, it will do anything to bring Libyans together in order to reject violence and terrorism and accept democracy and pluralism. The key will be power and wealth sharing, and immediate security for all Libyans.

4. Q&A

Q: (Jon Alterman) You mentioned, in passing, the relationship with Morocco, which from a US perspective is frustrating that it has not been better. Foreign ministers, in my experience, are trained to be optimists, so if you could tell us what is actually going well in this relationship, the Moroccan-Algerian relationship, because people don’t often know about. What is the good news in that relationship?
A: We are the same people. Moroccan, Algerian people are the same. We share everything. I believe they are mature enough to know that differences are there and that they can be resolved peacefully, in a civilized way, that we can develop plans of action and resolution that we can put together. But I don’t think it would be fair to the vision of bilateral problem, of the inability of two neighborly countries that are out there, that have been out there together for ages to live together in order to share a vision of the future. Algeria has no linkage on this issue, it is impartial. I think there is a difference, a very important aspect of international relations, it’s a legal issue, it’s a moral issue, it’s also a strategic issue that affects security in the region. Now are there solutions? There are no problems that don’t have a solution. It is just a question of political will. The leadership of the Polisario has shown will to sit down and look at the issue within the frame of international law. I also don’t believe that everything needs to be frozen while we wait for a solution on the Sahara. We can revive the AMU and bilateral relations, as Algeria doesn’t have a role in the Sahara.

Q: (Charles Dahan) Why is the border closed? What can be done to mitigate the tensions since as you said Moroccans and Algerians are the same people?
A: I could sit here and tell you the history and the Algerian side of the crisis, which is quite convincing, but we really need to talk about the future. There are technical working groups working on this and at the border level trade is going on – Morocco’s trade with Algeria is higher than it is with most African countries. Life continues. If the working groups are allowed to make recommendations and the government accepts them, there will be a solution. The border will be open in the future, but I can’t see that future yet because the work hasn’t been done.

Q: (Haim Malka, CSIS) We have seen reports about North Africans joining ISIL. Do you have any figures on the number of Algerians? What about the impact on Algeria and the Maghreb of returning fighters?
A: The Palestinian issue is at the root of some of this extremism and it needs to be resolved. Extremism is a phenomenon with deeply rooted causes and we need to address the underlying causes. The question of returnees is very serious. Part of what happened in the past in Algeria was the result of returnees from Afghanistan. As for Algerian fighters, Algerians are starting to realize that terrorism no future. The number of Algerians fighting for ISIL is in the hundreds – maybe 300-400. We have the same concerns that now even non-Arabs are having with regard to recruits. It is an issue for everyone now. I also should
have stated from the beginning that terrorism is not inherent to any religion. It results from marginalization, a lack of education, and a lack of opportunity.

Q: (Altman) What about Algerians in Libya? Or Algerian border areas serving as a refuge for Libyan militants?
A: It seems to me that Algerians are francophone and mostly operating in the Sahel. But yes, also in Libya. Border areas are difficult – they are not quiet and in the Sahel there are hard to control. Algeria has mobilized countless resources to address the borders – it wants to be a provider of security and stability in the region. This fight against terrorism is a priority and we are encouraged by the results at home. We believe our neighbors can also achieve similar results.

Q: (Gare Smith, Foley Hoag (did not identify as Algerian lobbyist)) Algeria has shown significant leadership in Mali, in promoting human rights for the Sahrawi people, and in Libya. What is the most constructive role for the US to play in supporting Algeria’s efforts in Mali, Libya, and for self-determination for the Sahrawi? What advice will you give to Kerry on how the US can support these efforts?
A: Well I actually already met with Secretary Kerry last night so if you have advice, I would be happy to hear it for when I speak with him in New York. Our partnership with the US is all-encompassing. Through the Strategic Dialogue we discuss – the sky is the limit. At present, the focus is on crises in Libya and in Mali, where we are pushing the parties to be more flexible. We are also engaged on Palestine – we appreciate the efforts of Secretary Kerry and regret that they were not successful. Secretary Kerry and I had a candid conversation about the vision for the region more broadly. And on Syria, I believe a peaceful transition is possible.

Q: (Altman) Do you have any advice for Obama on how he is handling ISIL? He has been criticized for how he has gone about coalition building. As a friend and leader, do you have any advice for the Administration on leadership?
A: Listen to us.

5. Observation

Approximately 60 people attended the event, notably members of the diplomatic corps, scholars, and North Africa experts. Minister Lamamra’s speech offered little in the way of substance and focused instead on Algeria’s messaging on its “key leadership role in promoting security and stability in the Maghreb and Sahel.” This was even pointed out on occasion during the Q&A when he wasn’t really answering some of the questions. That said, he had a good demeanor throughout the event, making several jokes and engaging with the audience. In his prepared remarks, he didn’t even mention Morocco when commenting on the AMU.

On the question of the Sahara and relations with Morocco, Minister Lamamra mostly danced around the topic – making vague references to “differences in the region” and Algeria’s commitment to the principle of self-determination – the same policy it has maintained since the Sahara was under Spanish rule. With regard to Gare Smith’s questions, it was quite interesting to note that Smith was out of the loop as to when Secretary Kerry met with Minister Lamamra. It is also interesting that Minister Lamamra did not answer Smith’s question as to his discussions with Kerry about human rights in the Sahara. From this event – and other developments in Congress over the past year – it seems quite evident that Algeria is happy to engage in low-level lobbying on the Sahara to keep the issue alive and maintain its position against Morocco, but that it has not prioritized the question of the Sahara in its foreign policy.